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Ukraine Invasion Day 289: "You need tanks" [1]
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Date: 2022-12-08
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Head of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag, confirmed that the US supports the idea of transferring Leopard tanks to Ukraine. The reality is more about providing generators for the winter.
Ukrainian officials stated on December 8 that Russian forces further militarized the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) . Ukrainian state nuclear energy agency Energoatom reported on December 8 that Russian forces transferred several Grad MLRS systems near reactor number 6 and the dry storage fuel area at the ZNPP.[21] Energoatom stated that Russian forces most likely plan to use the Grad systems to strike Nikopol and Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast - near daily targets of Russian shelling already.[22] ISW has reported on prior footage confirming that Russian forces have stored military equipment, including ammunition, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, and other armaments on the ZNPP grounds.[23] New equipment deployments to the ZNPP may be an attempt to placate ongoing speculation among Russian nationalist milbloggers of a possible Russian withdrawal from the ZNPP, which the Kremlin has denied twice within the past 10 days.[24]
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley stated that fighting in Ukraine may intensify this winter despite the recent fighting tempo decrease from autumn, partially supporting ISW’s assessments and forecasts. [16] Milley told the Wall Street Journal on December 7 that frontlines in Ukraine are currently “stabilizing[,] and as winter rolls in,” he acknowledged the “potential opportunity for offensive action” from either Russian or Ukrainian forces during "the depth of the winter because of the weather and the terrain."[17] Milley’s assessment diverges from US Director for National Intelligence Avril Haines’ December 3 forecast that the pace of the war in Ukraine will slow over the winter so that fighting can resume in spring 2023.[18] Milley’s statement supports ISW’s assessment that Ukrainian forces will be able to exploit the weather conditions as the hard freeze approaches in late December since winter is conducive for mechanized warfare in Ukraine.[19] ISW assesses Ukrainian forces likely are preparing to take advantage of frozen terrain to move more easily than they could in the muddy autumn months and that Ukraine’s continued operational successes depend on Ukrainian forces’ ability to continue successive operations through the winter of 2022–2023 without interruption.[20]
"However, it probably illustrates some Russia decision-makers' genuine (but false) belief that there is a credible threat of invasion by Ukrainian forces."
"There is a realistic possibility that the Russian authorities are promoting defensive preparations within internationally recognised Russian territory to burnish patriotic feeling.
"Trench digging has been reported in Belgorod since at least April 2022, but the new constructions are probably more elaborate systems, designed to rebuff mechanised assault," the MOD said.
According to the MOD, the governor of Belgorod also announced he was "establishing local 'self-defence units".
Russia's extension of defensive positions along its border with Ukraine highlights the false belief of decision makers in Moscow that there is the threat of an invasion by Ukraine's military, according to the Ministry of Defence (MOD).
Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for a protracted war of conquest in Ukraine. During a meeting with the Russian Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC), Putin remarked that the “special operation” in Ukraine can be a “lengthy process” and that the acquisition of new territory is a significant result of this process for Russia.[1] Putin compared himself favorably with Russian Tsar Peter the Great by noting that Russia now controls the Sea of Azov, which Peter the Great also fought for.[2] This invocation of Russian imperial history explicitly frames Putin’s current goals in Ukraine as overtly imperialistic and still maximalist. Putin is conditioning Russian domestic audiences to expect a protracted, grinding war in Ukraine that continues to seek the conquest of additional Ukrainian territory.
The Russian information space responded positively to Putin’s assertions and set further conditions for the protraction of the war, with one milblogger comparing Ukraine to Syria and noting that Russian forces did not start meaningfully experiencing victories on the battlefield until years into the operation.[3] ISW has previously observed that the Kremlin has been setting information conditions for the protraction of the war in Ukraine since the summer following Russian forces’ dismal failures to secure and retain their primary objectives.[4] This informational conditioning is fundamentally incompatible with any discussions regarding a ceasefire or negotiations. Putin seems unwilling to risk losing domestic momentum by halting his offensive operations even briefly, let alone to pursue an off-ramp short of his full objectives, which, as he is making increasingly clear, appear to include the reconstitution of the Russian Empire in some form.
www.understandingwar.org/...
x A couple of interesting points emerge from today’s statements made by Putin about Russia’s ‘special military operation’ to invade #Ukraine. 1/13 🧵
https://t.co/J2IKMnNMUk — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) December 7, 2022
2/ First, the headline is the nuclear issue. Putin is walking back some of his more bellicose statements, now claiming that Russia would not use them first. This is positive (if he is genuine), but what does this really mean?
3/ He is enlarging the corner he has painted himself into with his #Ukraine invasion. Currently, he has minimal strategic room for manoeuvre. By ruling out nuclear first use, he further reduces any potential for NATO direct intervention in the war. He is enlarging the corner he has painted himself into with hisinvasion. Currently, he has minimal strategic room for manoeuvre. By ruling out nuclear first use, he further reduces any potential for NATO direct intervention in the war.
4/ He is also, just slightly, easing back his narrative about the conquest of Ukraine being an existential one for Russia. This gives him some wriggle room down the track should he need it.
5/ And he has probably now been presented with modelling from his military that shows the use of a few tactical nuclear weapons would have minimal battlefield impacts but they would have huge, long term strategic effects for Russia and its neighbours.
6/ The second noteworthy statement was that his invasion of #Ukraine is a ‘lengthy process.’ These words, probably chosen well in advance, are designed for a couple of audiences. The second noteworthy statement was that his invasion ofis a ‘lengthy process.’ These words, probably chosen well in advance, are designed for a couple of audiences.
7/ The first audience is the Russian population. He is preparing them for other future potential expansions in commitment, possibly including more mobilisation phases. This has been explored in reports from @TheStudyofWar & @criticalthreats understandingwar.org/backgrounder/r… The first audience is the Russian population. He is preparing them for other future potential expansions in commitment, possibly including more mobilisation phases. This has been explored in reports from
8/ Another audience would be Russian military and national security officials (as well as people like the head of Wagner). He wants to keep them on side, so Putin is saying that he is in this to win, and won’t be cutting and running. At least that is his plan at the moment!
9/ A third audience is the population of those Western nations who are supporting . He is again asking them if high inflation and high energy costs over the long term are worth their support to Ukraine. washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/… A third audience is the population of those Western nations who are supporting #Ukraine . He is again asking them if high inflation and high energy costs over the long term are worth their support to Ukraine.
10/ Finally, he is essentially saying to the governments of western nations “good luck with keeping your populations on side with this war in the next couple years, and good luck with the cost of expanding your munitions production capacity to keep up with ’s usage.” Finally, he is essentially saying to the governments of western nations “good luck with keeping your populations on side with this war in the next couple years, and good luck with the cost of expanding your munitions production capacity to keep up with #Ukraine ’s usage.”
11/ Now, these comments could have just been spur of the moment mutterings of a tired President. But somehow I doubt it.
12/ It again underpins the need for strategic patience from the governments and populations supporting #Ukraine over winter and into 2023. And it reinforces the need to provide every bit of support possible to ensure Ukraine emerges victorious from the Russian invasion. End 13/ Thank you to the following for the images and links used in this thread: @DefenceU @BBCNews @TheStudyofWar @criticalthreats @IAPonomarenko @washingtonpost
• • •
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces conducted a limited assault northeast of Kharkiv City likely in an ongoing effort to conduct reconnaissance-in-force and fix Ukrainian forces at the international border in Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Ternova, Kharkiv Oblast (40km northeast of Kharkiv City).[25] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces conducted a previous assault near Ternova, far removed from areas encompassed by the eastern Ukrainian counteroffensive, in hopes of keeping Ukrainian forces in the area that otherwise could join counteroffensive operations.[26]
Russian forces reportedly reinforced positions and conducted a limited counterattack near Svatove on December 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Stelmakhivka (16km northwest of Svatove).[27] Luhansk Oblast head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces have recently transferred Russian Airborne Forces from Kherson Oblast to Svatove.[28] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that elements of Russia’s 1st Guards Tanks Army likely deployed along the defensive line near Svatove.[29] The UK MoD reported that the 1st Guards Tank Army is likely using mobilized personnel to replenish losses it suffered during its September retreat from Kharkiv Oblast, but that it still remains well below the army’s normal end strength of 25,000 personnel.[30] The UK MoD also reported that Russian forces have completed an almost continuous trench system along the 60km between Svatove and the Russian border.[31] A BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) affiliated source claimed on December 8 that Russian forces pulled a large number of forces into the Svatove area.[32] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may be preparing for an increased pace of spoiling counterattacks in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts in order to preempt an expected increase in the pace of the Ukrainian eastern counteroffensive this winter.[33] Russian forces are likely reinforcing positions in the Svatove area to conduct more spoiling attacks and to defend against expected Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
Russian forces continued to conduct a higher pace of counterattacks in the Kreminna area amid ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on December 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 17km northwest of Kreminna near Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka and within 12km south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations west of Kreminna in the direction of Lyman.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to advance in the Kreminna area while clear skies allow Russian forces to use heavy equipment and drones.[36] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces have been achieving short gains instead of deep breakthroughs in the area and are unable to dislodge Ukrainian forces from positions along the Balka Zhuravka River (16km northwest of Kreminna).[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults northwest of Kreminna near Chervonopopivka.[38] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the R-66 highway near Chervonopopivka.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts.[40]
www.understandingwar.org/...
x ⚡️Military activity on the territory of Belarus on December 7:
1) In the morning, active training was held at the Asipovichski training ground (Asipovichy district).
1/18 pic.twitter.com/SlusVtm0zh — Belarusian Hajun project (@MotolkoHelp) December 8, 2022
2) During the day, Russian soldiers in groups of 3-4 people were spotted in shopping centers, cafes and pharmacies in Vitsebsk.
▫️13:20. A tilt-covered MAZ truck of the Belarusian Armed Forces with a trailer was seen in Vitsebsk.
2/18
3) 07:30. An APC was moving from Minsk towards Lahoisk along the M3 highway.
▫️08:40. A column of the Belarusian Armed Forces (6 tilt-covered KamAZ trucks, 2 APCs, Volat armored vehicle and a paddy wagon) was moving from Minsk towards Lahoisk along the M3 highway.
3/18
4) 07:40. MAZ-543 of the Belarusian Armed Forces with a ballast was moving from the Shabany district of Minsk towards the M9 highway.
▫️08:45. A fuel truck based on ZiL-131 of the Belarusian Armed Forces was seen in Minsk.
4/18
▫️08:55. An Ural truck (KUNG) was moving from the Stsiapianka district towards the Anharskaya district of Minsk along the M9 highway.
5/18
▫️09:15. A tilt-covered MAZ truck of the Belarusian Armed Forces was moving from the Chyzhouka district towards the Loshytsa district of Minsk along the M9 highway.
▫️10:00. ZiL-131 (KUNG) of the Belarusian Armed Forces was seen in Minsk.
6/18
5) 08:15. 7 fuel trucks of the Russian Armed Forces were moving Liakhavichy towards Baranavichy along the R4 highway.
6) 08:50. A column of the Russian Armed Forces was moving from Stoubtsy towards Baranavichy along the M1 highway.
7/18
The column included a command-staff vehicle R-149BMR, which fuel trucks, 2 Tigr armored vehicles, Taifun armored vehicle, 5 tilt-covered KamAZ trucks, 3 UAZ-396, UAZ-3303, 6 pickups and a SUV.
8/18
▫️11:10. The same column was moving from Baranavichy towards Ivatsevichy along the M1 highway.
▫️12:00. The same column was moving from Ivatsevichy towards Biaroza along the R2 highway.
9/18
▫️12:30. A tilt-covered KamAZ truck and 2 dropside KamAZ trucks were moving from Ivatsevichy towards Biaroza along the R2 highway.
10/18
7) 08:50. Dongfeng Mengshi armored vehicle of the Belarusian Armed Forces was moving from Luninets towards Mikashevichy (Luninets district) along the M10 highway.
11/18
8) 10:00. 2 Ural trucks (KUNG) of the Belarusian Armed Forces were moving from Pryvolny (Minsk district) towards Minsk along the M4 highway.
12/18
▫️15:20. A Belarusian MAZ truck with the inscription “demining” was moving from Pryvolny (Minsk district) towards Minsk along the M4 highway.
▫️19:30. 5 fuel trucks and a dropside truck of the Russian Armed Forces were moving from Samakhvalavichy towards Pryvolny.
13/18
9) Fighters took off from Baranavichy airfield at 10:40, 10:41, 10:42.
14/18
10) 10:45. A tilt-covered MAZ truck and a tilt-covered Ural truck of the Belarusian Armed Forces were moving from Drahichyn towards Kobryn along the M10 highway.
▫️11:50. UAZ-396 of the Russian Armed Forces was moving from Kobryn towards Drahichyn along the M10 highway.
15/18
11) 12:00. About 10 trucks and an APC of the Belarusian Armed Forces were moving from Nikitsikha (Shumilina district, Vitsebsk region) towards Polatsk along the R20 highway.
16/18
12) 12:10. A column with at least 10 APCs was moving along the R46 highway from the intersection with the R113 highway towards Polatsk.
17/18
13) 13:06. Russian An-12BK (RF-95407) landed at Homel airport.
▫️14:40. A tilt-covered truck of the Russian Armed Forces was seen in Homel.
▫️18:00. A tilt-covered ZiL-131 was seen in Homel.
18/18
• • •
x "Russia’s war against Ukraine has increased the importance of the Black Sea. It is high time for the EU to develop an ambitious and comprehensive strategy"
https://t.co/RncX4Ybi19 — Transatlantic Policy Center 🇺🇦 (@AU_EuropeCenter) December 8, 2022
Ukraine could use more S-300s. And until it finds another source for secondhand batteries—or acquires enough Western-made SAM batteries as substitutes—a threat emitter costing perhaps $30,000 is an easy way to appear to fill gaps in the country’s air-defenses.
Deception is a time-honored tradition in the practice of air-defense. Decoy guns once played the same role that threat-emitters do today. But the Ukrainians and Russians haven’t totally abandoned the art of the physical decoy.
Indeed, fake air-defense systems—inflatable, wooden or inoperable versions of operational systems—have appeared on both sides in the war. The Ukrainians in particular are adept at drawing Russian missiles away from real air-defenses and toward fake ones. Threat-emitters add electronic realism to the deception.
www.msn.com/...
x Fake Air-Defenses Are Bolstering Ukraine’s Real Air-Defenses
https://t.co/sxzdHFtMiJ — Stan Dominick (@StanDominick1) December 8, 2022
x Putin announced the idea of a "triple gas union", in which Russian gas would go to the Chinese market through Central Asia late in November, during an official visit of the President of Kazakhstan Qasym-Jomart Toqayev to Moscow.
2/ — Ukraine Front Lines (@EuromaidanPR) December 8, 2022
x "A new package of sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine will propose to ban the export of drones and key components to #Iran and other third countries, that could then supply #Russia."
https://t.co/ZJEXc2BccN — Jason Brodsky (@JasonMBrodsky) December 8, 2022
But this war will not go on forever. And it’s in the peace, rather than the fighting, that the tensions in Europe will become clear. There are three distinct camps when it comes to thinking about how this war should end: the realists, the optimists and the revisionists. Representatives from each can be found among politicians and voters in almost all European countries, but they are not equally represented everywhere: In Western and southern Europe the debate is mostly between realists and optimists; in Ukraine and some of the East European countries, it is between optimists and revisionists. Geography and history best explain the differences. West Europeans primarily fear nuclear war. East Europeans fear return of the Russian sphere of influence in their countries in case of Ukraine’s defeat. The so-called realists believe that Europe’s goal should be that Russia does not win, Ukraine does not lose and the war fails to broaden. Look to the statements of President Emmanuel Macron of France for this view. By this logic, Ukraine should be helped to liberate as much of its territory as possible but a Ukrainian victory must have its limits, because seeking this goal would greatly increase the risk of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons. The most obvious limit, it bears stating, is that Ukraine not go as far as trying to reclaim Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. The realists rightly view the current conflict as more dangerous than the Soviet-American confrontation during the Cold War, because the Cold War was a clash between two forces that both believed that history was on their side. The West now confronts a leader with an apocalyptic mind-set, haunted by the specter of a world without Russia. The second camp are the optimists. They see the end of war as not just Ukrainian victory but the end of Vladimir Putin. They argue that Russia’s military defeat and the continued effects of sanctions — which will only become more devastating — are clear signs that the Russian president’s time in office is limited, and they support President Volodymyr Zelensky’s unwillingness to negotiate with Mr. Putin. The proponents of this view, including German Greens and most of the East Europeans, argue that only unrestrained support for Ukraine can achieve a lasting peace. Russia should not be just stopped but defeated.
Revisionists see the war in Ukraine not as Mr. Putin’s war but as Russians’ war. For them, the only guarantee for peace and stability in Europe after this war ends would be the irreversible weakening of Russia, including the disintegration of the Russian Federation. They argue for supporting separatist movements in the country and keeping Russians far away from Europe regardless of political changes in the country. In their view, the war that started with Mr. Putin’s claim that Ukraine does not exist should end with the final dissolution of the Russian empire. The “End of Russia” strategy is, perhaps not surprisingly, most popular in countries that have suffered under Moscow’s rule in the past: Poland, the Baltic republics and, of course, Ukraine. www.nytimes.com/…
x Timothy Snyder: The Making of Modern Ukraine. Class 21. Comparative Russ...
https://t.co/SAf49wmLCw via @YouTube — Oksana Yonan (@1Truthkeeper) December 8, 2022
But for overall influence with American audiences, veteran Russia experts say Tucker Carlson’s big Fox megaphone still dwarfs other propaganda tools favorable to Moscow.
“The audience for Fox News commentators like Tucker Carlson, who frequently spreads pro-Russian narratives, is obviously orders of magnitude bigger than that of new niche players like Rumble that often carry Russian disinformation,” said Andrew Weiss, a vice-president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Such platforms are far more impactful than the more sneaky techniques that the Russian propaganda apparatus employs these days.”
www.theguardian.com/...
x prediction: your guy is going to get kidnapped from a rich Venezuela suburb, drugged and smuggled to the Hague on a commercial plane by a squad of Ukrainian special forces
https://t.co/KzTLsB7rF2 — Alexander Reid Ross (@areidross) December 8, 2022
x A Russian who submits to mobilization and being sent to Ukraine to die in an unjust cause has the spirit of a slave.
It is an exceptional Russian who has the spirit of liberty and a will to live – who has the good conscience to rebel or shoot his officer or surrender or desert. — Michael MacKay (@mhmck) December 9, 2022
x ‘Putin has repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian culture and language simply don’t exist. By targeting art museums, music halls, libraries, theaters, and historical sites, he attempts to make it so.’
Brilliant @ayadakhtar for @PENamerica
https://t.co/zO4CWOYgoK — Raza Ahmad Rumi (@Razarumi) December 8, 2022
[END]
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