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Ukraine Invasion Day 224: is a Zugzwang also a culminating point for Russia in Kherson [1]

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Date: 2022-10-04

The Zugzwang in chess may also be what von Clausewitz called a “culminating point,” or the moment when an attacking force can no longer proceed.

Is a Russian counterattack coming, now that the war is in its seventh month. We’ve yet to see any large-scale movement of Russian forces in these areas despite the significant battlefield losses to Ukraine.

Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblast.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization is having more significant short-term impacts on the Russian domestic context than on the war in Ukraine, catalyzing fractures in the information space that confuse and undermine Putin’s narratives.

Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains in northern Kherson Oblast on October 4, beginning to collapse the sparsely-manned Russian lines in that area.

Ukrainian forces continued to make gains in eastern Kharkiv Oblast west of Svatove on October 4, pushing past the Oskil River and increasingly threatening Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast.

Russian forces continued to conduct artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyiapole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 4.

Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 4.

The Kremlin effectively ordered local Russian administrations and non-Ministry of Defense institutions to fund a significant part of the mobilization effort from local budgets.

Russian security officials are attempting to maintain their domestic security apparatus as Putin’s partial mobilization drains the Russian security sector to generate additional forces to fight in Ukraine. www.understandingwar.org/…

Moscow’s rapid loss of more than 2,300 square miles of territory in northeastern Ukraine has raised the prospect that the Russian military is spent as an offensive force for the foreseeable future, which could limit Russian President Vladimir Putin to defending the Ukrainian territory he already holds while leaving him open to additional defeats, according to military analysts. , Putin faces obstacles in replenishing the battered ranks and degraded equipment of his military to any degree that would allow Russia to again take the initiative on the battlefield. The situation is a sobering reality for Putin, whose forces barreled into Ukraine on Feb. 24 on a mission to “demilitarize” and “denazify” the country but retreated from Kyiv just over five weeks later to concentrate on expanding control over Ukraine’s east through artillery warfare. As Ukrainian forces roll back those eastern gains , Putin faces obstacles in replenishing the battered ranks and degraded equipment of his military to any degree that would allow Russia to again take the initiative on the battlefield. The result is an opportunity for Ukrainian forces, which despite significant losses of their own, are hoping to make more territorial gains before winter conditions harden battle lines. Further gains by Ukraine — particularly around the southern city of Kherson — would deal additional blows to Russian morale and increase pressure on Putin, who is already facing calls by hard-line Russians to announce a general mobilization that could be politically toxic for his regime. The rapid collapse of the Russian front around Kharkiv in recent days “reflects the structural problems with manpower and low morale in an overstretched Russian military,” said Michael Kofman, a Russian military analyst at Virginia-based research group CNA. “The Russian military’s approach is fundamentally unsustainable,” Kofman said. “Russian forces face exhaustion, retention problems and a steady degradation of combat effectiveness.” A “partial mobilization” in Russia could provide a boost looking into next year, Kofman said, but Russia lacks the forces in the short term to defend its territory in the south of Ukraine while also making any meaningful advances in the eastern Donbas region. Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian valor, Russian blunders combined to save the capital Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the former commander of U.S. Army Europe, said the Russian military had reached what military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called the “culminating point,” or the moment when an attacking force can no longer proceed. Hodges said Ukrainian forces helped bring that about. www.washingtonpost.com/...

Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts on October 4. Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River along the T2207 highway, forcing Russian forces to retreat to the south toward Kherson City. Ukrainian forces also continued to push south along the Dnipro River and the T0403 highway, severing two Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northern Kherson Oblast and forcing Russians south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border toward the Beryslav area. Ukrainian military officials noted that the Ukrainian interdiction campaign is crippling Russian attempts to transfer additional ammunition, reserves, mobilized men, and means of defense to frontline positions.[1] Ukrainian forces also continued to advance east of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that battles are ongoing near the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[2] Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization is having more significant short-term impacts on the Russian domestic context than on the war in Ukraine, interacting with Russian battlefield failures to exacerbate fractures in the information space that confuse and undermine Putin’s narratives. Ukrainian sources have rightly observed that the partial mobilization is not a major threat in the short term because the Ukrainian counteroffensive is moving faster than the mobilization can generate effects.[3] Ukrainian Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov even stated that mobilization in Russia is a “gift” to Ukraine because the Kremlin is finding itself in a “dead end,” caught between its failures and its determination to hold what it has seized.[4] The controversies surrounding the poorly executed partial mobilization, coupled with significant Russian defeats in Kharkiv Oblast and around Lyman, have intensified infighting between pro-Putin Russian nationalist factions and are creating new fractures among voices who speak to Putin’s core constituencies.[5] Putin is visibly failing at balancing the competing demands of the Russian nationalists who have become increasingly combative since mobilization began despite sharing Putin’s general war aims and goals in Ukraine. ISW has identified three main factions in the current Russian nationalist information space: Russian milbloggers and war correspondents, former Russian or proxy officers and veterans, and some of the Russian siloviki—people with meaningful power bases and forces of their own. Putin needs to retain the support of all three of these factions. Milbloggers present Putin’s vision to a pro-war audience in both Russia and the proxy republics. The veteran community is helping organize and support force generation campaigns.[6] The siloviki are providing combat power on the battlefield. Putin needs all three factions to sustain his war effort, but the failures in Ukraine combined with the chaotic partial mobilization are seemingly disrupting the radical nationalist community in Russia. Putin is currently trying to appease this community by featuring some milbloggers on state-owned television, allowing siloviki to generate their own forces and continue offensive operations around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, and placating veterans by ordering mobilization and engaging the general public in the war effort as they have long demanded. Russian failures around Lyman galvanized strong and direct criticism of the commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Alexander Lapin, who supposedly commanded the Lyman grouping, as ISW has previously reported.[7] This criticism originated from the siloviki group, spearheaded by Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Kadyrov and Prigozhin represent an emerging voice within the regime’s fighting forces that is attacking the more traditional and conventional approach to the war pursued by Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu and the uniformed military command. The chaotic execution of Putin’s mobilization order followed by the collapse of the Lyman pocket ignited tensions between the more vocal and radical Kadyrov-Prigozhin camp, who attacked the MoD and the uniformed military for their poor handling of the war.[8] Putin now finds himself in a dilemma. He cannot risk alienating the Kadyrov-Prigozhin camp, as he desperately needs Kadyrov’s Chechen forces and Prigozhin’s Wagner Group mercenaries to fight in Ukraine.[9] Nor can he disenfranchise the MoD establishment, which provides the overwhelming majority of Russian military power in Ukraine and the institutional underpinnings needed to carry out the mobilization order and continue the war. www.understandingwar.org/...

x Nuclear weapons experts say it's still unlikely that Vladimir Putin will order an atomic strike on Ukraine.



Still, the risk of the Russian president going nuclear climbs as his losses mount, they warn.@johnleicester explains: https://t.co/8uosh4qMmO — AP Europe (@AP_Europe) October 4, 2022

x This move "could be a form of signaling to the West that Moscow is escalating" or preparing for a "strategic deterrence exercise," said Muzyka. — The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) October 4, 2022

x Well, there we go, the 🇷🇺-occupiers are shooting at the Zaporizhia NPP, again.



I think this justifies the same response from the West (🇺🇸) as 🇷🇺 using a tactical nuclear weapon. pic.twitter.com/gZkVwpBGby — Jason Jay Smart (@officejjsmart) October 4, 2022

x President Volodymyr Zelensky said that dozens of settlements had been liberated in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts during the past week. “Ukrainian forces are moving fast and powerful in the south as part of the ongoing defensive operation,” Zelensky said. — The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) October 4, 2022 Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories) Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line) Ukrainian forces continued to make gains in eastern Kharkiv Oblast west of Svatove on October 4. Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian troops in Bohuslavka and Borivska Andriivka, both within 30km west of Svatove and near the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.[18] Bohuslavka and Borivska Andriivka are on the left bank of the Oskil River. These gains, along with other Ukrainian advances on the east bank of the river, have essentially deprived Russian forces of the ability to use the river as a defensive line. A Russian milblogger described this inflection by noting that what used to be the Kharkiv front (the front bounded by the line of the Oskil River) has now become the Luhansk front as Ukrainian troops are threatening Russian positions within Luhansk Oblast itself.[19] Russian sources continued to discuss Ukrainian advances toward Svatove and noted that while Russian troops still control the R66 (Svatove-Kreminna) highway, which Russian milbloggers regard as a critical Russian ground line of communication (GLOC), Ukrainian reconnaissance groups are operating along the road to set conditions for future attacks toward Svatove.[20] A Russian source reported that fighting is ongoing in Krasnorichenske, a settlement near the R66 and between Svatove and Kreminna.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army and elements of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army are preparing to defend Svatove.[22] As ISW has previously reported, these units and formations were severely degraded during the Kharkiv counteroffensive and are unlikely to establish a stable defense of these critical areas if Ukrainian forces press their attacks.[23] Russian sources will likely continue to reinforce their positions along the R66 highway in anticipation of further Ukrainian attacks. www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/...

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne; on and south of Bakhmut near Mayorsk, Ozeryanivka, Zaitseve, and Bakhmutske; north and west of Avdiivka near Vesele, Kamianka, and Pervomaiske; and near Novomykhailivka in western Donetsk Oblast.[35] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces and Wagner Group fighters fought in eastern Bakhmut and south of Bakhmut in Vesela Dolyna and Zaitseve.[36] A Russian source claimed that Wagner Group fighters are reinforcing positions in the Bakhmut area.[37] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are fighting in the Avdiivka area near Pervomaiske and Nevelske to expand Russian control over the Donetsk City Airport.[38] Russian sources expressed continued concern that Ukrainian forces may launch a counterattack on the eastern Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast front line in the coming days.[39] Footage posted on October 4 reportedly shows Russian drones and artillery striking a Ukrainian equipment column in the Vuhledar, western Donetsk Oblast area on an unspecified date.[40] www.understandingwar.org/... x Volodymyr Zelenskiy said “more and more occupiers are trying to escape, more and more losses are being borne by the enemy army, and there is a growing understanding that Russia made a mistake by going to war against Ukraine." https://t.co/a9yCbLkmaO — Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (@RFERL) October 4, 2022

Russian defense ministry map confirms significant losses in Ukraine’s Kherson region

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast) Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains in northern Kherson Oblast on October 4. Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian troops in Velyka Oleksandrivka, Novopetrivka, and Starosillya, all in northwestern Kherson Oblast within 20km south of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[24] Russian sources acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have also captured at least half of Dudchany, a critical settlement in northeastern Kherson Oblast that lies along the T0403 highway, which runs along the west bank of the Dnipro River into the Beryslav-Nova Kahkovka area.[25] Several Russian sources indicated that Russian troops are withdrawing south toward Beryslav and regrouping in the area of Mylove (15km southwest of Dudchany) and that the northeastern sector of the Russian line in Kherson Oblast is collapsing along the Kakovkha reservoir.[26] One Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces captured Kachkarivka, less than 9 km from Mylove.[27] The Ukrainian 35th Marine Brigade also liberated Davydiv Brid in western Kherson Oblast.[28] An established Ukrainian position on the east (left) bank of the Inhulets River and on the right bank of Kakhkovka Reservoir (which feeds the Dnipro River) will enable Ukrainian forces to essentially squeeze Russian troops up against the Dnipro River to the east and force them southwards toward Kherson City and Beryslav-Nova Kakhkova according to a Russian milblogger.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian troops attacked Ternovi Pody (20km northwest of Kherson City), likely to expand Russian control northwest of Kherson City and afford Russian troops more defensible positions around the city as other elements withdraw from the north.[30] Russian milbloggers provided insight into the sparse allocation of Russian forces that are collapsing under Ukrainian advances in northern Kherson Oblast. A Russian source claimed on October 4 that elements of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet have operated in the area without rotation since March and that the frontline is stretched so thin that some villages in this sector have 15 men defending them.[31] The milblogger claimed that a frontline of 20km needs 500 men to defend at approximately 20m per person and that, due to under-staffing in battalions in northern Kherson Oblast, the ratio was one soldier per 60m of line.[32] This description of a thin and undermanned frontline, along with effective Ukrainian offensive operations, partially explains the rapid rate of Russian collapse in this sector. Ukrainian forces additionally continued the interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast to support ongoing ground operations. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian troops targeted Russian military, logistics, and transportation assets and concentration areas on October 3 and 4.[33] Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops once again struck the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson City.[34] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... x A map used by the Russian Defense Ministry in its daily briefing on Tuesday confirmed significant Russian losses in Ukraine’s Kherson region, compared to a map of the same region used during its briefing on Monday.https://t.co/6tDTYTUloy pic.twitter.com/ES96iFKHHt — Mick Krever (@mickbk) October 4, 2022 x North Kherson Front (October 4)



Ukrainian Forces 🇺🇦 liberated 5 more settlements: Chereshneve, Petropavlivka, Novovoskresenske, Novomykolaivka, and Chervone



In the past 4 days Ukrainian Forces liberated 24 settlements and advanced half the distance needed to reach Nova Kakhovka pic.twitter.com/7HOU64FUyE — Ukraine Battle Map (@ukraine_map) October 4, 2022

x #UkraineWar: Overview of Russian equipment losses added on 04/10/2022



Full list: https://t.co/wxuwtueKnD pic.twitter.com/XUjEmCR9AL — Jakub Janovsky (@Rebel44CZ) October 4, 2022



x Meanwhile on Russian state TV: grim predictions that Russia is at least two months away from even attempting to advance. Also, some surprising admissions about how unprepared they were and the magnitude of the losses they've experienced in Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/VXL05R7JpN — Julia Davis (@JuliaDavisNews) October 5, 2022 Asked about the alliance’s plans since Russia invaded Ukraine seven months ago, US Assistant Defense Secretary for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander hailed NATO’s new multinational battlegroups along its eastern border. She also said its members increasingly see spending targets “as a floor not a ceiling” and want to focus that spending on both modernization and ― with an eye on Russia’s hollow forces ― advanced training. “I think the old debate about ‘is it deterrence by tripwire, deterrence by denial?’ is behind us now. It’s clear that what you need is an effective, credible defensive capability in order to deter an adversary, in this case, Russia,” Wallander said. “What that credible defense looks like varies by areas of Europe. It includes not just ground forces, it includes air defense, it includes maritime domain, so it is multi-dimensional, but allies are really digging into what that looks like in their national capabilities,” she said. Beyond billions in military, financial and humanitarian aid for Ukraine, Wallander said discussions within the U.S. about reconstruction aid are already underway. Wallander said the European Union, World Bank, International Monetary Fund should be involved. “I think the main message is that it’s not the United States alone, it is actually these international institutions. And, and I think the Europeans have a strong commitment to supporting Ukraine,” Wallander said. www.defensenews.com/... x Russian forces are now attempting to form a new line of defence while Ukrainian forces enter abandoned grey zones. — WarMonitor🇺🇦 (@WarMonitor3) October 4, 2022

x A torture chamber in Pisky-Radkivski. 2 photos. A gas mask that was put on the head of a victim who was covered with a smoldering rag and buried alive. And a box of gold dental crowns. A mini Auschwitz. How many more will be found in occupied Ukraine?

Photo @serhii_bolvinov pic.twitter.com/So4glJlt9N — Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) October 4, 2022

x Musk floated the idea to give Crimea to Russia in a tweet that earned him a "fuck off" from a Ukrainian diplomat and praise from Putin's spokesperson. https://t.co/AFNAuHLxO7 — Motherboard (@motherboard) October 5, 2022

x The City of Bila Tserkva 🇺🇦

(80km South West of Kyiv) was attacked overnight by Six Iranian Shahed-136 Kamikaze Drones



The drone attacks target city was 300km away from Russia and 400km away from the frontline



💥 Six explosions were heard and the drones targeted infrastructure — Ukraine Battle Map (@ukraine_map) October 5, 2022

x The new study found that the mismatch between satellite and GDP data did not appear in dictator­ships until they were too rich to receive some types of foreign aid https://t.co/zBCoJ61XKL — The Economist (@TheEconomist) October 5, 2022

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[1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/10/4/2126985/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-224-is-a-Zugzwang-also-a-culminating-point-for-Russia-in-Kherson

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