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Ukraine Invasion Day 199: possible encirclement ahead - fight, flight and give up materiel again [1]
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Date: 2022-09-09
Ukraine claims to have retaken more than 1,000 sq km (385 sq miles) of territory in its south and east from Russia in the last week. The counteroffensive continues.
Reading about Ukrainian operations around Kharkiv, I am struck yet again by the reality that the biggest conflict in Europe since World War II is taking place because a not-very-bright mid-level KGB guy thought he could recreate an empire that's already failed at least twice.
The Russian MoD repeated its Bilohorivka information mistake by failing to acknowledge the situation around Kharkiv Oblast and establish a desired narrative, leaving milbloggers to fill this gap with criticism of Russian forces. The Russian MoD only claimed to have destroyed a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Balakliya.[7] Some milbloggers complained that the Russian MoD did not seize the information space in a timely manner to prevent the spread of Ukrainian social media on Russian Telegram channels, leading to distrust among Russian audiences.[8] Milbloggers largely supported the Russian MoD’s narratives that the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast had completely failed just days prior to Ukrainian breakthroughs in Kharkiv Oblast.[9] Such a shift in milblogger perceptions of Russian progress in Ukraine can be partially attributed to the flaws in the Russian war-time information strategy, namely that:
The current tone and scale of Russian milblogger criticism echo the response to Russia’s loss of a large amount of armor in a failed Russian river crossing in Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast, in May. [6] ISW assessed at the time that the catastrophic Russian losses suffered due to incompetence shook the confidence of pro-Russian milbloggers, sparking criticism of the Russian war effort. Russian milbloggers and social media users accessed satellite imagery that showed devastating losses of Russian military equipment, which caused many to comment on the incompetence of the Russian military and analyze the scene on a tactical level. The Russian MoD did not comment on the situation, fueling burgeoning doubts about Russia’s prospects in Ukraine.
Ukrainian successes on the Kharkiv City-Izyum line are creating fissures within the Russian information space and eroding confidence in Russian command to a degree not seen since a failed Russian river crossing in mid-May. Ukrainian military officials announced that Ukrainian forces advanced 50km deep into Russian defensive positions north of Izyum on September 8, but the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably did not issue any statement regarding Ukrainian advances in Kharkiv Oblast.[1] Ukrainian successes and the Russian MoD’s silence prompted many Russian milbloggers to criticize and debate Russian failures to retain control over the city of Balakliya, approximately 44km northwest of Izyum. Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces fully or partially withdrew from Balakliya in good order, while others complained that Ukrainian forces beat Russian forces out of the settlement.[2] Others noted that Rosgvardia units operating in the area did not coordinate their defenses or have sufficient artillery capabilities to prevent Ukrainian counterattacks in the region.[3] Milbloggers warned about an impending Ukrainian counteroffensive northwest of Izyum for days prior to Ukrainian advances, and some milbloggers noted that Russian command failed to prepare for “obvious and predictable” Ukrainian counteroffensives.[4] Others noted that Ukrainian forces have “completely outplayed” the Russian military command in Balakliya, while others encouraged readers to wait to discuss Russian losses and withhold criticism until Russian forces stabilize the frontlines.[5]
Here is today’s updated gif of the advances from Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the Kharkiv Oblast over the last 5 days. This is based on maps from @War_Mapper . #Kharkiv #Ukraine #UkraineFrontLines #RussiaIsATerroristState #NAFO #UkraineWillWin #Kupyansk #Balakliia #Balaklia pic.twitter.com/ub5PkHGoKe
Social media provides additional visual evidence corroborating the ongoing successful Ukrainian interdiction campaign and Russian attempts to restore GLOCs to northern Kherson Oblast. Satellite imagery from September 7 suggests that one of the ferries operating near Antonivsky Road Bridge is out of service, likely following recent Ukrainian strikes on the GLOC.[16] However, geolocated footage published on September 7 shows that Russian forces opened a new ferry crossing over the Dnipro River in downtown Kherson City.[17] Residents reported hearing over 10 explosions in the area of the Darivka Bridge, and geolocated footage showed the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on a Russian convoy on a pontoon crossing near Nova Kakhovka on September 7.[18] Russian and Ukrainian sources published footage of a destroyed residential building in Nova Kakhovka, and local Ukrainian reports stated that a Russian air defense missile fell onto the building.[19] Residents also reported explosions near a railway junction at Novooleksiivka (just north of the Kherson Oblast-Crimea border) after the arrival of a Russian train from Crimea, which supports Ukrainian military officials’ reports of continued partisan activities in southern Kherson Oblast targeting Russian logistics.[20] Local Telegram channels reported the activation of Russian air-defense systems and explosions in Nova Mayachka and Chaplynka in central and southern Kherson Oblast, respectively.[21]
Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces are making incremental advances in Kherson Oblast and continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), command and control points, and ammunition depots throughout the region.[10] Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian Main Operational Department Oleksiy Hromov stated that Ukrainian forces have advanced between two and several dozen kilometers in unspecified areas in the Kherson Oblast direction.[11] Ukraine‘s Southern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian pontoon bridges over the Dnipro and Inhulets rivers on the night of September 8.[12] Ukrainian military officials also noted that Ukrainian ballistic missiles and aviation struck two Russian ammunition depots, an unspecified command post, and key positions of a Russian platoon.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Ukrainian partisans are cooperating with Ukrainian forces to disrupt Russian logistics in the rear.[14] Russian forces are reportedly intensifying filtration measures at a railway station on the southern Kherson-Zaporizhia Oblast border due to locals supplying information to Ukrainian forces about Russian troops entering Kherson Oblast.[15]
The number of attacks on the center of #Kharkiv today is terrifying! Just in the middle of the day, when there are a lot of people on the streets! This video is another proof of the genocide against Ukrainians! pic.twitter.com/WyQRDSNhTI
Driving the news: Ukraine launched its long-awaited push on Kherson in southern Ukraine last week, before following up with a rapid advance near Kharkiv in the northeast that seems to have caught Vladimir Putin's troops by surprise.
To date, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have liberated and taken control of more than 30 settlements in the Kharkiv region - address by the President of Ukraine — Official website of the President of Ukraine:
https://t.co/PNDg1LgNFo
He added that while it was early, Ukraine was “proceeding in a very deliberate way with a strong plan and, critically, enabled by resources that many of us are providing”.
“It’s early days, but it is demonstrably making real progress . . . [making] a significant advance, moving some 45 to 50km in one area past what had been the existing Russian line,” he said.
The rapid progress of Ukraine’s latest attack has threatened key Russian supply lines in the eastern Donbas region and comes a week after Kyiv launched a separate offensive in the south, around the town of Kherson.
Reports coming in about Ukrainian troops having taken control of Oskil and Kapytolivka. The Izyum pocket is being closed by the Ukrainian Army as we speak. pic.twitter.com/qYZuzjDwIl
Supporting Effort #1- Kharkiv City and Eastern Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication – GLOCs – to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Ukrainian forces secured substantial gains in Kharkiv Oblast on September 8 and are advancing on Kupyansk, a key node in Russia’s GLOCs supporting the Izyum axis. Ukrainian forces have likely advanced to positions within 15km of Kupyansk and will shell the town overnight. Russian rear positions in Kharkiv Oblast are now exposed to further Ukrainian advances, and Ukrainian forces will likely capture Kupyansk within the next 72 hours. Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces recaptured Borshchyvka and Ivanivka along the E40.[46] Ukrainian forces likely captured Shevchenkove or bypassed the settlement and advanced toward Hrushivka, given geolocated footage of Ukrainian forces in Borivske (20 km southwest of Kupyansk) and a Russian report of fighting near Hrushivka.[47] A Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces captured Savintsi, Rakivka, and Dovhalivka, all just north of Zalyman on the R78.[48] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have reached transportation hubs at Vesele and Kunye, 10km east on the R78 from Savinsti, but there is currently no evidence to support this claim.[49] Ukrainian forces continued their drive southeast on the N26 highway towards Kupyansk, advancing at least to Shevchenkove (roughly 35km west of Kupyansk), where geolocated imagery shows Ukrainian forces at the settlement’s entrance and most Russian sources report fighting remains ongoing.[50] The loss of Kupyansk and other rear areas on critical GLOCS will hinder Russian efforts to support offensive and defense operations, but will not completely sever Russian lines of communication to Izyum.
Ukrainian forces’ relatively quick speed of advance, proximity to Kupyansk, and ability to shell the city are prompting panic in Russian rear areas. Geolocated footage shows damage from a likely Ukrainian strike on a Russian military headquarters in occupied Kupyansk.[51] Kharkiv Oblast occupation administration head Vitaly Ganchev announced the evacuation of all women and children from Kupyansk City and Kupyansk Raion as well as Izyum Raion, citing increased Ukrainian artillery and rocket strikes but most likely due to the ongoing ground operations.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that occupation authorities in Chuhuiv Raion, Kharkiv Oblast, are forcibly mobilizing men of conscription age by detaining them and sending them to Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast, likely to prevent these men from supporting advancing Ukrainian forces.[53]
Ukrainian forces recaptured Balakliya on September 8. Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian forces calmly operating within the center of Balakliya, raising a Ukrainian flag on the city council building, and conducting clearing operations.[54] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Balakliya, inadvertently confirming that Russian forces no longer control the city.[55] Several Russian milbloggers acknowledged Ukraine’s capture of Balakiya while others denied it.[56] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had either surrendered or withdrawn from Balakliya, emphasizing the extent of discord within the Russian information space about the progress of Ukrainian military operations north of Izyum.[57]
Ukrainian forces likely made minor territorial gains north of Kharkiv City. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces shelled Male Vesele (roughly 20km northeast of Kharkiv City), indicating that Ukrainian forces have retaken the settlement on an unspecified date likely within the past few days.[58] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces retook Dementiivka (north of Kharkiv City on the E105) and Sosnivka (11km from the Kharkiv-Russia border) on September 7.[59]
Russian forces attempted limited ground assaults north of Kharkiv City on September 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Dementiivka, Prudyanka (north of Kharkiv City on the T2117), and Konstantynivka (13km north of Zolochiv).[60] Russian forces struck an administrative building in Kharkiv City with S-300 rounds and continued routine artillery strikes on the surrounding settlements.[61]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks south of Izyum and around Slovyansk on September 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Dibrivne and Dovhenke, both approximately 25km south of Izyum.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults in the area of the Sviati Hory National Nature Park (about 20km northeast of Slovyansk) and Bohorodychne (about 12km northwest of Slovyansk).[33] Russian forces also conducted routine artillery strikes along the Izyum-Slovyansk line and on areas north and northeast of Slovyansk.[34]
Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack northeast of Siversk on September 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack on Hryhorivka, about 10km northeast of Siversk.[35] Russian forces continued routine artillery strikes on settlements around Siversk.[36]
Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut on September 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Zaitseve, Mykolaivka Druha, and Mayorsk, all within 20km south of Bakhmut.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack in Soledar, about 10km northeast of Bakhmut.[38] Russian sources claimed on September 8 that Russian and DNR forces moved into the residential areas of Soledar, where Ukrainian forces are still defending.[39]
Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack along the northwestern, western, and northern outskirts of Donetsk City on September 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attacked Pervomaiske (12km northwest of the outskirts of Donetsk City), Nevelske (12km northwest of Donetsk City), Mariinka (about 22 km west of Donetsk), and Kamyanka (about 18km north of Donetsk City).[40] DNR Militia Head Eduard Basurin claimed on September 8 that Russian and proxy forces are expanding the springboard near Pisky towards Tonenke in an effort to surround Avdiivka.[41] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured positions near a hilly area in Pisky, a formerly heavily fortified Ukrainian area.[42] Russian sources claimed that DNR forces finished clearing the western part of the Donetsk City airport and reached the ring road in the area of Opytne, approximately 5km northwest of Donetsk City.[43]
Russian forces conducted a limited ground assault in western Donetsk Oblast on September 8. A senior Ukrainian General Staff official reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault on Vremivka, about 75km west of Donetsk City.[44] Russian forces continued routine shelling and airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in the area between Donetsk City and the Zaporizhia Oblast border.[45]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian occupation officials continued to accuse Ukrainian forces of shelling and conducting drone attacks against Enerhodar. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Internal Affairs Minister Vitaly Kiselyov published footage of damage to the Enerhodar occupation administration building’s roof following a claimed Ukrainian loitering munition strike on the building.[68] Russian sources also claimed to have arrested an individual responsible for spotting targets for Ukrainian drones in Enerhodar.[69] Russian-backed Zaporizhia Oblast Military-Civilian Administration Head Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled Enerhodar, but did not provide any visual evidence supporting his accusation.[70] Rogov also claimed that only the sixth reactor at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is operating, and at an extremely low capacity.[71]
Russian forces continued to fire multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and heavy tube artillery at Nikopol and launched a cruise missile at Kryvyi Rih Raion on September 8.[72] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces launched Kh-22 cruise missiles at Bereznehuvate Hromada (territorial community) and continued shelling along the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border.[73] Social media users published footage showing smoke at the Saky Air Base in western Crimea and a cloud of smoke in Yevpatoria.[74]
www.understandingwar.org/...
x As expected, rashist militants in Kharkiv region have been abandoned by their commanders. They are fleeing their positions chaotically, in small groups. Some of the rashists steal bicyles and scooters from local people, others run away on foot. — Michael MacKay (@mhmck) September 9, 2022
x The last 48 hours have seen quite a lot happening in #Ukraine. While the southern offensive continues, the Ukrainian operations around Kharkiv have achieved a significant penetration of Russian defences on the Kupiansk-Izium axis. What might this mean? 1/25 pic.twitter.com/gNBsa7oI84 — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) September 10, 2022
2/ I would caveat that much remains unclear about these offensives. And, as every military leader knows, first reports can be wrong! But, there is sufficient information - without compromising operational security - to draw initial conclusions about operations around #Kharkiv.
3/ It is clear that the Ukrainians have achieved surprise against the Russians in the #Kharkiv region. The Ukrainians attacked what appears to have been a thinly defended area and have achieved a significant penetration into Russian rear areas.
4/ That they were able to exploit this opportunity indicates that Ukraine maintained a significant mobile operational reserve, containing combined arms teams supported by fires and logistics.
5/ And once again, the Ukrainians have been able to pull off a good operational level deception plan. While the focus was on the south, they assembled and launched an operation in the north. Kudos (again) to Ukrainian leaders and planners.
6/ While the southern offensives continue, and is vital to Ukraine’s economic future, the #Kharkiv offensive has tactical and operational implications for that region and the war more broadly.
7/ First, it will compromise Russian operations on their eastern front, particularly if both Kupiansk and Izium are captured by Ukraine. It compromises Russian supply routes and introduces a larger psychological issue with Russians fighting in the east.
8/ It also makes it difficult for Russia to continue to fight in the east without dealing with this threat to their rear areas and logistics.
9/ The Ukrainian advance deep into the Russian-held areas of Ukraine in the north will demand that Russia rush reinforcements here - potentially impacting their ability to defend parts of the south. Perhaps the new Russian 3rd Army Corps is an option?
10/ The shifting of Russian forces means they can’t be used while moving between different parts of the country. This redeployment of forces will also create other weaknesses and opportunities that the Ukrainians can exploit.
11/ Potentially, we could see cascading Russian tactical withdrawals and failures in various regions as a consequence. This is, having a superior tempo to the enemy and a rapid identification and exploitation of opportunities, is the essence of operational art.
12/ There are outcomes for influence operations from this operation in the north. Especially for Russia and it’s supporters. But it also shapes the current ‘supporters of Ukraine’ meeting in Germany and popular opinion/support in the west.
13/ The Ukrainians will be going through a lot of fuel and ammo, but these offensives are the kinds of operations for which good military organisations stockpile for well in advance (and the Ukrainians are good).
14/ Deception has been central to all Ukrainian preparations for this phase of the war. The Ukrainians have obviously taken care to quietly stockpile military resources and place units in reserve to be able exploit opportunities like what has occurred in the north.
15/ There are likely to be significant Russian material losses in the north, given the speed of the Ukrainian advance. Overrunning Russian supply depots (especially with artillery ammo and fuel) will further hurt the Russians and help Ukraine.
16/ We might also see large numbers of Russian prisoners in the north. Not only are these hard to replace, given Russian recruiting problems, it is a strategic influence coup for Ukraine. And a real problem for Putin.
17/ This #Kharkiv offensive also represents an excellent marriage of operational art and military strategy. Operationally, the Ukrainians are sequencing, prioritising and adapting their tactical battles across time and geography to meet strategic objectives.
18/ Strategically, the Ukrainians continue to implement their strategy of corrosion, which attacks Russia at their weak points, and destroys their logistics, C2, and morale to corrode front line forces from within.
The ingenious strategy that could win the war for Ukraine
The consistent Ukrainian military campaign is successfully corroding the Russian offensive and may deliver an unlikely, but historic, victory.
https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/the-ingenious-strategy-that-could-win-the-war-for-ukraine-20220517-p5alz4.html
19/ Clearly there are tactical and operational risks. A Russian counterattack might ‘pinch off’ the penetration & isolate the advancing Ukrainians. But the Russians need to move quick to do this, have sufficient reserves, as well as defend other areas on exterior lines.
20/ But as we have seen so far in this war, the Ukrainian command philosophy of delegation and exploiting opportunities is superior to the Russian more centralised, plodding method. It will be hard (not impossible) for Russia to respond to the current Ukrainian operational tempo.
21/ The Russians, while not beaten, are in real trouble at the moment. Because of this, we should watch for some unexpected reaction from Putin. He has shown no signs of wanting to pull back from this invasion.
22/ And lest we get too triumphalist, we should remember that Luhansk and large parts of Donetsk and southern #Ukraine remain occupied by the Russians. Subsequent Ukrainian offensives will be necessary to clear these areas.
23/ Despite all this, we must give the Ukrainians their due. There is a way to go, but they have achieved surprise, deceived the enemy about their intentions and conducted a series of offensives that have thrown the Russians onto the back foot.
24/ Ukraine probably now has the initiative as well as tactical and operational momentum going into the winter. The war is far from over, but perhaps the tide is finally turning. End. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/…
25/ Thank you to those whose images I used in this thread: @DefenceU @IAPonomarenko @WarMonitor3 @UAWeapons @War_Mapper @Militarylandnet @ChuckPfarrer @TheDeadDistrict @nytimes @MaxBoot @EliotHiggins
• • •
Washington (AFP) – Rebuilding Ukraine following the devastation caused by the Russian invasion will cost an estimated $349 billion, according to a report issued Friday.
[END]
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