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Ukraine Invasion Day 153: combat conditions continue [1]
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Date: 2022-07-25
Ammunition depots remain targets for both sides, but only one side has “filtration centers” as it attempts to manipulate occupied populations.
I agree with those that argue that the West must push harder to end the war in Ukraine. The focus of that effort, however, must be Putin, not Zelensky. Putin started this war. Putin invaded Ukraine. Without him on board, it will not end.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces conducted a limited ground assault north of Kharkiv City on July 25.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered losses when attempting an unsuccessful ground assault from Tsupivka to Dementiivka.[17] Russian forces continued conducting combat operations in an effort to maintain occupied positions and prevent Ukrainian forces from advancing toward the international border.[18] Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Petrivka, Prudyanka, and Yavirske and launched tube and rocket artillery strikes on Kharkiv City and settlements to the north, northeast, and southeast on July 25.[19]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk and shelled settlements to the southeast and southwest of Izyum on July 25. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Russian grouping in this area is focusing on replenishing manpower and equipment losses.[3] Russian forces shelled Bohorodychne, Dibrovne, Dolyna, Adamivka, and Mazanivka to the southeast of Izyum and Barvinkove, and Karnaukhiva to the southwest of Izyum in the Barvinkove direction.[4] Russian forces also conducted missile and artillery strikes on Kramatorsk, 10km south of Slovyansk.[5]
Russian forces continued unsuccessful ground assaults east of Siversk on July 25. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian troops failed to advance on Ivano-Darivka (about 10km southeast of Siversk) from Berestove and Verkhnokamyanka.[6] Russian forces reportedly continued ground attacks around Spirne (15km southeast of Siversk) and Verkhnokamyanske (5km due east of Siversk) and conducted air and artillery attacks around Siversk to support ongoing ground attacks.[7]
Russian forces made incremental advances south of Bakhmut on July 25. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Deputy Internal Minister Vitaly Kiselev posted footage of Wagner Group mercenaries in front of the sign at the entrance of Novoluhanske, roughly 25km southeast of the outskirts of Bakhmut, which indicates that Russian troops have advanced into Novoluhanske.[8] Several Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces are actively clearing the territory of the Vuhledar Power Plant, which lies on the northern edge of Novoluhanske.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces had ”partial success” on the territory of the Vuhledar Power Plant, which may indicate that Ukrainian troops conducted a controlled withdrawal from the plant.[10] A Russian war correspondent reporting for the Russian Federal News Agency (FAN) stated that Ukrainian forces can only withdraw to the northwest of Novoluhanske to Semihirya, further suggesting that Ukrainian forces are engaging in a deliberate and controlled withdrawal from the territory of the power plant.[11] Russian forces also continued fighting around Novoluhanske in Vershyna and Myronivskyi.[12]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued to fortify their positions in Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts in preparations for Ukrainian counteroffensives. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh reported that Russian forces are digging trenches on the territory of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and hiding military equipment in residential neighborhoods.[20] Enerhodar City Administration Head Dmytro Orlov added that Russian forces are continuing to use defensive positions around the Zaporizhzhia NPP to shell settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[21] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) noted that Russian forces also partially restored the work of a concrete plant in Melitopol to strengthen defensive lines and firing positions and rebuild an airfield in the city.[22] The GUR specified that Russian attempts to rebuild the airfield will require at least 21 to 28 days and will not likely make it fully operational. Ukrainian sources published footage of Russian forces reportedly transferring tanks and armored personnel carriers via settlements south and north of Melitopol, likely in the Kherson Oblast direction.[23] Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Military Administration Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian forces are attempting to patch the Antonivskyy Bridge but are unlikely to restore its capacity to transport heavy military equipment.[24] Geolocated footage also showed Russian forces building a pontoon bridge over the Inhulets River near Darivka, approximately 17km northeast of Kherson City.[25]
Russian forces continued to launch air, missile, and artillery strikes along the Kherson Oblast administrative border, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Mykolaiv City on July 25.[26] Russian forces reportedly fired six missiles at Mykolaiv City and settlements in its vicinity.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces are also increasingly conducting aerial reconnaissance in the region.[28]
www.understandingwar.org/...
x Updates:
🇷🇺 advanced on Novoluhans'ke and the power station at Vuhlehirs'ke Tes (both SE of Bakhmut). Both locations remain contested. pic.twitter.com/2QQ0zAKhok — Ukraine War Map (@War_Mapper) July 26, 2022
x 🇺🇦 There is accumulating evidence that the momentum in the #Ukraine war is shifting significantly to the Ukrainian side.@FukuyamaFrancis explains in detail in his latest for @americanpurpose. ⤵️
https://t.co/6hBro7VKRq — FSI Stanford (@FSIStanford) July 25, 2022
There is accumulating evidence that the momentum in the Ukraine war has shifted quite dramatically to the Ukrainian side, and that we can expect big changes on the battlefield in the coming weeks. I’m continuing to be optimistic about Ukraine’s prospects, despite hand-wringing about the apparent stalemate on the battlefield since the Russians shifted focus to Donbas in mid-April. I realize that motivated reasoning may be coming into play: because I desperately want Ukraine to emerge victorious, it is easy to pick out facts that support this view, while downplaying those that contradict it. Nonetheless, things have been changing rapidly in the past two weeks: · Of course, as many observers has noted, delivery of the U.S. HIMARS long-range rocket systems has been used very effectively by Ukraine to destroy what the U.S. now describes as over 100 Russian high-value targets, including ammo dumps, command posts, and logistics infrastructure. This has then sharply reduced the intensity of Russian artillery bombardments, and has led to hundreds of Russian casualties a day, including large numbers of officers. To date the U.S. has supplied 8 of these systems, and on July 20 promised another 4. Ukraine has been asking for much bigger number of HIMARS systems—50, 70, and answering this request is a priority. But the real constraint would seem to be not in the number of launchers but the resupply system needed to continue feeding them with rockets. We should keep in mind that the original 4 systems did an incredible amount of damage to Russian logistics. · The Ukrainian command continues to make strategically wise decisions. They are focusing at this point in liberating Kherson and oblasts to the south that would allow them to restore their access to the Black Sea, rather than trying to push Russia back in Luhansk. The Russians have occupied Kherson since nearly the beginning of the war and have had plenty of time to dig in. But the city sits on the west bank of the Dnipro River and can be reached only by two bridges, which have this week come under Ukrainian artillery attack. Liberating Kherson would then open up further targets like the bridge across the Kerch Straits that is critical for resupplying Russian forces in Crimea. · There is accumulating evidence that Russian manpower, equipment, and morale are deteriorating rapidly. Nadin Brzezinski has pointed to multiple logistics failures, like the fact that Russian artillery barrels are wearing out and cannot be easily replaced because they depend on high-quality steel not produced in Russia. They are running out of trucks, which now need to move supplies much longer distances to stay out of HIMARS range. The often-derided Western economic sanctions have cut into the Russian industrial base, which continues to depend on Western technology to operate. Putin himself has referred to “colossal” hi-tech problems caused by sanctions. · The Russians recruited heavily in ethnic minority regions, and there is evidence now of mass desertions among the Buryats, Dagestanis, and other such groups who have borne the bulk of casualties. Contract soldiers, who make up the bulk of Russian forces, are simply walking away or refusing to renew their contracts. [...] On the other side of the ledger is a simple problem of industrial base. The Russian economy was always larger than the Ukrainian one; under sanctions it may decline 15% this year, against a 40% decline in Ukrainian output. Russian rocket attacks continue to hit Ukrainian facilities and terrorize Ukrainian citizens, including in areas like Kharkiv liberated from Russian occupation. Western-supplied equipment is far superior to Russian equivalents, but the Russians have a huge industrial base that continues to churn out products like 152mm ammunition free from Ukrainian retaliation. German equipment during World War II was also superior to its American and Russian counterparts, but the U.S. industrial base ultimately overpowered the qualitative advantage. As Giselle Donnelly has argued in this journal, U.S. and other NATO countries have drawn down existing stocks of equipment and ammunition, and will not be able to replenish them anytime soon due to a long-term failure to make adequate military investments. This is why, as noted earlier, Western sanctions are very critical. All of these considerations put a great premium on timing. Everyone is rightly expecting a very difficult winter, when Russian gas cutoffs will leave Europe cold and deepen the recession that’s widely expected. European support for Ukraine and sanctions has remained remarkably solid despite Russia’s recent throttling of Nordstream I, but getting through the winter without increasing calls to pressure Ukraine into a ceasefire negotiation will be difficult. The only way that strong support for Ukraine can be maintained politically is if the Ukrainian military begins making some visible strategic advances in the near term, meaning by the end of the summer. The artillery war that took place between mid-April and early July has conditioned people to think that advances by either side will be like the Russian advance on Severodonetsk, slow and bloody. But the Ukrainians have other options to weaken Russian logistics and command structure, and we may see the entire Russian position in the south collapsing suddenly. This is the only way to undercut the conventional wisdom that Ukraine and Russia are locked in a stalemated long-term conflict. Europe may get through one winter of privation successfully, but it will not hold the line if voters see no hope for change. Ukraine’s intelligence chief Gen. Budanov thinks the breakthrough will come about by the second half of August. Let’s hope he’s right. www.americanpurpose.com/...
x "I think the way the Ukrainians understand [the Russian strike on Odesa] is Russia's trying to remind them that nowhere is safe, that there is no corner of Ukraine that Russia will not strike" - @shustry w/ @NicolleDWallace pic.twitter.com/h6s6zNFyRk — Deadline White House (@DeadlineWH) July 25, 2022
x The Armed Forces of Ukraine destroyed the command post of the 11th separate amphibious assault brigade of russian occupiers and the ammunition depot in the area of the settlement Pyatikhatky in Kherson region.#RussiaUkraineWar pic.twitter.com/R918qgviWF — Euromaidan PR (@EuromaidanPR) July 26, 2022
x BREAKING
The Ukrainian Army is making gains along the #Kherson frontline, attacking Russian invaders’ supply lines, and building up an advantage.#UkraineRussiaWar
https://t.co/Flq1hFHHo6 — KyivPost (@KyivPost) July 25, 2022
x RUSSIAN DARIVKA PONTOON BRIDGE THREAD:@ArtisanalAPT and I have discovered the probable origin of the new Russian pontoon bridge that appeared next to the damaged Darivka bridge today.
1/ pic.twitter.com/XDhPLCMZkB — Oliver Alexander (@OAlexanderDK) July 26, 2022
x The span shown in the video is approximately 80 meters long. The segment of pontoon bridge in does not cross the entire span, only reaching about ¾ of the way across, approximately 60 meters.
3/ pic.twitter.com/SZfLPmSyec — Oliver Alexander (@OAlexanderDK) July 26, 2022
x Lower res satellite imagery from the 25th July shows that these pontoon segments are no longer in this tributary.
It appears that at least one of these segments was moved up the river to the location by the Darivka bridge sometime on 25 July or late 24 July.
5/ — Oliver Alexander (@OAlexanderDK) July 26, 2022
x In the north of Kharkiv region, the Russian fascist invaders of Europe assaulted Dementiyivka from temporarily-occupied Tsupivka. Ukrainian defenders inflicted heavy losses on the rashists, who retreated from battle.
–General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 18:00, July 25 pic.twitter.com/5nkMpf2FWi — Michael MacKay (@mhmck) July 25, 2022
x Ukraine has destroyed 50 Russian ammo depots with the use of HIMARS, @oleksiireznikov says.
My secret 6th sense regarding the number was right! — Illia Ponomarenko🔥 (@IAPonomarenko) July 25, 2022
x 🔥 First 6 British Stormer HVM anti-aircraft missile systems have already been delivered to Ukraine, Operational Command “South” reports. pic.twitter.com/R7zb9Rtoag — UkraineWorld (@ukraine_world) July 25, 2022
x Now, the road through Vasylivka is the only way out of the occupied territories of Southern Ukraine. Melitopol Mayor says Russians use people as a “human shield,” fearing Ukrainian counteroffensive 2/2 — Hromadske Int. (@Hromadske) July 25, 2022
x Russia is using more than a dozen so-called filtration centers in eastern Ukraine and western Russia to detain and deport thousands of Ukrainians, according to a newly declassified U.S. intelligence assessment.
https://t.co/ic0dWtkm6y — New York Times World (@nytimesworld) July 25, 2022
Russia is using more than a dozen so-called filtration centers in eastern Ukraine and western Russia to detain and deport thousands of Ukrainians, according to a newly declassified U.S. intelligence assessment. Adding to a growing body of evidence related to the filtration centers — which were set up to temporarily detain and screen Ukrainians and identify anyone perceived to pose a threat to Russia’s occupation efforts — the analysis by the National Intelligence Council, dated June 15, said those efforts had intensified as Ukrainian resistance in occupied territories has grown. It identified “18 possible locations in eastern Ukraine and western Russia,” noting there are likely more that have yet to be identified.
“The filtration process includes temporary detention, data collection, interrogation, and in some cases abuse of detainees, and takes place in a variety of temporary processing centers — often in parallel with internally displaced persons and refugee processing,” according to the assessment.
The analysis outlined three possible fates for those who pass through the centers. “Those who are deemed nonthreatening may be issued documentation and permitted to remain in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, or in some cases forcefully deported to Russia,” the agency reported. “Others deemed less threatening, but still potentially resistant to Russian occupation, face forcible deportation to Russia and are subject to additional screening. Those deemed most threatening during the filtration process, particularly anyone with affiliation to the military or security services, probably are detained in prisons in eastern Ukraine and Russia, though little is known about their fates.” www.nytimes.com/...
x UA forces wiped out at least 100 occupiers who had set up a command and control post in the Luhansk region. In the past 24 hours at least 240 orcs have been liquidated.
https://t.co/14oeZmwYC2 — Euromaidan PR (@EuromaidanPR) July 25, 2022
x Russia steals Ukrainian steel - $600 million worth, already paid for by European customers, - Yurii Ryzhenkov, head of Metinvest company (it owns Azovstal and Mariupol Ilyich plant - 40% of Ukrainian metal production)
https://t.co/cVHsRgK8OZ pic.twitter.com/e9scK9gYU4 — Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) July 23, 2022
x Russian economy is super fragile. It's critically dependent upon the:
1. Export of natural resources
2. Technological import
It has always been so. That's why Russia could never win a major war without massive economic help of the West. Without Western allies Russia's doomed🧵 pic.twitter.com/0HEe4tnYAD — Kamil Galeev (@kamilkazani) March 4, 2022
x Russia is further curbing natural gas flows on the Nord Stream pipeline, escalating European concerns over a supply crunch this winter
https://t.co/QDqWNylJPK — Bloomberg (@business) July 25, 2022
x Ukraine central bank has sold over $12 billion of its gold reserves during the war, its deputy head says.
https://t.co/QGZoXyku0Y — Aldous Huxley (@8thAlien) July 26, 2022
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