In this issue:
* COMMENTARY: THE RISE AND FALL OF A SRSG
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              S O M A L I A  N E W S  U P D A T E

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Vol 3, No 15              May 18, 1994.               ISSN 1103-1999

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Somalia News Update is published irregularly via electronic mail and
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COMMENTARY: THE RISE AND FALL OF A SRSG

(SNU, Uppsala, May 18) - Chances are that Lansane Kouyate, the
special representative of the UN's secretary-general to Somalia, will
find that Somalia has costed him his job. Eagerly awaiting the moment
when he could go back to take up the post as under secretary-general
for political affairs as the successor to James Jonah, he accepted to
first assume the role as UNOSOM's number one man. Having served
closely under the two previous SRSGs he was an obvious choice and he
was actually appointed already last year, when the Americans all of a
sudden decided to throw in their own man - Admiral Howe.
    With Howe departed - some would say deported - after his blatant
failure to comprehend that in Somalia you cannot pursue personal
vendettas unless you are thoroughly equipped to handle the
consequences (whether the equipment existed or not is currently the
subject for hearings organized by the Senate's Armed Service
Committee), it was not easy to find a successor. UNOSOM II is not an
attractive position among the suitable UN bureaucrats. The
credibility of the organization has been shrinking to the extent that
UN branch agencies like the WHO now openly contradict UNOSOM press
releases in their own press releases. But Kouyate was there and he
took that job too.
    Now versions differ. Some have it that there is absolutely no
relation between Kouyate's two recent appointments; he will leave
Mogadishu for New York on May 30, come whatever may. Others hold that
the appointment for the New York office is somewhat conditional and
ultimately dependent on his ability to handle the Somalia business.
All agree, however, that it would look awkward for the new under-
secretary-general to come back to the security council's discussion
about Somali on May 31 without being able to show any kind of solid
improvement. According to recent press leaks, the Americans made
their willi-nilly support for ground-troops to Rwanda, dependant on
progress being made in Somalia. Unless the May 31 deadline for an
agreement is beaten, there is a good likelihood that the mandate for
UNOSOM will not be prolonged beyond July 15.
    Kouyate himself is well aware of at least the pressure to
demonstrate progress to the security council. Since March the SRSG
has done little else besides pursuing every possible avenue to forge
a political agreement among the "political leaders" (a UNOSOM
euphemism for the leaders of the 15 militias). Since the beginning of
March, Kouyuate has been shuttling back and forth between the
capitals on the Horn plus Cairo and New York to find a fresh angle to
Somalia's problems that would enable Aideed to return from his self-
imposed exile in Nairobi with preserved dignity and willing to put
phrases of peace and reconciliation into action. The problem is that
in his attempt to please all involved parties, including regional
powers with hegemonic aspirations, Kouyuate has found himself dealing
with crooks and tied up by contradictory promises. In the end the
current developments may put into jeopardy whatever futile chances
that once may have existed for a peaceful solution to the problems of
southern Somalia - and it is already a threatening his position in
New York.
    It all began in mid-March with the attempt to get two camps of
militias known as SNA and SSA to sign an agreement in Nairobi that
essentially boiled down to that they pledged to stand by the
agreement that Kouyate had them sign a year ago in Addis Ababa. It
was only after that Kouyate stopped paying their hotel bills (running
at $150,000 per day) that the signatures were produced. The agreement
stipulated that a two-step process would be initiated: A planning
meeting in Mogadishu on April 15 to work out the details for a
reconciliation conference in Mogadishu on May 15.
    Back in Somalia there were few tangible signs of this "peace
process". Tensions were mounting in and around the airport and the
Hawaadle clan who had held it prior to the arrival of the UNITAF
command in December 1992 now wanted it back when the American and
other Western forces pulled out. Although the Hawaadle militias were
loosely allied with Aideed's USC/SNA movement, Aideed's Habar Gedir
clan did not accept the Hawaadle road blocks that they put up along
the access road to the airport. Fighting erupted and the planning
meeting was relocated to Nairobi. Then, as fighting continued it was
rescheduled for April 25. The fighting spread to the southern port of
Merka and it was clear that major conflict between the militias of
Habar Gedir and Hawaadle was arising. In some of the worst combat
that Mogadishu had seen since the UN stopped the hunt for Aideed in
October last year, the Hawaadle were defeated and withdrew to their
strong-hold in the Hiraan region. The planning meeting, meanwhile,
had to be postponed for until May 10.
    However, as so often before, Somali political realities took
little notice of the course that UNOSOM tried to follow. Back in
Hiraan region, the Hawaadle cleared out all Habar Gedir militias from
the regional capital Beled Weyn. Then they went north and overrun the
town of Mataban, then they captured the town of Gurael - both places
held a substantial Habar Gedir population.
    If this had been the only problem the planned meetings could
probably have been held. After all, large-scale fighting has never
stopped UNOSOM in the past to hold simultaneous "peace conferences"
in neighbouring capitals. The signing ceremony of last year's
"reconciliation conference" in Addis Ababa had to be postponed due to
fresh fighting in Kismayo between two of the signatories of the
conference.
    A set of additional problems emerged in the current case. It
proved first of all impossible for Aideed to go back to Somalia. His
SNA alliance is extremely fragile and even within the different sub-
clans of Habar Gedir there is opposition to his leadership.
Basically, Aideed feared for his security if he was to go back to
Mogadishu. The other block of allied militias, the SSA or "Group of
Twelve" of Ali Mahdi loyals was no less conflict ridden. Within some
of the Abgal sub-clans there was a long-standing discontent over
their alliance with some of their former archenemies among the
Daarood clans' militias, and some of the smaller clans within the
alliance were upset with Ali Mahdi's failure to react against the
Habar Gedir purge of Hawaadle in Mogadishu. In the midst of this
turmoil, someone sneaks into UNOSOM's headquarters and walks off with
nearly $ 4 millions in an humiliating theft that now eventually is
being investigated by the Scotland Yard. It became clear that Kouyate
needed some form of distraction and a substantial carrot to wave with
if the scheduled meetings were going to come off ground.
    There has never been a better carrot for Somali unity than
recourse to Pan-Somalism and the notion of "Greater Somalia". The
only thing that all southern factions agree on is that the northern
proclamation of its secession in May 1991 is wrong. A southern leader
could not wish for a greater dignity than to come back as the person
who reunified the Somali territory. An early draft for the Addis
Ababa agreement actually contained the phrase "the territorial
integrity of Somalia is sacred". It was omitted at the time but in
subsequent security council resolutions, the secretary-general has
inserted similar phrases.
    So, Kouyate dug up Abdirahman "Tuur", the first president of the
independent Somaliland republic, in fact the person who declared its
independence. He had been living in London since he failed to get
reelected in May 1993. "Tuur" had also served as the chairman of the
northern movement SNM until spring 1993 and Kouyate was assured by
one of his advisors that this was still the case. In brief, Aideed
and Kouyate held meetings with "Tuur" in Addis Ababa and eventually
convinced him to renounce Somaliland's secession and declare that as
from now, the SNM would take full part in the talks held among the
southern factions. It will probably never be known precisely how
Kouyate managed to obtain "Tuur's" cooperation, but a few days after
the press conference a person closely allied with "Tuur" was
intercepted by the Ethiopian authorities on the Addis airport
carrying a very large sum of money.
    For a while it almost looked as if Kouyate had found a real
successful formula as far as the south was concerned. Aideed could
claim the credit for having "reunited" Somalia and that would ensure
his smooth return to Mogadishu. Having sown the seeds of a renewed
"Greater Somalia" fervour it was also very likely that inter-
factional strife would diminish. Furthermore, the Egyptians, and most
likely the secretary-general, would be pleased to se Somaliland
vanish. However, "Tuur" turned out to be just another headache for
Kouyate. Having barely announced "SNM's" participation in all future
talks it turns out that he is not longer the chairman and when
massive demonstrations against "Tuur" was held in nearly all the
major cities of Somaliland even Kouyate and his advisers became aware
that they had committed a fatal tactical error. To make things worse,
"Tuur" started making demands by urging that the already postponed
planning meeting should be rescheduled again.
    The date for the planning meeting had to be changed again. This
time it became May 30 with the reconciliation conference tagged for
"mid-June". If the leaders will be able to sign yet another agreement
on that very date, there is still a chance for Lansane Kouyate to get
back to the UN headquarters for the security council debate the next
day. But there is a good chance they no agreement will emerge and
even a better chance that the security council for once will look to
deeds more than to words. Since the latest postponement, 5 Nepalese
peace keepers have been shot dead and several wounded. One of the
wounded was later kidnapped from the UN military field hospital were
he was being treated. These are the meagre results of 18 months of UN
brokered peace keeping.
    In the meantime, Somalis all over the Horn have continued to
tend to their own affairs. In Somaliland the inter-clan field force
was recently completed with the 37 remaining members of the
Warsangeli clan joining it. In the south, the genuine clan leaders
joined by the Hiraab-agreement in January have continued their
activities to promote peace and reconciliation in a Somali way. When
recently fighting broke out between the Degode and Ajuran clans in
northern Kenya, the Imaam of Hiraab sent a representative to the area
to soothe the feelings and initiate dialogue. Other representatives
of the Imaam have travelled elsewhere to the Somali-inhabited
territories to take part in dialogues meetings way beyond UNOSOM's
control.
    The big question the security council will confront is whether
not Somalia would be better off without UNOSOM.
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SNU is an entirely independent newsletter devoted to critical
analysis of the political and humanitarian developments in Somalia
and Somaliland. SNU is edited and published by Dr. Bernhard Helander,
Uppsala University, Sweden. SNU is produced with support from the
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden.
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