CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS - 1986 FACTION FIGHT DOCUMENTS
[IS Canada, 1986]
MOTION AGAINST PERMANENT FACTIONALISM
Democratic centralism is based upon the principle of "freedom of
discussion and unity in action" once a decision has been taken in
a socialist organization. Members of a revolutionary socialist
group have the right to organize into factions to present their
views to the organization as a whole. This requires, however that
any factional grouping present its views for discussion and
debate in open forums of the organization. For the past fifteen
months in Toronto, we have had a situation of unprincipled
permanent factionalism by a minority which has organized
according to a hidden agenda and which has failed to openly
declare its political basis and objectives. (See "Motion to
Create Two Toronto Branches") The activity of this unprincipled
minority has led the majority of the I.S to support the division
of the Toronto Branch into two separate branches. We repudiate
permanent factionalism as foreign to the norms of democratic
centralism and will call for disciplinary action should
unprincipled factionalism continue.
[August 1986]
MOTION TO CREATE TWO TORONTO I.S. BRANCHES
Preamble:
Fifteen months ago, the IS formally resolved a brief faction
fight with the adoption at the May, 1985 Organizing Committee
meeting of a section from the document "The Way Ahead". It was
believed at the time that there was enough basis of political
agreement throughout the organization on the basic perspective
contained in "The Way Ahead" to enable common work around a
common perspective to heal the divisions which especially plagued
the Toronto branch.
It is now clear, and has been for some time, that the
factional divisions in Toronto have not disappeared. The last
fifteen months have seen a persistent pattern of argument in
Toronto over issues such as day school proposals, proposals for
public meetings on South Africa, educational proposals, coverage
in the newspaper (most notably over the recent events in the
Philippines), approach to solidarity work around strikes, and,
most significantly, over the proposal for a six person slate for
Toronto branch coordinators. In principle, of course, such debate
can and should be a healthy process by which arguments and
disagreements are formulated, debate ensues, and the organization
or branch arrives democratically at a majority position, which
all comrades agree loyally to implement. Such a process is at the
core of our concept of democratic centralism. But debate in the
Toronto branch has not been conducted according to these norms.
On the contrary, debate has been unprincipled and factional in
character. Unprincipled because the main political arguments have
not been aired openly in the branch meetings -- but instead in
private discussions where unaccountable charges tend to be the
order of the day; and factional because virtually all arguments
are conducted in terms of pre-established sides or groupings
which overwhelmingly reflect the factional line of division of 18
months ago. We are, in other words, in a situation of permanent
factionalism in Toronto in which there is an ongoing attempt to
create and exaggerate political differences in order to justify
factionalism, in which the central branch is unable to give a
decisive lead to the national organization.
Eighteen months of permanent factionalism have demonstrated
that the two groupings in Toronto are, at present, incapable of
collaborating in a common branch. While the organization's other
main branches, Ottawa and Montreal, have managed to grow and
develop, the Toronto branch is slightly smaller now than it was
15 months ago, and the internal atmosphere has rarely been worse.
It is time now to make a decisive break with the legacy of
permanent factionalism which, in thelong [sic] run, threatens to
break up the whole of the organization. Since genuine attempts at
a political resolution to these divisions have failed, there is
no alternative -- short of a split or expulsions -- but to impose
an organizational solution.
Therefore be it resolved:
1. That the present Toronto branch be divided into two branches
to be known as "Toronto Central" and "Toronto East"
2. That the membership of Toronto Central consist of the
present branch coordinating team (Mark, Michelle, Sandra and
David M.) and their political supporters, while the membership of
Toronto East consist of the defeated slate from the May
coordinators election (Cindy, Alain, Abbie, Paul, Nancy and John)
and their political supporters:
3. That the idefitication [sic] of political supporters of each
grouping shall be made on the basis of a declaration by branch
members; no member may belong to both branches;
4. That the division into two branches shall persist for a
period of at least 12 months;
5. That the division of the branch is to go into effect
immediately;
6. That the "Toronto Central" branch is to function as the
national centre and to responsible for editing and producing
Socialist Worker, maintaining "Socialist Worker Books",
sustaining all national financial accounts, and organizing all
national meetings and speaking tours;
7. That only the "Toronto Central" branch shall continue to use
the IS office for branch meetings; while "Toronto East" can use
office facilities for the production of leaflets and so on by
agreement with the coordinators of the "Toronto Central" branch;
8. That the geographic lineof [sic] division between the two
branches be Sherbourne St., the area east comprising the area for
street sales workplace sales and strike interventions of "Toronto
East", the area west comprising the area for "Toronto Central";
9. That both branches shall have the right to participate in
city-wide rallies and demonstrations (e.g. Labour Day,
International Women's Day) and that coordinators of both branches
shall discuss details beforehand of any such areas of joint
intervention;
10. That present areas of work be divided between the two
branches on the following basis: Ontario Coalition for Abortion
Clinics and the Chubb strike be assigned to "Toronto East", while
York University and the University of Toronto be assigned to
"Toronto Central"> That "Toronto East" be allowed to continue its
workplace sale at 4900 Yonge St. despite the fact that this
location is west of Sherbourne St. These assignments reflect the
already existing divisions in these areas of work. Neither branch
is to intervene in an area assigned to the other branch;
11. That any disputes or conflicts over areas of work are to be
submitted to the Steering Committee, the Organizing Committee or
the National Convention for resolution;
12. That both branches shall agree not to "raid" the contacts of
the other branch in an effort to recruit them from the periphery
of one branch to that of another. Any cases of contract raiding
shall be met disciplinary action by the steering committee, OC or
national convention.
13. That any individual member in either branch may apply for
membership in the other branch. Acceptance of their membership
requires a majority vote of branch members.
OPEN LETTER TO THE CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS [Sept. 1986]
Dear Comrades:
We are taking the very unusual step of writing this letter
because we are dismayed by recent developments inside the
Canadian International Socialists. The manner in which the
Organizing Committee decided on 3 August to split the Toronto
branch in our view threatens the very existence of the IS.
It is only this urgent danger which has led us to intervene. We
believe that the revolutionary marxist tradition which is our
common inheritance as members of the same international tendency,
and to which the SWP has made some contribution, makes it our
duty to warn against the path now taken by the majority.
We discussed the factional situation in some depth with David
McNally, Brian MacDougall, and Abbie Bakan when they visited
Britain in July. One issue considered was the proposal to split
the Toronto branch, presented to us by David as a means of
relieving some tensions, and reducing factional polarization.
While not at that stage opposing the proposal, we argued that it
could not be a solution, and that it involved various dangers.
We made it clear that in our view the source of the divisions in
the Toronto branch lay not in political differences but in
personal factors exacerbated by widespread confusion over
perspectives. We stressed to David, Brian, and Abbie the
importance of mutual tolerance in a small revolutionary group,
and we urged them to start from what they had in common, namely
the Marxist tradition, and not the petty matters which divided
them.
At no stage during our lengthy and friendly conversation with him
did David state or imply anything which suggested that he
dissented from this broad assessment. He explicitly agreed with
us that disciplinary measures against the minority were
undesirable, and argued that splitting the branch was an
alternative to such measures.
He has obviously changed his mind. The enormously detailed,
13-point resolution passed at the OC is clearly a disciplinary
measure, as was stated by the movers. It places the minority, now
in the Toronto East branch, on markedly unfavourable terms
compared with the majority in Toronto Central. Moveover, its
terms are such as almost to guarantee that this is only the first
in a series of disciplinary measures whose likely outcome will be
the expulsion of the minority.
Take, for instance, clause 12 of the resolution, which not only
forbids the branches 'raiding' each other's contacts, but states:
"Any case of contact raiding shall be met with disciplinary
action by the steering committee, OC or national convention." The
idea of 'contact raiding' is itself an absurdity, since it
implies that the two branches are in competition with each other,
so that one's gain is the other's loss. Is this really how two
units of a revolutionary organization should relate to one
another? Any contact made by a branch is a gain to the group as a
whole, not the property of the branch concerned.
Clause 12 shows how deeply a factional mentality has penetrated
the minds of the OC resolution's drafters. It also virtually
guarantees that there will be occasions for further disciplinary
measures against the minority, since "contact raiding" is such a
vague concept, into which almost anything can be made to fit. For
example, a member of the East branch could be disciplined for
talking to someone to whom a member of the Central branch had
already sold a paper on the same march.
The OC resolution is not, therefore, as it claims, an alternative
to, but rather a step towards "a split or expulsions." Were there
any doubts on that score the arguments used to justify it, and
the atmosphere in which it was passed would remove them. (Our
information on the OC meeting itself comes from the only
independent observer present, Ahmed Shawki of the International
Socialist Organization, who shares our deep concern about
developments in Canada. We very much regret that David McNally
did not use the opportunity of his brief visit to Britain in late
August to discuss recent developments with us.)
This is most evident in David McNally's speech introducing the
resolution. He made it clear that splitting the branch was "a
punitive measure", and declared that "the situation looks pretty
grim for the minority". Moreover, he proclaimed himself "a
polarizer", who had been "centrally involved in refactionalizing
the situation." Many of the contributions which followed were
even worse, with remarks like "You are being kicked the fuck
out", comparisons of the minority with the Spartacists, and Brian
MacDougall openly warning that "further measures" might be
necessary.
We find it difficult to think of any meeting in the history of
our own organization, which has had many bitter faction fights,
which was conducted in such an atmosphere. We are not afraid of
vigorous arguments, nor of polarization, but only as part of
political clarification which unites, and raises the level of the
organization.
Yet what is the issue at stake here? Essentially that the Toronto
minority has been engaged in "unprincipled and factional"
behaviour. Now we hold no particular brief for the minority. When
Abbie was in Britain, we were very critical of some actions of
the minority, notably the decision to run a slate for the Toronto
branch co-ordinators in May.
Perhaps partly as a result of our arguments, Abbie subsequently
conceded both at a Toronto branch meeting and at the OC that the
"slate motion had helped to refactionalize the situation." But
her self-criticism, far from being welcomed as a conciliatory
gesture, was seized on by the majority as the main charge against
the minority. This refusal to allow the minority room in which
to retreat leaves us in no doubt that factionalism is endemic on
both sides of the argument in Canada.
David contended that "the norms of democratic centralism have
been systematically violated" by the minority, and that
"democratic centralism is very, very important even for very
small groups cut off from the corrective influence of the class."
He gave the instance of the Bolsheviks in 1907-10, when the
defeat of the 1905 revolution and the consequent collapse of the
workers' meant that the political differences between Lenin and
Bogdanov could not be put to the test of the class struggle.
Lenin was forced to resort to organizational measure, using the
rather dubious device of an extended meeting of the editorial
board of "Proletary" to expel the Bogdanovists.
One of the important qualities of a revolutionary is a sense of
proportion. To draw an analogy between the Bolsheviks in 1909 and
the IS in 1986 is to show a grievous lack of this sense. The
Bolsheviks had just been through a revolution in which the first
soviets were formed, and in which they had organized an
unsuccessful insurrection. As a result of the revolution, the
Bolsheviks had grown to a mass party, numbering 46,173 members in
1907.
Lenin's struggle against Bogdanov was part of the painful, but
necessary retreat from tactics appropriate to revolutionary
situation, of the process of adjustment to a downturn so deep
that the Bolsheviks numbered only a few hundred in 1910. Bogdanov
was a substantial figure in the revolutionary movement, whose
philosophical writings had an enormous influence then and later,
and who had a major following among the Bolsheviks themselves.
His differences with lenin were political, concerning the whole
question of revolutionary strategy and tactics, of whether, for
example, revolutionaries should as a matter of principle boycott
bourgeois elections.
No analogy exists between this situation and that of IS Canada.
The Bolsheviks at their weakest were far more important than a
group which can barely muster forty members at a national summer
school. Above all, there are no political differences of
principle involved. Lenin expelled Bogdanov because he was an
ultra-left. But no-one has seriously argued that the Toronto
minority have deviated from revolutionary Marxism to a comparable
extent.
Moreover, the "norms of democratic centralism" are not timeless
principles whose application does not vary according to time,
place, and situation. As we wrote in a letter to the Australian
IS whose arguments we gather have been misused in Canada, "the
need for democratic centralism arises from the need for a
revolutionary party which seeks to win workers to Marxism on the
basis of its practical involvement in the class struggle.
Democratic centralism is the mechanism through which the party
draws in the experience of the workers' battles in which it
intervenes, reflects on and seeks to generalize from this
experience, and applies the lessons arrived at in further
interventions in the class struggle.
"Democratic centralism is thus only fully realized by a
revolutionary party with deep roots in the working class which
allow it to engage in agitation around immediate issues of class
struggle. This none of the organizations in the IS Tendency, the
British SWP included, is generally able to do. We mostly engage
in different sorts of propaganda, general and concrete. moreover,
it would be pretentious and harmful for groups the size of IS
Australia [or Canada] to have top-heavy "Leninist" organizational
structures.
"Nevertheless, any revolutionary organization needs to have a
mechanism to appraise work done, determine priorities, and
allocate resources. There must be democratic procedures for
hammering out the tasks of the organization. These proceedings
are beside the point unless: (1) they involve genuine discussion
of what is to be done - which permanent factions preclude; (2)
they terminate in decisions that are binding on all.
While these principles are essential to the functioning of any
revolutionary organization, even their application requires
considerable tact and sensitivity. As comrades in Canada know all
too well, it is very hard to be a member of a small propaganda
circle like the IS. The gap between our ideas - workers' power,
international socialism - and the harsh reality of capitalist
'normality' is so vast. The kind of leadership required for such
a group requires a strong emphasis on political clarity, on the
ideas of the Marxist tradition, combined with considerable
patience with and tolerance of the quirks, weaknesses, even
"deviations" of the members.
What we have instead in Canada at present is the appropriation of
the revolutionary tradition to justify organizational measures
which can only seriously damage, if not destroy the group.
Certainly to demand, as did one speaker at the OC, of the
minority that they say "I repudiate, I renounce" their past
crimes has nothing to do with the "norms of democratic
centralism" in any circumstances, and is more reminiscent of
Stalin's show-trials.
The majority will no doubt protest that they have been goaded
into this behaviour by the factionalism of the minority. We do
not dispute that the minority have acted factionally. We agree
that permanent factions are a paralysing, debilitating evil in a
revolutionary organization. But the truth is that factionalism is
endemic on all sides - that apolitical gossip, innuendo, insults
and manoeuvering are rife throughout the organization, not simply
within the Toronto branch, but also between the two factions
there and the other main branches in Ottawa and montreal. To
treat the Toronto minority as responsible for the factionalism is
to confuse a symptom with the disease.
Attacking the Toronto minority has become a substitute for
analyzing the underlying causes of the crisis which has now
afflicted the IS for nearly two years. But in the absence of such
an analysis there is no reason to believe that the crisis will
not continue, even if, as seems all too likely, the minority is
expelled. David McNally began to probe the roots of the crisis in
his document "The Way Ahead", approved as defining the group's
perspective by the May 1985 OC.
He identified the fundamental problem as the IS's failure fully
to recognize and to adapt to the downturn in the class struggle
which developed in 1976-7 soon after the group was formed. Even
when the IS began to face up to the downturn in 1979-80, and lay
much more stress on general Marxist propaganda, David argued, "in
practice...we specialized in propaganda...and treated our active
interventions as a duty which contributed little if anything to
building the group today. Rather than seeking to combine our
education and activity...as closely as possible, we operated with
an approach that artificially separated them. And this artificial
separation of education and activity permeated all our work.
Education increasingly became an end in itself ( what "holds us
together" in the downturn ). Our interventions drifted aimlessly
- sometimes with exaggerated expectations, sometimes with no
expectations...To the degree that we had perspectives, they were
not worked out in branch meetings, at the OC and in the
convention. Instead, they were arrived at in private, informal
and unaccountable discussions between a handful of
comrades...Moreover, leadership itself became top-down and
educational in character - the job of leadership being to "teach"
members the politics." (p.8)
But if David's analysis was cogent, his proposed remedies were
disastrously mistaken. It was through the paper that he sought to
overcome the separation of education and activity. "Our paper
strives to connect socialist theory, politics, analysis and
proposals to the real-life struggles of workers today. The paper
is our tool for bringing about - even if in the most modest of
ways - what Rosa Luxemburg called "the fusion of sciences and the
workers", the fusion of Marxist theory and working-class
experience. The paper is thus a lifeline in which the current
flows both ways: from the working class to the socialist
organization (in the form of the experiences of working-class
struggle ), and from the socialist organization to the
working-class ( in the form of our analysis, arguments and
proposals for working-class struggles ). ( pp.10-11 )
This conception of the paper implied, David argued a
re-orientation of the group. "In order to organize our active
relationship to the working class...., the paper must be the
centre around which we organize all of our work in the IS. That
requires that we feed our experience of working-class struggle
back into the organization (starting with the branch meetings ),
that we discuss, debate and analyse that experience, that we amp
out perspectives on our interventions and the approach we will
carry in Workers' Action, and that we return to the branch
meeting to evaluate the use of the paper in our interventions.
Discussion of the paper - our workplace and street sales, our
strike interventions, our interventions in demonstrations and
coalitions, and out coverage in all areas - must be the core of
all our branch meetings." ( p. 11 )
This perspective seemed to us completely mistaken, and we argued
strongly against it at the international meeting of IS groups in
July 1985. In the first place, David was proposing a paper of the
upturn in conditions of downturn. ( See C. Harman, "The
Revolutionary Paper", IS 2:24 [1984]. ) The kind of paper he
described is appropriate to a situation where workers are on the
offensive and generalizing from their experience of struggle. In
a situation of downturn, where struggles are fragmented and
defensive, where the best one can hope for are bureaucratic mass
strikes like Operation Solidarity or the British miners' strike,
the conclusions that worker draw from their experience are likely
to be demoralized and reactionary ones. Thus the miners' defeat
has vastly strengthened the position of right-wing social
democracy in Britain. It is therefore dangerous nonsense to
argue, as David did, that "especially in a downturn, it is
critical to grasp every bit of experience of struggle and to
discuss in a detailed and a critical manner" ( p. 7, emphasis
added ).
The appropriate paper for a downturn is one in which the main
emphasis is upon political analysis and explanation, providing
both members of the organization and their contacts with the
overall perspective on the basis of which they can make sense of
the setbacks suffered by the workers' movement, and also
recognize the possibilities of renewed class struggle in the
future. Instead, for a period in mid-1985 Workers' Action became
little more than a strike sheet. Fortunately, renamed Socialist
Worker, it shifted back to much greater emphasis on politics last
autumn.
Nevertheless, the same mistaken perspective remained in place. it
was re-affirmed at January's convention ( see D. McNally, "The
task is to Build a Socialist Organization", SW February 1986 ).
In particular, the idea that "discussion of the paper ... must be
the core of all our branch meetings" went unchallenged, even
though it is gravely mistaken. Even in a period of upturn the
focus of branch meetings should be political discussion, though
then it would be closely related to immediate struggles. The
emphasis on Marxist ideas should be even greater in a period of
downturn, when the socialist political analysis we offer at our
meetings provides those attracted to our ideas with the
generalization which they are denied in the outside world.
To devote one branch meeting a month to detailed discussion of
the latest issue of SW, as the Ottowa [sic] branch does, is a
recipe for internalization and navel-gazing, especially, since
the discussion appears to focus heavily on matters of style, and
layout rather than on the political content of the paper ( see
"Ottowa Branch Report - January 1986 IS Convention", pp. 17-19,
25-6 ). Indeed, the perspective is one guaranteed to
institutionalize factional nit-picking and the kind of obsession
with organizational minutae displayed by the Ottowa report, which
devotes no less than 36 pages to a branch whose size varied over
the year between 11 and 15 members!
We believe that the IS has yet to think through the implications
of the downturn for its practice. The devaluation of the group's
propagandism of the early 1980s which both sides in Toronto now
tend to go in for seems to us one-sided. General Marxist
propaganda is the anchor of a revolutionary group in a period of
downturn, when its audience is likely to be primarily
individuals, often students, seeking political explanations,
rather than rank-and-file workers generalizing from their
experience of struggle. We certainly learned things from the IS
through our members' visits to Canada which have proved helpful
in Britain. The source of what David calls the IS's "artificial
separation of education and activity" lies to some degree in a
failure to recognize the importance of concrete propaganda, that
is, of relating general Marxist ideas to specific issues and
struggles.
In general, the conditions of downturn and our own puny size make
it difficult for us to engage in agitation, advancing demands and
proposals which can take the struggle forward. but we can still
reach a wider audience by connecting our overall analysis of the
world to crises which may be pushing some section into activity
of some kind. it is important to grasp this because downturns are
not flat and empty, but often lead to volcanic eruptions, to
bureaucratic mass strikes.
A number of groups in the IS tradition have gone through the
experience of having to adapt temporarily to such episodes of
struggle - IS Canada during Operation Solidarity in 1982, the SWP
during the 1984-5 miners' strike, IS Denmark during the Easter
1985 strikes, OSE during the strikes against Papandreou's
austerity policies. Even less dramatic incidents can create new
openings, as the wave of campus unrest over South Africa did for
the ISO is spring 1985, or the Hawke government's attacks on
living standards may do for IS Australia.
To build a revolutionary organization in the present downturn
requires as its basis a political routine of street sales, weekly
discussion meetings, and student work designed to win individuals
on the basis of general Marxist propaganda when the kind of
opportunity just described presents itself. We believe that the
IS has yet systematically to address the question of building in
the downturn.
Support for this diagnosis is provided by the Ottowa branch
report to the August OC, which concludes: "The branch has begun
to feel that over the last year, and particularly since January,
we have failed to approach our activities primarily as
opportunities to make propaganda. thus our interventions have
tended to focus on the technicalities of the given strike or
coalition, while not arguing enough politics to justify the
effort expended and while letting activities such as public
meetings, study groups, etc slide somewhat." ( p. 3 ) To remedy
this situation a number of proposals are made: regular study
groups, public meetings every eight weeks, bi-weekly streets
rather than "low workplace and union meeting sales", regular
branch discussions on concrete political issues.
This self-criticism and its proposed remedies represent a real
shift away from the mistaken "Way Ahead" perspective. The tragedy
is that rather than their providing the stimulus for a discussion
on how to reorient the group, they were lost amid the factional
hubbub of the resolution on Toronto, of which the Ottowa comrades
appear, if anything, to be more vehement supporters than the
Toronto majority itself.
The assault on the Toronto minority amounts to making the letter
a scapegoat for the drift and crisis which the IS has suffered in
recent years. The minority are not the source of the group's
problems. These arise, as we have argued, from a failure to think
through the implications of the downturn. In the absence of such
an analysis and consequent re-orientation the IS in 1984 was
fertile ground for factionalism. The occasion was provided by the
disintegration of the core of the national leadership, due to the
personal antagonisms which developed between David and Abbie,
which unleashed both associated conflicts in Toronto, and
accumulated resentments of the old leadership in other branches.
it is the combination of the lack of a clear perspective, and a
welter of petty, personal conflicts, not any political
differences, which underlies the factionalism.
Nor did the may 1985 OC which supposedly ended the "first"
faction fight represent any real resolution. In the first place,
the perspective agreed there, embodied in "The Way Ahead", did
not, as we have argued, offer correct guidance on how to build
the group. Secondly, that OC meeting very much reflected the
dominance of a bloc of the Toronto majority with the leaderships
of the Montreal and Ottowa branches, united by little more than a
common hostility to Abbie and her supporters. We warned at the
1985 international meeting that such a bloc, lacking any clear
and principled political basis, was not a stable entity. The
resumption of factional hostilities, which began with the dispute
over the editorship of SW at the convention, reflected the
inevitable disintegration of this unprincipled bloc rather than
any crime committed by the Toronto minority.
How then, can the crisis be resolved? The majority at the August
OC appeared to think that the solution lies in the surgical
removal of the minority first from the Toronto branch, but
ultimately from the organization. This is an extremely
short-sighted and irresponsible attitude to take. In the first
place, a group of eighty cannot afford to lose any members,
especially ones who are, for all their mistakes, serious,
committed, and active revolutionaries such as those in the
minority.
Secondly, a split always costs more than those actually expelled.
Other become demoralized by the arguments, and by the shrunken
size of the group, and leave as well. Let us give an example from
our own experience. In 1975 we expelled a substantial number of
members in Birmingham. We were right to do so: a major political
difference had arisen leading to serious breaches of discipline
on their part. Moreover, the disagreement reflected pressures
from the outside, since many of those expelled were engineering
workers who were being pulled rightwards by the onset of the
downturn. Nevertheless, our Birmingham district was severely
damaged by the split, to the extent that, even today, from being
one of our strongest big-city organizations in the early 1970s,
it is now one of our weakest. Splits and expulsions, even when
unavoidable, exact a very high price.
Thirdly, what guarantee is there that getting rid of the Toronto
minority will be the end of the matter? The IS went through a
succession of splits in the late 1970s during its last period of
crisis. If the minority in Toronto are expelled on an arbitrary
and factional basis, why stop there? There are growing tensions
between the Toronto majority and Ottowa on the one hand, and the
Montreal branch on the other. And once Montreal has been "sorted
out", what there to stop the victors from fighting over what will
by then be very meagre spoils? Those who live by the sword perish
by the sword.
The IS is in a fragile enough state as it is: the fact that
barely half the membership attended the August summer school/OC
is not a good augury. The outcome of the succession of expulsions
to which the present path taken by the majority is leading could
be a mere rump, unable to produce a monthly paper or even to
pretend to be a national organization.
It is because we are desperately concerned to avoid such a
disastrous outcome that we have written this letter. Nothing of
substance divides the members of the IS. Indeed they have far
more in common - namely the revolutionary socialist tradition.
Re-uniting the organization requires recognizing this, and seeing
also that building a revolutionary group involves enormous
resources of patience and tolerance, and a sense of proportion.
All these qualities are sadly lacking in IS Canada at present,
but there is no reason why its members, who we know are deeply
committed to the group and to the ideas it embodies, should not
be able to recover them.
We appeal:
1) to all members to step back from their present factional
alignments;
2) to supporters of the majority to abjure the use of
disciplinary measures against the minority;
3) to supporters of the Toronto minority to abjure the kind
of factional nitpicking which helped to provoke the present
crisis;
4) to all members to use the discussion period leading up to
the national convention to hammer out a perspective that can
build the group.
This letter is intended as a contribution to the process of
political clarification essential to re-uniting the group. There
is still time to save the IS.
Yours fraternally
Tony Cliff and Alex Callinicos for the Central Committee of
the Socialist Workers' Party ( Britain )
Draft
Steering Committee
Coppy [sic] to Branches 25 September 1986
Crisis in the IS - First Contribution from Montreal.
It is indeed an exceptional situation for the SWP Central
Committee to intervene in our organisation with its open letter.
We welcome the letter as a fair description of the state of the
organisation, and, more importantly, as a framework for at least
beginning the much needed debate inside our group.
In May David McNally came to Montreal (with Paula and Kogan) to
present his view of the crisis in Toronto. He first stressed that
there had been a considrable increase in the level of activity in
TO around SW sales, demonstrations and strike visits. It was
agreed that it was work of this kind that gave any prospect of
healing the branch. No diffferences of political substance were
identified between the two sides in TO. The logic of David
attacking the minority with disciplinary measures was seen to
inevitably escalte into a national fight (as Montreal would come
to the support of the minority and Ottawa the majority and so
on...). Such a fight would have many casualties, since it would
be started on poison not political clarity. In this context,
creating two branches was discussed as a possible alternative to
an unprincipled national fight (some members in Montreal liked
the idea, others opposed it). Possibly the two sides might begin
to calm down if they didn't have to see each other every week.
such a move implied the political failure of David to unify the
branch around the work of building the IS, not a disciplinary
action against the minority. David, Paula and Kogan agreed that
there were excellent comrades in the minority and that the
minority pulled their weight in paper sales, attendance at
meetings, demos, and pickets. It was also state many times by
them that Montreal was a healthy branch. To us in Montreal it was
clear that punitive action against the minority should not, and
we assumed would not, be taken. Their visit ended in an air of
good faith.
David said he would phone to continue these fruitful talks before
going to the International meeting in Britain (he didn't).
(Incidentally, the April OC had asked David to send copies to
branches of the report he was going to give to the International
meeting, but he didn't. When challenged in August, he promised to
do so but still hasn't.)
There was surprise and extreme anger therefore in August when
heard reports of the OC and received copies the two main
resolutions. We were not informed before the OC that anything of
this kind was going to be raised at all. In fact we received no
proper political preparation for the OC at all, just the flyer
for the Summer School. In contrast, comrades in the Ottawa branch
were consulted some three weeks before, and invited down to
prepare the resolutions. (By the way, some people seem to want to
draw significance out of the absence of montreal comrades at the
OC. Several comrades had made it clear in April that they could
not attend an early August OC. Near the day it looked as if we
could get a car load of 5 down, but when the car couldn't go the
others could not rake together the train fares.)
Everything positive that we had discussed with Dave in may was
gone by the August OC. Gone was the recognition that in fact
there had been improvements in Toronto through increased
activity, paper sales etc. by the body of good comrades on both
sides of the TO branch. The two branch proposal was no longer a
means of creating space for the two sides to build without some
of the poison. It had become a Frankenstein to punish the
minority for all our sins and by an implication exhonerate [sic]
the existing IS leadership around David.
Gone also, we discovered pretty quickly after the OC, was the
idea of Montreal as a healthy branch doing good work. (It is
after all the only Branch in Canada to have grown during the past
18 months of crisis -from 8 to 17- which doesn't make us
necessarily correct but does give us the right to be considered
genuine). It became clear that we were next for the boot.
This became in a sense the last straw. We have had many
longstanding [sic] disagreements with David and the "centre".
Now, out of intensified political disagreement , (and basic
self-defence), it was decided, by especially those comrades who
had experience of conventions, OCs etc, to formally go into
opposition.
On 14 August Joe Herbertson resigned from the OC Steering
Committee. On the phone David accepted this as he had now come to
the conclusion that David, Bryan and Sandra were in political
opposition to Joe.
We wrote on 27 August of our intention to oppose the August OC
decisions (or more to the point the political thinking behind
them), and to attempt a serious pre-Convention debate to get a
more honest accounting of our problems and set out some new
perspectives. Since we clearly do not have the sympathy of the
dominant leadership in the IS (eg. the current steering committe
[sic] members, who in turn have had a comfortable numerical
majority at teh [sic] Convention and the two Ocs this year) we
see the need to fight as a principled, temporary faction. We
promised an initial letter early in September. This was delayed
because of the healthy demands on our time (see Oct SW), and also
because as we talked things through it became clear to us that
things were even worse than we thought. Now much of what we would
have had to deal with in our initial letter has been covered by
the SWP Central Committee's Open letter.
We welcome the intervention of the SWP, and accept the broad
framework of their letter as the starting point of debate. Below
we state 7 basic themes we take as central to the SWP letter, and
then expand on each of them. This remains an initial letter,
which will need to be followed up with specific documents on the
various aspects appropriate for developing a solid perspective by
Convention (namely, branch building, work in the colleges,
contacts with workers, campaigns and coalitions, Socialist Worker
etc etc.).
1. The crisis threatens the very existence of the IS.
The seriousness of our problems is highlighted by the fact that
the present alignments, based as they are on an unhappy blend of
politics and personalism, represent roughly a potential 50:50
division in the group. If things continue unchecked, leave alone
possible expulsions, the organization could well fall apart or
split in two.
2. A serious debate in the organization, leading up to Convention
next January is essential. This will inevitably be sharp and
often heated. In so far as it leads to clarification, and a new
set of perspectives that allow us to build, we may be able to
limit the casualties. In the past we have tended to fudge. In a
desire for unity we did not debate clearly why David's "Building
in the Downturn" document for the 1985 February convention
(signed by 18 IS comrades) was wrong, nor did we honestly deal
with why it was necessary for Abbie to stand down as National
Secretary in May. Therefore, some of the political problems
associated with David's original document, or the legacy of
Abbie's method of organising, could raise their heads at a later
date in different contexts, thereby limiting our progress in
developing some good perspectives and practices for building the
group. Underneath the personalism identified in the SWP letter is
a history of problems that need to be dealt with, although not in
an inward looking fashion. We must not be afraid of polarisation
if it begins to create some political clarity. part of developing
new perspectives is some very honest accounting of how we've been
conducting ourselves this past year or so. Nor will it be enough
to bemoan the poison between certain members in Ottawa and
Montreal. We have to find the political causes, and resolve them.
3. What has passed as political debate has often been a welter of
petty, personal conflicts.
Apart from Dave and Abbie, the two sides in TO include a number
of people whose personal relationships broke up in bitterness. No
doubt this provided fuel for personalism and poison. However, why
has it persisted for so long? The answer is that this sort of
personal factionalism has political roots, and will not disappear
by self-restraint and a cold shower. We have in fact inherited a
legacy of running the group, established by Dave and Abbie, that
puts sustaining personal control high on the priorities. Many
people with talent and energy have been demoralized or driven out
of the group if they were seen as some challenge to the
"leadership". This situation was perpetuated by a system of
patronage in the branches. Disagreements over activity would be
resolved in terms of who had control of the branch, not what was
the perspective for building that particular branch. The legacy
is that we are terribly underdeveloped. We simply do not have a
wide layer of independent thinking, confident branch builders
that would form the cadre of our organisation. This has very
seriously damaged our ability to debate our problems.
Perhaps the most striking remaining product of this legacy
is Bryan McDougal [sic], whose desire for top-down control, rigid
moralism and his instinctive reliance on "punishment" (of others)
as a means of dealing with disagreements, forced the Ottawa
comrades to take the very unusual steps of barring him from any
role of leadership and influence in the branch in 1984. Despite
his claimed "rehabilitation", it is clear from his dealings in
the national style of leadership is still a real problem.
There is nothing controversial in this as an account of
history. Dave, Abbie and Bryan have all admitted it on various
occasions since then. Dave describes the situation of his
leadership quite well in the passage quoted by the SWP(p9). But
that passage would even more accurately describe the present
situation. things have not improved in these respects; if
anything the situation is worse.
Take as one example the way Dave has responded to political
criticisms to his editorship of the paper. In December, 1985, the
Montreal branch had a number of pre-Convention discussions on
the paper (see the document written up at that time, Appendix 1).
Informally Dave admitted that he would welcome a change in role,
a replenishing of his political batteries etc. However he was
worried that no-one had the capability to take over yet. John
Bell then agreed to have a go, if he had the help and support of
the comrades in TO. By the eve of the January 1986 Convention
Dave argued a different line, namely that any challenge to his
editorship would be exploited by Abbie and reopen the past
faction fight. In addition it became obvious to us that John's
editorship would be sabotaged even were he to be elected.
Therefore John decided not to stand in the elections for editor.
(Incidently we agreed under pressure from David to withdraw the
document on SW from the Convention, not wanting to reopen the old
faction fight and conceding that the document had arrived in TO
only a few days before Convention. This was a political mistake,
and in retrospect an example of what the SWP open letter refers
to as the unprincipled block against Abbie. in the event it was
obvious that Dave had wildly exaggerated the possibility of Abbie
making any significant impact on the Convention. Even in terms of
personalism the argument was a storm in a teacup. What was really
the case is that Dave can not tolerate personal criticism. Dave
later, on many occasions, argued that the lesson from this sordid
affair must be to argue on political principles out in the open,
with documents released sufficiently in advance for comrades to
digest them. We agreed. However, was Dave's handling of the run
up to the August OC any the better?) In January Dave reported to
us in Montreal on the phone that he would probably stand down as
editor within four months. He subsequently added 4 loyalists to
the Ed board, and reported in montreal after our day School that
he would now stay on. In a new change of tack he now argued that
our criticisms were inward looking, and not political. (Take a
look at the infamous, withdrawn, SW document to see whether we
were guilty of such a crime. We would certainly not claim it to
be a perfect document, certainly now that so much additional
water has passed under the bridge.) By August Nancy and John from
the minority were off the ED Board and a criterion for pasting up
the paper even became subject to a loyalty pledge to David and
the majority coordinating team (see August 13 point resolution.)
We have come full circle. Dave has resisted a serious debate
about the political content of the paper. instead of giving a
political lead, shaping the paper, solliciting [sic] articles and
making the paper begin to make what the SWP letter calls concrete
propaganda, he has instead responded by protecting his personal
control.
To raise these matters is not to revert to personalism, but to
begin to recognise that there are some very unhealthy and
unaccountable methods of giving leadership and direction in our
organisation. We have to break with the petty personalism that
has plagued the IS. To make any progress comrades are going to
have to break with some almost instinctive responses to line up
on the basis of personal loyalties. But to have this debate, and
still have Dave and Bryan in effective control would be to fudge
one of the more prickly problems and resort to damaging
sentamentalism [sic]. The personalism and poison has part of its
political roots in the personal desire for control by some of our
leading comrades.
For those who have followed the situation in the ISO in the
States, who could argue that it has not been valuable to create
space for new people to take over the reigns and remove Cal and
Barbara Winslow from leadership?
As the SWP letter highlights, all this has been made very much
worse by the absense [sic] of perspectives for seriously building
the IS; but it has also been a block to developing fresh
perspectives. As we have tried in practice to begin to develop a
practice for qualitative and quantitative growth in Montreal the
process of generalising our lessons to the rest of the group has
been slowed because of this unhealthy internal atmosphere. The
very same comrades will say in almost one breath that we are
going good work but we are wreckers! it is not personalism in a
small group to see that certain individuals are important (in
both a positive and negative sense). So the question of who we
elect to responsible positions in the IS at Convention for the
coming year (editor, sec, steering committee, tres., branch
coordinators etc) is part of resolving our crisis. As long as we
remember, of course, that it will all be bullshit if we don't
have a good open debate on perspectives running up to the
Convention.
4. There is no perspective for building the IS
(the group has stagnated for many years. in practice we are
trying to develop a set of perspectives in Montreal, and we
certainly have convinced ourselves at least, that significant
growth is possible. Since the 1985 May OC and the "Way Forward"
the branch has gone from 7 to 17)
5. the Toronto East Branch must be given complete backing to
operate on the same terms as the TO Central branch.
The August OC resolutions must be thrown out. (Whether we
maintain 2 TO branches is a tactical question that should be
looked at again only once there is some measure of political
clarity.)
6. the perspectives for Socialist Worker have to be changed to be
based around concrete propaganda.
We attach a copy of the Socialist Worker document prepared for
last January's convention, but withdrawn under pressure from
David. it is by no means adequate, and much water has passed
under the bridge since then making the election of a new editor
this year essential. We will write up a SW document to contribute
to the present debate. This will cover the editorial aspects, and
how we use it in the branches)
7. the interpretation of democratic centralism on display in
August must be rejected
It is a sick joke that the disciplinary measures against the
East TO comrades were justified in the name of democratic
centralism. Our internal regime is unhealthy, debate is quickly
taken personal offence to, we don't know how to make decisions,
our most elementary organisation is a mess etc. And there
certainly hasn't been any lead given from the centre.
TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS October 9, 1986
We welcome the open letter from the SWP as a positive
contribution to the current debate in the Canadian IS. We accept
the spirit and the central direction of the letter, despite
serious reservations about several aspects of the SWP's
interpretation of recent events. Most importantly, we agree that
an immediate change of course is required to shift the terms of
debate onto a political basis. We are putting toward the
following statement as a step in that direction.
1. We will recommend at the next Organizing Committee meeting
the immediate withdrawal of all punitive aspects of the motions
on permanent factionalism and the creation of two Toronto
branches passed at the August OC meeting.
2. We agree that all sides in the IS, including the Toronto
majority and Ottawa have participated in a process of apolitical
factionalism. All sides have treated organizational solutions and
changes in personnel as a necessary precondition to principled
political debate about how to build the IS in the current period.
This has produced a series of factional battles in which genuine
political differences have been obscured, making it impossible to
clarify any political differences that may exist. Political
debate about any differences that exist on how to build the
organization should be the only basis for organizational changes.
3. The climate created by ongoing infighting has created a
political vacuum at the center of the IS. Currently, there is no
political strategy that has been articulated, accepted and
consistently acted upon by a clear majority of the organization.
Effective direction and leadership in a revolutionary
organization must be based upon a strategy for building the
group; a strategy designed only to beat other faction [sic]
within the IS does not provide a basis for effective leadership
or growth.
4. We call on all sections of the organization to immediately
abandon all factional alignments based on organizational and
personnel changes and to combat all tendencies to slander and
gossip which have been generated by apolitical debate.
5. Since there is no accepted and adequate strategy for
building the IS at present, a period of open and principled
debate is essential. As a contribution to such a debate comrades
in the Toronto Central and Ottawa branches promise to prepare
discussion documents for the 1987 convention.
6. We call on comrades in all branches, and in particular the
Toronto East and Montreal branches, to contribute in writing to
this debate. While it is important to clarify the roots of the
current crisis, the upcoming debate must focus on the question of
strategy for building the IS in the present period.
--Brian McDougall and David McNally (endorsed by Ottawa branch)
To the Steering Committee
Circulate to Branches/Copies to all members
20 October, 1986
The Crisis in the IS: Initial Response from Montreal to the SWP
Letter
It is indeed an exceptional situation for the British SWP Central
Committee to intervene in our organization. We welcome that
intervention, having made very similar criticisms and
observations for quite some time. The SWP letter can be a
framework for at least beginning the much needed debate in the
Canadian IS. However, the situation is in our opinions even worse
than that put forward by the SWP- on two of its central themes:
(i) personal factionalism and (ii) perspectives.
(i) The SWP letter describes well the poisonous atmosphere in the
IS, and puts it down to a consequence of us not having a correct
perspective for growth. But the apolitical personalism in the
group has political roots in that some leading members have
cultivated it over many years as a means to maintain control of
the organisation (In our opinion, David, Bryan and Abbie are the
prime examples). It has become part of the political method. And
this in turn has blocked putting good perspectives into practice.
Thus we cannot simply shake off the legacy without a very serious
examination of the way we conduct ourselves, and the method of
leadership. Part of the coming perspectives debate has to be
directed to challenging the thoroughly unhealthy internal regime
of the IS. We need to develop a collective leadership in the
branches based on consistent work. Our present system of
"leadership" continues to be unacceptable and undemocratic, and
does not encourage the development of comrades' political and
organisational skills. The consequence is a very low level of
political debate in the organisation, and a grossly
under-developed cadre for an organization of our age.
(ii) On the question of perspectives the SWP letter to some
extent misses the mark by concentrating on "The Way Ahead"
document in May 1985 by David McNally. This has never been
particularly significant in practice. There is what is written,
and there is what is done. So the "upturn in a downturn" problem
identified by the SWP letter has rarely been in evidence. (A
noted exception was the PSAC coverage in the winter, which in
length and its propositions for activity would have been more
appropriate had there been a prospect for an explosion of strike
activity and a layer of militants that could challenge the
beaurocrats [sic]. The result was very tedious SW coverage.) More
typically, a central problem is that the paper is neither an
"upturn" nor a "downtown" paper. We have long argued that the
paper relies too heavily on essentially timeless statements of
fundamental principle, that gives the paper its staleness. What
is missing is a sense of connecting in to real questions of
concern to socialists, and prospective socialists, in
Canada in the middle 1980's. There is a strong tendency,
politically encouraged by the Editor, to abstain from the real
world. (To make the paper connect to the real world does not mean
we can change that real world.) Our paper is a hit or miss
mixture of some good individual articles in a sponge of abstract
propaganda. The result is a paper with no sense of analysis of
relevance to socialists in Canada today. Rather than an "upturn"
or a "downturn" paper, ours could perhaps be called a "vacuum"
paper with little sense of who we are writing for and why.
But we are not really going to solve the problems of
abstentionism in the paper (or in the language of the SWP letter,
the inability to develop concrete propaganda), without looking at
branch building and IS perspectives generally.
As we in Montreal have discussed the crisis in the IS over the
past few months, we have come to see that the complete confusion
over perspectives is not because we haven't had a good
perspective. Many good things have been written, and some good
work has been done. In these cases there has been working to two
different perspectives, which are pulling us in opposing
directions.
We believe that at heart there have been two basic responses to
the downturn in the IS. To put it crudely, one is to give up, the
other is to build around consistent work. The first type of
response to the downturn was most clearly articulated in David
and the 18's "Building in the Downturn" document at the 1985
Convention. In a desire for unity in 1985 we did not deal
adequately with why that document was political suicide, and we
have paid the price of that fudging. Many of the political
problems of that perspective have raised their heads in different
contexts ever since. (The letter from Tony Cliff and Lindsey
German at that time should be re-read by everyone now.) We have
to break consciously from those inevitable pressures on us to
adapt to the downturn with passivity and abstract propaganda.
That is pulling us in the ultimate direction of becoming an
academic study circle. David, no matter how many perspectives has
formulated on paper since then, has not in practice broken from
that perspective.
Coming to terms with the downturn is not to justify doing
nothing, it is not a question of holding on waiting for the
upturn. For those who like labels, this becomes a case of
engaging in downturn determinism or perhaps more accurately,
downturn miserablism. Understanding the downturn means finding a
way to build in this extremely difficult environment for
revolutionaries.
The starting point of any perspective for building in the
downturn is the notion of "back to basics".
Firstly, that means emphasising the central core of our politics
in our branch meetings and in the paper. In a downturn, it is
very easy to lose sight of our ultimate objectives of workers'
power, with a consequent collapse of self respect, and a loss of
confidence in the groups [sic] relevance. We have to feel that
what we are doing now, no matter how modest, is some meaningful
contribution to building a revolutionary party in Canada that can
play a decisive role in mass class struggles, and ultimately in
smashing the state.
Secondly, we have to make sure that our weekly meetings are a
place for non-members to come and learn, and begin to get
involved with our activities. The meetings must provide an
atmosphere for the political development of members and contacts.
The weekly branch meeting is absolutely central to building the
IS. The numbers present at branch meetings, and particularly the
numbers of non-members, are the best yardstick of our political
health. If attendance is poor then you know you have a problem,
either with the meetings themselves (people will not continue to
come to metings [sic] if they do not learn things at them, and if
they seem a waste of time ie. they must give some direction to
the work of the branch in the coming week) or with your work. We
will never make lasting gains from outside activity if our
meetings are not good. (We will return in later documents to
these questions)
Thirdly, selling Socialist Worker is at the very heart of how we
relate to the outside world. It is how we identify ourselves, and
how we find people. Selling the paper will become a chore if
there is not a confidence that it will help you find new people.
In turn, you need to have confidence that any new person will
find the meetings interesting and helpful, and that there is some
meaningful activity for them to get involved in. (The question of
the content of the paper is a separate question that we will
address more fully in later documents)
Fourthly, there has to be a serious attitude to organisational
matters: coordinating, preparing for the meetings, following up
on any new people, contacting people for meetings, getting to
sales on time, getting things done once you've agreed to do them
etc etc. It is quite important to create a sense of collective
discipline, joint effort, and professionalism about our work. The
criticism that there is no politics in Montreal is in itself a
non-political argument, and is in part a reflection of a
cavalier, and ultimately abstentionist, attitude to building an
organisation.
Only when you have the basics in place, can you really begin,
slowly, to expand your horizons and lift the level of activity in
the branch. Activity which has been labelled "mindless" has been
quite modest. Problems arise when activtiy [sic] isn't directed
to building the meetings, widening your circle of regular
readers, increasing the numbers of contacts etc. Loose talk which
sneer at "mindless activity" has been dangerous in the IS. We
must build up the level of activity, and have branch leads who
lead from the front, to raise the level of activity of the more
passive members, not pander to passivity.
In Montreal we have been trying to build on this perspective for
a couple of years and slowly the benefits are beginning to become
more apparant [sic]. If your feet are firmly on the ground, and
you have a strong committment [sic] to the core of the politics,
and you look after the basics of meetings, coordinating, and
paper sales, then you can very dramatically increase the size of
your general periphery. At any time of course special attention
has to be given to the one or two people that are closest to
joining . But is essential to build a larger periphery. There are
people out there interested in socialist politics. You've got to
get out there and find them.
We will draw up a comprehensive branch report for the November OC
because we have learnt so much (both positive and negative) from
our activities around the campaign to stop South African
shipments, from our work around the colleges, and from our
attempts to develop some relations with individual workers. It
has reinforced the central need to be strong on the basics. It
has convinced us that the general level of activity in the IS
should be raised, it has convinced us that it is possible to grow
in the downturn, and it has convinced us that many of the current
practices for work in coalitions, in the colleges etc in the IS
have to be challenged.
None of this is new. We have been arguing it for a long time. In
fact the two basic responses to the downturn (pulling us one hand
toward a passive, academic study circle or on the other hand
towards a determined attitude to building an organisation of
revolutionaries) are in evidence to varying degrees in all
branches and even within individual comrades. That is why present
alignments are not based on politics. There are political
differences as we discussed above. But these do not correspond
neatly to the present alignments in the IS. Therefore, the
personal factionalism and the present alignments are a block to
identifying and resolving them.
To develop new perspectives will not mean plucking them out of
thin air. It will mean examining our experiences in a very honest
fashion, and identifying and decisively rejecting those
abstentionist politics and rotten organisational practices which
are pulling us towards destruction. And it will mean identifying
and consciously reinforcing those practices that lead to an
active outward looking approach from which we can build, starting
with solid foundations of regular consistent work and gradually
opening up new possibilities. Only then can we develop in
practice an on-going dialogue in the group on how to combine
activity and propaganda in the downturn. Then we can begin to
share our experiences, and generalise from them. the present
political situation has made that almost impossible.
The consequences of failure to do this are extreme. As the SWP
letter says, our continued existence is at stake. The present
alignments, based as they are on an unhappy combination of
politics and personalism, represent a potential 50:50 division in
the group. If things go unchecked, leave alone expulsions, we
could fall apart or split in two or three. If we do not resolve
the political questions of perspectives and leadership, then many
of the best comrades will fall away through demoralization,
leaving a sectarian rump.
If we do make a decisive turn, then the prospects are good. We
have no serious competition on the Canadian left. A mass party
can not grow numerically in a political downturn. A small party
like the British SWP can grow in one and twos. But a tiny group
which grows consistently in ones and twos can double and triple
its membership, without the needs for a fundamental improvement
in the levels of class struggle.
Joe Herbertson
Nelson Calder
Ian Thompson
To the Steering Committee
Circulate to Branches/copies to all Members
21 October, 1986
Initial Montreal response to the letter from Bryan McDougal [sic]
and David McNally, dated October 9, 1986.
1.We of course agree that the OC in November must drop all
punitive measures against the Toronto East branch.
2.We agree that a period of open principled debate leading up to
Convention is necessary. At the OC we should have presentations
from each branch in order to establish the scope of agreement and
disagreement, so we can identify the key questions of debate, but
not necessarily resolve them. The OC can then agree on a
structure for Convention that allows the debate to be clarified
and resolved. The OC must set a date for Convention.
3.We agree that the political centre of the IS has completely
failed, but the problems run deeper than just apolitical in-
fighting. They are the result of poor political and
organizational methods of our current leadership.
That Bryan and David agree to lift the punitive measures, agree
on the need for a period of open debate, and accept the collapse
of the political centre in the IS represent undoubted steps
forward.
However, despite the 180 degree turn this letter makes, there are
the obvious signs that nevertheless it shall be "business as
usual". The letter is written with the assumption that Toronto
Central and Ottawa will continue as one alignment, distinct from
montreal and Toronto East. No attempt was made by Bryan or David
to consult with Montreal, and presumably Toronto East, prior to
writing their letter. The endorsement of the letter by Ottawa is
reminiscent of the situation prior to the August OC where Ottawa
was drawn into the practical preparations for the attack on the
Toronto minority some weeks in advance, whereas Montreal received
no honest indication of what was being planned.
There is also an attempt in the letter to tar everyone with the
same brush of apolitical factionalism, thereby ducking any
responsibility - by those who have actually had control of the IS
this past year or two - for the failure to unite the group around
consistent work. In Dave and Bryan's letter, we are still not
seeing a break with the method of innuendo. Where have we, or
others, put personnel changes forward as a precondition for
debate? We have not escaped the poison, but when have we resorted
to apolitical factionalism, against the interests of building the
group? We may well ask, why have annual elections at Convention
at all, if to want different people in positions as a consequence
of your political assessment is labelled "apolitical personnel
changes".
We have no "preconditions" of debate, but we do have opinions
that we will argue and solutions that we will put forward in the
course of the political debate around perspectives. Lets [sic] be
quite clear and honest; we have political reasons for not wanting
David and Bryan (or for that matter, Abbie) in the leadership of
the IS for 1987. But we feel that it is not a precondition for
debate, just part of the solution.
The lofty appeal by Bryan and David for all sides to abandon
their alignments based on organizational and personnel changes is
in part an attempt by them to protect their current positions of
control in the group. After all, no one in opposition to dave and
Bryan have any positions that could be threatened by "personnel
changes". Every single position of responsibility in the national
organization is held by people who have been part of Bryan and
David's alignment. It is essential that an open perspectives
debate that is attempting to save the very existence of the IS
does include an honest examination of the manner in which we
operate, the unhealthy internal regime and the reasons for the
failure of leadership. Room has to be created for fresh people to
develop and take on responsibilities for the paper and the
national centre.
We have to learn how to debate, for our own survival. It is
precisely principled debate that allows for serious differences
to be aired without being accused of splitting, wrecking etc etc
ad nauseum [sic]. For a year now, we have not wanted Dave to
continue as editor. So what? Have we refused to sell the paper
under his editorship? No, we have roughly doubled our sales this
year. And during the year we have seen Bryan in operation (in
matters going outside the borders of Ottawa) and we do not want
him to continue as a Steering Committee member. So what? Have we
stopped building the IS in this time? Of course not. We have
roughly doubled the attendances at our meetings, and we have
greatly increased the numbers of contacts and loose periphery.
We make a somewhat different appeal to the comrades than made by
Bryan and David. It is a grim fact that many have followed the
twists and turns of David and Bryan with little evidence of
political independence or principle. We ask comrades to break
from the almost habitual, instinctive responses. Break with the
mentality of the blocks. We are not asking you to now agree
slavishly with us. Disagree, argue, by all means. But if we do
not shake off the personalism, the suspicion, the rigid
apolitical loyalties, then we will go down to ruin in exactly the
way the SWP letter predicts.
We have already been accused of being irresponsible for wanting
changes in leadership without people in place now to take their
place. This is to miss the point: serious damage is being done by
the existing leadership - [w]e can not let that continue.
Potentially there are many comrades in the two Toronto branches
who could do a better job. In any case, we need to change the
method of leadership, based on a spirit of collective work to get
the perspectives carried through in practice. The pre-Convention
and Convention debates will begin to identify those comrades who
are breaking with the current political and organizational
practices,and who genuinely want to build a revolutionary group
in Canada today. It is such comrades who we shall vote into the
positions of responsibility at the end of Convention.
