ISSN: 0898-6827
A A C A R B U L L E T I N
of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research,Inc.
Editor: H. B. PAKSOY Vol. IV No. 1, Spring 1991
EDITORIAL ADDRESS: BOX 2321 AMHERST, MA 01004
BOOKS FOR REVIEW, NEWS ITEMS AND COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD BE SENT
TO THE EDITOR.
Executive Council: Thomas Allsen (Trenton State College) (Ex-
Officio; Secretary of the AACAR Monograph Series Editorial
Board); Audrey L. Altstadt (U of Massachusetts-Amherst); Peter
Golden (Rutgers U); H. B. Paksoy (U of Massachusetts-Amherst &
Harvard U-CMES) (Ex-Officio; Editor, AACAR BULLETIN); Azade-
Ayse Rorlich (U of Southern California); Uli Schamiloglu (U of
Wisconsin-Madison); Maria Subtelny (U of Toronto)
IN THIS ISSUE
-- HELSINKI WATCH Report: "Conflict in the Soviet Union--The
Untold Story of the Clashes in Kazakhstan."
-- US COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE-
Congress of the United States) Report: "Azerbaijan Elections."
-- SUMMARY of Discussions at the Conference "The Aral Sea
Crisis: Environmental Issues in Central Asia" held at INDIANA
UNIVERSITY, Bloomington, Indiana, July 14-18, 1990
-- AN ADDRESS BY SHEIK-UL-ISLAM AL-HAJ ALLAHSH K R PASHAZADE
(Chairman of the Moslem Religious Board for the Transcaucasus;
People's Deputy of the USSR), to the Fourth International
Conference on Central Asia, held at the UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN-MADISON, September 27-30, 1990
-- Iraj Bashiri, NEITHER TAJIK, NOR UZBEK: RUSSIAN
-- Audrey L. Altstadt, BAKU 1991: ONE YEAR AFTER BLACK JANUARY
-- News of the Profession
-- Book Reviews
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2 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
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HELSINKI WATCH REPORT
(Helsinki Watch is a member of the International Helsinki
Federation for Human Rights. The following is reprinted from
the Helsinki Watch releases)
17 October 1990
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev
President of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow, USSR
Dear President Gorbachev:
Helsinki Watch appeals to you, as head of the Soviet
government, to end the long standing official policy of denying
3 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
access to foreigners, including journalists, to most of the
territory of the Soviet Union. This policy seems to us to be
out of step with the reform program you have initiated in
Soviet life.
We are also concerned about the veil of officially imposed
secrecy that has shrouded recent instances of unrest in Central
Asia and the Caucasus. Foreign journalists have been denied
access to those areas for several months (Alma-Ata, Sukhumi,
Ferghana, Baku, Dushanbe, Osh, etc.) for several months after
the violent incidents have ended. By the time these areas are
open to journalists, it is hard to arrive at an accurate
picture of the events that occurred. Journalists traditionally
travel to places of unrest; surely they can judge the safety of
a situation without government interference.
Local attempts --both official and unofficial-- to
investigate incidents of violence have frequently been stymied
by governmental interference at various levels. We hope that
Soviet officials at all levels will now allow these
investigations to proceed and will permit the publication of
the results. Efforts at obfuscation do not serve the interests
of the peoples of the Soviet Union.
Restrictions on freedom of internal movement, on
journalists' access, and on investigations of local unrest by
independent, non-governmental organizations also fly in the
face of Soviet commitments under the Helsinki process. After
all, the main aim of the Helsinki process is to promote
openness not only between states but also between citizens and
their governments.
In an effort to bridge the gaps in public knowledge about
the disorders in Alma-Ata in December 1986, Helsinki Watch sent
a mission to Kazakhstan in May 1990. We interviewed
participants in the demonstrations and produced a report,
CONFLICT IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE CLASHES
IN KAZAKHSTAN, We enclose a copy of this report and a Russian-
language summary. Since our report is the first in-depth study
of the Alma-Ata events of December 1986, we hope you will find
it of interest.
We are also sending this report to President Nazarbaev,
and to the Soviet and Kazakhstan press with the hope that they
will publish our findings, thus taking a positive step in the
interests of true glasnost.
Sincerely (Jeri Laber, Executive Director).
The following is excerpted from the above referenced report,
Pp. 22-23:
4 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
Beatings:
-- Beatings were probably the most frequent form of
attack, primarily by the militia and soldiers, but also by
demonstrators. One protestor described her efforts to save a
young demonstrator from a severe beating:
I was badly beaten. I was warned by a soldier: "Leave on
the orders of Moscow." I tried to help a young man who was
being held by his hair; he was beaten and bleeding. So I took
the soldier by the hair. It was three soldiers to one young
man. Then they took my arm and pulled behind me. I started to
scream and one soldier put my hat in my mouth. I was then taken
away and later released. I saw many young women who were
beaten, with blood on their hair and from their noses.
-- The beatings sometimes led to severe injuries or even
death:
I saw a guy who was carried away by the students. A
medical student measured his pulse. It was unclear if he was
alive or dead or if he had been badly beaten. (Erlan
Dekelbayev)
Initiation of Violence:
-- Witnesses gave Helsinki Watch conflicting reports on
which side had initiated violence. Several sources indicated
the armed forces reacted with force (hitting people with metal
rods or sappers' spades, or beatings) to demonstrators throwing
rocks (at the militia/military, at the tribunal , or state
property such as fire engines or cars). A Man said the violence
began when Kazakh protestors threw stones at the tribunal:
"Kazakhs began breaking off parts of the building and throwing
stones at the tribunal. Then, fire trucks were summoned. One
car was overturned, a second car escaped. The first car was
burned and pushed toward the soldiers." Participant gave a
somewhat different version of events, saying that violence
began after demonstrators threw rocks at fire engines -- after
they had been drenched with cold water on a winter night:
"About 8 pm that evening, fire engines were brought in to
dampen the crowds. The demonstrators threw rocks at the fire
engines. Also about 8 pm, at the two far ends of the square,
two big military cars were blown up at the same time." Early
on, the KGB student border guards started using sappers'
shovels. A witness said his sources told him: "They then
summoned students from the KGB border guard academy who carried
short spades. These students fought with demonstrators.
Authorities said they didn't hurt anyone with shovels, they
just pushed people away. The kazakh say people were hit."
Copies of the 100 Pp. Report may be obtained by writing:
Helsinki Watch, 485 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10017; or,
5 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
Helsinki Watch, 1522 K Street, NW, Suite 910, Washington DC
20005.
The U.S. COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(CSCE; also referred to as the "US Helsinki Commission") by law
monitors and encourages progress in implementing the provisions
of the Helsinki human rights accords. The Commission, created
in 1976, is made up of nine U.S. Senators, nine U.S.
Representatives and one official each from the U.S. Departments
of State, Commerce and Defense. The publications of the CSCE
may be obtained by writing: Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Congress of the United States, 237 House
Office Building Annex 2, Washington, DC 20515.
The following are excerpted from the "REPORT ON THE
SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN," prepared by the Staff
of the U.S. Commission on CSCE, 25 October 1990. A copy of the
full report is available from the above address.
-- On September 30, 1990, the first multi-party elections
to the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan took place. There was never
any doubt, given the circumstances of the election, that the
communists would gain control of the legislature; the question
was whether non-communist groups, many of whom had joined the
"Democratic Azerbaijan" coalition, would win any seats. Though
the final figures are not yet in, non-communist forces led by
the Azerbaijan Popular Front have for the first time won some
representation in parliament.
-- The elections took place in a state of emergency, which
has been in effect since January 1990, when the Soviet military
entered Baku in force. Non-Communist groups argued that holding
free and fair elections under such conditions was impossible
and claimed that the authorities maintained the state of
emergency in order to facilitate rigging the election's
outcome.
-- Colonel Valery Buniatov, the military commandant of
Baku [who replaced Lt. General V. S. Dubiniak], closed the city
from September 26 to October 2 to non-residents in an attempt
to keep out election observers invited by non-communist groups.
Soviet troops met would-be election monitors, including members
of the Moscow and Leningrad city soviets, at the airport and
sent them home. Nevertheless, Helsinki Commission staff and a
representative of the US Embassy in Moscow were permitted to go
to Baku. They encountered no difficulties in meeting with
Communist Party and government officials, as well as with
representatives of non-communist organizations.
-- (From P.12) AFP spokesmen and many others dismissed out
of hand the notion that free elections could be held in a state
of emergency, when the highest authority in the land reposed
6 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
not in the elected representatives of the people but rather in
a Soviet military commandant whose frequent public
pronouncements stressed the primacy of order and warned of
"extremist plots." The 1:00 AM - 5:00 AM curfew did not really
impede campaigning but candidates complained about the
commandant's refusal to permit election rallies and meetings
and their lack of access to the media, despite the election
law's provisions.
Opposition candidates also pointed to the presence of
Soviet troops in the city and the overall atmosphere of
intimidation, especially after the events of January 1990, as
unconducive to the free expression of views. Unofficial groups
did not always get permission to publish their newspapers,
which were in any case subject to strict military censorship.
The APF could not publish its weekly AZADLYG (Freedom) from
January until May. After it resumed publication, according to
Popular Front Representatives, some editions appeared with
large sections crossed out or deleted. The APF also protested
Colonel Buniatov's insistence that he approve the texts of pre-
election statements of all candidates and that these statements
not "insult" the CPA and President Mutalibov.
SUMMARY of Discussions at the Conference
"The Aral Sea Crisis: Environmental Issues in Central Asia"
INDIANA UNIVERSITY, Bloomington, Indiana, July 14-18, 1990
Discussions at the conference revealed a great variety of
opinions concerning the nature of the environmental crisis
affecting Soviet Central Asia, its origin and possible
solutions. It was impossible to reach "final" conclusions on
the subjects discussed, or adopt "unanimous" resolutions
concerning recommended actions, unless such as resolution (like
the proposed letter to Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush) remains
purely formal and symbolic. The organizers of the conference
believe that solutions for the problems discussed should be
worked out by the five republics of Soviet Central Asia
themselves; they cannot be dictated to them by anyone else.
However, we believe at the same time that our discussions
helped clarify the problem and may help in choosing the course
of future action. Therefore we have tried to summarize below
some ideas brought up by the participants in the conference,
which seem to us especially important and on which there was a
broad consensus. We would like to emphasize that we do not seek
to propose, let alone impose, any solutions of our own, and
what follows below is only a faithful summary of opinions
expressed in formal and informal discussions during the
7 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
conference. It is up to appropriate bodies in the Soviet Union
to take this summary into consideration.
A. THE CAUSES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN CENTRAL ASIA
The following primary causes can be indicated: the
"command economy" and central planning, which not only proved
to be bankrupt in the entire Soviet Union (and elsewhere in the
world), but, more specifically, ignored the needs of Central
Asia and sacrificed them in the name of some "higher"
priorities; in particular, this was expressed in an inadequate
investment by the central government in the Central Asian
economy (both agriculture and industry), and in health care and
education, and in measures dictated from Moscow with total
disregard of their environmental and human costs in Central
Asia (like the enforcement of cotton monoculture and the use of
defoliants). The totalitarian political regime made impossible
any correction of these policies based on independent study and
public opinion.
One can hope that with the great changes that are taking
place now in the Soviet Union the grave environmental situation
in Central Asia can be corrected and the damage caused by the
previous fallacious (and sometimes even criminal) policy can be
repaired. It will require major efforts on the part of both
governmental bodies and an informed public, and the economic
cost of these efforts will be very high; however, the lack of
action or a further delay in taking action may result in an
ecological and economic catastrophe of an even greater scale.
B. POSSIBLE GENERAL COURSE OF ACTION
1. The study of various aspects of the critical
environmental situation in Central Asia has already continued
in the Soviet Union for quite a while. Given the urgency of the
cause, decision making cannot be delayed indefinitely under the
pretext that "insufficient date" have been collected. An
authoritative body should give its basic recommendations
already NOW, that is, in the fall of 1990. For the situation
with the Aral Sea, it should be, most probably, the Committee
which will be convened in Nukus in early October. A similar
committee may be URGENTLY formed to study other aspects and
areas of ecological crisis in Central Asia and to give its
recommendations.
2. The five republics of Central Asia (Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan, Kazakhstan) should form
a center coordinating their environmental and economic
policies, whose decisions should be binding for their
respective governments. Without such coordination one can
hardly expect that any measures taken by a single republic
unilaterally (especially in a case like the Aral Sea problem,
which concerns all five republics) can bring success. This
8 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
center should have immediate authority (a) to overrule all-
union and republican agencies, many of which have impeded even
the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to
environmentally stricken areas and (b) to deal DIRECTLY with
agencies, organizations and corporations outside the USSR which
may offer technological and organizational assistance in
addressing Central Asia's environmental problems.
3. The central government is expected to assist the
Central Asian republics in solving their environmental
problems, and not merely with expertise and technical help:
after all, it was the policy of the central government which
created the present catastrophic situation in Central Asia, and
it should be expected that the central government will bear a
major portion of the expenses to correct this situation.
However, the branches and agencies of the central government,
which are directly responsible for the fallacious policies
(like Minvodkhoz, SANIIRI, etc.) and which, therefore, have a
vested interest in "face saving" measures, should be prevented
from imposing their solutions, and their role should remain
purely consultative.
4. One should not place much hope on applying to other
countries (USA, Japan, Western Europe) or international
economic agencies for immediate financial help in order to deal
with the Central Asian environmental problems; so far
experience shows that these countries and agencies are
reluctant to provide financial help as long as the Soviet Union
has not introduced a COMPREHENSIVE AND WORKING system of market
economy (i. e. a capitalist economy -- one should call things
by their proper names), that is, until "perestroika" bears real
fruit. Without this precondition such assistance would be,
according to western ideas, "throwing good money after bad."
C. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS: IMMEDIATE MEASURES
1. The most urgent measures concern the improvement of
health conditions in Central Asia, including:
(a) Introducing local water purification systems.
(b) Building sewage disposal systems and water supply
systems, first of all in the regions most severely affected by
ecological crises (Karakalpak, Khorezm regions), providing
especially hospitals, schools and kindergartens with clean
water and disposal systems.
(c) Providing increased medical help (emergency hospitals,
pharmacies, supplies of medicines) to the entire population of
Central Asia, but especially to the population of the regions
that are in the most critical environmental situation.
(d) Upgrading or introducing prenatal care, improved
gynecological and pediatric clinics, monitoring of genetic
problems, etc.
9 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
(e) Proclaiming --and observing-- an immediate and total
ban on the use of defoliants and introducing strict control on
the use of pesticides.
(f) Closing the nuclear testing facility near
Semipalatinsk.
2. Other immediate measures concern the economy insomuch
as it has a direct effect upon the environmental situation:
(a) Abolition of cotton monoculture through an immediate
termination of the system of mandatory state orders
("goszakaz") for agricultural products and establishing the
right of farmers to choose what crops they cultivate; this
should be combined with a mandatory reduction of cotton
cultivation (especially in the areas close to population
centers); cotton should be replaced by other crops, traditional
in Central Asia, which require less water for irrigation.
(b) Termination of rice cultivation in most regions of
Central Asia, where it was introduced in the 1960s and later.
(c) Introduction of user fees for irrigational water in
major river basins (Amu-Darya, Syr-Darya, Zarafshan, etc.).
(d) Termination of reclamation of new lands for
agriculture based on irrigation, and termination of the
cultivation of all saline lands, which produce crops below
allowable standards.
(e) Closing of industrial enterprises producing large
amount of hazardous waste and located in major population
centers (permanently, or temporarily --until the construction
of appropriate filtering, treatment, etc. systems.).
3. Establishment of an inter-republican Central Asian
agency with wide administrative authority to control the
implementation of ecological measures agreed upon among five
Central Asian republics.
D. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS: LONG TERM MEASURES
1. Improvement of irrigation systems, especially covering
the bed of ALL active canals with synthetic or other lining
(priority should be for the Karakum canal, which is the most
wasteful irrigation canal in the world).
2. Introduction of modern systems of purification of
drainage water.
3. Introduction of a system of strict control over the use
of water, with differentiated user fees and severe fines for
waste of water.
4. Reconstruction of the system of water reservoirs in
Central Asia, possibly with a great reduction of the number of
these reservoirs.
10 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
5. Renewal and restoration of stock-breeding, based on
private ownership of herds and pastures and improved use of dry
and irrigated pasture lands.
6. Increased investment in the development of the
infrastructure, especially roads and communication systems,
including the communication of Central Asia with outside world.
7. Increased investment in the construction of small
industrial enterprises utilizing local raw material and human
resources.
8. Increased investment in new housing in Central Asia.
Professor Randall Baker Professor Yuri Bregel
Sheik-ul-Islam
al-Haj Allahsh k r Pashazade,
Chairman of the Moslem Religious Board for the Transcaucasus;
People's Deputy of the USSR
[The following is extracted from the presentation made by the
Sheik-ul-Islam at the Fourth International Conference on
Central Asia, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON (September 27-30,
1990). A copy of the English translation was provided by Mr.
Pashazade.]
The tradition of Islam was already thirteen centuries old
by the year 1920, a turning point for my land, when the
invasion of the Red Army resulted in the overthrow of the
legitimate government of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic
and proclamation of Soviet power.
....We have to recognize that the idea of socialism, its
promising slogans and declarations proved attractive for the
masses of Azerbaijan. Primarily because they responded to their
aspirations for social justice, a free and dignified life.
Naturally, their hearts could not but respond to such
declarations in the first post-revolutionary years as, for
instance, the Soviet government's Appeal "To All Toilers of
Russia and the East." It stated, among other things:
"Henceforth, your beliefs and customs, your national
and cultural traditions shall be declared free and
inviolate. Arrange your national life freely and
without hindrance. You have a right to this. Know
that your rights, just like the rights of all peoples
of Russia are protected by the entire might of the
revolution and its organs..."
11 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
What could be more convincing than those words signed by
Lenin himself? A religion free of supervision, pressure and
suspicion of power, and government free of anti-religious
sanctions whose tolerance of religion promoted the unity of
citizens of a multinational state. This could have been the
ideal of society, the aim of its future development.
But the tragedy of historical reality was that neither
during that turning point nor in subsequent years could
Communist power shed its ideological dogmas and thus assess
objectively the sentiments of believers, their aspirations for
a new life, the ideals of equality and justice.
In noting this, however, we should not fall into the trap
of one-sidedness or lose sight of ambivalent positions of
religious authorities. True, there were cases of open
resistance of the clergy, including Moslems in Azerbaijan, to
Soviet power and its principles of organizing a new society.
But obviously, it was primarily ideological, political and
practical considerations rather than the above-mentioned
factors that determined the state's negative attitude toward
religion and believers. Let us recall that in 1922 Lenin
invoked economic need to justify appropriation of multimillion-
ruble-worth of valuables that belonged to churches and
monasteries, demanding the harshest penalty for resisting
clerics.
So, on the one hand, there were declarations of religious
tolerance, freedom of conscience, allegedly protected by law,
and on the other, the rights of believers and the clergy were
cynically trampled upon: they were subjected to violence and
became outcasts in society.
Looking back at the events in those years we see: the more
the government consolidated its position the more obvious its
attitude toward religion became, inexorably bringing closer an
open confrontation aimed at totally annihilating religion.
A specific feature of Azerbaijan was that, unlike the
country's central regions, there the Islamic clergy still
retained their solid positions in the 1920s and continued to
exert a substantial influence on the population. Any
underestimation of that reality could not but aggravate the
difficult situation of Soviet power, which determined its
tactic of a temporary compromise. The influence of some local
figures brought up in the spirit and traditions of the Moslem
environment such as Nariman Narimanov, had also a certain role
to play.
But the process of destruction could not bypass
Azerbaijan. Moreover, it was particularly devastating here, as
if it sought to make up for the time lost. The waqf lands whose
income was used for religious needs were confiscated, sheriat
courts were prohibited and religious educational establishments
were shutdown.
In addition to "standard" accusations levelled against all
Soviet people, Azerbaijan Moslems were charged with Pan-Turkism
and Pan-Islamism. The charges were made even against those who
12 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
resisted the transition from Arabic characters used for more
than a millennium to Latin.
The cruel repressions against the clergy and believers
were determined by the very slogan of the anti-religion
movement: "The struggle against religion is the struggle for
socialism!"
The blind fanaticism knew no limits: clerics and ordinary
believers were repressed or shot, prayer buildings of the
Moslem and other confessions were barbarically destroyed. Apart
from the famous Bibi-Heibat mosque, a grandiose Russian
Orthodox church, a Polish Roman Catholic church and other
religious buildings that were valuable cultural monuments were
torn down in Baku. The number of mosques in Azerbaijan declined
sharply.
The religious structures lay in ruins before World War II.
The space cleared of the annihilated religions was to be filled
with the cult of Stalin, his deification. It was only the war
that made the dictator change his religious policy. This was no
reverence of repentance, but a forced necessity prompted, among
other reasons, by the desire to please the war allies: the
United States and Great Britain. 1943-1944 saw the appearance
of four Moslem Religious Boards which covered the entire
territory of the Soviet Union. Among them is the Board for the
Transcaucasus of which I have been the head for the last
decade.
Certainly, religion was totally dependent on the
government which exercised unremitting control over activities
of communities. It is an eloquent fact that heads of the
Council for Religious Affairs were appointed from among the
members of the NKVD, a punitive organization whose very name
causes older people shudder.
Khrushchev's thaw which has a beneficial effect on
society's life, did not, however, put an end to the old
attitude toward religion and believers. Little was changed in
subsequent years, albeit the wave of violence was abated.
Until recently Moslems were excluded from social life,
restricted by the walls of mosques that were in fact turned
into reservations. Links to the external world and contacts
with co-religionists abroad were allowed only within the
framework of "the struggle against imperialism, for the triumph
of peace throughout the world."
We fought for years to have a medrese opened in Baku to
train clerics. But to no avail. It was only the holding of the
representative international Islamic conference "Moslems in the
Struggle for Peace" in Azerbaijan that helped to get things
moving. For something had to be shown to the foreign guests to
prevent any doubts they might have about the freedom of
conscience in the USSR.
Yes, we should be grateful to the world public for even
today much is being done with an eye on the external effect.
Yes, major changes have taken place in the life of
believers in recent years. Slowly and with difficulty new
13 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
shoots sprout in relations between the state and religion. But
it seems to me that the most important thing is the
understanding and recognition of the fact that unscrupulous
atheisation has had the most pernicious effect on society's
morality.
The Islamic clergy has warmly welcomed the policy of
perestrioka calling upon believers to use all means at their
disposal to support the renewal of society and the efforts
aimed at its democratization. For their part, Moslems are
entitled to expect that the state will shed its suspicion of
them and their faith and will see them as loyal citizens. For
those who think that the Moslem religion prescribes enmity of
Christians are mistaken, since the Holy Quran states: "...And
nearest among them in Love to the Believers are those who say
'we are Christians'" (Quran, 5-82).
The recently heightened interest in religion, primarily
from the cognitive perspective, is characteristic of the entire
Soviet Union, all confessions; and Azerbaijan and Islam are no
exception. This is also true of the opening of prayer houses,
spiritual educational establishments, the expansion of
publishing activity (though Azerbaijan lags considerably behind
other republics in this respect).
Naturally, these beneficial changes are perceived by our
Moslems as a result of democratization of Soviet society,
legitimate realization of the freedom of conscience recorded in
the Constitution.
It is regretted that the revival of religious life which
is natural for the entire country is seen as a threat of
"Islamic fundamentalism" in our case. I see no root-cause of
this in the persistence of anti-Moslem stereotypes which
artificially model a phenomenon out of individual facts, for
certain political purposes.
By calling for reason, peace and good neighborliness in
the midst of the hard interethnic conflict, both peoples,
Moslems proved their unfailing commitment to the sacred ideals
of Islam. We acted on the conviction that both Moslems and
Christians believed in one Creator. And they must realize that
the commitment to religious ideals admits no veneration or the
fanning up of interethnic enmity. That it is the duty of
preachers of all religions to prevent and overcome ethnic
strife. But, to our profound regret, the calls of Moslems to
unite the efforts of the two religions were unheeded. Yet, in
spite of the very difficult situation, in our region and the
country as a whole, we still hope for the better. We believe
that what unites and bids us together as members of one human
family is immeasurably more profound, solid and strong than
that which separates us.
Let us not spare our efforts in the name of sacred ideals
of Good, Justice and Brotherhood. May the Most High help us in
our endeavors.
14 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
NEITHER TAJIK, NOR UZBEK: RUSSIAN
by Iraj Bashiri [Acting Chair, Department of Russian and East
European Studies, University of Minnesota]
In one of the sessions of the Fourth International
Conference on Central Asia at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison (September 27-30, 1990), it was suggested that we might
have underestimated the intensity and the importance of the
inter-ethnic rivalries and struggles current in the Moslem
republics of the Soviet Union. What follows is an affirmation
and illustration of that remark.
I arrived in Dushanbe on April 19, 1990 as a delegate to
the International Symposium and Music Festival of East Peoples
devoted to the 1400th anniversary of Borbad. I found Dushanbe
to be a delightful city surrounded by the snow-topped
elevations of Hisar. The authorities and the inhabitants were
equally charming. I was to participate in the proceedings of
the Symposium for the next ten days; I hoped to visit Samarkand
and the Noble Bukhara before returning to Minneapolis.
When at the Tajikistan hotel the authorities collected the
passports as they handed the keys, all hopes for visiting other
places were dashed. Upon expressing my concern to my friend and
guide, however, I discovered that a trip to Samarkand had been
scheduled as part of the program of the Symposium. This trip
would be realized we were told, if the authorities in Samarkand
kept their promise.
Meanwhile, I had realized that a trip to Bukhara was
absolutely out of the question. Three things seemed to creep
into my conversations with the Tajiks and with my colleagues
familiar with the Soviet scene. One was the Tajiks' fear of the
Uzbeks. The UZbeks, the Tajiks said, would gladly take over
Dushanbe just as wrested Samarkand and Bukhara from them. The
other was the Tajik's contention that both Samarkand and
Bukhara, contrary to the Uzbeks' claims, are Tajik-speaking
urban centers. In order to prevent the world from recognizing
these cities as Tajik centers, the Tajiks claimed, the Uzbeks
have restricted access to them. The Uzbeks, of course, deny
this. Finally, a major stumbling block to a trip to Bukhara
was, I was told, that the monuments of Bukhara, unlike those of
Samarkand, were still not renovated to the scale of those of
Samarkand and thus were not ready to be presented to an
international body.
Fortunately, the Samarkandis came through and on the 27th,
those who had been allowed to make the trip assembled in the
lobby of the hotel. Buses were ready to take all to the
airport. But 8:00 gave way to 9:00 and 10:00 and still no
movement. It was rumored that the Samarkandis had, at the last
moment, reneged on their promise to allow their neighbors'
guests a visit to their republic. While these rumors were still
15 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
circulating, however, we were asked to board the buses and soon
after we headed for the airport.
On the plane, before take-off, the authorities checked
every name and eventually asked the only two Afghans in the
group to disembark. This we, the members of the Symposium, did
not allow.
In Samarkand, the visitors were met by the usual offering
of bread and flowers. A troop of musicians and dancers
entertained the visitors. The guests danced and talked to the
welcoming party for about ten minutes before heading for the
buses waiting to take us to the monuments.
At the gate of the airport, the buses were stopped. After
a few minutes, the drivers and group leaders went to the office
at the gate to find out the reason for the delay. The Tajik and
Uzbek authorities, they said when they returned, were deciding
which language, Tajik or Uzbek, should be the main language for
describing Samarkand to the guests. The Uzbeks felt, we were
told, that the language of the Republic of Uzbekistan should be
used. They offered to provide translators for Tajik. The Tajiks
were adamant that since all guests knew Tajik there was no need
for Uzbek at all. Meanwhile the clock was ticking towards 5:00
p.m. when the party was scheduled to return to the airport for
take-off for Dushanbe.
This haggling went on for a while longer before the "elder
brother," to use Stalin's interpretation, stepped in and
resolved the problem. Both the Tajiks and the Uzbeks quickly
pulled their horns in. Russian, it was decided, should be the
language used to describe the sights and the monuments. The
group leaders would then translate the Russian into Tajik or
Uzbek as needed.
Once the dispute was over, the buses speeded through
Samarkand and stopped in front of the Opera and Ballet Theater
where the guests were entertained with the Tajik composer F.
Bakhor's "Maqam-i Ishq" and the rest of the visit proceeded
smoothly from there.
The seemingly simple incident at the gate, however, played
a major role in bringing home to me the depth of the inter-
ethnic tensions not only between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks but
among the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens. I noted thereafter that
in most speeches in Dushanbe there were distinct references to
the recovery of the Tajik speaking cities of Bukhara and
Samarkand. Indeed, the integrity of the Tajik language and
efforts at keeping it safe from Russian, placed me in a tough
spot in a bookstore in Dushanbe. When speaking Tajik,
apparently I used ruble instead of sym [s m]. A tajik youth
standing next to me protested vehemently. You should not use
Russian equivalents, my guide explained. Either speak Russian
of Tajik. Do not mix languages!
Language, of course, is a system of symbols. The use of
these symbols invokes a different reaction by different people.
But there were other symbols. While helping me buy several
postcards at the hotel, my guide got into an argument with the
16 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
hotel clerk who was a Russian. After we were alone I asked
about the incident, he told me that the clerk was angry with
him because he wore a beard. Further discussion made it clear
that he was identified with a group of Dushanbe intellectuals
who were anti-Russian and who wore beards as a sign of their
protest.
BAKU 1991: ONE YEAR AFTER BLACK JANUARY
by Audrey L. Altstadt
The use of Soviet armed forces in Baku last January solved none
of the long-standing problems which plagued that republic --
economic disadvantage, ecological damage, political struggle,
the threat to the NKAO or fighting along the border. Nor did it
root out support for the democratic movement. Intervention
allowed the communist party apparatus in Azerbaijan (AzCP) to
reassert itself, but it was the power "from the barrel of a
gun" not of public support. "They can kill us, but cannot make
us bend..." wrote one newspaper.1 Before the arrival of the
Soviet Armed forces last January, the (AzCP) was in the throes
of a crisis. The AzCP (like CPs in many other republics) had
always had to perform a "balancing act" between the demands of
Moscow and those of the population of the republic. CP power
depended on Moscow, but a party organization that lost all
popular support and confidence would be useless as an
instrument of central policies. As long as there was no
organized "voice" to express popular will, the AzCP had little
difficulty in dealing with isolated opposition and could retain
its "balance." The growth of informal groups, the most
influential of which was the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF),
changed that. The growth of the APF coincided with the tenure
of Moscow appointee A. Vezirov as First Secretary. Under
Vezirov, the AzCP had leaned too far to Moscow's side, ignoring
both the popular will on vital issues of the day and refusing
to recognize the "informal" groups who articulated it. By the
end of 1989, the party had apparently lost authority in the
popular mind and had lost control of several towns --Jalilabad,
Lenkoran-- and several points of the republican borders.
Indeed, this loss of control appears to have been the main
reason for Moscow's use of troops in Baku. Within the party,
too, a split was evident. A stunning speech by party Secretary
Hasan Hasanov was published in APF organs in early January
1990.2 Hasanov revealed that many decisions concerning the
NKAO carried out by Moscow ostensibly after consultation with
the AzCP had actually come as a surprise to Baku. Thus it
appeared that while the party had been toeing Moscow's line,
Moscow was ignoring the AzCP. The AzCP was not only not
defending Azerbaijan's interests, its sovereignty and its
territory, it was not even able to represent them in any
17 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
meaningful way. With the military presence and the imposition
of martial law, the AzCP struggled to regain its authority. As
is usual in such crises, the First Secretary was immediately
sacked and blamed for everything. His successor was a local
engineer, Ayaz Niyazioglu Mutalibov. During February and March,
the party waged a campaign to restore confidence in itself both
internally and among the public. Apparently, the party realized
it had to embrace popular demands to reestablish credibility
and enforce its claim to leadership. The new AzCP platform,
produced in May, was essentially the old APF platform couched
at times in standard party rhetoric.3 The platform and
Mutalibov's first speech as republican President4 called for
economic and political solidarity, guarantees of territorial
integrity, and security of borders. Among other points adopted
from the opposition was the call for more equitable prices of
commodities produced by Azerbaijan and reforming education to
foster "greater national consciousness." The NKAO and Nakhjivan
ASSR were affirmed as inalienable parts of Azerbaijan. In
keeping with their autonomous positions, their rights to
determine their own "economic and social development and
cultural construction" was assured. But the party pledged "to
carry out a decisive and uncompromising battle against any
attempts at creation of unconstitutional organs of power..." in
those regions. This was still the communist party program, and
it affirmed its commitment to a "Leninist conception of
socialism" and the development of a materialist world view. It
claimed political leadership for the AzCP as guarantor of
perestroika. Mutalibov welcomed "political pluralism" and
pledged the AzCP to contend in elections with other parties
using democratic methods, he warned that "unruliness" would not
be permitted. We are all tired of extremism, he said. We can
not separate democracy from law and order. The rhetoric and
positions of the AzCP did not substantially change after May.
It reflected that the party had been forced to abandon its
traditional posture and adopt the demands of its opponents. It
was a defeat for AzCP. The APF and other opposition groups
meanwhile continued under the State of Emergency to protest
Moscow's actions of January 1990: the use of troops; the
failure of the Soviet government first to declare a state of
emergency or establish a curfew which could have reduced
civilian casualties; the use of live ammunition and heavy
artillery against civilians; and for the resulting deaths of
200 or more civilians (ranging in age from under 12 to over 70
years of age) and the injury of hundreds, perhaps thousands. A
report of July by "Shield," a group of military experts from
the USSR military procurator's office in Moscow supported APF
statements.5 "Shield" agreed that either Soviet "special
forces" or the KGB had blown up the television-radio power
station a few hours before the entry of troops, and that the
populace was notified of a curfew only on the morning of 20
January after troops had control of Baku. The "Shield" report
rejected the military's claims of "returning fire," noting
18 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
there was no evidence that those manning barricades on roads
leading into Baku had been armed. The report listed vehicle
numbers of three ambulances crushed by tanks. "Shield" listed
120 civilian dead and more than 700 wounded, in contrast to the
local military authorities' claim of 83 dead, including 14
military personnel. "Shield" concluded that the army had been
used against the local population, not an external threat. The
Baku press and the many meetings at the University and Academy
of Sciences led, by the time of the September elections, to a
new APF platform, the basis for a broad election bloc called
"Democratic Azerbaijan." If the AzCP platform had usurped many
of APF's original planks, the new APF platform reflected a
significant evolution on fundamental issues. Furthermore, in
the new platform, the Popular Front no longer defined itself
with respect to the communist party or the old order,
reflecting both political maturity and its decisive opposition
to the regime in Moscow and the entire Soviet system. The
first item of the program stated that the Red Army had occupied
the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic on 28 April 1920 and that
the creation of the Azerbaijan soviet government had been an
illegal act. The platform further stated that relations between
Azerbaijan and the Union must be changed in accord with
Azerbaijan's constitution; provisions contrary to the interests
of economic, political and cultural interests of the
Azerbaijani people are to be eliminated; reciprocal agreements
will be rejected if they restrict the people's "right to choose
its own path;" the republic will maintain separate foreign
policy and diplomacy. Regarding Domestic Policy the platform
states the willingness to fight for sovereignty, territorial
integrity and security of all citizens; the need for
self-defense and internal security is affirmed; the platform
argues the need for the development of a concept of
independence [dovlet mustegilik] and creation of an independent
state; the state, legal system and information structures
should be "de-party-cized" and the civil society should be
"de-ideologized;" freedom of speech, conscience and religion
should be guaranteed; passport regime should be dismantled;
the right to cultural development of all citizens regardless of
their nationality should be protected; to protect the security
of territory, NKAO should be dissolved. Development of a free
market is called for and creation of conditions favoring
foreign investment, foreign trade, tourism. The platform
suggests reconsideration of the existing social welfare system
and states the work of mothers raising children is equal to
other social labor. Human rights are to be guaranteed and
"democratic government (majority government)" is to be fought
for; in litigation, the accused are to be presumed innocent;
acts not prohibited by law are to be regarded as legal. Under
the section on "culture and education," the exiting apparatus
is to be destroyed and replaced; national-cultural wealth
illegally taken from the republic is to be returned, the
alphabet is to be "reformed" and religious buildings seized or
19 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
damaged by state or party are to be restored. Finally, on
ecological issues, the current Council of Ministers committee
for environmental protection is to be dissolved and a
comparable commission is to be created under the parliament
[sic]; environmental protection measures are to be
strengthened.6 It was perhaps clear that the proponents of this
program stood for nothing less than the complete destruction of
the Soviet system in Azerbaijan, and could therefore not be
permitted to win any substantial representation. In the
elections of 30 September amid widespread charges of
impropriety, falsification, intimidation (two APF candidates
were murdered days before the election) and outright fraud, the
AzCP candidates won most seats and the APF about 26 of 350
seats. In several districts, run-offs were held two weeks
later, on 14 October, but APF candidates did apparently not do
much better. Aside from denouncing the illegal practices of the
AzCP, there was little the APF could do. It continues to
discuss the broad spectrum of issues that concerns the
republic. The major issue (apart from ending the State of
Emergency) that now confronts the political forces in
Azerbaijan is the union treaty. Any treaty which is written by
the center not the republics, proclaimed one commentary,7 will
remain unsatisfactory. Power for protecting territorial
integrity was given to the center in 1922 and how has Moscow
fulfilled it --by giving bits of Azerbaijan to its neighbors
over the last 70 years. (97,000 sq km in 1922, but 86,600 sq km
today). Economic criticism8 has included the same statement
that power must be given by the republics to the center (not
the reserve), that the proposed union agreement relies too
heavily on organs of coercion for implementation, and that it
will not develop infrastructure in the republics "freezing"
them at current relative levels (detrimental to Azerbaijan).
The latest word from Baku is that if some guarantees of
"territorial integrity" are included, Mutalibov is prepared to
accepted the treaty as now written. The APF will not. Az
Azerbaijan commemorates "Black January," there are few signs of
hope in the Union. They see a replay of Baku's horrors in
Lithuania and Latvia and hear plans for soldiers to patrol
cities with the police. When Moscow is "liberal," Azerbaijan
may still be crushed. When Moscow begins to talk about control,
Azerbaijan begins to talk about 1937.
Notes:
1. Azerbaijan (organ of the Karabagha Khalg Yardimi Komitesi),
24 February 1990.
2. Reported in the APF organ Azadlik 14 January 1990.
3. Bakinskii Rabochii (BR) 22 May 1990, pp. 1-2.
4. Edebiyyat ve Injesenet 25 May 1990, pp. 1-2. Mutalibov in
speech noted that party program had been accepted by CC that
morning.
20 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
5. The commission "Shchit" ("Shield") examined evidence during
12-22 July 1990; its report was printed in Moskovskie novosti
12 August and reprinted in BR 17 August, p.3 with the title
"Ianvar' v Baku." References are from BR.
6. Azadlik 8 September 1990
7. Azerbaijan, 4 May 1990 by Tofik Gandilov (Moscow).
8. Azadlik 22 November 1990, "Ittifag programy bize ne vad
edir?" by Saleh Mammadov, doctor of economics.
NEWS OF THE PROFESSION
During Spring 1990 AACAR By-Laws were drafted, and submitted to
the membership at the end of June for comments. By September
the By-Laws were accepted. Under its provisions, AACAR members
were invited to submit candidates for the Executive Council
elections. The Nominations Committee [Profs. John C. Street (U
Wisconsin-Madison) (Chairman), Brian Spooner (U Pennsylvania)
and Robert Jones (U Massachusetts-Amherst)] compiled the slate
of fourteen names for five Executive Council positions from the
responses received. After consultations with those nominated,
to secure consent, the Ballot was prepared and mailed by Prof.
John C. Street [incurring considerable personal cost, for which
AACAR is grateful]. The Ballots were returned to the members of
the AACAR Elections Committee [Profs. Iraj Bashiri (U
Minnesota) (Chairman), Devin DeWeese (Indiana U) and Uli
Schamiloglu (U Wisconsin-Madison)] by the date specified. Prof.
Bashiri announced the winners: Audrey L. Altstadt (U of
Massachusetts-Amherst); Peter Golden (Rutgers U); Azade-Ayse
Rorlich (U of Southern California); Uli Schamiloglu (U of
Wisconsin-Madison); Maria Subtelny (U of Toronto). The Ex-
Officio Members (who were ineligible at this time for election
to additional office, as stipulated by the By-Laws) of the EC
are: Thomas Allsen (Trenton State College) (Secretary of the
AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board); H. B. Paksoy (U of
Massachusetts-Amherst & Harvard U-CMES) (Editor, AACAR
BULLETIN). Executive Council held its first meeting via
conference call and elected AACAR Officers from among its
members as required: Uli Schamiloglu (Treasurer) Azade-Ayse
Rorlich (Secretary), Audrey L. Altstadt (President).
Muriel Atkin (George Washington U) has joined Thomas Allsen
(Trenton State College), Peter Golden (Rutgers U), Thomas
Noonan (U of Minnesota) and Omeljan Pritsak (Harvard U) as a
member of the AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board.
The AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board invites the
submission of high quality manuscripts in the field of Central
Asian Studies for publication. AACAR has negotiated contracts
with a number of publishing houses for the purpose. Contact:
21 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
Prof. Thomas Allsen, Secretary of the AACAR Monograph Series
Editorial Board, History Department, Trenton State College,
Trenton, NJ 08650.
Dr. Jeffery J. Roberts, Chairman of AACAR Panels Committee,
request that AACAR membership contact him with proposals for
AACAR panels. As each area studies organization, such as AAASS,
AAS, MESA, require that proposals be made early, it is
particularly important to act immediately for the 1992 round.
Please forward your suggestions to Dr. Jeffery J. Roberts,
AACAR Panels, Middle East Studies Center, Ohio State
University, 308 Dulles Hall, 230 W. 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH
43210.
AACAR Executive Council voted to hold the AACAR Membership
Meeting in conjunction with the American Association for the
Advancement of Slavic Studies annual convention, 22-25 November
1991 in Miami. The AACAR Meeting will be restricted to members
in good standing. AACAR Members are requested to make
reservations directly with the providers of convention
facilities: Intercontinental & Hyatt Hotels, Miami, Florida;
and register for the AAASS Convention.
The 34th Meeting of the PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ALTAISTIC
CONFERENCE (PIAC) will convene in Berlin-Germany, July 21
(arrival date) - 26 (departure date), 1991. The second circular
giving details on accommodation, registration fee,
transportation, visa requirements, etc, will be sent in
February to all who request it from Prof. Denis Sinor,
Secretary General, PIAC, Indiana University, 101 Goodbody Hall,
Bloomington, IN 47405. Telefax: 812-855-7500.
Ingeborg Baldauf, Bert G. Fragner, Klaus Kreiser and Semih
Tezcan announce that ESCAS IV, 4th EUROPEAN SEMINAR ON CENTRAL
ASIAN STUDIES will be held at BAMBERG UNIVERSITY, Institute of
Oriental Studies, from 8 to 12 October 1991. Six panels are
envisioned, each covering a half-day session. There will be no
parallel sessions. The number of papers in each panel may vary
from four to six. Papers are expected to be short so as to
allow maximum time for discussions. The final decision about
panels, speakers and discussants will be announced in the
second circular. Contact the above organizers at: ESCAS IV,
Institut f r Orientalistik, Universitat Bamberg, Postfach 1549,
D-8600 Bamberg, Germany.
Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies (RIFIAS), INDIANA
UNIVERSITY announces Rockefeller Foundation Residency
Fellowships aimed at exploring indigenous primary sources on
the history and civilization of Inner Asia. The Fellowship
program is intended to support the study of indigenous Inner
Asian sources by specialists who are equipped with the
necessary philological and disciplinary skills. The RIFIAS
22 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
library, in addition to its general collections, and current
journal subscriptions, also houses several special collections.
The Tibetan collection, housed separately, consists of several
hundred volumes of Tibetan texts reprinted in India, as well as
350 original Tibetan blockprints. The most recently developed
special collection, the Central Asian Archives, comprises (1) a
collection of microfilms and photocopies (obtained primarily
from Soviet libraries) of out-of-print publications dealing
with Central Asia (2) a collection of microfilms of Persian,
Turkic and Arabic manuscripts containing historical,
biographical and geographic works on Islamic Central Asia. This
collection currently comprises nearly 750 microfilms of
manuscripts and over 800 microfilms and photocopies of
published works. Details may be obtained from Professor Yuri
Bregel, Director, RIFIAS, Indiana University, Goodbody Hall,
Bloomington, IN 47405. Phone: 812/855-1605.
The UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON announces the establishment
of an annual summer workshop in Central Asian Studies
consisting of the following courses for 1991:
Central Asian 503, Civilization of Central Asia (3 cr.) -
Intensive 3-week course May 28-June 16. (Prerequisite: Junior
Standing).
Pending funding, the following course will also be offered on
the Madison campus:
First Year Kazakh I-II (8 cr. undergraduate/6 cr.
graduate) - intensive 8-week course June 17-August 11. (No
prerequisites).
Fellowship support may be available through a Social Science
research Council "Grant for Summer Language Institutes for
Soviet Languages Other than Russian." The University of
Wisconsin-Madison will also offer other summer courses in
Central Asian Studies, pending funding, including Intensive
Kazan Tatar, Third Year Uzbek, Russian language. Other subjects
may also be available. TO APPLY FOR ADMISSION AND FELLOWSHIPS:
Summer Sessions Office, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
Madison, WI 53706. Estimated summer 1991 tuition and fees for
6-9 cr. for undergraduate and special students is $530 for
residents and 1736 for non residents. Estimated summer tuition
and fees for 4-7 cr. for graduate students is $728 for
residents and $2236 for non-residents. For the 8-week summer
session estimated room is $431 double ($565 single) in
Elizabeth Waters Hall and estimated board is $400. FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT: Prof. Uli Schamiloglu, Department of
Slavic Languages, 720 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706. Phone:
608/262-3498.
The Soviet Cultural Studies Group, Department of Anthropology,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY announces a symposium for students and
23 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
interested scholars planning or conducting research on, in or
related to the Soviet Union. The aim of the symposium is to
allow scholars with an interest the cultural study of the
Soviet Union to present their work, share ideas, develop areas
of cooperation and keep up to date on latest changes and
developments. Working sessions being considered include: (1)
Coordinating Research Efforts: examining ways to foster
cooperation and sharing of information among researchers
working in different areas. Strategies for complementary data
collection, textual standardization for ease in sharing,
consistency in translation, communication in the field and
after. (2) Issues in Nationalities Research: culture and
discourses of ethnic/national identity; uses of history in
nation building; culture creation in literature and art; the
ethnographer as implicated observer. (3) Cultural study of
Complex States: understanding and keeping up with Soviet
"policy"; the bureaucratic legacy; the use and abuse of models
under revolutionary circumstances. Inquiries and ideas for
workshops should be sent to: Soviet Cultural Studies Group,
Department of Anthropology, Columbia University, New York, NY
10027. E-mail:
[email protected]. The Symposium,
sponsored by the Nationality and Siberian Studies Program of
the Harriman Institute for the Advanced Study of the Soviet
Union, will be held: Friday April 19, 1990, at the 501
Schermerhorn Hall, Columbia University.
Suitland Reference Branch of the NATIONAL ARCHIVES has custody
of the US Department of State's Foreign Service Posts records,
covering the period from the mid 1930s to the mid 1950s. The
Branch also has custody of the records of US Foreign Assistance
Agencies for the 1948-1961 period. Contact: Dr. Greg Bradsher,
Suitland Reference Branch (NNRR), NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
Washington, DC 20409.
Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies at the
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN announces two Rockefeller Foundation
Residency Fellowships in the Humanities for 1991-1992, for the
study of Middle Eastern literatures. The program is designed to
enable writers and scholars of Middle Eastern literature to
produce English translations and commentaries. For application
package, contact Ernest N. McCarus, Director, Center for Near
Eastern and North African Studies, The University of Michigan,
144 Lane Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1290. Fax: 313-936-2948.
KAZAKH/AMERICAN RESEARCH PROJECT is sponsoring a Travel and
Research trip to Kazakhstan, May 20-June 30, 1991. For details,
please contact Dr. Jeannine Davis-Kimball, Director, 2424
Spaulding Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94703. Phone: 415-549-3708.
Since 1984 THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA FOLKLORE NEWSLETTER
has been informing scholars about developments, conferences,
publications and ongoing fieldwork relating to folklore of the
24 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
Middle East and South Asia. Volume 7, No. 2 has recently been
issued. The Newsletter is published at the Center for
Comparative Studies in the Humanities at the OHIO STATE
UNIVERSITY and appears tri-annually. Subscriptions: $6 for US
residents; $10 for institutions and foreign subscribers.
Contact: THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA FOLKLORE NEWSLETTER,
Center for Comparative Studies in the Humanities, 306 Dulles
Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210.
CITIZEN EXCHANGE COUNCIL announces two joint programs, both
involving visits to Moscow, Samarkand, Tashkent, Leningrad: (1)
In association with the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS. This
program includes a three day conference hosted by the English
language department of Samarkand State University; (2) In
association with the FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY, Connecticut.
Contact: Stephany Dickey, Citizen Exchange Council, 12 W. 31st
Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY, 10001. Phone: 212-643-1985.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Program in Comparative Literature
publishes ALUMNI NEWSLETTER. Spring-Summer 1990 issue is
available from: 2070 Foreign Language Building, 707 South
Mathews, Urbana, IL 68101.
EASTERN ART REPORT is published by the Centre for Near East,
Asia and Africa Research (NEAR), covering the arts of Near &
Middle East, South & Southeast Asia, China & Japan.
Subscription infromation from: Eastern Art Report, P O Box 571,
172 Castelnau, London SW13 9DH, UK.
BIBLIOGRAPHY-- The following items were kindly provided by
Prof. Geng Shimin of Beijing: Ji Xianlin, "Translation from the
Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka-- Two leaves (1.3, 1.9) of the
Xingjiang Museum Version," Collection of Papers on the Studies
of Dunhuang-Turfan Manuscripts. Vol. 2. Beijing, 1985. *
Idem, "Translation from the Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka--
the 39th Leaf of the Xingjiang Museum Version," Tocharian and
Indo-European Studies. Vol. 1, Reykjavik. * Idem,
"Translation from the Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka-- the two
leaves (1.15, 1.16) of the Xingjiang Museum Version," Studia
Indo-Germanica et Slavica. Festgabe f r W. Thomas zum 65.
Geburtstag. M nchen, 1988. * Idem, "Translation from the
Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka-- the two leaves (1.2, 1.4) of
the Xingjiang Museum Version," Studies of Dunhuang LAnguages
and Literatures. Beijing, 1988. * Idem, "Tokharian A and
the Dvatrimsadvaralaksana," Languages of Nationalities. 1982.
No. 4. * Idem, "On the Maitreyasamitininataka in
Tokharian A of the Xingjiang Museum," Cultural Relics. 1983.
No. 1. * Idem, "Maitreya and Mile," Social Sciences of
China. 1990, No. 1. * Geng Shimin und Hans-Joachim
Klimkeit, Das Zusammentreffen mit Maitreya--Die erst f nf
Kapitel der Hami-Version des Maitrisimit, Teil I: Text,
bersetzung und Kommentar, Teil II: Faksimilies und Indices.
25 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
Wiesbaden, 1988. * Idem, "Fragmentary Manuscripts of
Abhidharmanasasatra, Avatamsaka-Sutra," Languages of
Nationalities, 1985, No, 1.; Bulletin of the Central Institute
for Nationalities. 1987, No, 1.; Central Asiatic Journal. 1989,
Vol. 33. * Geng Shimin, H. J. Klimkleit, P. Laut, "Manis
Wettkampf mit dem Prinzen." Zeitschrift der Deutschen
Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. Bd. 137, 1987. * Idem,
"Die Geschichte der Prinzen--Weitere neue manichaisch-t rkische
Fragmente aus Turfan." ZDMG. Bd. 139, 1989. * Jiang
Zhongxin, "On the Remains of the Sanskrit Saddharmapundarika
kept in the Museum of L snun (Port Arthur)," Researches on the
Unearthed Manuscripts. Beijing, 1985. * Idem, "On the
Transition of Suffix -am into -o in the Kashgar Version of the
Sanskrit Saddharmapundarika." Studies on Southasia. 1986, No.
2.
BOOK REVIEWS
Azade-Ayse Rorlich THE VOLGA TATARS: A PROFILE IN NATIONAL
RESISTANCE. (Hoover Institution Press, 1986). XVI + 288 Pp.
Appendix, glossary.
In the current era of rapid change within the Soviet Union
any volume that sheds light on the traditions and culture of
one of the non-Russian peoples of that country and elucidates
its historical political roles and aspirations is important.
This is especially true for Azade-Ayse Rorlich's THE VOLGA
TATARS. The Volga Tatars are, perhaps, not as well known to the
Western world as some other Turkic peoples of the USSR. But, as
Rorlich informs us, it was precisely this people, which now
occupies the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, that
often took the lead in formulating and articulating,
disseminating and implementing cultural and political programs
not only for themselves, but for the extended Moslem population
in the Russian empire and later the Soviet Union. To learn
about the Volga Tatars is then to become better informed about
a minority population contained in the various incarnations of
the Russian state, about Russian policy toward it, and,
importantly, something about the responses of that population
to those policies, i.e., how it survived and developed within
an alien political and cultural context.
In presenting their story, Rorlich divides the history of
the Volga Tatars into three main sections. The first deals with
the formation of a Kazan principality in the aftermath of the
13th-century Mongol invasion of the mid-Volga region, its
transformation into the Kazan Khanate, and the conquest of the
latter by the Russian state of Muscovy in 1552. Her coverage of
this early period is relatively brief; it is also the weakest
26 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
portion of the book. The information presented is largely
derivative of other literature and, unfortunately, Rorlich
reproduces some of the findings drawn from that literature in a
confused and/or misleading manner.
Bur the author is on firmer ground and is much more
authoritative in the remainder of the book. Her account there
rests on her own research and analysis of an impressive array
of sources, including primary materials in Russian, Turkish and
Tatar languages, as well as secondary sources published in
Western languages as well. Her linguistic skills alone enable
Rorlich to provide unusual, if not unique, insights to an
English-reading audience. It is on this foundation that she
explores the Volga Tatars' development under the cultural
influences and political pressures resulting from Russian
political dominance during the Russian imperial period (section
II) and the Soviet era (section III).
Sections II and III are organized primarily around major
policy initiatives undertaken by the Russians and, secondarily,
the Tatar responses to them. In conjunction with this schema
Russian policy becomes the chief determinant of the events and
time periods emphasized. There are resultant gaps in the
narrative, between the time of the Russian conquest of 1552 and
the era of Catherine the Great (late 18th century), for one
example, and between 1932 and the post World War II era, for
another. Questions do arise about the experience and
development of Volga Tatar society during those periods of
stability, between the historical pressure points, when the
society was able to develop on its own momentum rather than
reacting to external forces.
But by presenting her account in this fashion, Rorlich
also offers important lessons to students of the history of
Russia and the USSR as well as those of Moslem society. In
designing their responses to Russian policy the Volga Tatars
drew upon Islamic traditions and cultural factors intrinsic to
a community that transcended political boundaries and spanned
(in the 18th-19th centuries) the Ottoman Empire and Central
Asia as well as territories politically within the Russian
Empire. Volga Tatar society was also complex, and Rorlich
demonstrates how diverse elements within it reacted to Russian
influences differently, some adopting, others adapting, and yet
others wholly rejecting aspects of Russian culture. In the
process, some Tatars became estranged from their Moslem
heritage, while others reinforced their commitment to it. Tatar
society engaged in its own debates and internal conflicts as it
attempted to cope with the challenges presented by the policies
of their Russian rulers.
The result, however, was that by the 19th century the
Tatars were developing their own reform movements and
contributing to the transformation of the traditional Moslem
community into a modern, secular society. These movements
constitute the core of Rorlich's study. In section II she
examines their different stages, principles, and leaders from
27 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
the early 19th century to 1917. Her narrative spans a broad
spectrum, ranging from religious reformers, whose concerns to
revitalize Islam and make it more accessible to a broader
Moslem public led them to challenge the scholastic religious
authorities entrenched in theological capitals of Central Asia,
to figures who represent various facets of the secular,
political reform movement that was active by the 1905-1917
period. In the process she discusses programs and policies
relating to an array of topics such as language, alphabets,
education, and the press, and reveals how they defined and
reflected broader social and political concerns.
The reform movements thus also contributed to a dynamic
process within the larger Islamic community, as it juggled
pressures of conservative religious scholastics with those
emanating from proponents of pan-Turkism on the one hand and,
on the other, from an exclusive nationalism that distinguished
Volga TAtars from Russians and also from other Turks and
Moslems. The dilemmas of the reformers of this period were
complicated by their simultaneous and sometimes contradictory
yearnings for the preservation of their unique national and/or
religious identity as well as for secular knowledge and
material progress, which logically encouraged the mastery and
use of Russian language and emulation of Russian institutions,
such as schools and cultural media.
The continuing evolution of Volga Tatar political
movements during the revolutions of 1917 and the Soviet era is
the subject of section III. In it Rorlich focuses on one of the
most significant, from the perspective of creative cultural
adaptation, Volga Tatar achievements --the Tatar national
communist movement. Led by Mirsaid Sultangaliev and based on a
perceived "compatibility of some of the basic fundamental
precepts of MArxism and Islam" (p. 148), this movement sought a
"Moslem road to communism" during the unsettled years following
the Bolshevik revolution. Although its demand for autonomous
political organs became incompatible with the centralized
structures created by the Soviet authorities, who eventually
crushed it, the movement reflected an attempt to merge foreign
or Russian communist principles with indigenous traditions and
provides an illustration of how the Volga Tatars were able to
adapt an alien political ideology and creatively graft it to at
least one branch of the reform movements that had emerged from
their own multi-faceted society. It thus constitutes strong
evidence for Rorlich's basic message: The Volga Tatars have
been and remain a dynamic, resilient people with the capacity
to adapt to and develop in changing conditions while retaining
essential qualities, perspectives, values, and characteristics
unique to their own culture, history, and traditions.
THE VOLGA TATARS is somewhat flawed by editorial
carelessness (the birthdate of Abu-Nasr al-Kursavi, for
example, is identified as 1776 and 1726 on page 49). But such
inconsistencies in detail do not detract from the overall value
of this study. On the contrary, Rorlich has not only brought to
28 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
light the history and accomplishments of the Volga Tatars in
particular; she has also sensitively focused attention on more
universal social dilemmas arising from competition between
pressures to preserve national identity and to assimilate,
tendencies to modernize and to maintain national traditions,
temptations to seek independence and remain within larger
political units, i. e., dilemmas with which many minority
peoples have grappled in the past and which continue to
challenge multinational societies in the modern world.
Janet Martin
University of Miami-Coral Gables
ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE RED ARMY: ASSET OR LIABILITY?
Alexander R. Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush (Eds.) (Westview
Press, 1988).
This is an excellent introduction to the political and
military issues surrounding the use of non-Russian ethnic
groups in the Soviet military. It is also very timely,
considering the current ferment in the non-Russian republics
and the attempt by the military leadership to enforce the draft
laws by force, if necessary. The different chapters in the book
cover the historical background of Soviet policies toward the
different ethnic groups in the military, current demographic
trends and their possible effects on Soviet military policy and
performance, and inter-ethnic relations in today's Red Army, a
discussion that was based on extensive interviews with Soviet
emigres. The basic theme of the book is that throughout the
Soviet period, different regimes have employed non-Russian
minorities for varying purposes in the military and that
different nationalities were employed in different ways, based
on the leadership's view of the political reliability and
racial characteristics of each particular group. The
nationalities of Central Asia have consistently been considered
the least politically reliable and militarily capable of all,
and thus have consistently received the lowest positions and
the worst treatment.
Part one of this book, written by Susan L. Curran and
Dmitry Ponomareff, deals with the historical background of the
use of non-Russian nationalities in the military from the time
of Ivan IV through the post-World War II period. The authors
show the similarities in the attitude toward and treatment of
different nationalities during the imperial and Soviet periods
and point out that during the tsarist period, it was the
Central Asian nationality groups who were considered to be the
least politically reliable. The authors also discuss the ways
that the Soviets utilized non-Russian nationalities during the
Civil War in their campaign to recapture the non-Russian
territories and during World WAr II, when the large scale use
29 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
of non-Russian troops alleviated military manpower shortages
but also raised further doubts about the loyalty of non-Russian
troops. Part two, written by Alexander R. Alexiev, is a
companion study of German policies toward non-Russian
nationalities in the occupied territories during World War II.
Alexiev points out how widespread was the willingness of the
nationalities to support the Germans and how short-sighted
German policies led to the erosion of this support.
Part three is the most interesting section of the book.
Written by the book's co-editors, this chapter is a discussion
of the results of their interviews with Soviet emigres
concerning the role and treatment of the non-Russian
nationalities in the military and the inter-ethnic relations
among the different groups. As a result of these interviews the
authors have concluded that there probably continues to be a
policy of strictly controlling the ethnic composition of combat
units to ensure the dominance of Slavic elements and that non-
Slavic troops are most heavily concentrated in non-combat
units, such as construction battalions. It is also unsurprising
that the Soviet officer corps is heavily Russian. Based on
perceived reliability, intelligence, and language ability,
there is an apparent hierarchy of ethnic groups in the military
with the Russians, Ukrainians, and the Belorussians at the top
and the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia at the bottom.
The authors also discuss the prevalence of tensions among
different ethnic groups in military units, with the most
frequent conflict occurring between Russian and non-Russian
troops. The occurrence of conflict between non-Russian
nationalities is apparently much lower. Based on the data they
collected, the authors have concluded that there is potential
for a lessening of Soviet military capability, given the
reliability problems and inter-ethnic tensions and the growing
percentage of non-Russian troops due to Soviet demographic
trends. However, Gorbachev's stated goal of reducing the Soviet
military establishment may help alleviate this problem, by
allowing for the continued dominance of Slavic groups within a
smaller force structure.
The last two chapters deal with demographic trends among
the draft-age population and with the use of Muslim soldiers in
Afghanistan. This book is well-written and documented
throughout and should be read by anyone interested in Soviet
nationality policies or with Soviet military policy and
capabilities.
Philip Bayer
SRI International
