7. By experiencing state created juristic benefits (such as
through the vehicle of corporations by being
shareholders/directors/officers). In 1910, the Supreme Court
ruled that if a Prince creates some type of a profit or gain
situation in Commerce (and remember that King's Commerce is a
closed private domain belonging to Government), then the King
can participate in taxing that profit or gain that the Prince
created.1 When state created benefits are accepted by you, then
the Commercial enrichment you experience within that state
franchise is very much within the taxing power of the United
States Government; and that is correct Law.2
Additionally, the King can tax other state created Commercial
benefits that are experienced by others like attorneys and
accountants who, as Special Interest Groups, use the police
powers of the state for their own private enrichment, by setting
up shared monopolies and then experiencing higher revenues than
otherwise obtainable under a LAISSEZ-FAIRE free market entry
without restrictions on new lower priced competitors entering
into their trade.3
This game of using penal statutes to create shared enrichment
monopolies is quite old, and yet look around you today and see
how many bleeding heart folks there are, who really want to
believe that line that Government is their friend, just somehow;
and also fall for the fraudulent line that such a monopoly is
for their own protective good -- by keeping all those evil
quacks, vile frauds, and assorted degenerate incompetents out of
the legal and medical professions.4
Although we might not be too philosophically sympathetic with
the manipulative use of Legislatures to create monopolies and
the Tortfeasance that is thrown at us in the adverse secondary
circumstances flowing from their operations, as a matter of law,
creating game rules for voluntary players in King's Commerce is
largely immune from Constitutional restrainments.5
In France in the 1600s, Finance Minister Jean Colbert once wrote
a CODE OF COMMERCE [sometimes called the CODE SAVARY (1673)].
The Code created controlled entrance guilds, and laid down rules
for apprenticeship and admissions of masters. An extensive
number of trades were so regulated by the Code, and once
entrance into those guilds was restricted [i.e., the number of
possible competitors was restricted], then the demand for taxes
immediately appeared:
"Each new guild was to pay certain sums for the granting to it
of statutes and regulations..."
"Colbert raised money from the organization and reorganization
of the guilds... and made of them before the century was out
congealing monopolies which the state [wanted], because revenue
could be raised from them."6
As a general rule, money raising statutes that generate
enrichment for the Crown never die; and down to the present day,
a portion of the Commercial law of France remains based on the
122 Articles of Colbert's CODE OF COMMERCE.7 But here in the
contemporary United States, once a state has got you tied into a
licensing program of some type, then and there you are
experiencing some type of state created juristic benefit, and as
such, you then become a federal taxable object for this benefit
accepting reason alone. When presented with such a state
license, no other questions about the existence of the National
Citizenship Contract, or any other juristic contract, ever need
be asked by those termites in the IRS searching the Countryside
for some meat to lay into.8
Other state monopolies like Driver's Licenses and motor vehicle
registrations are very much used by the IRS in many ways to
assist them in tax collections; and state tax collectors also
use these records for their own statute enforcement and state
treasury enrichment conquests as well. When those Driver's
License records are collected by the state, they are also
forwarded to Washington, and then redistributed to foreign
persons and foreign political jurisdictions under numerous
executive agreements, diplomatic and military treaties, and
bureaucratic cordialities.
Yet, even though you entered into those state licenses merely to
avoid your incarceration as an unlicensed driver, the
uncontested preparation of a state created juristic personality,
such through a Driver's License, to the Supreme Court would be
prospectively sufficient for that Court to attach IN PERSONAM
liability to Title 26 as a Person accepting special state
created benefits.9 It is also reasonable to infer that a
Driver's License is evidence of Residency, and of the acceptance
of a wide-ranging array of state benefits tailored to Residents.
Remember that your use of those highways is your acceptance of a
benefit that Government created, and since reciprocity is
expected back in return, contracts are in effect: Invisible and
automatic.10
If you do so file objections to the assertion of a Beneficent
Taxable Juristic Commercial Status over you by way of a Driver's
License, you will need to again prove your present STATE OF
MIND; and the exact state code criminalizing such innocuous
behavior has to be quoted within the body of your Objection.
Some folks prefer to play it safe and avoid the Driver's License
altogether; while others selectively use deception in assuming a
NOM DE PLUME for purposes of deflecting recourse
identification.11
However, other folks are not able to so quickly terminate the
Driver's License due to the fundamental importance of the thing
and either their present inability to successfully handle a
criminal prosecution or their reluctance to assign something
deleterious to it; and so at a minimum, an Objection and a
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TO QUIET STATUS originated in Federal
District Court is in order. The Declaratory Judgment, ruling
that the Driver's License was a COMPELLED LICENSE, existing as a
coerced instrument signed by you to avoid incarceration as an
unlicensed driver, and is not to be used by the IRS or anyone
else for the expansive purposes of evidence of either Residency
or of Domiciliary, nor as evidence of entrance into Commerce, or
of the taxable acceptance of federal or state created benefits,
or of consent to be bound by any statute, other than those state
motor vehicle statutes. The objective of our pursuit of a
Declaratory Judgment is: That since the license was compelled
out of us when some DE MINIMIS tension is in effect with a
Substantive Right (the RIGHT TO TRAVEL), and since the avowed
purpose of the license itself is to adduce EVIDENCE OF
COMPETENCY, then the extraneous collateral expectations of
reciprocity in any area outside of those Motor Vehicle Statutes
it would otherwise create when left unchallenged, is now
terminated.12
If you are going to Object to, and have new narrow contours now
defined on your Driver's License in order to restrain its use by
other Government agencies as the high-powered King's Equity
attachment instrument that it is, then the Objection should
generally follow the model pattern set forth above in the
discussion of Federal Reserve Notes. This Objection should refer
to the exact state penal statute that you are applying for the
license under Objection and protest, merely to avoid
incarceration as an unlicensed driver.13
Remember that the Supreme Court is in Washington, and you are
out in California, Florida, or Texas, and it is unreasonable for
you to assume that the Supreme Court knows the state statute
that you are Objecting to, so quote it for them verbatim. How
can you engage in involuntary behavior based on threats
contained in a state statute, if you don't even know what the
statute says?14 If you are just too busy to go down to the law
library and find out the exact wording of that penal statute, I
have no sympathy for any rebuffment that you will experience
later on as some appellate forum rules adversely against you, on
the grounds that your STATE OF MIND was not clarified
substantively or timely. Also included should be a brief recap
of the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases in the United States Supreme
Court.15
Patriots and Highway Protesters are reaching incorrect
conclusions when they cite the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases as being
sufficiently substantive to annul state statutes requiring
highway operator's licenses. Those RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases only
offer a line of reasoning parallel with your objectives. Only in
loose DICTA does the reasoning found in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Cases support your position; so they offer a mitigating source
of relief against state statutes, but not a necessarily
vitiating source of relief. Nowhere did our Founding Fathers
restrain the states from requiring licenses to operate motor
vehicles or anything else on public highways, and the words
RIGHT TO TRAVEL do not even appear anywhere in the
Constitution.16 And although the words RIGHT TO TRAVEL do not
appear anywhere in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has,
through their Opinions, given that right Constitutional status
cognizance.17
But whatever DE MINIMIS protective penumbra the RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Cases offers, you are now invoking to abate both your regional
Prince and the King's Tax Collectors who use Department of Motor
Vehicle information and legal assumptions that information
infers for their own enrichment purposes. In this circumstantial
context of submitting a carefully pre-planned and prepared
written Objection, where time is not of the essence, failure to
cite your authorities (failure to explain your justifications)
timely could be fatal. You are up against high-powered
adversaries, and lightly drafting papers, as if you were on a
picnic, is fatal. Judges do not owe you Justice aligned with
your philosophy; those are adversary court proceedings you are
in, where mere preponderance wins, and an insubstantive
Objection is open to attack. (And remember that a RIGHT TO
TRAVEL also lies outside of, and beyond the reach of, the King's
Charter (the Constitution).18
Some judicial forms from another era have applied the LIBERTY
CLAUSE in the Fifth Amendment to restrain the interference by
the FEDERAL GOVERNMENT in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL area (but keep in
mind that those Cases were ruled upon in an era when automobiles
and other high-powered technology did not exist in the United
States, and highway contracts WITH STATES did not exist then, as
well).19
So your objective in having the contours of the Driver's License
restrained to now apply only to Highway Contract grievances, the
RIGHT TO TRAVEL being claimed is both of a Constitutional
origin, as well as of a Natural origin, ex-Constitutional.20 But
important for the moment is the Objection itself, and your
Declaration therein that you are not a Resident or a Citizen of
that State together with correlative supporting averments of
Benefit Rejections,21 regardless of any statute that facially
appears to force Residency Status on persons physically
inhabited in that state for an extended period of time.22
But if your Objection does conform to this model, then a Judge
generally will be reluctant to hold the spurious unrelated
reciprocity terms of a Commercial contract (which Driver's
Licenses can be applied to operate as a Commercial
Enfranchisement Instrument under some limited circumstances)
against a person, in a setting other than the originally
specified terms, who has proved that they entered into that
contract under compelled circumstances in order to avoid
incarceration merely to enjoy a Substantive natural Right (the
RIGHT TO TRAVEL), and without experiencing any Commercial
benefit therefrom.23
That is the type of an Objection the Supreme Court wants to
hear. The documentation and proof that the Supreme Court would
want to see is a copy of the application for the Driver's
License where it says you signed it under protest; proof of
service of your Objection on state officials, the Objection
itself, and a 30-day invitation to those state officials to let
them cancel or rescind the Driver's License if the application
of Commercial Status and/or Residency Status is deemed mandatory
on all License holders (thus requiring those state officials to
come out of the closet and expose some Status oriented law to
you they might not want you to know). Under your DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT, the Driver's License will be construed to act
exclusively as EVIDENCE OF COMPETENCY under Motor Vehicle
statutes only.24
If they do decide to rescind, this is a classic Case for
Administrative Law intervention; and in either alternative
administration disposition, you win. Here, our administrative
grievance with the state concerns the disputed Commercial and
Enfranchised Residency Citizenship Status that your Driver's
License will otherwise be judicially construed to convey in the
future. Uncontested Driver's Licenses can very much be used by
state taxing commissions as evidence of Residency, and hence
evidence of an IN PERSONAM attachment of liability for the
expected reciprocal payment of benefits accepted on the state
Income Tax, among many other juristic things. As viewed by
sophisticated appellate judges, for state vehicle code
enforcement purposes, Driver's Licenses are EVIDENCES OF AN
OPERATOR'S COMPETENCY, and are not, in this context, the
Evidences of Consent to be Regulated in Commerce that Highway
Contract Protesters occasionally talk about. The state does not
need any "Driver's License" from you, in order to force you into
an administrative contract when you accept the benefits of
driving a motor vehicle down a state highway. Patriots
propagating the view that the mere existence and non-existence
of a Driver's License attaches and detaches liability to those
state highway regulatory statutes are misleading their
followers: You don't need any written contract on someone in
order to sue someone and bring him into a Court and perfect a
judgment against the poor fellow -- but you do need to show the
acceptance of benefits and of the expectation of reciprocity,
which elements are very much present when a motor vehicle is
operated on state provided highways, with "Public Notice"
statutes creating the expectation of reciprocity.
Under this setting, it might be preferable to move directly for
a Judicial Declaration of Status, rather than pursuing
Administrative ESTOPPEL remedies. That DECLARATORY JUDGMENT is
important protection material for you in other non-related areas
of taxation, and you have a good chance of getting one issued
out, and so submission of your Case to a sequence of state
Administrative Law procedures, in hopes of using Collateral
Estoppel abatement arguments later on, might be discouraged in
this instance. Federal Judges will be reluctant to listen to
California Motor Vehicles Department Administrative Law
questions in an IRS Case of some type, even though the Judge
knows very well that there is some peripheral merit to what you
are saying. And so all factors considered, jumping to a
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT becomes appropriate by necessity in this
unusual factual setting of redefining the contours of an
Adhesion Contract Driver's License to a limited and narrowed
construction (meaning: Evidence of Highway Competency, only).
One of the evolving stages in the life of what are now
contemporary penal Motor Vehicle Statutes had, as one of their
previous stages, the purpose of assigning legal rights and
liabilities to Motor Vehicle operators so that civil litigants
can have fault and damages assessed against them in a courtroom.
For example, in Massachusetts, it originally was known as the
TRESPASSER ON THE HIGHWAY DOCTRINE;25 and later evolved into a
regulatory jurisdiction when Massachusetts enacted a
comprehensive Motor Vehicle Act after automobiles made their
highway appearance.26
The talk from Patriots and Highway Contract Protesters that I
hear constantly, about how the old Common Law says this and that
about my rights to use Government Highways anyway that I feel
like it,27 is actually not relevant today in the United States.28
Reasons: First, the factual setting that our Father's Common
Law on free ingress and egress developed out on the King's
Highways is not replicated today in the United States, since
technology has changed the factual setting that our Father's
Common Law used to operate on.29
Contemporary technology has very much changed the quiescent
HORSE & BUGGY era and pedestrian highway factual setting our
Father's Common Law grew up on.30 In the old HORSE AND BUGGY
days of England, highways were largely dirt paths acquired from
the easement forfeiture from adjoining landowners. Here in the
United States up until the 1940s or so, there was an extensive
network of privately owned toll roads -- Government was just not
"into" highways that much. In old England, the King never spent
any money on those dirt paths called highways, as there was
nothing to maintain; so when foul weather, even adverse weather
lasting across an entire season made its appearance, then the
roads simply ground to a standstill, and noting moved.31
But today, Government is spending incredible amounts of money,
year in and year out, to build and maintain highways, so RIGHT
TO TRAVEL argument parallels that folks draw that try to disable
the contemporary ability of the King to even ask for reciprocity
back in return for benefits offered are incorrect -- since in
the old days, the King was not offering a special benefit to
begin with (except in some London streets constructed with
cobblestone), and so to say that the King was once disabled back
then from asking for reciprocity when the King never initially
provided any benefits, is an incorrect parallel built upon
disparate factual settings.
And today, high-powered technology routinely causes wholesale
death and destruction when an operator does no more than
momentarily lose absolute mental concentration on driving -- and
in such a factual setting, an honest assessment by Highway
Contract Protesters of the underlying legitimacy of the
requirement that there be EVIDENCE OF COMPETENCY, would
necessarily result in the conclusion that a Driver's License, so
called, really isn't all that unreasonable, and is in fact, very
reasonable.32 So it is technology that is responsible for the
Prince's Highway LEX, and not the traffic density congestion
that is created from the mere existence of other people in
Society.33
An interesting and very strong argument can be made by your
adversaries, arguing that it would be the failure of the states
to preemptively regulate the highways by licensing that
interferes with your RIGHT TO TRAVEL, since having
physiologically incompetent drivers out on the highways
obstructs and interferes with the RIGHT TO TRAVEL of those other
drivers who are competent.34 And your adversaries have a
truckload full of statistics to support their line of
reasoning.35
Do you see what a difficult corner clever insurance companies
have worked judges into? Their arguments are logical, and
coming up from a factual setting steeped in the presence of
juristic contracts, great weight will be given to their
arguments, no matter how self-serving, twisted, or vicious they
may be.36
Whenever anyone, regardless of your relational Status off the
highways, uses those Government highways, an invisible contract
is in effect right then and there; it is not necessary for your
regional Prince, the State, to adduce written evidence of your
consent -- just like it is not necessary to get a contract in
writing to get the contract enforced judicially.37
When Protesters get up in the morning, get out the old car, and
drive into the street, they are literally driving themselves
into a contract -- as the Protester then and there accepted
benefits conditionally offered by the State -- no where in your
State Constitution does it require the Prince to build and
maintain those Highways of his, so his building and offering
those Highways for your consideration and possible use is purely
discretionary on his part; nor is your Prince restrained from
possessing any expectation of reciprocity from PERSONS accepting
the benefits derived from the use of those Government Highways.38
So our Father's old Common Law isn't being contaminated at all
by Star Chamber Traffic Court judges ignoring the fact that no
Tort damages were caused by the criminal defendant, as they go
about their work prosecuting technical infractions to Highway
Contracts: Because neither of the twin Tort indicia of either
MENS REA or CORPUS DELECTI deficiency arguments sounding in the
sugar sweet liability vitiating music of Tort Law that Highway
Contract Protesters love to throw at Traffic Court judges, are
not even relevant whenever contracts are up for review and
enforcement -- they never have been, and they never will be, and
the Last Day before Father will not be any exception.39
Many folks out there are searching for a SILVER BULLET; I hear
references to that perennial search constantly. They are
searching for some legal procedure, some great air-tight line of
reasoning, some great legal brief that just ties it all
together, to throw at the IRS and Traffic Court judges. These
folks are missing the boat, so to speak, all together: Because
the origin to their frustration lies in invisible contracts, and
you become a party to those invisible contracts because you
accepted some benefit someone else was conditionally offering.40
And for some philosophically uncomfortable reasons, the
reciprocity on your part that the contract calls for is never
forthcoming. Even walking into a shopping center could be a
contract -- if the management so much as posts a notice giving
some conditional or qualified use to persons entering therein
and accepting the benefits the management is offering (such as
requiring shoes and shirts, and so are the arguments of
UNFAIRNESS -- that those reciprocal terms of wearing shirts and
shoes just don't apply to you because you traveled from just so
far away -- as some shopping center security guard throws you
out of the place -- is just whimpering). It is actually the
continued refusal by Protesters to first see, and then honor,
invisible contracts that creates the friction that irritates
Protesters so much, and the SILVER BULLET you Protesters are
looking for actually lies within yourself.
Remember that your use of those Government highways is your
acceptance of a special benefit that Government created and
offers, and since reciprocity is expected back in return,
contracts are in effect: Automatic and invisible. And one of
the ways out of a contract altogether is to prove FAILURE OF
CONSIDERATION (meaning that you did not accept any benefit the
other party offered).41
Just how does a PERSON prove FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION when he
was caught accepting a benefit by driving down a state highway?
The RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases really don't support the position of
you Protesters very well; however, there is some merit in your
harmless expression of political dissent, even if the dissent is
technically improper (addressing the argument specifically).
There is simply no statement anywhere in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Cases that bluntly restrains the States:
"No state shall require licensing as a condition of use of
public thoroughfares."
And since our Founding Fathers never restrained the States in
this area, then snickering at judges today who are writing on a
record that does not restrain expectations of reciprocity is
improvident: That somewhat tranquil era of HORSE AND BUGGIES no
longer dominates the highways, where in its place today lies the
high-powered automotive technology making its appearance; and
also gone from the scene is our Father's old Common Law on basic
Property Rights [the right to clean air uncontaminated by
automotive exhaust], which has also taken the back seat.42
Our Founding Fathers never restrained the states from asserting
a regulatory jurisdiction over public (Government) highways
through an operation of contract. By comparison, the Framers
were also negligent in making sure the First Amendment was
applicable to all potential future forms of communications
media, that an organic technology would bring forth some day,
because the First Amendment, frozen in the hard paper media
technology of the 1700s, does not apply to restrain the
establishment of a regulatory speech and content-supervised
jurisdiction over television and radio media propagating through
the electromagnetic spectrum, that the King grabbed for himself
by his RADIO ACT OF 1927.43 And in other areas, technology has
eaten away at what would have otherwise been not permissible
under the Fourth Amendment.44
Today, in similar ways, the Fourth Amendment is being hacked
apart in ways our Fathers never even considered: Because the
technology existing today (aviation flights and electromagnetic
scans) did not exist then, so no such restrainments were
included in their writing of the Fourth Amendment.45
Rather than snickering at judges today, an accurate assessment
of the origin of the problem is that our Fathers lacked the
sophistication required to apply worst case scenarios over the
likely geometry of Government, and failed to pre-emptively apply
their majestic restrainments to apply to prospective, but then
unknown, technological innovations.46
Yes, the Constitution was Inspired, but an Inspired Document is
not a perfect document; Inspiration only means supporting
ASSISTANCE, and not CONTROL.
But... remember that the question of damages or no damages is a
Tort Law factual setting question and it not relevant when you
are out on those state highways: Because a contract is in
effect whenever you use those highways, by your acceptance of
benefits offered for your use conditionally. When you operate a
motor vehicle over those state highways, you have accepted
special benefits created and offered by the state, and so when
accepting juristic benefits, in the context of reciprocity being
expected back in return, then there lies a contract -- quietly,
invisible, automatic, and rather strong. The relational
non-Commercial, non-Resident, and non-Citizen status of the
operator off of the highway is irrelevant in attaching contract
liability by accepting the use of the benefit of Government
highways. A specific, on-point adjudication on this Driver's
License Question is going to involve this question:
Whether the States have the standing jurisdiction required to
force, under penal statutes, a regulatory jurisdiction such a
contract creates, when tension is in effect between the
existence of that contract, and the substantive RIGHT TO TRAVEL
interests discussed in appellate rulings.
In every recent state court ruling that I have examined (post
1930 era) where a QUO WARRANTO type of question was being
addressed,47 all courts forced a regulatory jurisdiction over
the operator of a motor vehicle, and pleas and cries for
restrainments based on RIGHT TO TRAVEL and RIGHT TO WORK
tensions and the like, have all universally fallen on deaf ears
with state judges in this era, and also by Federal Judges when
addressing questions of Civil Rights violations relief when
Highway Contract Protesters throw vindictive Section 1983
actions at some traffic cop.
Yet despite this predominate skew towards contract priority in
judicial RIGHT TO TRAVEL doctrinal reasoning, annulment by the
Supreme Court of criminal liability for the innocent use of
public highways under circumstances where no collaborating
damages were caused, would be appropriate; an honest assessment
of the total factual picture by a sophisticated judge would
result in the conclusion that merely driving a car down a street
without a license does not ascend to the minimum threshold
requirements that characterize legitimate criminal incarceration
standards -- compelled contract or no compelled contract; those
penal highway statutes exist by virtue of Special Interest Group
sponsorship and pressure, and judges are diminishing their own
stature and violate the restraining mandates inherent in the
REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT CLAUSE, by letting clever and
politically ambitious Special Interest Groups get away with
whatever they can buy in Legislatures to damage innocent
behavior under circumstances where unnecessary covenants within
adhesive contracts are being asserted in tension with
Substantive Natural Rights in the Locomotion area; other highway
drivers have no assurance that another approaching car is not
being driven by an unlicensed Citizen of France, who by virtue
of his political status would not have an unlicensed motor
vehicle operation penal statute thrown at him. Therefore, there
is an inherent ASSUMPTION OF RISK among all highway users that
some drivers will necessarily have to be unlicensed,48 since it
is literally legally impossible, and also unattractive for
Foreign Relations reasons not related to preventing vehicular
accidents, to maintain a perfect expectation of motorist
licensing compliance.49
These risk elements on using highways are judgment factors that
all motorists evaluate and consider, even though this process is
often invisible by operating in the psychological strata of the
subconscious; the actual judgment process involved when a
composite profile confluence of such risk elements are blended
together and evaluated, is called RISK ASSESSMENT.50
In a factual setting where an unlicensed driver creates damages
out on the highway, then punitive incarceration is appropriate,
and this requirement reconciles everyone's objections by
accomplishing the same identical criminal recourse the
INCARCERATIONISTS yearn for so much in their vindictive cries
for encagement glory.
Incidentally, by comparison in Canada, the Ontario Police only
seeks a $53 civil fine for driving without a license, and the
sky doesn't seem to be falling in on Canada without the
existence of some precious little penal statute in existence to
incarcerate an unlicensed drive; so Case hardened American
judges who parrot the Insurance Company lobbyist line (that
incarceration is the only medicine to deal with unlicensed
drivers) are exercising flaky judgment that isn't very well
thought out ("...da law says I gotta").51
Even prominent United States Supreme Court Judges can be found
operating in this competency limitation strata,52 as they live
in a shell, isolated away from divergent opinions that may very
well be built upon an enlarged basis of factual knowledge they
do not possess, and as such, just might possibly have some merit
to them.53
This highway power play by Insurance Companies, to use penal
statutes and the police powers to experience Commercial
self-enrichment, raises a secondary "fairness" question on the
propriety of using statutes operationally skewed to favor their
sponsors; however, "fairness" is a Tort concept definable only
along the infinite -- and in contrast to that, contracts are
narrow, specific, and contain detailed positive mandates and
negative restrainments in effect between the parties. Being that
contracts are both specific and finite, and that special
benefits were accepted synchronous with the contract's technical
reciprocal contours being pre-defined; therefore, the inherently
indeterminate nature of FAIRNESS is fundamentally out of harmony
with contracts, and properly belongs in that free-wheeling world
of Tort Law, where anything goes. Where the terms of contracts
are not freely negotiated due to the dominate overbearing
positional strength of one of the parties, the judicial
allowance of a DE MINIMIS amount of corrective "fairness" is
appropriate since there never was any mutual assent54 -- and
that already exists in American Jurisprudence and is now called
the Adhesion Contract Doctrine.55
But to otherwise allow a party to bring in claims of "fairness"
from the outside, to now operate on the contract, would be to
work a Tort on the other party that such "fairness" operates
against. This is an important concept to understand with
contracts. As a PRINCIPLE OF NATURE, Judges are correct when
they toss out your arguments that sound in the pleasing tone of
Tort, when you are a party to a Contract Law jurisprudential
grievance. WILLFUL FAILURE TO FILE and Highway Traffic
Infractions are all Contract Law grievances. Remember that
invisible contracts are in effect whenever benefits have been
accepted and reciprocity is being expected back in return. Your
use of the state's highways automatically creates the existence
of such an invisible juristic contract, and also attaches the
summary features of a giblet cracking regulatory adjudicating
Star Chamber that American Traffic Courts have infamous
reputations for.56
Yet, there is some minimal merit present in the Patriot position
out on the highways. Patriots have been silent on a judicial
enlightenment analogy that should be made here, as some Patriots
like to enlighten Judges on reasoning and Principles applicable
to favorite Patriot factual setting confrontations. The Supreme
Court has ruled that shopping center owners, who open up their
premises for public ingress and egress, lose some of their
property rights, i.e., there is a declension in status from
having absolute authority to eject with discretion anyone they
want, down to being restrained from doing so.57
If this legal reasoning, which diminishes the rights of property
owners, were to be applied to a highway setting by way of
comparative analogy, then the fact that Government Highways are
open to the public should, theoretically, partially restrain the
State from exercising absolute jurisdiction to eject a person
from merely using the highways without a license, down to a
reduced property rights status where the mere non-existence of a
compelled Driver's License is insufficient grounds for
incarceration, absent, perhaps, collaborating causal damages. Of
and by itself, that argument won't win any Cases (the quiescent
environmental ambiance one enjoys walking down a row of store
fronts in a shopping center really does not have any factual
parity with the high-powered accelerated velocity of
contemporary highways). I know that Protesters would very much
like to hear me throw invectives at Traffic Court Star Chamber
Magistrates and state that PRINCIPLES OF NATURE are being
violated by Judges by their consenting to incarcerate unlicensed
drivers at Sentencing Hearings,58 but Traffic Courts are merely
enforcing contracts, and no restrainment exists in appellate
court rulings or other pronouncing instruments of Law; nowhere
is there specific wording to disable expectations of reciprocity
denominated in penal terms, on those Highway Contracts.
As for the analogy in status declension, this property rights
declension in status experienced by property owners who open up
their property for public use is just the same old longstanding
Common Law restrainment that English judges placed on the King
of England updated and applied to a contemporary Commercial
factual setting of privately owned shopping centers, that
restrained the King from selectively excluding persons from
using the King's Highways by requiring free and open access and
use of the King's Highways to everyone.59
The application of this Principle also surfaces again with the
rights of property owners adjoining public highways, to yield
their expectations of exclusion and privacy whenever the highway
itself becomes impassable or otherwise founderous, and allows
travelers to leave the highway and start using your property.60
Called the RIGHT TO TRAVEL EXTRA VIAM, this yield in property
rights is deemed to be only of a temporary character, and people
acquiring the property which adjoins the Highway already had
their prior NOTICE that the day might come when inclement
weather may cause some travelers to use a few feet of your
property. The Principle which supports its use is not unlike
that Principle which undergrids the DOCTRINE OF PRIVATE WAYS BY
NECESSITY.61
Remember that in another setting the King also experiences a
declension in Status whenever he enters into the world of
Commerce: From Sovereign to just another corporation game
player. In any event, Highway Contract Protesters remaining
unconvinced of their weak position need further development on
the true origin of the Patriot problem out on those highways: A
contract, and the elevated priority in Nature that contracts
ascend to whenever they are in effect. If the significance of
that idea is not being learned now, then I can assure you that
you will learn it in no uncertain terms at the Last Day.
And as for you lingering diehard Protesters, your BILLS OF
ATTAINDER arguments based on restrainments in the United States
Constitution will not vitiate your Highway Contract liability.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER are legislative acts that inflict punishment
without a judicial trial, and violate the Separation of Powers
Doctrine.62
Thinking about the Patriot argument in a light most favorable to
the Protester, in a sense, traffic tickets issued out by
policing agencies operating under the Executive Branch,
pre-adjudicating guilt and demanding fines, appear to function
quite clearly as BILLS OF ATTAINDER.63
Invisible contracts are in effect whenever you accept benefits
conditionally offered by someone else; but the existence of a
contract in the highway factual setting presented the Judiciary
in protesting an assertion of regulatory jurisdiction is not
relevant with this particular argument some Highway Protesters
are using incorrectly.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER originated in Old England, as the English
Parliament sentenced individuals and identifiable members of a
group to death.64
Correlative to the BILLS OF ATTAINDER Protester argument is the
BILLS OF PAIN AND PENALTIES of Article I, Section 9; they are
legislative acts inflicting punishment other than terminal
execution.65
Generally addressed to persons disloyal to the Crown or State,
PAINS AND PENALTIES consisted of a wide ranging array of giblet
cracking punishments: Imprisonment,66 banishment to outside the
kingdom,67 and the punitive grab of property by the King.68
The reason why I took the time here to detail some of the
factual settings that gave rise to BILLS OF ATTAINDER is to show
you Protesters that the old English Parliament used BILLS OF
ATTAINDER (summary legislative expressions of punishment) to
denounce crime under factual settings where both Contract Law
[for High Treason] and Tort Law [for murder] would have applied
if the Judiciary had any say in the matter.69
The Supreme Court has defined a BILL OF ATTAINDER as a
Legislative Act which inflicts punishment on named individuals
or members of an easily ascertainable group without the benefit
of a judicial trial.70 In determining whether a particular
statute is a BILL OF ATTAINDER, the judicial analysis
necessarily requires an inquiry into three definitional
elements, each of the three standards must be violated:
1. Specificity in Identification; and
2. Punishment; and
3. Lack of Judicial Trial.71
Highway Motor Vehicle regulatory statutes vary widely from State
to State. In some States, Highway Contract infractions are sent
to a Motor Vehicles Administration Bureau for fine assessment in
summary Hearings; whereas in other States JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
rule the Highways through their Star Chambers; still other
States, like New York, feature a combination of the two --
Administrative Bureaus for citations issued within large cities,
and Star Chamber JP's for everyone else. In New York State, even
if you are cited within a large city that has Administrative
Bureaus established, when dealing with unlicensed drivers, the
bouncers who arrested you will bypass the Administrative Bureaus
and throw you directly into a municipal criminal court. However,
for this pending explanation, let us assume that your tickets
are being handled through any one of several possible
administrative devices. As it applies to Highway Contract
Protesters, when the arresting officer issues you out a
citation, and perhaps fixes a fine right then and there without
any judicial trial, or if the Administrative Law Judge affixes
the fine, then, seemingly all of the indicia that characterize
BILLS OF ATTAINDER have been met: An identifiable group has
been targeted; summary punishment was determined by some
Executive Department agent; and there was no judicial trial. For
Highway Contract Protesters in search of some arguments, just
anything, to throw at Judges, that is all they need to hear.
I know that you Protesters do not want to hear this kind of
talk, but your reasoning is defective and Traffic Tickets do not
operate as BILLS OF ATTAINDER, for reasons that require an
expanded basis of factual knowledge to exercise judgment on.
Traffic Tickets do possess the BILL OF ATTAINDER indicia
attributes of targeting a specific and identifiable group of
people to nail; and there is pre-defined Legislative punishment
provided for; but it is the last remaining element of a Judicial
Trial that you Protesters err in. Even though your fines were
assessed or collected under summary Administrative findings of
guilt (at either the roadside or in front of an Administrative
Law Judge), with the fines being pre-determined by Legislative
mandates, in all States where I have examined Motor Vehicle
Statutes, there is a provision for a Judicial Trial DE NOVO,
meaning that whatever fine was paid or assessed by the Executive
Department agent can be challenged on appeal in Court with the
benefit of a Judicial Trial, who will then consider your Case
starting from a clean slate, or DE NOVO (meaning anew of fresh).
Since a Judicial Trial is offered, Traffic Tickets do not meet
BILLS OF ATTAINDER standards under Supreme Court guidelines --
at least, that is the way the Legislatures believe that they
have protected themselves from challenge.72
If you Protesters still want to contest your Tickets as BILLS OF
ATTAINDER, your defense needs to center around the practical and
legal impediments created by statutes that discourage
unsatisfied Ticket Protesters from pursuing altogether a
Judicial Trial DE NOVO. Such impediments that defeat the ready
availability of a Judicial Trial DE NOVO might be both the
demands from Judges that you retain an attorney to represent you
at this impending Judicial Trial, and perhaps the demands laid
upon you for posting an unreasonably large "bail" (specifically
to discourage appeals).
If your state statutes do provide for an eventual Judicial Trial
DE NOVO, then your claims of Motor Vehicle statutory impairment
based on BILLS OF ATTAINDER arguments will not ultimately
prevail unless special correlative pleading is adduced by you
documenting how other practical impediments or statutes have
obstructed your free and easy access to a Judicial Trial DE
NOVO, and that therefore the State has cleverly circumvented the
BILL OF ATTAINDER Constitutional restrainment practically, while
satisfying the appearance of complying with the Supreme Law
facially.
Judges simply do not have any objection to the collection of
administrative fines under Executive Department findings of
facts (guilt) without any Judicial trial or intervention. And
this lack of judicial objection is even greater when the PERSON
pursues Commercial enrichment through the regulatory
jurisdiction of a contract; but in contrast to that, Judges will
draw the line and not allow the collection of administrative
fines or of chronologically accelerated asset seizures, that
take place under the rubric of Legislatively mandated Executive
Department findings of fact (guilt), if there are any statutory
provisions that attempt to pre-empt, preclude, or prevent
eventual Judicial review or procedural supervision. Absent such
special circumstances, a provision for an eventual Judicial
Trial DE NOVO satisfies the Constitutional BILL OF ATTAINDER
requirement for ultimate Judicial supervisory review of summary
administrative grabs.
Accepting the special benefits of a Government contract is not a
very favorable relational status to attack Government with as a
defense line, particularly in adversary judicial proceedings;
nevertheless, the BILLS OF ATTAINDER negative restrainment in
the Constitution operates on all factual settings regardless of
the presence of a contract or not. Unless difficult impediments
are created practically that restrain you from easy access to a
Judicial Trial DE NOVO, the mere fact that the State has
specifically provided for such supervisory Trials DE NOVO
largely precludes a successful BILL OF ATTAINDER challenge to
the statutory scheme.
I know that you Highway Contract Protesters do not want to hear
this kind of talk, but an honest assessment of your position
would necessarily result in the rather obvious conclusion that
you will never, ever get, from any appellate court anywhere in
the United States, the on-point published adjudication of your
unlicensed motor vehicle operation question in your favor [and I
am aware that many Highway Contract Protesters have convinced
themselves that they are on the imminent threshold of the
ultimate judicial conquest: A published Opinion in their
favor]. You Highway Contract Protesters are just not in such a
strong position that you have convinced yourselves that you are
in; your copious Common Law RIGHT TO TRAVEL briefs are
applicable to a highway factual setting of a tranquil quiescent
nature that is nowhere to be found in the United States today.73
Remember that in Nature, contracts, when they are in effect,
come first. Sorry, Protesters, but you are into an invisible
contract whenever you accept a benefit someone else
conditionally offered, and we damage largely ourselves by
refusing to Open our Eyes once corrective presentations of error
are made to us. And when contracts are in effect, then only the
content of the contract is of any relevancy to a Judge -- to
allow a Judge to go beyond the stipulations of the parties, or
to otherwise supersede or vary the contract by Tort Law
reasoning, is to have the Judge throw a Tort at the losing
party.74
Yes, you Highway Contract Protesters out there have some deep
soul searching to do.75 For purposes of experiencing an
appellate court victory, you Protesters are actually wasting
your time; for purposes of acquiring knowledge of the priority
in Nature of invisible contracts governing the settlement of
grievances, you Highway Contract Protesters will one day look
back and be ever so grateful that you drove yourself to the deep
technical depths that you did in search of answers and legal
arguments, any arguments, to win your Cases, as unknown to you
at that time, that factual knowledge later turned out to be
prerequisite to see the invisible Contracts Heavenly Father has
on us all from the First Estate, and to understand the Contract
Law Jurisprudential setting that will be the Last Day, a
Judgment Setting where attractive Tort Law reasoning and
correlative defense arguments sounding in the sugar coated
deceptively sweet melodies of Tort will not be beneficial.76
1 This Principle was applied to an Income Tax collection setting
in FLINT VS. STONE TRACY COMPANY, 220 U.S. 108 (1910).
2 "While the tax in this case, as we have construed the statute,
is imposed upon the exercise of the privilege of doing business
under a corporate capacity, as such business is done under
authority of state franchises, it becomes necessary to consider
in this connection the right of the Federal Government to tax
the activities of private corporations which arise from the
exercise of franchises granted by the state in creating and
conferring powers upon such corporations. We think it is the
result of the cases heretofore decided in this court, that such
business activities, though exercised because of state created
franchises, are not beyond the taxing power of the United
States. Taxes upon rights exercised under grants of state
franchise were sustained by this court in RAILROAD COMPANY VS.
COLLECTOR, 100 U.S. 595 (1879); UNITED STATES VS. ERIE RAILROAD,
106 U.S. 327 (1882). [See also 106 U.S., page 703 for opinions
by Justices Bradley and Harlan]; SPRECKLES SUGAR REFINING
COMPANY VS. MCCLAIN, 192 U.S. 397 (1903)."
- FLINT VS. STONE TRACY COMPANY, 220 U.S. 108, at 155 (1910).
3 The objective of monopolies is to make money, they are
enrichment oriented legal devices benefiting their members; the
story told by members of the monopoly, deflecting the
existential reasoning off to the side with sweet sounding lies
that portray their monopoly's bleeding heart objectives as
merely being just pure concerns of public welfare and QUALITY,
are fraudulent. For a protracted and thorough discussion on the
negative quality side effects of professional trade licensing,
on how they fail their stated purposes [meaning that their
purposes were fraudulently stated at the time of monopoly
creation] and are counter-productive in a wide-ranging array of
areas, and for a history of licensing, see David B. Hogan in THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSING: HISTORY, EVIDENCE AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, 7 Law and Human Behavior 117 (1983). Numerous
other articles in the September, 1983 issue of LAW AND HUMAN
BEHAVIOR explain why quality necessarily degenerates in that
inherently uncompetitive atmosphere that characterizes shared
monopolies. In the old English Case of DAVENPORT AND HURDIS [11
Coke 86], the court there refers to the increase in prices and
deterioration in quality and commodities, which necessarily
results from the granting monopolies [see THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE
CASES, 83 U.S. 36, at 103 (1872).]
"In practice, such [regulatory] restrictions frequently are
designed to give some profession or occupation monopoly power.
It is, for example, very difficult to argue that most
professional licensure laws are primarily concerned with quality
control [see Stigler in THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATION, 2
Bell Journal of Economic and Management Science 3, at 13
(1971)]. Simple restrictions on the number of market
participants are also generally explicit grants of monopoly
power to a limited group. While limits on the number of taxicabs
in a city may reduce traffic congestion, they also benefit
license holders [see Kitch in THE REGULATION OF TAXICABS IN
CHICAGO, 14 Journal of Law and Economics 285 (1971)."
- Susan Ross Adams in INALIENABILITY AND THE THEORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS, 85 Columbia Law Review 931 (1985).
4 Never mind the fact that before the Professions were
monopolized, folks had to check references and exercise business
judgment, as in any other business arrangement where you are
dealing with unacquainted people. Today, the mere fact that
licenses are in force automatically precludes much inquisitive
background questioning that should still be asked -- Government
has assumed the role of qualifier for you; and many persons
holding licenses, when asked of their qualifications, refuse to
give references and merely point attention over to that license
-- dealing with such a person, shrouding his business background
behind a veil of secrecy, is improvident. A prime example lies
in the regulatory jurisdiction asserted over securities and
related Commercial investment instruments -- the mere fact that
Government has conducted a searching probe called FULL
DISCLOSURE (a fraudulent characterization since much material is
forbidden to be included in a PROSPECTUS), automatically reduces
normal intensity questioning by prospective investors; and so as
a result, investors are pre-emptively deprived of the ability to
collect facts, exercise a risk/yield assessment judgment, and
then make a risk investment -- Government is really your friend
when stripping you of the important learning ability to acquire
judgment experientially [try to ask a corporate officer for
additional information not contained in that PROSPECTUS their
lawyers wrote -- he won't give you any, since it is illegal;
some big friend Government is]. Persons placing overriding
priority on the perceived important function of protecting the
public financially from investment con artists or investments
without merit, to justify depriving other people of the exercise
of their own comparative investiture placement judgment and the
benefit of acquiring real intrinsic knowledge experientially,
are manufacturing unnecessary Torts they will later regret, as
the purpose of this Second Estate is exclusively intellectual.
And any operation of Government which impairs or attempts to
impede the acquisition of factual knowledge or the unrestricted
flow of information between Individuals, is literally a Doctrine
of Devils. And as for MD's, if licensed medical doctors know
what they are doing as well, then why is it that whenever they
go on strike, the death rate drops? [I am reminded of the
circumstances that King Louis the 15th went through, when he was
a small infant. He had contracted chicken pox, and an attending
nurse hid him from the French medical profession to spare his
life; doctors had previously killed Louis's brother and father
during treatment].
5 "... and although we have no direct constitutional provision
against a monopoly, yet the whole theory of a free Government is
opposed to such grants, and it does not require even the aid
which may be derived from the Bill of Rights [of Connecticut],
the first section of which declares that `no man or set of men,
are entitled to exclusive public emoluments, or privileges from
the community' to render them void. The statute of 21 James I.,
C. 3, which declares such monopolies to be contrary to law and
void, except as to patents for a limited time, and printing, the
regulation of which was at that time considered as belonging to
the king's prerogative, and except also, certain warlike
materials and manufactures, the regulation of which for obvious
reasons may fairly be said to belong to the king, has always
been considered as merely declaratory of the common law."
- NORWICH GAS VS. NORWICH CITY GAS, 25 Connecticut Reporter 19,
at 38 (1856) [CONNECTICUT REPORT carries the Cases from the
Connecticut Supreme Court.]
See also the briefs for Counsel in THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES [83
U.S. 36 (1872)] as they contain a great deal of legal material
in opposition to monopolies [6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at
475, by Kurland and Casper [University Publications, Arlington,
Virginia (1975)]. The Supreme Court in THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES
discusses the great CASE OF MONOPOLIES, decided during the reign
of Queen Elizabeth which held that all monopolies, in any known
trade or manufacture, are an invasion of the liberty of the
Citizens to acquire property, and pursue happiness, and were
declared void at Common Law, which is correct reasoning when
applied to appropriate Tort Law factual settings lying outside
of any participation in that closed private domain of King's
Commerce. [THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES addressed the question as
to whether or not monopolies were forbidden by the 13th
Amendment and several clauses in the 14th Amendment, by reason
of the damages they create on Citizens].
6 COLBERT'S LIFE AND THEORIES, Volume I, page 309 and Volume II,
page 457 [Columbia University Press (1939)].
7 Levasseur, HISTORIE DE COMMERCE, I, 299-300.
8 Here in New York State, for example, Section 441(1)(d) of the
Real Property Law defines individuals who are eligible to apply
for, and receive, state licenses for the sale and brokerage of
real estate. Licenses are granted freely to either Citizens of
the United States, or to aliens; once a license to experience
financial enrichment in a shared business monopoly has been
issued, the state does not care about your political relational
status to the King, or any associated benefits accepted thereby.
With such a license in effect, for taxing purposes, your Prince
has you tied down but good and tight.
9 "Whatever a state may forbid or regulate it may permit upon
condition that a fee be paid in return for the privilege. And
such a fee may be exacted to discourage the prosecution of a
business or to adjust competitive or economic inequalities.
Taxation may be made the implement of the exercise of the
state's police powers."
- ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA COMPANY VS. GROSJEAN, 301 U.S. 412, at
426 (1936).
10 And the pronouncements of Highway Contract Protesters,
arguing that Highway Contracts do not exist until the Driver's
License application itself has been signed, is defective
reasoning, as I will explain later.
11 Judges often have a difficult time ruling on the question as
to whether or not an assumed name was fraudulently used to
deceive other people. The reason why this difficulty is inherent
with assumed names is due to the Common Law right of anyone to
assume any name they feel like, how and when they feel like it,
and without any petition to Government for such an assumption of
a NOM DE PLUME. See UNITED STATES VS. COX, 593 F.2nd 46 (1979),
and UNITED STATES VS. WASMAN, 484 F.Supp. 54 (1979), for Cases
where Federal Judges wrestled quite a bit with this question.
12 The DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL is slightly different from
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL in that EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL precludes a
litigant who wrongfully induced another to adversely change his
position from asserting a right or defense, which is what
happens when IRS termites start chopping away at the off-point
benefits derived from a State License acquired solely to avoid
penal consequences, under tension with a Substantive Right:
"... the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he
is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from
asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed,
either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against
another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct,
and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse,
and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of
property, of contract, or of remedy."
- J. Pomeroy in 3 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Section 804 95th
Edition (1941)].
Traditionally, Courts have been reluctant to hold the operation
of this Doctrine against the Government. [See generally ESTOPPEL
AGAINST STATE, COUNTY, AND CITY in 23 Washington Law Review 51
(1948)]. Consequently, since Government is let off the
responsibility hook, people with claims against the Government
have often suffered wrongs unnecessarily that Courts would not
have tolerated had both litigants been non-juristic parties; yet
things have been loosening up a bit since the OIL SHALE CASES
[see EMERGENCE OF AN EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT -- THE OIL SHALE CASES in 46 University of Colorado
Law Review 433 (1975)]. In 1981, the Supreme Court seemed
willing to entertain the use of this EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
against the Government in SCHWEIKER VS. HANSEN [see EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT by Deborah Eisen, in 67 Cornell
Law Review 609 (1982)].
13 Contracts entered into where arrest was threatened are
coercive, and are wide open to attack. Read the story of the
finding of the sunken lost Spanish Galleon ship, the ATOCHA, and
the subsequent muscle threats by the State of Florida to arrest
the underwater treasure hunters if they didn't agree to turn
over a percentage of their treasure finds to the Florida Prince,
in the STATE OF FLORIDA VS. TREASURE SALVORS, INC. [458 U.S. 670
(1980)]. Footnote number 4 refers to the Federal District Court
in Florida that ruled that those contracts so signed were
coercive. [If the treasure hunters were smart, they would have
filed a REJECTION OF POLICE POWER BENEFITS with the State of
Florida, and then present the Judiciary with an entirely
different factual setting to rule on. Maybe the Treasure Hunters
wanted the protectorate benefits of the guns and cages offered
by the State; if so, then they should have tendered the
reciprocity so expected.]
14 When addressing an evidentiary question -- such as the
appropriateness of assigning BURDENS OF PROOF to either
Government or the Individual, under circumstances where the
Individual does not want to do something but penal statutes
intervene to change his reluctance -- Justice Frankfurter once
said that:
"Where an individual engages in conduct by command of a penal
statute... to whose laws he is subject, the gravest doubt is
case on the applicability of the normal assumption -- even in a
prosecution for murder (see LELAND VS. OREGON, 343 U.S. 790) --
that what a person does, he does of his own free will. When a
consequence as drastic as [enfranchisement] may be the effect of
such conduct, it is not inappropriate that the Government should
be charged with proving that the Citizen's conduct was a
response, not to the command of the statute, but to his own
direction. The ready provability of the critical fact --
existence of an applicable [penal] law, particularly a criminal
law, commanding the act in question -- provides protection
against shifting the burden to the Government on the basis of a
frivolous assertion of the defense of duress. Accordingly, the
Government should, under the circumstances of this case, have
the burden of proving by clear, convincing, and unequivocal
evidence that the Citizen voluntarily performed an act causing
[enfranchisement]."
- Justice Frankfurter in NISHIKAWA VS. DULLES, 356 U.S. 129,
at 141 (1957).
The actual factual circumstances in NISHIKAWA involved similar
Tort questions of the unfairness of involuntary expatriation
when a Citizenship Contract is hanging in the background.
15 Such as:
- EDWARDS VS. CALIFORNIA, 314 U.S. 160
- TWINING VS NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78
- WILLIAMS VS. FEARS, 179 U.S. 270, AT 274
- CRANDALL VS. NEVADA, 6 WALL. 35, AT 43-44
- THE PASSENGER CASES, 7 HOWARD 287, AT 492
- U.S. VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, AT 757-758 (1966)
- GRIFFIN VS. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88, AT 105-106 (1971)
- CALIFANO VS. TORRES, 435 U.S. 1, AT 4, note 6
- SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
- CALIFANO VS. AZNAVORIAN, 439 U.S. 170, AT 176 (1978)
All of which were cited in ALEXANDER HAIG VS. CIA AGENT PHILIP
AGEE, 435 U.S. 280, at 306 (1980), which reaffirmed the RIGHT TO
TRAVEL within the United States, and then distinguished that
Right from the lessor administrative "freedom" to travel outside
the TERRA FIRMA of the United States as being discretionary,
within reasonable limits, by the King over his Subjects, as all
"Citizens" are operating under the administrative jurisdiction
of contractual King's Equity. See also a separate but parallel
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT DOCTRINE; and UNITED STATES VS. LAUB, 385
U.S. 475 (1966); and THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL: THE PASSPORT PROBLEM
by Louis Jaffee in 35 Foreign Affairs, at 17 (October, 1956)
which discusses, at a light level, the national interest
implications involved when the RIGHT TO TRAVEL is under tension
with statutes.
16 Remember the word PUBLIC, as used by Judges, generally means
GOVERNMENT. When appellate judges use the words AFFECTS A PUBLIC
INTEREST to justify some further state intervention somewhere,
what they mean is that a Government interest is affected. As
applied to Highway law, partial justification for the state
judicial affirmance of the requirement to hold an operator's
license is the fact that the regulatory jurisdiction the State
Legislature is asserting over those highways does, in fact,
"affect a Governmental interest," as it is the state that spends
the money to acquire the land, build the highway, and then
spends incredible amounts of more money, year in and year out
without any let up, to maintain those roads. If that does not
affect a Governmental interest, then would someone explain just
what would?
17 "...[The] right finds no explicit mention in the
Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right
so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In
any even, freedom to travel throughout the United States has
long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.
.. The constitutional right to travel from one State to
another... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our
Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established
and repeatedly recognized."
- UNITED STATES VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, at 757 et seq. (1966)
[Sentences were quoted out of order].
Although that statement is correct, it only applies to
INTERSTATE travelling. Protesting Patriots suggesting that
fraudulent factual averments of INTERSTATE travelling be adduced
as defensive instruments in local traffic prosecution arguments,
as I have heard, are improvident -- the selective incorporation
of deception into your MODUS OPERANDI will only postpone the day
of arrival for that SILVER BULLET which Highway Contract
Protesters are searching for, a bullet which lies within
yourselves.
18 Does the following restrainment on Government appear any
place in the Constitution?...
"The streets belong to the public in the ordinary way. Their
use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and
generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the
legislature deems proper."
- PACKARD VS. BARTON, 264 U.S. 140, at 144 (1923).
19 "The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which the
Citizen cannot be deprived of, without due process of law under
the Fifth Amendment... Freedom of movement across frontiers...
and inside frontiers as well, was part of our heritage..."
- KENT VS. DULLES, 357 U.S. 116, at 125 (1958).
20 The Supreme Court once ruled that the RIGHT TO TRAVEL
interstate overruled State arguments of social or economic
consequences:
"The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a
right of constitutional significance, and the Court's decision,
therefore, did not require an AD HOC determination as to the
social or economic importance of that right."
- SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT VS. RODRIGUEZ, 411 U.S. 1, at 32
(1973).
21 Remember that Residency contracts are presumed to be in
effect, and contracts have to be attacked for substantive
reasons, such as FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, and do not roll over
and die by your mere unilateral declarations of their
nonexistence.
22 In certain pleading contexts, there is not a lot of legal
difference between a DOMICILIARY and a RESIDENT. In HAMMERSTEIN
VS. LYNEE [200 Federal 165 (1912)], a Federal District Court
ruled that the word RESIDE in the 14th Amendment's State
Citizenship Clause also meant DOMICILIARY. One of the
characteristics of the English Language is the lack of identity
of some of the words that comprise its structure; many words
have found multiple homes in different locations, and therefore
meanings must be abated pending consideration of an enlarged
context of the surrounding words. RESIDENCE and DOMICILE are two
such words in Law that, on some occasions, are interchangeable,
and on other occasions, are not interchangeable. The recurring
semantic nature of some words [that Judges are partly
responsible for since they continuously refuse to define
explicit meanings] to be inherently difficult broncos to tie
down, was noted once by a Federal Court, when dealing with a
DOMICILIARY question:
"The theoretical domicile which is equivalent to State
Citizenship is always one which exists ANIMO REVERTENDI [meaning
WITH INTENTION TO REVERT BACK]. The theoretical domicile which
clings to a homeless wanderer, who never intends to return, has
its uses in deciding rights of succession to property, in
respect to taxation and to the administration of pauper laws,
but is not, I think, equivalent to Citizenship in the sense in
which the word "citizen" is used in the Judiciary Act. While
domicile, in some sense, may not be lost by mere departure with
intent not to return, State Citizenship is thus lost. In other
words, where the word "domicile" is used as meaning home, where
absence from domicile is AMINO REVERTENDI, domicile may be
equivalent to State Citizenship; but where domicile exists
merely by legal fiction, and absence is accompanied by intent
never to return to the state of domicile, the word is not
synonymous with Citizenship."
- PANNIL VS. ROANOKE TIMES COMPANY, 252 Federal 910, at 915
(1918).
Therefore, correctly pleading Supreme Court rulings on the
purely voluntary nature of Citizenship is suggested, and that
you are an Inhabitant of that State WITHOUT JURISTIC BENEFITS,
and neither a Resident nor a Domiciliary BENEFIT ACCEPTANT; but
your self-proclaimed status as an INHABITANT means nothing until
you first reject all state constitutional benefits, and the
benefits of Residency, and the police protectorate powers, in
particular.
23 State Residency statutes were once overruled by the Supreme
Court on grounds relating to RIGHT TO TRAVEL. In SHAPIRO VS.
THOMPSON [394 U.S. 618 (1969)], the Supreme Court ruled that the
INTERSTATE right to travel overruled and annulled state
residency statutes [where welfare grants offered by States
restricted to persons living in that kingdom for at least one
year, where annulled. This is a unique case in the sense that
its reasoning will never surface anywhere else, as the claimed
"chilling effect" the state residency statutes generated on the
Interstate Right to Travel represented one of philosophical
justification. Substitute the same "chilling effect" RIGHT TO
TRAVEL reasoning on any other Patriot state residency Protester
case, and the Federal Judge will snort at you.
24 "Automobile licenses are issued periodically to evidence that
the drivers holding them are sufficiently familiar with the
rules of the road and are physically qualified to operate a
motor vehicle."
- DELAWARE VS. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 648, at 658 (1978).
25 In 1692 the Colonial Legislature of Massachusetts enacted a
little slice of LEX, called the LORD'S DAY ACT, that said:
"... no traveller... shall travel on that day..."
In 1876, a negligent Defendant successfully invoked this statute
to bar the recovery by a Plaintiff who was injured while walking
on a Sunday [SMITH VS. BOSTON AND MAINE R.R., 120 Mass. 490
(1876)]. To the Supreme Judicial Court, the Plaintiff was "...
unlawfully traveling upon the highway" [id., at 492]. In 1877,
the Massachusetts Legislature removed the civil liabilities that
permeated the LORD'S DAY ACT.
26 "... all automobiles... shall be registered" and "... no
automobile... shall be operated... unless registered."
- MASSACHUSETTS ACTS, c.473, Section I,3 (1903).
Six years later, in DUDLEY VS. NORTHHAMPTON STREET RAILWAY [202
Mass. 443 (1909)], the court denied an owner of an unregistered
car recovery against a negligent Defendant on the ground that
the former was a "trespasser on the highway." Although the
Defendant pressed the analogy of the LORD'S DAY CASES, the court
was able to find additional support for its ruling, by
attributing to the statute a purpose of facilitating
identification of motor travelers by requiring registration of
vehicles. By also forbidding the operation an unregistered
automobile, the court found it logical to charge the motor
vehicle owner and operator of an unregistered motor vehicle with
liability for damages caused to others, regardless of any
mitigating negligence elements present in the factual setting.
In FAIRBANKS VS. KEMP, 226 Mass. 75 (1917), the owner of an
unregistered automobile, although exercising due care and
caution, was held liable because of a statutory violation]. See,
generally,
- Huddy in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, Section 249
(1932); Fifth Edition;
- Editor's Note in TRESPASSER ON THE HIGHWAY DOCTRINE, 46
Harvard Law Review (1946).
27 "Highways are public roads, which every Citizen has a right
to use."
- 3 Kent Commentaries 32.
See also; several English authorities:
- SUTCLIFFE VS. GREENWOOD, 8 Price 535;
- REX VS. CAMBERWORTH, 3 B. & Adol. 108.
And for other English commentators, see:
- SHELFORD ON HIGHWAYS;
- WOOLRYCH ON WAYS.
For American authorities, a point of beginning is:
- MAKEPEACE VS. WORTHEN, 1 N.H. 16;
- PECK VS. SMITH, 1 Connecticut 103;
- ROBINS VS. BORMAN, 1 Pick. 122;
- JACKSON VS. HATHAWAY, 15 Johns. 477;
- STACKPOLE VS. HEALY, 16 Massachusetts 33, and the many Case
citations therein.
28 For a detailed presentation of what our Father's simple
Highway Common Law was like in that serene and tranquil era,
before automotive technology contamination steamrolled our
Common Law into the ground by way of an overriding contract,
see: TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS, by Joseph Angell [Little,
Brown & Company (1868)], and its Second Edition, published in
1886; and LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS, by Byron Elliott [Brown
Merrill & Company (1890)] and its Second Edition published in
1900. Both books have thousands and thousands of Case citations.
The Fourth Edition has two volumes and was co-authored by Byron
and William Elliott [Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis (1926)].
29 What technology has done to our Law on a factual setting of
Government highways is the same that technology has done to the
Law of Patent Property Rights:
"I have little doubt, in so far as I am entitled to express an
opinion, that the vast transforming forces of technology have
reduced obsolete much of our patent law."
- Felix Frankfurter in MARCONI WIRELESS VS. UNITED STATES, 320
U.S. 1, at 63 (1942).
And just as technology rolled up its sleeves and went to work to
convert our once quiescent highways over into a setting of
high-powered vehicles, so too has technology gone to work on
running our Patent Law into the ground; and now also privacy
itself has also fallen by the wayside, as technological
innovations make their appearance on the scene:
"Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protections of the person,
and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the
right `to be let alone.' Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprises have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that `what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops [footnotes
deleted]."
- Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, 4
Harvard Law Review 193, at 195 (1890).
Constitutions can very much be written to organically
self-enlarge with the passage of time to be made to apply to
factual settings then unknown at the time that Constitution was
being written; but our Founding Fathers in 1787 did not do that.
30 For a recent presentation of what technology will do to
trigger the appearance of Highway regulatory LEX where there had
been none before, a view of PITCAIRN ISLAND in the South Pacific
is revealing. Pitcairn Island is steeped in the allure of
intrigue, as it was colonized by Fletcher Christian and his
fellow mutineers from the HMS BOUNTY in 1790. It is a British
Colony two square miles in area and is administered by an Island
Council under the British High Commissioner Governor in New
Zealand. For all of Pitcairn's history up until recent days,
only pedestrians and wheelbarrows were even seen on its
highways, but in 1965, things changed. A heavy Bristol crawler
tractor made its appearance on the Island [see the PITCAIRN
MISCELLANY (the Island newspaper) for January 31, 1965]; and
soon that tractor was followed by a second tractor [id., August
31, 1965]. Within a few months after the first tractor had
arrived, a large number of imported bicycles were making their
appearances, and so now the appearance of some LEX was imminent
for Pitcairn Island:
"With so many bikes here, traffic rules will be the next new
thing to be introduced here."
- Editorial, PITCAIRN MISCELLANY, August 31, 1965.
Sure enough, the road LEX soon followed in November, 1965 [id.,
November 30, 1965] by vote of the Island Council.
31 Back in the old days, when highways became impassable, things
drew to a standstill -- and society literally stopped and
occasionally starved as well:
"Roads were so bad, and the chain of home trade so feeble, that
there was often scarcity of grain in one part, and plenty in
another part of the kingdom."
- ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA under "Corn Laws" [Cambridge,
England (1910)] 11th Edition.
32 "We agree that the States have a vital interest in ensuring
that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate
motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation,
and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection
requirements are being observed."
- DELAWARE VS. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 648, at 658 (1978).
33 In ancient times, metropolitan cities were frequently heavily
congested with traffic. Long before the City of Paris leveled
entire neighborhoods to widen some streets in the 1700s, in the
First Century B.C., Julius Caesar banned wheeled traffic (not
pedestrians) from the streets of Rome during peak daylight
hours. The result was that to some extent the wheeled traffic
waited until dusk to use the streets; pedestrians were free to
use the streets during the daylight hours, causing wheeled
vehicles to shift their street congestion into late night hours
[see C.A.J. Skeel in TRAVEL IN THE FIRST CENTURY AFTER CHRIST,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ASIA MINOR, at 65; Cambridge
University Press (1901)].
34 "... it has always been recognized as one of the powers and
duties of a Government to remove obstructions from the highways
under its control."
- IN RE DEBS, 158 U.S. 573, at 586 (1894).
35 "Laws requiring that drivers be licensed and that applicants
be subjected to thorough examination apparently are a more
effective means of reducing accidents."
- Note, DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS IN SPEED LEGISLATION, 46
Harvard Law Review 838, at 842 (1942).
In footnotes 31, 32 and 33, the TRAVELLER'S INSURANCE COMPANY is
found disseminating information on highway traffic accidents
back in the 1920s and 1930s; having achieved their important
objectives of filling the Motor Vehicle Statute books full of
penal codes, the insurance companies largely faded away from the
scene.
36 Special Interest looters, Tory Aristocrats, and Gremlins,
reigning supreme up and down the corridors of American
legislatures, have been going to work on the meat there since
the founding of the Republic:
"That corruption should find its way into the Governments of
our infant republic, and contaminate the very source of
legislation, or that impure motives should contribute to the
passage of a law, or the formation of a legislative contract,
are circumstances most deeply to be deplored."
- FLETCHER VS. PECK, 10 U.S. 87, at 130 (1810).
Here in 1985, the only persons who would actually try and
dispute the presence of looters in American legislatures are
those folks who live most distant from reality, of which there
are quite a few, and collectively they write many books which in
turn propagates their error, which is sometimes intentional.
37 If I am a roofing contractor, and we agree to have me repair
your roof, I don't need any written contract on you at all to
throw MECHANIC'S LIENS on your property, perfect an IN REM
Judgment against your house, and then sell at Foreclosure your
own house right out from underneath you -- without anything
having been placed "in writing;" I do not need your "consent" to
get my money out of your house, if you default on the contract.
A Highway Contract Protester would argue that since nothing was
signed, the contract does not exist; but your arguments are
defective, and you Protesters don't know what you are talking
about.
38 Today, regional Princes are calling the shots on Highway
regulatory matters -- tomorrow, the King intends to grab for
himself those Highways. EXECUTIVE ORDER 11921 ["Adjusting
Emergency Preparedness Assignments..."], largely for use in a
POST-WAR scenario, claims jurisdiction to recover from National
Emergencies [See 41 FEDERAL REGISTER 24293 for June 15th, 1976].
Sections 804(4)(b) ["Construction, use and management of
highways, streets, and appurtenant structures..."] to justify
this impending Federal grab, as soon as some emergency can be
manufactured. This EXECUTIVE ORDER 11921 superseded in art, and
complemented in part, an earlier EXECUTIVE ORDER 11940 from the
Nixon era [October 28, 1969], that was designed to justify
Federal PRE-WAR seizure of everything.
39 In some States, criminal procedure statutes were written in
such a way that CRIMINAL INTENT was required to be adduced by
prosecuting attorneys under circumstances where contracts are
actually in effect. Patriots who know how to weasel out of
traffic prosecutions in those few States where this legislative
rule is in effect, by citing those CRIMINAL INTENT requirement
statutes on NO DRIVER'S LICENSE PROSECUTIONS, are not correct in
associating any prevailing significance to the existence of
those statutes, other than the fact that, yes, some clown in
their legislature once messed up -- just like legislatures have
messed up elsewhere in criminal procedure statutes in other
states. Those State statutes were written by INTELLIGENTSIA
lawyers -- and so now the degenerate commingling of Tort indicia
into contract infractions by a few states, together with the
willful withholding of the identification of the creation of
invisible contracts when special juristic benefits were quietly
accepted out in the practical setting (benefits carrying
regulatory hooks of lingering reciprocity expectations along
with them) by many other States, is not to be construed as
overruling the authenticity of the information presented herein.
Errors and other enactments representative of improvident
reasoning by legislatures are actually quite frequent in
American legal history; and always remember that legislatures do
not create NATURE -- they never have and they never will.
40 "Men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they
fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it
comes, turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have
to fight for what they meant under another name."
- William Morris in A DREAM OF JOHN BALL ["The Commonweal
Magazine" (November 13, 1886); reprinted by Longmans Green and
Company, London (1924)].
41 Another way out is through the preemptive intervention of
INTERNATIONAL LAW for those persons having Diplomatic Status
through institutions recognized as such by the President of the
United States. Another way to get out of a State asserted
contract is to be a Federal Employee and start using those
highways while engaged in Federal work. In an Opinion written by
Mr. Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court once ruled that it is not
Constitutionally permissible for a State to throw a slice of
regulatory LEX at a Federal Employee driving a motor vehicle on
State highways while on Federal business. While touching on the
broader recurring question of just what are those frequently
overlapping contours of Federal/State legislative jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court said that:
"Of course an Employee of the United States does not secure a
general immunity from State Law while acting in the course of
his Employment. That was decided long ago by Mr. Justice
Washington in UNITED STATES VS. HART [Pet. C.C. 390; 5 OPINIONS
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, at 554]. It very well may be that, when
the United States has not spoken [here is the RATIFICATION
DOCTRINE surfacing again: That silence is sometimes very
significant], the subjection to local law would extend to
general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of
carrying out the Employment -- as, for instance, a statute or
ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners of
streets. COMMONWEALTH VS. CLOSSON, 229 Massachusetts 329. This
might stand on much the same footing as liability under the
Common Law of a State to a PERSON injured by the driver's
negligence. But even the most unquestionable and most
universally applicable of state laws, such as those concerning
murder, will not be allowed to control the conduct of a Marshal
of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the Laws
of the United States. IN RE NEAGLE, 135 U.S. 1."
- JOHNSON VS. MARYLAND, 254 U.S. 51, at 56 (1920).
Here in JOHNSON, a Federal Employee was prosecuted for not
having a driver's permit, and the Supreme Court annulled the
application of that State statute to this Federal Employee. Yes,
working for the King does have some peripheral benefits. And as
for State statutes not controlling the conduct of the United
States Marshal, boy I can just hear some sophomoric Tax
Protester, having won perhaps the Governorship of a state,
announcing to the world that Residents of that State won't need
to concern themselves with the IRS anymore; boy does the King
have a few surprises up his sleeve for that clown.
42 Federal Judge David Bazelon once write a piece touching on an
aspect of Technology and of its effect on our Law [COPING WITH
TECHNOLOGY THROUGH THE LEGAL PROCESS, 62 Cornell Law Review 817
(1977)]; despite Judge Bazelon's elevated sensitivity to the big
environmental picture with the long-term declension seminally
originating with Technology, he misses the boat in not defining
solutions along re-establishing clean PROPERTY RIGHTS lines that
our Fathers once possessed.
43 In allowing juristic intervention into the assertion of a
regulatory jurisdiction over waves propagating through the
electromagnetic spectrum, the Supreme Court did not refer to the
technology aspect in the historical sense, but justified this
intervention on the grounds that there were only a limited
number of broadcasting frequencies available for radio and
television use, and therefore, we are told, Government must now
divide up the pie for us [see NBC VS. UNITED STATES, 319 U.S.
190 (1943)]. Like saying that since the number of printing
presses is limited, therefore, the King will allocate newspaper
publishing rights -- CLASSICAL GREMLIN REASONING ON RATIONING.
Based on this factual premise of frequency scarcity, the radiant
liberating qualities of the First Amendment was held not to
apply here; but actually the King, as usual, was lying in his
arguments to the Supreme Court in justification of this grab
[but a successful like requires two, the Supreme Court fell for
it]. Down to the present day, there has been nothing but a never
ending organic enlargement of the number of frequencies used
since the inception of radio transmission, because an organic
technology has reduced bandwidth frequencies through
increasingly more sophisticated transmission and reception
hardware. The frequency bandwidth technology claimed to have
been limited in number has, as a factual matter, simply grown to
accommodate the demand. Not only are higher frequencies now
being used, but several channels are now scrambled onto one
frequency bandwidth with multiplexing and demultiplexing taking
place at the points of transmission and reception. Therefore,
with a regulatory jurisdiction nestled in place, the Federal
Communications Commission now has broad authority to determine
the right of access to broadcasting. See:
- FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION VS. NELSON BROTHERS BOND AND
MORTGAGE, 289 U.S. 266 (1933);
- FCC VS. POTTSVILLE, 309 U.S. 134 (1940);
- FCC VS. SANDERS BROTHERS RADIO STATION, 309 U.S. 470 (1940);
- FCC VS. ABC, 347 U.S. 284 (1954)].
In 1969, the Supreme Court, continuing on with this incorrect
LIMITED NUMBER OF FREQUENCIES line, said that while there is a
protected right of everyone to speak, write, or publish as he
feels like, subject to very few limitations, there is no
comparable right of everyone to broadcast due to limited
frequencies [so we are told] -- see RED LION BROADCASTING VS.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Like Felix Frankfurter would openly
admit, judicial competence is quite limited; and just as their
COMMON SENSE deficiency manifests itself in many areas, such as
this FREQUENCY SHORTAGE line of reasoning, so too does their
rare gifted genius also surface in many areas.
44 In 1927, coming out of a Prohibition enforcement action, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that wiretapping of telephone
lines by Government agents was not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. The technological development of the telephone in
1927 was then 50 years old; and the Case portrays an ominous
picture of what happens when our Founding Fathers failed to
bluntly, specifically, and explicitly tie the King's giblets
down tight, in no uncertain terms. Nowhere did our Fathers
require the application of the restrainment Principles found in
the Bill of Rights to be applied to technology then not
existing, even though in 1787 the printing press was a
relatively recent technological development. One might think
that even in 1787, something might come along not contemplated
by the word "Press" in the First Amendment -- but no, our
Fathers did not provide for that. Writing initially in WEEMS VS.
UNITED STATES, dissenting Justice Louis Brandeis had a few words
to say about the inherently organic nature of Constitutions:
"Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it
is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language
should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that
evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into
existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to
be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is particularly true of constitutions.
They are not ephemeral enactments [meaning short-lived or
transient], designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use
the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, `designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.'
The future is their care and provision for events of good and
bad tendencies of which no prophecies can be made. In the
application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation
cannot be only what has been, but of what may be. Under any
other rule indeed, a constitution would indeed be as easy of
application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its
general principles would have little value and be converted by
precedent into lifeless and impotent formulas. Rights declared
in words might be lost in reality."
- WEEMS VS. UNITED STATES, id., 217 U.S. 349, at 373 (1909).
In another case, Justice Brandeis then continued on in his own
words:
"Discovery and invention have made it possible for the
Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the
rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the
closet. ...The progress of science in furnishing the Government
with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping.
Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the
most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic
and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed
beliefs, thoughts, and emotions."
- Louis Brandeis, OLMSTEAD VS. UNITED STATES, 277 U.S. 438, at
473 (1927).
45 "I foresee a second challenge to civil liberties in the next
century growing out of developments in science and technology.
By placing new tools at the Government's disposal, technological
advances enhance its power, and raise the question of when -- if
ever -- the Government may use these tools.
"In recent years, we have asked that question with regard to
various surveillance technologies, from X-Rays and magnetometers
to wiretaps to "bugs." I am told it is now possible to
intercept conversations through window panes with laser beams,
and to eavesdrop on telephone conversations by monitoring
microwave radio channels. The uses of new technologies are so
hard to detect that even if the courts articulate clear-cut
rules, enforcing them will be unusually difficult. Yet, our
experience with surveillance technology teaches, if we are to
preserve the freedoms the Framers sought to guarantee, we must
guard against much more than the specific evils they feared.
"Although I cannot predict the technological developments of the
next century, I foresee intractable issues looming in behavior
and thought control. The emerging wizardries of chemotherapy,
psychosurgery, behavior modification and genetic engineering,
with their "clockwork orange" overtones, might seem an unlikely
source of moral dilemmas. ...But like all technological
advances, these developments carry promise as well as peril."
- Judge David Bazalon in CIVIL LIBERTIES -- PROTECTING OLD
VALUES IN THE NEW CENTURY, 51 New York University Law Review
505, at 511 (1976).
46 "Constitutions of Government are not to be framed upon a
calculation of existing exigencies; but upon a combination of
these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the
natural and tried course of human affairs. There ought to be a
capacity to provide for future contingencies, as they may
happen; and as these are... illimitable in their nature, so it
is impossible safely to limit that capacity."
- Joseph Story, II COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, at 403
(Cambridge, 1833).
47 QUO WARRANTO asks the question: By what Jurisdiction?
48 In Highway Tort Liability Law, the phrase I quoted earlier,
called ASSUMPTION OF RISK, is actually a legal doctrine; it is a
negligence defense argument to throw at adversaries in the heat
of judicial battle. In a highway Tort Law liability setting,
this Doctrine would surface where a guest who accepts a
gratuitous ride in your car is deemed to have assumed the risk
of any defects that exist in your car that were unknown to you.
This Doctrine is related to a PRINCIPLE OF NATURE that mandates
that there has to come some point in time, regardless of any
other mitigating element present in the factual setting, that
requires to pull that thumb of theirs out of their mouths and
start taking some responsibility for the uncontrolled knocks and
circumstantial aberrations that make their infrequent appearance
in our lives down here, as they knowingly entered into risk
environment situations [like driving on highways] where they
knew something adverse could happen, and yet, they went right
ahead and took the ride anyway. [See generally, William Prosser,
LAW OF TORTS ["Negligence: Defenses"] (West Publishing, 1971)
4th Edition.]
49 This is just another example of Government's MODUS OPERANDI:
If they can grab the tax and get away with it politically, they
will -- while remaining silent on the exceptions. If Government
can force a licensing environment over you, they will and if
they cannot, they will not; and then they will remain silent on
their legal and practical disabilities. Criminals too operate in
similar ways: Imagine yourself being at a ski resort; there are
60 pairs of skis and poles leaning against a rack; and along
comes a criminal casing the place over. Fifty pairs of the skis
are locked down, and 10 of them are not. If you were a criminal,
what would you do? Criminals take what they can take, and leave
behind that which is relatively too difficult to grab and make
off with.
"The only object we have here in view in presenting this
[graduated income tax] amendment is to rake in where there is
something to rake in, not to throw out the dragnet where there
is nothing to catch."
- Senator William Peffer, June 21, 1894 [as quoted by Frank
Chodorov in THE INCOME TAX, page 37 (Devin-Adair, 1954)].
50 Everyone is in a constant state of making RISK ASSESSMENTS,
even though not all folks scientifically view their judgment
thinking along these well defined lines; anytime an environment
of risk is being entered, RISK ASSESSMENT judgment is actually
being made, even if subconsciously. Gremlins, being the
administratively well organized body of vermin workhorses that
they are, also thoroughly immerse themselves in precise, well
thought out RISK ASSESSMENT model scenarios. This process is
normally used in such areas like probing for the probable
subject reaction to one more turn of the screws, or in
estimating the likelihood of actually achieving, and then
getting away with, some desired damages somewhere -- some
murder, some revolution, or some war, conquest, asset grab, or
famine being manufactured someplace. From the Gremlin
perspective, then, RISK ASSESSMENT has to be viewed as another
tool in the decision making process to deflect the occurrence of
adverse circumstances as what was once a great Gremlin
enscrewment plan starts to fall apart for some unexpected
reason. Gremlins have had a few words to say about structural
risk analysis and assessment (I selected this discourse due to
its Highway setting and the political overtones it brings to
light):
"There is no such thing as a risk free society. There is no
point in getting into a panic about the risks of life until you
have [made comparisons]. ...puzzling is the apparently
irrational attitude which people have towards environmental
hazards... Some 7,000 people are killed and some 350,000 injured
each year on the roads of Britain. Yet this perpetual carnage --
nearly 1,000 killed or injured every day -- generates no public
outrage. ...you will find that politicians will be rather chary
of imposing a maximum speed limit of 50 miles per hour on all
roads where the limit is not already 30 or 40, though if they
did, both energy and lives would be saved. Why then don't they
do it? It would not REALLY be difficult to enforce.
"...I shall put the answer politely: Their [RISK ASSESSMENT]
judgment... tells them that people would not like it. And then
all the other goodies they have in mind for you, less
unemployment, less inflation, less taxation, and increasing
standard of living, fair shares for all... you name it -- might
be unrealizable; because, you might say, `Maybe we need a change
of Government. I want to go faster than 50 miles per hour on all
those marvelous motorways I paid for.'
"...The results of risk accounting are surprising..."
- Baron Nathaniel Rothschild in the WALL STREET JOURNAL
["Coming to Grips with Risk"], page 22 (March 13, 1979).
Just as RISK ASSESSMENT is applied to the decision making
process by Gremlins through benefit and detriment comparison, we
too will now decide whether or not we will enter into
replacement Covenants again with Father down here; RISK
ASSESSMENT weighs the costs involved and compares them with the
benefits earned. In your own RISK ASSESSMENT judgment process,
while looking back at your own life for the past 10 years, we
need to ask ourselves a QUESTION:
Would I really have been inconvenienced to have spent Sunday
mornings in Church instead of on the golf course, and also spent
a few other hours across the weekdays on Celestial Contract
related work?
For the value placed on the inconvenience involved, is the risk
of standing before Father at the Last Day, without having been
tried under his NEW AND EVERLASTING COVENANTS, worth the
probable forfeiture of Celestial benefits? The answer to that
Question lies within yourself.
51 For a review of the numerous arguments on judicial competence
limitations and calibre capacity as manifested by Case hardened
Judges, see THINKING ABOUT COURTS: TOWARDS AND BEYOND A
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCY by Ralph Cavanaugh, et al.,
in 14 Law and Society Review 371 (1980).
52 Justice Felix Frankfurter very openly stated his observation
that judicial competence is limited. In MARCONI WIRELESS VS.
UNITED STATES, he stated that:
"It is an observation that the training of Anglo-American
judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast upon them by
patent legislation. ...judges must overcome their scientific
incompetence as best they can."
- MARCONI WIRELESS VS. UNITED STATES, 320 U.S. 1, at 60 (1942).
Justice Frankfurter then went on with supporting quotations from
Thomas Jefferson and Judge Learned Hand. And just as Federal
Judges can be competency deficient in scientific knowledge, thus
rendering their judgments in that area prone to error, so too
can they be, and in fact are, competency deficient in other
areas as well, generating similar erroneous judgment results.
53 Consider Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist:
"No one questions that the State may require the licensing of
those who drive on its highways and the registration of vehicles
which are driven on those highways."
- Rehnquist, dissenting, in DELAWARE VS. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 648,
at 665 (1978).
Sorry, Mr. Rehnquist, but there are many people who are
questioning such a licensing requirement, and they have more
than sufficient minimum legal authority, based on several
THOUSAND State and Federal Court Opinions from a different era,
as to warrant both a hearing and an extended Judicial response
-- and not the snortations of a Judge who spent virtually his
entire isolated life working for Government. [Notice how I said
that Highway Contract Protesters are entitled to a Hearing and
an Explanation. I did not say that they are entitled to prevail.]
54 For an illuminating article on the topic of MUTUAL ASSENT in
contracts, see Samuel Williston in MUTUAL ASSENT IN THE
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, 14 Illinois Law Review 85. Under some
conditions, the amount and nature of relief damages that can be
awarded under contracts is sensitive to the status of the
contracts falling under an OBJECTIVE meeting of the minds test
[meaning some type of an Adhesion or quasi-contract (forced in
whole or part on people) is in effect]; or in the alternative, a
SUBJECTIVE meeting of the minds [meaning a purely negotiated
contract is in effect]. See IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS AND MUTUAL
ASSENT by George P. Costigan, 33 Harvard Law Review 376 (1919).
55 In 1985, the California Supreme Court handed down four cases
that I am aware of that touched to some extent on the ADHESION
CONTRACT DOCTRINE:
- VICTORIA VS. SUPERIOR COURT, 710 Pacific 2nd 833 (1985);
- PERDUE VS. CROCKER NATIONAL BANK, 702 Pacific 2nd 503 (1985);
- SEARLE VS. ALLSTATE LIFE INSURANCE, 696 Pacific 2nd 1308
(1985).
For example, in PERDUE VS. CROCKER NATIONAL BANK, bank account
signature cards were deemed Adhesion Contracts; and Contracts of
Adhesion are referred to as signifying standardized contracts
which, when drafted and imposed by a party of superior
bargaining strength, relegates to the other subscribing party
only the opportunity to adhere to the contract, or in the
alternative, to reject it IN TOTO [meaning rejected IN THE
WHOLE]. In SEARLE VS. ALLSTATE LIFE INSURANCE, Justice Bird
noted that insurance policies are Contracts of Adhesion, and
that therefore, if there are any vague, evasive, and ambiguous
statements in the contract, the party who drafted the contract
(the insurance company) loses when a grievance turning on the
vague clause comes before a Court. In both Cases, an underlying
common denominator surfaces in that there really was not any
MUTUAL ASSENT ("meeting of the minds") in effect by the parties
at the time the contract was entered into.
56 Occasionally, I have heard rumblings from Highway Contract
Protesters to the effect that both the United States and the
several States lack jurisdiction to exclude foot passengers from
using the Interstate Highway System. They cite the Common Law
Doctrine that:
"...all persons have a right to walk on a public highway, and
are entitled to the exercise of reasonable care on the part of
persons driving carriages along it."
- Joseph Angell in LAW OF HIGHWAYS, at 454 [Little Brown
(1886)]. [Joseph Angell also cites BROOKS VS. SCHWERIN, 54 New
York 343 to state that foot passengers have equal rights with
those driving in carriages.]
The answer lies in another Common Law Doctrine that gave
improved methods of locomotion SUPERIOR PRIVILEGES on highway
use. See a Case entitled MACOMBER VS. NICHOLS, 34 Michigan 212
(1875), for an Opinion by Chief Judge Cooley discussing this
Doctrine, and the interesting Case citations therein. See also
ROAD RIGHTS AND LIABILITY OF WHEELMEN by George Clemenston
[Callaghan & Company, Chicago (1895)]. Sorry, Protesters, but
our Father's Common Law is not being damaged by the placement of
signs at entrances to Interstate Highways that exclude foot
passengers; such PUBLIC NOTICE reasonably creates expectations
of reciprocity by the highway's owners that they are
conditionally offering the use of that highway to you as a
benefit, and so now contracts are in effect. Those Interstate
Highways are special purpose limited use highways constructed
along sealed corridors where any type of use limitation is
purely discretionary by their Government owners. Government is
not required to build those Interstate Highways for you, so when
they do so, they are built and offered for use on their terms.
57 - MARSH VS. ALABAMA, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); [A company owned
town had taken on a PUBLIC FUNCTION and could not prohibit the
distribution of religious material on the town's privately owned
streets.]
- AMALGAMATED FOOD EMPLOYEES VS. LOGAN VALLEY PIZZA, 391 U.S.
308 (1968); [Shopping center management cannot interfere with
union pickets, reasoning that shopping centers were the
functional equivalent of central business districts. (LOGAN
VALLEY was later modified in LLOYD CORPORATION VS. TANNER, 407
U.S. 551 (1972)].
- PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER VS. ROBINS, 447 U.S. 74 (1980);
[Shopping center management restrained from ejecting persons
(high school students) disseminating political literature (a
petition in opposition to the United Nations Resolution against
Zionism). Affirmed on the basis of adequate and independent
California state grounds; property owners face diminished
expectations of property rights when their property is open to
the public.]
58 "...DA LAW SAYS I GOTTA" -- as their eyes are fixated on
penal statutes; their minds swirling in accident statistics
colored by Insurance Companies; and with a pair of demons at
their sides, working them over and hacking away at them by
reminding the judge just how tough of a cookie he really is to
deal with such naked defiance by a Protester.
59 And in real property law, a variation of this Principle
surfaces in the INGRESS AND EGRESS DOCTRINE, which forces the
neighbors of a landlocked parcel of land to yield some of their
property rights and grant a right of way easement to the nearest
public thoroughfare for the benefit of the fellow who is
landlocked.
60 "If the usual track is impassable, it is for the general good
that people should be entitled to pass another line."
- Lord Mansfield, in COMYN'S DIGEST, "Chemin," D.6.
61 See a chapter called "Founderous Roads -- Right to Travel
EXTRA VIAM" in the book entitled "THE LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS"
by Byron Elliott [Brown-Merrill (1890)].
62 CUMMINGS VS. MISSOURI, 4 U.S. 323 (1866); [Clergymen were
barred from the ministry in the absence of subscribing to a
loyalty oath.]
63 See generally, LEGISLATURE DISQUALIFICATION AS BILLS OF
ATTAINDER, by Wormuth, 4 Vanderbuilt Law Review 603 (1951).
64 See, for example, the 1685 attainder of James, Duke of
Monmouth, for High Treason:
"WHEREAS James Duke of Monmouth has in an hostile manner
invaded this kingdom, and is now in open rebellion, levying war
against the king, contrary to the duty of his allegiance; Be it
enacted by the King's most excellent majesty, by and with the
advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and
commons in this parliament assembled, and the authority of the
same, That the said James Duke of Monmouth stand and be
convicted and attained for high treason, and that he suffer pain
of death, and incur all forfeitures as a traitor convicted and
attained of high treason."
- 1 JACOB 2, c.2 (1685)
The forfeiture the statute is referring to is the total grab of
the condemned person's property by the King, and the corruption
of his blood (whereby his heirs were denied the right to inherit
his estate).
65 UNITED STATES VS. LOVETT, 328 u.s. 323, AT 324 (1945);
THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, by Z. Chafee,
Jr.; page 97 (1956).
66 For example, see 10 and 11 William 3, c. 13 (1701):
"An Act for continuing the Imprisonment of Counter ["Counter"
is the criminal's name] and others, for the late horrid
Conspiracy to assassinate the Person of his sacred Majesty."
67 "...all and every the persons, named and included in the said
act [declaring persons guilt of treason] are banished from the
said state [Georgia]."
- COOPER VS. TELFAIR, 4 Dallas 14 (1800).
See also KENNEDY VS. MENDOZA-MARTINEZ, 372 U.S. 144, at 168
(footnote #23), (1963).
68 Following the American Revolutionary War, several States
seized the property of alleged Tory sympathizers. See a Case
called JAMES CLAIM in 1 Dallas 47 (1780); ["John Parrock was
attained of High Treason, and his estate seized and advertised
for sale"]; and RESPUBLICA VS. GORDON, 1 Dallas 233 (1788);
["... attained for treason for adhering to the King of Great
Britain, in consequences of which his estate was confiscated to
the use of the commonwealth..."].
69 And the Judiciary has had a say in the matter, as they, with
very open minds, continue to explore the possibility that
various legislative acts might very well function as BILLS OF
ATTAINDER:
"The infamous history of BILLS OF ATTAINDER is a useful point
in the inquiry whether the Act fairly can be characterized as a
form of punishment leveled against appellant. For the
substantial experience of both England and the United States
with such abuses of parliamentary and legislative power offers a
ready checklist of deprivations and disabilities so
disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpunitive
ends that they unquestionably have been held to fall within the
proscription of Article I, Section 9."
- RICHARD NIXON VS. THE ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES, 433
U.S. 425, at 473 (1976).
70 "This Court's decisions have defined a BILL OF ATTAINDER as a
legislative Act which inflicts punishment on named individuals
or members of an easily ascertainable group without a judicial
trial."
- UNITED STATES VS. O'BRIEN, 391 U.S. 367, at footnote #30
(1967).
71 These three indicia are discussed in UNITED STATES VS.
O'BRIEN, 391 U.S. 367, at footnote #30 (1967).
72 "It is difficult to see in what sense a typical BILL OF
ATTAINDER calling for the banishment of a number of notorious
rebels inflicts "punishment" any more than does a statute
providing that no GRAND MAL epileptic shall drive an automobile.
In each case the legislature has moved to prevent a given group
of individuals from causing an undesirable situation, by keeping
that group from a position in which they will be capable of
bringing about the feared events. The `legislative intent' --
insofar as that phrase is meaningful -- in two cases is probably
identical."
- Editor's Comment in YALE LAW JOURNAL, as cited in BILLS OF
ATTAINDER by Raoul Berger, 63 Cornell Law Review 355, at 402
(1978).
For other discussions on BILLS OF ATTAINDER, see:
- Editor's Comment in THE SUPREME COURT'S BILL OF ATTAINDER
DOCTRINE: A NEED FOR CLARIFICATION, 54 California Law Review
212 (1966);
- Editor's Comment in THE BOUNDS OF LEGISLATIVE SPECIFICATION:
A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE BILLS OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE, 72 Yale
Law Journal 330 (1962).
73 I once had a very nice lunch with, perhaps the world's
premier Highway Contract Protester, George Gordon, who now lives
in Isabella, Missouri. I asked this majestic Protester
EXTRAORDINAIRE if he had any objection for the requirement that
airline pilots be forcibly required to hold and maintain in good
standing, EVIDENCES OF COMPETENCY. He agreed with the idea
absolutely, and stated to me that he wanted the assurance that
airplane pilots were competent to fly. When I asked him for his
feeling on whether or not operators of automobiles should also
be required to hold and maintain EVIDENCE OF COMPETENCY, this
Protester, whom I admire so much, responded with silence, and
the conversation carried on in other directions. [At the present
time, this Protester is advising his students to take the
Competency test and pay the fees, but not to "sign the contract"
-- an incorrect line of legal advice that attaches special
significance to the existence of the written Driver's License as
documenting EVIDENCE OF CONSENT; but of which significance there
is absolutely none -- the Law does not operate on paper and
never has. To say that the Law does not exist without signatures
being affixed to paper is to say that before the technology of
pens, ink, and paper surfaced predominantly in the Middle Ages,
that there was no Law -- which is a patently stupid conclusion
to arrive at. No Driver's License has ever had to have been
adduced to prove the existence of CONSENT, an irrelevant factor
whenever invisible contracts are in effect, since the acceptance
of a hard tangible benefit, such as the use of Government
Highways, overrules and annuls any such weasely little Tort
argument of UNFAIRNESS].
74 Yes, the Law operates out in the practical setting by your
acts, and not on paper by the existence of a Driver's License,
and you Highway Contract Protesters are really missing the boat
altogether:
"The law necessarily steps in to explain, and construe the
stipulations of parties, but never to supersede, or vary them. A
great mass of human transactions depend upon implied contracts,
upon contracts, not written, which grow out of the acts of the
parties."
- Joseph Story, III COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, at 249
["Contracts"] (Cambridge, 1833).
75 The deep soul searching that Highway Contract Protesting
Patriots need to do is the same soul searching that other
prominent people have already done in other settings, as they
too knew that they were in serious error -- but for different
reasons -- because the sanctification that their soul was
unsuccessfully searching for was to correct error of a far
different nature...
..It had been a nice day outside yesterday on that Thursday;
generally it had been a wet week down here; reaching a typical
afternoon temperature into the 70s, now on Friday it was quite
humid outside. Coming down from New York to attend a Pepsi-Cola
Meeting, as Nelson had arranged, the thought of being in
"AMERICA" triggered something warm inside Richard Nixon's heart,
although he did not know just what. Richard Nixon was an
American Vice-President, a high-profile and very well known
fellow throughout the world, and so it was important that other
good reasons always be made available to explain away his
presence on his peripheral assignments for Nelson Rockefeller --
a high-powered, heavy duty, and world class Gremlin. For
Vice-President Richard Nixon, merely walking down the sidewalk
or strolling through a hotel lobby created an attraction not
easily forgotten by passers-by.
And now it was early on a Friday morning and temperatures were
now into the low 60's, and were going to rise; the weather
reports had stated that the expected intermittent rains that
day. Richard Nixon had gotten up early this morning and had left
his suite at the Baker Hotel for a stroll; he had a busy day
ahead of him, as well as having to deal with something else that
was eating away at him. He had left his wife Pat back in New
York -- and for good reasons.
Standing there on the sidewalk next to Elm Street, watching the
cars go by, something impressive was overruling his train of
thoughts, as the idea would not leave his mind that he would
never, ever, forget this time, this day and this place. Looking
across the street, there was a series of small 5 to 7 story
buildings. He looked across the municipal park and saw that
United States Terminal Annex Building, then he turned and saw in
series the County Court House Building; a beautiful old stone
faced mansion called OLD RED which held the County executives'
offices, built way back in the 1800s, it was of elegant red
brick -- well worn but elegant. Continuing his panorama view he
saw the County Criminal Courts Building, then the County Records
Building -- all those buildings were fronting on Houston Street,
and they were all Government. He knew that this day would be
haunting him for the rest of his life. Boy, what he had to go
through for Nelson. Standing on the sidewalk next to Elm Street,
Richard Nixon turned again and looked around behind him -- there
was a set of railroad tracks over there, and a confluence of
three streets -- Main Street, Elm Street, and Commerce Street --
going underneath those tracks. Turning back around, he once
again saw the small municipal park and the series of Government
buildings encircling it. Continuing his turn, now there appeared
a taller warehouse like building that attracted his attention
momentarily. Continuing his panoramic view, he continued to turn
and saw another park like setting on a bluff -- there was a
collection of trees, benches, and a concrete fence with an
interesting architectural design in it -- and all of that looked
like it was perched overall on a grass knoll. The concrete fence
was actually a monument built by the WORKS PROGRESS
ADMINISTRATION in 1938 to honor a Tennessee lawyer named John
Byran, one of the pioneers who settled in this town back in
1839, before taking off to join the California Gold Rush in 1849.
Continuing on with his circle, he encountered the railroad
tracks again, but now his eye caught several boxcars parked
nearby -- yes, he remembered how those boxcars were supposed to
be there; Nelson's plans always were so well oiled. Looking at
the stream of cars coming and going in both directions
underneath its bridge, he studied the passengers for a while.
Looking at the drivers in those cars, Richard Nixon thought to
himself how he held valuable factual information those folks did
not have -- factual information so important that literally,
before the end of the day from right then and there, every
single human being on the fact of the Earth, accessible to some
news information, would then know in hindsight what Richard
Nixon now knew in advance.
Occasionally, Richard Nixon had been baffled (if BAFFLED is the
word), or perhaps MYSTIQUED, about the nonchalant ambivalence
and indifference of Americans generally to their Government and
to those who were quietly running the show hidden in the
background; why these common folks just did not understand POWER
very well. Why couldn't these simple folks come to grips with
the fact that successful politicians are simply accustomed to
using juristic force to accomplish their own personal
objectives? And that there were numerous others who also want
the benefits derived from using Juristic Institutions on their
behalf, while wanting to stay blended in latently within the
shadows of the background.
Searching his soul some more, an idea came into the back of his
mind -- a partial recognition of what it meant to be "IN
AMERICA" -- the real AMERICA was merely the absence of Corporate
Socialist Rockefeller Cartel gremlin intrigues and maneuverings
for conquest -- a Cartel power so dominant in New York that
merely traveling anywhere else in the Country was "AMERICA."
But something about this city was different; here nice,
friendly, class people lived. He remember how he actually
enjoyed being interviewed yesterday by the local Press in his
suite at the Baker Hotel -- boy was that a refreshing change; he
had felt relaxed. Richard Nixon really liked these folks, and
once momentarily yearned to be one of them -- simple,
uncluttered, and concerned largely with themselves and their
families. Richard Nixon remembered how he saw his picture in the
local newspaper this morning, and the photograph published was
very distinguished looking. Why, if that Press Interview had
taken place in New York City, there would have been no end to
the distortion taking place, and the photograph selected would
have been the worst -- Nelson's barking media dogs in his media,
what garbage they were. Yes, Nelson had promised Richard Nixon
the Presidency off in the future, so now the barking dogs were
going to have Richard Nixon as a piece of meat to kick around
once again. While trying to relate to the journalists who lived
in this city, Richard Nixon visualized in his mind reading the
editorial page this morning next to his Press Interview
photograph, and recalled feeling how real Americans lived in
this city, as the local newspaper editors had the SAVIOR FAIRE
to admire a man personally, while disagreeing with some of his
philosophy:
"[We] hope, Mr. Vice President, that your brief interlude here
today will be pleasant. The NEWS, along with thousands in this
area, has disagreed sharply with many of your policies, but the
opposition is not personal."
Gee, Richard Nixon was thinking to himself, such a statement
would never be found appearing in any paper Nelson and David had
any control over -- a newspaper actually admiring someone else?
Never. Hmmm, so that is what the distinguishing characteristic
was: These common folks out here held no malice in them against
others; they were not enscrewment oriented, so they thought in
totally different terms. These common folks out here in AMERICA
do not start out Press Interviews looking for ways to run
someone else into the ground.
In watching the cars go by again, Richard Nixon remembered how
sometime ago, he had once heard Nelson Rockefeller mutter some
contemptful characterization of these common folks by calling
them PEASANTS, which was uttered with a salty derogatory slur in
Nelson's inflection designed to rub in, in no uncertain terms,
the elevated grandeur of his aloof status. Now while looking at
a white convertible go by with a blonde in it, unsophisticated,
seemingly carefree, uncluttered, and naive -- yet she and these
other common folks down here possessed something important that
Richard Nixon quietly yearned for, but could not identify; the
very fact that Nelson Rockefeller had bad-mouthed these folks
meant that there was something special about them that Richard
Nixon thought he also wanted for himself, but in trying to
figure out just what the SOMETHING was, Richard Nixon's mind
just drew a blank for the moment. These common folks out here in
AMERICA, Nelson's PEASANTS, hmmmm... unlike Nelson, they were
carefree, they were without malice towards others, nor did they
walk about like Atlas with the burdens of global problems on
their shoulders, nor they did not hold the literal fate of
entire civilizations in their hands, and they were also without
factual knowledge on impending adverse circumstances, and yet,
for some puzzling reason, they still clearly held the upper hand
in some invisible way [HOLDING THE UPPER HAND is a
characterization that Nelson Rockefeller would infrequently use
in other textual settings, as his mind was constantly making
assessments on power relationships he was evaluating]. Here
Richard Nixon was in advanced and premier positions in virtually
every perspective of measurement that society offers, and yet at
the same time he also felt way behind all of these simple little
common folks. Richard Nixon really did not want to be here this
day; he did not want to have had to sit in on that briefing
session in New York along with Nelson, Secretary of Defense
Robert MacNamara; his assistant Alexander Haig; Director of
Clandestine Operations for the CIA, Richard M. Bissell, Jr.; and
Nelson's long time friend, George DeMohrenschilt. Nelson had
also given Richard Nixon a peripheral but operationally
important coordinating role to play in the scenario that would
be unfolding into the public's view shortly. It was a massive
operation involving several hundred people, many of whom did not
know what the end objective was, and would only be realizing
their supporting role after the objective blossomed out into the
public eye -- but not Richard Nixon; he knew the total picture
from start to finish, as all supervisors and coordinators have
to know in order to supervise and coordinate. In a practical
sense, Richard Nixon was a very powerful person today -- he had
the ability to place a phone call to Nelson Rockefeller and call
off the whole operation. And now Richard Nixon was telling
himself that this was something he did not want to do, this was
something he resented -- yet he remained silent about his
opposition, and went right ahead and did what he was told to do,
as his conscience was telling him not to do, as the good little
water boy he had always been for Nelson Rockefeller. In a
similar way, today was also going to be the end of the line for
Richard Nixon as well, as he would not need to concern himself
with his conscience wrestling with him any more.
Now while Richard Nixon's mind had been racing about, touching
on one deep contemplative and historical thought after another
-- almost an hour had passed, and he snapped out of his somewhat
dreamy world to realize that he had other things to do before
catching his plane back to New York. This was a matured Richard
Nixon who was now starting to mellow out -- the old Richard
Nixon was emotionally disturbed and had frequently thrown temper
tantrums at students in his law class at Whittier College he
once taught -- mean and ugly tantrums whose [expletive deleted]
language caused even the paint to peel off the walls; those
tantrums had indicated an unpleasant upbringing from a broken
home [which his parents were responsible for] and lack of
minimal esteem for others [which he was responsible for]. But
now as the new Richard Nixon turned around in a circle once
again, catching a final panoramic glimpse of the neighborhood
scene again -- a scene that the entire world, literally, would
become very well acquainted with in a few hours -- a tear formed
in one eye and made it down to his cheek before it was wiped
away; no, he really did not want to go through with this; he
quietly resented this, and even momentarily regretted ever
getting involved with Nelson Rockefeller.
A Question surfaced in his mind, followed by another: WHO AM I?
WHAT AM I DOING HERE?, with the first Question fading away
quickly with the second soon following suit; he had done enough
soul searching for one day, and this whole thing was eating at
him too much. After suppressing expressions of sympathy that he
and Nelson would be extending to Jackie on the morrow in a
private White House reception -- those recurring condolences
that he had been rehearsing -- Richard Nixon finally cleared his
mind of these extraneous thoughts as he slowly turned around and
left Dealey Plaza, heading indirectly for Love Airfield. After
placing a phone call to Nelson Rockefeller in New York City,
telling him that everything "...is set" and that he is flying
back to New York, Richard Nixon would clear out of Dallas two
hours before President Kennedy arrived in Dallas after having
breakfast in Forth Worth. For factual information on Nixon in
Dallas, see generally the DALLAS MORNING NEWS:
- ["Guard Not for Nixon"], Section 4, page 1 (Friday, November
22, 1963);
- ["Nixon Predicts JFK May Drop Johnson" - Press Interview],
Section 4, page 1 (has accompanying photograph);
Yes, that Question WHO AM I? really did once enter into Richard
Nixon's mind in the idea stream of soul searching that he did on
that Friday morning. If the great Highway Contract Protesters
were smart, then unlike Richard Nixon's accelerated dissipation
of difficult Questions his lack of factual knowledge created
impediments to comprehending, this is one Question that
Protesters should home in on without letup, until an Answer
surfaces somewhere. There is no other Question in this Life that
could be asked that is more important. Richard Nixon's error was
in chasing the idea away quickly -- indicative of the error in
judgment he also exercised as an unprincipled opportunist, when
he was once invited to jump into bed with Nelson Rockefeller, a
judgment that as of 1985, Richard Nixon has quietly both
appreciated and regretted making several times over. Yes,
Richard Nixon got that right: Us little PEASANTS do in fact HOLD
THE UPPER HAND in ways invisible to Gremlins, imps, and their
water boys: Being the clumsy, ignorant, dumb, stupid,
uncluttered and unmotivated simple little GOY cattle that we
are, at least we haven't forfeited the Celestial Kingdom by
murdering other people.
76 "We came into this world to receive a training in mortality
that we could not get anywhere else, or in any other way. We
came here into this world to partake of all the vicissitudes, to
receive the lessons that we receive in mortality, from or in a
mortal world. And so we become subject to pain, to sickness [and
to presentations of error]. ... We are in the mortal life to get
an experience, a training, that we could not get any other way.
And in order to become gods, it is necessary for us to know
something about pain, about sickness, [about incorrect
reasoning], and about the other things that we partake of in
this school of mortality."
- Joseph Fielding Smith in SEEK YE EARNESTLY, pages 4 and 5
[Deseret Book Publishings, Salt Lake City (1970)].
Yes, CORRECT REASONING is very important to acquire down here,
and there is a very good reason why this is so: Because how we
think today governs our acts tomorrow. This Principle operates
as a function of the memory judgment making machinery in our
minds, an important Principle that Lucifer once deeply regretted
violating in the First Estate, as he once continuously tossed
aside and ignored Father's seemingly insignificant little
advisories:
"Thoughts are the seeds of acts, and precede them. Mere
compliance with the word of the Lord, without a corresponding
inward desire, will avail little. Indeed, such outward actions
and pretending phrases may disclose hypocrisy, a sin that Jesus
vehemently condemned.
"...The Savior's constant desire and effort were to implant in
the mind right thoughts, pure motives, noble ideas, knowing full
well that right words and actions would eventually follow. He
taught what modern physiology and psychology confirm -- that
hate, jealousy, and other evil passions destroy a man's physical
vigor and efficiency. `They pervert his mental perceptions and
render him incapable of resisting the temptation to commit acts
of violence. They undermine his moral health. By insidious
stages they transform the man who cherishes them into a
criminal.' [Just like executioners for the KGB are eaten alive
by a canker and must be replaced frequently, as I quoted Ian
Fleming.]
"Charles Dickens makes impressive use of this fact in his
immortal story OLIVER TWIST, wherein Monks is introduced first
as an innocent, beautiful child; but then `ending his life as a
mass of solid bestiality, a mere chunk of fleshed iniquity. It
was thinking upon vice and vulgarity that transformed the
angel's face into the countenance of a demon.'...
"I am trying to emphasize that each one is the architect of his
own fate, and he is unfortunate, indeed, who will try to build
himself without the inspiration of God, without realizing that
he grows from within, not from without. [Yes, just like that
SILVER BULLET that Protesters are also looking for -- it too
lies within yourselves.]"
- David O. McKay in CONFERENCE REPORTS ["The Need for Right
Thinking"], at page 6 (October, 1951). David O. McKay was at
that time the President of the Church.
