VIRUS-L Digest   Tuesday, 15 Jan 1991    Volume 4 : Issue 10

Today's Topics:

Re: Apple //gs "Die!" Virus
Stone-2 (PC)
Reoccurence of Stoned on formatted drives (PC)
QEMM IS _NOT_ A VIRUS (was Re: QEMM Virus? (PC))
Re: Hard Disk Protection (PC) and (Mac)
Re: SCAN program for IBM's (PC)
Stoned (PC)
Re: SCAN program for IBM's (PC)
Johsi / Stoned2 (PC)
Re: possible macintosh virus (Mac)
Re: SCAN program for IBM's (PC)
Re: Grapes virus? (Mac)
(No) Viruses in Irak's EXOCET?
TROJAN WARNING: A VM trojan horse (IBM VM/CMS)

VIRUS-L is a moderated, digested mail forum for discussing computer
virus issues; comp.virus is a non-digested Usenet counterpart.
Discussions are not limited to any one hardware/software platform -
diversity is welcomed.  Contributions should be relevant, concise,
polite, etc.  Please sign submissions with your real name.  Send
contributions to [email protected] (that's equivalent to
VIRUS-L at LEHIIBM1 for you BITNET folks).  Information on accessing
anti-virus, documentation, and back-issue archives is distributed
periodically on the list.  Administrative mail (comments, suggestions,
and so forth) should be sent to me at: [email protected].

  Ken van Wyk

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 11 Jan 91 16:59:55 +0000
From:    [email protected] (Julian Sims)
Subject: Re: Apple //gs "Die!" Virus

A dangerous new virus found at the City University.

Article from computer unit newsletter Xmas 1990

A "new" virus that originated in Spain, appears to be very infectious
and, after a set number of boot-ups will completely wipe the hard
disk.  It does not reside in the areas where viruses have bee found to
date, so it is not found by any of the detection programs at City.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 11 Jan 91 10:28:00 -0800
From:    [email protected]
Subject: Stone-2 (PC)

Someone mentioned that Stone-2 has not reached the States yet.  Maybe
not.  But I have had an infection that has been "dual."  Running Scan,
I would be told that I had an infection of Stone and Stone II.  But
one pass of Clean would remove it.  Since then I have switched to
F-Prot, have had infection of Stone, but no indication that Stone II
was involved (I am using Roman numerals because that is the way it was
identified; is there a difference between Stone II and Stone-2?)

[email protected]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 11 Jan 91 12:38:54 -0600
From:    [email protected]
Subject: Reoccurence of Stoned on formatted drives (PC)

Hi,

    I have a tendency to only scan VIRUS-L when I read it so I am not
sure about the current line of discussion regarding the user who had
been reinfected with the STONED virus after "cleaning" his hard drive.
Let me present a problem that we had a few weeks ago for your consideration.

    The equipment:  A 386 clone with an 80Mb hard drive AND a floppy
controller with four ports; and a gob ( >5Mb ) of extended memory.  Floppy
A: is a 360K 5 1/4", B: is a 1.2M 5 1/4", and C: is a 1.44M 3.5".  The
hard drive has four partions (E,F,G, and H) and one RAM drive, I:.

    We had a version of STONED that McAfee could NOT detect or clean
because of the way it had infected our drive.  The chain of events went
something link this:

    1>  We had become aware, through a comedy of errors, that our hard
      drive was STONED after we inserted a known-to-be-clean diskette
      into the A: drive, used a DIR command, and then removed it and
      checked the boot sector with Norton Disk Doctor.

    2>  SCAN would not detect the virus on our E: drive (the boot drive),
      but would detect it in memory.

    3>  If we put a clean disk in our 3.5" drive (drive C:) and then SCANed
      it, it would find STONED "in the partion table" but CLEAN was
      unable to remove it.

now it gets weird...

    4>  We would boot from a (repeatedly confirmed) clean disk in our A:
      drive.  SCAN memory.  Find nothing.  Play around on the B: and C:
      drives.  SCAN memory.  Find nothing.  Change drive to E: and then
      immediately change back to C:.  SCAN memory.  Find STONED resident
      in memory.


    Our analysis of the situation was that STONED had infected the first
sector of our hard drive which was the partion table NOT the boot sector.
McAfee's CLEAN was not able to clean our drive because (we guess) the
program assumed that the first partion of our hard drive was C: and it
couldn't handle the values it was finding for our configuration.  We know
for a fact that when we attempted to CLEAN our E: drive, nothing would
happen.  We solved our problem by reformatting and repartioning the hard
drive and pulling the old data off of tape.
    Somewhere in the middle of this process we called McAfee and discussed
our problem.  They were very responsive and very interested but seemed as
stumped was we were.  We were expecting a call-back from them but, when one
never came, we solved the problem on our own.  I would like to state for
the record that we feel that they have made an excellent product and that
they are an organization with a great deal of integrity.  The frightening
thing about this whole situation was that STONED would get loaded into our
computer's memory whenever we did anything that forced it to check the
partion table on our hard drive regardless of whether or not we booted from
a clean system diskette.

                                             Hope this helps,

                                               Jon

Jon Spinner   C09615SJ@WUVMD
ECS computer clinic manager
Washington University in St. Louis

------------------------------

Date:    09 Jan 91 15:51:56 +0000
From:    [email protected] (Gary Murph
         y)
Subject: QEMM IS _NOT_ A VIRUS (was Re: QEMM Virus? (PC))


The code cited in the original posting was a legitimate section of the
QEMM install and optimize code --- the sequence in question is part of
a 'reboot' procedure.  After seeing the original notice in the digest,
we contacted Quarterdeck by fax and received the above explanation.

As a further note: the original posting did not say _why_ the
so-called signature was suspicious or how it was discovered.  Our
virus checking detected no anomaly.  If you find something suspicious,
please tell us why and how you found out.

Please do not just "pass it on" when you are posting such serious
allegations; always check your sources before announcing to the world.
These two seemingly innocent postings have probably cost Quarterdeck a
fortune in lost time and fax expenses!

- --
o| Gary Murphy                                                            |o
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
o| uunet!mitel!cunews!cognos!garym       garym%[email protected] |o
| Cognos Inc.      P.O. Box 9707 Ottawa K1G 3N3     (613) 738-1338 x5537 |
o| "There are many things which do not concern the process" - Joan of Arc |o

------------------------------

Date:    12 Jan 91 08:22:04 +0000
From:    [email protected] (Mark Phaedrus)
Subject: Re: Hard Disk Protection (PC) and (Mac)

padgett%[email protected] (Padgett Peterson) writes:

[another user's request for something for the PC similar to Mac's SAM deleted]

>Could be done with something hooking the timer but why ? MACs execute
>code on the floppy when inserted but an IBM or clone does not (unless
>you try to boot from it). Under MS-DOS, a program must be requested
>for execution before it is loaded and that is when good anti-viral
>programs do their thing.

    Not to pick nits here, but this contains a pretty common
misconception about the Mac that should be cleared up (since it's
important when considering Mac virus protection).  Macs do not
automatically "execute code on the floppy when inserted."  If you have
infected application files in a floppy disk and you insert it, nothing
adverse will happen unless you actually try to launch the infected
application The Mac viruses (notably WDEF) that infect immediately on
disk insertion do this because of the way the Finder stores
information on disk, and the way Mac file contents are accessed.
    Most file access on a Mac is resource-based; instead of a program
asking for a specific range of bytes, it asks for, say, desk accessory
#12.  Depending on which access calls the program uses, it can either
look for that resource in one specific file, or in all the
currently-opened files, looking in the most recently-opened first
(which the System itself usually does).  That's how programs like
Suitcase II that let you add new fonts and DAs on the fly work; they
just hold the new files open, and the System automatically looks
through them for resources as well.
    Every Mac disk has a "Desktop" file that keeps track of where
applications are, what their icons look like, etc.  When you're
running the Finder, it keeps all these files open.  The WDEF and
similar viruses sneak in by infecting these Desktop files with a
resource that's the same ID as one the System uses; when the System
looks for this resource, it picks the one in the Desktop file over the
one in the System file, since the Desktop file was opened more
recently.  If the resource is one that would normally be executed
(like a WDEF, which tells the Mac how to draw windows), the System
will execute the infected resource, which can then copy itself to
other Desktop files or do anything else it wants to do.
    Once you understand how the virus enters and spreads, it's not
nearly as threatening.  Unless you're running the Finder (or some
other program that uses Desktop information), it doesn't matter
whether a disk is WDEF-infected or not, since that file is never
opened.  If you hold down Command-Option during a restart or while
inserting a disk (which forces the Desktop to be rebuilt), the virus
is eliminated without infecting the Mac, since the infected Desktop
file is deleted and replaced by a clean copy.  Finally, if you're
using Desktop Manager (which I would heartily recommend), your hard
disk can't be infected, since there's no Desktop file on it at all and
since the files that replace it don't store resources.-- Internet:
[email protected] (University of Washington, Seattle)
 The views expressed here are not those of this station or its management.
  "If you can keep your head while those about you are losing theirs,
     consider an exciting career as a guillotine operator!"

------------------------------

Date:    13 Jan 91 14:32:42 +0000
From:    [email protected] (Fridrik Skulason)
Subject: Re: SCAN program for IBM's (PC)

> I am interested in finding a DOS antivirus program which would
> automatically scan disks as they are inserted.

Why?

Doing this seems a bit silly to me, to say the least.  Consider the
following:

On PCs we have basically two types of viruses - Boot secor viruses and
program viruses.  Assuming we could in all cases detect if a new disk
has been inserted, which cannot (I think) be done on the original PC,
but only on XTs, ATs and late computers (see INT 13H, function 16H),
let's just look at the benefits:

It must be kept in mind that the PC does not automatically execute
code from the diskette when it is inserted.  One some other machines,
(for example Amiga) this is done, so an anti-virus program there HAS
to check the disk as soon as it is inserted.

Boot viruses could be detected by automatic scanning of all disks as
they are inserted, but it would be easier just to check the boot
sector when Ctrl-Alt-Del is pressed.

File viruses could be found as well, but this would take untolerably
long time in the "worst case" - a disk full of LZEXE-packed programs,
which would have to be unpacked before scanning.  I doubt many would
tolerate that delay whenever a disk is inserted.  Just scanning the
programs when they are executed seems by far preferable to me.

Also - unlike Mac and Amiga, the PC does not generate any signal when
a disk is changed - you would need a resident program continously
checking the Diskette Change Line Status.

- -frisk

- --
Fridrik Skulason      University of Iceland  |
Technical Editor of the Virus Bulletin (UK)  |  Reserved for future expansion
E-Mail: [email protected]    Fax: 354-1-28801  |

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 13 Jan 91 12:09:52 +0000
From:    [email protected] (David Conrad)
Subject: Stoned (PC)

Many recent postings have made the point that the Stoned virus
overlays a sector in the FAT, thus causing damage to the file system.
My question, which I *think* I know the answer to is:

Couldn't this sector be restored from the second copy of the FAT?

I believe that the answer is yes, but I would appreciate if those who
study these beasts could confirm this.

- --
David R. Conrad
[email protected]
- --
=  CAT-TALK Conferencing Network, Computer Conferencing and File Archive  =
- -  1-313-343-0800, 300/1200/2400/9600 baud, 8/N/1. New users use 'new'    -
=  as a login id.  AVAILABLE VIA PC-PURSUIT!!! (City code "MIDET")        =
  E-MAIL Address: [email protected]

------------------------------

Date:    13 Jan 91 21:11:09 +0000
From:    [email protected] (Woody Baker @ Eagle Signal)
Subject: Re: SCAN program for IBM's (PC)

[email protected] (Douglas Barlow) writes:
> Only one problem with that idea: How can the machine tell when a disk
> is inserted?  There isn't any type of sensor in IBM floppy drives likee
> in the Mac.

Fastback senses when a disk is inserted.  There is a flag that is used
to determine if a disk has been removed or inserted.  A program such
as this can certainly query that flag.  No problem
Cheers
Woody

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 14 Jan 91 10:06:42 -0800
From:    Jeffrey <[email protected]>
Subject: Johsi / Stoned2 (PC)

  Thanks to everyone on Virus-l for their help with my Virus problem
especially Nick F., Michael B., James O., and Carlos J.  The response
was great, and sorry if I didn't mention you by name if you replied to
my note.  Our PC was infected by both viruses simultaneously.
Stoned-2 sporadically caused the machine not to boot (but didn't
display the "stoned" message), and Joshi disabled the machine when we
tried to boot up on Jan. 5 1991 (again without the signature message,
"type happy birthday joshi to continue...").  Apparently each virus
caused the other one to execute incompletely.

  Both Virii were successfully removed, though the corruption of the
partition table from Johsi neccesitated a cable transfer from my
Hard-disk to a clean hard-disk.  We now have McAfee's program
installed.  The virus was apparently picked up from someone who
accessed a bulletin board and executed some code they had down-loaded.

  Lastly, someone replying to my note requested a copy of the virus
so they could analyze it and tell me more about it (I forgot who,
though).  Sorry, but I won't send any live code to anyone for any
reason.  Thanks again for all the help.
                      --Jeffrey

------------------------------

Date:    14 Jan 91 10:32:46
From:    [email protected] (Brenda Barabash)
Subject: Re: possible macintosh virus (Mac)

[email protected] writes:

>Does anyone know of a Macintosh virus that will make all floppy disks
>appear to be locked to the computer? At first, we thought the problem
>was with the disk drive, but when it started surfacing on other
>computers, we've become a little suspicious. Any help would be
>appreciated.

>Matt Wu
>[email protected]

We are also experiencing problems with floppy disks appearing to be
locked when they aren't.  This is happening on both new disks and old
disks.  It's definitely got to be a virus.  If anyone knows which one
please let us know.

Brenda Barabash                         ...{calgary,arcsun}!jade!brenda
Jade Simulations

------------------------------

Date:    14 Jan 91 20:22:24 +0000
From:    [email protected] (Johnathan Vail)
Subject: Re: SCAN program for IBM's (PC)

[email protected] (Pete Klammer/303-556-3915) writes:

  >Only one problem with that idea: How can the machine tell when a disk
  >is inserted?  There isn't any type of sensor in IBM floppy drives like
  >in the Mac.
  >Doug Barlow

  Isn't the write-protect sensor status available for polling?  If you
  constantly (once per clock tick) check the write-protect detector, you
  could see the "shadow" of the diskette sleeve (write protected or not)
  as the disk is inserted or removed.  I.e., if the detector toggles in
  any way, a diskette has been either inserted or removed.

If I remember correctly the drve has to be selected.  Even if this is
possible and isn't precluded by door open, etc., it definately won't
work while another drive is selected and being used.

jv

"Live Free or Die, Death is the lesser of the two evils" -- General John Stark
_____
|     | Johnathan Vail | [email protected]
|Tegra| (508) 663-7435 | [email protected](WorldNet)
-----  [email protected] {...sun!sunne ..uunet}!tegra!vail

------------------------------

Date:    15 Jan 91 10:52:45 +0000
From:    [email protected] (Randall S Geels)
Subject: Re: Grapes virus? (Mac)

A common problem we see when using FORTAN around the lab is that some
program which has the same creator id as all your FORTRAN apps is on
the same disk. The solution is to:
a) Remove the offending application
b) Change the creator id of the offending appl with ResEdit
then rebuild the desktop file (hold down option-command as the Mac
restarts). This will get rid of your problem and cause all you FORTAN
appl icons to revert back to the defaultMac application icon.

Randy Geels

------------------------------

Date:    15 Jan 91 11:23:00 +0100
From:    Klaus Brunnstein <[email protected]>
Subject: (No) Viruses in Irak's EXOCET?

French press (La Liberation) and media reported (Jan.10) in  some
details that computer viruses could be planted, either in advance
or  afterwards,  in  French  EXOCET rockets  to  influence  their
performance such as to misguide them.  Following a report of  the
German Press Agency (dpa),  German media (on Jan.11) were full of
reports about "viruses in Hussein's rockets".  According to  dpa,
(unnamed) French computer scientists said:

  - manufacturers of war material  usually  implant,  "for  mere
    commercial reasons",  viruses in exported war electronics to
    provoke,  after  some time,  faults and  "profitable  repair
    work";

  - though  Irakian weapon computers are  "hermetically  cut-off
    from the outside world", computer viruses could be implanted
    e.g. via "weather data";

  - moreover,  the built-in computers contain programs which may
    be triggered remotely;  the control system of (French-built)
    EXOCET rockets could be switched-off from French ships;  the
    only  problem  would be the mass of weapon computers  to  be
    switched-off simultaneously.


As usual in events related to malicious code,  truth is mixed  up
with misunderstandings, errors and impossibilities:

  - the implementation of weapon software makes self-reproducing
    programs (=viruses) impossible;  moreover,   it is very  im-
    probable, that such systems may be (re-)programmed remotely;
    French "experts" with such arguments are non-trustable;

  - on  the other hand,  other aspects of "malicious  code"  may
    well  be present in weapon computers;  at least in the  test
    phase,  rockets  can  be  destroyed by  triggering  a  self-
    destruction system remotely;  following the well-established
    principle "never change a running program", such "backdoors"
    (the  proper  name for this type of  malicious  code)  could
    survive the test version;

  - moreover,  French  system analysis might well have  foreseen
    scenarios  in  which to defend against  French-made  rockets
    (e.g. EXOCETS); French warships might remotely influence the
    EXOCET  control  systems if this remains  unchanged  by  the
    (Irakian) users of such technology;  with equivalent probab-
    ility,  other  Western weapon control systems could  contain
    similar self-protection mechanisms  (e.g.  US' Hawk missiles
    having been captured in Kuweit) ;

  - finally,  it is well-published (even in non-military period-
    icals)  that  and how electronic countermeasures  (ECM)  may
    mislead weapon electronics.


Some interesting questions following from such "possibilities":

  - May Irak detect, influence or adapt such weapon software? As
    software  technology  is not well-enough developed  in  Irak
    (and most part of the Arab world),  they probably must  rely
    on  foreign experts (as they evidently do in  other  Hi-Tech
    areas).

  - If French EXOCET rockets are remotely controllable:  why did
    the  French  not warn their "friends"  who  suffered  severe
    losses through their weaponry (e.g.  UK in Falkland  crisis,
    or US in the Iran crisis,  see accident of USS  STARK)?  Did
    they  at least now warn and properly equip their  allies  in
    the Arabian desert?

For  "RISK  experienced"  experts,  it  is  not  surprising  that
misinformation  lives best in threatening situations (such as  at
the Gulf);  apart from general attitudes of  newsmedia,  computer
scientists  who  nominate their  technological  constructs  (e.g.
"self-reproducing   programs")  in  such  inadequate   terms   as
"viruses" (see also:  "intelligence" etc) are highly  responsible
for misinterpretation and misunderstanding by less well  informed
media people and the public!  On the other side,  authorities and
the  public only in such threatening circumstances become   aware
of riskful assumptions inherent in contemporary computer systems.
Such unfortunate experience may lead to the cynic assumption that
risks may best be conceived by (hopefully:  moderately) "ex post"
experiencing  them,  rather than analysing and avoiding them  "ex
ante".


Postscriptum:  computer "viruses" may nevertheless play a role in
"Operation Desert Shield".  There are (yet unconfirmed) news that
several  thousands  PCs (5000?) have been  infected  by  ordinary
"computer viruses".  This would not be a surprising experience as
the  soldiers  had to "vaste" ample waiting for  Jan.15;  in  the
absence of other possibilities for spending free  time,  computer
games (usually a source of "virus" infections) may have played  a
major  psychological  role,  maybe  with  some  impact  on  their
"ordinary functional behaviour".

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 15 Jan 91 14:20:51 +0200
From:    Guy Sirton <[email protected]>
Subject: TROJAN WARNING: A VM trojan horse (IBM VM/CMS)

I have received, a couple of minutes ago, from someone I don't know,
a file called 'GAME2 MODULE'.  This file appears to be a VM trojan horse which
upon execution scans your names file and sends a copy of itself to
everyone in it.  If you receive a copy of that file do not run it.

Guy

------------------------------

End of VIRUS-L Digest [Volume 4 Issue 10]
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