And in Conclusion.... Vol.2 Ver.1.1


          First some answers to frequently asked questions.

          These answers are derived from comments and information
          found on registration cards from The Hacker Chronicles
          Volume I as well as the many phone calls we have recieved.
          Although about 99% of the cards and comments were positive
          in nature, we wish to address negative aspects regardless
          of the low percentage.

          Comment: This has some of the same material as another cd I have

          Answer : It does most definately contains much of the same material.
                   However, Chronicles was released first. So this is a case
                   of them having the same material as we do NOT the other
                   way around.  Please keep in mind that the Hacker
                   Chronicles was and is the FIRST CD Rom Based product of
                   its kind as related to the computer/high tech
                   underground/security. Do not be fooled by imitations
                   and wanna-bees. At one time another company made an
                   illegal exact duplicate of THC Vol 1.  Be warned that
                   due to a small pathing change OUR front end software
                   on this product will not function. We also do not provide
                   technical support as this is not our product.

         Question: When will the next volume be out. (Not soon enough)

          Answer : Subsequent volumes of The Hacker Chronicles will be
                   release every 1.5-2 years. Why so far apart? Well,
                   this material isnt just lying around and produced by
                   the ton on a daily basis as is the case with shareware.
                   As a result we do not have quarterly or bi-annual
                   release dates as do many shareware products. In order
                   to find out what the release date is of the CD you
                   may have now, simply look at the directories and see
                   what dates they contain.

         Question: Why is some of the material so old.

         Answer  : The Hacker Chronicles is an ongoing collection.
                   While we do have thousands of new files on each
                   volume, some older files are left in place for a reason.
                   First The Hacker Chronicles is designed to reflect
                   the entire history of the computer and technical
                   underground. The New, The Old, and anything in
                   between. Many security consultants and training
                   facilities utilize this product and often need to
                   provide examples of technical flaws in there
                   (or anyone elses) systems. Whether its past or present
                   a good example is a good example. Second, while
                   the print/release date of a few of the files may
                   be older. they still contain valid technical
                   information. As long as even part of the material
                   is valid or provides a good example (of a bad example)
                   then it is still usefull. And of course there is the
                   historical perspective. We will not release another
                   volume until we feel that there is suffiucient NEW
                   material to do so. In addition while there are
                   hackers and fone phreaks who purchase this product
                   we are not here to supply material the day it hits the
                   street to the underground community. We would prefer
                   to think of this product as a training facility for
                   enthusiastes and professionals alike.

         Question: How many files are on this disk?

         Answer  : Due to the frequency of this question, we have
                   incorperated a function similer to chkdsk (C)
                   that will tell you every thing you need to know
                   about the total size and file count right on the
                   menu of Volume II.

         Comment : The interface (front end) software is primative.

         Answer  : Yes it is a little primative, thats why we have
                   totally rewritten the front end software (as
                   described in the welcome file at the top of the
                   index). Nearing the release date for Vol. I we
                   were under obligations to meet contract deadlines
                   with our publisher and didnt get enough time to
                   spruce things up both visual and functional.
                   This is not the case with Volume II. We spent a
                   lot of time attempting to bring you both the
                   material and the atmosphere found on underground
                   BBS systems. We prefer to think of it as simple
                   yet fast and functional, and believe you the
                   purchaser will be happy with the changes in
                   both functionality and presentation.

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          Words from the author:(Reprinted From Volume I)

          Over the last 13 years I have worn many hats.  That of a
      Phone Phreak/Hacker, Sysop of one of the oldest BBS's in the
      world, and that of technical security consultant. To some there
      might seem a conflict of interest in the hats I have worn.  But,
      my belief is that the material found in the underground computer
      sub-culture of Hackers & Phone Phreaks should be considered a form
      of educational service to systems designers/administrators, as
      well as programmers, law enforcement and others involved in the
      design, improvement, and policing of the electronic frontier.
          True, there will always be that certain percentage of people
      who would use this (or any other information) maliciously.  It
      is also my belief that these people are in the minority. These
      people while usually teenagers with more ego than intellect can
      if desired find the majority of this information in any library,
      magazine, or newsletter already in print. Most of this style of
      material doesnt originate on underground BBS's, but rather ends
      up there as a compilation of like materials. However to some,
      such as law enforcement for example, a threat is perceived and
      derived from seeing the compilation of this style material all
      in one place and accessable via computer. Just the fact that it
      comes from a computer some how makes it more ominous than if read
      from some obscure techno underground newsletter. This is nothing
      more than a perception problem.
          A case in point is the Craig Neidorf case where he was raided
      and had all of his personal computer equipment taken and charged
      with tens of thousands of damage and losses, because of releaseing
      what was at the time 'perceived' as critical 911 services
      information. Only to have the case thrown out later and discovering
      the self same 911 material was available publicly (if you knew where
      to look) for $30 dollars. While I personally have no great love
      for Craig and was badly and unjustly chastised by him once, he still
      should not have been left with the loss of thousands in personal
      property/equipment, not to mention a hundred thousand (I think that
      was the figure I heard quoted) in attorney's fees. This doesnt
      include the hundreds of thousands in lost tax payer dollars that
      were needlessly squandered on that case.
          My point is that the first thing that needs done is to clean up
      the problem, not the person. For example, my first major systems
      consulting contract was for a long distance telco who was lossing
      $450,000 a month in New York City alone. When hired, the first words
      out of my mouth were 'I'm not a head hunter', as this practice would
      only cost them 3-5 more dollars in investigative and legal fees in
      order to aquire and prosecute for every dollar they lost in fraud.
      The solution I offered was to fix the problem at its source (their
      system).
          After reviewing their setup from top to bottom It didnt
      take long to discover their billing code/PIN structure was at the
      heart of the problem. They had given a secretary a pad and pencil
      and said, we need some codes, here's how many digits they need to be
      so write down some and turn them in for use. In addition they were
      only using 4 digit codes at the time. To make matters worse the codes
      were only spaced a few digits apart thanks to the secratary who had
      no idea the significance of what she was doing. All this by a branch
      of what was then the 4th largest long distance company in the
      country. Gross negligence at best. But, who is the first to cry foul
      when their ineptitude was taken advantage of.
          From someone such as myself who bore the title of Phone Phreak
      proudly, this entire situation was nothing short of hilarious.
      However it was quite simple to fix. I needed only apply basic
      and common knowledge I had aquired from my studies around the
      computer/telecomm subculture. A task that should be promoted by the
      security powers that be, inorder to educate themselves, instead
      of going out and hiring ex-FBI and Ex-Police officers with an
      investigative/rubber hose mentality who didnt even have a true
      understanding of the problem they were hired to fix, to run their
      security departments. Who often like the very people they were
      chasing were operating on ego rather than intellect (not to mention
      authority). As potentially dangerous a combination to individual rights
      enjoyed in this country as the dangers provided by the malicious types
      within the computer underground itself. The point here is that
      there are problems within both the law enforcement and underground.
          Let me now give a couple of examples of how I used underground
      experience to fix this monumental snafu. First the obvious. Myself
      and a programmer friend (The Researcher) sat down and designed and
      wrote software to generate a new code network which was not 4 but
      but 7 digits in length, and only permitted one 'possible'
      (if assigned) good code in every 10,000 possible combinations.
      Ironically this software was written and tested and run on the very
      BBS machine that ran what was at the time (and still is) the oldest
      underground BBS in the world (P-80 Systems).
          Next, knowing that computers were used to do the majority of
      the code hacking at this time, it made the task simple to fix the
      switching equipment. Before I tell you how this was accomplished,
      a little advance training is in order. When you are dialing a number
      through any phone company local or national when you do something
      wrong (or even right for that matter) you get whats called a
      'treatment' such as a recording or a 'fast busy' signal. With
      this in mind I first had to deal with the problem of the existing
      older codes that had not been converted to my 7 digit system and
      were still highly open to to fraud (it takes awhile to assign
      thousands of customers new codes). This was done by adding 6 new
      treatment ports to the switching equipment. On the first two ports
      I put ring generators (the device that provides the sound of the
      phone ringing in your earpiece) to create a ring with no possible
      answer situation when a bad code was dialed. Since the fraudulent
      codes were being reassigned on a daily basis with new 7 digit codes
      it provided a lot confusion for people still in posession of the
      older 4 digit codes. they couldnt tell if it was a dead code or
      the person they were calling just wasnt home, while not hampering
      the legitimate customer who simply misdialed his code. On the next
      2 treatment ports I placed Hayes modems, which were like the other
      two ports in so much as they were a two in 6 chance of being aquired
      as a treatment for a bad code being dialed. This action gave the most
      effective security of the time due to the fact that people hacking via
      computer relied on a modem carrier to distinguish when they had gotten
      a good code. SO I GAVE THEM ONE. This made it almost impossible to
      distinguish a good code from a false carrier I was sending out.
      Thus making it difficult and near (but not) impossible to hack
      codes from that network. It also provided nothing more than a
      'hey I wonder what I did wrong' thought to a legit customer who just
      misdialed and simply dials again as they normally would. Also one
      of there big problems was New York City was so big, that a call to
      another part of town could be long distance. New York City alone had
      five area codes. This meant that by simply blocking any calls who's
      area code is 'local or local long distance' I.E. in the city but a
      long distance call,  which they should have been doing anyway in order
      not to be trafficing local calls (a big nono in the long distance world)
      they could stop this problem and significantly reduce the impact of the
      of the old 4 digit codes already comprimised and being used
      specifically for the purpose of local calls at the same time.
           Within 6 months their losses went from $450,000 a month to zero.
      The net cost in equipment for switch changes, and the new code network
      was about $5,000. Pennies for an operation of this size. When compared
      against the hundreds of thousands in investigative and legal fee's
      as well as tax dollars and additional taxation of the court system,
      which is already overburdoned. How many people are not in jail and
      being supported by the american tax dollar. I guess the moral to
      the story is work smart not hard. Someone took the time to
      trust me and to take a look at themselves and make the decision to use
      the underground as a tool for solving the 'real' problem rather than
      using it to track and apprehend people (which in case no one caught on,
      doesnt fix the problem in the example above).  At the risk of stating
      the obvious, many of these people could be of great benifit to society
      if properly utilized (as opposed to stigmatized). If the time was
      taken to invite them in the front door, your less likely to see them
      around at the back door. As a matter of fact they might be quite an
      appropriate individual to protect the back door. Most of these guys
      would jump at the chance.....

          In closing I would like to take time to repeat the warning voiced
      elsewhere on this disk, Please DO NOT attempt to use any material
      found on this disk unless you are certain it is both legal and safe.

                                               Scan Man