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= Rojava_conflict =
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Introduction
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The Rojava Conflict, also known as the Rojava Revolution, is a
political upheaval and military conflict taking place in northern
Syria, known among Kurds as Western Kurdistan or Rojava.
During the Syrian civil war that began in 2011, a Kurdish-dominated
coalition led by the Democratic Union Party as well as some other
Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian, and Turkmen groups have sought to establish a
new constitution for the 'de facto' autonomous region, while military
wings and allied militias have fought to maintain control of the
region. This led to the establishment of the Democratic Autonomous
Administration of North and East Syria in 2016.
Supporters of the Kurdish movement argue that the events constitute a
social revolution with a prominent role played by women both on the
battlefield and within the newly formed political system, as well as
the implementation of democratic confederalism, a form of libertarian
socialism that emphasizes decentralization, gender equality and the
need for local governance through direct democracy.
State discrimination
======================
Repression of the Kurds and other ethnic minorities has gone on since
the creation of the French Mandate for Syria after the 1916
Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Syrian government never officially
acknowledged the existence of the Kurds and in 1962, 120,000 Syrian
Kurds were stripped of their citizenship, leaving them stateless. The
Kurdish language and culture have also been suppressed. The government
attempted to resolve these issues in 2011 by granting all Kurds
citizenship, but only an estimated 6,000 out of 150,000 stateless
Kurds have been given nationality and most discriminatory regulations,
including the ban on teaching Kurdish, are still on the books. Due to
the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, the government is no longer
in a position to enforce these laws.
Qamishli riots
================
In 2004, riots broke out against the government in the northeastern
city of Qamishli. During a soccer match between a local Kurdish team
and a visiting Arab team from Deir ez-Zor, some Arab fans brandished
portraits of Saddam Hussein, who killed tens of thousands of Kurds in
Southern Kurdistan during the Anfal campaign in the 1980s. Tensions
quickly escalated into open protests, with Kurds raising their flag
and taking to the streets to demand cultural and political rights.
Security forces fired into the crowd, killing six Kurds, including
three children. Protesters went on to burn down the Ba'ath Party's
local office. At least 30 and as many as 100 Kurds were killed by the
government before the protests were quelled. Thousands of Kurds then
fled to Iraq, where a refugee camp was established. Occasional clashes
between Kurdish protesters and government forces occurred in the
following years.
Mashouq al-Khaznawi, a very influential Kurdish sheikh, was killed in
2005 due to his increasing activism which began during the 2004
Qamishli uprisings. He was described as the "center" of the 2004
uprisings and was considered a threat by the Syrian government, who
killed him and sparked outrage among Kurds.
Syrian Civil War
==================
In 2011, the Arab Spring spread to Syria. In an echo of the Tunisian
revolution, Syrian citizen Hasan Ali Akleh soaked himself in gasoline
and set himself on fire in the northern city of Al-Hasakah. This
inspired activists to call for a "Day of Rage", which was sparsely
attended, mostly because of fear of repression from the Syrian
government. Days later, however, protests again took place, this time
in response to the police beating of a shopkeeper.
Smaller protests continued, and on 7 March 2011, thirteen political
prisoners went on hunger strike, and momentum began to grow against
the Assad government. Three days later dozens of Syrian Kurds went on
hunger strike in solidarity. On 12 March, major protests took place in
Qamishli and Al-Hasakah to both protest the Assad government and
commemorate Kurdish Martyrs Day.
Protests grew over the months of March and April 2011. The Assad
government attempted to appease Kurds by promising to grant
citizenship to thousands of Kurds, who until that time had been
stripped of any legal status. By the summer, protests had only
intensified, as did violent crackdowns by the Syrian government.
In August, a coalition of opposition groups formed the Syrian National
Council in hopes of creating a democratic, pluralistic alternative to
the Assad government. But internal fighting and disagreement over
politics and inclusion plagued the group from its beginnings. In the
fall of 2011 the popular uprising escalated to an armed conflict. The
Free Syrian Army (FSA) began to coalesce and armed insurrection
spread, largely across central and southern Syria.
Kurdish parties negotiate
===========================
The National Movement of Kurdish Parties in Syria, a coalition of
Syria's 12 Kurdish parties, boycotted a Syrian opposition summit in
Antalya, Turkey on 31 May 2011, stating that "any such meeting held in
Turkey can only be a detriment to the Kurds in Syria, because Turkey
is against the aspirations of the Kurds".
During the August summit in Istanbul, which led to the creation of the
Syrian National Council, only two of the parties in the National
Movement of Kurdish Parties in Syria, the Kurdish Union Party and the
Kurdish Freedom Party, attended the summit.
Anti-government protests had been ongoing in the Kurdish-inhabited
areas of Syria since March 2011, as part of the wider Syrian uprising,
but clashes started after the opposition Kurdish Democratic Union
Party (PYD) and Kurdish National Council (KNC) signed a seven-point
agreement on 11 June 2012 in Erbil under the auspice of Iraqi
Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani. This agreement, however, failed
to be implemented and so a new cooperation agreement between the two
sides was signed on 12 July which saw the creation of the Kurdish
Supreme Committee as a governing body of all Kurdish-controlled
territories in Syria.
YPG claims territory
======================
The People's Protection Units (YPG) entered the conflict by capturing
the city of Kobanî on 19 July 2012, followed by the capture of Amuda
and Efrîn on 20 July. The cities fell without any major clashes, as
Syrian security forces withdrew without any significant resistance.
The Syrian Army pulled out to fight elsewhere. The KNC and PYD then
formed a joint leadership council to run the captured cities.
The YPG forces continued with their advancement and on 21 July
captured Al-Malikiyah (), which lies 10 kilometers from the Turkish
border. The forces at the time also intended to capture Qamishli, the
largest Syrian city with a Kurdish majority. On the same day, the
Syrian government attacked a patrol of Kurdish YPG members and wounded
one fighter. The next day it was reported that Kurdish forces were
still fighting for Al-Malikiyah, where one young Kurdish activist was
killed after government security forces opened fire on protesters. The
YPG also took control over the towns of Ra's al-'Ayn () and
Al-Darbasiyah (), after the security and political units withdrew from
these areas, following an ultimatum issued by the Kurds. On the same
day, clashes erupted in Qamishli between YPG and government forces in
which one Kurdish fighter was killed and two were wounded along with
one government official.
On 24 July, the PYD announced that Syrian security forces had
withdrawn from the small Kurdish city of 16,000 of Al-Ma'bada (),
between Al-Malikiyah and the Turkish borders. The YPG forces then took
control of all government institutions.
Autonomous government established
===================================
On 1 August 2012, state security forces on the periphery of the
country were pulled into the intensifying battle taking place in
Aleppo. During this large withdrawal from the north, the YPG took
control of at least parts of Qamishli, Efrin, Amude, Dirbesiye and
Kobanî with very little conflict or casualties.
On 2 August 2012, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic
Change announced that most Kurdish-majority cities in Syria, except
Qamishli and Hasaka, were no longer controlled by government forces
and were now being governed by Kurdish political parties. In Qamishli,
government military and police forces remained in their barracks and
administration officials in the city allowed the Kurdish flag to be
raised.
After months of de facto rule, the PYD officially announced its
regional autonomy on 9 January 2014. Elections were held, popular
assemblies established and the Constitution of Rojava was approved.
Since then, residents organized local assemblies, reopened schools,
established community centers, and helped push back the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to gain control of almost all land in
Syria east of the Euphrates river. They see their model of grassroots
democracy as one that can be implemented throughout Syria in the
future.
Social revolution
======================================================================
After declaring autonomy, grassroots organizers, politicians and other
community members have radically changed the social and political
make-up of the area. The extreme laws restricting independent
political organizing, women's freedom, religious and cultural
expression and the discriminatory policies carried out by the Assad
government have been superseded. In their place, a Constitution of
Rojava guaranteeing the cultural, religious and political freedom of
all people has been established. The constitution also explicitly
states the equal rights and freedom of women and also "mandates public
institutions to work towards the elimination of gender
discrimination".
The political and social changes taking place in Rojava have in large
part been inspired by the libertarian socialist politics of Kurdish
leader Abdullah Öcalan.
Cooperative economy
=====================
The Rojava economy is a blend of private companies, the autonomous
administration and worker cooperatives. Since the revolution, efforts
have been made to transition the economy to one of self-sufficiency
based on worker and producer cooperatives. This transition faces the
major obstacles of ongoing conflict and an embargo from all
neighboring countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and the various forces
controlling nearby areas of Syria. This has forced people to rely
almost exclusively on diesel-run generators for electricity.
Additionally, strong emphasis is being placed on businesses that can
bring about self-sufficiency to the region.
There were at first no direct or indirect taxes on people or
businesses in the region; Instead the administration funded itself
mainly through the sale of oil and other natural resources and tariffs
on border commerce (which is clandestine because of the embargo).
However, in July 2017, it was reported that the administration in the
Jazira Region had started to collect income tax to provide for public
services in the region. There are partnerships that have been created
between private companies and the administration. The administration
also funds the school system and distributes bread to all citizens at
a below-market rate.
The Movement for a Democratic Society Economic Committee has been
helping businesses move towards a "community economy" based on worker
cooperatives and self-sufficiency.
Other cooperatives involve bottled mineral water, construction,
factories, fuel stations, generators, livestock, oil, pistachio and
roasted seeds, and public markets.
Additionally there are several agricultural communes with families
collectively working the land.
According to the region's "Ministry of Economics", by 2015,
approximately three-quarters of all property had been placed under
community ownership and a third of production had been transferred to
direct management by workers' councils.
Direct democracy
==================
The Rojava Cantons are governed through a combination of district and
civil councils. District councils consist of 300 members as well as
two elected co-presidents, one man and one woman. District councils
decide and carry out administrative and economic duties such as
garbage collection, land distribution and cooperative enterprises.
Civil councils exist to promote social and political rights in the
community.
Ethnic minority rights
========================
Closely related to religious freedom and the protection of religious
minorities is the protection of ethnic minorities. Kurds now have the
right to study their language freely, as do Assyrians. For the first
time, a Kurdish curriculum has been introduced to the public school
system.
Residents are also now free to express their culture freely. Culture
and music centers have formed, hosting dance classes, music lessons
and choir practice.
In some areas, in addition to the gender quota for councils, there is
also an ethnic minority quota.
There has been, however, numerous instances of discrimination toward
Assyrians, including policies of seizing the property of Assyrians who
had to flee due to conflict, and numerous instances of attacks against
the Assyrian minority. Kurdish authorities have also shut down
privately run Assyrian schools ostensibly to protect students from
"exorbitant tuition costs".
Restorative justice
=====================
Rojava's criminal justice system incorporates principles of
restorative justice. Reconciliation Committees have replaced the
Syrian government court system in several cities. Committees are
representative of the ethnic diversity in their respective area. For
example, the committee in Tal Abyad has Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and
Armenians.
Women’s revolution in Rojava
==============================
Rojava is famous for its attempt at overcoming gender inequality and
improving women's rights. In the Rojava Revolution, women's
participation has achieved a lot of media attention in recent years. A
lot of Kurdish women bound their power, gathered their weapons, and
served in the mobile company of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) on
the front line in Syria. The revolution in Rojava is mainly caused by
the underlying dominant ideology, namely a secular egalitarian
ideology. Influenced by the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, women have
taken up their arms and have been fighting for a liberated Kurdistan.
Ideologies that include an active fight for gender equality lead to
the equal inclusion of women in military positions.
Within the Kurdish forces, and especially regarding its leadership
positions, there is an unprecedentedly high prevalence of female
fighters. The YPJ is a unique case where women embody a substantial
part of the overall military force. The traditional belief, that
combat is a male-dominated area and women simply are victims of that
fact, is thereby compromised.
Jineology
===========
A strong political ideology, namely the Democratic Autonomy concept of
Abdullah Öcalan, has had a major impact on female empowerment. Öcalan,
political activist and founder of the PKK, has the belief that a
society needs to make decisions with consent from all members. A
nation should be based on this kind of democracy, as well as ecology
and women's freedom. Öcalan brought the concept of democratic
confederalism to life, which encouraged a move away from patriarchal
nationalism. Within this concept, feminism, specifically jineology
(the science of women), is central to the social revolution taking
place in Rojava. The Democratic Autonomy concept has been modified to
the ongoing conflict in Syria. All YPG and YPJ fighters and Asayish
have the study of jineology as part of their training, and it is also
taught in community centers. In 2017, the University of Rojava
established the department of Jineology integrated in Languages and
Social Studies Faculty. The aim was to "teach the reality of life and
women and redefine them and achieve changes in the mentality of the
society".
Legal revolution
==================
Aside from the military victories, Rojava is the witness of a legal
revolution. Since the war broke out there have been multiple legal
changes regarding women's rights. In the Social Contract of the
Autonomous Regions of Kobane, Jazira and Afrin, formulated in 2014, it
is stated that women and men have the same rights. Much of the focus
of the revolution has been on addressing the extreme levels of
violence which women in the area have endured, as well as increasing
women's leadership in all political institutions. To illustrate, the
authority of Rojava has come up with an initiative to install a 40%
quota representation of women in every organization and institution.
This has the consequence that in every layer of government, from a
local organization to the parliament, women must be assigned as vice
presidents or co-presidents. Also, efforts are being made to reduce
cases of underage marriage, polygamy and honor killings, both socially
as well as through legislation forbidding these practices.
Women’s Protection Unit (YPJ)
===============================
In the 1980s, political organizations began recruiting women for their
political and military ranks. An example of such a political
organization was the Kurdish Workers Party, the PKK. The extent to
which women participate in the PKK and the YPG demonstrates the
outstanding roles they have had in the battle with ISIS. The YPG can
be seen as the National Liberation Movement and the women from the YPJ
have been fighting side by side with them. Both forces, YPJ and YPG,
are under the control and command of the Democratic Union Party (PYD).
Their combaters are trained both militarily and educationally, as they
are introduced to the political thought of Öcalan and jineology. The
Rojava Model perceives women as revolutionary operators who fight for
improving democratic values. Women not only stimulate emancipation in
society but further tackle the system which allows men to have
internalized hegemony over women. Therefore, women are highly visible
as female fighters in the YPJ against ISIS.
Women's houses
================
In every town and village under YPG control, a women's house is
established. These are community centers run by women, providing
services to survivors of domestic violence, sexual assault and other
forms of harm. These services include counseling, family mediation,
legal support, and coordinating safe houses for women and children.
Classes on economic independence and social empowerment programs are
also held at women's houses.
Religious freedom
===================
The right to religious expression is also safeguarded in the
constitution. This, as well as the extreme hostility towards religious
minorities in Islamist controlled areas, has led to a large migration
of religious minorities to Rojava.
Relations and conflicts
======================================================================
There are four major forces involved in the Rojava revolution. The
People's Protection Units are working with the PYD and other political
parties to establish self-rule in Rojava. Syrian government forces
still maintain rule in some areas of Rojava under the leadership of
the Assad government. A collection of Sunni Islamist forces, the
largest being the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), fought
to rule the region by way of Islamic fundamentalism. Finally, there
were several militias under the general banner of the Free Syrian Army
whose intentions and alliances have differed and shifted over time.
Rojava–Syrian government relations and conflicts
==================================================
While conflict between the YPG and the Syrian government has not been
as active as fighting against Islamist forces, there have been several
conflicts between the two forces. Territory once controlled by the
Syrian government in both Qamishli and al-Hasakah has been taken over
by YPG forces. At the end of April 2016, clashes erupted between
government forces and YPG fighters for control of Qamishli.
As of the beginning of August 2016, YPG fighters controlled two-thirds
of the northeastern city of al-Hasakah, while pro-government militias
controlled the remainder. On 17 August 2016, heavy clashes broke out
between YPG fighters and the pro-government militias, resulting in the
deaths of four civilians, four Kurdish fighters, and three government
loyalists. On 18 August, Syrian government aircraft bombed YPG
positions in Hasakah, including three YPG checkpoints and three YPG
bases. Syrian Kurds had recently demanded that the pro-government
National Defense Forces militia disband in al-Hasakah. A government
source told the AFP that the air strikes were "a message to the Kurds
that they should stop this sort of demand that constitutes an affront
to national sovereignty". Another possible factor behind the fighting
may have been the recent thaw in Turkish-Russian relations that began
in July 2016; Russia, a key ally of the Syrian government, had
previously been supporting Syrian Kurdish forces as a means to apply
pressure to Turkey. After the recent territorial defeat of ISIL in
Syria and Iraq and improvements in the Turkish-Russian relationship,
it is possible that Russia and its allies began to view a strong YPG
as increasingly less useful. In response to the attacks by the Syrian
aircraft on Kurdish positions near al-Hasakah, the United States
scrambled planes over the city in order to deter further attacks. By
22 August, Syrian government troops, Hezbollah fighters, and members
of the Iranian paramilitary Basij militia had become involved in the
fighting against Kurdish forces in al-Hasakah.
In October 2023, in response to a series drone strikes on U.S. bases
in Syria and Iraq, the Kurdish forces fight Syrian militias. 3 Kurdish
militiamen and 19 Syrian militiamen were killed while 20 Syrian
militiamen were injured.
In the context of the 2024 opposition offensives in Syria and the
downfall of the Assad regime, SDF forces took part in the battle of
Aleppo, expanding their control of the Sheikh Maqsood area, as well as
taking territory across the Euphrates river, seizing Deir ez-Zor.
Internal relations and conflicts in Rojava
============================================
On 28 December 2012, Syrian government forces opened fire on pro-FSA
demonstrators in al-Hasakah city, killing and wounding several
individuals. Arab tribes in the area attacked YPG positions in the
city in reprisal, stating the Kurdish fighters were collaborating with
the government. Clashes broke out, and three Arabs were killed, though
it was not clear whether they were killed by YPG forces or nearby
government troops. Demonstrations were organised by various Kurdish
groups throughout northeastern Syria in late December as well. PYD
supporters drove vehicles at low speeds through a KNC demonstration in
Qamishli, raising tensions between the two groups.
From 2 to 4 January, PYD-led demonstrators staged protests in the
al-Antariyah neighbourhood of Qamishli, demanding "freedom and
democracy" for both Kurds and Syrians. Many activists camped out on
site. On 4 January, approximately 10,000 people were participating in
the rallies, which also included smaller numbers of supporters of
other Kurdish parties, such as the KNC, which staged a rally in the
Munir Habib neighbourhood. PYD organisers had planned for 100,000
people to participate, but such support did not materialise. The
demonstrations were concurrent with rallies conducted across the
country by the Arab opposition, though Kurdish parties did not use the
same slogans as the Arabs, and also did not the same slogans amongst
their own parties. Kurds also demonstrated in several other towns, but
not across the entire Kurdish region.
Meanwhile, several armed incidents occurred between the dominant
PYD-YPG and other Kurdish parties in the region, particularly the
Kurdish Union ("Yekîtî") Party, part of a Kurdish political coalition
called the Kurdish Democratic Political Union formed on 15 December
2012, which excludes the PYD. On 3 January, PYD gunmen staged a
drive-by shooting on a Yekîtî office in Qamishli. Armed Yekîtî members
returned fire, injuring one PYD member. The same day, armed clashes
broke out between YPG fighters and members of the newly formed Jiwan
Qatna Battalion of Yekîtî in ad-Darbasiyah. Four Yekîtî members were
abducted by the YPG, who said they were affiliated with Islamist
groups, though Yekîtî activists stated that the PYD wanted to prevent
other Kurdish groups from arming themselves. Following demonstrations
in the town demanding their release and an intervention by the KNC,
the four men were released by the end of the day. On 11 January, YPG
forces raided an empty Yekîtî training ground near Ali Faru which had
been built in early January, tearing down both the Kurdish and FSA
flags that had been flying at the base. Though PYD members defended
the raid by saying that the flags could have attracted government
airstrikes, Yekîtî condemned the action.
On 31 January, Kamal Mustafa Hanan, editor-in-chief of Newroz (a
Kurdish-language journal) and a former Yekîtî politician, was fatally
shot in the Ashrafiyah district of Aleppo. It was not clear if he was
the victim of a stray bullet or of a politically motivated
assassination. Yekîtî organised a funeral procession in the town of
Afrin in the Kurdish-held northwest corner of Aleppo Province on 1
February, which members of both the PYD and KNC attended. Also on 1
February, Kurds staged demonstrations in several towns and villages
across West Kurdistan concurrent with opposition demonstrations
elsewhere in the country. The demonstrations were organised by various
Kurdish groups, including the PYD and KNC. Demonstrators from the KNC
demanded an end to fighting in Ras al-Ayn and the withdrawal of armed
groups from the town, while PYD demonstrators stressed solidarity with
their YPG units and the Kurdish Supreme Council.
From 2 to 5 February, YPG forces blockaded the village of Kahf
al-Assad (), inhabited by members of the Kurdish Kherikan tribe, after
being fired upon by unknown gunmen in the village. YPG checkpoints
were also established around other Kherikan villages. The Kherikan are
traditionally supporters of the Massoud Barzani government of Iraqi
Kurdistan, and as oppose the PYD. The blockade was the third time in
two years that hostilities had broken out between the PYD/YPG and
locals from Kahf al-Assad.
On 7 February, YPG members kidnapped three members of the opposition
Azadî party in Ayn al-Arab.
On 22 February, Osman Baydemir, mayor of the city of Diyarbakır in
Turkey, announced the initiation of a one-month humanitarian aid
programme in which his city--along with the surrounding districts of
Bağlar, Yenişehir, Kayapınar, and Sur--would provide food assistance
to Kurdish areas in Syria affected by the war, which had received
little of the humanitarian aid that other regions of Syria had
received.
On 11 April 2016, PYD supporters attacked the offices of the Kurdish
National Council and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria in
Derbessiye and Qamishli. The head of the Kurdish National Council told
Turkey's TRT World channel the "PYD's oppressive attitude in Syria is
forcing Kurds to leave the region".
On 16 January 2017, more than 270 Syrian Kurdish activists signed an
appeal calling for unity talks between the main Syrian Kurdish
parties. In response, the Movement for a Democratic Society led by the
PYD stated that they welcome unity and called on the Kurdish National
Council to participate in federal project. The KNC led by the KDP-S,
in response, demanded the release its political prisoners detained in
Rojava. The KNC has rejected the federalism project launched by the
Syrian Democratic Council and stated that it will participate in the
peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan, with Turkey and Russia. The Kurdish
National Alliance in Syria, part of the SDC also welcomed the proposal
of unity.
On 3 February 2017, amidst clashes between the KDP-S-affiliated
Peshmerga group and the Sinjar Resistance Units in Sinjar, a KNC
office was burned in Qamishli and another attacked in Dirbêsiyê. The
KNC said the pro-PYD youth group the Ciwanen Soresger was perpetrating
the attacks. However, the perpetrators were reportedly arrested by the
Asayish.
On 3 March 2017, the Rojava Asayish arrested more than 40 members of
the KNC in Syria while the KDP Asayish arrested 23 opposition
protesters in Iraqi Kurdistan. 17 of them were later released but 6
were still imprisoned. By 16 March, more than 13 KNC offices and an
Assyrian Democratic Organization office in Rojava were shut down by
Rojava Asayish forces, reportedly for failing to register with PYD
authorities. In response, the Human Rights Watch called on both sides
to "immediately" release all "arbitrarily held political detainees".
The Mesopotamia National Council announced their support for TEV-DEM's
requirement for parties to apply to licenses to operate in Rojava.
However, the council also called for the self-management to give
sufficient time for applications and denounced "random" closing of the
parties' offices.
On 3 April 2017, the Kurdish National Council called on the PYD to
release 4 of its detainees: a Kurdish Future Movement in Syria member,
a Kurdish Youth Movement member, and two KDP-S members. As of the same
day, 6 detainees were still held by Iraqi Kurdish authorities.
On 12 April 2017, an official in TEV-DEM met with Gabriel Moushe
Gawrieh, head of the Assyrian Democratic Organization, and discussed
the closure of the latter's offices since March. It was the first time
TEV-DEM officials met with the ADO.
Rojava–Islamist conflict
==========================
The Rojava-Islamist conflict is a major theater in the Syrian civil
war, starting in 2013 after fighting erupted between the Kurdish
People's Protection Units (YPG) and Islamist rebel factions in the
city of Ras al-Ayn. Kurdish forces launched a campaign in an attempt
to take control of the Islamist-controlled areas in the governorate of
al-Hasakah and some parts of Raqqa and Aleppo governorates after
al-Qaeda in Syria used those areas to attack the YPG. The Kurdish
groups and their allies' goal was also to capture Kurdish areas from
the Arab Islamist rebels and strengthen the autonomy of the region of
Rojava.
YPG forces as well as later the broader Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
have clashed heavily with Islamist forces of all stripes in the
following years, in particular with those representing the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Including the Siege of Kobanî
(2014), the Al-Hasakah offensive (February-March 2015), the Al-Hasakah
offensive (May 2015), the Tell Abyad offensive (May-July 2015), the
Battle of Sarrin (June-July 2015), the Battle of Al-Hasakah
(June-August 2015), and the Raqqa campaign (2016-2017) including the
Battle of Tabqa (2017).
Rojava–Turkey conflict
========================
Turkey has long called the PYD as a Syrian extension of the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK), and has therefore taken a hardline stance
against the group, the official talking point being that it would not
allow a Kurdish state to form along their southern border with Syria.
Turkey's policy towards Rojava is based on an economic blockade,
persistent attempts of international isolation, opposition to the
cooperation of the international Anti-ISIL-coalition with Rojava
militias, and support of Islamist Syrian Civil War parties hostile
towards Rojava, in past times even including ISIL. Turkey has on
several occasions been militarily attacking Rojava territory and
defence forces. The latter has resulted in some of the most clearcut
instances of international solidarity with Rojava.
Turkey received PYD co-chair Salih Muslim for talks in 2013 and in
2014, even entertaining the idea of opening a Rojava representation
office in Ankara "if it's suitable with Ankara's policies". Turkey
recognizes the PYD and the YPG militia as identical to the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist organisation by
Turkey, the European Union, the United States and others. However, the
EU, the US, and others cooperate with the PYD and the YPG militia in
the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and
do not designate either a terrorist organisation. About its loss in
international standing, the consequence of domestic and foreign
policies of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish government is
contemptuous. The Turkish foreign minister called the PYD a "terrorist
organisation" in his speech at the meeting of Council of Foreign
Ministers of the 13th Islamic Summit of the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) on 12 April 2016 at Istanbul, Turkey. In November
2016 a state-run media organization of Turkey, 'Anadolu Agency',
stated that the educational institutions of Rojava had "prejudice
against Islam". U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said there were
links between the PYD, the YPG, and the PKK. Secretary Carter replied,
"Yes," to a Senate panel when Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) asked whether
he believed the Syrian Kurds are "aligned or at least have substantial
ties to the PKK". Rojava and YPG leaders state that the PKK is a
separate organization. YPG representatives have persistently
reiterated that their militia has an all Syrian agenda and no agenda
of hostility whatsoever towards Turkey. However, according to the
Turkish 'Daily Sabah', at one occasion in January 2016 "a YouTube
video has appeared of an English-speaking man, reported to be a
fighter from the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) armed wing, the
People's Protection Units (YPG) (...) making a call for Westerners to
join the ranks of the armed group and conduct terrorist attacks
against the Turkish state." In the perception of much of the Turkish
public, the Rojava federal project as well as U.S. support for the YPG
against ISIL are elements of a wider conspiracy scheme by a
"mastermind" with the aim to weaken or even dismember Turkey, in order
to prevent its imminent rise as a global power.
Following YPG successes in 2015, including the capture of Tell Abyad,
Turkey began targeting YPG forces in northern Syria.
On 16 February 2016, Turkish forces began shelling Kurdish forces in
the Afrin District after the SDF took initiative from an SAA offensive
and captured rebel-held areas of the Azaz District, including Tell
Rifaat and Menagh Airbase. Turkey vowed not to allow the SDF to
capture the key border town of Azaz. As a result, 25 Kurdish militants
were killed and 197 injured from Turkish artillery fire. In early
2016, following the capture of Tishrin Dam, the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF) were allowed to cross the Euphrates River, a proclaimed
'red line' by Turkey. Turkish forces bombed the Kurdish YPG
headquarters in Tell Abyad, destroying three armoured vehicles and
injuring two Kurdish fighters. The following day, 21 January 2016,
Turkish troops crossed the border into Syria and entered the
ISIL-controlled Syrian border town of Jarabulus which the YPG had been
planning on capturing as part of an offensive to unite their areas of
control into one continuous banner of territory. Kurdish-led forces in
northern Syria said Turkish airstrikes hit their bases in Amarneh
village near Jarablus on 27 August 2016, after Turkish artillery
shelled the positions the day before. The Syrian Observatory reported
on 27 August 2016, about exchange of gunfire between YPG and the
Turkish forces in the countryside north of Hasakah. It is unclear if
Turkish forces were on Syrian territory or had fired across the
border.
In March 2017, U.S. Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend said "I have
seen absolutely zero evidence that they have been a threat to, or have
supported any attacks on, Turkey from Northern Syria over the last two
years." The top U.S. commander in the campaign against Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) stated that the Peoples’ Protection
Units (YPG), the military wing of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union
Party (PYD), does not pose a threat to Turkey. "Of those YPG fighters,
I’ve talked to their leaders and we’ve watched them operate and they
continually reassure us that they have no desire to attack Turkey,
that they are not a threat to Turkey, in fact that they desire to have
a good working relationship with Turkey."
After the initiation of the 2024 Syrian opposition offenses against
the Assad regime, Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army
(SNA) launched an offensive to capture territory from the SDF. In
December 2024, the SNA captured Tell Rifaat and Manbij from SDF
control. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Turkish officials
have demanded the elimination of the YPG, and Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan has threatened a military intervention if the
autonomous region remains divided from the rest of Syria. The Turkish
offensive in northern Syria has continued into 2025.
See also
======================================================================
*Cities and towns during the Syrian Civil War
*International Freedom Battalion
*Rojava-Islamist conflict
*Timeline of the Kurdistan Workers' Party insurgency (2015-present)
*1983-1986 Kurdish rebellions in Iraq
*Kurdish women
* A Modern History of the Kurds
License
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License URL:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/
Original Article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rojava_conflict
