Network Working Group                                       K. Murchison
Request for Comments: 4642                    Carnegie Mellon University
Category: Standards Track                                     J. Vinocur
                                                     Cornell University
                                                              C. Newman
                                                       Sun Microsystems
                                                           October 2006


                Using Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              with Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)

Status of This Memo

  This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
  Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
  improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
  Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
  and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

  This memo defines an extension to the Network News Transfer Protocol
  (NNTP) that allows an NNTP client and server to use Transport Layer
  Security (TLS).  The primary goal is to provide encryption for
  single-link confidentiality purposes, but data integrity, (optional)
  certificate-based peer entity authentication, and (optional) data
  compression are also possible.



















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Table of Contents

  1. Introduction ....................................................2
     1.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................3
  2. The STARTTLS Extension ..........................................3
     2.1. Advertising the STARTTLS Extension .........................3
     2.2. STARTTLS Command ...........................................4
          2.2.1. Usage ...............................................4
          2.2.2. Description .........................................4
          2.2.3. Examples ............................................6
  3. Augmented BNF Syntax for the STARTTLS Extension .................8
     3.1. Commands ...................................................8
     3.2. Capability entries .........................................8
  4. Summary of Response Codes .......................................8
  5. Security Considerations .........................................8
  6. IANA Considerations ............................................11
  7. References .....................................................12
     7.1. Normative References ......................................12
     7.2. Informative References ....................................12
  8. Acknowledgements ...............................................12

1. Introduction

  Historically, unencrypted NNTP [NNTP] connections were satisfactory
  for most purposes.  However, sending passwords unencrypted over the
  network is no longer appropriate, and sometimes integrity and/or
  confidentiality protection are desired for the entire connection.

  The TLS protocol (formerly known as SSL) provides a way to secure an
  application protocol from tampering and eavesdropping.  Although
  advanced SASL authentication mechanisms [NNTP-AUTH] can provide a
  lightweight version of this service, TLS is complimentary to both
  simple authentication-only SASL mechanisms and deployed clear-text
  password login commands.

  In some existing implementations, TCP port 563 has been dedicated to
  NNTP over TLS.  These implementations begin the TLS negotiation
  immediately upon connection and then continue with the initial steps
  of an NNTP session.  This use of TLS on a separate port is
  discouraged for the reasons documented in Section 7 of "Using TLS
  with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP" [TLS-IMAPPOP].

  This specification formalizes the STARTTLS command already in
  occasional use by the installed base.  The STARTTLS command rectifies
  a number of the problems with using a separate port for a "secure"
  protocol variant; it is the preferred way of using TLS with NNTP.





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1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

  The notational conventions used in this document are the same as
  those in [NNTP], and any term not defined in this document has the
  same meaning as in that one.

  The key words "REQUIRED", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
  described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
  Levels" [KEYWORDS].

  In the examples, commands from the client are indicated with [C], and
  responses from the server are indicated with [S].

2. The STARTTLS Extension

  This extension provides a new STARTTLS command and has the capability
  label STARTTLS.

2.1. Advertising the STARTTLS Extension

  A server supporting the STARTTLS command as defined in this document
  will advertise the "STARTTLS" capability label in response to the
  CAPABILITIES command ([NNTP] Section 5.2).  However, this capability
  MUST NOT be advertised once a TLS layer is active (see Section 2.2.2)
  or after successful authentication [NNTP-AUTH].  This capability MAY
  be advertised both before and after any use of the MODE READER
  command ([NNTP] Section 5.3), with the same semantics.

  As the STARTTLS command is related to security, cached results of
  CAPABILITIES from a previous session MUST NOT be relied on, as per
  Section 12.6 of [NNTP].

  Example:

     [C] CAPABILITIES
     [S] 101 Capability list:
     [S] VERSION 2
     [S] READER
     [S] IHAVE
     [S] STARTTLS
     [S] LIST ACTIVE NEWSGROUPS
     [S] .








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2.2. STARTTLS Command

2.2.1. Usage

  This command MUST NOT be pipelined.

  Syntax
     STARTTLS

  Responses

     382 Continue with TLS negotiation
     502 Command unavailable [1]
     580 Can not initiate TLS negotiation

  [1] If a TLS layer is already active, or if authentication has
  occurred, STARTTLS is not a valid command (see Section 2.2.2).

  NOTE: Notwithstanding Section 3.2.1 of [NNTP], the server MUST NOT
  return either 480 or 483 in response to STARTTLS.

2.2.2. Description

  A client issues the STARTTLS command to request negotiation of TLS.
  The STARTTLS command is usually used to initiate session security,
  although it can also be used for client and/or server certificate
  authentication and/or data compression.

  An NNTP server returns the 483 response to indicate that a secure or
  encrypted connection is required for the command sent by the client.
  Use of the STARTTLS command as described below is one way to
  establish a connection with these properties.  The client MAY
  therefore use the STARTTLS command after receiving a 483 response.

  If a server advertises the STARTTLS capability, a client MAY attempt
  to use the STARTTLS command at any time during a session to negotiate
  TLS without having received a 483 response.  Servers SHOULD accept
  such unsolicited TLS negotiation requests.

  If the server is unable to initiate the TLS negotiation for any
  reason (e.g., a server configuration or resource problem), the server
  MUST reject the STARTTLS command with a 580 response.  Then, it
  SHOULD either reject subsequent restricted NNTP commands from the
  client with a 483 response code (possibly with a text string such as
  "Command refused due to lack of security") or reject a subsequent
  restricted command with a 400 response code (possibly with a text
  string such as "Connection closing due to lack of security") and
  close the connection.  Otherwise, the server issues a 382 response,



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  and TLS negotiation begins.  A server MUST NOT under any
  circumstances reply to a STARTTLS command with either a 480 or 483
  response.

  If the client receives a failure response to STARTTLS, the client
  must decide whether or not to continue the NNTP session.  Such a
  decision is based on local policy.  For instance, if TLS was being
  used for client authentication, the client might try to continue the
  session in case the server allows it to do so even with no
  authentication.  However, if TLS was being negotiated for encryption,
  a client that gets a failure response needs to decide whether to
  continue without TLS encryption, to wait and try again later, or to
  give up and notify the user of the error.

  Upon receiving a 382 response to a STARTTLS command, the client MUST
  start the TLS negotiation before giving any other NNTP commands.  The
  TLS negotiation begins for both the client and server with the first
  octet following the CRLF of the 382 response.  If, after having
  issued the STARTTLS command, the client finds out that some failure
  prevents it from actually starting a TLS handshake, then it SHOULD
  immediately close the connection.

  Servers MUST be able to understand backwards-compatible TLS Client
  Hello messages (provided that client_version is TLS 1.0 or later),
  and clients MAY use backwards-compatible Client Hello messages.
  Neither clients nor servers are required to actually support Client
  Hello messages for anything other than TLS 1.0.  However, the TLS
  extension for Server Name Indication ("server_name") [TLS-EXT] SHOULD
  be implemented by all clients; it also SHOULD be implemented by any
  server implementing STARTTLS that is known by multiple names.
  (Otherwise, it is not possible for a server with several hostnames to
  present the correct certificate to the client.)

  If the TLS negotiation fails, both client and server SHOULD
  immediately close the connection.  Note that while continuing the
  NNTP session is theoretically possible, in practice a TLS negotiation
  failure often leaves the session in an indeterminate state;
  therefore, interoperability can not be guaranteed.

  Upon successful completion of the TLS handshake, the NNTP protocol is
  reset to the state immediately after the initial greeting response
  (see 5.1 of [NNTP]) has been sent, with the exception that if a MODE
  READER command has been issued, its effects (if any) are not
  reversed.  At this point, as no greeting is sent, the next step is
  for the client to send a command.  The server MUST discard any
  knowledge obtained from the client, such as the current newsgroup and
  article number, that was not obtained from the TLS negotiation
  itself.  Likewise, the client SHOULD discard and MUST NOT rely on any



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  knowledge obtained from the server, such as the capability list,
  which was not obtained from the TLS negotiation itself.

  The server remains in the non-authenticated state, even if client
  credentials are supplied during the TLS negotiation.  The AUTHINFO
  SASL command [NNTP-AUTH] with the EXTERNAL mechanism [SASL] MAY be
  used to authenticate once TLS client credentials are successfully
  exchanged, but servers supporting the STARTTLS command are not
  required to support AUTHINFO in general or the EXTERNAL mechanism in
  particular.  The server MAY use information from the client
  certificate for identification of connections or posted articles
  (either in its logs or directly in posted articles).

  Both the client and the server MUST know if there is a TLS session
  active.  A client MUST NOT attempt to start a TLS session if a TLS
  session is already active.  A server MUST NOT return the STARTTLS
  capability label in response to a CAPABILITIES command received after
  a TLS handshake has completed, and a server MUST respond with a 502
  response code if a STARTTLS command is received while a TLS session
  is already active.  Additionally, the client MUST NOT issue a MODE
  READER command while a TLS session is active, and a server MUST NOT
  advertise the MODE-READER capability.

  The capability list returned in response to a CAPABILITIES command
  received after a successful TLS handshake MAY be different from the
  list returned before the TLS handshake.  For example, an NNTP server
  supporting SASL [NNTP-AUTH] might not want to advertise support for a
  particular mechanism unless a client has sent an appropriate client
  certificate during a TLS handshake.

2.2.3. Examples

  Example of a client being prompted to use encryption and negotiating
  it successfully (showing the removal of STARTTLS from the capability
  list once a TLS layer is active), followed by a successful selection
  of the group and an (inappropriate) attempt by the client to initiate
  another TLS negotiation:

     [C] CAPABILITIES
     [S] 101 Capability list:
     [S] VERSION 2
     [S] READER
     [S] STARTTLS
     [S] LIST ACTIVE NEWSGROUPS OVERVIEW.FMT
     [S] OVER
     [S] .
     [C] GROUP local.confidential
     [S] 483 Encryption or stronger authentication required



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     [C] STARTTLS
     [S] 382 Continue with TLS negotiation
     [TLS negotiation occurs here]
     [Following successful negotiation, traffic is protected by TLS]
     [C] CAPABILITIES
     [S] 101 Capability list:
     [S] VERSION 2
     [S] READER
     [S] LIST ACTIVE NEWSGROUPS OVERVIEW.FMT
     [S] OVER
     [S] .
     [C] GROUP local.confidential
     [S] 211 1234 3000234 3002322 local.confidential
     [C] STARTTLS
     [S] 502 STARTTLS not allowed with active TLS layer

  Example of a request to begin TLS negotiation declined by the server:

     [C] STARTTLS
     [S] 580 Can not initiate TLS negotiation

  Example of a failed attempt to negotiate TLS, followed by two
  attempts at selecting groups only available under a security layer
  (in the first case, the server allows the session to continue; in the
  second, it closes the connection).  Note that unrestricted commands
  such as CAPABILITIES are unaffected by the failure:

     [C] STARTTLS
     [S] 382 Continue with TLS negotiation
     [TLS negotiation is attempted here]
     [Following failed negotiation, traffic resumes without TLS]
     [C] CAPABILITIES
     [S] 101 Capability list:
     [S] VERSION 2
     [S] READER
     [S] STARTTLS
     [S] LIST ACTIVE NEWSGROUPS OVERVIEW.FMT
     [S] OVER
     [S] .
     [C] GROUP local.confidential
     [S] 483 Encryption or stronger authentication required
     [C] GROUP local.private
     [S] 400 Closing connection due to lack of security








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3. Augmented BNF Syntax for the STARTTLS Extension

  This section describes the formal syntax of the STARTTLS extension
  using ABNF [ABNF].  It extends the syntax in Section 9 of [NNTP], and
  non-terminals not defined in this document are defined there.  The
  [NNTP] ABNF should be imported first before attempting to validate
  these rules.

3.1. Commands

  This syntax extends the non-terminal "command", which represents an
  NNTP command.

  command =/ starttls-command

  starttls-command = "STARTTLS"

3.2. Capability entries

  This syntax extends the non-terminal "capability-entry", which
  represents a capability that may be advertised by the server.

  capability-entry =/ starttls-capability

  starttls-capability = "STARTTLS"

4. Summary of Response Codes

  This section contains a list of each new response code defined in
  this document and indicates whether it is multi-line, which commands
  can generate it, what arguments it has, and what its meaning is.

  Response code 382
     Generated by: STARTTLS
     Meaning: continue with TLS negotiation

  Response code 580
     Generated by: STARTTLS
     Meaning: can not initiate TLS negotiation

5. Security Considerations

  Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.

  In general, the security considerations of the TLS protocol [TLS] and
  any implemented extensions [TLS-EXT] are applicable here; only the
  most important are highlighted specifically below.  Also, this
  extension is not intended to cure the security considerations



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  described in Section 12 of [NNTP]; those considerations remain
  relevant to any NNTP implementation.

  NNTP client and server implementations MUST implement the
  TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 [TLS] cipher suite and SHOULD implement the
  TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA [TLS] cipher suite.  This is
  important, as it assures that any two compliant implementations can
  be configured to interoperate.  All other cipher suites are OPTIONAL.

  Before the TLS handshake has begun, any protocol interactions are
  performed in the clear and may be modified by an active attacker.
  For this reason, clients and servers MUST discard any sensitive
  knowledge obtained prior to the start of the TLS handshake upon the
  establishment of a security layer.  Furthermore, the CAPABILITIES
  command SHOULD be re-issued upon the establishment of a security
  layer, and other protocol state SHOULD be re-negotiated as well.

  Note that NNTP is not an end-to-end mechanism.  Thus, if an NNTP
  client/server pair decide to add TLS confidentiality, they are
  securing the transport only for that link.  Similarly, because
  delivery of a single Netnews article may go between more than two
  NNTP servers, adding TLS confidentiality to one pair of servers does
  not mean that the entire NNTP chain has been made private.
  Furthermore, just because an NNTP server can authenticate an NNTP
  client, it does not mean that the articles from the NNTP client were
  authenticated by the NNTP client when the client itself received them
  (prior to forwarding them to the server).

  During the TLS negotiation, the client MUST check its understanding
  of the server hostname against the server's identity as presented in
  the server Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle
  attacks.  Matching is performed according to these rules:

  -  The client MUST use the server hostname it used to open the
     connection (or the hostname specified in TLS "server_name"
     extension [TLS-EXT]) as the value to compare against the server
     name as expressed in the server certificate.  The client MUST NOT
     use any form of the server hostname derived from an insecure
     remote source (e.g., insecure DNS lookup).  CNAME canonicalization
     is not done.

  -  If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the
     certificate, it SHOULD be used as the source of the server's
     identity.

  -  Matching is case-insensitive.





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  -  A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name
     component in the certificate.  For example, *.example.com would
     match a.example.com, foo.example.com, etc., but would not match
     example.com.

  -  If the certificate contains multiple names (e.g., more than one
     dNSName field), then a match with any one of the fields is
     considered acceptable.

  If the match fails, the client SHOULD either ask for explicit user
  confirmation or terminate the connection with a QUIT command and
  indicate the server's identity is suspect.

  Additionally, clients MUST verify the binding between the identity of
  the servers to which they connect and the public keys presented by
  those servers.  Clients SHOULD implement the algorithm in Section 6
  of [PKI-CERT] for general certificate validation, but MAY supplement
  that algorithm with other validation methods that achieve equivalent
  levels of verification (such as comparing the server certificate
  against a local store of already-verified certificates and identity
  bindings).

  A man-in-the-middle attack can be launched by deleting the STARTTLS
  capability label in the CAPABILITIES response from the server.  This
  would cause the client not to try to start a TLS session.  Another
  man-in-the-middle attack would allow the server to announce its
  STARTTLS capability, but alter the client's request to start TLS and
  the server's response.  An NNTP client can partially protect against
  these attacks by recording the fact that a particular NNTP server
  offers TLS during one session and generating an alarm if it does not
  appear in the CAPABILITIES response for a later session.  (Of course,
  the STARTTLS capability would not be listed after a security layer is
  in place.)

  If the client receives a 483 or 580 response, the client has to
  decide what to do next.  The client has to choose among three main
  options: to go ahead with the rest of the NNTP session, to (re)try
  TLS later in the session, or to give up and postpone
  newsreading/transport activity.  If an error occurs, the client can
  assume that the server may be able to negotiate TLS in the future and
  should try to negotiate TLS in a later session.  However, if the
  client and server were only using TLS for authentication and no
  previous 480 response was received, the client may want to proceed
  with the NNTP session, in case some of the operations the client
  wanted to perform are accepted by the server even if the client is
  unauthenticated.





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6. IANA Considerations

  This section gives a formal definition of the STARTTLS extension as
  required by Section 3.3.3 of [NNTP] for the IANA registry.

  o  The STARTTLS extension provides connection-based security via the
     Transport Layer Security (TLS).

  o  The capability label for this extension is "STARTTLS".

  o  The capability label has no arguments.

  o  This extension defines one new command, STARTTLS, whose behavior,
     arguments, and responses are defined in Section 2.2.

  o  This extension does not associate any new responses with pre-
     existing NNTP commands.

  o  This extension does affect the overall behavior of both server and
     client, in that after successful use of the STARTTLS command, all
     communication is transmitted with the TLS protocol as an
     intermediary.

  o  This extension does not affect the maximum length of commands or
     initial response lines.

  o  This extension does not alter pipelining, but the STARTTLS command
     cannot be pipelined.

  o  Use of this extension does alter the capabilities list; once the
     STARTTLS command has been used successfully, the STARTTLS
     capability can no longer be advertised by CAPABILITIES.

     Additionally, the MODE-READER capability MUST NOT be advertised
     after a successful TLS negotiation.

  o  This extension does not cause any pre-existing command to produce
     a 401, 480, or 483 response.

  o  This extension is unaffected by any use of the MODE READER
     command, however the MODE READER command MUST NOT be used in the
     same session following a successful TLS negotiation.

  o  Published Specification: This document.

  o  Contact for Further Information: Authors of this document.

  o  Change Controller: IESG <[email protected]>.



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7. References

7.1. Normative References

  [ABNF]        Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
                Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 4234, October 2005.

  [KEYWORDS]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

  [NNTP]        Feather, C., "Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)",
                RFC 3977, October 2006.

  [PKI-CERT]    Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
                X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
                Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
                April 2002.

  [TLS]         Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
                Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April
                2006.

  [TLS-EXT]     Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen,
                J., and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006.

7.2. Informative References

  [NNTP-AUTH]   Vinocur, J., Murchison, K.,  and C. Newman, "Network
                News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) Extension for
                Authentication", RFC 4643, October 2006.

  [SASL]        Melninov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed, "Simple
                Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422,
                June 2006.

  [TLS-IMAPPOP] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC
                2595, June 1999.

8. Acknowledgements

  A significant amount of the text in this document was lifted from RFC
  2595 by Chris Newman and RFC 3207 by Paul Hoffman.

  Special acknowledgement goes also to the people who commented
  privately on intermediate revisions of this document, as well as the
  members of the IETF NNTP Working Group for continual insight in
  discussion.



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Authors' Addresses

  Kenneth Murchison
  Carnegie Mellon University
  5000 Forbes Avenue
  Cyert Hall 285
  Pittsburgh, PA  15213 USA

  EMail: [email protected]


  Jeffrey M. Vinocur
  Department of Computer Science
  Upson Hall
  Cornell University
  Ithaca, NY  14853

  EMail: [email protected]


  Chris Newman
  Sun Microsystems
  3401 Centrelake Dr., Suite 410
  Ontario, CA  91761

  EMail: [email protected]

























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Full Copyright Statement

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

  This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
  contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
  retain all their rights.

  This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
  "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
  OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
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