Network Working Group                                       K. Alagappan
Request for Comments: 1412                 Digital Equipment Corporation
                                                           January 1993


                      Telnet Authentication: SPX

Status of this Memo

  This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
  community.  Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
  Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
  Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

1. Command Names and Codes

  Authentication Types

     SPX          3

  Suboption Commands

     AUTH         0
     REJECT       1
     ACCEPT       2

2.  Command Meanings

  IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS <authentication-type-pair> AUTH
  <SPX authentication token> IAC SE

     This is used to pass the SPX authentication token to the remote
     side of the connection.  (A document which describes the
     authentication token syntax is forthcoming.)  The first octet of
     the <authentication-type-pair> value is SPX.  The second octet is
     a modifier to the SPX authentication type.

  IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY <authentication-type-pair> ACCEPT
  <mutual response> IAC SE

     This command indicates that the authentication was successful.
     After an SPX authentication exchange, both sides have securely
     established a random 8-byte key to be used as the default key for
     the ENCRYPTION option.  If the AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL bit is set in the
     second octet of the authentication-type-pair, the sender includes
     the mutual response bytes.  The receiver of the ACCEPT command
     compares the "mutual response" with its expected mutual response.



Telnet Working Group                                            [Page 1]

RFC 1412                     SPX for Telnet                 January 1993


     (A document which describes the mutual response syntax is forth
     coming.)  If the AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY bit is set in the second octet
     of the authentication-type-pair, the sender includes zero bytes of
     mutual response.

  IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY <authentication-type-pair> REJECT
  <optional reason for rejection> IAC SE

     This command indicates that the authentication was not successful,
     and if there is any more data in the sub-option, it is an ASCII
     text message of the reason for the rejection.

3.  Implementation Rules

  Every command after the first AUTHENTICATION IS must carry the same
  set of modifiers (e.g., CLIENT|MUTUAL) for subsequent AUTHENTICATION
  IS and AUTHENTICATION REPLY commands.

  If the second octet of the authentication-type-pair has the AUTH_WHO
  bit set to AUTH_WHO_CLIENT, then the client sends the initial AUTH
  command, and the server responds with either ACCEPT or REJECT.

  If the second octet of the authentication-type-pair has the AUTH_WHO
  bit set to AUTH_WHO_SERVER, then the server sends the initial AUTH
  command, and the client responds with either ACCEPT or REJECT.

4.  Examples

  User "joe" may wish to log in as user "pete" on machine "foo".  If
  "pete" has set things up on "foo" to allow "joe" access to his
  account, then the client would send IAC SB AUTHENTICATION NAME "pete"
  IAC SE IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS SPX AUTH <joe's spx authentication
  token> IAC SE.  The server would then authenticate the user as "joe"
  from the token information, and the server would send back either
  ACCEPT or REJECT.  If mutual authentication is being used, the server
  would include in the ACCEPT message, a mutual response.  The
  authorization check to see if "pete" is allowing "joe" to use his
  account is made after the authentication exchange is complete.
  Therefore, it is possible for the client to receive an ACCEPT
  response (based on the authentication token), but for joe to be
  denied access to log in to pete's account.










Telnet Working Group                                            [Page 2]

RFC 1412                     SPX for Telnet                 January 1993


      Client                           Server
                                       IAC DO AUTHENTICATION
      IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION

      [ The server is now free to request authentication information.
        ]

                                       IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND SPX
                                       CLIENT|MUTUAL SPX CLIENT|ONE_WAY
                                       IAC SE

      [ The server has requested mutual SPX authentication.  If mutual
        authentication is not supported, then the server is willing to
        do one-way SPX authentication.  ]

      [ The client will now respond with the name of the user that it
        wants to log in as, and the SPX authentication token.  ]

      IAC SB AUTHENTICATION NAME
      "pete" IAC SE
      IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS SPX
      CLIENT|MUTUAL AUTH <spx
      authentication token
      information> IAC SE

      [ The server responds with an ACCEPT command to state that the
        authentication was successful.  ]

      [ If AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL, the server responds with the mutual
        response so the client can verify that it is really talking to
        the right server.  ]

      [ If AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY, the server responds with a NULL mutual
        response, since the client is willing to trust the server
        already.  ]

                                       IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY SPX
                                       CLIENT|MUTUAL ACCEPT <mutual
                                       response> IAC SE












Telnet Working Group                                            [Page 3]

RFC 1412                     SPX for Telnet                 January 1993


Security Considerations

  The ability to negotiate a common authentication mechanism between
  client and server is a feature of the authentication option that
  should be used with caution.  When the negotiation is performed, no
  authentication has yet occurred.  Therefore, each system has no way
  of knowing whether or not it is talking to the system it intends.  An
  intruder could attempt to negotiate the use of an authentication
  system which is either weak, or already compromised by the intruder.

Author's Address

  Kannan Alagappan
  Digital Equipment Corporation
  550 King Street, LKG1-2/A19
  Littleton, MA 01460

  EMail: [email protected]

  Mailing List: [email protected]


  The working group can be contacted via the current chair:

  Steve Alexander
  INTERACTIVE Systems Corporation
  1901 North Naper Boulevard
  Naperville, IL 60563-8895

  Phone: (708) 505-9100 x256
  EMail: [email protected]




















Telnet Working Group                                            [Page 4]