OF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration:
under which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?
(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?
(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man. Origen says
(Tract. xxxv super Matth.): "I deem that a man who wishes to live
according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For if, according
to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear, it is evident
that neither is it lawful to adjure: and consequently it is manifest that
the high-priest unlawfully adjured Jesus by the living God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion. But
it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore seemingly it
is also unlawful to adjure a man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it belongs
to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior imposes an
oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain holy
things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy of God"
(Rm. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is
lawful to adjure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his
reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of his
promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so orders
himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man can order
himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others, by beseeching
his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as stated above (Q[83],
A[1]). Accordingly when either of these orderings is confirmed by
something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this difference
between them, that man is master of his own actions but not of those of
others; wherefore he can put himself under an obligation by invoking the
Divine name, whereas he cannot put others under such an obligation unless
they be his subjects, whom he can compel on the strength of the oath they
have taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing,
intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an
obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind
himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps over
another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their inferiors
by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name or
of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without
putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully
employed in respect of anyone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man intends
to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he would bind
himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure our Lord
Jesus Christ [*Mt. 26:63].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an
obligation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to employ
terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a certain
thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we
adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence
for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of God
Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through His
eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says (Tract.
xxxv, super Matth.): "To adjure the demons is not accordance with the
power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice." Now rather
than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power given by
Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when invoking
the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration. Therefore, if
it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make use of
necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore the
antecedent is false also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact associates
himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship with the
demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, "I would not that you should be made
partakers with devils." Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:17): "In My name they shall cast
out devils." Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of
God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated in the preceding article, there are two ways
of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence of some
holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the first way it is not
lawful to adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of
benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear towards the
demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which is by compulsion, we
may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not for others. For during the
course of this life the demons are our adversaries: and their actions are
not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy angels,
because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), "the rebel spirit is ruled
by the just spirit." Accordingly we may repulse the demons, as being our
enemies, by adjuring them through the power of God's name, lest they do
us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ,
as recorded by Lk. 10:19: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon
serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing
shall hurt you."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning
something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this
would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when certain
holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use of the
demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we read of the
Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist. Certam. Apost.
vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the
instrumentality of the demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not authoritatively
by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly appeal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to
obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated
above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to the
unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), "Speak no more, and go out of the man," says:
"A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the demons,
however much they speak the truth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby the demon's
help is besought in doing or learning something: for this savors of
fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the demons by
adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature. An
adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to one
that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore it is
vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible, swearing
is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an irrational
creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ adjuration towards
one.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained above
(AA[1],2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed towards
irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their own actions.
The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and, seemingly,
neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because we have not the
power to command irrational creatures, but only He of Whom it was said
(Mt. 8:27): "For the winds and the sea obey Him." Therefore in no way,
apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational creatures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons and
to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the apocryphal
Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Irrational creatures are directed to their own actions by
some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and moved is also
the action of the director and mover: thus the movement of the arrow is
an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation of the irrational
creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to God, Who
disposes the movements of all things. It is also ascribed to the devil,
who, by God's permission, makes use of irrational creatures in order to
inflict harm on man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two
kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational
creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an
irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director and
mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of this
kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to God, and
this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God: secondly, by
way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses the irrational
creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration used in the
exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is expelled from
an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to adjure the demons by
beseeching them to help us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] Out. Para. 1/1
OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF
PRAISE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of
invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken (Q[83]
). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?
(2) Whether God should be praised with song?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God should be praised with the lips?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the lips. The
Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,12): "The best of men ere accorded not praise,
but something greater." But God transcends the very best of all things.
Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, but something greater than
praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus. 43:33) to be "above all praise."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it is an
act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than with the
lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the words of Is.
29:13, "This people . . . honors [Vulg.: 'glorifies'] Me with their lips,
but their heart is far from Me." Therefore the praise of God lies in the
heart rather than on the lips.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be
encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked
proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is
written (Prov. 27:21): "As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so a
man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth." But God is not incited
to better things by man's words, both because He is unchangeable, and
because He is supremely good, and it is not possible for Him to grow
better. Therefore God should not be praised with the lips.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 62:6): "My mouth shall praise Thee
with joyful lips."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason, and in
speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man we use
words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to him.
Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or others may
learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in consequence we may
incite him to yet better things; and that we may induce others, who hear
him praised, to think well of him, to reverence him, and to imitate him.
On the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not indeed to make
known our thoughts to Him Who is the searcher of hearts, but that we may
bring ourselves and our hearers to reverence Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His
sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is aroused
towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: "The sacrifice of praise shall
glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the salvation
of God." And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in his affections
to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed to God, according
to Is. 48:9, "For My praise I will bridle thee lest thou shouldst
perish." The praise of the lips is also profitable to others by inciting
their affections towards God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 33:2): "His
praise shall always be in my mouth," and farther on: "Let the meek hear
and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with regard to His
essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, He is
above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence and the honor of
latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in his Psalter
[*Translated from the Hebrew]: "Praise to Thee is speechless, O God," as
regards the first, and as to the second, "A vow shall be paid to Thee."
Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects which are ordained for
our good. In this respect we owe Him praise; wherefore it is written (Is.
63:7): "I will remember the tender mercies of the Lord, the praise of the
Lord for all the things that the Lord hath bestowed upon us." Again,
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Thou wilt find that all the sacred hymns,"
i.e. divine praises "of the sacred writers, are directed respectively to
the Blessed Processions of the Thearchy," i.e. of the Godhead, "showing
forth and praising the names of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one
praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when it
fervently recalls "the glorious things of His works" [*Cf. Ecclus.
17:7,8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the inward
fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise God, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours as stated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God should be praised with song?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song. For the
Apostle says (Col. 3:16): "Teaching and admonishing one another in
psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles." Now we should employ nothing in
the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on the authority of
Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising God, we should
employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, "Singing and
making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men whose
duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung not with the
voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like play-actors, ease your
throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the church resound with
theatrical measures and airs." Therefore God should not be praised with
song.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and great,
according to Apoc. 14, "Give praise to our God, all ye His servants; and
you that fear Him, little and great." But the great, who are in the
church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): "I
hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar must not
sing" (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Romana Ecclesia).
Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical instruments
and human song, according to Ps. 32:2,3: "Give praise to the Lord on the
harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument of ten strings. Sing
to Him a new canticle." But the Church does not make use of musical
instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the divine praises, for fear
of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in like manner neither should
song be used in the divine praises.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than the
praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by singing,
both because the attention of the singers is distracted from the
consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all their
attention to the chant, and because others are less able to understand
the thing that are sung than if they were recited without chant.
Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church of
Milan, a Augustine relates (Confess. ix).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the praise of the voice is
necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore
whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted in
the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in
various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the Philosopher
state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica, prologue). Hence
the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that
the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion.
Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): "I am inclined to approve of
the usage of singing in the church, that so by the delight of the ears
the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of devotion": and he says of
himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched to
the quick by the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to
those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are sung
outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse spiritual
devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but reproves
those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse devotion,
but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence Augustine says
(Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved by the voice than
by the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally, and then had rather
not hear the singer."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is a
more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates, whom
it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by means of preaching and
teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, lest thereby they be
withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44):
"It is a most discreditable custom for those who have been raised to the
diaconate to serve as choristers, for it behooves them to give their
whole time to the duty of preaching and to taking charge of the alms."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6), "Teaching should
not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument such as the
harp or anything else of this kind: but only with such things as make
good hearers." For such like musical instruments move the soul to
pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it. In the Old
Testament instruments of this description were employed, both because the
people were more coarse and carnal---so that they needed to be aroused by
such instruments as also by earthly promises---and because these material
instruments were figures of something else.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by a chant
that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the singer
chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what he says,
both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as Augustine remarks
(Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit, according to its
variety, has its own appropriate measure in the voice, and singing, by
some hidden correspondence wherewith it is stirred." The same applies to
the hearers, for even if some of them understand not what is sung, yet
they understand why it is sung, namely, for God's glory: and this is
enough to arouse their devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] Out. Para. 1/2
VICES OPPOSED TO RELIGION (QQ[92]-114)
SUPERSTITION, i.e. BY WAY OF EXCESS (QQ[92]-96)
OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion.
First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving worship
to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly
contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those things that
pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of
superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly we must
consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and afterwards
irreligion and its parts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?
(2) Whether it has several parts or species?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to
religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other.
But religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the
latter is defined as being "immoderate observance of religion," according
to a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in
superstition." Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura Deorum ii,
28] states that the superstitious were so called because they spent the
day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive
[superstites] them." But this may be done even in accordance with true
religious worship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to
religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion
admits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q[81], A[5], ad 3), there is
no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe
Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou
strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of
superstition hath fallen." Now the worship of one God belongs to
religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]), religion is a moral
virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above (FS,
Q[64], A[1]). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue. One
by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of
virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circumstance called
"how much," but also with regard to other circumstances: so that, in
certain virtues such as magnanimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the
mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue,
but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of
virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when it ought
not, and in like manner as regards other circumstances, as the
Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,2,3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not
that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but because
it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it
ought not.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil
things---thus we speak of a good thief---so too sometimes the names of
the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus prudence
is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Lk. 16:8, "The
children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their
generation than the children of light." It is in this way that
superstition is described as religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its
etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of
signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is
applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ
sometimes: for "lapis" [a stone] takes its name from hurting the foot
[laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts
the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that
"superstition" means that from which the word is derived.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute
quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate
quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine worship
that ought not to be done.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are various species of superstition?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not various species of superstition.
According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one contrary includes
many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to which superstition is
contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to
the one species. Therefore neither has superstition various species.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to
which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are
directed to God, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Therefore superstition,
which is opposed to religion, is not specified according to divinations
of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain human actions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have . . . a show of
wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to say in a hypocritical
religion." Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of
superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various species of superstition
(De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion consist in going
beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances (A[1]). For
as we have stated (FS, Q[72], A[9]), not every diversity of corrupt
circumstances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is
referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this
respect that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above
(FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], AA[2],6).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on the
part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the divine
worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, to the
true God, but "in an undue mode," and this is the first species of
superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any
creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstition, divided
into many species in respect of the various ends of divine worship. For
the end of divine worship is in the first place to give reverence to
God, and in this respect the first species of this genus is "idolatry,"
which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The second end of religion
is that man may be taught by God Whom he worships; and to this must be
referred "divinatory" superstition, which consults the demons through
compacts made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of
divine worship is a certain direction of human acts according to the
precepts of God the object of that worship: and to this must be referred
the superstition of certain "observances."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he
says that "anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols is
superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on to
say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose
of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to the second
species; and a little further on he adds: "To this kind belong all sorts
of amulets and such like," and this refers to the third species.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from a
cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single
defect." Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated
above (A[1]; Q[10], A[5]). The saying of the Philosopher is true of
opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Divinations and certain observances come under the head of
superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the demons:
and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for "religion as
applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore
this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given to God in
an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time of grace, to
wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of
religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] Out. Para. 1/2
OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of
the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true God;
(2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory superstition; (4)
of the superstition of observances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true
God?
(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in the
worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): "Everyone that shall
call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." Now whoever worships God
calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is conducive to
salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in any
age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just worshiped God
in whatever manner they pleased, without committing mortal sin: wherefore
Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special kind of worship, as
related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no worship of God is pernicious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet the
Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore Gregory,
replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep. 64), who
stated that there existed in the churches various customs in the
celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose carefully whatever you
find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the Roman territory,
or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the Church." Therefore no
way of worshiping God is pernicious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp. August.
Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in a gloss on
Gal. 2:14) says that "after the Gospel truth had been preached the legal
observances became deadly," and yet these observances belonged to the
worship of God. Therefore there can be something deadly in the divine
worship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most
pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to
Christian religion." Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that which
is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by word, so it
is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that the outward
worship of religion consists, as shown above (Q[81], A[7]). Consequently,
if anything false is signified by outward worship, this worship will be
pernicious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the part
of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something
discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the
mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to make
use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of Christ were
foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be pernicious for anyone
to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the second place, falsehood
in outward worship occurs on the part of the worshiper, and especially in
common worship which is offered by ministers impersonating the whole
Church. For even as he would be guilty of falsehood who would, in the
name of another person, proffer things that are not committed to him, so
too does a man incur the guilt of falsehood who, on the part of the
Church, gives worship to God contrary to the manner established by the
Church or divine authority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence
Ambrose [*Comment. in 1 ad Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter
Lombard] says: "He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than
Christ delivered it." For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says
that superstition is "the use of human observances under the name of
religion."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in
spirit and truth, according to Jn. 4:23. Hence a worship that contains
falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by an
inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others followed
them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts about this
matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine worship are
in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them, and to
disregard them is unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship of God.
It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): "Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can,
for He will yet far exceed." Now the divine worship is directed to the
glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess in it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship,
"whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity," as Augustine
says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in faith, hope, and
charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we have
received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God. Therefore
if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there will be no
excess in the divine worship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) "that the
good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies, from Holy
Writ." But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be
superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with
regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in
the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God.
Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion,
through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end of divine
worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to Him in mind and
body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God's glory, and
subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curbing of
the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine worship, provided it
be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, and in
keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to
God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate
concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the commandments
of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the general
custom---which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep. xxxvi], "has the
force of law"---all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious,
because consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no connection
with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii)
quotes the words of Lk. 17:21, "The kingdom of God is within you,"
against the "superstitious," those, to wit, who pay more attention to
externals.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The glorification of God implies that what is done is done
for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so that
there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with external
acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute quantity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] Out. Para. 1/1
OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) Whether it is the gravest sin?
(4) Of the cause of this sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a species of
superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are idolaters. But
heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above (Q[11], A[1]). Therefore
idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which
superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally applied to
idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For just as we
speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of the desire of
true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of the worship of
false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship of the true God,
which is the latria of true religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species
of superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any
genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
8:4): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and further on (1
Cor. 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered in sacrifice to
idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?" implying an answer in
the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs properly to idolatry.
Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of
superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to whom
that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just as it is
undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached (Rm.
1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the creature rather than the
Creator." Therefore this species of superstition is unfittingly called
idolatry, and should rather be named "worship of creatures."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited Silas
and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him seeing the
whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22) he says: "Ye
men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too superstitious."
Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, As stated above (Q[92], A[2]), it belongs to superstition
to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when
divine worship is given to whom it should not be given. Now it should be
given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above (Q[81], A[1])
when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is superstition to give
worship to any creature whatsoever.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by means
of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so too was it
given to a creature represented by some sensible form or shape, which is
called an "idol." Yet divine worship was given to idols in various ways.
For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed images which produced
certain effects by the power of the demons: wherefore they deemed that
the images themselves contained something God-like, and consequently that
divine worship was due to them. This was the opinion of Hermes
Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep], as Augustine states (De Civ.
Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship not to the images, but to
the creatures represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these
(Rm. 1:23,25). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed the
glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a
corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of
creeping things," and of the latter he says: "Who worshipped and served
the creature rather than the Creator."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain men
to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men: for
instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole
world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, but by
reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God to
be nothing else than a soul governing the world by movement and reason:
even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but of his
soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given to the
whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to all such
things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as Varro
asserted, and Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others,
namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the cause of
all things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances created by
the supreme god. These they called "gods," on account of their having a
share of the godhead; but we call them "angels." After these they placed
the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they
stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these again
they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up into the
fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the merit of their
virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (De
Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which
the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in the
schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was said to
belong to "mythical theology" which was wont to be represented on the
stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion relating
to images was held to belong to "civil theology," which was celebrated by
the pontiffs in the temples [*De Civ. Dei vi, 5].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything invented
by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship to
a creature or any part of a creature, is superstitious."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of faith by
outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief by external
worship. Such a confession is signified by the term idolatry, but not by
the term heresy, which only means a false opinion. Therefore heresy is a
species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one sense it
may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and then its
signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, in
this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included in its
definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to true
religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax is univocally the
same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false king. In another sense
latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it
is essential thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought to be
given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to the latria of
true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence is applied equivocally
to the prudence that is a virtue, and to that which is carnal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The saying of the Apostle that "an idol is nothing in the
world" means that those images which were called idols, were not
animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though
they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we must
understand the saying that "what is offered in sacrifice to idols is not
anything," because by being thus sacrificed the sacrificial flesh
acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles thought, nor
uncleanness, as the Jews held.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles of
worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the term
"idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature, even without
the use of images.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether idolatry is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a sin that
the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith employs
images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there
images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, and in the Church are
images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore idolatry, whereby
idols are worshipped, is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the
angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it will
be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward
worship, according to Jn. 4:24, "God . . . they must adore . . . in
spirit and in truth": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that "God is
worshipped by faith, hope and charity." Now a man may happen to worship
idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith inwardly.
Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly without prejudice
to the divine worship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:5): "Thou shalt not adore them,"
i.e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i.e. inwardly, as a gloss explains it:
and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is a sin
to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this matter. For some
[*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and other
things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others
aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that divine honor
should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But this
is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the
same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due to
the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is the
worship of latria.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visible
sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most
high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely,
the service of a pure mind, should be offered" [*Augustine, as quoted
below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19),
"external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are
signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter
significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things they
signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize that we should
offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose invisible
sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to idols,
not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but as being
in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10)
quotes Seneca as saying: "We shall adore," says he, "in such a way as to
remember that our worship ss in accordance with custom rather than with
the reality": and (De Vera Relig. v) Augustine says that "we must not
seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted the same things for
sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools to various
and contrary opinions about the nature of their gods, and the sovereign
good." This error was embraced also by certain heretics [*The
Helcesaitae], who affirmed that it is not wrong for one who is seized in
time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the
faith in his heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of the
inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary of what
one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to
pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments of one's heart.
Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that "his
worship of idols was so much the more infamous forasmuch as the things he
did dishonestly were so done by him that the people believed him to act
honestly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor
again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria may
be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that
belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed and
confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of Christ,
to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we shall state in
the TP, Q[25], A[3].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what has
been said above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins. The worst
is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior worship, which
consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than external worship.
Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which are opposed to
internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which is opposed to
external worship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it is.
Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by blaspheming, or
denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to another, which
pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of the faith are
more grievous sins than idolatry.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater
evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against nature,
as stated in Rm. 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin
than idolatry.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do we say
that you," viz. the Manichees, "are pagans, or a sect of pagans, but that
you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet
you are much worse than they are, for they worship things that exist, but
should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship things that exist
not at all." Therefore the vice of heretical depravity is more grievous
than idolatry.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, "How turn you again to
the weak and needy elements?" says: "The observance of the Law, to which
they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship of idols,
to which they had been given before their conversion." Therefore idolatry
is not the most grievous sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the
uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Every sin
is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways.
First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most
grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly
commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to another
than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the
whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are committed against
God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems to be
for a man to give God's honor to a creature, since, so far as he is
concerned, he sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine
sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the part
of the sinner. Thus the sin of one that sins knowingly is said to be
graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this way
nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they
have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin
through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account
of greater contempt on the part of the sinner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it adds
undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without internal
unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated above (A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it
deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith by
deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the
will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, in
order that it may make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but
it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin against
nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more
manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of the sin of idolatry,
in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the order of the divine honor,
so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of
his own nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy is
more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more
derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in opposition
to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about God. It is
different with other heretics, who confess their belief in one God and
worship Him alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is not
quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost equal,
because both are species of pestiferous superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the part of
man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or guilt. But the
cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's nature, since rather
does man's natural reason dictate that there is one God, and that divine
worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings. Likewise,
neither could idolatry have its cause in man on the part of virtue, since
"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit," according to Mt. 7:18: nor
again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27,
"the worship of abominable idols is the cause and the beginning and end
of all evil." Therefore idolatry has no cause on the part of man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found among
men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated [*Peter
Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated either by
Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or by Ninus,
who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. Among the
Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first
to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the first to
make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a great extent in the
sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not
possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i.e. the
demons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what
name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and
their professors": and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry.
Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:14): "By the vanity of men
they," i.e. idols, "came into the world."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive
cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on account
of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divine
honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This cause is
assigned (Wis. 14:15): "A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made
to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken away: and him who
then had died as a man he began to worship as a god." The same passage
goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that "men serving either their affection, or
their kings, gave the incommunicable name [Vulg.: 'names']," i.e. of the
Godhead, "to stones and wood." Secondly, because man takes a natural
pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv),
wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human images skillfully
fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship;
hence it is written (Wis. 13:11-17): "If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut
down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of
his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and
then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his
children, or his marriage." Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of the
true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence men gave
divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their beauty or power,
wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1,2): "All men . . . neither by
attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but have
imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of
the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods
that rule the world."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of
the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving
answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous.
Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): "All the gods of the Gentiles are
devils."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of man,
a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, or
disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt.
Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all sin,
because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not produce at some
time, either through leading expressly to that sin by causing it, or
through being an occasion thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, in
so far as certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such as
homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless certain sins may
precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the recent
remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still retained in
his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was banished
by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed over the devil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of idolatry.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] Out. Para. 1/1
OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether divination is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a species of superstition?
(3) Of the species of divination;
(4) Of divination by means of demons;
(5) Of divination by the stars;
(6) Of divination by dreams;
(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;
(8) Of divination by lots.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether divination is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is derived
from something "divine": and things that are divine pertain to holiness
rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): "Who dares to say
that learning is an evil?" and again: "I could nowise admit that
intelligence can be an evil." But some arts are divinatory, as the
Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to
pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that
divination is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because nature
inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek to
foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore
divination is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or
fortune tellers": and it is stated in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can. Qui
divinationes): "Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a
penance of five years' duration, according to the fixed grades of
penance."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The
future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in
itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce
their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects can
be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes,
even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes produce their
effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most part, yet they
rarely fail: and from such like causes their future effects can be
foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even
as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow and foretell things
concerning rains and droughts, and physicians, concerning health and
death. Again, other causes, considered in themselves, are indifferent;
and this is chiefly the case in the rational powers, which stand in
relation to opposites, according to the Philosopher [*Metaph. viii,
2,5,8]. Such like effects, as also those which ensue from natural causes
by chance and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown from a
consideration of their causes, because these causes have no determinate
inclination to produce these effects. Consequently such like effects
cannot be foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man
cannot consider these effects in themselves except when they are present,
as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such
things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His
eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in the FP,
Q[14], A[13]; FP, Q[57], A[3]; FP, Q[86], A[4]. Hence it is written (Is.
41:23): "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know
that ye are gods." Therefore if anyone presume to foreknow or foretell
such like future things by any means whatever, except by divine
revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this
reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore Isidore says (Etym.
viii, 9): "They are called divines, as though they were full of God. For
they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they
forecast the future to men."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that
happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can be
foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other contingent
future things, through divine revelation: for then he does not divine,
i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives something divine. Then
only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself, in an undue
manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is manifestly a sin.
Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says
in his commentary on Mich. 3:9, seqq. that "divination is always taken
in an evil sense."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered share
of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future
events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not pertain to
divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of
other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil's deceit, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future by human
means, but not by the undue means of divination.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether divination is a species of superstition?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of superstition.
The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now divination is
apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig.
xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,24; De Divin. Daem. 3]. Therefore
it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition
undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue worship.
Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true
religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to
divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is from
his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an operation of
the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly,
under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved
themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of
shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of
the demons." Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23),
"whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is
superstitious." Therefore divination is a species of superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]; QQ[92],94), superstition denotes
undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of God in two
ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a sacrifice, an
oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it is something
divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an oath (Q[89],
A[4], ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only idolatrous
sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help of the demons
for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all divination results
from the demons' operation, either because the demons are expressly
invoked that the future may be made known, or because the demons thrust
themselves into futile searchings of the future, in order to entangle
men's minds with vain conceits. Of this kind of vanity it is written (Ps.
39:5): "Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies." Now it is
vain to seek knowledge of the future, when one tries to get it from a
source whence it cannot be foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that
divination is a species of superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the end in
view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind of
superstition as regards the mode of operation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the
demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with the
demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 3: In the New Law man's mind is restrained from solicitude
about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution for
the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the other hand
in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there were
consultations about the future in connection with religious matters.
Hence where it is written (Is. 8:19): "And when they shall say to you:
Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their enchantments," it is
added by way of answer: "Should not the people seek of their God, a
vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.: 'seek of their God, for the
living of the dead?']"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/3
In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 3/3
In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several species of
divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there are not
seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in
all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact with the
demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not several
species of divination.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a human act takes it species from its end, as stated
above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[6]). But all divination is directed
to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore all
divinations are of one species.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether one
detracts by word writing or gestures, it is the same species of sin. Now
divinations seem to differ merely according to the various signs whence
the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore there are not
several species of divination.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species of divination (Etym.
viii, 9).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), all divinations seek to acquire
foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and help of a
demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help, or else
thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things
unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have been explained
in the FP, Q[57], A[3]. When demons are expressly invoked, they are wont
to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to
human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order to foretell the
future: and this species is called "prestigiation" because man's eyes are
blindfolded [praestringuntur]. Sometimes they make use of dreams, and
this is called "divination by dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions
or utterances of the dead, and this species is called "necromancy," for
as Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, {nekron} "means dead and
{manteia} divination, because after certain incantations and the
sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to
answer questions." Sometimes they foretell the future through living men,
as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by
"pythons," of whom Isidore says that "pythons are so called from Pythius
Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination." Sometimes they
foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which appear in inanimate
beings. If these signs appear in some earthly body such as wood, iron or
polished stone, it is called "geomancy," if in water "hydromancy," if in
the air "aeromancy," if in fire "pyromancy," if in the entrails of
animals sacrificed on the altars of demons, "aruspicy."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the
demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain
knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of
certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the
position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers," who
are also called "genethliacs," because they take note of the days on
which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds or
of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs,
this belongs in general to "augury," which is so called from the
chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as "auspice" is derived from
watching birds [avium inspectione]. These are chiefly wont to be observed
in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If, however,
these observations have for their object men's words uttered
unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that he
wishes to foreknow, then it is called an "omen": and as Valerius Maximus
[*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5] remarks, "the observing of omens has a
touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be founded not
on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus that when the
Romans were deliberating whether they would change their position, a
centurion happened to exclaim at the time: 'Standard-bearer, fix the
banner, we had best stand here': and on hearing these words they took
them as an omen, and abandoned their intention of advancing further." If,
however, the observation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye,
of figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of
divination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines of
the hand is called "chiromancy," i.e. divination of the hand (because
{cheir} is the Greek for hand): while the divination which is taken from
signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is called
"spatulamancy."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
To this second species of divination, which is without express
invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by observing
certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult,
whether by drawing lots, which is called "geomancy"; or by observing the
shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by observing
which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing upon them, a
person may happen to draw; or by holding out several unequal sticks and
noting who takes the greater or the lesser. or by throwing dice, and
observing who throws the highest score; or by observing what catches the
eye when one opens a book, all of which are named "sortilege."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The
first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the head of
"necromancy"; the second is merely an observation of the disposition or
movement of some other being, and this belongs to "augury"; while the
third consists in doing something in order to discover the occult; and
this belongs to "sortilege." Under each of these many others are
contained, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not the
same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous to invoke
the demons than to do things that deserve the demons' interference.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the ultimate
end whence divination takes its general formality. But the various
species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters, according
as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The things observed by diviners are considered by them, not
as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in detraction, but
as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that diversity of
principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative sciences.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the demons is
not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1 Pt. 2:22, "Who
did no sin." Yet our Lord asked the demon: "What is thy name?" and the
latter replied: "My name is Legion, for we are many" (Mk. 5:9). Therefore
it seems lawful to question the demons about the occult.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who ask
unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired of the
woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war
(1 Kgs. 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that consists in
questioning demons is not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who knows, if
it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know what is
hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in the discovery
of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . . nor . . .
that consulteth pythonic spirits."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two
reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which is
a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him.
This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against certain
persons (Is. 28:15): "You have said: We have entered into a league with
death, and we have made a covenant with hell." And still more grievous
would it be if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid to the demon
invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result. For the demon who
intends man's perdition endeavors, by his answers, even though he
sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe him, and so to lead
him on to something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind. Hence
Athanasius, commenting on the words of Lk. 4:35, "He rebuked him, saying:
Hold thy peace," says: "Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ
put a stop to his speech, lest together with the truth he should publish
his wickedness and accustom us to care little for such things, however
much he may seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the
divine Scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Bede's commentary on Lk. 8:30, "Our Lord
inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which he
tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine forth
more graciously." Now it is one thing to question a demon who comes to us
of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for the good of
others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell
the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to gain from him
knowledge of things hidden from us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), "there is
nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being about
to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to appear to
him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some occult
dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or else the
spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, but some
phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the devil, and
styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the images of
things are wont to be called by the names of those things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No temporal utility can compare with the harm to spiritual
health that results from the research of the unknown by invoking the
demon.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether divination by the stars is unlawful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not unlawful. It is
lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes: thus a physician
foretells death from the disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly
bodies are the cause of what takes place in the world, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the stars is not
unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, human science originates from experiments, according to
the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered through many
experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby some
future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem not
unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as it is
based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the stars
contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God's
creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is not
unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): "Those astrologers
whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because they
seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their
divinations which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and
condemns."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 1/7
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2), the operation of the demon
thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false and vain
opinions, in order that man's mind may become entangled in vanity and
falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing
the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot be forecast by
their means. Wherefore we must consider what things can be foreknown by
observing the stars: and it is evident that those things which happen of
necessity can be foreknown by this mean,: even so astrologers forecast a
future eclipse.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 2/7
However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by
observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some have
stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by
means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable statement: since
every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which it stands
(thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), or it proceeds from the
same cause, so that by signifying the cause, in consequence it signifies
the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather, in so far
as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it cannot be said that
the dispositions and movements of the heavenly bodies are the effect of
future events; nor again can they be ascribed to some common higher cause
of a corporeal nature, although they are referable to a common higher
cause, which is divine providence. on the contrary the appointment of the
movements and positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on
a different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future
contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of
necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the latter
are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the manner of their
occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible to acquire
foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the stars, except in
so far as effects can be foreknown from their causes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 3/7
Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In the
first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human affairs
or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi [*Ed. Did.
v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a natural cause,
such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs
accidentally, neither is a "being" properly speaking, nor is "one"---for
instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or that a treasure
be discovered when a man digs a grave---for these and like occurrences
are not one thing, but are simply several things. Whereas the operation
of nature has always some one thing for its term, just as it proceeds
from some one principle, which is the form of a natural thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 4/7
In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of will
and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the intellect or
reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and consequently
neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the Philosopher shows
(De Anima iii, 4,9). Now no body can make an impression on an incorporeal
body. Wherefore it is impossible for heavenly bodies to make a direct
impression on the intellect and will: for this would be to deny the
difference between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle
reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those who held that "such is the will of
man, as is the day which the father of men and of gods," i.e. the sun or
the heavens, "brings on" [*Odyssey xviii, 135].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 5/7
Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free-will's
operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause of an
inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an impression on
the human body, and consequently on the sensitive powers which are acts
of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since, however,
the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii,
11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not impose any necessity on the free-will,
and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the
heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 6/7
Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to foreknow
casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with certitude future
human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion; and so
the operation of the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore it will
be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand if one were
to apply the observation of the stars in order to foreknow those future
things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain
and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious
divination.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 7/7
Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by
observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a great
number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for
the most part disposed in accordance with the inclination of the heavenly
bodies: while there are few, namely, the wise alone, who moderate these
inclinations by their reason. The result is that astrologers in many
cases foretell the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend
on the multitude. Secondly, because of the interference of the demons.
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17): "When astrologers tell the
truth, it must be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown
to man, lies hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the
action of unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they
are permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs." Wherefore
he concludes: "Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers, and of
all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth, lest his
soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of partnership
with them enmesh itself in their fellowship."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is
not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by
God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15,16): "By a dream in a vision
by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in
their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the ears of men, and teaching
instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore it is not unlawful
to make use of divination by dreams.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make use
of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams:
thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of his chief
baker (Gn. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon
(Dan. 2,4). Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of
men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of the
future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the
purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): "Neither let there be found
among you any one that . . . observeth dreams."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],6), divination is superstitious
and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Wherefore we must
consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from
dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for
instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious through what it has seen
in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something: while
sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so far as they are
referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and
in this way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then,
consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of
future occurrences, or be cognizant of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 2/5
Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes
in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams is twofold:
one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a
man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination while
asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences,
so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future
occurrences, and if at any time they concur it will be by chance. But
sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the inward
disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the
imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a man in whom there is
abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for
this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to
discover internal dispositions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 3/5
In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and
spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper's imagination is
affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a
heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping
with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is
sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their
dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num. 12:6, "If there be
among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I
will speak to him in a dream." Sometimes, however, it is due to the
action of the demons that certain images appear to persons in their
sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to
those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 4/5
Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making
use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those
dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or
outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be
an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a revelation
of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit,
through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit, through the
divination extending beyond its possible limits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[6] Body Para. 5/5
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of
external things is unlawful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by like
observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were unlawful holy
men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid
attention to auguries, for it is related (Gn. 44:5) that Joseph's steward
said: "The cup which you have stolen is that in which my lord drinketh
and in which he is wont to divine [augurari]": and he himself afterwards
said to his brethren (Gn. 44:15): "Know you not that there is no one like
me in the science of divining?" Therefore it is not unlawful to make use
of this kind of divination.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future
occurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, "The kite in the air
hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed
the time of their coming." Now natural knowledge is infallible and comes
from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make use of the birds'
knowledge in order to know the future, and this is divination by augury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11:32). Yet
Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and
interpreting of a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham's servant,
acted in like manner (Gn. 24). Therefore it seems that this kind of
divination is not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): "Neither let there be found
among you anyone . . . that observeth omens."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and whatever
dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the
cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known therefrom as
from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything future can be known
from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed are also
the causes of future occurrences or are cognizant of them. Now the cause
of dumb animals' actions is a certain instinct whereby they are inclined
by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their actions. This
instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. In the first place it may be
due to a bodily cause. For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive
soul, every power of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is
subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that
of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from
being signs of the future, in so far as they are conformed to the
dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to which
certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must observe two
things: first, that such observations must not be applied to the
foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be foreknown
from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above (AA[5],6):
secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those which in
some way may have reference to these animals (since they acquire through
the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things
necessary for their life---such as changes resulting from rain and wind
and so forth).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause,
namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon
Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and
vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb
animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems to
be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words which
are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the stars,
yet are they ordered according to divine providence and sometimes
according to the action of the demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are superstitious
and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set according to the
order of nature or of divine providence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv], when
Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of divining, he
spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to the common opinion
about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds have
about things concerning them; and in order to know these things it is not
unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from the frequent
cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a
dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his
instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words,
having previously prayed to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not unlawful,
because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, "My lots are in Thy hands,"
says: "It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining
the divine will when a man is in doubt."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances which
the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both in the Old
and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the casting of lots.
For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at the Lord's command,
pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of the anathema. Again
Saul, by drawing lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey (1
Kgs. 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the Lord, was
discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonas 1:7, sqq.): Zacharias was
chosen by lot to offer incense (Lk. 1:9): and the apostles by drawing
lots elected Matthias to the apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would
seem that divination by lots is not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy," i.e. single
combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called
"popular" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because
something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem to
be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single combat with
the Philistine (1 Kgs. 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would seem that
divination by lot is not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can.
Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make up
your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have condemned,
is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason we wish them
to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be mentioned among
Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under pain of anathema."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 1/7
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), sortilege consists, properly
speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may come
to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to
know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession, an honor, a
dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is called "sortilege
of allotment"; if one seeks to know what ought to be done, it is called
"sortilege of consultation"; if one seeks to know what is going to
happen, it is called "sortilege of divination." Now the actions of man
that are required for sortilege and their results are not subject to the
dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so
minded as though the human acts requisite for sortilege depended for
their result on the dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and
false, and consequently is not free from the interference of the demons,
so that a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 2/7
Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must
needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If we
ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in "sortilege of
allotment," it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in
the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of
something or other, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus
leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 3/7
If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual cause,
it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech. 21:21) that "the
king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking
divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols, and consulted
entrails": sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and forbidden by the
canons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 4/7
Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov.
16:33, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the
Lord": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine
declares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. OBJ[1]].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 5/7
Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have
recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount to
tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Lk. 1:8, says:
"He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men." Secondly,
if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to lots without
reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says (Super Act.
Apost. i): "But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks that he ought,
after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting lots, let him take
note that the apostles themselves did not do so, except after calling
together the assembly of the brethren and pouring forth prayer to God."
Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence
Augustine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep. lv): "Those who tell
fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped that they do so
rather than have recourse to consulting the demons, yet does this custom
also displease me, that anyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to
worldly matters and to the vain things of this life." Fourthly, if anyone
resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should
be carried out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede
says (Super Act. Apost. i): "Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias
was decided by lot," because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was not
yet poured forth into the Church: "whereas the same deacons were ordained
not by lot but by the choice of the disciples." It is different with
earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in
elections of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as in
the distribution of earthly possessions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 6/7
If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the divine
judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), "If, at a time of persecution,
the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain at his
post lest all should flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all die and
the Church be forsaken, should there be no other means of coming to an
agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen by lot." Again he
says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): "If thou aboundest in that which it
behooves thee to give to him who hath not, and which cannot be given to
two; should two come to you, neither of whom surpasses the other either
in need or in some claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than
in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not give
to both."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] Body Para. 7/7
This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[95] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to the
investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of something done by a
man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so far as a
miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the common
generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered unlawful,
both because it is directed to the judgment of the occult, which is
reserved to the divine judgment, and because such like trials are not
sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen
V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]: "The sacred canons do not approve of
extorting a confession from anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or
boiling water, and no one must presume, by a superstitious innovation, to
practice what is not sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For
it is allowable that public crimes should be judged by our authority,
after the culprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have
been approved, with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown
crimes must be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of
men." The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save that
it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since no miraculous
effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in
strength or skill.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] Out. Para. 1/1
OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the
magic art;
(2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;
(3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;
(4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the observances
of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two ways. First, by
reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft: secondly, through
being directed to an evil end, as when a person gives an alms for the
sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic art are not evil as
to the genus of the deed, for they consist in certain fasts and prayers
to God; moreover, they are directed to a good end, namely, the
acquisition of science. Therefore it is not unlawful to practice these
observances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who
abstained, "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and
wisdom." Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain fasts
and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its results
through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above (A[1]), the reason why it is
wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because they have
no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons
know scientific truths: because sciences are about things necessary and
invariable, and such things are subject to human knowledge, and much more
to the knowledge of demons, who are of keener intellect, as Augustine
says [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. Daemon. 3,4]. Therefore it seems to
be no sin to practice the magic art, even though it achieve its result
through the demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth from the dead":
which search relies on the demons' help. Now through the observances of
the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought "by means of certain
signs agreed upon by compact with the demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr.
Christ. ii, 20; see above Q[92], A[2]]. Therefore it is unlawful to
practice the notary art.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is
unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have not
in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing
certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so forth.
Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as causes, but as
signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are the sacramental
signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty signs, and consequently
a kind of "agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of
consultation and of compact by tokens" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii,
20; see above Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely
repudiated and avoided by Christian, even as other arts of vain and
noxious superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23).
This art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is
not intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner
connatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the consequence
is that this effect is expected either from God or from the demons. Now
it is certain that some have received wisdom and science infused into
them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Kgs. 3 and 2 Paralip 1). Moreover,
our Lord said to His disciples (Lk. 21:15): "I will give you a mouth and
wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist and
gainsay." However, this gift is not granted to all, or in connection with
any particular observance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost,
as stated in 1 Cor. 12:8, "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word
of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same
Spirit," and afterwards it is said (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one
and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He will."
On the other hand it does not belong to the demons to enlighten the
intellect, as stated in the FP, Q[109], A[3]. Now the acquisition of
knowledge and wisdom is effected by the enlightening of the intellect,
wherefore never did anyone acquire knowledge by means of the demons.
Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 9): "Porphyry confesses that the
intellectual soul is in no way cleansed by theurgic inventions," i.e. the
operations "of the demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern
what is true," such as are all scientific conclusions. The demons may,
however, be able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachings
of the sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it is not good
to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that the magic art
tends.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The abstinence of these children was not in accordance with
a vain observance of the notary art, but according to the authority of
the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the meat of Gentiles.
Hence as a reward for their obedience they received knowledge from God,
according to Ps. 118:100, "I have had understanding above the ancients,
because I have sought Thy commandments."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the demons is a sin
not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on account of
the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies to the case in
point.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the
purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that observances directed to the alteration of
bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the like, are lawful.
It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in order to
produce their proper effects. Now in the physical order things have
certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to assign; for
instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many like instances, all of
which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei xxi, 5,7). Therefore it would
seem lawful to employ such like forces for the alteration of bodies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly bodies,
just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain occult
forces resulting from their species through the influence of the heavenly
bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. images, also acquire from the
heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the production of certain
effects. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of them and of such
like things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many ways, as
Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8,9). But their power is from God.
Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose of
producing these alterations.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "to
superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and nostrums
condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of
certain cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing worn
or fastened on."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In things done for the purpose of producing some bodily
effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect
naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful
to employ natural causes in order to produce their proper effects. But,
if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally, it follows that
they are employed for the purpose of producing those effects, not as
causes but only as signs, so that they come under the head of "compact by
tokens entered into with the demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see
above Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "The
demons are allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them,
but by God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to
the various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as
spirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking, by means of various
kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing
natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such as
they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in
addition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other vain
observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be
superstitious and unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from their
substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of heavenly
bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire certain active
forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bodies result from the
conception of the craftsman; and since they are nothing else but
composition, order and shape, as stated in Phys. i, 5, they cannot have a
natural active force. Consequently, no force accrues to them from the
influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are artificial, but only
in respect of their natural matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry
held, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11), that "by herbs, stones,
animals, certain particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again
by certain movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens
it is possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying
into effect the various dispositions of the stars," as though the results
of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly
bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), "all these things
are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that are subject
to them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy
from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is requisite to
inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce to any effect
naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet
astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the
latter include certain explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore they
come under the head of explicit agreements made with the demons: whereas
in the other images there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in
certain shapes or characters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom the
demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever purpose He
will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the demons, to
employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the contrary, it is
appointed that he should wage war against the demons. Hence in no way is
it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help by compacts either
tacit or express.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are
unlawful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose of
fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes that
occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms, which
the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe such
like signs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly everybody
experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain times, or
places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or animals, uncanny or
ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come. Therefore it
seems not unlawful to observe these things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine
providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require that
precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences: wherefore,
according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that happened to the
fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our time. Now it is
not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds from divine providence.
Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to observe these presages.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "a
thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts
entered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb; a
stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together; kicking
the door-post when anyone passes in front of one's house; to go back to
bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes; to return home
if you trip when going forth; when the rats have gnawed a hole in your
clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret the
actual damage."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Men attend to all these observances, not as causes but as
signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them as signs
given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on divine
authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of the malice
of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with such like trifles.
Accordingly it is evident that all these observances are superstitious
and unlawful: they are apparently remains of idolatry, which authorized
the observance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days which is allied to
divination by the stars, in respect of which one day differentiated from
another: except that these observances are devoid of reason and art,
wherefore they are yet more vain and superstitious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they produce
certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully observe.
Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future events as
proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging when he sees
his master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if one were to fear
for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of which we have spoken in
the FP, Q[117], A[3], ad 2. But this does not apply to this kind of
observances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That men have at first experienced a certain degree of
truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a man
begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many things
occur in connection with them through the trickery of the demons, "so
that men, through being entangled in these observances, become yet more
curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold snares of a
pernicious error," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born, not
only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states (Contra
Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those deeds to
our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all things, however, that
occur through divine providence are ordered so as to be signs of the
future. Hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine words at the
neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written than when
uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of
producing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal the sick),
such as the "Our Father" or the "Hail Mary," or in any way whatever to
call on the Lord's name, according to Mk. 16:17,18, "In My name they
shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall
take up serpents." Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred words
at one's neck, as a remedy for sickness or for any kind of distress.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human body
than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain
incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing certain
other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): "Their madness is
according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp that stoppeth
her ears, which will not hear the voice of the charmers, nor of the
wizard that charmeth wisely." Therefore it is lawful to wear sacred words
as a remedy for men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the
saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. xxvi) that "God's word is
of no less account than the Body of Christ." Now it is lawful for one to
wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, or to carry them about one
in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it is equally
lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether uttered or
written, for one's protection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.) [*Cf.
the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, and
falsely ascribed to him]: "Some wear round their necks a passage in
writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in church and heard
by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good to have the Gospels
in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing them round his neck?
Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In the shapes of the letters
or in the understanding of the sense? If in the shapes, you do well to
wear them round your neck; if in the understanding, you will then do
better to bear them in your heart than to wear them round your neck."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In every incantation or wearing of written words, two
points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or written,
because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it is clearly
superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems that one should
beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they conceal
something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says [*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in
Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, falsely ascribed to him] that
"many now after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their fringes,
invent and write Hebrew names of angels, and fasten them to their
persons. Such things seem fearsome to those who do not understand them."
Again, one should take care lest it contain anything false, because in
that case also the effect could not be ascribed to God, Who does not bear
witness to a falsehood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
In the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words it
contain something vain, for instance certain written characters, except
the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of writing or
fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connection with reverence
for God, because this would be pronounced superstitious: otherwise,
however, it is lawful. Hence it is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v,
cap. Non liceat Christianis): "In blending together medicinal herbs, it
is not lawful to make use of observances or incantations, other than the
divine symbol, or the Lord's Prayer, so as to give honor to none but God
the Creator of all."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or to invoke
the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone, from Whom
the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in connection
with any vain observance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even in the case of incantations of serpents or any animals
whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred words and to the
divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like incantations, however,
often include unlawful observances, and rely on the demons for their
result, especially in the case of serpents, because the serpent was the
first instrument employed by the devil in order to deceive man. Hence a
gloss on the passage quoted says: "Note that Scripture does not commend
everything whence it draws its comparisons, as in the case of the unjust
judge who scarcely heard the widow's request."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they be
worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics they are,
it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this matter of some
vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be three-cornered, or the
like, having no bearing on the reverence due to God and the saints), it
would be superstitious and unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Chrysostom is speaking the case in which more attention is
paid the written characters than to the understanding of the words.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] Out. Para. 1/1
IRRELIGION, i.e. BY WAY OF DEFICIENCY (QQ[97]-102)
OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through
lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that they
come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which pertain to
contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly we shall
consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God; (2) Vices
pertaining to irreverence for holy things. With regard to the first we
shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted, and perjury,
whereby God's name is taken with irreverence. Under the first head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) In what the temptation of God consists;
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) To what virtue it is opposed;
(4) Of its comparison with other vices.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the
expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the temptation of God does not consist in
certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the power of God alone.
Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted by God, man, and demons.
But when man is tempted the result is not always expected from his power.
Therefore neither is God tempted when the result is expected from His
power alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the divine name
look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if the temptation
of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles would tempt
God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems to belong to man's perfection that he should
put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence Ambrose,
commenting on Lk. 9:3, "Take nothing for your journey," etc. says: "The
Gospel precept points out what is required of him that announces the
kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend on worldly assistance,
and that, taking assurance from his faith, he should hold himself to be
the more able to provide for himself, the less he seeks these things."
And the Blessed Agatha said: "I have never treated my body with bodily
medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who restores all things by His
mere word." [*Office of St. Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican
Breviary).] But the temptation of God does not consist in anything
pertaining to perfection. Therefore the temptation of God does not
consist in such like deeds, wherein the help of God alone is expected.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): "Christ who
gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet not
allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him, nevertheless by
fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest it should dare to
tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which it needs to
avoid." From this it would seem that the temptation of God consists in
omitting to do what one can in order to escape from danger, and relying
on the assistance of God alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person
tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By words,
that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether he can and
will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe another's
prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two ways. First,
openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter: thus Samson (Judges
14:12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order to tempt them. In
the second place it may be done with cunning and by stealth, as the
Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Mt. 22:15, sqq. Again this is
sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends, by word or deed, to
put some person to the test; and sometimes implicitly, when, to wit,
though he does not intend to test a person, yet that which he does or
says can seemingly have no other purpose than putting him to a test.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now
we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God
explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the
intention of probing God's knowledge, power or will. He tempts God
explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to experiment
on God's power, good will or wisdom. But He will tempt God implicitly,
if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks
for or does something which has no other use than to prove God's power,
goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his horse to gallop in
order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving the horse a trial: but
if he make the horse gallop with out any useful purpose, it seems to be
nothing else than a trial of the horse's speed; and the same applies to
all other things. Accordingly when a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts
himself to the divine assistance for some urgent or useful motive, this
is not to tempt God: for it is written (2 Paralip 20:12): "As we know not
what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee." But if this be done
without any useful or urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly.
Wherefore a gloss on Dt. 6:16, "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God,"
says: "A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he
chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to test
his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are moved
by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is an effect
of the divine power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with temporal aids,
so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God: wherefore if
they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they tempt God. But if
they were to neglect human assistance without any useful or urgent
motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii,
36) says that "Paul fled, not through ceasing to believe in God, but lest
he should tempt God, were he not to flee when he had the means of
flight." The Blessed Agatha had experience of God's kindness towards her,
so that either she did not suffer such sickness as required bodily
medicine, or else she felt herself suddenly cured by God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is a sin to tempt God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God has not
commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the same as to
tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all the tithes into
the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and try Me in this,
saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the flood-gates of heaven."
Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his knowledge
and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. Now it is lawful
to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O
taste and see that the Lord is sweet," and (Rm. 12:2): "That you may
prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God."
Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin, but
rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the Lord
said: "Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God," he replied: "I will not ask,
and I will not tempt the Lord," and then it was said to him: "Is it a
small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are grievous to my
God also?" (Is. 7:11-13). And we read of Abraham (Gn. 15:8) that he said
to the Lord: "Whereby may I know that I shall possess it?" namely, the
land which God had promised him. Again Gedeon asked God for a sign of the
victory promised to him (Judges 6:36, sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for
so doing. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written (Dt.
6:10): "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), to tempt a person is to put him
to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain. Wherefore
all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either in the
tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities), or in
others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove it to others), and in
this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it is a sin to be ignorant
of or to doubt that which pertains to God's perfection. Wherefore it is
evident that it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself
may know God's power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the divine
perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it to others:
this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of urgency, or a
pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite conditions. For thus did
the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought in the name of
Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in order, to wit, that Christ's
power might be made manifest to unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as stated
above (Q[87], A[1]). Hence there was a motive of urgency to pay it,
through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of usefulness, as
stated in the text quoted---"that there may be meat in God's house":
wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The words that follow,
"and try Me," are not to be understood causally, as though they had to
pay tithes in order to try if "God would open the flood-gates of heaven,"
but consecutively, because, to wit, if they paid tithes, they would prove
by experience the favors which God would shower upon them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will. One
is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to prove
whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge
of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental and thereby a man
experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness, and complacency in
God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom. ii) that "he
learnt divine thing through experience of them." It is in this way that
we are told to prove God's will, and to taste His sweetness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone, but
for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved because,
by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common welfare. Nor
would he have tempted God by asking, both because he would have asked
through God commanding him to do so, and because it was a matter relating
to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign through the divine instinct,
and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to have asked a sign through weakness
of faith, wherefore he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss
observes: just as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel (Lk. 1:18):
"Whereby shall I know this?" so that he was punished for his unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God for
a sign: first in order to test God's power or the truth of His word, and
this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God. Secondly, in
order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in some particular
matter; and this nowise comes under the head of temptation of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to the
virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a man doubts
God, as stated above (A[2]). Now doubt about God comes under the head of
unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore temptation of God is
opposed to faith rather than to religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): "Before prayer prepare
thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man," that is,
who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, "prays for what God taught
him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to do." Now this
pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that
temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, "And they tempted God in their
hearts," says that "to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with
simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts." Now deceit is
opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is opposed,
not to religion, but to truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above "to tempt God is to
pray to Him inordinately." Now to pray to God becomingly is an act of
religion as stated above (Q[83], A[15]). Therefore to tempt God is a sin
opposed to religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As clearly shown above (Q[81], A[5]), the end of religion
is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains directly to
irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is evident that to
tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since no one presumes to
tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it is manifest that to
tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[81], A[7]), it belongs to religion to
declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of reverence towards God.
Consequently it belongs to irreligion that, through doubtful faith, a man
does things indicative of irreverence towards God. To tempt God is one of
these; wherefore it is a species of irreligion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by forgiving
those against whom he has anything, or in some other way disposing
himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by God,
wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this implicit
temptation would seem to arise from presumption or indiscretion, yet the
very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and without due care in
matters relating to God implies irreverence towards Him. For it is
written (1 Pt. 5:6): "Be you humbled . . . under the mighty hand of God,"
and (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto
God." Therefore also this kind of temptation is a species of irreligion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to God,
Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man. Wherefore
deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and consequently it does
not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed to the truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin than
superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. Now the
sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was the
sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of superstition:
since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their number were
slain, as related in Ex. 32:28 [*Septuagint version. The Vulgate has
"twenty-three thousand."], whereas for the sin of temptation they all
without exception perished in the desert, and entered not into the land
of promise, according to Ps. 94:9, "Your fathers tempted Me," and further
on, "so I swore in My wrath that they should not enter into My rest."
Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it would
seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a species,
is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition which bears
some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than
superstition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave disrespectfully
to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we owe to our parents.
Now God should be honored by us as the Father of all (Malach. 1:6).
Therefore. temptation of God whereby we behave irreverently to God, seems
to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby we give to a creature the
honor we owe to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Dt. 17:2, "When there shall be found among
you," etc. says: "The Law detests error and idolatry above all: for it is
a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that belongs to the
Creator."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is that
which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is less
opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine excellence
than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just as a man is
more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error, than if he doubt
the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more against the reverence due to
God, if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to the divine
excellence, than if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man
professes an error, as shown above (Q[94], A[1], ad 1), whereas he who
tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of the divine excellence,
as stated above (A[2]). Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than
the sin of tempting God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above manner,
as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more severe
punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is written
(Ex. 32:34): "And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin also of
theirs."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards the
material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards the
end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God, since it
implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[97] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it is
singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence to
another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine excellence.
There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents, which can
without sin be given to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PERJURY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?
(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?
(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath
be false?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that the
statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Q[89], A[3]), an
oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less than by truth.
Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is incurred
likewise through lack of judgment, as when one swears indiscreetly, and
through lack of justice, as when one swears to something unjust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing
confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty than
the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by calling
on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in swearing by
false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human statement which is
confirmed on oath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx):
"Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are deceived
themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is: "Supposing a man
to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, whereas it is false";
the second is: "Take the instance of another who knows the statement to
be false, and swears to it as though it were true"; and the third is:
"Take another, who thinks his statement false, and swears to its being
true, while perhaps it is true," of whom he says afterwards that he is a
perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer while swearing to the truth.
Therefore falsehood is not necessary for perjury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath"
[*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[92], A[2]), moral acts take their
species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a
human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since an
assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot
happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls the end of
an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing, which is
called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood. Consequently
falsehood is essential to perjury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, "whichever of these three be
lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first and chiefly
perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the
Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in
whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very
reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do
the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since
by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of
lapsing into falsehood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since
they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys. ii, 3:
whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than the active
principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to the
truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that kind of
perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by swearing
what is false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the
apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it will
be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If
something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both materially
and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be
materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these cases the
conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way, on account
of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is formal in
anything is of greater importance than that which is material, he that
swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much of a perjurer as he
that swears to the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (De Verb.
Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It depends how the assertion proceeds from
the mind, for the tongue is not guilty except the mind be guilty."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all perjury is sinful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does not
fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet
sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for
instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore
he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is
perplexed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by
committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not to
enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not
all perjury is sinful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to be
guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that he
sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter order
him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly not all
perjury is sinful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a
declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation
of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may
swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on
the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the
statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made.
Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. cxxx), in
speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this horrible beast and
exterminate it from all human business."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[89], A[1]), to swear is to call God as
witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness to a
falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores the
truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore
perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs to
show reverence to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of
perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his oath, he
is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do
was not a fit matter of an oath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give
an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment.
Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but
contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is doing could not be
a matter of an oath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When one man swears or promises to do another's will, there
is to be understood this requisite condition---that the thing commanded
be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a
citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever the
state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature
of which obligation is that he should take his share of the state's
burdens if he takes a share of its goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some
particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be
made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past
and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the
statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as
stated above (FS, Q[96], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is laid
down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): "Referring to the question whether
an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to safeguard
their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that which our
predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and who absolved
such persons from the obligations of their oath. Henceforth, that
discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid occasions of perjury,
let them not be told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should
not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as for a mortal
sin." Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on St.
Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is a greater
thing to swear by God than by the Gospels." Now it is not always a mortal
sin to swear by God to something false; for instance, if we were to
employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in the course of an
ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to
break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through
committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that
infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed
in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury [*Cap. Cum
dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a
mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is
written (Lev. 19:12): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name."
Therefore it is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i,
2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Now we know
that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or
even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God.
Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt of God is a
mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature implies contempt of God,
since, as stated above (A[2]), the reason why it is sinful is because it
is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore it is manifest that
perjury, of its very nature, is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[89], A[7], ad 3), coercion does not
deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which can
be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which he took
under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. Nevertheless the
Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a man from an obligation
even of an oath, especially if the latter should have been coerced into
taking the oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as
for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal
sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent to
God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not excused
from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he
adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is swearing to
something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is he excused
from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to this, he would
seem to have no intention of swearing, and consequently is excused from
the sin of perjury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels,
than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of scandal
and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider them
equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to commit
perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the law.
Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not
infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared by
sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he has not sinned
mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather to one who breaks
a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has it in his power
after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a
declaratory oath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer commits a
sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that he swears
falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand
an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his own part he
leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one enjoin an oath
on another person.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to impose
an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath from a
person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then seem to
consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to impose an
oath on one who swears falsely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): "If anyone sin, and hear the
voice of one swearing falsely [*'Falsely' is not in the Vulgate'], and is
a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he
do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." Hence it would seem that
when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he is bound to denounce
him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath of such a man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is it
to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an oath of
one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep.
xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who swears
falsely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a
distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath on
his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of the
exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on his own
account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as does
Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm. clxxx): "For if he knows not that the man
will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: 'Swear to me' in order
that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation"
(because, to wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the
man will speak the truth). "This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Mt.
5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he knows
the man to have done so," i.e. the contrary of what he swears to, "and
yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other destroys himself
by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in
accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a
third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a
person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because
seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose
instance he demands it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath
on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other will swear
truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes
he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath in order that he
may be more certain.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), "though we are
forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy
Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others." Hence he that
accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he
forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the
passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another's
perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be
denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm."
Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be
made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin
of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another
person's injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to
the case, as stated above (Q[33], A[7]; Q[68], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good,
as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently
it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false
gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods. Yet it
seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true
God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man
makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false gods, as
Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man swears falsely by
the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] Out. Para. 1/2
OF SACRILEGE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby
sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1)
Sacrilege; (2) Simony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is sacrilege?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of the species of sacrilege;
(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred
thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can. Si quis
suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the
sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the
sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection with
anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of
something sacred.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can.
Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices,
"he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege." Yet public
offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that
sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things
receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be
violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of
a sacred thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be
sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]; FS, Q[101], A[4]), a thing
is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just
as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good
end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to
the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which
reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence
for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the head of
sacrilege.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good
of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a
commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine
providence, according to Wis. 6:5, "Being ministers of His kingdom, you
have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of the term, whatever
savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment,
and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a
kind of likeness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of
Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "But you are washed, but you are
sanctified." Wherefore it is written (1 Pt. 2:9): "You are a chosen
generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people."
Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance that
unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a
sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor.
Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who is
honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves
irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence.
Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the
latter be not violated in itself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sacrilege is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sacrilege not a special sin. It is stated
(XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin
against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by their
negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin is "a word, deed
or desire contrary to the law of God," according to Augustine (Contra
Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of
sin. Now sacrilege comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance
under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a
consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one
steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins as
the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v, 11).
But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for
it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the
preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special
sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to
which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege
is a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there
must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived
chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now
in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the violation
of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De Fide
Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it
honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death," as
acting against the king: and in the same way if a man violate a sacred
thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to God
and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the divine
law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do. These are
guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege,
through perverting the words of the divine law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in
various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed to
the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by
one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to
reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although
his act contains various kinds of sin materially.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through
its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing:
for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place for he
might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the
sacred things?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished
according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate
species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to
be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and
that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of
sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the
same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder,
theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore
they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently
it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance
with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If,
therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred
person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a
sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore
the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now
the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above (A[1]).
Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the
sacred things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the sin of sacrilege consists in
the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a
sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently the species of
sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects
of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the
greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against,
the more grievous the sacrilege.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who
are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to
certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to
the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written
(2 Macc. 5:19): "God did not choose the people for the place's sake, but
the place for the people's sake." Hence sacrilege committed against a
sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a
sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of
sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed
against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the
differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to
the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament
of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege
that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. The
second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels consecrated
for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the
relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to
speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come things connected with
the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and those things, whether
movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers.
And whoever sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of
sacrilege.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the
aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a
material, but also a formal difference.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in
one respect, and to different species in another respect. Thus Socrates
and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but differ in the species
"colored thing," if one be white and the other black. In like manner it
is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material
acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect
of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by
copulation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege
materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation is
from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13] says that "a trifle on a
priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But formally and properly
speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it
is committed against his holiness, for instance if a virgin consecrated
to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to be said of other
instances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be
pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a
criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is
punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii, 13;
Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not be
awarded a pecuniary punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment,
according to Nahum 1:9, "There shall not rise a double affliction." But
sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for
violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and
minor excommunication for other sacrileges. Therefore sacrilege should
not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): "Neither have we taken
an occasion of covetousness." But it seems to involve an occasion of
covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the
violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting
punishment of sacrilege.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax]:
"If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped
slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi": and
again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21):
"Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried
purest silver."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be
considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and
that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be
tormented" (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one
guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is
excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted
above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to
be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines,
that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem
that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not
sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from
him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he
is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the
Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary
punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from
sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but
excommunication in its stead.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from
sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to
inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of
excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[99] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this
would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted
for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility, and
consequently involves no occasion of avarice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] Out. Para. 1/1
ON SIMONY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) What is simony?
(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?
(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?
(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?
(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or
also oral remuneration or remuneration by service?
(6) Of the punishment of simony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual
or connected with a spiritual thing?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy or sell
something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing." Simony is
heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per pecunias.]):
"The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with him impugned the
Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who are guilty of
simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit
of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, whereas the latter
make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells
what he has just as he wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his
possessions." But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but of
the intellect, as shown above (Q[10], A[2]). Therefore simony should not
be defined as an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this
is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an intentional
will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven.
But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says in a
homily (v, in Ev.): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you
possess." Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something
spiritual.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of whom
we read (Acts 8:18,19) that "he offered the apostles money" that he might
buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on whomsoever he imposed
his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost." But we do not read that he
wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will to sell a
spiritual thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides
buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind of legal
compromise---Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that simony is
defined insufficiently.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself
spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add "or connected with
spiritual things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony: yet he
can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to
buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can.
Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): "None of the faithful is ignorant that
buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of
simony."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[18], A[2]) an act is evil
generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is undue
matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because a
spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is
said concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), "she is more precious than all
riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared with
her": and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon in
its very source, said (Acts 8:20): "Keep thy money to thyself to perish
with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be
purchased with money."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor is
not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (OBJ[1]). Now
ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual
things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of us as of the
ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things,
since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord said
(Mt. 10:8): "Freely have you received, freely give."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and
divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of
irreligion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of
faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart, so too the vices
opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief without,
sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is said to be a
"heresy," as regards the outward protestation, since by selling a gift of
the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is the owner of a
spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must, however, be observed that
Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy
Ghost for money, said that the world was not created by God, but by some
heavenly power, as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason
simoniacs are reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine's
book on heretics.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[58], A[4]), justice, with all its parts,
and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its subject.
Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the will. This act
is furthermore described as "express," in order to signify that it
proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in virtue and vice.
Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that sins from choice, but
only he who chooses sin through contempt of those things whereby man is
wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated above (Q[14], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man gives
what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term "buying" in a
wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to the
perfect signification of buying, both because neither "the sufferings of
this time," nor any gift or deed of ours, "are worthy to be compared with
the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us" (Rm. 8:18), and because
merit consists chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion, but in
an inward affection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in order
that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii [*Can.
Salvator]), that "Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of the Holy
Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the signs to be
wrought by him." Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in
intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish to buy them are
likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate, in act, Giezi the
disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kgs. 5:20-24) that he received
money from the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spiritual
things may be called not only "simoniacs" but also "giezites."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The terms "buying" and "selling" cover all kinds of
non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange or
agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by authority of
the parties concerned without danger of committing simony, as laid down
by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; cap. Super, de Transact.].
Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of his office, can cause these
exchanges to be made for useful or necessary reasons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives
through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are spiritual
by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while others are
called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence (I, qu. iii,
cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that "spiritual things do not
progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no bodily life
without the body."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any
other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is his
sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as
dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, were
he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for a
spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of simony.
In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a layman moneys
not belonging to the goods of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money for
the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as we shall state
in the TP, Q[68], A[6]; TP, Q[73], A[3]. But seemingly it is lawful in
certain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a priest were
unwilling to baptize a dying child without being paid. Therefore it is
not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, which
is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend or money
for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the
other sacraments.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament
consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money when
absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to
buy or sell a sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be not
sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that "it was no
crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom." Now it is the
custom in some places to give something in the consecration of bishops,
blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange for the
chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it is not
unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously hinders a
person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But it is lawful
for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seemingly,
in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a like ecclesiastical
dignity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is given
for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]):
"Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from the
priesthood."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most
spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which no
price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a
non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the
ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, according
to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), "Know you not, that they who
work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the holy place; and
they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual grace
of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused by any
custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over natural or divine
law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. FS, Q[97], A[3]]. Now by money
we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary value, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the other hand, to receive anything
for the support of those who administer the sacraments, in accordance
with the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor
is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment
for their need. Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the
priests that rule well," says: "They should look to the people for a
supply to their need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since nowise
ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize without being
paid, one must act as though there were no priest available for the
baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the child can, in such a
case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be baptized by anyone else. He
could, however, lawfully buy the water from the priest, because it is
merely a bodily element. But if it were an adult in danger of death that
wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to baptize him
without being paid, he ought, if possible, to be baptized by someone
else. And if he is unable to have recourse to another, he must by no
means pay a price for Baptism, and should rather die without being
baptized, because for him the baptism of desire would supply the lack of
the sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for
consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be
simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not the price
of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a punishment of a
past crime for which he was excommunicated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over natural or
divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such
there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with
the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly simoniacal,
especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling to pay. But if
the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized by custom it is not
simoniacal, provided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only
of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand be acceded to
voluntarily. In all these cases, however, one must beware of anything
having an appearance of simony or avarice, according to the saying of the
Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain
yourselves."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of one's
rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any dignity or
prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since this would be to
use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But it is lawful to
use money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one has already
acquired that right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 2/2
Reply OBJ 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia] say
that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is
conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state in
the Third Part of the work [*XP, Q[42], A[3]]. Wherefore we must reply
that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office
of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for Matrimony
considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be considered as a
sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law [*Cap. Cum in
Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand anything for the Nuptial
Blessing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for
spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But
something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears
from 1 Kgs. 9:7,8, and 3 Kgs. 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it is
lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual
actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the
assistance of their prayers, according to Lk. 16:9, "Make unto you
friends of the mammon of iniquity." To preachers also, who sow spiritual
things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:14).
Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the divine praises in
the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and sometimes an annual
income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to receive something
for spiritual actions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is
lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may sell
his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master the
exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem lawful
for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual power,
for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now in
certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are received
there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for spiritual things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid invisibilis]):
"It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by the
consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by
seeking any kind of return whatever." Now all these spiritual things are
acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge
a price or return for them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because they
confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called
spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto.
And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men,
according to 1 Cor. 9:7, "Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own
charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?"
Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual in such
like actions; but to receive or give something for the support of those
who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes of the
Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there be no
intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be brought to bear
on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding spiritual things that
ought to be administered, for then there would be an appearance of
simony. But after the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then
the statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be exacted from
those who are unwilling but able to pay, if the superior authorize this
to be done.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Micheas 3:9, certain
gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood, but
not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked
prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from
them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of
buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the
poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Temporal
things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not as a price
of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11, "Let the priests
that rule well," says: "Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal
to live, charity demands that this should be given to them: yet the
Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the object of preaching: for
if they sell it for this purpose, they sell a great thing for a
contemptible price." In like manner temporal things are given to those
who praise God by celebrating the divine office whether for the living or
for the dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the same
purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for making processions in
funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the
intention of buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance
if it were decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a
funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an
ordinance would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any
person. The ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were
decreed that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms,
because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover,
the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the
latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is bound by
virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing
spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from the
funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. Therefore, if he were to
accept anything for the exercise of his spiritual power, this would
imply, not a hiring of his labor (which he is bound to give, as a duty
arising out of the office he has accepted), but a sale of the very use of
a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to receive
anything for any dispensing whatever, or for allowing someone else to
take his duty, or for correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct
them. On the other hand it is lawful for him to receive "procurations,"
when he visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a
means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having
taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of others
can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since this is
not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other
hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale
of the truth, and consequently he would sin grievously. For instance,
those who in certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of
that church and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an
ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything
in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price for
entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that are
unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the
monastery is free, to accept something for the support of those who are
about to be received into the monastery, if its revenues are
insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in admitting to a
monastery a person who has proved his regard for that monastery by the
generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to
incite a person's regard for a monastery by means of temporal benefits,
in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the monastery; although
it is unlawful to agree to give or receive something for entrance into a
monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual
things?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed to
spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to spiritual
things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake of
spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed
to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, and
this is clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual
things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice for
the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28).
Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of
burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right of
the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the
priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought
from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gn. 23:8, sqq.), and Jacob
bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gn. 25:31, sqq.). Again the
right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and is granted
"in fee." Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be redeemed.
Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of prebends of
which they have the presentation, although a prebend is something annexed
to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to
spiritual things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap.
Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one
is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let
no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways.
First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have to spiritual
things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical
office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual
things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things,
because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other
things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto,
for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the
presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred vessels,
which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore such things as
these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede them in the order
of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as to
their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but their
relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as to
their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their
material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor provided
they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since when
once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels but mere
metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out of the same material
they would have to be consecrated again.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/5
Reply OBJ 3: We have no authority for supposing that the double cave
which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that purpose:
wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for burial, in
order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be lawful now to buy
an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a church. Nevertheless
because even among the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as
religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a burial
place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not sin in buying,
because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot of ground. Even now,
it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy land on which there
has previously been a church, as we have also said with regard to sacred
vessels (Reply OBJ[2]). Or again, Abraham is to be excused because he
thus freed himself of a grievance. For although Ephron offered him the
burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it
gratis without prejudice to himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/5
The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's choice,
according to Malach. 1:2,3, "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."
Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in
buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his grievance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 3/5
The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it
be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the property sold or granted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 4/5
The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but
merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe,
as stated above (Q[87], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 5/5
With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed,
that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a
benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of
the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on
the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that
benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as
though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt of
simony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an
equivalent of service, or for an oral remuneration?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things in
return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration. Gregory
says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that those who serve the
interests of the Church should be rewarded." Now an equivalent of service
denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems lawful to
confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service
received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on
account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it
implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simoniacal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request would seem
to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve simony, which
consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the
conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's request.
Therefore this is not simoniacal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that they
may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration: and yet
hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral
remuneration does not entail simony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says:
"Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose
for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration
of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or money
received, is guilty of simony."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the term "money" denotes
"anything that can have a pecuniary value." Now it is evident that a
man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a
pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. Therefore
to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is
the same as to grant it for the money, received or promised, at which
that service could be valued. If likewise, to grant a person's request
for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to some kind of
usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man contracts
the guilt of simony by accepting money or any eternal thing which comes
under the head of "real remuneration," so too does he contract it, by
receiving "oral remuneration" or an "equivalent in service rendered."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service, directed to
spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or benefit of her
ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of
the devotion that led him to render the service, as he would by reason of
any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of remuneration for service
rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or
directed to carnal things (e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the
profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it
will be a case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be
simony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by
reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but
not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does
not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is based. But
to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the understanding
or intention that he provide for one's kindred from the revenue is
manifest simony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that pertains to
human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby man's favor is
obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly one
commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an unworthy person
implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention wherefore the deed
itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for a worthy person, the
deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based on a worthy cause, on
account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person for whom the
request is made. Nevertheless there may be simony in the intention, if
one look, not to the worthiness of the person, but to human favor. If,
however, a person asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls,
his very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for
an unworthy person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for
oneself an ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for the sake of
praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false pretenses stealthily
purloins rather than buys human praise: so that seemingly the hypocrite
is not guilty of simony.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being
deprived of what they have acquired by simony?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not
fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by
simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for a
remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once
acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration.
Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of
what he has acquired simoniacally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the
episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from
him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church
tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the
power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if
he has acquired it by simony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done without his
knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is
voluntary, as was shown above (FS, Q[74], AA[1],2; FS, Q[77], A[7]). Now
it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual, which
others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent. Therefore
he should not be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed on
him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a person
who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to restore
what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit of those
who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate and his
entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that which has
been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery by
simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one should
be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has
committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic state
which he has acquired by simony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted for
the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the judge. Now
simony is committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is
defined in reference to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore
a person should not always be deprived of what he has acquired by simony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than to
retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those who are
guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity.
Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): "He
that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or
promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the
dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired
against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some of
his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will and orders, the
recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord, Whose
stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered spiritual
things to be given gratis, according to Mt. 10:8, "Freely have you
received, freely give." Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in
return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those
who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things,
as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other
punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and
excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis
Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally, receives
the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the sacrament:
but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because
he has received the character by stealth as it were, and against the will
of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by virtue of the law,
both as regards himself, namely, that he should not busy himself about
exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely, that no one may
communicate with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be
public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he basely gave,
although the other party unjustly retains it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders
simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a
benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal
transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the
law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret he
is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not as
regards others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows to
have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command or for
fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from him do not
receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are ignorant of
his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a dispensation.
Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders in obedience to
his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of simony, but that one
ought not to exercise the Order without a dispensation. But this is an
unreasonable statement, because no one should obey a man to the extent of
communicating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue
of the law, suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders
unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by receiving
Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain
on the point, one ought not to give credence to another's sin, and so one
ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the
bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal
promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him
because he is not suspended as regards others, but only as regards
himself, as stated above (ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not only the
punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring
unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it.
Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or an
ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of what he
has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and resigning the
benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this
he is punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is bound to
restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but also such as could have
been acquired by a careful possessor (which, however, is to be understood
of the net fruits, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account
of the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended for the
good of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by
others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of
his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with
fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he
has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be
made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an
enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he
is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction,
by paying what was promised.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must be
restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer,
notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of
that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers by his
sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the guilty parties
be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire chapter be at
fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of superior authority,
either to the poor or to some other church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 5 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 5: If there are any persons who have been simoniacally
admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was
committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General Council
[*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III], they must be
expelled from their monastery without hope of return, and do perpetual
penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of the same order, if a
stricter one be not found. If, however, this took place before the
Council, they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If this
cannot be done, they must be received into monasteries of the same
order, by way of compensation, lest they wander about the world, but they
must not be admitted to their former rank, and must be assigned a lower
place.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 5 Para. 2/2
On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their
knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting they
may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of simony;
but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is not punished
as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of his
evil intention.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has
knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the bishop
also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what he
has received simoniacally, so that he will receive either the lesser
dispensation allowing him to communicate with the laity, or a greater
dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to retain his order in
some other Church; or again a greater dispensation, allowing him to
remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a full dispensation
allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the same Church, but
not to accept a prelacy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)
After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will
render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry
arise with regard to piety:
(1) To whom does piety extend?
(2) What does piety make one offer a person?
(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?
(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of
religion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human
individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes,
properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by the
term {eusebeia}. But the worship of God does not denote relation to man,
but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain
human individuals.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day, provides a
banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of
mercy." Now the works of mercy are to be done to all, according to
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not extend
definitely to certain special persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual relations
besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. viii, 11,12), and on each of them is founded a kind of
friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a
gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay:
'godliness']." Therefore piety extends not only to one's kindred and
fellow-citizens.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by piety
that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country
and render them faithful service."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways,
according to their various excellence and the various benefits received
from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely
excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. In
the second place, the principles of our being and government are our
parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment.
Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after
God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so
does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one's
parents and one's country.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our
kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our
country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends
of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship due
to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular. Hence it
is written (Malach. 1:6): "If I be a father, where is My honor?"
Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine worship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term piety is often
used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the common
people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God Himself
has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices.
This custom has led to the application of the word 'pious' to God
Himself."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and fellow-citizens
are more referable to the principles of his being than other relations:
wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether piety provides support for our parents?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our parents.
For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy father and
mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honor.
Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide support for one's
parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound to
support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), "neither ought the
children to lay up for the parents." Therefore piety does not oblige them
to support their parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to
other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above (A[1]). But
one is not bound to support all one's kindred and fellow-citizens.
Therefore neither is one bound to support one's parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, our Lord (Mt. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for
hindering children from supporting their parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to
say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that
which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior
through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence
and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him
to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he
be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his
cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and so
on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service due.
Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty and
homage": "duty" referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or honor,
because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give homage
to those whose memory or presence we honor."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Mt. 15:3-6) the
honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them; and the
reason for this is that support is given to one's father because it is
due to him as to one greater.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his
son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially
fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to
support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay
by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is
accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to
support him, but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand, because
naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children
of their parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer homage and
duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country"; not,
however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others
according to our means and their personal claims.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from other
virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds from
love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue
from charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But
piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x).
Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty,
seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common good.
But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a
part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a
special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in rendering
another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of something
due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a
special way to that which is its connatural principle of being and
government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it pays duty
and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are related
thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and
charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is a
protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is the principle of our being and government in a far
more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence religion, which
gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage
to our parents and country. But things relating to creatures are
transferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of excellence, piety
designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of excellence, is
called "Our Father."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is for
us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of our
country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice has more
of the character of a general virtue than piety has.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for
the sake of religion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents should be
omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Lk. 14:26): "If any
man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and
children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot
be My disciple." Hence it is said in praise of James and John (Mt. 4:22)
that they left "their nets and father, and followed" Christ. Again it is
said in praise of the Levites (Dt. 33:9): "Who hath said to his father,
and to his mother: I do not know you; and to his brethren: I know you
not; and their own children they have not known. These have kept Thy
word." Now a man who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even
hates them, must needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of
piety should be omitted for the sake of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Lk. 9:59,60) that in answer to him who
said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord replied: "Let
the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of God."
Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury
one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the sake of
religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now just as we
worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do we worship
God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the
sake of the worship of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not break to
fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with those
observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both on the
score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on the score
of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without the
permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards one's
parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Mt. 15:3-6) who taught
that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying one's
parents the honor we owe them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is
opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his
book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), "good is not opposed to good."
Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one
another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other. Now,
as stated above (FS, Q[7], A[2]; FS, Q[18], A[3]), the act of every
virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if it overstep
them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice. Hence it belongs
to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents according to the due
mode. But it is not the due mode that man should tend to worship his
father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Lk. 12:52, "the piety of
divine religion takes precedence of the claims of kindred."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the
worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to
one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad
Heliod.): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy
mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the
cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter."
Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents should
be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If,
however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not withdrawn
from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and there will
be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom.
xxxvii in Ev.) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance in our
way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them." For if
our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we
must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is in this sense
that the Levites are said to have not known their kindred, because they
obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the idolaters (Ex. 32). James
and John are praised for leaving their parents and following our Lord,
not that their father incited them to evil, but because they deemed it
possible for him to find another means of livelihood, if they followed
Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father because,
according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), "Our Lord by so doing
saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and other
things that one anticipates under these circumstances. For after the
burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and so
forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the
funeral." Or, according to Cyril's commentary on Lk. 9, "this disciple's
request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that he might
support a yet living father in the latter's old age, until at length he
should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not grant, because there were
others, bound by the duties of kindred, to take care of him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred by us
to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with regard to any
of our neighbors are offered to God, according to Mt. 25:40: "As long as
you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you did it to Me." Accordingly,
if our carnal parents stand in need of our assistance, so that they have
no other means of support, provided they incite us to nothing against
God, we must not abandon them for the sake of religion. But if we cannot
devote ourselves to their service without sin, or if they can be
supported without our assistance, it is lawful to forego their service,
so as to give more time to religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in the world,
and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he that is in the
world, if he has parents unable to find support without him, he must not
leave them and enter religion, because he would be breaking the
commandment prescribing the honoring of parents. Some say, however, that
even then he might abandon them, and leave them in God's care. But this,
considered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while having human means
at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's
assistance. on the other hand, if the parents can find means of
livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter
religion, because children are not bound to support their parents except
in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his
profession in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world:
wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave
the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more
with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience to
his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points efforts for
his parents' support.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] Out. Para. 1/2
OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of
which will manifest the contrary vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
(2) What does observance offer?
(3) Of its comparison with piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct from
other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But the
object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully
says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay worship
and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity." But worship and
honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in dignity.
Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are in a
position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in science
and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay honor and
worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore observance,
whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in dignity, is not a
special virtue distinct from other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a position
of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law, according to Rm.
13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is
due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of the law belongs to
legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore observance is not by
itself a special virtue distinct from other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance along
with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As explained above (Q[101], AA[1],3; Q[80]), according to
the various excellences of those persons to whom something is due, there
must needs be a corresponding distinction of virtues in a descending
order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle
in a particular way, which character is found in God in a universal way,
so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence in one respect,
partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father
is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever
pertains to the perfection of human life: while a person who is in a
position of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to
certain things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters,
the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of
learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are designated
as "fathers," on account of their being charged with like cares: thus the
servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kgs. 5:13): "Father, if the prophet had
bid thee do some great thing," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby worship is given to
find piety, whereby we worship our so under piety we find observance,
whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[101], A[3], ad 2), religion goes by the
name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so called
is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be called
observance by way of excellence, although observance properly speaking is
distinct from piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a man
not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain power of
governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered
as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of others. On the other
hand, the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not
give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but merely a
certain excellence in himself. Wherefore a special virtue is appointed
for the payment of worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity.
Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit
for positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account
of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay
the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot be done
to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their position of
dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our parents.
Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and not to
special justice, which is a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above
(Q[58], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who
are in positions of dignity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay worship and
honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according to Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honor,
so that worship and honor would seem to be the same. Therefore it is
unfitting to define observance as paying worship and honor to persons in
positions of dignity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe: wherefore
this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of justice. Now we do
not owe worship and honor to all persons in positions of dignity, but
only to those who are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly
defined as giving worship and honor to all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who are
placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of
remuneration, according to Rm. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues;
tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear;
honor to whom honor." Moreover, we owe them reverence and subjection,
according to Heb. 13:17, "Obey your prelates, and be subject to them."
Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind
of dignity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern
subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus a
sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a
certain excellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a
person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration:
first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a
certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his
government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which
is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of the
exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting in
rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him,
according to one's faculty, for the benefits we received from him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever other
suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[80]), debt is twofold. One is legal
debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor and
worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over him.
The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty: it
is in this way that we owe worship and honor to persons in positions of
dignity even though we be not their subjects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions of
dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to them on
account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their
government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the
command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their
labor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety. For the
prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a father who
is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because
the household which a father governs is part of the state which is
governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, and inferiors
are more subject thereto. Therefore observance is a greater virtue than
piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the common
good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we ought to set
aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself
to the danger of death for the sake of the common good. Therefore
observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions of dignity,
is a greater virtue than piety, which pays worship to one's kindred.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the first
place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the virtuous by the
virtue of observance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore observance
takes the first place after religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Now,
immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first
table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to piety.
Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order of
excellence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity
in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one serves
them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer
belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to one's
father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that which is paid to
persons in positions of dignity refers specially to their personal
usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to observance, as
distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must
needs take into consideration the different relations in which other
persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard. Now it
is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred are more
substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity, since
birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's
substance than external government, the principle of which is seated in
those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes
precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more
akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a
particular power, as regards external government, but not as regards the
father being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should
be compared with the divine power from which all things derive their
being.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are related to
the common good, their worship does not pertain to observance, but to
piety, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[102] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be proportionate
to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered in himself, but
also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous
persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of honor than the
persons of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, on
account of the benefits they have received from their parents and their
natural kinship with them, to pay worship and honor to their parents than
to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] Out. Para. 1/2
PARTS OF OBSERVANCE AND ORDINARY VICE (QQ[103]-109)
OF DULIA (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1)
dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to those
who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey their
commands.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?
(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?
(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above
us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?
(4) Whether it contains several species?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether honor denotes something corporal?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal. For honor
is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be gathered from
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is something
spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated above (Q[81],
A[2], ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "honor is
the reward of virtue." Now, since virtue consists chiefly of spiritual
things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward is more
excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of corporal
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory. Now
praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor consists of
things internal and spiritual.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, "Honor widows
that are widows indeed," and (1 Tim. 5:17), "let the priests that rule
well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.):
"Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration." Now both
of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor consists of
corporal things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence.
Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their
excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now
witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is the
searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices. wherefore
honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal
movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges either God's
excellence or another man's excellence before God. But, as regards men,
one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, either by words, as when
one proclaims another's excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for
instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by
offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly honor
consists of signs, external and corporal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand it
is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man honors
another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is
the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in order that he may
be held in reverence by others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is not a
sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal things can
be greater than honor, since these corporal things themselves are
employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue. It is, however,
due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made known, according
to Mt. 5:15, "Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel,
but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house."
In this sense honor is said to be the reward of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways. First,
because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor consists of
any external signs, so that praise is included in honor. Secondly,
because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a person's
excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear witness to
his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise one that works well
for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even to the best, which is
not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our bearing
witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes clear to the
knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for "glory" is the
same as {kleria}, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rm. 16:27 observes
that glory is "clear knowledge together with praise."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are above
us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Mt. 11:11, "He
that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the
Baptist." Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor him
(Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those who are above us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his
virtue, as stated above (A[1]; Q[63], A[3]). But sometimes those who are
above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as neither
is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of
nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 12:10): "With honor preventing one
another," and we read (1 Pt. 2:17): "Honor all men." But this would not
be so if honor were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honor
is not due properly to those who are above us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias "had ten talents
of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and we read
(Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be
proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom the king
hath a mind to honor." Therefore honor is paid to those also who are
beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not due properly
to those who are above us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is due
to the best."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), honor is nothing but an
acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's
excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor
him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in
itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is always
due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those who
honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some others,
or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in some
respect and not simply.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of honor,
but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or again, he
forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity
of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the angels "according to
the hope of glory of the children of God": wherefore he refused to be
honored by him as though he were superior to him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of his
virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and because the honor
paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he presides. As for
the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should be looked upon as
enemies, rather than treated with honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In every man is to be found something that makes it
possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3, "In
humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and thus, too,
we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not
that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of some
excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and Mardochaeus were
honored by kings.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria? Objection 1. It
seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct from latria. For a
gloss on Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my trust," says:
"Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by creation, to Whom
we owe latria." Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct
from that which is directed to Him as God. Therefore dulia is not a
distinct virtue from latria.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), "to be
loved is like being honored." Now the charity with which we love God is
the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia whereby we
honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we
honor God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image is
the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing
represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made to
the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. 2:22,23) that
"they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man
incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him."
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is
honored.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due to
man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey their
masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from latria which
denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to what has been stated above (Q[101], A[3]),
where there are different aspects of that which is due, there must needs
be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God
and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is competent to God
and to man under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount
lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely subject
to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the divine
lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular power over some man or
creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a
distinct virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of
God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by observance we
honor all those who excel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is
the reverence of servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for
servitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence,
inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria is
called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of
excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to create by
reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss drew a
distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of creation, which is
not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect of lordship, which
is communicated to a creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that
which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore the
charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we love our
neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from charity, in
respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In like manner,
since there is one reason for serving God and another for serving man,
and for honoring the one or the other, latria and dulia are not the same
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the thing
represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an image is
referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the movement to
the image differs specifically from the movement to the thing.
Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia regards
some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of that
dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing
reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion,
towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be towards
its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of God
redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence that is
paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether dulia has various species?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we show
honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under
different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in the
object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is
divided into specifically different virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as pale
differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a mean between
latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having a special
affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother
of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species of dulia, one
being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image of
God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational creature we
find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image
differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must
distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more since
honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance, to the
wood of the Holy Cross.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not
divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be
taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account of
any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance, and
any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken in
this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one another. In
another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting the reverence
of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude, as stated above
(A[3]). Taken in this sense it is not divided into different species, but
is one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet.
ii), for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a
soldier his commanding officer under another, the disciple his master
under another, and so on in similar cases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a wide
sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a man by
reason of his having an affinity to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational
creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are naturally
subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the
same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's robe receives the
same honor as the king himself, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] Out. Para. 1/1
OF OBEDIENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?
(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;
(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?
(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one man is bound to obey another?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For nothing
should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so ordered
that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God
made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own
counsel." Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have to
look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule of
conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human
conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it
acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous. Therefore
if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this
very reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable through
being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey
another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates and
be subject to them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed from
natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In
natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions
by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and so in
human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue
of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to
command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural
order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the
higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and
divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as though
it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike
irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what
he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from his own
counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other
things, so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory
says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give way to another's voice, we
overcome ourselves in our own hearts."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational
wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than
another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the
one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will of this
other man who obeys him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one way on
the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it;
in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own
free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious,
chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore although
obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt will, one's merit is not
for that reason diminished, especially before God, Who sees not only the
outward deed, but also the inward will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether obedience is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For disobedience
is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general sin, because
Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey the divine law."
Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral. But
obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised under
faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold
the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the
more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the more
meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." But every
special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its own,
since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in
Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects.
Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior,
of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of
superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many
special virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice,
as stated above (Q[80]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have
a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render a
deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the
divinely established order of things, as shown above (A[1]), and
therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order,
as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. FP, Q[5], A[5]]. Again,
this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its
object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their superiors,
this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as
special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its
specific object is a command tacit or express, because the superior's
will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man's obedience
seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls
the express command as soon as he understands his superior's will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from
admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues correspond:
thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils both an act of
fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end, and an act of
justice, by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the aspect of
precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts of all virtues, but
not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of
precept, as stated above (FS, Q[96], A[3]). Moreover, certain things are
sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such
things for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden.
Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering
formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special
virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way it is
requisite for obedience that one perform an act of justice or of some
other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept; and for
disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the
other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of
any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the
omission of that action through any intention whatever, then obedience
will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct
object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed or
inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and
which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to Titus 3:1,
"Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it
observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is
measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so
far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he
ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q[92],
A[2]). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the person who
retains another's property, and deficiency in the person who does not
receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too
obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of him who fails
to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his
own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does not
receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be a mean between
two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice (Q[58],
A[10]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Obedience, like every virtue requires the will to be prompt
towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant to it.
Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from
another's will. Wherefore obedience make a man's will prompt in
fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If
that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its own sake apart
from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends
towards it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on account of
the precept, but on account of his own will. But if that which is
prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself,
repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is
quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes
when it holds its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one's own
will seems to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept,
but to the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in
disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will tends to
nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards
outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of
God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters
obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided
the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [*Cf. Q[82], A[2]] to
the fulfilment of the precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels:
wherefore it admits a various species according to the various aspects of
excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the
person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And since
obedience is due to a person's precept on account of reverence to him, it
follows that obedience to a man is of one species, though the causes from
which it proceeds differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues. For it is
written (1 Kgs. 15:22): "Obedience is better than sacrifices." Now the
offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all
moral virtues, as shown above (Q[81], A[6]). Therefore obedience is the
greatest of all virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the only
virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when
ingrafted." Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience
is greater than all the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should never be
done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we should
lay aside the good we are doing." Now one does not lay aside a thing
except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the good
of other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from
charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be
practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not
through fear of punishment, but through love of justice." Therefore
charity is a greater virtue than obedience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering
to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man
contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is
greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man
contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue
derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his contemning
earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, virtues whereby he
adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues, whereby he
holds in contempt some earthly thing in order to adhere to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns that
he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three kinds
of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of these
are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and the
highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief, in a way,
is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all other goods.
Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn
our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral
virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred to
sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas by
obedience we slay our own will." Wherefore even any other acts of virtue
are meritorious before God through being performed out of obedience to
God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one's
goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the fulfilment of
the divine will, which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be
meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done without charity,
which cannot exist apart from obedience. For it is written (1 Jn. 2:4,5):
"He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a
liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity
of God is perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and
dislikes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and
honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under different
virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of
precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it proceeds
from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under
observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence for one's
parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it proceeds from
reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains to devotion,
which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from this point of view
it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer sacrifice, as well as
because, "in a sacrifice we slay another's body, whereas by obedience we
slay our own will," as Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case
in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God
than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the
commandment of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a precept,
belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue act causally
or dispositively towards their generation and preservation, obedience is
said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And yet it does not follow that
obedience takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons.
First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept, one may
nevertheless perform that act of virtue without considering the aspect of
precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue, whose object is naturally
prior to the precept, that virtue is said to be naturally prior to
obedience. Such a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime
nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to command is
competent to God. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may
precede, even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way
obedience is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by
nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to which we are
bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so forth: and by no
means may such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But there is
another good to which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we
ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are
bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by falling into sin.
Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he who forbids his subjects any
single good, must needs allow them many others, lest the souls of those
who obey perish utterly from starvation, through being deprived of every
good." Thus the loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and
other goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it is
written (Mt. 9:30,31) that our Lord after healing the two blind men
commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out
spread His fame abroad in all that country." Yet they are not blamed for
so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in all
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. Now
we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue: thus He
commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22); and the Jews to
steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which things are contrary
to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was an adulteress
(Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be
obeyed in all things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine will
even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to
conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated
above (FS, Q[19], A[10]). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 24:7): "All things that the Lord
hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), he who obeys is moved by the
command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by their
motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things that are
moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown
above (FS, Q[9], A[6]). Therefore just as all natural things are subject
to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too all wills, by a kind
of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the divine command.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the miracle
had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine precept, but,
as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His servants who follow
Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and yet that it should be
proclaimed against their will, in order that others might profit by their
example."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since "the
nature of a thing is what God does therein," according to a gloss on Rm.
11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of nature;
so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue since virtue and
rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with God's will and
obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of
virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abraham to slay his
innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life
an death. Nor again was it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews
to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are His,
and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that
Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because God Himself is the
ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with
woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons
aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, yet
he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes to
man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is bound to
obey God's commands in all things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all
things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your parents in
all things," and farther on (Col. 3:22): "Servants, obey in all things
your masters according to the flesh." Therefore in like manner other
subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects,
according to Dt. 5:5, "I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and
you at that time, to show you His words." Now there is no going from
extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore
the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of God,
wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): "You . . . received me as an
angel of God, even as Christ Jesus" and (1 Thess. 2:13): "When you had
received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not as
the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God." Therefore as man
is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take vows
of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a religious
is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things. Therefore he is
also bound to obey in all things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey God rather
than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are against
God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],4), he who obeys is moved at the
bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of
justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its mover
by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its mover,
may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising from
the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if
a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in
the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the
latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto in every
respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the action of heat, as
regards being heated, but not as regards being dried up or consumed. In
like manner there are two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound
to obey his superior in all things. First on account of the command of a
higher power. For as a gloss says on Rm. 13:2, "They that resist [Vulg.:
'He that resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of God" (cf. St.
Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a commissioner issue an order, are
you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul? Again
if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another, will you
hesitate, to disregard the former and serve the latter? Therefore if the
emperor commands one thing and God another, you must disregard the former
and obey God." Secondly, a subject is not bound to obey his superior if
the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him.
For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery
falls upon the whole man: for the better part of him is excepted." His
body is subjected and assigned to his master but his soul is his own.
Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is
not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to
be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all men
are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the
nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his
body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound
to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of
contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the
like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human
affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his
authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters
relating to war, a servant his master in matters touching the execution
of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the
conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers to matters
within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both
internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all things.
On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all
things, but only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of
which the superior stands between God and his subjects, whereas in
respect of other matters the subject is immediately under God, by Whom he
is taught either by the natural or by the written law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life,
in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they
are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular
mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation. If they be
willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the
superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not
contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case
would be unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient
for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey:
secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly,
indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular power.
For a gloss on Mt. 17:25, "Then the children are free," says: "If in
every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom
are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all
kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom." Now Christians, by their
faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to Jn. 1:12: "He
gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His
name." Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Rm. 7:4): "You . . . are become dead to
the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is the divine
law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are subject to the
secular power is of less account than the divine law of the Old
Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members of
Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby they
were under the power of secular princes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them with
violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without justice, what
else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?" Since therefore the authority of
secular princes is frequently exercised with injustice, or owes its
origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians ought not to
obey secular princes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Titus 3:1): "Admonish them to be subject
to princes and powers," and (1 Pt. 2:13,14): "Be ye subject . . . to
every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king as
excelling, or to governors as sent by him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice,
according to Rm. 3:22, "The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ:"
wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but
strengthens it." Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey
their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence
faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of
obeying secular princes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[5]), subjection whereby one man is bound
to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its liberty.
Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from
defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle
declares by saying of himself (Rm. 7:23) that in his mind he served the
law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore those that are
made children of God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin,
but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly
masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim. 6:1, "Whosoever are servants under
the yoke," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and
therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison with
human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to another.
Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[104] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is
required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority is not
just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not
bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal
or danger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] Out. Para. 1/1
OF DISOBEDIENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether disobedience is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every sin is
a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given above (Q[104],
A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin
would be mortal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born of
vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is
disobedience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not
fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many commands
that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore if
disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid
mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned (Rm.
1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[24], A[12]; FS, Q[72], A[5]; FS,
Q[88], A[1]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which is
the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and our neighbor.
The charity of God requires that we obey His commandments, as stated
above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore to be disobedient to the commandments of
God is a mortal sin, because it is contrary to the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to
superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is a
mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to Rm. 13:2,
"He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." It is also
contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the superior
who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, which
has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because
it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every mortal
sin disobedience, properly and essentially, but only when one contemns a
precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. And when a
thing is done contrary to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but
with some other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except
materially, and belongs formally to another species of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it seems
to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to another's
command, it follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there is
nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial
sin is a disposition to mortal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a
superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so
that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore
superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins. For it
is written (1 Kgs. 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel,
and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey." But idolatry is the
most grievous of sins, as stated above (Q[94], A[3]). Therefore
disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes the
obstacles of sin, as stated above (Q[14], A[2]). Now disobedience makes a
man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from
sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and
consequently is the most grievous of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of
one man, many were made sinners." Now the cause is seemingly greater than
its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than
the others that are caused thereby.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than
contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of the
commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not
the most grievous of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one
disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the part
of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take every care
to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a
lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set
aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority.
Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more grievous is it
to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man.
Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the person commanding
does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every
such person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest to the
end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the
unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the person
commanding. As to the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater
the good commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that
commandment, because since God's will is essentially directed to the
good, the greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled.
Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins
more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of our
neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to the
greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is
more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but through
setting aside that which is more in the intention of the person
commanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with the
various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which there is
contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of disobedience is more
grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being
a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever sins against his
neighbor acts also against God's commandment. And if the divine precept
be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The
disobedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous
than the sin which contemns the man who made the precept, because
reverence for the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his
command. In like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God,
such as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally
separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving
contempt of God's commandment alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but of
likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God just as
idolatry does, though the latter does so more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost, but
only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of any
obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the
contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since any
good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the Holy Ghost
consists in the contempt of those goods which lead directly to repentance
and the remission of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was
transmitted to a men, was not disobedience considered as a special sin,
but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in
these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to every sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude.
Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?
(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?
(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?
(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?
(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor
received or the disposition of the giver?
(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, distinct from
other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits from God, and
from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return belongs to
the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we repay our parents
belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is
not distinct from the other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of giving
thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs
to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special
virtue, distinct from other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for the
preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they
are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness or
gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors received, is not a special
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice
(De Invent. Rhet. ii).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[60], A[3]), the nature of the debt
to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the
debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause
of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first
principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father,
because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing:
thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom
general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom
we have received particular and private favors, on account of which we
are under particular obligation to him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling
in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have
received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby
we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and
observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is
thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And
it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is
distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it
excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God was
reckoned above (Q[83], A[17]) among things pertaining to religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice,
when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted that
so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue
of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid
spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as
Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is
contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever
in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship
is preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of favors belongs
specially to the virtue of gratitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the
penitent?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God
than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from God,
the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is
greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the
innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him
gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing his own
infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own
strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed
Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee?" And
farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as much, yea and
more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep
torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor
of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give
thanks than the penitent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the greater
the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is more
continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says
(Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou
hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also
whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have done? . . .
Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed
by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed not." Therefore
the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 7:43): "To whom more is forgiven, he
loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less' Lk.
7:47]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient
corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is
greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the
part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed "gratis":
wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two
counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this way
the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater
gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other
things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because
it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more
bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God
is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of
punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed
on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed
on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift
bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich
man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have
to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such
absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the
voluntary and the involuntary.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to every
benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself,
according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he
be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to
pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to
every benefactor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some
favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly
given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit.
But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks
are not due to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs
to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master.
Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor .
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and
advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very well
off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he
has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being
virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem equitable to repay
him. Also the recipient of a favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable
to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for
favors received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient
and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment of a favor
would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are
not always to be repaid by gratitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give
thanks."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself
because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be
directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as
such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that
he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to his
benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with
regard to a father (Q[31], A[3]; Q[101], A[2]), a man owes his
benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him
in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or
support, if he need it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is
liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who forgives
not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own
misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor on himself,
he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist
what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable." Wherefore in things that
one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude,
since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it.
Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to others
are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher
states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the
various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather
than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he ought to
have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his
thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had been conferred
duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De Benef.
ii.) "promptness enhances, delay discounts a favor."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much whether
a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both
his and ours. He that considers himself only, and benefits because cannot
otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for
his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done it for me in common with
himself, having both of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely
unjust, unless I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to
me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a
kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does what
is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: when he
does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he
does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his motive,
it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude is due even to a
slave, when he does more than his duty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he
can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so
too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef.
ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay it back:
and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown by the
outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere." From
this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to
thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14): "He that abounds should be
repaid with honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money": and
Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): "There are many ways of repaying those who
are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good advice,
frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery."
Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in
his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De
Benef. vi), "it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have
received no favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness
has made you his debtor!"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 2/2
If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he
should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue if
possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has
changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as
heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he
has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,
3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor
depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment should
be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through
the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not
imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii):
"It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For we are
bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there
is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repayment
is a duty, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore a man is bound to repay a
favor at once.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy
according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems
to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently
more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to a
benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to equal the
favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to repay,
is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be
considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must
these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the
affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore
Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it
graciously." As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as
will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of choosing a
convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would
not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca
observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to repay too soon, is an
unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of
justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property without
his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and
therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of
virtue demands.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be
regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the
proper time through earnestness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time and
one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and the same
is to be observed in repaying favors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor's disposition
or at the deed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the
benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to
beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself
denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of
justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking.
Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather than
the disposition of the benefactor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone
knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a
favor according to the benefactor's disposition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under a
greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and
has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues,
namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the
repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like:
and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quantity
received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different
ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has
the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have
to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that is
based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness
accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue
repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the
giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic.
viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it
is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it
follows again that repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition
of the giver than on the effect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action,
in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, consists
materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence
Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly action consists not in deed or gift,
but in the disposition of the giver or doer."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is
part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as
stated above (Q[80]). Hence it does not follow that we shall find the
same kind of debt in both virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so far
as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a
benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly
action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and readily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to
surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make even equal
repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore
gratitude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has received
by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his turn, as it
were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn
the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a
favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely.
Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since "the indefinite
removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore repayment of
gratitude should not surpass the favor received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is excess of
equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it seems that
to repay more than the favor received is sinful and opposed to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay
those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and this
is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore gratitude
should incline to do something greater.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[5]), gratitude regards the favor
received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be
deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis
without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral
obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to
bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the favor
received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would
seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received.
Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back
something more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[3], ad 5; A[5]), in repaying favors we
must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we
consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents
namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the will of the
giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back
something greater to his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If,
however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be
sufficient for gratitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the more it
is paid the more it is due, according to Rm. 13:8, "Owe no man anything,
but to love one another." Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the
obligation of gratitude has no limit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[106] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider
equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of wills. For
while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will gave something
he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays
something over and above what he has received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] Out. Para. 1/1
OF INGRATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca says
(De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is ungrateful." But
sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance
if one man has helped another to commit a sin. Therefore, since it is not
a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingratitude is not always a
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits it:
because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i), "no man
sins in what he cannot avoid." Now sometimes it is not in the power of
the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has not the means
of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet Seneca
declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is the height of
ingratitude." Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being unwilling
to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rm. 13:8), "Owe no man
anything." Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca declares
(De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim. 3:2),
where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked." etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[106], A[4], ad 1, A[6]) a debt of
gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin from
the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that
every ingratitude is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that helps
another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so no
thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will,
supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him in
doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the repayment
due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin, because this
would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary to gratitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to
repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the repayment
of the debt of gratitude, as stated above (Q[106], A[6], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed the
forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not subject to
the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as Seneca observes
(De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays hold of a man, he has
apparently given little thought to their repayment."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and from
the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone should owe
this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benefactor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For whoever sins
acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this pertains to
ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of
sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin, for
instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against a
benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful to take
no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but it is the
height of ingratitude to forget it." Now these do not seem to belong to
the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness,
which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue,
because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more
opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to
the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to
show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than
it is due, as stated above (Q[106], A[4]). But still more opposed to
gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude, because the
virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Q[106], A[6]), inclines to return
something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly denominated from being
a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency or privation takes its
species from the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ
according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as
gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude
one special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the
things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the
favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks, and
the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according to
one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is first
in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of
ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he
declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the
third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception
of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover, since
opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it belongs to the
first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to
find fault with a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as
though it were unkindness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to God, inasmuch
as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But formal
ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is a special
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin from
being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way the
aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These three are not different species but different degrees
of one special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For one ought
to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful to God by
committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of ingratitude.
Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity, as
stated above (Q[24], A[12]). But ingratitude is contrary to charity,
since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue, as stated above
(Q[106], A[1], ad 3; A[6], ad 2). Therefore ingratitude is always a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver and the
receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should forthwith
forget having given, and the latter should never forget having received."
Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should forget is that he may be
unaware of the sin of the recipient, should the latter prove ungrateful;
and there would be no necessity for that if ingratitude were a slight
sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of committing a
mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii), "sometimes it is
necessary to deceive the person who receives assistance, in order that he
may receive without knowing from whom he has received." But this would
seem to put the recipient in the way of ingratitude. Therefore
ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As appears from what we have said above (A[2]), a man may
be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for instance by
failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his appreciation
of it or to pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal sin,
because, as stated above (Q[106], A[6]), the debt of gratitude requires a
man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not bound to do;
wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin mortally. It is
nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either from some kind of
negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet
ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either
of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld, this being needful
to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the
debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes mortal
and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a mortal
sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it arises from
venial sin, it has the imperfect character.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God to
the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but there is
something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it removes a
virtuous act of obedience to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to, but
beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity, but
excludes some act thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say that a man
after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake to
suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very
praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we mean that he must
not publish it abroad and boast about it."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not
ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so if
he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a
favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vainglory,
as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to
avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the greater through the
benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the
favor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful. For it
is written (Wis. 16:29): "The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as
the winter's ice." But this hope would not melt away unless favors were
withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from the
ungrateful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of committing
sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an occasion of
ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is
tormented" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a
favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the
favor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:35) that "the Highest . . . is
kind to the unthankful, and to the evil." Now we should prove ourselves
His children by imitating Him (Lk. 6:36). Therefore we should not
withhold favors from the ungrateful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an
ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it is
certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is, what
ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not easily
judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. iii), "a
man is often grateful although he repays not," because perhaps he has not
the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined
to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve
this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. If,
however, the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the
other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man
deserves to suffer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords him
an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the recipient
takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to
the bestower.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[107] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part of a
punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician, by
healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] Out. Para. 1/1
OF VENGEANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;
(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vengeance is lawful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps what is
God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written (Dt. 32:35,
Rm. 12:19): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay." Therefore all vengeance is
unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with him.
But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant 2:2, "As the
lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that cannot bear with
a wicked one." Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which is
the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear, but of
love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at least in
the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes revenge
for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for
a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus
Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says:
"Let us learn after Christ's example to bear our own wrongs with
magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not even by listening to
them." Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin of
only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things my heart
hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the gathering
together of the people, and a false calumny." But vengeance should not be
taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Mt. 13:29,30, "Lest
perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both to grow," says that
"a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the sovereign."
Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good and
lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for it is
written (Lk. 18:7): "Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day
and night?" as if to say: "He will indeed." Therefore vengeance is not
essentially evil and unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on
one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must
consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed
chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests
there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take
pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the
charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he
intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as
neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not
sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against
him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the
Apostle, who says (Rm. 12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but overcome
evil by good."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good,
to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned
(for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be
restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and
God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due
circumstances be observed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his
rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes use of the
power granted him by God. For it is written (Rm. 13:4) of the earthly
prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him
that doeth evil." If, however, a man takes vengeance outside the order of
divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and therefore sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in
due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not
bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their
neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth.,
falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: "It is praiseworthy to be
patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God's wrongs is most
wicked."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore
those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the
Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only those
who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they belong to the
Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and the
Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For
example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to seize him (4
Kgs. 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (4 Kgs. 2); and
Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him into exile (XXIII, Q.
iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong inflicted on a man
affects his person, he should bear it patiently if this be expedient. For
these precepts of patience are to be understood as referring to
preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken on
them, either in respect of the whole multitude---thus the Egyptians were
drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel
(Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed (Gn. 19)---or
as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the punishment of
those who worshipped the calf.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 2/3
Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the severity
of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the principals, whose
punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord (Num 25) commanded the
princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the multitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 3/3
On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the
multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the
innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that
this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should be
spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign, whom the
multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it cannot be
punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his sin were
such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually or
temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to arise from his
punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vengeance is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct virtue. For
just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are the wicked
punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not
belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice.
Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a special
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an act
to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now man is
sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil.
Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special virtue.
But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance. Therefore it is
not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to
virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through
habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect
us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong
to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination
there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of
nature to remove harm, for which reason animals have the irascible power
distinct from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself
against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which
have already been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming,
but of removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully
says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong,
and in general whatever is obscure" [*'Obscurum' Cicero wrote 'obfuturum'
but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis] "(i.e.
derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it." Therefore
vengeance is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to commutative
justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the bestowal of a
particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so too the
punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public justice, is an
act of commutative justice; while so far as it is concerned in defending
the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is resisted, it belongs to
the virtue of revenge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle
thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervor
of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as a man
avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity makes him
regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds from charity as
its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in Ev.), "there are no
green leaves on the bough of good works, unless charity be the root."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of excess,
namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the measure in
punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency and consists in
being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written (Prov. 13:24): "He
that spareth the rod hateth his son." But the virtue of vengeance
consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with regard to all the
circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary
among men?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of
punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot
him. But our Lord forbade (Mt. 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle,
whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners
should not be put to death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the same
punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with death,
it seems that all such persons should be punished with death: and this is
evidently false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to publish
his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the multitude,
since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for sin.
Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be inflicted
for a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as
appears from what we have said above (FS, Q[105], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to
the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of
virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those
things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else fear
would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin should be
taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the things which man
loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom, and external goods
such as riches, his country and his good name. Wherefore, according to
Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), "Tully writes that the laws
recognize eight kinds of punishment": namely, "death," whereby man is
deprived of life; "stripes," "retaliation," or the loss of eye for eye,
whereby man forfeits his bodily safety; "slavery," and "imprisonment,"
whereby he is deprived of freedom; "exile" whereby he is banished from
his country; "fines," whereby he is mulcted in his riches; "ignominy,"
whereby he loses his good name.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when there is
fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But sometimes the
wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger, but even with
great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the punishment of
death may be inflicted on sinners.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as
regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of the
divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a medicinal
character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins
alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or of
any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time as the
sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of punishment is
greater than the enticement of the example of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned
involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the will of
another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Ex. 20:5, "I
am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the
children, unto the third and fourth generation." Thus for the sin of
Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Gn. 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his
descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kgs. 5). Again the blood of
Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for
they said (Mt. 27:25): "His blood be upon us and upon our children."
Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into
the hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people
were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons of
Heli (1 Kgs. 4). Therefore a person is to be punished without having
deserved it voluntarily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's power.
But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power; thus a man
is removed from the administration of the Church on account of being
infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal see on
account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore vengeance is
taken not only for voluntary sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is
sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of
Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their
parents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their children
were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover, dumb animals,
which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on account of the
sin of the Amalekites (1 Kgs. 15). Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken
on those who have deserved it involuntarily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a man
does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by fear to
commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have
deserved it involuntarily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that "the ship in which Judas was,
was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the security of his
own merits, was in distress about those of others." But Peter did not
will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes punished without
having voluntarily deserved it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). Therefore
vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it voluntarily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under
the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save for
sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is restored,
in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will
suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore, since every
sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated above (FS, Q[81],
A[1]), it follows that no one is punished in this way, except for
something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment may be considered as a
medicine, not only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future
sin, or conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes
punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never
blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful
in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater consequence.
And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence, while temporal
goods are least important, sometimes a person is punished in his temporal
goods without any fault of his own. Such are many of the punishments
inflicted by God in this present life for our humiliation or probation.
But no one is punished in spiritual goods without any fault on his part,
neither in this nor in the future life, because in the latter punishment
is not medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for
another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in
respect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man is
condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin of another, and
this for three reasons. First, because one man may be the temporal goods
of another, and so he may be punished in punishment of the latter: thus
children, as to the body, are a belonging of their father, and slaves are
a possession of their master. Secondly, when one person's sin is
transmitted to another, either by "imitation," as children copy the sins
of their parents, and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with
greater daring; or by way of "merit," as the sinful subjects merit a
sinful superior, according to Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a
hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?" Hence the people of
Israel were punished for David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kgs. 24).
This may also happen through some kind of "consent" or "connivance": thus
sometimes even the good are punished in temporal matters together with
the wicked, for not having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship,
whereby one man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and
in order to inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one
affects all, as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking
of the sin of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord,
"Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third
and fourth generation," seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity,
since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future
time, in order that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet
should the wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost
necessary to take vengeance on them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/4
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human judgment
should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest, and God
condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment cannot be
conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby He punishes certain persons
in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since man is unable to
grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know what is expedient for
each individual. Wherefore according to human judgment a man should never
be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such
as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even
according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without
any fault on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/4
First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his, disqualified
for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being infected with
leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the Church: and for
bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered from
receiving sacred orders.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 3/4
Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a certain
church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to the good of
the clerics.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 4/4
Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance
through the sin of his parent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in temporal
matters together with their parents, both because they are a possession
of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in their
person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be spared,
they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve to be
punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and
any other irrational creatures, because in this way their owners are
punished; and also in horror of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not involuntary
simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated above (FS, Q[6],
AA[5],6).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin of Judas,
in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of one, in
commendation of unity, as state above (Reply OBJ[1],2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] Out. Para. 1/1
OF TRUTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning
truth there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is a part of justice?
(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether truth is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of virtues is
faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes the habit
and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but something prior to
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it belongs
to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to be neither
more nor less than they are. But this is not always
praiseworthy---neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2,
"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"---nor even in evil
things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Is.
3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not
hid it." Therefore truth is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or
moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object is not
God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by
"truth we faithfully represent things as they are were, or will be."
Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but their end. Nor
again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean between excess and
deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the better it is. Therefore
truth is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth
Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by reason
of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a virtue, but
the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way, truth is not a
habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a certain equality
between the understanding or sign and the thing understood or signified,
or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in the FP, Q[16], A[1];
FP, Q[21], A[2]. Secondly, truth may stand for that by which a person
says what is true, in which sense one is said to be truthful. This truth
or truthfulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a
good act: and virtue is "that which makes its possessor good, and renders
his action good."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far as it is a
statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does not suffice
for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for that purpose
that it should also be clothed with the due circumstances, and if these
be not observed, the act will be sinful. Accordingly it is sinful to
praise oneself without due cause even for that which is true: and it is
also sinful to publish one's sin, by praising oneself on that account, or
in any way proclaiming it uselessly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain signs which
are in conformity with things; and such signs are either words, or
external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of things are the
subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the latter are concerned
with the use of the external members, in so far as this use is put into
effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth is neither a
theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue. And it is a mean
between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the part of the
object, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of the object,
because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality, and equal is a
mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason that a man says
what is true about himself, he observes the mean between one that says
more than the truth about himself, and one that says less than the truth.
On the part of the act, to observe the mean is to tell the truth, when
one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists in making known one's own
affairs out of season, and deficiency in hiding them when one ought to
make them known.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether truth is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the true and the
good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special virtue, in fact every
virtue is goodness, because "it makes its possessor good." Therefore
truth is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of truth
as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue, since every
virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore truth is not a
special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives aright,
and of which it is written (Is. 38:3): "I beseech Thee . . . remember how
I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect heart." Now one
lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the definition of virtue
given above (FS, Q[55], A[4]). Therefore truth is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since
hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue,
since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every virtue.
Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic. ii,
7).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in making a man's
deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness in
human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a special
virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii) good consists
in order, it follows that a special aspect of good will be found where
there is a special order. Now there is a special order whereby our
externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered in relation to some
thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is perfected by the
virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The true and the good are convertible as to subject, since
every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But considered
logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect and will exceed
one another. For the intellect understands the will and many things
besides, and the will desires things pertaining to the intellect, and
many others. Wherefore the "true" considered in its proper aspect as a
perfection of the intellect is a particular good, since it is something
appetible: and in like manner the "good" considered in its proper aspect
as the end of the appetite is something true, since it is something
intelligible. Therefore since virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it
is possible for truth to be a special virtue, just as the "true" is a
special good; yet it is not possible for goodness to be a special virtue,
since rather, considered logically, it is the genus of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species from what
is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and beside
the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns himself, belongs
to the virtue of truth, as something directly intended: although it may
belong to other virtues consequently and beside his principal intention.
For the brave man intends to act bravely: and that he shows his fortitude
by acting bravely is a consequence beside his principal intention.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true, not
whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is said to be
true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure, namely, the
divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that law.
This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to duplicity,
whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while having another in
his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies
the intention, not indeed directly (since this belongs to every virtue),
but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends
another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether truth is a part of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems proper
to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the truth, one
does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in all the
foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is in
the will, as stated above (Q[58], A[4]). Therefore truth is not a part of
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely, "truth
of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine." But none of these
is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues, as stated
above (A[2], ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice, so that it
is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs rather to the
intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the
parts of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[80]), a virtue is annexed to justice,
as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something in common
with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now
the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice. In the first
place it is directed to another, since the manifestation, which we have
stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another, inasmuch as one
person manifests to another the things that concern himself. In the
second place, justice sets up a certain equality between things, and this
the virtue of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things which
concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of
justice, as to the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal
debt, which justice considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as,
out of equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth.
Therefore truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a
secondary virtue to its principal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes
another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society. Now
it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they believed one
another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the virtue of truth
does, in a manner, regard something as being due.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by his
own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters external signs
in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the manifestation of the
truth is an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the
truth of life, as stated in the preceding A[2], ad 3.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/3
We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to the
fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according to
the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice differs
from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man lives aright
in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude
of the law in those judgments which refer to another man: and in this
sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth of which we
speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way the truth of
justice may be understood as referring to the fact that, out of justice,
a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man confesses the
truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a
particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of
which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the
truth a man's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are not
speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this apply to
matters in which justice or injustice is questioned."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 3/3
The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain to
this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Nevertheless
since truths of science, as known by us, are something concerning us, and
pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of doctrine may pertain
to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth whereby a man
manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that which
is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one by
saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that four
are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be avoided," as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the virtue of truth
does not incline to that which is less rather than to that which is
greater.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather than to
the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is nearer to the
one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer to daring than to
timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than to the
other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality, holds to the exact
mean. Therefore truth does not more incline to that which is less.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to
amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom; and
to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to an
addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth than
to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the denial of
truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it seems that
truth should incline to that which is greater rather than to that which
is less.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this
virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is less."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that
which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the whole
good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth. This is
done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained in the
greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less. For, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this seems to be more prudent
because exaggerations give annoyance." For those who represent themselves
as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to others,
since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who make less
account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they seem to defer
to others by their moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6):
"Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will
say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that
which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that
what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this virtue to
incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet this
would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the proper
aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should be
safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with greater
danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to prudence
to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think or say
that one has not what one has.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[109] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] Out. Para. 1/1
VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH (QQ[110]-114)
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2)
dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.
Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?
(2) Of the species of lying;
(3) Whether lying is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether lying is always opposed to truth?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For opposites
are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible with truth,
since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to
Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but also
to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by this
virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life. But
lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii) that
"a lie is a false signification by words." Accordingly, it seems that
lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the "liar's
sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not opposed to truth, but
rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt that
it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a false
statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie." But this is
opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its
object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the
first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own
object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in
relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as
stated above (FS, Q[18], AA[6],7).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
Now it has been said above (Q[109], A[1], ad 3) that the virtue of
truth---and consequently the opposite vices---regards a manifestation
made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of
reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every
representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the
reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not
intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural instinct,
and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or
statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on
the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or
statement is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may
bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while
the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone
may be deceived.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is
said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive,
then there is falsehood---materially, since what is said is false,
formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on
account of the will to impart a falsehood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood,
from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false;
wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in
opposition to the "mind." Consequently if one says what is false,
thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because
the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it is not a
perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is accidental
for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other
hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive,
even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and
moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and
attains the specific nature of a lie.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by
deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection
thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if
it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking; for instance a
heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in
accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that
lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally and
essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and
accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as a
moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood
than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold the
chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a lie is a
false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every kind of
sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false by means
of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying,
but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to the species
of its cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and
mischievous lies?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into "officious,"
"jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should be made according
to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the
Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part. Animal i, 3). But
seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is
something beside and accidental to the species of that act, so that an
indefinite number of effects can result from one act. Now this division
is made according to the intention of the effect: for a "jocose" lie is
told in order to make fun, an "officious" lie for some useful purpose,
and a "mischievous" lie in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are
unfittingly divided in this way.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of
lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie that
profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party so as
to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying and
deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the sixth
"injures no one, and profits /someone in saving his money"; the seventh
"injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death"; the eighth
"injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the
body." Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is insufficient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into
"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which falls
short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not
contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems
that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a
lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for the
wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of lie
that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice."
The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a jocose lie,
the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three
kinds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 1/7
I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect to
their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division of
lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), lies are
of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and this
belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short of the truth, and
this belongs to "irony." This division is an essential division of lying
itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in the
preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more and
less are in essential opposition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 2/7
Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and
with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying,
on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if
by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is called a
"mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed
to some good---either of pleasure and then it is a "jocose" lie, or of
usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie, whereby it is intended
to help another person, or to save him from being injured. In this way
lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 3/7
Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their
relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their
gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in
the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under
"mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and then we have the
lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and this either with the
sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie,
which "profits no one, and injures someone"; or with the intention of
injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the
third kind of lie, "which profits one, and injures another." Of these the
first is the most grievous, because sins against God are always more
grievous, as stated above (FS, Q[73], A[3]): and the second is more
grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is diminished by the
intention of profiting another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 4/7
After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth,
which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution; and
this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of lying and deceiving."
This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7)
that "the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 5/7
The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For
the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to
please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie,
wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness
regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie,
which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his body, and this is the
seventh kind, which "saves a man from death"; or the morality of his
virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which "saves him from unlawful
defilement of his body."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 6/7
Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the
sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration of
the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in
their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the
pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the
life of the body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 7/7
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every lie is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident that the
evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they seem to
have told something false: since their accounts of the words of Christ
and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of
them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives of
Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that "God built
them houses" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ that
they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very holy men
that they lied. Thus (Gn. 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham said of his
wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he was
Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gn. 27:27-29). Again, Judith is
commended (Judith 15:10,11) although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore
not every lie is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid
the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body
perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's
mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may
lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from
being killed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised. Yet
one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says (Synonym.
ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill." Therefore not every
lie is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our
neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): "Whoever thinks
that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself
shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he deceives
others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no one is
deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are told, not
with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake of giving
pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ.
Therefore not every lie is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to make
any manner of lie."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus
can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be
good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a
complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius
asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since
it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs
of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by
words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while
truthfulness is good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin,
as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is
contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that the
writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived of
its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That the
words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel and other
sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says (De
Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to understand that in order to
know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he
must not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that sense is
expressed." Hence it is evident, as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that
"we must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to
describe in the same way and in the same words a thing which they
remember to have seen or heard."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for
their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to tell
a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And because the midwives
feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie was not
meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v), the
deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virtue: and
we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, however, any of
their statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand such
statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says
(Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that whatever is related of those
who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being worthy of credit, was
done and said by them prophetically." As to Abraham "when he said that
Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for
she is called his sister since she was the daughter of his father,"
Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust.
xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself said (Gn. 20:12): "She is truly my
sister, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother,"
being related to him on his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was
Esau, Isaac's first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to
wit, the latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of
this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to
signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the Gentiles,
should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of
perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it
was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do
certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to
Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she
exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words
contain truth in some mystical sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor,
but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this
Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in
order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful
to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity
when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in
order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is
lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says
(Contra Mend. x).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he
promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but
if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without faith in
changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if
he has promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in
promise, and did well to change his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have
changed with regard to persons and the business in hand. For, as Seneca
states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound to keep a promise, it is
necessary for everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he
lie in promising---since he promised what he had in his mind, due
circumstances being taken for granted---nor was he faithless in not
keeping his promise, because circumstances are no longer the same. Hence
the Apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to
go (2 Cor. 1), did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented
him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First, in itself,
secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the
very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the
intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive
by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or
any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet in Holy Writ:
because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or
say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the
thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states
what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every lie is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written (Ps.
6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and (Wis. 1:11): "The
mouth that belieth killeth the soul." Now mortal sin alone causes
destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a
mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: "Thou
shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every liar
breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to whom he
lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when
he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity." Now
no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty of iniquity," for a
venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal sin.
Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a
temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from the
reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward
which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have
received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the
lie of which they were guilty." Therefore even an officious lie, such as
was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a
precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish
to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore every
lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie
told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy," etc.:
"There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not
devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our
neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and
officious lies are not mortal sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary
to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above
(Q[24], A[12]; Q[35], A[3]). Now a lie may be contrary to charity in
three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended;
thirdly, accidentally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false
signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to the
charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so that
a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity, but also
to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and
a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about something the
knowledge of which affects a man's good, for instance if it pertain to
the perfection of science or to moral conduct, a lie of this description
inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, since it causes him to have a false
opinion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our
neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the
false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of
which is of no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to
one's neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some
contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this
kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through
being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a mortal
sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's neighbor,
in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a
mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's neighbor, and one
sins mortally if one has merely the intention of committing a mortal sin.
But if the end intended be not contrary to charity, neither will the lie,
considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose
lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie,
where the good also of one's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may
be contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting
therefrom: and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man
were not deterred through scandal from lying publicly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a
gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a
lie."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the
love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q[44], A[1], ad 3; FS,
Q[100], A[5], ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in
so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbor. Hence it is
expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a broad
sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it is
written (1 Jn. 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'And sin is
iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways.
First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and their
reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is
commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in his
exposition of Is. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses') explains that God
"built them spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be considered with regard
to the external act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed
eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving of which
was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though this was
inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense
that we must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited
by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already merited
it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection understands the words
to mean.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[110] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin.
But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a sin to
be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another species.
Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another species,
except perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, for
instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot apply to an officious
or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose lie is not a mortal sin
in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal. We may
take in this sense the saying of Augustine that "it is a precept of
perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie":
although Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, for he begins
by saying: "Unless perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does it matter that
they are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are
bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or
teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal
sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other
matters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] Out. Para. 1/1
OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?
(3) Whether it is opposed to truth?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is written
(Lk. 24:28) that our Lord "pretended [Douay: 'made as though'] he would
go farther"; and Ambrose in his book on the Patriarchs (De Abraham i)
says of Abraham that he "spoke craftily to his servants, when he said"
(Gn. 22:5): "I and the boy will go with speed as far as yonder, and
after we have worshipped, will return to you." Now to pretend and to
speak craftily savor of dissimulation: and yet it is not to be said that
there was sin in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all dissimulation is a
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in his
commentary on Gal. 2:11, "When Peter [Vulg.: 'Cephas'] was come to
Antioch:---The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of
Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us that
dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed"; and David "changed
his countenance before" Achis, king of Geth (1 Kgs. 21:13). Therefore not
all dissimulation is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to
simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people (Is.
3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not
hid it." Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's sin. Therefore it
is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never reprehensible
to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 16:14, "In three years," etc., says: "Of
the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness." But to
sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[109], A[3]; Q[110], A[1]), it belongs
to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward signs to be
such as one is. Now outward signs are not only words, but also deeds.
Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something
different from that which is in one's mind, so also is it contrary to
truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify the contrary of what
is in oneself, and this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation.
Consequently dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs of outward
deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way, as
stated above (Q[110], A[1], OBJ[2]). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin,
as stated above (Q[110], A[3]), it follows that also all dissimulation is
a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), "To pretend is not
always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification, then it is
a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some signification, there is
no lie, but a representation of the truth." And he cites figures of
speech as an example, where a thing is "pretended," for we do not mean it
to be taken literally but as a figure of something else that we wish to
say. In this way our Lord "pretended He would go farther," because He
acted as if wishing to go farther; in order to signify something
figuratively either because He was far from their faith, according to
Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.); or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii),
because, "as He was about to go farther away from them by ascending into
heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on earth by their hospitality."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i) says
that Abraham "foretold what he knew not": for he intended to return alone
after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed what He
was about to do. It is evident therefore that neither dissembled.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Jerome employs the term "simulation" in a broad sense for
any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a figurative
pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of Ps. 33, "I
will bless the Lord at all times." There is no need to excuse Jehu's
dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked man, since he
departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kgs. 10:29,31). And yet he
is praised withal and received an earthly reward from God, not for his
dissimulation, but for his zeal in destroying the worship of Baal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because no
one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil deeds,
he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man might pretend
to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has some appearance
of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil, both because it is
a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although he is wicked on this
account, yet his wickedness is not the wickedness he simulates. And
because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness is not derived
from the thing simulated, whether this be good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which he
is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is, for this is
sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by outward signs of
deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet he dissembles not
if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide one's sin without
being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that we must understand the
saying of Jerome on the words of Isaias 3:9, that the "second remedy
after shipwreck is to hide one's sin," lest, to wit, others be
scandalized thereby.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. For
dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be hypocrisy in
showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to Mt. 6:2, "When
thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites
do." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): "Some there are who wear
the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of perfection.
We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of the
hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and another to
sin from malice." Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without
attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward
habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the
same as hypocrisy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our Lord
says of hypocrites (Mt. 23:5) that "all their works they do for to be
seen of men": and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that "they never consider
what it is that they do, but how by their every action they may please
men." But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention, but in the
outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and crafty
men prove the wrath of God," says that "the dissembler simulates one
thing and does another: he pretends chastity, and delights in lewdness,
he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse." Therefore hypocrisy is
not the same as dissimulation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Hypocrite' is a Greek word
corresponding to the Latin 'simulator,' for whereas he is evil within,"
he "shows himself outwardly as being good; {hypo} denoting falsehood, and
{krisis}, judgment."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "the word hypocrite is derived
from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a disguised
face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to imitate the
complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under the guise of a
man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to deceive the people
in their acting." Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. ii) that "just as
hypocrites by simulating other persons act the parts of those they are
not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon is not that man himself but
pretends to be), so too in the Church and in every department of human
life, whoever wishes to seem what he is not is a hypocrite: for he
pretends to be just without being so in reality."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not,
however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person simulates
another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention.
Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to the
service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but man, he
simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gregory says
(Moral.) that "hypocrites make God's interests subservient to worldly
purposes, since by making a show of saintly conduct they seek, not to
turn men to God, but to draw to themselves the applause of their
approval:" and so they make a lying pretense of having a good intention,
which they have not, although they do not pretend to do a good deed
without doing it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or the
clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform works
of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, with the
intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail through
weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he is not bound
to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of holiness. If, however,
he were to put on the habit of holiness in order to make a show of
righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things: one by
way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly the evil
intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, which does not
tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, or any sensible
objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of truth.
For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing signified.
Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be opposed to any
special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any
virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as stated in Mt.
6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially opposed to the virtue of
truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile, wherefore
it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to prudence as above
stated (Q[55], A[4]). Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not
opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end. Now
the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory: wherefore a
gloss on Job 27:8, "What is the hope of the hypocrite, if through
covetousness he take by violence," says: "A hypocrite or, as the Latin
has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through desire of being
honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a
life which is not his." [*The quotation is from St. Gregory's Moralia, Bk
XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or vainglory is not directly opposed
to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above (A[1]). Now
a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation or hypocrisy
is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24, x),
"contrariety is opposition as regards form," i.e. the specific form.
Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed
to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another way indirectly.
Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be considered with regard to
the very species of the act, and this species depends on that act's
proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation,
whereby a man simulates a character which is not his, as stated in the
preceding article, it follows that it is directly opposed to truth
whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be what he is, as
stated in Ethic. iv, 7.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered in
relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an instrument of
action, or anything else of that kind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his end,
not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it, but in
respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it. Hence his
hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth, inasmuch as he
wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he performs acts of
that virtue, not as intending them for their own sake, but
instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his hypocrisy has not,
on that account, a direct opposition to that virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[55], AA[3],4,5), the vice directly
opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways of
achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it
accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds: and
it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now
guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and sometimes
secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to simplicity to
guard oneself from deception, and in this way the virtue of simplicity is
the same as the virtue of truth as stated above (Q[109], A[2], ad 4).
There is, however, a mere logical difference between them, because by
truth we mean the concordance between sign and thing signified, while
simplicity indicates that one does not tend to different things, by
intending one thing inwardly, and pretending another outwardly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as also
of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end, but from
the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one is. Wherefore
it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things of himself, for no
further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said above with regard to lying
(Q[110], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For Jerome says
on Is. 16:14: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate
holiness": and a gloss on Job 1:21 [*St. Augustine on Ps. 63:7], "As it
hath pleased the Lord," etc., says that "pretended justice is no justice,
but a twofold sin": and again a gloss on Lam. 4:6, "The iniquity . . . of
my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom," says: "He deplores the
sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity
than the sin of Sodom." Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore
hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin out of
malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin against the
Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from
seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is
deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and
crafty men prove the wrath of God": and the hypocrite is excluded from
seeing God, according to Job 13:16, "No hypocrite shall come before His
presence." Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of
dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed. Neither
therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this
is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is
hypocrisy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and
simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person whose
intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be
holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont to
use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin: for no one is
entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin. But if by a
hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness, which he lacks
through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is
deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not
always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will depend on the
end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of God or of his
neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he were to simulate
holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain
ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any
temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be
not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a
man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said in
Ethic. iv, 7 that "he would seem to be vain rather than evil"; for the
same applies to simulation as to a lie.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of
holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of this
kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated with
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[111] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] Out. Para. 1/1
OF BOASTING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head,
namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) To which virtue is it opposed?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. For
lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast even without
lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is
written (Esther 1:3,4) that Assuerus "made a great feast . . . that he
might show the riches of the glory" and "of his kingdom, and the
greatness and boasting of his power." Therefore boasting is not opposed
to the virtue of truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to be
one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man boasts of having
what he has not." Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29,30): "We have heard the
pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy,
and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I know, saith the Lord,
his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according to it."
Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that boasting arises from
vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed to the virtue of humility.
Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth, but to humility.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore it
is written (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? or what advantage
hath the boasting of riches brought us?" Now excess of riches seems to
belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or
liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that
boasting is opposed to truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, "Jactantia" [boasting] seems properly to denote the
uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw [jactare] a
thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift oneself, properly
speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or 'tall-talking' as we
should say in English]. This happens in two ways. For sometimes a man
speaks of himself, not above what he is in himself, but above that which
he is esteemed by men to be: and this the Apostle declines to do when he
says (2 Cor. 12:6): "I forbear lest any man should think of me above that
which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me." In another way a man
uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself above that which he is
in reality. And since we should judge of things as they are in
themselves, rather than as others deem them to be, it follows that
boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self above what one is in
oneself, than the uplifting of self above what others think of one:
although in either case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting
properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's opinion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways. First,
with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed to truth;
as stated (in the body of the article and Q[110], A[2]). Secondly, with
regard to its cause, from which more frequently though not always it
arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly moving and
impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly by arrogance, it
often results that outwardly he boasts of great things about himself;
though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from arrogance, but from
some kind of vanity, and delights therein, because he is a boaster by
habit. Hence arrogance, which is an uplifting of self above oneself, is a
kind of pride; yet it is not the same as boasting, but is very often its
cause. For this reason Gregory reckons boasting among the species of
pride. Moreover, the boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through
his boasting, and so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory
considered as its end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First, as an
occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches. Hence
(Prov. 8:18) "riches" are significantly described as "proud" [Douay:
'glorious']. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since according to
Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of glory, but also for
the sake of gain. Such people invent stories about themselves, so as to
make profit thereby; for instance, they pretend to be skilled in
medicine, wisdom, or divination.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether boasting is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is written (Prov.
28:25): "He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, stirreth up quarrels."
Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, since God hates those that
sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal sin. Now
a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, "Extol not thyself in the thoughts of thy soul,"
says: "This is a prohibition of boasting and pride." Therefore boasting
is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an
officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; for
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), "the boaster pretends to
something greater than he is, sometimes for no further purpose, sometimes
for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of money." Thus it
is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie, and
consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly it is
always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For Gregory
says (Moral. viii, 30) that "it belongs to the very perfect, by outward
deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are not inwardly
uplifted by the praise awarded them." Therefore boasting is not always a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[110], A[4]), a mortal sin is one that
is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered in two
ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and
sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that
which is contrary to God's glory---thus it is said in the person of the
king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): "Thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said:
I am God"---or contrary to the love of our neighbor, as when a man while
boasting of himself breaks out into invectives against others, as told of
the Pharisee who said (Lk. 18:11): "I am not as the rest of men,
extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican." Sometimes it
is a venial sin, when, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against
neither God nor his neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with regard
to its cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and
then if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin,
then the boasting will also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a
venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting through
desire of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be aiming at
the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore boasting of this kind
is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
7) that "a man who boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who
boasts for the sake of glory or honor." Yet it is not always a mortal sin
because the gain may be such as not to injure another man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin. But it
happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not
intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be a
mortal sin on that account.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride that is
a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but
only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor, either in
itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in
boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv,
7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he were to
prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn God's commandments for
the sake of boasting: for then it would be against the charity of God,
in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its last end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[112] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
To boast for the sake of glory or gain seen to involve an officious lie:
provided it be do without injury to others, for then it would once become
a mischievous lie.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] Out. Para. 1/1
IRONY* (TWO ARTICLES) [*Irony here must be given the signification of the
Greek {eironia}, whence it is derived: dissimulation of one's own good
points.]
We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether irony is a sin?
(2) Of its comparison with boasting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether irony is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself, is not
a sin. For no sin arises from one's being strengthened by God: and yet
this leads one to belittle oneself, according to Prov. 30:1,2: "The
vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened
by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of men." Also it is
written (Amos 7:14): "Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet." Therefore
irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the
English (Regist. xii): "It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to
acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty." But all sin is
inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But "some belittle
themselves in words, so as to avoid pride," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): "If thou
liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying,
thou hast become one by lying."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two ways.
First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the greater things
in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of himself the
presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this
way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus,
except through corruption of one of its circumstances. Secondly, a person
belittles himself by forsaking the truth, for instance by ascribing to
himself something mean the existence of which in himself he does not
perceive, or by denying something great of himself, which nevertheless he
perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For there is
a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly annexed to
it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, "If any man among you seem to be wise in
this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise." But there is
another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to say,
"is foolishness with God." Accordingly, he that is strengthened by God
acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the estimation of men,
because, to wit, he despises human things, which human wisdom seeks.
Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom of men is not with me,"
and farther on, "and I have known the science of the saints" [*Vulg.:
'and I have not known the science of the saints'].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is
acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that which
is received by divine inspiration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not of
the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of a
prophet."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to
perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only if
he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if
he fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not a sin. But
he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge to be sinful:
which would be a lie of irony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid another:
and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid pride.
Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): "Shun not arrogance so as
to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3) that "it is a
reckless humility that entangles itself with lies."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. For
each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a kind of
equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by
diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony
sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is not
a less grievous sin than boasting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): "When he shall speak low,
trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart." Now it
belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold
wickedness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who speak
with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in their
manners."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[110], AA[2],4), one lie is more
grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is
about---thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most
grievous---and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a
mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now
irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by any
other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so that
in this respect they are equal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely, the
desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's averseness,
albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by uplifting himself: and
in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "boasting is a
more grievous sin than irony."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some
other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then irony
is more grievous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting, according as a
lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its matter:
for it has been said that in this way they are equal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in
spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward words
or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by
wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind, and that he
intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus our
Lord said of certain men (Mt. 6:16) that "they disfigure their faces that
they may appear unto men to fast." Wherefore such persons are guilty of
both vices, irony and boasting, although in different respects, and for
this reason they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 7) that it is "the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of
themselves, and to make very little of themselves": and for the same
reason it is related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess
clothes that were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men
seek glory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[113] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There is one that
humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit," and it is
in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through deceitful
humility, "speaks low" wickedly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and
the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning
friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is that
which is on account of virtue." Now any virtue is the cause of
friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states (Div.
Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a
consequence of every virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of
friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those he
loves and from those who are not his friends." Now it seems to pertain to
simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to those whom he
loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. Therefore this kind of
friendliness is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man
decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart of
the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there
is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of
pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous of sharing
pleasures, but fears to give pain." Therefore this kind of friendliness
is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now
it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the congregation of
the poor." Therefore affability, which is what we mean by friendship, is
a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[109], A[2]; FS, Q[55], A[3]), since
virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of good,
there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists in order,
as stated above (Q[109], A[2]). And it behooves man to be maintained in a
becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with
one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave
towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need of a special
virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is
called friendliness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his
Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves
another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in treating
of charity (Q[23], A[1], A[3], ad 1; QQ[25],26), what things belong to
this kind of friendship. But he mentions another friendliness, which
consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has not the perfect
nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far as
a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in
contact.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain
general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every beast
loveth its like." This love is signified by signs of friendship, which we
show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are strangers or
unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: because we do not
show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not treat strangers with
the same intimacy as those who are united to us by special friendship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is where there
is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his neighbor, for the
Apostle says (Rm. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be
grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity": but that he may
bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. 7:38, "Be not
wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn."
Again, "the heart of fools is where there is mirth," not that they may
gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it
belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he
dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures,
according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for
brethren to dwell together in unity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of
some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the virtuous
man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he
lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I made you
sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2 Cor. 7:9),
"I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were
made sorrowful unto repentance." For this reason we should not show a
cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we may please
them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way encourage them
to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26): "Hast thou daughters?
Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of justice.
For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this virtue does
not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among
whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue
is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in fellowship.
Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures, as
stated above (FS, Q[60], A[5]; FS, Q[61], A[3]). Therefore this virtue is
a part of temperance rather than of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
contrary to justice, as stated above (Q[59], AA[1],2). Now, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in like manner known
and unknown, companions and strangers." Therefore this virtue rather than
being a part of justice is opposed thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a part
of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as
to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to
another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of
justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is
bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay,
or by some debt arising out of a favor received. For it regards merely a
certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those among
whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary to
displease them for some good purpose.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As we have said above (Q[109], A[3], ad 1), because man is
a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the manifestation of
truth without which human society could not last. Now as man could not
live in society without truth, so likewise, not without joy, because, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one could abide a day with the sad
nor with the joyless. Therefore, a certain natural equity obliges a man
to live agreeably with his fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige
him to sadden them for their good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the senses.
But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have their
origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly towards
another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they were noisome.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[114] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one ought
to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and strangers,
since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to please and
displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way." This likeness
consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] Out. Para. 1/1
VICES OPPOSED TO FRIENDLINESS (QQ[115]-117)
OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1)
Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether flattery is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether flattery is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists in
words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is not
a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. 31:28, "Her children rose up
and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her." Moreover, there
is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 Cor. 10:33, "I . .
in all things please all men." Therefore flattery is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But it is
not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise good, which
seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore Gregory
says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against flattery. "It
must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful moderation of our
Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by
immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the
tongue of the detractor may humble." But detraction is an evil, as stated
above (Q[73], AA[2],3). Therefore flattery is a good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, "Woe to them that sew cushions
under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery." Therefore
flattery is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[114], A[1], ad 3), although the
friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends chiefly
the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not fear to
displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of
avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to
speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and
would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere intention of
pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of making some
gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" or "adulator." As a rule,
however, the term "flattery" is wont to be applied to all who wish to
exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or deeds in their
ordinary behavior towards their fellows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: One may praise a person both well and ill, according as one
observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing other due
circumstances one were to wish to please a person by praising him, in
order thereby to console him, or that he may strive to make progress in
good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship. But it
would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a person for things in
which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps they are evil, according
to Ps. 9:24, "The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul"; or they
may be uncertain, according to Ecclus. 27:8, "Praise not a man before he
speaketh," and again (Ecclus. 11:2), "Praise not a man for his beauty";
or because there may be fear lest human praise should incite him to
vainglory, wherefore it is written, (Ecclus. 11:30), "Praise not any man
before death." Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man
in order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress
therein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of
vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to Ps.
52:6, "God hath scattered the bones of them that please men," and
according to the words of the Apostle (Gal. 1:10), "If I yet pleased men,
I should not be the servant of Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be not
observed; and so too is it to praise good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one another.
Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is contrary
thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards the end.
Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas the
detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times
he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether flattery is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to
Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful." But
flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For the sinner is
praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The
sinner hath provoked the Lord." Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant):
"Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery": and a gloss on
Ps. 69:4, "Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that say
to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: "The tongue of the flatterer harms
more than the sword of the persecutor." Therefore flattery is a most
grievous sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less than
others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): "Let their sword enter into
their own hearts." Now he that flatters another induces him to sin
mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, "Let not the oil of the sinner
fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer softens the
mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive
of vice." Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3): "The
cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and treachery
shall be degraded from his office." Now such a punishment as this is not
inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis)
reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of higher
standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[112], A[2]), a mortal sin is one that
is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and
sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways. First, by reason
of the very matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for this is
contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, and
contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to sin.
Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Is. 5:20. "Woe to you that
call evil good." Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man
flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or
in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written (Prov.
27:6): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an
enemy." Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer,
even without his intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In
this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or
taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood
from what has been said above concerning scandal (Q[43], AA[3],4). If,
however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please others,
or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something in a case
of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently it is not a
mortal but a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises
another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the sword
of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater
consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so
efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being
a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a
sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q[43], A[1],
ad 3; FS, Q[73], A[8], ad 3; FS, Q[80], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with the
intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than others,
since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is
only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[115] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters another
treacherously, in order to deceive him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] Out. Para. 1/1
OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?
(2) Of its comparison with flattery?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of
friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord,
just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated
above (Q[37], A[1]). Therefore quarreling is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man stirreth up
strife." Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or quarreling
is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars and
quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from your
concupiscences which war in your members?" Now it would seem contrary to
temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it seems that
quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship
(Ethic. iv, 6).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one
person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed in
this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the
person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him from
lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to pertain
to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times contradiction
arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom someone does not
fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling, which is opposed to
the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it belongs to behave
agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 6) that "those who are opposed to everything with the intent
of being disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and
quarrelsome."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of discord,
while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the intention of
displeasing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not on
their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on the
species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times from
anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not follow that
it is directly opposed to meekness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a general
evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rm. 7:7 says: "The law is
good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the contrary
vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does the more
grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than quarreling, for
it is written (Is. 3:12): "O My people, they that call thee blessed, the
same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps." Therefore flattery
is a more grievous sin than quarreling.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in
flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another: whereas
the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts openly. Now he
that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than
quarreling.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer
than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than
flattery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual
state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be
more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim.
3:2,3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and (2
Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle." Therefore
quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one
way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a vice
is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the
virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to displease:
and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure sins more
grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who exceeds in giving
pleasure. In another way we may consider them as regards certain external
motives, and thus flattery sometimes more grievous, for instance when one
intends by deception to acquire undue honor or gain: while sometimes
quarreling is more grievous; for instance, when one intends either to
deny the truth, or to hold up the speaker to contempt.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving secretly, so
the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly. Now, other
things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person openly, by
violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a more grievous
sin than theft, as stated above (Q[66], A[9]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more
vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason: wherefore
the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler,
although spiritual sins are more grievous, since they proceed from
greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are committed through deceit
are viler, in so far as they seem to arise from a certain weakness, and
from a certain falseness of the reason, although sins that are committed
openly proceed sometimes from a greater contempt. Hence flattery, through
being accompanied by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling,
through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[116] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness of a
sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more grievous sin,
but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery
than of quarreling, although quarreling is more grievous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] Out. Para. 1/2
OF LIBERALITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely,
covetousness and prodigality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?
(2) What is its matter?
(3) Of its act;
(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?
(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?
(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether liberality is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is
contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for
one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to
the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself,
so that he leaves for himself the lesser things." Therefore liberality is
not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth
contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Since,
then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal
man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic. iv, 1) that
"he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it
away."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But
liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: since
many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give;
and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise.
Therefore liberality is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel contains
many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated." Now in the
Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore
liberality is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs to
virtue to use well the things that we can use ill." Now we may use both
well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the powers
and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without, such as
the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood.
Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it
follows that liberality is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil (Hom.
in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in order
that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for
one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably spends
more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more
provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in which each one is able to
look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not belong to the
liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to
lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says
(De Offic. i): "It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your
relatives if you know them to be in want."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his
riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal to
perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal man does not neglect
his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people"; and Ambrose says
(De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches
all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew
his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by any household
cares." For this belongs to the state of perfection, of which we shall
speak farther on (Q[184], Q[186], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's
possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is directed
to happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those who spend
much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and likewise whoever
spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De
Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their possessions, your
honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you
give for the sake of boasting rather than of pity." Wherefore those who
lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain evil works, are not
liberal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses,
without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of
other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the same
way as virtuous people, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]). In like manner
nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal, although he be poor.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "Liberality is proportionate
to a man's substance," i.e. his means, "for it consists, not in the
quantity given, but in the habit of the giver": and Ambrose says (De
Offic. i) that "it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives
things their value."
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether liberality is about money?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every moral
virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to justice to
be about operations, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore, since
liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions and not
about money.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind of
wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches,
according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5,6). Therefore liberality is not
chiefly about money.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since habits
are distinguished by their objects. But external things are the matter of
distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not the matter
of liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "liberality
seems to be a mean in the matter of money."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs to
the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called
open-handedness [largitas], because that which is open does not withhold
things but parts of them. The term "liberality" seems also to allude to
this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it [liberat], so to
speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his mind to be free of
attachment thereto. Now those things which are the subject of a man's
free-handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which are
denoted by the term "money." Therefore the proper matter of liberality is
money.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 3), liberality depends not on the
quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of the giver
is disposed according to the passions of love and desire, and
consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things given.
Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of liberality, while
exterior money is the object of those same passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says in his book De Disciplina Christi (Tract.
de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever he
owns, goes by the name of "'pecunia' [money], because in olden times
men's possessions consisted entirely of 'pecora' [flocks]." And the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name of money to anything
that can be valued in currency."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Justice establishes equality in external things, but has
nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal
passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and in
another way of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether using money is the act of liberality?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality. For
different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming to
other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not the
proper act of liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but also
to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be
connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be
unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but also
in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender, and
consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De Benef. v):
"A man is not liberal by giving to himself." Therefore not every use of
money belongs to liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever
matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter:
Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best
use of riches." Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of
money is the act of liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, as stated
above (FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now the object or matter of liberality is money
and whatever has a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (ad
2). And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows
that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money. Now
money comes under the head of useful goods, since all external goods are
directed to man's use. Hence the proper act of liberality is making use
of money or riches.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of riches as
such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On the other
hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under another aspect,
namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing is due to another.
And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special
aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the fulfilment of
some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in relation to liberality as
something in addition thereto, as we shall explain farther on (Q[134]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of
his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities for that good
use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's fortitude not only to wield his sword
against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath.
Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use money, but also to
keep it in preparation and safety in order to make fitting use of it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated (A[2], ad 1), the internal passions whereby man
is affected towards money are the proximate matter of liberality. Hence
it belongs to liberality before all that a man should not be prevented
from making any due use of money through an inordinate affection for it.
Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in applying it to one's
own use, and would seem to come under the designation of costs or
expenditure; while the other consists in devoting it to the use of
others, and comes under the head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liberality
that one be not hindered by an immoderate love of money, either from
spending it becomingly, or from making suitable gifts. Therefore
liberality is concerned with giving and spending, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying of Seneca refers to liberality as
regards giving: for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason that
he gives something to himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man chiefly to
give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is regulated by
prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence that a man should
keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that
"those who have not earned money, but have received the money earned by
others, spend it more liberally, because they have not experienced the
want of it." Therefore it seems that giving does not chiefly belong to
the liberal man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do, nor
does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry for
what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1.
Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a man
employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar, as the
Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he might provide
himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems that he
does not chiefly aim at giving.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than others.
But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he looks after
others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to
give.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "it belongs to
a liberal man to surpass in giving."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the use
of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of money is
like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money, in so far as
it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now in
parting with a thing ---for instance, when we throw something---the
farther we put it away the greater the force [virtus] employed. Hence
parting with money by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue
than when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue as such
to tend to what is more perfect, since "virtue is a kind of perfection"
(Phys. vii, text. 17,18). Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for
giving.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen or
spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more prudent
than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be considered in
money's use, which is likened to movement, than in its keeping, which is
likened to rest. As to those who, having received money that others have
earned, spend it more liberally, through not having experienced the want
of it, if their inexperience is the sole cause of their liberal
expenditure they have not the virtue of liberality. Sometimes, however,
this inexperience merely removes the impediment to liberality, so that it
makes them all the more ready to act liberally, because, not
unfrequently, the fear of want that results from the experience of want
hinders those who have acquired money from using it up by acting with
liberality; as does likewise the love they have for it as being their own
effect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs to
liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give it in a
fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every virtue is
grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hinders
that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable giving; namely, not
giving what ought suitably to be given, and giving something unsuitably.
Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at both: but especially at the
former, since it is more opposed to his proper act. For this reason, too,
he does not give to all: since his act would be hindered were he to give
to everyone: for he would not have the means of giving to those to whom
it were fitting for him to give.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Giving and receiving are related to one another as action
and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both action and
passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, it does not
belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and still less to beg.
Hence the verse:
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
'In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give often,
take seldom, ask never.' But he makes provision in order to give certain
things according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own
possessions, for he is careful about realizing them that he may make a
liberal use thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence to
spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether liberality is a part of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For justice
regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the less liberally
is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of justice, but is
incompatible with it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, justice is about operation as stated above (Q[58], A[9];
FS, Q[60], AA[2],3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the love and
desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong
to temperance rather than to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly, as
stated (A[4]). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and mercy,
which pertain to charity, as state above (QQ[30],31). Therefore
liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Justice has to do with the
fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is divided into two
parts, justice and beneficence, also called liberality or
kind-heartedness." Therefore liberality pertains to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice, since justice
pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one's
own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees with justice:
first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly,
that it is concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit
under a different aspect, a stated in this Article and above (A[2], ad
3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part of
justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although liberality does no consider the legal due that
justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is based on
a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it answers to the
idea of due in the lowest degree.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the body.
But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to the body
but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly pertain to
temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the fact
that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he gives:
wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But the giving of
liberality arises from a person being affected in a certain way towards
money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so that when it is fitting
he gives it not only to his friends but also to those whom he knows not.
Hence it belong not to charity, but to justice, which is about external
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues. For
every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man is
likened chiefly by liberality to God, "Who giveth to all men abundantly,
and upbraideth not" (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is the greatest of
the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "in things that
are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best." Now the nature
of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since "the good is
self-communicative," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence Ambrose
says (De Offic. i) that "justice reclines to severity, liberality to
goodness." Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now
Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above all makes a man famous":
and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "among the virtuous the
liberal are the most beloved." Therefore liberality is the greatest of
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to be
more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing."
The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and just men are
honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater
virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality tends
towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own nature;
in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very nature it tends
to set in order one's own affection towards the possession and use of
money. In this way temperance, which moderates desires and pleasures
relating to one's own body, takes precedence of liberality: and so do
fortitude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to the common
good, one in time of peace, the other in time of war: while all these are
preceded by those virtues which are directed to the Divine good. For the
Divine good surpasses all manner of human good; and among human goods the
public good surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named
the good of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external
things. Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this
way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not
being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of it,
whether for himself. Or for the good of others, or for God's glory. Thus
it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many ways. Since,
however, we should judge of things according to that which is competent
to them primarily and in respect of their nature, rather than according
to that which pertains to them consequently, it remains to be said that
liberality is not the greatest of virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to whom He
gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives, wherefore it
seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues, rather than to
liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving forth
its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better than money
which liberality gives forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[117] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not that
which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others, but that
which is based on utility, because he is more useful in external goods,
which as a rule men desire above all others. For the same reason he
becomes famous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] Out. Para. 1/2
VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY (QQ[118]-122)
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF
COVETOUSNESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1)
covetousness; (2) prodigality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) To which virtue it is opposed;
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?
(7) Whether it is a capital vice?
(8) Of its daughters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether covetousness is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that covetousness is not aa sin. For covetousness
[avaritia] denotes a certain greed for gold [aeris aviditas*], because,
to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external goods
may be comprised. [*The Latin for covetousness "avaritia" is derived from
"aveo" to desire; but the Greek {philargyria} signifies literally "love
of money": and it is to this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. A[2],
OBJ[2])]. Now it is not a sin to desire external goods: since man desires
them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to man, and
because by their means man's life is sustained (for which reason they are
spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's neighbor, or
oneself, as stated above (FS, Q[72], A[4]). But covetousness is not,
properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed neither to
religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is directed to God.
Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to
gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:18): "He that
committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." In like manner
neither is it apparently a sin against one's neighbor, since a man harms
no one by keeping what is his own. Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now
covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is
not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be without
covetousness, contented with such things as you have."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil
must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure. Now
in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain
measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be commensurate
with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with health, as
the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External goods come under the
head of things useful for an end, as stated above (Q[117], A[3]; FS, Q[2]
, A[1]). Hence it must needs be that man's good in their respect consists
in a certain measure, in other words, that man seeks, according to a
certain measure, to have external riches, in so far as they are necessary
for him to live in keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will
be a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep
them immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is
defined as "immoderate love of possessing." It is therefore evident that
covetousness is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as means to
an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is held
in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness
exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about external things
in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the acquisition and
keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more
than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against one's neighbor,
since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, without another man
lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same
time. Secondly, it may signify immoderation in the internal affection
which a man has for riches when, for instance, a man loves them, desires
them, or delights in them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a
man sins against himself, because it causes disorder in his affections,
though not in his body as do the sins of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal
sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of temporal
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated according to
reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though old
people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone
that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are not excused
from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether covetousness is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is called
{philargyria}, applies not only to silver or money, but also to anything
that is desired immoderately." Now in every sin there is immoderate
desire of something, because sin consists in turning away from the
immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as state above (FS, Q[71],
A[6], OBJ[3]). Therefore covetousness is a general sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous [avarus]
man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass [avidus aeris]," i.e.
money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called {philargyria}, i.e.
"love of silver." Now silver, which stands for money, signifies all
external goods the value of which can be measured by money, as stated
above (Q[117], A[2], ad 2). Therefore covetousness is a desire for any
external thing: and consequently seems to be a general sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a gloss on Rm. 7:7, "For I had not known concupiscence,"
says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all
evil." Now the law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of
covetousness: hence it is written (Ex. 20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy
neighbor's goods." Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all
evil, and so covetousness is a general sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special
sins (Rm. 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all iniquity,
malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated
above (FS, Q[72], A[1]). Now the object of a sin is the good towards
which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a special aspect
of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now the
useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. And riches, as
such, come under the head of useful good, since they are desired under
the aspect of being useful to man. Consequently covetousness is a special
sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which
are comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness [avaritia] is
denominated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been originally
employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute masters,
is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a
wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamentis),
consequently the term "covetousness" has been amplified to denote all
immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a
homily (xvi in Ev.) that "covetousness is a desire not only for money,
but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately
sought after." In this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in
this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the
First Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First
Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses of
human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as they have
the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods that can
be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so forth, which are
desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things is
not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is a special vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for
anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is forbidden
to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to covet those things
that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality. For
Chrysostom, commenting on Mt. 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and
thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two kinds
of justice, one general, and the other special, to which covetousness is
opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v, 2). Therefore
covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's exceeding
the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is appointed by
justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to
liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean between
two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv, 1). But
covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to
liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:9): "A covetous man shall not
be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits
from them." Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it
inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the
desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches
in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and keeping
of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or
retaining another's property. This is opposed to justice, and in this
sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27): "Her princes in the midst
of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood . . . and to run
after gains through covetousness." Secondly, it denotes immoderation in
the interior affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or
desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he
be unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is opposed to liberality,
which moderates these affections, as stated above (Q[117], A[2], ad 3,
A[3], ad 3, A[6]). In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5):
"That they would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be
ready, so as a blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes:
"Lest they should regret what they had given, and give but little."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of covetousness
in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is called
illiberality [*{aneleutheria}] by the Philosopher.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure in
the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of legal
due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's property. But
liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally in the interior
affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of money,
and in the spending of the same, in so far as these proceed from the
interior affection, looking at the matter from the point of view not of
the legal but of the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of
reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite vice:
since it consists in having more than one ought according to justice, the
contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and this is not a sin
but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice
of prodigality opposed to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no one is
worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy of death on
account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Rm. 1:29): "Being
filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness [Douay:
'avarice']," etc. adds (Rm. 1:32): "They who do such things are worthy of
death." Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/2
OBJ 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one's own
inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says (Serm.
super. Luc. xii, 18): "It is the hungry man's bread that thou keepest
back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy man's money
that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou mightest
succor."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 2/2
Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is
contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all
covetousness a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save through a
mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace. But, according
to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St.
Chrysostom], "Lust for money brings darkness on the soul." Therefore
covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, "If any man build upon this
foundation," says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that "he
builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, how he
may please the world," which pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he
that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially, for it is
said of him that "he shall be saved, yet so as by fire." Therefore
covetousness is some times a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]) covetousness is twofold. In one
way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in respect of
its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the unjust taking
or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to theft or robbery,
which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q[66], AA[6],8). Yet venial sin
may occur in this kind of covetousness by reason of imperfection of the
act, as stated above (Q[66], A[6], ad 3), when we were treating of theft.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
In another way covetousness may be take as opposed to liberality: in
which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the love
of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise
that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love
of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin. If, on
the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love stops short of this, so
that although he love riches too much, yet he does not prefer the love of
them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do
anything in opposition to God or his neighbor, then covetousness is a
venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by
reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a
legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of their
want or on account of his having too much.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on the
soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the love of
riches to the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it is
written (Ecclus. 10:9): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous man," and
the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than to love
money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale." Tully also says
(De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is based chiefly on
two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to love money."
But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is the most
grievous of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more grievous
it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for Augustine says
(QQ[83], qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity." Therefore
covetousness is the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being
incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most
grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable
sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "old age and
helplessness of any kind make men illiberal." Therefore covetousness is
the most grievous of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is "a
serving of idols." Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous sins.
Therefore covetousness is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according
to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness
is not the most grievous of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil,
consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far as
it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good. Consequently the
order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the
good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good
the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is against God is
most grievous; after this comes a sin that is committed against a man's
person, and after this comes a sin against external things, which are
deputed to man's use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly,
the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good to which the
human appetite is inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good,
the more deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a
lower than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the
lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and
this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine
good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the human
appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a greater
deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal
element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the material
element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the point of view of
the good corrupted, rather than from that of the good to which the
appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that covetousness is not
simply the most grievous of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the
good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it is
given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own soul to sale";
because, to wit, he exposes his soul---that is, his life---to danger for
the sake of money. Hence the text continues: "Because while he liveth he
hath cast away"---that is, despised---"his bowels," in order to make
money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a "narrow mind," namely,
that one be willing to be subject to money.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any
temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness: because
greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man
turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way,
covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable
by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns God's mercy,
or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man's sins are
healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity
of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is incurable on the part of a
human defect; a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the
more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and
consequently the more one gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability
of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of
its being somewhat more dangerous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a
certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like the
idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in the
same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external creature by
paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an
external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not for worship.
Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as
idolatry.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For spiritual
sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of covetousness is
bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a
spiritual sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh. Now
covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from the
corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through
corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is
disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "He
that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." Now
covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom.
xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by
the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness seems
not to be a spiritual sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among
spiritual vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the
affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and
sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures
are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are
consummated in the carnal senses---for instance, the pleasures of the
table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which are
consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins of
the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while
spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without
pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes
pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches.
Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the
pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes
pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin
of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean between
purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of
spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely carnal
sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Movement takes its species from the term "whereto" and not
from the term "wherefrom." Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from
its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating in
some defect of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was
possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh in
the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the
possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, the covetous
man loads himself with an excess of riches.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether covetousness is a capital vice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For
covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality as
extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor prodigality a
capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be reckoned a
capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), those vices are
called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of other
vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches
have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to an
end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital
vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness arises
sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who, when
they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind
to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, wishing to be
thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's property."
Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of being a capital
vice in respect of other vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the
capital vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one
which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when an
end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man sets
about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end
is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, as stated
above (FS, Q[1], AA[4],7,8): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with
the conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the
conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not
set man's appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great
promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the
reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we
"use money in token of taking possession of something," and again it is
written (Eccles. 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore covetousness,
which is desire for money, is a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is
perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appetite.
Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same
genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal vice is opposed
to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a principal
virtue, since it does not regard the principal good of the reason, yet
covetousness is a principal vice, because it regards money, which
occupies a principal place among sensible goods, for the reason given in
the Article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is
desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of
reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal man is
a fool rather than a knave."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is true that money is directed to something else as its
end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible things, it
contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness
to happiness, as stated in the Article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising sometimes out
of other vices, as stated above (Q[36], A[4], ad 1; FS, Q[84], A[4]),
provided that itself be frequently the source of others.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and
insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly
stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness,
violence, and insensibility to mercy." For covetousness is opposed to
liberality, as stated above (A[3]). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood
are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to
charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice,
insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no connection with
covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to the
same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore they
should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine daughters of
covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy
lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity." Therefore the
former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds of
vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, for he
speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints
[*{kyminopristes}], misers [*{kimbikes}], who do illiberal deeds," and of
those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead,
and robbers." Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is
insufficient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects. But
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy cities and
despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal," i.e. covetous.
Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the
daughters mentioned above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise
therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since
covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two
things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this
respect covetousness gives rise to "insensibility to mercy," because, to
wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his
riches [*See Q[30], A[1]]. In the second place it belongs to covetousness
to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be
considered in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. In this way it
gives rise to "restlessness," by hindering man with excessive anxiety and
care, for "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money" (Eccles.
5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in the execution [effectu]. In this
way the covetous man, in acquiring other people's goods, sometimes
employs force, which pertains to "violence," sometimes deceit, and then
if he has recourse to words, it is "falsehood," if it be mere words,
"perjury" if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to
deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have "fraud"; if persons, then
we have "treachery," as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through
covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to
belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of
sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that it
is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have
species.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For lying
and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false
witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of
fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre
belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, since it
is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to
mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than
daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said to be
illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little
he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is "tightfisted": if he gives
with great reluctance, he is said to be {kyminopristes} [skinflint], a
cumin-seller, as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things of
little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or covetous,
through an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. In one way, through
making money by disgraceful means, whether in performing shameful and
servile works by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more
through sinful deeds, such as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit
where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by
laboring much to make little profit. In another way, in making money by
unjust means, whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or
by despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[118] A[8] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so is
illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence, are
said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. For
opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at the
same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to
covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But covetousness, as
opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions whereby man is
affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to
any passions of the soul, since it is not affected towards money, or to
anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to
covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as stated
above (FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now prodigality seems always to be directed to
some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his
goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated
(Lk. 15:13) of the prodigal son that he "wasted his substance living
riotously." Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperance
and insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that
prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we give
here the name of covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue
in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality
differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards
affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than
he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of them
than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies excess
in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while covetousness,
on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring
and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is opposed to
covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same subject
in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from what is in it
principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the
principal thing is giving, to which receiving and retaining are
subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally
giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be "prodigal,"
while he who is deficient in giving is said to be "covetous." Now it
happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding in
receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner
it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is
prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due
either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is
lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and
this pertains to covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the
mind, for he gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising
virtue, cares not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and
covetous in different respects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not as
exceeding, but as deficient in them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the sake
of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes through
being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on account
of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to intemperance,
both because through spending too much on other things he becomes
fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence
of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no pleasure in
virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) "that many a prodigal ends in becoming
intemperate."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prodigality is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle says (1
Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the root of all
evils." But it is not the root of prodigality, since this is opposed to
it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the rich of
this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others." Now this is
especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and to be
deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming to the
perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Mt. 6:34), "Be not . . .
solicitous for tomorrow," and (Mt. 19:21), "Sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou
hast, and give to the poor." Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the opposition between
prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of
which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful
through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality
is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring, not
to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness, which is
the concupiscence of the "fomes" [*Cf. FS, Q[81], A[3], ad 2], whence
all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a general covetousness
with regard to any kind of good: and in this sense also it is evident
that prodigality arises from covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to
acquire some temporal good inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to
others, or at least to satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that
reviews the passage correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking
literally of the desire of riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim.
6:9): "They that will become rich," etc. In this sense covetousness is
said to be "the root of all evils," not that all evils always arise from
covetousness, but because there is no evil that does not at some time
arise from covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of
covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in
order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and
communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does not
do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), "his giving is
neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought to be. For
sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor, namely, to
buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give nothing."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the
total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be
given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal man,
if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who give all
their possessions with the intention of following Christ, and banish from
their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not prodigal but
perfectly liberal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not
communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures
himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the wasting of
riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of his
very being." Now he that injures himself sins more grievously, according
to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?"
Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable
circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is
sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of those
who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to accept from
others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a
circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality to
those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1).
Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated
above (Q[56], A[1], ad 1; FS, Q[61], A[2], ad 1). Now prodigality is more
opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written (Prov.
21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of
the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to give too much and
receive nothing." Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the prodigal
seems to be much better than the illiberal man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin
than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because
covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving, wherein
the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving or
retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the
prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous
man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 6.
Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the
prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he
is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending
impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover,
prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness
thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for the
reason given above (Q[118], A[5], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The difference between the prodigal and the covetous man is
not that the former sins against himself and the latter against another.
For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is his, and
his means of support, and against others by spending the wherewithal to
help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the dispensers
of the Church's goods, that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their
prodigal expenditure. In like manner the covetous man sins against
others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins against himself,
through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): "A
man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet doth not give him the power
to eat thereof." Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he
injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the
covetous man profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even
use his own goods for his own profit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them according
to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality we note
that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that
it retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the sake of
intemperance points already to several additional sins, wherefore the
prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. That an
illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs to others,
although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the
motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to
accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[119] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues are
directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone,
for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] Out. Para. 1/1
OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider "epikeia," under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether "epikeia" is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "epikeia" [*{epieikeia}] is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a virtue. For no virtue does away
with another virtue. Yet "epikeia" does away with another virtue, since
it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is
opposed to severity. Therefore "epikeia" is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "With regard to
these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they make
them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge must
pronounce judgment not on them but according to them." But seemingly
"epikeia" pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that the law
should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore "epikeia" is a
vice rather than a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, apparently it belongs to "epikeia" to consider the
intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But
it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the
lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and
Constitutions, under Law i: "It is fitting and lawful that We alone
should interpret between equity and law." Therefore the act of "epikeia"
is unlawful: and consequently "epikeia" is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[96], A[6]), when we were treating
of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned, are composed
of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was
not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every single
case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what commonly happens:
although if the law be applied to certain cases it will frustrate the
equality of justice and be injurious to the common good, which the law
has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in
the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be
injurious---for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in deposit,
and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, or if a man were to
seek the return of his deposit in order to fight against his country. In
these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set
aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the
common good. This is the object of "epikeia" which we call equity.
Therefore it is evident that "epikeia" is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Epikeia" does not set aside that which is just in itself
but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it opposed to
severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought to be
followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be
followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and
Constitutions under Law v: "Without doubt he transgresses the law who by
adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the
lawgiver."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it was
not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be
observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law, but
on some particular contingency.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it is
not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the interpretation
of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there is need, not of
interpretation, but of execution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "epikeia" is a part of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice. For, as stated
above (Q[58], A[7]), justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now
"epikeia" is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all
virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part
of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established
by law. Therefore it seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a
less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as being
principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now "epikeia"
seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name:
for it is derived from {epi}, i.e. "above," and {dikaion}, i.e. "just."
Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems that "epikeia" is the same as modesty. For
where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all
men," the Greek has {epieikeia} [*{to epieikes}]. Now, according to Tully
(De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore
"epikeia" is not a part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "epikeia is a
kind of justice."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[48]), a virtue has three kinds of
parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of
which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole.
This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of
many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one
thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as
"being" of substance and accident.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, "epikeia" is a part of justice taken in a general sense,
for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10).
Wherefore it is evident that "epikeia" is a subjective part of justice;
and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of
legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of
"epikeia." Hence "epikeia" is by way of being a higher rule of human
actions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one
way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal
justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the
letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is
of more account, then "epikeia" is the more important part of legal
justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the
law with regard to the letter, then "epikeia" is a part not of legal
justice but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with
legal justice, as exceeding it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "epikeia is
better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the
letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not
better than all justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[120] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to "epikeia" to moderate something, namely, the
observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a
part of temperance, moderates man's outward life---for instance, in his
deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term {epieikeia} is
applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely,
piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether piety is a gift?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the
virtues, as stated above (FS, Q[68], A[1]). But piety is a virtue, as
stated above (Q[101], A[3]). Therefore piety is not a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above
all the moral virtues, as above (FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now among the parts of
justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice
is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift rather
than piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated
above (FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven:
for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the inmost recesses of the
heart with works of mercy": and so there will be no piety in heaven since
there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q[30], A[1]]. Therefore piety is not a
gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter
of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: 'godliness'] [*"Pietas," whence our English
word "pity," which is the same as mercy.]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[68], A[1]; FS, Q[69], AA[1],3),
the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul,
rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost
moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection
towards God, according to Rm. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since it belongs
properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father, it follows
that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay worship and
duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the
flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as
Father.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more
excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as the piety
that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is yet more
excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore
religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the gift of piety is
greater than religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not
only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account
of their being related to his father so by the gift of piety he pays
worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their
relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to honor the saints, and
not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands them or not, as
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Consequently it also assists those
who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act has no place in
heaven, especially after the Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its
principal act, which is to revere God with filial affection: for it is
then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5,
"Behold how they are numbered among the children of God." The saints will
also mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day,
the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," corresponds to the
gift of piety?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," does
not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding
to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are
they that hunger and thirst after justice," or the fifth beatitude,
"Blessed are the merciful," since as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]), the
works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second beatitude does not
pertain to the gift of piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of knowledge,
which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Is. 11). Now
direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since, then, the third
beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," corresponds to the gift of
knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts, as
stated above (FS, Q[70], A[2]). Now among the fruits, goodness and
benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which pertains
to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond to the
gift of piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety is
becoming to the meek."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold
congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they
are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he
assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the
second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on. Another
congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each gift
and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the gifts
according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and fifth
beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet the
second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness
removes the obstacles to acts of piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their proper
natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge and piety:
but taking them according to their order, different beatitudes correspond
to them, although a certain congruity may be observed, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[121] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly
ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes
obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;
(3) Of the second;
(4) Of the third;
(5) Of the fourth;
(6) Of the other six.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of
justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the citizens
virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1.
Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, "the law prescribes about all acts
of all virtues." Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first.
principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the
judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as
stated above (FS, Q[99], A[4]). But the precepts of the decalogue are
moral precepts, as stated above (FS, Q[100], A[3]). Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of justice
regarding the common good, for instance about public officers and the
like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue.
Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly
belong to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two
tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our neighbor,
both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are
directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts
of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore
all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of
the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to principles
that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of
duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of
one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself it
would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do
as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it appears
manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which
is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to
justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion,
which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of
piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are
about justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but
in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about
those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral
precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as the
ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as
these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are contained in the
decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the precepts of the
decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be
administered in different ways according to the difference of men. Hence
they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue,
but among the judicial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as their
end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is charity":
but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is unfittingly
expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father in the flesh,
according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we [Vulg.: 'shall we not
much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live?" Now the precept of
piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed affirmatively in these
words: "Honor thy father and thy mother." Much more, therefore, should
the first precept of religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed
affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to religion,
as stated above (A[1]). Now religion, since it is one virtue, has one
act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden: since we read
first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me"; secondly, "Thou
shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and thirdly, "Thou shalt not
adore them nor serve them." Therefore the first precept is unfittingly
expressed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the first
precept forbids the sin of superstition." But there are many wicked
superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above (Q[92], A[2]). Therefore
it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it
behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the
order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two
things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that the
first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation
of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in building a
home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and in the goodness
of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which
is that a man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of
the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was
to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary
was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly
directed to God, Who is the last end of man's will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in
the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the
farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according
to Jer. 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns."
Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as
to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief obstacle to
religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to Mt. 6:24, "You
cannot serve God and mammon." Therefore in the first precept of the Law
the worship of false gods is excluded.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about
religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day." Still
the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the
obstacles to religion might be removed. For though affirmation naturally
precedes negation, yet in the process of generation, negation, whereby
obstacles are removed, comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially
is this true in matters concerning God, where negation is preferable to
affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes
(Coel. Hier. ii).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some served
certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images. Hence Varro
says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped gods without using
images: and this worship is first forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not
have strange gods." Among others the worship of false gods was observed
by using certain images: and so the very making of images was fittingly
forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven
thing," as also the worship of those same images, by the words, "Thou
shalt not adore them," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some compact,
tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood to be
forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is unfittingly
expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in
vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: "Thou shalt not deem the
Son of God to be a creature," so that it forbids an error against faith.
Again, a gloss on the words of Dt. 5:11, "Thou shalt not take the name of
. . thy God in vain, " adds, i.e. "by giving the name of God to wood or
stone," as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which, like
error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as
faith precedes religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the
first, whereby superstition is forbidden.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes ---for
instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking in
conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col. 3:17, "All
whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the name of the
Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God's name in vain
seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding superstition, and
thus should have preceded it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou shalt
not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by swearing to
nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that
is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is
without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much
more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to God
is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other like
sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not have been
said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in
vain."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary
to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true
religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First, by
excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others
than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Secondly, by
lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is contemned, and this
pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above (Q[97], in the
preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now superstition hinders
religion by preventing man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him:
and when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at
the same time give due worship to God, according to Is. 28:20, "The bed
is straitened, so that one must fall out," i.e. either the true God or a
false god must fall out from man's heart, "and a short covering cannot
cover both." On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing
man from honoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first
of all acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we
have acknowledged.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before the
second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal explanation is
that which is given Dt. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy
God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that which is not [*Vulg.: 'for he
shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon a vain thing']."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of God,
but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's word by
way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name more frequently
in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in consequence all
inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by this precept: and it
is in this sense that we are to take the explanation quoted in the First
Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is not.
This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called perjury, as
stated above (Q[98], A[1], ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is
false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the
truth. on the other hand, when a man swears without judgment, through
levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity on the part of the
oath itself, but only on the part of the swearer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we begin by
putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law, which forms
man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which
are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by prohibition or by
command, to those things which are of most common occurrence in the
course of human life. Hence the precepts of the decalogue include the
prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent occurrence than
blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the
thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying
words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: "Thou shalt
not take the name of . . . thy God in vain": since it matters not in
which of God's names perjury is committed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of
the Sabbath, is fittingly expressed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the
hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For this, understood
spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in commenting on Lk. 13:14,
"The ruler of the synagogue being angry that He had healed on the
Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law forbids, not to heal man on the
Sabbath, but to do servile works," i.e. "to burden oneself with sin."
Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept, for it is written (Ex.
31:13): "See that you keep My Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me
and you in your generations." Now the precepts of the decalogue are both
spiritual and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the
precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain "sacred
things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated above (FS,
Q[101], A[4]). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also
sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there were many
sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was unfitting to omit
all other ceremonial observances and to mention only that of the Sabbath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But in
the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not
sin---for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth day,
and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also Elias (3
Kgs. 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God, Horeb, must
have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried the ark of the
Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7, must be understood to have
carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Lk. 13:15): "Doth not every
one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them
to water?" Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the
decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed also
under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not observed,
neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's day, on
which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like things.
Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is unfittingly
expressed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed by the first
and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above (AA[2],3), it
remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is established in
true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God: and
just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior worship under the guise
of certain corporal similitudes, so is external worship given to God
under the guise of sensible signs. And since for the most part man is
induced to pay interior worship, consisting in prayer and devotion, by
the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law as
necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists in sensible
signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so to speak, first and
common principles of the Law, and consequently the third precept of the
decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as the sign of a
universal boon that concerns all. This universal boon was the work of the
Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to have rested on
the seventh day: and sign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh
day---that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after
the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is
given: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth . . . and rested
on the seventh day."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood
literally, is partly oral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral precept in
the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be given to Divine
things. For there is in man a natural inclination to set aside a certain
time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep,
and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a
certain time for spiritual refreshment, by which man's mind is refreshed
in God. And thus to have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself
with Divine things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as
this precept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of
the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept
in its allegorical signification, as representative of Christ's rest in
the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral signification, as
representing cessation from all sinful acts, and the mind's rest in God,
in which sense, too, it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial
precept in its analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment
of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed
among the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial
precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain
particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is
representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all
creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the
general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial
precept of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the
Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself
with Divine things, and is signified in the words: "Remember that thou
keep holy the Sabbath day." For in the Law those things are said to be
holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing is
cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Ex. 20:11), "On the
seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work." The kind of work meant appears
from Lev. 23:3, "You shall do no servile work on that day [*Vulg.: 'You
shall do no work on that day']." Now servile work is so called from
servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of
sin, according to Jn. 8:34, "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of
sin," and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. Another servitude is
whereby one man serves another. Now one man serves another not with his
mind but with his body, as stated above (Q[104], AA[5],6, ad 1).
Wherefore in this respect those works are called servile whereby one man
serves another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the
work of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a
servile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath
day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance:
since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in order that he
may occupy himself with works connected with God's service. For this
reason, according to Jn. 7:23, "a man [*Vulg.: 'If a man,' etc.] receives
circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be
broken": and for this reason too we read (Mt. 12:5), that "on the Sabbath
days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath," i.e. do corporal works
on the Sabbath, "and are without blame." Accordingly, the priests in
carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath
observance. In like manner it is not contrary to the observance of the
Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or
writing. Wherefore a gloss on Num 28 says that "smiths and like craftsmen
rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does
not cease from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the
priests in the temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame." On the
other hand, those works that are called servile in the first or second
way are contrary to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they
hinder man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is
hindered from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by
lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day is
more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily work.
Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): "It would be better if the
Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time seditiously in
the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be making linen on
the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new
moon." It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on the
Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God,
are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to servants;
while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they are common to
those who serve and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant
or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his
neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the well-being of
the body, according to Prov. 24:11, "Deliver them that are led to death":
secondarily as regards avoiding damage to one's property, according to
Dt. 22:1, "Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his
sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother." Hence a
corporal work pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily
well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is not against the
observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the
health of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not profane the
Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day (1 Macc. 2),
nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this
same reason our Lord (Mt. 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the
ears of corn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner a
bodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is not
contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is written (Jn.
7:23): "Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the
Sabbath day?" And again, a bodily work that is done to avoid an imminent
damage to some external thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our
Lord says (Mt. 12:11): "What man shall there be among you, that hath one
sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not
take hold on it and lift it up?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day took the
place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the precept but
by the institution of the Church and the custom of Christian people. For
this observance is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath
in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord' day is not so
strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works are permitted on the Lord's
day which were forbidden on the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and
so forth. And again in the New Law, dispensation is more easily granted
than in the Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works, on account of
their necessity, because the figure pertains to the protestation of
truth, which it is unlawful to omit even in small things; while works,
considered in themselves, are changeable in point of place and time.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one's parents, is fittingly
expressed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's parents,
is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining to piety.
Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude,
and others of which we have spoken (QQ[101],102, seq.). Therefore it
seems that there should not have been given a special precept of piety,
as none is given regarding the others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but also
to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the
well-wishers of our country, as stated above (Q[101], AA[1],2). Therefore
it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the honoring of one's
father and mother.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also support.
Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly prescribed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young, and
on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time. Therefore it
was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise, "That thou
mayest be long-lived upon earth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of
God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our neighbors, we are
under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts
directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing us to our
parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is
the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain affinity to
the precepts of the First Table.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[101], A[2]), piety directs us to pay the
debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence, since the
precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought to contain
some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of justice, which
regard some special debt.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to one's
kindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents that
our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the
decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man to his
parents rather than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this
precept of honoring our parents is understood to command whatever
concerns the payment of debt to any person, as secondary matter included
in the principal matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Reverential honor is due to one's parents as such, whereas
support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for instance, because
they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated above (Q[101], A[2]
). And since that which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which
is accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the Law, which
are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring
our parents: and this honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to
comprise support and whatever else is due to our parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their parents
not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present life,
according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay:
'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that
now is and of that which is to come." And with reason. Because the man
who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain congruity, that the
favor should be continued to him, and he who is ungrateful for a favor
deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of bodily life to our parents
after God: wherefore he that honors his parents deserves the prolongation
of his life, because he is grateful for that favor: while he that honors
not his parents deserves to be deprived of life because he is ungrateful
for the favor. However, present goods or evils are not the subject of
merit or demerit except in so far as they are directed to a future
reward, as stated above (FS, Q[114], A[12]). Wherefore sometimes in
accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard
chiefly the future reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are
sooner deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their
parents, live longer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that one
refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required that one pay
one's debts, according to Rm. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues."
Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's neighbor.
Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and
bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on one's
neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above (QQ[72],
seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are unfittingly
expressed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as
denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The desire
[concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom":
secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1, "From
whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . from your
concupiscences which war in your members?" Now the concupiscence of the
sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise
first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a precept
of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will forbidden, since
it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting for the precepts
of the decalogue to include some that forbid concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or theft.
But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder. Therefore
neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire of theft
and of adultery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which is
due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special
reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which is due to
all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to religion,
whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth precept pertaining
to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his parents---which duty
includes the paying of all that is due for any special reason---it was
necessary in due sequence to give certain precepts pertaining to justice
properly so called, which pays to all indifferently what is due to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict
injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing of
those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to be given a
place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue. On the
other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are paid in different ways
to different people: hence it did not behoove to include affirmative
precepts about those duties among the precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor are
reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as taking
precedence of others in point of generality and importance. For all
injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are understood
to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the principal of all.
Those that are inflicted on a person connected with one's neighbor,
especially by way of lust, are understood to be forbidden together with
adultery: those that come under the head of damage done to property are
understood to be forbidden together with theft: and those that are
comprised under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are
understood to be forbidden together with the bearing of false witness,
which is more directly opposed to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include the
prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go farther
than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their prohibition is
the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[122] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but of
horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the other hand,
adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e. of something
pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of something useful:
and good of its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscible.
Hence the concupiscence of theft and adultery had to be forbidden by
special precepts, but not the concupiscence of murder.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] Out. Para. 1/3
TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ[123]-170)
FORTITUDE (QQ[123]-124)
OF FORTITUDE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We
must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3) the
gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] Out. Para. 2/3
Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude
itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to
fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?
(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?
(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?
(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?
(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?
(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?
(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?
(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?
(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?
(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fortitude is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (2
Cor. 12:9): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity." But fortitude is contrary
to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological,
intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the
theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be
gathered from what we have said above (FS, Q[57], A[2]; FS, Q[62], A[3]).
Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, since
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7,8): "Some seem to be brave
through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers," both of which
cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue, "and some are
called brave on account of certain passions"; for instance, on account of
fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on account of sorrow, anger, or
hope. But moral virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as
stated above (FS, Q[55], A[4]). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it is a
"good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7,8). But
fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from the
temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers
fortitude among the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue is
that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good." Hence
human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man
good, and tenders his work good. Now man's good is to be in accordance
with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). Wherefore it
belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work accord with
reason. This happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself,
and this is done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing
the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice;
thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude
in human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from
following the rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some
object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason
requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance.
Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in
accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents
itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is
requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by
fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it conforms
man to reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the infirmity
of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the Apostle was
speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with
infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or
fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, and this belongs
to the perfection that is called humility.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a virtue
without having the virtue, and from some other cause than virtue. Hence
the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people are
said to be brave by way of resemblance, through performing acts of
fortitude without having the virtue. This may be done in three ways.
First, because they tend to that which is difficult as though it were not
difficult: and this again happens in three ways, for sometimes this is
owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness of the danger;
sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming
dangers---when, for instance, one has often experienced escape from
danger; and sometimes this is owing to a certain science and art, as in
the case of soldiers who, through skill and practice in the use of arms,
think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable
of defending themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit.
i), "No man fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do
well." Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude without having the
virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he
wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not
indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such
as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such
as blame, pain, or loss.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, as
explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from its
likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion
of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by
reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (FS, Q[63], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fortitude is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it is
written (Wis. 7:7): "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice,
and fortitude," where the text has "virtue" for "fortitude." Since then
the term "virtue" is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a
general virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is not lacking in
courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues and guards their
behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred
by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding
to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue"; and
he says the same further on in connection with other vices. Now this
cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from firmness.
But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in Ethic. ii.
Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), the term
"fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain
firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a
condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii),
it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly,
fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and
withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely
in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that
"fortitude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils." In this
sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special
matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word
virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in
one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a
principle of action, as stated in Metaph. v, 17. And since this latter
meaning is the more common, the term "virtue," as denoting the extreme
limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a general
sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting
the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more
specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely fortitude, to which
it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of assaults.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting
firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even as a
special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the
assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are most
difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are
less difficult.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fortitude is about fear and dying?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring. For Gregory
says (Moral. vii): "The fortitude of the just man is to overcome the
flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts of the present
life." Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures rather than about
fear and daring.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to
fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has
nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a
man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not
about fear and daring.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear, as
stated above (FS, Q[45], A[1], ad 2) in the treatise on passions.
Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more than about hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that
fortitude is about fear and daring.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), it belongs to the virtue of
fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following
the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the
notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails
difficulty, as stated above (FS, Q[42], AA[3],5) in the treatise on
passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult things,
which can withdraw the will from following the reason. And it behooves
one not only firmly to bear the assault of these difficulties by
restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it
is necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom
for the future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore
fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just man,
as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all mentions
matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds
that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue, by saying:
"To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal reward."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the course
of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear. Hence
fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but mediately
about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for hope
is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same object, and is
opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above (FS,
Q[45], A[1]). And since fortitude properly regards those temporal evils
that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully's definition quoted
in the Second Objection, it follows that fortitude properly is about fear
and daring and not about hope, except in so far as it is connected with
daring, as stated above (FS, Q[45], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of death. For
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is love bearing all
things readily for the sake of the object beloved": and (Music. vi) he
says that fortitude is "the love which dreads no hardship, not even
death." Therefore fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also
about other afflictions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a
mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a
mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also about
other fears.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is about
an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in Ethic. iii.
Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Andronicus says that "fortitude is a virtue of the
irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), it belongs to the virtue of
fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of
reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly
the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is
equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must be
that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the
greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will in
consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover
it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something
extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does
away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii)
that "the soul is shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain,
lest the body be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done
away and destroyed." Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear
of dangers of death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of adversity:
yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any kind of
adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while
through bearing others he is said to be brave in a restricted sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates the
love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of contrary
evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, as a
consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is the case
with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own life is natural:
and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying the fear of death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right reason:
wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason is
not contrary to virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in
battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their fortitude. But
martyrs are not commended in connection with battle. Therefore fortitude
is not properly about dangers of death in battle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude is applicable
both to warlike and to civil matters": and Tully (De Offic. i), under the
heading, "That it pertains to fortitude to excel in battle rather than in
civil life," says: "Although not a few think that the business of war is
of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must
be qualified: and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are many
things in civil life that are more important and more glorious than those
connected with war." Now greater fortitude is about greater things.
Therefore fortitude is not properly concerned with death in battle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country's
temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that "wars are waged
in order to insure peace." Now it does not seem that one ought to expose
oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of one's country,
since this same peace is the occasion of much license in morals.
Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not about the danger
of death in battle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude is
chiefly about death in battle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[4]), fortitude strengthens a man's
mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now fortitude
is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to good;
wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from
the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness,
storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem to come on
a man through his pursuing some good. on the other hand, the dangers of
death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good,
because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight. Now a
just fight is of two kinds. First, there is the general combat, for
instance, of those who fight in battle; secondly, there is the private
combat, as when a judge or even private individual does not refrain from
giving a just judgment through fear of the impending sword, or any other
danger though it threaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to
strengthen the mind against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a
general battle, but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be
called by the general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that
fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind
of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of death on
account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend
through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey
with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own
person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God;
wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the
genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason they
are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb.
xi. 34.]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Personal and civil business is differentiated from the
business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and civil
affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts which
are private wars, and so with regard to these also there may be fortitude
properly so called.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it
become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there are
many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such
as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which are
occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. For
virtue "is about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is
more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the
chief act of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater
power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on
another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then
fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to
fortitude to attack rather than to endure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its
mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack
denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit.
Since then fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems
that it regards attack rather than endurance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "certain
persons are" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), and according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 9), "fortitude is more concerned to allay fear, than to
moderate daring." For it is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate
daring, since the danger which is the object of daring and fear, tends by
its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack
belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter moderates daring, whereas to
endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore the principal act of
fortitude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of
dangers rather than to attack them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three
reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being
attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is
attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more difficult
to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because he that
endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks
upon danger as something to come; and it is more difficult to be unmoved
by the present than by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies
length of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden movements;
and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than to be
moved suddenly to something arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 8) that "some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is
present; this is not the behavior of a brave man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an
action of the soul cleaving most resolutely [fortissime] to good, the
result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of the
body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with the
cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of the
good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first in
intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the order
of execution, follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is impossible
for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his habit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We love virtues for the
sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be virtuous,"
namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own sake, "without
loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor, we shall surely
cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the
sake of which alone we love virtue." But fortitude is a virtue. Therefore
the act of fortitude is directed not to fortitude but to happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is
love ready to bear all things for God's sake." Now God is not the habit
of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be better
than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does not act
for the sake of the good of his habit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "to the brave
man fortitude itself is a good": and such is his end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the
proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent's
form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce
the likeness of its heat into some passive matter, and the end of the
builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever
good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the remote end of
the agent. Now just as in things made, external matter is fashioned by
art, so in things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence.
Accordingly we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proximate
end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he intends to act
in accordance with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First Objection
proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its end, instead of
the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The other two objections
consider the ultimate end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the brave man delights in his act?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For "delight is
the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x, 4,6,8). Now the
brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature.
Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, "But the fruit of the
Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are called
"fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure delight."
Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in
his act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave
man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own body,
which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the
good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the brave
man does all things with pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the brave
man seems to have no delight in his act."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[31], AA[3],4,5) where we were
treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting
from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from an
apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from
deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason. Now the
principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain things that are
unpleasant as apprehended by the soul---for instance, the loss of bodily
life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also
as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things connected with
them---but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact,
such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something
that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in the
act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he
has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life,
and for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: "I
suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer
these things because I fear Thee."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual
delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's grace, which
has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it
delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed
Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt
as though he were walking on roses.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely
overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual
sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the
body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for a brave man to
delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be
sad."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one power hinders
the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses hinders the
mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of their
end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is principally the
case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "to
perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in so
far as one attains the end."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the
delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the
sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that
spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the
presence of great bodily pain.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden
occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when they are
unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "fortitude is the
deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil." Therefore fortitude
does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The brave man is not
unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures beforehand,
and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter
the future by his forethought, lest he should say afterwards: This befell
me because I did not think it could possibly happen." But it is not
possible to be prepared for the future in the case of sudden occurrences.
Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden
happenings.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the "brave man
is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the future, which is
inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of
fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "fortitude is
chiefly about sudden dangers of death."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the operation of
fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not
about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think
beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to
withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory
(Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force,
and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed
with the shield of foreknowledge." The other thing to be considered in
the operation of fortitude regards the display of the virtuous habit: and
in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, because
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the habit of fortitude is
displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of
nature. Wherefore if a person without forethought does that which
pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of some sudden
danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly
seated in his mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude, to
prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same way as a
brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the Replies
to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the brave man makes use of anger in his action?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his action. For
no one should employ as an instrument of his action that which he cannot
use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and
lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii),
when a bodily passion is in movement, it does not rest at once just as
one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not employ anger for his action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he
should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more imperfect.
Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude,
wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira i): "Reason by
itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also to
accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason to seek
help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid, the trusty from the
untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?" Therefore a brave man should
not make use of anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of
fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or
desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts
are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons
dare many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither
sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it should not
employ anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger helps
the brave."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[24], A[2]), concerning anger and
the other passions there was a difference of opinion between the
Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all other
passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas the
Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men
both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified by reason.
And possibly they differed not in reality but in their way of speaking.
For the Peripatetics, as stated above (FS, Q[24], A[2]), gave the name of
passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may
comport themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the
command of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more
prompt, they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the
other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of reason.
On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to certain
immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they called them
sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them altogether from
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not
immoderate anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is
subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will, which
would not be the case were it immoderate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its
assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an instrument,
just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the
instrument to be more imperfect than the principal agent, even as the
hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a follower
of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by him directly at
Aristotle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A[6]), has two acts,
namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the act of
endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but for the
act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other
passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, so
that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking. On the other
hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though
accidentally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of anger,
as stated above (FS, Q[47], A[3]), or as making a person expose himself
to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner desire, by its
very nature, tends to a pleasurable good, to which it is directly
contrary to withstand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to
attack, in so far as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack
pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "Of all the cases
in which fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man
is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose," i.e.
for a due end; "this is true fortitude."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[11] Out. Para. 1/1
Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For, as stated
above (A[10]), anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now anger is not
accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude.
Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object of
fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and toil, as
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon which
human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a hinge
[cardine]. But fortitude is about dangers of death which are of rare
occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a
cardinal or principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary on Lk.
6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude among the
four cardinal or principal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[11] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), those virtues are
said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost claim to that
which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other conditions of
virtue in general one is that it is stated to "act steadfastly,"
according to Ethic. ii, 4. Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise
for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more
praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or recede. Now man is
impelled to recede from that which is in accordance with reason, both by
the pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain impels him
more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36): "There
is none that does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we
perceive that even the most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest
pleasures by the fear of pain." And among the pains of the mind and
dangers those are mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against
them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude in its act
of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for it is
by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal passion,
as stated above (FS, Q[25], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it behooves
to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude is directed to
evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of
reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the
occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of justice
which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters
mortal adversaries.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues. For
Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is higher, so to speak, than the
rest."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good. But
fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the greatest of
the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his
possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this that a
man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: whereas
justice and the other moral virtues are about other and external things.
Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i): "Justice is the most
resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): "Those virtues must
needs be greatest which are most profitable to others." Now liberality
seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things that are
great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good": wherefore the better
a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a perfection of reason,
has the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since it
belongs to justice to establish the order of reason in all human affairs:
whereas the other virtues safeguard this good, inasmuch as they moderate
the passions, lest they lead man away from reason's good. As to the order
of the latter, fortitude holds the first place, because fear of dangers
of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of
reason: and after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures of
touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing
essentially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before
safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the
cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third,
temperance fourth, and after these the other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in
respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both in
warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he begins
by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat of fortitude, which being
higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to
civil matters."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the
difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its
goodness rather than its difficulty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death except
in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to fortitude
depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that
"fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since the
stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
The Fourth argument is granted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[123] A[12] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular
favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude, since it
safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
i, 9) that "just and brave men are most beloved, because they are most
useful in war and peace."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] Out. Para. 1/1
OF MARTYRDOM (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
(3) Concerning the perfection of this act;
(4) The pain of martyrdom;
(5) Its cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all acts of
virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the
case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and of whom
Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that "they attained the ripe age of
eternity through the glory of martyrdom." Therefore martyrdom is not an
act of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is unlawful
to kill oneself, as stated above (Q[64], A[5]), and yet martyrdom is
achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "during
persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from those who
threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended
their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the Catholic Church with
most solemn veneration." Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of
virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would it
seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of
virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Mt. 5:10):
"Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs
is the kingdom of heaven." Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], AA[1],3), it belongs to virtue
to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason consists
in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its proper effect,
as shown above (Q[109], AA[1],2; Q[123], A[12]). And martyrdom consists
essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against the assaults
of persecution. Hence it is evident that martyrdom is an act of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the use of
their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they suffered
martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains no proof
of this, it is better to say that these babes in being slain obtained by
God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by their own
will. For the shedding of one's blood for Christ's sake takes the place
of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case of baptized children the merit
of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal
grace, so in those who were slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's
martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence
Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though
he were addressing them: "A man that does not believe that children are
benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned in
suffering for Christ. You were not old enough to believe in Christ's
future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could endure suffering
of Christ Who was to suffer."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the Church
was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority thus to
honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf. Q[64], A[1], ad 2]."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now it
has been stated (FS, Q[108], A[1], ad 4) that some of the precepts of the
Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the preparation of the
mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and such a
thing, whenever expedient. In the same way certain things belong to an
act of virtue as regards the preparation of the mind, so that in such and
such a case a man should act according to reason. And this observation
would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom, which
consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor
ought a man to give another an occasion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone
act unjustly, one ought to endure it in moderation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For the Greek
{martyr} signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the faith of
Christ. according to Acts 1:8, "You shall be witnesses unto Me," etc. and
Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith
which those glorious warriors have sealed with their blood." Therefore
martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue which
inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the act avails
nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Maximus
says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ is victorious in His martyrs."
Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyrdom,
according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man
lay down his life for his friends." Moreover without charity martyrdom
avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, "If I should deliver my body to
be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore
martyrdom is an act of charity rather than of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is easy
to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great thing to
imitate his faith and patience." Now that which calls chiefly for praise
in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act. Therefore
martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed
martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how
shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?" Now a
person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs.
Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[1], seqq.), it belongs to
fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against
dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all against
those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is
firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and
justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the imminence of
which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest with his
persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii):
"The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and Christ's
servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and
strength divine." Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of
fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs:
They "became valiant in battle" [*Heb. 11:34].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude. one
is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is the end of
fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield
to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that good, and in this
consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic fortitude
strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the safeguarding of which
he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man's
soul in the good of Divine justice, which is "through faith in Christ
Jesus," according to Rm. 3:22. Thus martyrdom is related to faith as the
end in which one is strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its first
and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas fortitude
inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that
elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding, and of
fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests both virtues.
It is due to charity that it is meritorious, like any other act of
virtue: and for this reason it avails not without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[123], A[6]), the chief act of fortitude
is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which is aggression,
martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude on the part of its
chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised for
their patience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.
For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not of precept
pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary for
salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is necessary for salvation,
since the Apostle says (Rm. 10:10), "With the heart we believe unto
justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation," and it is
written (1 Jn. 3:16), that "we ought to lay down our lives for the
brethren." Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to perfection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man give
his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give God his
body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxv)
that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices." Therefore martyrdom is
not an act of the greatest perfection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to
maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better than
the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2).
Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he that
teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and guiding
subjects is more perfect than the act of martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers martyrdom to
virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems to
belong to perfection in the highest degree.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First, with
regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue proximately
eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance
of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because endurance
of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so far as it is
directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue, such as faith or
the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the end is better.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its
first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this
respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since, as
the Apostle says (Col. 3:14), that "charity . . . is the bond of
perfection." Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of
the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a thing is proved to be
so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its sake is
more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its sake is more
odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the present life man
loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more than
anything, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily
torment, "from fear of which even dumb animals refrain from the greatest
pleasures," as Augustine observes (QQ[83], qu. 36). And from this point
of view it is clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in
respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity,
according to Jn. 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man
lay down his life for his friends."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of
counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being
necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii)
that a man is under the obligation of observing continency, through the
absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary to the
perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary for
salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for salvation
to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal
for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom of their
own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring
to the preparation of the mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of
obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil.
2:8) that He became "obedient unto death." Hence it is evident that
martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered absolutely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to the proper
species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all other
virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether death is essential to martyrdom?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For Jerome
says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): "I
should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr,
although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory says (Hom. iii in
Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet
the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since even if we no
longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly
desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit." Therefore there can be
martyrdom without suffering death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising
life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh: wherefore
seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the
body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or has
been threatened in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of
Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of martyr should be
accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the flesh for the sake
of Christ's faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of
the body: wherefore also Lucy said: "If thou causest me to be violated
against my will, my chastity will gain me a twofold crown."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to
fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as Augustine
declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships besides death,
which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely imprisonment, exile,
being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in Heb. 10:34, for which
reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus,
notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not essential to
martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A[2],
ad 1; A[3]). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death. Therefore it
is before death; and consequently death is not essential to martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in dying
for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living
without faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that As stated above (A[2]), a martyr is so called as being a
witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things
visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb. 11.
Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith
in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order to
obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the life of
the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things relating to
the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred and all they
possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence
Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin for skin, and all that a man
hath he will give for his soul" [Douay: 'life'] i.e. for the life of his
body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man
suffer death for Christ's sake.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet
with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is
condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is not
evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith,
or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of men her
testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently this is not
martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God, however, Who searcheth
the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a reward, as Lucy said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[123], AA[4],5), fortitude regards danger
of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is
not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or
forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the
voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person willingly
suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man
lives for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ's sake, or
after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship
inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. The act of
martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this state, and at the very
time that he is suffering these hardships.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For it is
written (1 Pt. 4:15,16): "Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a
thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's things. But if as a
Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name."
Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith of Christ.
Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom to those who
suffer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne to
the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing witness to
any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man
would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of geometry or
some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous. Therefore faith
alone is the cause of martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most account
which are directed to the common good, since "the good of the nation is
better than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of martyrdom, it
would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for the defense
of their country. Yet this is not consistent with Church observance, for
we do not celebrate the martyrdom of those who die in a just war.
Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 5:10): "Blessed are they that suffer
persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom, according to
a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage. Now not only
faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore other
virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[4]), martyrs are so called as being
witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear witness to
the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which is in
accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore
Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the truth of faith.
Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also outward
profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one confesses
the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he has faith,
according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works, my faith." Hence it
is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): "They profess that they know
God but in their works they deny Him." Thus all virtuous deeds, inasmuch
as they are referred to God, are professions of the faith whereby we come
to know that God requires these works of us, and rewards us for them: and
in this way they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the
Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered
death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is said to
be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but also because he
is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ, according to Rm.
8:9, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His"; and
again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins, according to
Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the
vices and concupiscences." Hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to
suffer in confession of the faith, which is done by words, but also to
suffer for doing any good work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's
sake, because this all comes under the head of witnessing to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection with the
worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to
godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to be
the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as stated
above (Q[110], AA[3],4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it may be
contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin
against the Divine Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[124] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The good of one's country is paramount among human goods:
yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is of more
account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good may become
Divine, for instance when it is referred to God, it follows that any
human good in so far as it is referred to God, may be the cause of
martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] Out. Para. 1/2
VICES OPPOSED TO FORTITUDE (QQ[125]-140)
OF FEAR* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently
'fear' or 'timidity.' The translation requires one to adhere to these
terms on account of the connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise
'cowardice' would be a better rendering.]
We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2)
Fearlessness; (3) Daring.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as stated
above (FS, Q[23], A[4]; Q[42]). Now we are neither praised nor blamed for
passions, as stated in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it
seems that fear is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a sin:
since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is
commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be
obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear
and trembling." Therefore fear is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin is
contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now fear
is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "a
man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even
earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear is not a
sin. .
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that kill
the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not, neither be thou
afraid of their words."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being
inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as stated
above (Q[109], A[2]; Q[114], A[1]). Now this due order requires that the
appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates that
certain things should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to
be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more than others; and
among things to be sought after, that some are to be sought after more
than others. Moreover, the more a good is to be sought after, the more is
the opposite evil to be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that
certain goods are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be
avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates
that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather
seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the
appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the
appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in
general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or
evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame,
because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or
afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate
manner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance with
reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in the
service they owe their masters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we
cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing. Hence
there is no sin in fearing them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude:
because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above (Q[123],
AA[4],5). But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of
death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all they that fear the
Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal
dangers, or to lose worldly goods." Again a gloss on Mt. 27:44, "He
prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word," says that "evil fear is
threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt." Therefore
the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for fortitude is
that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now sometimes a man
exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine
relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not to be Caesar's slave,
gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain
likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed not
to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q[20], A[1]; FS, Q[40], A[4]).
Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that
timidity is opposed to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[19], A[3]; FS, Q[43], A[1]), all fear
arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to something
he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or
vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous
man loves the good proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is
included in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate
desire. Hence in like manner inordinate fear is included in every sin;
thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the
loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which
has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved in Ethic. iii,
6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude
which regards dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be
antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure of
speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g.
The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear
of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of
death.]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic
acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end,
as stated above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[6]): and it belongs to a
brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good.
But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from
slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary to fortitude.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that "to die in order to
escape poverty, lust, or something disagreeable is an act not of
fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships is a mark of
effeminacy."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (FS, Q[45], A[2]), fear is the beginning of
despair even as hope is the beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as
fortitude which employs daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the
other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow,
however, that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that
only from fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope
is referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear
that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument
does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated above (FS,
Q[23], A[1]), fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the
sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated
above (FS, Q[74], A[4]). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God. But
fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, "Whosoever is fearful,"
etc., says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of
conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can
rally and take courage." Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also
from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept, but only
from perfection; for a gloss on Dt. 20:8, "What man is there that is
fearful and fainthearted?" says: "We learn from this that no man can take
up the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he still
fears to be despoiled of earthly riches." Therefore fear is not a mortal
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet
this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, "But the fearful and
unbelieving and the abominable," etc., "shall have their portion in the
pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death."
Therefore fear is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), fear is a sin through being
inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be shunned
according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is
confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the
rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a
venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the
rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately shuns
something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear
is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear
of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to
do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by the Divine law,
such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to the fear
that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may reply that
a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage
beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may happen
nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot be
persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins mortally by
consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from accomplishing what
he purposed doing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a
good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but for the
perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is
sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance when one
has a reasonable cause for fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear excuses from sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a sin,
as stated above (A[1]). But sin does not excuse from sin, rather does it
aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this be
true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a courageous man
is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death
comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an object of fear.
Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual. Now
fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of inducing one
to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not
excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6),
"one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not a
result of one's own wickedness." Therefore it seems that in no sense does
fear excuse from sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q[1], Cap. Constat.):
"A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics, has an
ostensible excuse."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), fear is sinful in so far as it
runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain evils to
be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is
less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more
avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of
temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if through fear of
death he were to promise or give something to a robber, and yet he would
be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to
whom he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through fear a
man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less to be avoided,
and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he
could not be wholly excused from sin, because such like fear would be
inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the
evils of the body. and evils of the body more than evils of external
things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in
order to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, or evils of
external things, such as loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of
the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused
from sin. Yet one's sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done
through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he
is under a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through
fear are not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but in
the point of its involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the
shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[125] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal goods
not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal evils are
not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal things are goods
of the least account, and this was also the opinion of the Peripatetics.
Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared; but not so much that one
ought for their sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] Out. Para. 1/1
OF FEARLESSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fearlessness is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is
reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in
praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall be
without dread." Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death,
according to Mt. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body," etc., nor
anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Is. 51:12, "Who art
thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?" Therefore it is not
a sin to be fearless.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (Q[125], A[2]).
Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly, since
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "the love of God to the
abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city." Therefore it
is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Lk. 18:2) that "he
feared not God nor regarded man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge alike
of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby one
dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal goods.
And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and
whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, that is, to
love these things not as placing his end therein, but as things to be
used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to the natural
inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them in due
measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this love: since
what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says
(Eph. 5:29): "No man ever hated his own flesh." Wherefore even those that
slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to
free from present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and
other temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves
them* less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect
'se' instead of 'ea.' We should then read: For the reason that he loves
himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these things cannot
result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he thinks
it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods
he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self
and despising others, according to the saying of Job 41:24,25: "He
[Vulg.: 'who'] was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing":
and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason; thus the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the "Celts, through lack of
intelligence, fear nothing." [*"A man would deserve to be called insane
and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an
earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said to be the case with the
Celts."] It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it
result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding:
yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The just man is praised for being without fear that
withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it is
written (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be justified."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man are
not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they are to be
feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or
as regards the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is written
(Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth from evil."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from
loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be feared;
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): "He that feareth the Lord shall
tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be despised, in so far
as they are helping us instrumentally to attain those things that pertain
to Divine fear and love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. For we
judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is hindered by a
man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both brave to
endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to
fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love,
or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due love is
opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence
or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean.
But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then fortitude
has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems
that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness to be
opposed to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[3]), fortitude is concerned
about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the rational mean
in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude
that man should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that he
should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so forth. Now this mode
of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore
just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as
a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness
is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not
what he ought to fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear, and
to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the fearless
man does not do.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean of
fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in respect
of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[126] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of
daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the
mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having
different extremes in different respects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] Out. Para. 1/1
OF DARING [*Excessive daring or foolhardiness] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether daring is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether daring is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written (Job 39:21)
concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the
godly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men
[*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men']." But no
vice redounds to a man's praise. Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one should
take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been counseled." But
daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but
praiseworthy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above (FS,
Q[45], A[2]) when we were treating of the passions. But hope is accounted
not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on the way with a
bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no man's fellowship is
to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Daring, as stated above (FS, Q[23], A[1]; Q[55]), is a
passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to reason, and
sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on
this account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the passions are
sometimes employed in the sense of excess, thus we speak of anger meaning
not any but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same
way daring as implying excess is accounted a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by
reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel,
which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking
counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly,
which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q[58], A[3]).
Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy as
it is directed by reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, as
the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4,5,6). Hence the names of
certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in
order to designate vices we employ especially the names of those passions
the object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger and
daring. But hope and love have a good for this object, and so we use them
rather to designate virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether daring is opposed to fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For excess of
daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But presumption pertains
to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to
humility rather than to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so far
as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts himself in
danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes
to danger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore daring, as
designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as stated
above (Q[123], A[3]). Now since timidity is opposed to fortitude in
respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity
in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in
the point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed to
it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such vice. Therefore
neither should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books of
Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[126], A[2]), it belongs to a moral
virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it is
concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation in the
matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to
moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of
passion, and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is
evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is concerned
about fear and daring, as stated above (Q[122], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend chiefly
on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species. Wherefore it is
not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption
which is its cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend on
its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm done by
daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring
depend on this.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[127] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the
offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature inclines
him to do this except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the
fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the vice which exceeds in
daring has no contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does
not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring are precipitate and eager to meet
danger, yet fail when the danger is present," namely through fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider
what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned.
For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely
"magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and "perseverance." Now
magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned
about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the
Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice,
as stated above (Q[117], A[5]). Therefore magnificence should not be
reckoned a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does
not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself.
Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger.
But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to
danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience
denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude.
Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be
reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in
every virtue: for it is written (Mt. 24:13): "He that shall persevere to
the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance should not be
accounted a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of
fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence,
constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven virtues
annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of will,
magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it seems
that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fortitude.
The first is "civic" fortitude, which produces brave deeds through fear
of dishonor or punishment; the second is "military" fortitude, which
produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third
is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion,
especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a man act
bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude
which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now
these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above
enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are
unfitting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[48]), a virtue can have three kinds of
parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a
special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided
into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very
special matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it:
integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is
requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what
fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of
death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor
hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues
to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q[123], AA[3],6), the act of
fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are
required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the
mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this
respect Tully mentions "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. Rhet.
ii) that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great
and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the
deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently
begun. In this respect Tully mentions "magnificence," which he describes
as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of
great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of
mind," so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly
if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to
dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because
without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to
other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically
distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to
principal: thus "magnificence" is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv)
to great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as
confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the
other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not
broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the
stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions "patience," which
he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and
difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by
the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose
courage, according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in
your minds." In this respect he mentions "perseverance," which
accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a
well considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter
of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be
referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from
fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain
greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the
object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude:
and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological
virtue, as stated above (Q[17], A[5]; FS, Q[62], A[3]). But by
confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in
himself, yet under God withal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since
to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although
magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or
venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection with
fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which
fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other
hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to
fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part
thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto
the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part
of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/4
Reply OBJ 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully,
namely "confidence, magnificence, forbearance," which he puts in the
place of patience, and "firmness," which he substitutes for perseverance.
And he adds three, two of which, namely "magnanimity" and "security," are
comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more
specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man's hope for
great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching
forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it
has been stated above (FS, Q[40], A[2]) that hope presupposes love and
desire of the thing hoped for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 2/4
A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of
hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for.
Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes
one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on
account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope,
as stated above, (FS, Q[40], A[4], ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security,
which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be
comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one
needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that
magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in
discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to
perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting
on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of
any other obstacles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 3/4
Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the
above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions "perseverance" and
"magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity." "Strength of will" is
the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that "strength of will
is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted,
and to endure what reason says should be endured"---i.e. good courage
seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as "strength of soul
in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is apparently the same
as confidence, for he says that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency
in matters of virtue." Besides magnificence he mentions {andragathia},
i.e. manly goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence
consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds,
which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence
and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to {andragathia},
strenuousness: wherefore he says that {andragathia} is the virtue of a
man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 4/4
Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the
four principal parts mentioned by Tully.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[128] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true
notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they
differ as to motive, as stated above (Q[123], A[1], ad 2); wherefore they
are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] Out. Para. 1/1
OF MAGNANIMITY* (EIGHT ARTICLES) [*Not in the ordinary restricted sense
but as explained by the author]
We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however,
the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of
confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle
treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence;
(3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1)
of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?
(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(6) Of its relation to confidence;
(7) Of its relation to assurance;
(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether magnanimity is about honors?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is
in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since "magnanimity"
signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the irascible part, as
appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says that "in the
sensitive appetite are desire and mind," i.e. the concupiscible and
irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward
of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be
about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for
then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about
passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about
honors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather
than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to
great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but
for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "magnanimity
is about honor and dishonor."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of
the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things,
first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to
its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since
a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be
magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act
may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another
absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it
consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one
make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great
when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
The things which come into man's use are external things, and among
these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to
virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated above
(Q[103], AA[1],2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and
again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set
aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of
things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be
brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows
therefore that magnanimity is about honors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the
concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added,
they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor,
inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet
it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult
good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope,
and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, we have stated
(Q[123], AA[4],5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of
death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way
as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a
desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to
care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame.
Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives
to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the
honor accorded by man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors.
For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above (A[1]).
But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not
essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about
anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or
little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be
about great honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is
dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and
consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only
about great honors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is
about great honors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue
is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a
power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in
De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every
operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or
difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and
trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the
difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of
virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point
of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the
rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found
only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other
difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain
opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be
applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral
virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason
as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of
this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the
passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects
of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of
resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which
is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the
resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is
great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and
daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and
likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some
passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the
external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such
are the love or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is
necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in
those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because
things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being
necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there
are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely
liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely "magnificence."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary
honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes,
which are {philotimia}, i.e. love of honor, and {aphilotimia}, i.e.
without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor,
and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these
things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there
is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of
magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such
things as are deserving of honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in
itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the
mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more
difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest
presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need
of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things
existing outside the soul.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more able to
make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks
upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors
as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor
virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by
great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he
despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like
manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he
recognizes that he does not deserve it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether magnanimity is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue
observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater
extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the
greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above
(FS, Q[65], A[1]). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity:
since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever is worthy of
little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is
not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated above
(FS, Q[55], A[4]). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the
body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a magnanimous man that
his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm." Therefore
magnanimity is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity
is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems himself worthy of
great things, and despises others," according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore
magnanimity is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But
magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the first
place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and
slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q[113]] towards many;
fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he
holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful.
Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc. 15:18):
"Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the greatness of
courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought for their country,
was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, only deeds of virtue are
worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of
courage is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the
good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good. Now among
external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated
above (A[1]; FS, Q[11], A[2], OBJ[3]). Therefore magnanimity, which
observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the
magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he tends
to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the
mean," because he tends to the greatest things according to reason, for
"he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth" (Ethic. iv, 3),
since his aims do not surpass his deserts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to
their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts of
all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to
every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other hand, as regards
the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are
connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul,
either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is
possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have
the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practice that act if
it were competent to him according to his state.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according to
the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens
that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily
movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on
many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous
is intent only on great things; these are few and require great
attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and
rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel
about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only
about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements
are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his
emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these
conditions are found naturally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: There is in man something great which he possesses through
the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the
weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself
worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God:
thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend
to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any
other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand,
humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own
deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they
fall away from God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as
to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others
and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's
gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): "In his
sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is brought to
nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the contempt of
magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord," which points to
the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that
magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they
seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to
different considerations.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous
man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the first
place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from
whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that he takes no
pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet
greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of
which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in
the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not
that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not
busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as
are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ
irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile
things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true,
but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the
large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards
persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle
class." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with
others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends:
because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to
littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little,
according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly,
that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e.
virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as
being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect
which is inconsistent with magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special
virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic.
iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the
magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any
special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the
magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that "it belongs to the
magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of prudence), "nor to
act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that he is ready to do
favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he gives his services
readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he is truthful" (which is
an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not given to complaining" (which
is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul,
according to the saying of Is. 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the
garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride adorned
with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as
stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from
the other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]), it belongs to a special
virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now
magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter,
namely honors, as stated above (AA[1],2): and honor, considered in
itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in
itself is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above
(Q[103], A[1], ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards
all the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great
honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great
deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great
deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy
of great honors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows
that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and
shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is
beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to
perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. on
the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of
certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and
gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the
truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also
that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing
the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like
things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as
they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or
adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results
from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which
makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing
is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as
fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If magnanimity, which is
also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great
assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a man is brave we expect
him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception."
Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous
man is not {philokindynos}, that is, a lover of danger. But it belongs to
a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has
nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for,
whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But
good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more
important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon
magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[61], A[3]), a principal virtue is
one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a
principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of
mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every virtue," according
to Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to
something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness.
Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of
difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in
that matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein
fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest
goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves
his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than
any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with
fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it
falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein
it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of
fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), "to lack evil is
looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil,
such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the
obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the
latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be
considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference as regards
the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it follows that
properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all
kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks "many" the
same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for
no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that
he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a
magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger, since he does
something great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other
virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous
man is not {mikrokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for small things,
but {megalokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for great things. And
Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither
seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For
nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to
withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an
evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and
that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed
to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so
essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally.
Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness
of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude
takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply
of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular
respect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a
man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another,
according to 2 Cor. 3:4,5, "Such confidence we have, through Christ
towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves,
as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent with the idea of
magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Is.
12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be without fear
seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to
fortitude rather than to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due
to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we are the
house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto
the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and
this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with
magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence
for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6) and in
the prologue to this.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it
belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence
belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have confidence,
hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence apparently denotes
chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who
promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong
opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something,
not only on account of another's statement, but also on account of
something we observe in another, it follows that confidence may denote
the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing
something either in oneself---for instance, through observing that he is
healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in another, for
instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful,
a man is confident that he will receive help from him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Now it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly
about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence
denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which
gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it
follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the
"magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the deficient. But
this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds
"or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For
every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human
assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is sufficient
by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he
needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in
others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have
at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his
own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in
himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (FS, Q[23], A[2]; FS, Q[40], A[4]), when we
were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair,
because the latter is about the same object, namely good. But as regards
contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object
is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it
is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly
strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the
obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to
magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which
belongs to fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains
to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of
hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the
mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so
that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species
of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot
denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For
this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an
annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv.
Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether security belongs to magnanimity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For
security, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6), denotes freedom from the
disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore
security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not
belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore
does security belong to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be secure
because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to virtue,
which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim. 2:15,
"Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore
security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all
the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted
the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14,18, "If thou wilt put away
from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being buried thou shalt
sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to
any other virtue, as a part thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:
"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity to
give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune." But a
man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to
magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man
take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now
security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is
the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from
fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly
belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as
confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs
immediately to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is
fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the
passion (FS, Q[45], A[2]). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to
fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs
indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes
fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of
mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as
fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one
puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in
this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and
participation of, future happiness, as stated above (FS, Q[5], AA[3],7).
Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a
virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's reward.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For
according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): "virtue suffices for
itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (A[4],
ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the
magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully
says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two
things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external things."
Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great
soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his
natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle says
(Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune."
Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every
one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore external
goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune
seems to conduce to magnanimity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), magnanimity regards two things:
honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its
end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor
is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the
multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the
result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of
fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of
virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches,
power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to
magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can
be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act
more expeditiously.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as
he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming
for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them
useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[129] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very
joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since
the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods
of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much
cast down by their loss.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PRESUMPTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first
place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three, namely,
presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider
pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the
first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether presumption is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether presumption is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says:
"Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.: 'and
stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it seems to
savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself.
Therefore presumption is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not listen
to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men,
or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that
make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should pursue divine things
as far as possible." Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far
above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to what
is above oneself, it seems that presumption is something praiseworthy,
rather than a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are
sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." If then
presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not
sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of
anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): "O wicked presumption,
whence camest thou?" and a gloss answers: "From a creature's evil will."
Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore
presumption is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the
Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in
accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in
general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it is
established throughout all natural things, that every action is
commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent
strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as
being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to do
what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption, as its
very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing hinders that which is above the active power of a
natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing:
thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be
so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which surpass
the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for
a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate
accomplishment of what belongs to perfect virtue. But it is not
presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance towards perfect
virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things
that were before him, namely continually advancing forward.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the
order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the
intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In
this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought to pursue immortal and
divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do, but that
he should be united to Him in intellect and will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we can do by
the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense." Hence since we can
think and do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above our
ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the
accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous if one
were to make the attempt without confidence in God's assistance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by
excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the
Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q[14], A[2]; Q[21], A[1]). But the sin
against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity.
Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself
worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he
deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability.
Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little
things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "on account of
external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they
deem external goods as something great." Therefore presumption is opposed
to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the
"vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a
presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[129], A[3], ad 1), magnanimity
observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it
tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to
anything greater than is becoming to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not
exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he does
exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does
not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed to
magnanimity by excess.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against
the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice through
inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of
presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies
contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the
gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as this
contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability, it can be opposed
to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something
great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for
going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be
called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed to
magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated
above (Q[129], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so far
as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err in two
ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater
virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, as regards the
kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and worthy of great
things, by reason of something that does not make him so, for instance by
reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without virtue, neither
justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called
magnanimous."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[130] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his
ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the
case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has exceeded
his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply, but only in
the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising and
wronging others. This savors of an excess of magnanimity, not in any
truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that
"when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, proud,
haughty restless, and bent on excelling in all things, whether in words
or in deeds, without any considerations of virtue." Thus it is evident
that the presumptuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in
reality, although in appearance he surpasses him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] Out. Para. 1/1
OF AMBITION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ambition is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes the
desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the greatest of
external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved.
Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something deserving of
praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a
reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him
from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good and to
avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "with the
bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in honor": and
Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the arts." Therefore
ambition is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that "charity is not
ambitious, seeketh not her own." Now nothing is contrary to charity,
except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[103], AA[1],2), honor denotes
reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two things
have to be considered with regard to man's honor. The first is that a man
has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it
were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is due
principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls for
observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him by God,
that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be
pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him
to profit others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a
man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to
desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor
for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite
rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others.
Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident
that it is always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The desire for good should be regulated according to
reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it is
sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now those
are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's dictate
that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the virtuous
man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: since the
reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said
to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have nothing greater
than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor derives greatness
from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident
that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened from
doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due measure;
so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of
doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what means he obtains
honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that "the good as well as the
wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one," i.e. the good, "go
about it in the right way," whereas "the other," i.e. the wicked,
"through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood." Yet
they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are
not virtuous, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says
that they who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess.
For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now
presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above (Q[130],
A[2]). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems to
regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7) that "Jason
ambitiously sought the high priesthood." Therefore ambition is not
opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is written
(Acts 25:27) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp
[ambitione]. . . had entered into the hall of audience" [*'Praetorium.'
The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is the same], and (2 Para.
16:14) that when Asa died they "burned spices and . . . ointments over
his body" with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magnanimity is not about
outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man exceeds
in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others."
But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of
magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), ambition signifies inordinate
love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use of them in a
becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to
magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its end,
in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts in
proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to
magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts great deeds
beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards is its
matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and in this way ambition
is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to
be exceeded in various respects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity, on
account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly
inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For if a
man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity, not for
the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding
his ability, he would not be ambitious but presumptuous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[131] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of honor,
wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is signified by
the words of James 2:2,3: "If there shall come into your assembly a man
having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . . . shall say to
him: Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore ambition does not regard outward
worship, except in so far as this is a kind of honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] Out. Para. 1/1
OF VAINGLORY (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital vice?
(5) Of its daughters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the desire of glory is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one sins
in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye . .
followers of God, as most dear children." Now by seeking glory man
seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is written
(Is. 43:6,7): "Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of
the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have created him for
My glory." Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which incites a mar to do good is apparently not a
sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully says (De
Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive his utmost":
and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according to Rm. 2:7:
"To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work . . . glory and
honor" [*Vulg.: 'Who will render to every man according to his works, to
them indeed who . . . seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal
life.']. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is
"consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and this
comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that
glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with praise." Now it is no sin to
desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for praise,
according to Ecclus. 41:15, "Take care of a good name," and Rm. 12:17,
"Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the
sight of all men." Therefore the desire of vainglory is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better advised
who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore Augustine
says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be "glorified is the same
as to be clarified." Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain display:
wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of something as
regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a bodily or
a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear simply can be seen
by many, and by those who are far away, it follows that the word glory
properly denotes that somebody's good is known and approved by many,
according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.) [*The quotation is from
Livy: Hist., Lib. XXII C, 39]: "I must not boast while I am addressing
one man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists
in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one, or
of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good as being worthy of
praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one's own good: for it is
written (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this
world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know the things that are
given us from God." Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve
one's own good works: for it is written (Mt. 5:16): "Let your light shine
before men." Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a
sin: but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is
sinful to desire anything vain, according to Ps. 4:3, "Why do you love
vanity, and seek after lying?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the
thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that which
is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail
and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory,
for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the part of
the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the desire of
his own glory to a due end, such as God's honor, or the spiritual welfare
of his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says on Jn. 13:13, "You call Me Master and
Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan.): "Self-complacency is
fraught with danger of one who has to beware of pride. But He Who is
above all, however much He may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself.
For knowledge of God is our need, not His: nor does any man know Him
unless he be taught of Him Who knows." It is therefore evident that God
seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for ours. In like manner a man may
rightly seek his own glory for the good of others, according to Mt. 5:16,
"That they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is in
heaven."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory:
it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works, and of
which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17,18): "He that glorieth let him glory in
the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God
commendeth." It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue,
through desire for human glory, as also through the desire for other
earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for
the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is requisite for man's perfection that he should know
himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it is not
to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for
something, either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men
may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man,
or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of others' praise the good
which is in him, may himself strive to persevere therein and to become
better. In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should "take care of
his good name," and that he should "provide good things in the sight of
God and men": but not that he should take an empty pleasure in human
praise.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. For, as
stated above (A[1]), vainglory consists in glorying in things that are
not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things,
which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose
judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these vices are
not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to
magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to
magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with
vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way
presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
(Q[130], A[2]; Q[131], A[2]): and these differ from vainglory. Therefore
vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, "Let nothing be done through
contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were given to
dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of
vainglory." But contention [*Cf. Q[38]] is not opposed to magnanimity.
Neither therefore is vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading,
"Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for
glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever
strive to keep untrammeled." Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory is an effect
of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is praised, or
shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the knowledge of
others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated above (Q[129],
AA[1],2), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man
uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in moderation. Wherefore
inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in them is
itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous
man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. In like manner he
thinks little of other things that are sought for honor's sake, such as
power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity to glory
in things that are not; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man
(Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth than for opinion. Again it is
incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of
human praise, as though he deemed this something great; wherefore it is
said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv), that he cares not to be praised.
And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great,
nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to
other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall short
of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the magnanimous man
thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But if we consider
his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by way of excess,
because the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation,
and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[127], A[2], ad 2), the opposition of
vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if done
intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends save for
what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that
the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing is great in his
estimation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing precludes
the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory precludes the
eternal reward: for it is written (Mt. 6:1): "Take heed, that you do not
give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you shall not have
a reward of your Father Who is in heaven." Therefore vainglory is a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper to
God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates to
himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (Is. 42:8): "I
will not give My glory to another," and (1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only
God be honor and glory." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous and
harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of
Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, "God, Who proveth our hearts," says: "Unless a
man war against the love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful
power, for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as
one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure in it, when it
is given." Chrysostom also says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that "vainglory
enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions."
Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "while other vices find
their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds a place even in
the servants of Christ." Yet in the latter there is no mortal sin.
Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[24], A[12]; Q[110], A[4]; Q[112], A[2]
), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin of
vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to charity
as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it
may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason of the
matter about which one glories: for instance when one glories in
something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God, according to
Ezech. 28:2, "Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God," and
1 Cor. 4:7, "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast
received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?" Or
again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories:
for this is forbidden (Jer. 9:23,24): "Let not the wise man glory in his
wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the
rich man glory in his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this,
that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Or again when a man prefers the
testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain
people (Jn. 12:43): "For they loved the glory of men more than the glory
of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the
one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his last
end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to
obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is against God. In
this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 14)
that "this vice," namely the love of human praise, "is so hostile to a
godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it fears or loves God,
that our Lord said (Jn. 5:44): How can you believe, who receive glory one
from another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not
inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in, nor
as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a
venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a
virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done for
the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On
the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply through
vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires the
excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God alone
differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on
account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave
sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too self-confident:
and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vainglory is a capital vice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a vice that
always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital. But vainglory
always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for this
is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor is not a
capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But vainglory
seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it is not always a
mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory is
apparently a frail thing, and is something outside man himself. Therefore
vainglory is not a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the seven
capital vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some
reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory
among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride to
be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate
offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without
reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on (Q[152], AA[1],2),
denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good one may
desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom:
wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that
this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices, and
ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the
capital vices. Now among the goods that are the means whereby man
acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect,
inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of a man's goodness: since good
is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore, just as by the glory
which is in God's sight man acquires honor in Divine things, so too by
the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence in human
things. Hence on account of its close connection with excellence, which
men desire above all, it follows that it is most desirable. And since
many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that
vainglory is a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from
pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and FS, Q[84],
A[2]) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Praise and honor, as stated above (A[2]), stand in relation
to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared
to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honored and
praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the
knowledge of others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of
desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to be
reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to
be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as
venial sin can dispose man thereto.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be
disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord,
and love of novelties?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned
to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy,
discord, and eccentricity [*Praesumptio novitatum, literally 'presumption
of novelties']." For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is
numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not arise from
vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral.
xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the daughters
of vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of
anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore
it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory is
always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is
nothing new, for it is an established custom among men. Therefore
eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who
there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[34], A[5]; Q[35], A[4]; FS, Q[84],
AA[3],4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed
to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the
end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own excellence, as stated
above (AA[1],4): and to this end a man may tend in two ways. In one way
directly, either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if
they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties which men
are wont to wonder at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In
another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he
is not inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the
intellect, and thus we have "obstinacy," by which a man is too much
attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is
better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have "discord,"
whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with
others. Thirdly, as regards "speech," and then we have "contention,"
whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds,
and this is "disobedience," whereby a man refuses to carry out the
command of his superiors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[112], A[1], ad 2), boasting is reckoned
a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is arrogance: but
outward boasting, according to Ethic. iv, is directed sometimes to gain,
but more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, except in
conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a glorious thing for
him not to yield to the will and words of others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[132] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on
account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory to
the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of
the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give alms as
though this were something novel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PUSILLANIMITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?
(2) To what virtue is it opposed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pusillanimity is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin makes a
man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a fainthearted man
is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore
pusillanimity is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a fainthearted
man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet does not deem
himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great goods except the
virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "none but
the virtuous are truly worthy of honor." Therefore the fainthearted are
virtuous: and consequently pusillanimity is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclus. 10:15). But
pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man sets
himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws from the
things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who deems
himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted." Now
sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for
instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose
them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6). Therefore
pusillanimity is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin. Now
pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col. 3:21): "Fathers,
provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged."
Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin,
because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural
inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power:
as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now
just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his
power, by striving to do more than he can, so pusillanimity makes a man
fall short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to tend to
that which is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so
is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in the earth
the money he had received from his master, and did not trade with it
through fainthearted fear, was punished by his master (Mt. 25; Lk. 19).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbor:
and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, because he
injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be
profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if "they who
demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged strictly,
without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have
done had they been less retiring."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from
sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with loss
of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by
reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing certain great
things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through not trying to make
use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, sometimes mortally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things
in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he derives either
from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from external
fortune, and if he fails to use those things for virtue, he becomes
guilty of pusillanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of pride:
when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks
himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent. Hence it
is written (Prov. 26:16): "The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than
seven men that speak sentences." For nothing hinders him from
depreciating himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself
in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance
he would have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of a numerous
people without misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he
refused to obey the command of his Creator."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which they
were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace: yet
they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred;
though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the fainthearted man knows not
himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if
he knew himself." Now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence.
Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who
through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be
slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of
prudence, as stated above (Q[47], A[9]). Therefore pusillanimity is not
opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear:
hence it is written (Is. 35:4): "Say to the fainthearted: Take courage
and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according
to Col. 3:21, "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest
they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude, and
inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to
magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is
the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue. Now
pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore
if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a more
grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the saying of
Ecclus. 37:3, "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" Therefore
pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and
littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little are
opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in
itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to
magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in
connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends
to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man
shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, it may be
considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the intellect
is ignorance of one's own qualification, and on the part of the appetite
is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed one's ability.
Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to
shrink from the great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated above
(Q[132], A[2], ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather
on their respective species than on their cause or effect. Hence
pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding from a
cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it is opposed
to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind
does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering one's
own ability, according to Ethic. iv, 3, or in accomplishing what is
within one's power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of
view of its effect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor is
the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of death:
wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is
opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it under the
aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to take vengeance,
it does not cause pusillanimity, which disheartens the soul; on the
contrary, it takes it away. If, however, we consider the causes of anger,
which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them
is disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[133] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is a graver
sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good things,
which is a very great evil according to Ethic. iv. Presumption, however,
is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride whence it proceeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] Out. Para. 1/1
OF MAGNIFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With
regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) What is its matter?
(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether magnificence is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one
virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]). But one
may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal man is
magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to Ethic. ii,
6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for it exceeds
liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are opposed to one
another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as stated in Metaph.
x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore
it is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on
the contrary perfects it, as stated above (Q[108], A[2]; Q[117], A[1],
OBJ[1]). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the "magnificent
man is not lavish towards himself": and this is opposed to the natural
inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not
a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is
right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about things
to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence= magna facere---i.e.
to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But
magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to Ps. 47:35:
"His magnificence and His power is in the clouds." Therefore magnificence
is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of virtue in
relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the
limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature
of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something great, whence
magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of
virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his
actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds.
Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either
actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained
above (Q[129], A[3], ad 2), as also (FS, Q[65], A[1]) when we were
treating of the connection of virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we
consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean, if we
consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds,
as we have also said of magnanimity (Q[129], A[3], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that
which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that which
regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large.
Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish
towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but because to
do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of
greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently: for
instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or
things that are of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man
to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there must needs be
a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite is inclined
to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does.
Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether magnificence is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For
magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may
belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in
the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great
work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but
denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as
that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to something
great, as stated above (Q[129], AA[1],2). Therefore it belongs to
magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not
a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is
written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness," and
(Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His
sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Q[81],
A[8]). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion.
Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues
(Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something
great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere---i.e. to make
great things]. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense,
and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to work something in
external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind;
in a broad sense "facere" is employed to denote any action, whether it
passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent,
as to understand or will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something
great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it is
then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use
of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely
that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great, namely in
quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. In this
way magnificence is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something
great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad sense, it is not a
special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in
the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be taken in the broad
sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to
magnificence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something
great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making
[faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so
that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great,
while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great,
direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to that
which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing done is
sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something
great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to tend
with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent.
Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and administering of great
and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind,
discussion" referring to the inward intention, and "administration" to
the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as magnanimity intends
something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the
same in every work that can be produced in external matter [factibili].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intention of magnificence is the production of a great
work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no end of human
works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence does a
great work especially in reference to the Divine honor. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most commendable expenditure is
that which is directed to Divine sacrifices": and this is the chief
object of magnificence. For this reason magnificence is connected with
holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great
expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Q[117], A[2]).
Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2). But
liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure. Therefore
magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work.
But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an
external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents.
Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the
poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do not
necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for
themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore
magnificence is not about great expenditure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence
does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but only
to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale." Therefore it
is only about great expenditure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), it belongs to magnificence to
intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work,
proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be
produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to
spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming
manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a magnificent
man will produce a more magnificent work with equal," i.e. proportionate,
"expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man
may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence
the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure
itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also
the very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as
the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be
hindered from spending much.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[129], A[2]), those virtues that are
about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the
genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, and
another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing.
Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use;
namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and
magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use of money.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the
magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as
it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all
due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles to which
are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the
use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work
which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure
or outlay.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated
in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the
aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for
instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do something which
will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what
the whole state is striving for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue
may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be
magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the
external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the
outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps,
however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison
to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless
be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great
are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad
aliquid.).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For
magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (A[3]).
But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore
magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But magnificence
seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which
is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice,
which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the
magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in
common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should
not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn.
Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot
be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with
this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as
being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things
are necessary, as stated above (Q[80]). The one is that the secondary
virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it
be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point
that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does
magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the
irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous
thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that
threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence
tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one's property,
which is of much less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore
magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under
the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard
sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in
different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the
love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible
faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so
that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence
regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty,
not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely
expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in
the irascible part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in
matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it tends
to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude
tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[134] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as
stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason.
Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by
observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is
especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things,
since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the risk of a
great loss.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] Out. Para. 1/1
OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES) [*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just
as "magnificentia" is doing great things.]
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether meanness is a vice?
(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether meanness is a vice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates
great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore both the
liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a
virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful
reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states
(Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man is
loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or illiberality.
Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a special
vice opposed to magnificence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[6]), moral
acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are
denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean
[parvificus] because he intends to do something little [parvum]. Now
according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and
little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do
something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work
he does. This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as regards
the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense.
Accordingly the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of his
work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he
does not shirk, so that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that "the magnificent man with equal
expenditure will produce a more magnificent result." On the other hand,
the mean man intends principally to spend little, wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "he seeks how he may spend least."
As a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does
not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little.
Wherefore the Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great
expense forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that
he is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails
to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and
work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what
is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a
vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of
reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the Article.
For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for
declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things:
hence meanness is a vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes us take
counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because he
has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least
account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible,
because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason,
but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his
inordinate affections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the
liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so too
the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and
slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards
ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is
a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful than
illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "although
meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a
man, since neither do they harm one's neighbor, nor are they very
disgraceful."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is
opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a virtue.
Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above
(A[1]), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely
consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much, where they ought
to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according
to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something of meanness. Therefore
there is not a vice opposed to meanness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as stated
above (A[1]). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a
show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs to
vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q[131], A[2]
). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic. ii,
8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are
relative terms, as stated above (A[1]). Now just as expenditure may be
little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with
the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist
between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice of
meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and
thus fails to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his
work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same
proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice
is called in Greek {banausia}, so called from the Greek {baunos},
because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also
called {apyrokalia}, i.e. lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes
all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called
"consumptio" [waste].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not
from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs to the
vice which is opposed to meanness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which
observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of
waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value
of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend little. But it
is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the
magnificent man intends principally, in so far as when it behooves to
spend much, it spends little or nothing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[135] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species of
its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness falls
short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of
another vice, such as vainglory or any other.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether patience is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
(3) Whether it can be had without grace?
(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether patience is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most
perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not
there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to Is. 49:10 and
Apoc. 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor
the sun strike them." Therefore patience is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is
"that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes found in
wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently
that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, "All the days of
his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in
sorrow." Therefore patience is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above (FS,
Q[70], A[1], ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (Gal.
5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of the
soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even
preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[1]), the moral virtues are
directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason
against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is
strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, "The
sorrow of the world worketh death," and Ecclus. 30:25, "Sadness hath
killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the necessity for a
virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give
way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an
equal mind," i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon
with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things."
It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the
same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of
the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain
in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will
not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters
pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point of being
subject to God. In like manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not
consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had
aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that
"patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it
except where evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by
patience will be eternal."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly speaking
those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them,
than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that
they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous nor
praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their
hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (FS, Q[11], A[1]), the very notion of fruit
denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as
stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be
applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but as
to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially
in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in
every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience hath a
perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of the
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul.
Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written (Lk.
21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls." Therefore
patience is the greatest of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other
things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in
Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues."
Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory
(Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it
is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's work
good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority and
preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines
man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are
effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than those which
are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as
among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which
establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity /are
greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check
on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one
which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death,
about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance
is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship,
which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest
of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and
of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of
fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to
good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing
hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by
patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to
hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice
forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,
that it is more perfect simply.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is
said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root
the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the
virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely
because it removes their obstacles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For
the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the
rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer
evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil
for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for
Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that "men endure many toils and sorrows
for the sake of the things they love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is
it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake
of good, and this is to be truly patient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more
abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens
are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their
country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient.
Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help
of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble
and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the
soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner
one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of
the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from God,
"is my patience."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of
desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes
to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure."
The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves
displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them
for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows
that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is
more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the
sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good
of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to
be referred to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is
evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1
Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through
grace, according to Rm. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is clearly
impossible to have patience without the help of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in
the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of
concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more
prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence
delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to
come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this
that pertains to true patience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. FS, Q[61], A[5]] is
commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend
thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help
of God's grace [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[2]]. On the other hand, the good of
grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural
virtue. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the
sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for
his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and
patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether patience is a part of fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is
not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as fortitude:
because, as stated above (Q[123], A[6]), the proper act of fortitude is
to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the
Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom.
xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by
others." Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above
(Q[123], A[3]), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be
about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible.
Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if
patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but
even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not
a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because
it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs to
patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others," as
Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are
inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that
are connected with the danger of death, and about these evils fortitude
is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the
principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in
this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to
principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent.
811).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but
that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas
it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to
good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing through
sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter
respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly
about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while
patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be patient, not
because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner
by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a way
as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly
in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because
the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the
matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of
temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance is
only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as
arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience
is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs
to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures:
whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue
on account of such like sorrows, however great they be.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an
integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may
patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from
this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent with
patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who
inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Mt. 4:10,
"Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own
wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked": and
Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that "the
precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth,
since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies." But in
so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude
as secondary to principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is
necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with
magnanimity.]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine
says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, not as though
any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may
be converted." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4): "The Most High is a
patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that patience is the same as
longanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But
impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for
one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it
seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is
place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of place.
Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, in so far
as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. ii] on
Rm. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and
longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity differs from patience,
because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are
said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliberate
delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great
things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long
way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good,
rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so
also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with
magnanimity than with patience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two
reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils
for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is
easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult.
Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature
to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that is deferred
afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be patience in bearing this trial,
as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy
are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the delay of the
hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures
in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may
be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says
that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and
difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By saying "arduous"
he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to the
grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by
adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far
as it has something in common with patience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though distant
from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which is a
long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what
is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time,
since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[136] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason
for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear with
those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time
in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity:
whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable;
for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with
patience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the
head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(3) Of its relation to constancy;
(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether perseverance is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than perseverance. But
continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore
perseverance is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine (De
Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De Persever. i),
no one can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere
until death. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should persist
unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. But
this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent.
Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence in a
well-considered purpose." Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue,
but a condition of every virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that
"perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and
those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are
indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to
omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue is
about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special kind
of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed
may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the act's
very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that
act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long in
something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist long
in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of itself
a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in
connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in
itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in
enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity
requires.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is
found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure
long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that
involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured for a long
time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not on this
account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among other
evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because
evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of
food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now it is not
difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not
much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of
the temperate man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are
most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things,
through lacking the perfect virtue that moderates these passions.
Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect
virtue, but something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other
hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of
difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for
even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the
more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue,
because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than
from the aspect of difficulty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: thus
Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe without
seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing
the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without exercising
the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, begins to
perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for instance a builder
begins to build a house, but does not complete it. Accordingly we must
reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes used to denote the habit
whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of persevering:
and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere
and begins to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet
completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end is
twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life.
Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of
the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of
the fight, and the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There
are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole
of life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end
of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the
principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the
end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as
denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two
ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that
virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end,
belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as
its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to its
subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every
virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is about
pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance
is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions
which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation
of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more
praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it
seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of
prudence which perfects the reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose
perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal
virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of
a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a
part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]; FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), a
principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that
lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in
connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of
accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated (Q[123], A[2])
that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firmness in
matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers of
death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a
title to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must be
annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance
of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives
perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult as to endure
dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as
secondary to principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not
only on the matter [*Cf. Q[136], A[4], ad 2], but also on the mode,
because in everything form is of more account than matter. Wherefore
although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in common with
temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with
fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising
from length of time.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (Ethic.
vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in a
certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a
virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or failure
on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the
irascible.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a
virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according to Mt.
24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved." Hence it
is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost, since it
would no longer endure to the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For
constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q[137], A[5]): and
patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain
to perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good." Now it
does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in great
deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to
magnificence rather than to perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem
nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness.
Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides constancy
with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above (Q[128]
, A[6]). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a
thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as
appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy
belongs to perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it
belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to
those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the
virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against
the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas
constancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties arising
from any other external hindrances. Hence perseverance takes precedence
of constancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising from
continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that
which arises from external obstacles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are especially
those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above
(Q[136], A[1]). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while
it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. Now
the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance
rather than to patience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in
little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length of
time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence
considers, yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards.
Hence constancy may pertain to both.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has
something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point of
their difference, as stated in the Article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For
perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (A[1]). Now according to Tully
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore
the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this
does not need the help of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm
brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rm. 5:15, seqq. Now "before sin
man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had
received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more
therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere
without the help of a further grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of
virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7): "We . .
have walked through hard ways." Now some persevere in sinful deeds
without the help of another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of
virtue without the help of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that
perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in
Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2], ad 3), perseverance
has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance,
considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace,
even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote
the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs
not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of God sustaining
man in good until the end of life, as stated above (FS, Q[109], A[10]),
when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is
changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away
from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in
the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide
unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is
often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned,
inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a
thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the
habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it was given
to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere of his
free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make
perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the
predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but
perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened, of
his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great
a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these,
although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in
faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[137] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by
himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling into
sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in
sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the other hand, by doing
good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is
able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of grace for that
end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Of effeminacy;
(2) Of pertinacity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally
'softness']
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. For a
gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9,10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers
with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate---i.e. obscene, given
to unnatural vice." But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy
is not a vice opposed to perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "delicacy is a
kind of effeminacy." But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance.
Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the man who
is fond of amusement is effeminate." Now immoderate fondness of amusement
is opposed to {eutrapelia}, which is the virtue about pleasures of play,
as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to
perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
persevering man is opposed to the effeminate."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[137], AA[1],2), perseverance is
deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on
account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly
opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on
account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we
understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be "soft" if it
readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft
through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram.
Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, if a
person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but
he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them." Now it is evident
that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure:
wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading "True magnanimity
consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down
by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by
toil, to yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger
motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of
withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an
effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused
by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by
custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more
difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural
disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the
frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who are passively
sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it
were.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only
toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the delicate are
those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure.
Hence it is written (Dt. 28:56): "The tender and delicate woman, that
could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness
[Douay: 'niceness']." Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly
speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the
cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In play two things may be considered. In the first place
there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed to
{eutrapelia}. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is
opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be
unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire
play or any other relaxation inordinately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory. But
vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated
above (Q[132], A[2]). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to
perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by
excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because the
pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when they prevail, and
grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it be opposed by
deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is clearly false.
Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against
sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures, the
brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity is
over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to
perseverance more than to other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is to
perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is opposed
to religion, as stated above (Q[92], A[1]). Therefore pertinacity is
opposed to perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be
pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious."
"Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man
"perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients
called 'vicia' what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii,
9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is "head-strong," or {idiognomones},
that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their opinions more
than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought,
and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance
is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for
exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for falling short of it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion,
is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence:
wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been
stated above (Q[127], A[2], ad 1; Q[133], A[2]), that opposition of vices
to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in
something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in
the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, this
pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the
contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[138] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of
the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the same way as
perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie
rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed to
perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is
the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?
(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fortitude is a gift?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ
from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be
reckoned a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above
(FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven:
for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the fainthearted
against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven."
Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a sign
of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the
passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of
temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is
not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy
Ghost (Is. 11:2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]; FS, Q[61], A[3]): and this firmness of mind is
required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard
to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper
and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these
respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties,
whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil.
In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he
may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may
threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man's
power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since
these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this
in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good
deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confidence of this is
infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the
contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the
Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above (FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) that the
gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance
of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence
of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift
of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way:
for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence
the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not
only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it
consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of
fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned
chiefly with the greater goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst
after justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger
and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of fortitude.
For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the
virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to
the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of
piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good.
Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and
not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (Q[45]).
Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but
to the gift of wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since
delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now the
fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore
neither does any beatitude correspond to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude
becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true
goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[121], A[2]), Augustine makes the
beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they
are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness between
them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger
and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A[1]
), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not
merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of
works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire,
which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand
here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to
all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is
the object of that fortitude which is a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated
above (Q[23], A[8], ad 3; FS, Q[68], A[4], ad 3). Hence whatever pertains
to fortitude may also be referred to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[139] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently
to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of
evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and
accomplishment of goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:
(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;
(2) The precepts of its parts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably given in
the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the
Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Dt. 20). Therefore precepts of
fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative
precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not vice versa.
Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but
negative precepts in prohibition of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]; FS, Q[61], A[2]). Now the precepts are directed to
the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to
them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed among
the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the
lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various ways
according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in
human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and
others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is
that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts
both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the
mind to God. For this reason it is written (Dt. 20:3,4): "Fear ye them
not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for
you against your enemies."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among
them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of those
goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the
promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according to
Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the
people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest, in order to
obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be
taught how to come to the possession of eternal life by fighting
spiritually, according to Mt. 11:12, "The kingdom of heaven suffereth
violence, and the violent bear it away." Hence Peter commands (1 Pt.
5:8,9): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about,
seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith," as also
James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he will fly from you." Since, however,
men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from them by
corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New
Law, that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according to Mt.
10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the
things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the things
to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of
fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[122], A[1]), the precepts of the
decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be
known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had
to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is
manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not so evident
that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the
Divine Law?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are
unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and perseverance
are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence, magnanimity, and
confidence, as stated above (Q[128]). Now we find precepts of patience in
the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there should also have
been precepts of magnificence and magnanimity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the
guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv). Now
the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should not
have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i),
as to the preparedness of the mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/2
OBJ 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as
stated above (Q[128]; Q[136], A[4]; Q[137], A[2]). Now the precepts of
fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A[1],
ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance should have
been negative and not affirmative.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 2/2
The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by
Holy Writ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things
as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man needs
not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and annexed
virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only about the
acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the secondary
and annexed virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus of
fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness which
they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to
excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under
precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather
than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other hand,
the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience and
perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on
account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of precepts
of patience and perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[3], A[2]), although affirmative precepts
are always binding, they are not binding for always, but according to
place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts about the
other virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, in
the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them when necessary, so too are
the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[140] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, is
about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution; nor is
it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On the other
hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships and toils,
wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially in general,
what is to be done in such cases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] Out. Para. 1/2
TEMPERANCE (QQ[141]-143)
OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself;
(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must
consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?
(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?
(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind
of touch?
(6) What is the rule of temperance?
(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?
(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether temperance is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue goes
against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural
aptitude for virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws
us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to Ethic. ii, 3,8.
Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above
(FS, Q[65], A[1]). But some people have temperance without having the
other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous or
timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as
appears from what we have said above (FS, Q[68], A[4]). But seemingly no
gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have been already
ascribed to the other virtues (QQ[8],9,19,45,52, 71,139). Therefore
temperance is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the name
of a virtue."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[55], A[3]), it is essential to
virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance
with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is
that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now
temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies
moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance is
a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it.
Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him.
Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those
pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From
such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are
contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary
to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is,
however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not
subject to reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect
virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are in
sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the
opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though they do
acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so far as
certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated above (FS,
Q[63], A[1]), or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of
prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear,
whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps.
118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear has for
its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in this respect
it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (Q[19], A[9], ad
1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in
order to avoid offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of the
fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and
these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear
corresponds to temperance also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether temperance is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to
preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake." But
this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe and
seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is common to
every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot separate
the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just is
beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance,
according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore
temperance is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a
special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term
in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to which
that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used
antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of
speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g.
The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word "temperance" has a
twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common signification:
and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the
word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which
reason appoints to human operations and passions: and this is common to
every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical difference between temperance
and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since
temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from
obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those
things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as
withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to
man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special
matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which
seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore
integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter,
be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and secondly in a sense
of excellence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a most
disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural to
man, as we shall state further on (AA[4],5). Hence tranquillity of soul
is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common
property of all the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed
to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, in respect
of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain
moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by
beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Secondly, because the
things from which temperance withholds us, hold the lowest place in man,
and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state
further on (AA[4],5; Q[142], A[4]), wherefore it is natural that such
things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute
of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like
manner honesty [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as
synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a
special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest
man is one who has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state."
This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that
bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q[142], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and
pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "temperance is
reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of
the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are called emotions of the
mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and
pleasures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good" [*Ethic.
ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially with
regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which
are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers, according to
Augustine (QQ[83], qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of
temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of
moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) that
"it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and
to enforce moderation." Now moderation is needed, not only in desires and
pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the
exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not occur in
the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De
Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and desire are
kept under control."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[136], A[1]), it belongs
to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the passions that
rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's passions is twofold,
as stated above (FS, Q[23], A[2]), when we were treating of the passions:
the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily
goods, the other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against
reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily goods,
considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are
subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to attain its
proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that
the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode
of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those
passions which denote a pursuit of the good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying from
sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being
immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man
flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good
of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it
belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm
in the good of reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature
bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear, which
regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which
attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, too,
temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with
those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and
pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from the absence
of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so
too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the aforesaid pleasures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FS, Q[23], AA[1],2; FS, Q[25], A[1]), when
we were treating of the passions, those passions which pertain to
avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to the pursuit of
good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the passions of the
concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly moderates the passions of
the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates
all the other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions that
precede results in moderation of the passions that follow: since he that
is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately
for the absence of the things he desires.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the
object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to
temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from
certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which fortitude
bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fortitude about
fears.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions of the
soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the
internal passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and
pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that "the
function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which draw us
to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from the fruit
of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is the duty of
temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular praise." Now we
are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire for pleasures of
touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for
these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and again by the desire for
riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (1 Tim. 6:10).
"Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay version following the Greek
{philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is the root of all evils."
Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is
worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but
he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of which he
is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but in the
soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for
pleasures of touch.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain
to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now all
pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they all
equally belong to the matter of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of
the body, as stated above (FS, Q[31], A[5]) in the treatise on the
passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of virtue
through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curiosity
in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge,
saying (Gn. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil." Therefore
temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of
temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of
touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in
games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of
temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance
is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), temperance is about desires and
pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring. Now
fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils
whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death.
Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the
greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural operation,
it is so much the greater according as it results from a more natural
operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which
preserve the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the
nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence temperance is
properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures. Now
these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that
temperance is about pleasures of touch.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes
temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as
concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this
is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply that
if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control
lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to temperance to
moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other pleasures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in
external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate
to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions, which
pertains to the virtue of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in
man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not result
from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the
lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to his
food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the other senses, not
only for this reason, but also on account of the becomingness of the
sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about the pleasures of the other
senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but
consequently: while in so far as the sensible objects of the other senses
are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased
at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the
preservation of nature. Hence these passions are not of such importance
that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater
than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses, and
consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite,
against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral virtue.
We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in
accordance with reason, wherefore they need no control, save
accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to
another greater and more binding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of
nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about all
pleasures of touch.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the
taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which are
more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard the
touch. But according to what has been said (A[4]), temperance is about
pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore
temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than about those
proper to the touch.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about
things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch is the
sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food, whereas
"savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the pleasing quality
of the food." Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about
the touch.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and
intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy pertains.
Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors which are the
object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to
the taste.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly
temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the taste."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[4]), temperance is about the greatest
pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in
the species or in the individual. In these matters certain things are to
be considered as principal and others as secondary. The principal thing
is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary
for the preservation of the species, or of food and drink which are
necessary for the preservation of the individual: while the very use of
these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use
more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing
savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the
pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these
necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch.
Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of
the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of these
senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have
relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the touch than
the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste
than about the other senses.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results
therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or
dry." To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make the food
pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for
nourishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to
speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of
food and drink.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food, but
secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which it is
served.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend on the
needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated according
to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the
needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not depend on
the needs of the body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs of
the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against
temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by
nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem
unreasonable.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the need
of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in using
any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of
health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the body is
not the rule of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both
Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding
him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for
its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things with
the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far as they
are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]; Q[109], A[2]; Q[123], A[12]), the
good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because
"man's good is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius asserts (Div.
Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs
certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly
in this order; since good has the aspect of end, and the end is the rule
of whatever is directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that
are at man's disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to
their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule
of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use, and uses them only for
as much as the need of this life requires.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a
rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes
the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear
that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of the
builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is
happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the
need of human life, to which whatever is useful for life is subordinate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it
may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary" to that
without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an
animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something without which a thing
cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these
needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
11) that "the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of
health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body." Other things that
are not necessary for this purpose may be divided into two classes. For
some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these
temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin against
temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those things, and these
temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time,
and in keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant
things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound
condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according to the
requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements of
the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches
and station, and more still on the requirements of good conduct. Hence
the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man makes use
of pleasant things provided that not only they be not prejudicial to
health and a sound bodily condition, but also that they be not
inconsistent with good," i.e. good conduct, nor "beyond his substance,"
i.e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the
"temperate man considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of
his station."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue. For the
good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about those
things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about pleasures
common to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10.
Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to
control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more
impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is
written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh
forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one provoked?"
Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of
desire and concupiscence, as stated above (FS, Q[25], A[4]). But humility
controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly,
humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which controls
concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues
(Moral. ii, 49).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[11]; Q[61], A[3]), a principal
or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim to praise
on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of
virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue,
deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance
is concerned, both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so
that it is more difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire
for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present
life, as stated above (A[4]). For this reason temperance is reckoned a
principal or cardinal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the
agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very fact that the
reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest
removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This is how
temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for
instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its impetus
be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for
pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is more
lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more
principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire,
wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible. But
the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with
greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance, which
appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. For
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and seek most in
temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard for
what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for being honorable and
beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue. Now
it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch than to
regulate external actions, the former pertaining to temperance and the
latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more
necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death
which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur
every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude.
Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest
virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason
we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of
the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it
is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than
temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and
another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for
the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and
pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and
fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and
the theological virtues are more excellent still.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not
on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance, but on
account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us,
by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower animals.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the
excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein
temperance excels.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[141] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which is general because it regards the many conduces
more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general because it
occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance in the
latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although in some respects
temperance may be described as greater not only than fortitude but also
than justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?
(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;
(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether insensibility is a vice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those are
called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures of touch.
Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient
in such matters: for it is written (Dan. 10:2,3): "In those days Daniel
mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, and neither
flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was I anointed with ointment."
Therefore insensibility is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "man's good is to be in accord with reason," according
to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all pleasures of touch
is most conducive to man's progress in the good of reason: for it is
written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who took pulse for their food
(Dan. 1:12), "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book and
wisdom." Therefore insensibility, which rejects these pleasures
altogether, is not sinful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin
would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in avoiding
sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we deny ourselves pleasures we
are less liable to sin." Therefore there is nothing vicious in
insensibility.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now
insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious. Now
nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary for
man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man should make use
of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for man's well-being,
as regards the preservation either of the individual or of the species.
Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting
things that are necessary for nature's preservation, he would sin, as
acting counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of
insensibility.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and
even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures as
result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's health,
certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex; as also
for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and soldiers
have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil their
respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover health
of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet,
and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to contemplation and
Divine things need much to refrain from carnal things. Nor do any of
these things pertain to the vice of insensibility, because they are in
accord with right reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any
horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some
praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of
contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text
goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately afterwards.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive
powers. which need a bodily organ. as stated in the FP, Q[84], AA[7],8,
man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now
the body is sustained by means of operations that afford pleasure:
wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he abstain from all
pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the body will be greater
or less, according as man needs more or less the powers of his body in
accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for those
who undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of
imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind of spiritual procreation,
as it were, to abstain from many pleasures, but not for those who are in
duty bound to bodily occupations and carnal procreation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not
altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For Jerome
in commenting on Mt. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and become as little
children," says that "a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of
injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman," all of which is
contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in respect
of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas
concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned, are
always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5, "Mortify . .
your members upon the earth, which are . . . concupiscence" [*Vulg.:
'your members which are upon the earth, fornication . . .
concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we apply
the term intemperance* to childish faults." [*{Akolasia} which Aristotle
refers to {kolazo} to punish, so that its original sense would be
'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First,
because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean
that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly. by way
of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are said
to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked
concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as
rewards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence
desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing
is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully says
(De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness is twofold," that "the
beautiful is that which is in keeping with man's excellence in so far as
his nature differs from other animals." Now a child does not attend to
the order of reason; and in like manner "concupiscence does not listen to
reason," according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the
result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed:
hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not broken becometh
stubborn, and a child left to himself will become headstrong." So, too,
concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine says
(Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a custom, and custom not resisted
became necessity." Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both.
For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence it is written (Prov.
23:13,14): "Withhold not correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat
him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell." In like manner by
resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to the demands of
virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the
mind be lifted up to spiritual things, and remain fixed "thereon, the
impulse of custom," i.e. carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being
suppressed is gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed
it, and though not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we
curb it." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child
ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the
concupiscible to accord with reason."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as denoting what is
observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of
intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, with
regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are about
natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex, which are
directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire may be called
natural with regard to the species of the thing that nature requires for
its own preservation; and in this way it does not happen often that one
sins in the matter of natural desires, for nature requires only that
which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save only
where it is desired in excess as to quantity. This is the only way in
which sin can occur with regard to natural desires, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity [*Cf.
Q[167]], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of food, or the adornment
of women. And though children do not affect these things much, yet
intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and fostered
in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in them should
not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the good of virtue.
Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent virtue
than temperance, as stated above (A[2]; Q[141], A[8]). Therefore
cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the less is
a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable, if a man
is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now seemingly
it is more difficult to control pleasures than other passions; hence it
is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that "it is more difficult to contend against
pleasure than against anger, which would seem to be stronger than fear."
Therefore intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous
sin than cowardice, which is overcome by fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now
cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires to be
intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which
pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin than
intemperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice."
Therefore it is more sinful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, one may be compared with another in two ways. First, with
regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man who
sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
cowardice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to
avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life. On
the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which is
not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated above
(A[2], ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed pleasures or
desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the more necessary
the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. Wherefore intemperance is a
more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the object or motive
matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the more
grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are
demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death, stun
the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of intemperance.
Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the graver it is. Now
intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice has, and this
for two reasons. The first is because actions done through fear have
their origin in the compulsion of an external agent, so that they are not
simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, whereas actions
done for the sake of pleasure are simply voluntary. The second reason is
because the actions of an intemperate man are more voluntary individually
and less voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate,
yet man is enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an
intemperate man. Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is
not to dwell on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about
in matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that
imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his
shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary, for
instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is more voluntary in
the particular circumstances in which the act takes place, is simply more
voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more voluntary than
cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is easier to find a
remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and
sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of everyday occurrence,
and it is possible for man without danger by frequent practice in their
regard to become temperate; whereas dangers of death are of rare
occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to encounter them frequently
in order to cease being a coward.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with temperance
may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard to the end,
which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed to the common
good more than temperance is. And from this point of view cowardice has a
certain precedence over intemperance, since by cowardice some people
forsake the defense of the common good. Secondly, with regard to the
difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure dangers of death than
to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from this point of view
there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For
just as it is a greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger
force, so on the other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof
of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a
greater vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one shuns
perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures whatever of
food and sex which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is
more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of death, than the desire
of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although the latter is more
difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain
other evils.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a general
than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we have the
voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most disgraceful of
sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to sin. Now some sins
are more grievous than intemperance: for instance murder, blasphemy, and
the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly less
disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of intemperance
are most common, because they are about things connected with the common
use of human life, and in which many happen to sin. Therefore sins of
intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and
intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain desires
and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and pleasures; such
are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now
honor is due to excellence, as stated above (Q[103], A[1]), and glory
denotes clarity (Q[103], A[1], ad 3). Accordingly intemperance is most
disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to human
excellence, since it is about pleasures common to us and the lower
animals, as stated above (Q[141], AA[2],3). Wherefore it is written (Ps.
48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been
compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them." Secondly, because
it is most repugnant to man's clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the
pleasures which are the matter of intemperance dim the light of reason
from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these
pleasures are described as being most slavish.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12], "the sins of the
flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although less
culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability is
measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace regards
shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin in
respect of the sinner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and
disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the nature of
the vices themselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[142] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we mean
in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are connected with
human passions which to a certain extent are in conformity with human
nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of human nature are still
more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are apparently reducible to the
genus of intemperance, by way of excess: for instance, if a man delight
in eating human flesh, or in committing the unnatural vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these
same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly
assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to be "continence,
mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be distinct from
virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue.
Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But
temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as
stated above (Q[141], A[4]). Therefore mildness is not a part of
temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle
says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now external
actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q[58], A[8]).
Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts
of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,
sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the
companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity,
refinement, method, contentment." [*'Per-se-sufficientiam' which could be
rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that this is taken in a bad
sense. See Q[169], A[1].] Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently
reckoned the parts of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, As stated above (QQ[48],128), a cardinal virtue may have
three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The
integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which
are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral
parts of temperance, "shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the
disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and "honesty," whereby one loves
the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above (Q[141], A[2], ad 3),
temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness,
and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Body Para. 2/6
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a
virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter or
object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two
kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards
meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is
"sobriety." Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and
in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of
procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures incidental to
the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling, we
have "purity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Body Para. 3/6
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues:
for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal
matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is
not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of
touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is
effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the
appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of
temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Body Para. 4/6
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul;
secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in
outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which
temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements
towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of
the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement is
restrained by "continence," the effect of which is that, although a man
suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them.
Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of
the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by "humility."
The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and
this is restrained by "meekness" or "mildness."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Body Para. 5/6
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is
the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus, has three parts.
The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do,
and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we do: this he
assigns to "method." The second is that a man observe decorum in what he
does, and this he ascribes to "refinement." The third has to do with the
conversation or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and
this is called "gravity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] Body Para. 6/6
With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed.
First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius assigns
"lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly, we must not be too
nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes "moderation,"
Andronicus "simplicity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as
imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q[165],
A[1]); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has
something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is about
pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint.
Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not
because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the mode of
restraint and moderation as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what is
due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain
moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[143] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the
moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the
moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] Out. Para. 1/1
INTEGRAL PARTS OF TEMPERANCE (QQ[144]-154)
OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the
first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty.
With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
(2) What is its object?
(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?
(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a
virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is clear from the
definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes
the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii, 7).
Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something
connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy. But it is not
part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in
the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of justice. since
shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about
the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude, because it belongs to
fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while it belongs to
shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it a part of
temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is
a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is
a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to
Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is the companion and
familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a stranger to any
kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest,
a seeker after the beautiful." Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices are
opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery.
Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to Ethic. ii,
1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from many
such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore shamefacedness is
a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that
shamefacedness is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a
broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys.
vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection,
though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now
shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of
something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of a base action."
Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about
a possible and arduous evil, as stated above (FS, Q[40], A[1]; FS, Q[41],
A[2]; FS, Q[42], A[3]), when we were treating of the passions. But one
who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which
would be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, that
is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually do anything
base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly
speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way /shamefacedness
is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of
virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's
definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an
elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now
shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement
result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it falls short
of the notion of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and
disgrace. Now it has been stated (Q[142], A[4]) that the vice of
intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness
pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of its
motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the species
of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed
to other virtues are base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also
pertain to other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is
contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of honesty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is
sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that
whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is
opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, in so
far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed
to temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired
virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object of
shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard:
although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would be more
ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful
action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shamefacedness is
fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer
ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I have borne reproach,
shame hath covered my face." Therefore shamefacedness is not properly
about a disgraceful action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful.
Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance when he
performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is
not properly about a disgraceful action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful
according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to do virtuous
deeds, according to Lk. 9:26, "He that shall be ashamed of Me and My
words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed," etc. Therefore
shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful
action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more
ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins,
while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to Ps. 51:3,
"Why dost thou glory in malice?" Therefore shamefacedness is not properly
about a disgraceful action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear of doing
a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[41], A[2]; FS, Q[42], A[3]), when
we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil,
one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There
is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a
voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the character of an
arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not appear to
be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as
fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such
evils are not a matter of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the
reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory consists
in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the character of
an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an arduous good,
shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost
reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due to vice, as
honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness regards also the
disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
"a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any
fault of his own."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains
from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while
doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach.
In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the latter we say that he is
"ashamed." Hence he says that "the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but
he who blushes fears to be disgraced."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin
which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6)
that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause."
Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is subject on
account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher
says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it said of the
apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from the presence of
the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach
for the name of Jesus." It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man
is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on account of
virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external
things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written (Is. 51:7): "Fear
ye not the reproach of men."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[63], A[3]), though honor is not really
due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: and the
same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to sin alone,
yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of defect. Hence a
man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. Yet
it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either because he
looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or because he is
afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical for doing virtuous
deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either
because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison with
sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance of some
temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of daring, of
theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of power. The same
applies to other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected
with him?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who are
more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that
"men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation." Now
men desire this especially from people of the better sort who are
sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more shamefaced
of those who are more closely connected with him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who perform
like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows
to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii, 6, "a man
does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself." Therefore he is not
more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take more
shame from those who retail their information to many, such as jokers and
fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected with a man do
not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame chiefly from
them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are most
liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done nothing
amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those
whose friends they wish to become." Now these are less closely connected
with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more
closely united to him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most
ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor denotes
attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence which is
according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is
shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect, especially that
which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's attestation is
considered to be, the more does he make another person ashamed. Now a
person's attestation may be considered as being more weighty, either
because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of
the truth attaches to a person's attestations for two reasons. First on
account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in the case of wise and
virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of being honored and by whom
he is brought to a greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower
animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment.
Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because
"everyone judges well of what is known to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this
way we are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us,
since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and
persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire
us with no shame at all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some
advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous of
being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to
be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm. And for this
reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with us make us
more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their society, as though
this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from
strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same
reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just as
the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a
more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments hold fast to
the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we live is more
cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected with
us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they look upon
our defect as disgraceful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do
by making many think ill of us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us more
ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to wit, we
should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because when
contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems greater, so
that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom he esteemed
good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful. The reason why we
are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something for the first
time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to suffer some
injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing to become
their friends.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For
contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are
not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's forehead, thou
wouldst not blush." Therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to
be ashamed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are ashamed
not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this happens also
in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv, 9].
Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if they
are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore a
virtuous man can be ashamed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated above
(Q[143]). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since then
temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a "virtuous
man is not shamefaced."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2) shamefacedness is fear of some
disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared:
first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one reckons
it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, because
the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him to be
disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are without
shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of them.
Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves, or
as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous are not
shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were anything
disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous
hypothetically."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men
through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average men it
is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not
altogether free from evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, but
also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1 Thess. 5:22,
"From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." The Philosopher, too,
says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should avoid "not only what is
really evil, but also those things that are regarded as evil."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 1) the virtuous man despises
ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore he
is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame,
like the other passions, may forestall reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[144] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though it
entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore Ambrose
says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the first foundation of
temperance," by inspiring man with the horror of whatever is disgraceful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] Out. Para. 1/1
OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad
sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of
decorum.]
We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;
(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral
goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];
(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;
(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether honesty is the same as virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully
says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is desired for
its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the
sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "happiness
is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore honesty is not the same
as virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an
honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since
"it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
honesty is not the same as virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior choice,"
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems to pertain
rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, "Let all things be
done decently [honeste] and according to order" among you. Therefore
honesty is not the same as virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth.
According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death
[poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are omitted in
the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has 'honestas']. But virtue
does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty
into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided.
Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable
state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy
of honor. Now honor, as stated above (Q[144], A[2], ad 2), is due to
excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to
his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly speaking,
honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things
that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake
alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which
is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their own sake,
inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no
further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of
something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good.
It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that "some things allure us by their
own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth,
knowledge." And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are
more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like
things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we
practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of
honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far as
they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power, and
riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that
these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it is only the
good man who is worthy of honor." Now a man is good in respect of virtue.
Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable
for the sake of something else, while honor is due to virtue for its own
sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is
due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated above
(Q[103], AA[1],2). But one attests only to what one knows; and the
internal choice is not made known save by external actions. Wherefore
external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as it reflects
internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists radically in the
internal choice, but its expression lies in the external conduct.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded
as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name of honesty is
given to external prosperity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the beautiful.
For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since the honest
is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii,
53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision to which it
is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is
characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then
honor and glory differ, as stated above (Q[103], A[1], ad 3), it seems
also that the honest and the beautiful differ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above (A[1]).
But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is written
(Ezech. 16:15): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the harlot because
of thy renown." Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23,24): "Those that are our
uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness [honestatem],
but our comely [honesta] parts have no need." Now by uncomely parts he
means the baser members, and by comely parts the beautiful members.
Therefore the honest and the beautiful are apparently the same.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and
due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being
"the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe." Hence the beauty
of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned,
together with a certain clarity of color. In like manner spiritual beauty
consists in a man's conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect
of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty,
which we have stated (A[1]) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue
that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man.
Wherefore "honesty is the same as spiritual beauty." Hence Augustine says
(QQ[83], qu. 30): "By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we
properly designate as spiritual," and further on he adds that "many
things are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to call
honest."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good.
Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended,
it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good are beloved by all." Wherefore
the honest, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty, is an object of
desire, and for this reason Tully says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest
the form and the features, so to speak, of honesty; and were it to be
seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of
wisdom."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory is the effect
of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person acquires
clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a
man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and beautiful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body: although
it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to play the
harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to Ezech. 28:17, "Thy
heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy
beauty."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and
the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake"
[*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired for its own
sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased,"
as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not
differ from the pleasant.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that attracts the
desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on
account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is money." Now riches
come under the head of honesty, for it is written (Ecclus. 11:14):
"Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God," and (Ecclus. 13:2): "He
shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more
honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the honest differs not
from the useful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be
useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De
Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Q[83], qu. 30): "The honest is that
which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to
something else."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful
and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated
above (A[2]), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a certain
beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated in
accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it is natural
for a thing to take pleasure in that which is becoming to it. Wherefore
an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man: and the Philosopher proves
this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is
pleasing is honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the
senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of this kind is
beside man's reason which perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which
is essentially honest, is referred to something else as its end namely
happiness. Accordingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in
the one subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as
having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its
spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to
desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant, however,
extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is
useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does
not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its own
sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is in accordance
with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for
its own sake by the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion of
the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the
instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible
with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it is
contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with reason;
although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with regard to a
particular end. But they do not mean to say that every useful thing as
such may be classed among those that are honest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of
temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole in
respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty,"
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not a
part of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . . makes all
thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which
sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to
intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part
of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now "it
is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to the
Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance,
but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as related in
2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for the most
venerable and most holy laws."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part of
temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as pertaining
especially to temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), honesty is a kind of spiritual
beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites
are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs
especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most
disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by its very
name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to which it
belongs to moderate and temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as
being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part
thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an
integral part or condition attaching thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken
in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a part of
temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his thoughts
honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great and
deserving of honor [*Cf. Q[148], A[6]].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[145] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to
temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet
greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in
check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus honesty
is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the
Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that "our uncomely parts have more
abundant comeliness," which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] Out. Para. 1/2
OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those
which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about
pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which
is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically about drink.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] Out. Para. 2/2
With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1)
Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice
which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether abstinence is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (1
Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power [virtute]."
Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for the Apostle
says (Rm. 14:17): "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink," where a
gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11] observes that "justice
consists neither in abstaining nor in eating." Therefore abstinence is
not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself to
God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take food as
physic." Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate
medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one's food, which
belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in Ethic.
ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but to
deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence
excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "impatience
not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its peaceful
seclusion." Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "sometimes the sin of
pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer," so that abstinence excludes
humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pt. 1:5,6): "Join with your faith
virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence"; where
abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food.
Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting
retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a
virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Secondly, it may be
taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous
habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of Peter's words quoted
above, where he says that we ought "to join abstinence with knowledge,"
namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for
those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements
of health.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered in
themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 8:8): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat
not [*Vulg.: 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'], shall we have
the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i.e. spiritually.
Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in so far as they
are done reasonably through faith and love of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and
quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the
body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of
reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang. ii,
qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food
a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the people among
whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his
health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without
food when bound by duty or necessity to abstain."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are
too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen
the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore,
just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess, from which
all the parts of fortitude take their name, so temperance is commended
for a kind of deficiency, from which all its parts are denominated. Hence
abstinence, since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency,
and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord with right
reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not
in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain as one
ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God's
glory and not one's own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether abstinence is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For every
virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by
itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the virtue of abstinence
is praised only on account of the other virtues." Therefore abstinence
is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) that
"the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature of God is
evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now this belongs to
chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special
virtue distinct from chastity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so should
he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having
food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulg.: 'are']
content." Now there is no special virtue in being content with moderate
clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons abstinence as
a special part of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[136], A[1]; Q[141], A[3]) moral virtue
maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions: hence
whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs from the good of
reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now pleasures of the table are
of a nature to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they
are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs it for the
maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore
abstinence is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated
above (FS, Q[65], A[1]). Wherefore one virtue receives help and
commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in this
way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the
other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only
against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony:
since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of
gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to them. Yet
abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a
help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[146] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use of
food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue
for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] Out. Para. 1/1
OF FASTING (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?
(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
(3) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?
(5) The time of fasting;
(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?
(7) The hour of eating for those who fast;
(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fasting is an act of virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For every act
of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always acceptable to
God, according to Is. 58:3, "Why have we fasted and Thou hast not
regarded?" Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now
fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence
takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas
by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do not fast
would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is not an act
of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil, is
not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is fasting
before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts (2
Cor. 6:5,6) where the Apostle says: "In fasting, in knowledge, in
chastity, etc. [Vulg.: 'in chastity, in knowledge']."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to
some virtuous [honestum] [*Cf. Q[145], A[1]] good. Now this is consistent
with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose.
First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle
says (2 Cor. 6:5,6): "In fasting, in chastity," since fasting is the
guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome [*Contra Jov. ii.] "Venus
is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there," that is to say, lust is
cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we have recourse to
fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation
of heavenly things: hence it is related (Dan. 10) of Daniel that he
received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in
order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): "Be
converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in
mourning." The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et
Jejun. [*Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de Tempore)]): "Fasting cleanses the soul,
raises the mind, subjects one's flesh to the spirit, renders the heart
contrite and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the
fire of lust, kindles the true light of chastity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered vicious
by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text goes on to
say: "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is founded," and a
little further on (Is. 58:4): "You fast for debates and strife and strike
with the fist wickedly." These words are expounded by Gregory (Pastor.
iii, 19) as follows: "The will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain
then is the flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate
movements be wrecked by vice." And Augustine says (in the same sermon)
that "fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns
pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and paltry."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The mean of virtue is measured not according to quantity
but according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Now reason
judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a man to take
less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary circumstances, for
instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to perform certain
bodily works with greater ease: and much more does reason direct this to
the avoidance of spiritual evils and the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet
reason does not retrench so much from one's food as to refuse nature its
necessary support: thus Jerome says:* "It matters not whether thou art a
long or a short time in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body
immoderately, whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or
sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods." [*The
quotation is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De
Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to St.
Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint's works.] In like manner
right reason does not retrench so much from a man's food as to render him
incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in the same
reference) "Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before
chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his senses."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is said to
be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure negation,
wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting
of one who abstains in some measure from food for a reasonable purpose.
Hence the former is called natural fasting [jejunium jejunii] [*Literally
the 'fast of fasting']: while the latter is called the faster's fast,
because he fasts for a purpose.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence. For
Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the reference is
lacking] commenting on Mt. 17:20, "This kind of devil" says: "To fast is
to abstain not only from food but also from all manner of lusts." Now
this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively an act
of abstinence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that
"the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year." Now paying tithes is an
act of religion, as stated above (Q[87], A[1]). Therefore fasting is an
act of religion and not of abstinence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above
(QQ[143],146, A[1], ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with fortitude,
to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable
to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "fasting is frugality
of fare and abstinence from food."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every
virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that
appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food,
wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident that
fasting is an act of abstinence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from food,
but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything harmful,
and such especially is sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence from
all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), an act ceases to
be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to another
virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that virtue, as
explained above (Q[32], A[1], ad 2; Q[85], A[3]). Accordingly there is no
reason why fasting should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or
of any other virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure, not
any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger of death.
To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of touch,
belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are the hardships of
fasting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fasting is a matter of precept?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. For
precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a matter
of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have
to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting is not
a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin.
Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast would
sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that "the Wisdom of
God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of freedom,
instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the community of the
Christian people, that is, of the free multitude, should be bound
together in subjection to one God." Now the liberty of the Christian
people seems to be hindered by a great number of observances no less than
by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar.,
Ep. lv) that "whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be
distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and small number of its
solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive with slavish
burdens." Therefore it seems that the Church should not have made fasting
a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting says:
"Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands
of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles." Therefore
fasting is a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make legal
precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal in
temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe
by statute those things that concern the common weal of the faithful in
spiritual goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now it has been stated above (A[1]) that fasting is useful as atoning
for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things. And
everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practice fasting as
far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in general
is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the fixing of the time
and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to the Christian people,
is a matter of precept of positive law established by ecclesiastical
authority: the latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast
prescribed by nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fasting considered in itself denotes something not eligible
but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful to some end.
Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but it
is binding under precept to each one that stands in need of such a
remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this remedy, both because
"in many things we all offend" (James 3:2), and because "the flesh
lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. 5:17), it was fitting that the Church
should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In doing this
the Church does not make a precept of a matter of supererogation, but
particularizes in detail that which is of general obligation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those commandments which are given under the form of a
general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject to
the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a mortal
sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the lawgiver's
authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate the end
intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to keep a
commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially if the
lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it
is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin mortally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Augustine is speaking there of those things "that are
neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found among
the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of the
universal Church." On the other hand, the fasts that are of obligation
are appointed by the councils of bishops and are sanctioned by the custom
of the universal Church. Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the
faithful, rather are they of use in hindering the slavery of sin, which
is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written (Gal. 5:13):
"You, brethren, have been called unto liberty; only make not liberty an
occasion to the flesh."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church.
For the commandments of the Church are binding even as the commandments
of God, according to Lk. 10:16, "He that heareth you heareth Me." Now all
are bound to keep the commandments of God. Therefore in like manner all
are bound to keep the fasts appointed by the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from
fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (Joel 2:15):
"Sanctify a fast," and further on (Joel 2:16): "Gather together the
little ones, and them that suck the breasts." Much more therefore are all
others bound to keen the fasts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal, and
necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily works are
directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual
things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since fasting is
directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing by the
commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of the Church ought
not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or bodily works.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through
necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast through
necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought they to fast
willingly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. For
the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to Christ's
teaching. But our Lord said (Lk. 5:34) that "the children of the
bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them [*Vulg.: 'Can
you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst the bridegroom is
with them?']." Now He is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a
special manner [*Cf. FP, Q[8], A[3]], wherefore our Lord said (Mt.
28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . even to the consummation of the
world." Therefore the righteous are not bound by the commandment of the
Church to fast.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[90], A[2]; FS, Q[98], AA[2],6),
general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the many.
Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what happens
generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the precept to be
binding on a person in whom for some special reason there is something
incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet discretion must be
brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful
for a man to use his own judgment in omitting to fulfil the precept,
especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be difficult for him to
have recourse to superior authority. on the other hand, if the reason be
doubtful, one should have recourse to the superior who has power to grant
a dispensation in such cases. And this must be done in the fasts
appointed by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless there
be some special obstacle to this observance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The commandments of God are precepts of the natural law,
which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the commandments
of the Church are about matters which are necessary for salvation, not of
themselves, but only through the ordinance of the Church. Hence there may
be certain obstacles on account of which certain persons are not bound to
keep the fasts in question.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In children there is a most evident reason for not fasting,
both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which they need to
take food frequently, and not much at a time, and because they need much
nourishment owing to the demands of growth, which results from the
residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as the stage of growth lasts,
which as a rule lasts until they have completed the third period of seven
years, they are not bound to keep the Church fasts: and yet it is fitting
that even during that time they should exercise themselves in fasting,
more or less, in accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great
calamity threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more
severe penance, according to Jonas 3:7, "Let neither men nor beasts . . .
taste anything . . . nor drink water."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to
pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work can
be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bodily
health and such external conditions as are necessary for the upkeep of
bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting the fasts of
the Church. But if one be under the necessity of starting on the
pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of doing much work,
either for one's bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spiritual
life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep the fasts of the
Church, one is not bound to fast: because in ordering fasts the Church
would not seem to have intended to prevent other pious and more necessary
undertakings. Nevertheless, in such cases one ought seemingly, to seek
the superior's dispensation; except perhaps when the above course is
recognized by custom, since when superiors are silent they would seem to
consent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient for
one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the fasts
of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt who beg
their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any one time to have a
sufficiency of food.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways.
First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that "the
disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as yet of a
weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old garment." Hence
while Christ was with them in body they were to be fostered with kindness
rather than drilled with the harshness of fasting. According to this
interpretation, it is fitting that dispensations should be granted to the
imperfect and to beginners, rather than to the elders and the perfect,
according to a gloss on Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned is towards
his mother." Secondly, we may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v]
that our Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old
Law. Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be
held back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the
newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii,
27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. one pertains to those who
are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for
they are called "children of the bridegroom"; hence when we read in Luke:
"The children of the bridegroom cannot fast [*Hom. xiii, in Matth.]," we
read in Mt. 9:15: "The children of the bridegroom cannot mourn [*Vulg.:
'Can the children of the bridegroom mourn?']." The other pertains to the
mind that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and this fasting is
befitting the perfect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the times for the Church fast are unfittingly
appointed. For we read (Mt. 4) that Christ began to fast immediately
after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate Christ, according to 1 Cor.
4:16, "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Therefore we ought
to fast immediately after the Epiphany when Christ's baptism is
celebrated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the ceremonies
of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the Old Law to fast
in certain particular months: for it is written (Zach. 8:19): "The fast
of the fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the
seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be to the house of Judah, joy
and gladness and great solemnities." Therefore the fast of certain
months, which are called Ember days, are unfittingly kept in the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), just
as there is a fast "of sorrow," so is there a fast "of joy." Now it is
most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in Christ's
Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the Church solemnizes
on account of Christ's Resurrection, and on Sundays which commemorate the
Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the general custom of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],3), fasting is directed to two
things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to heavenly
things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially for those
times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and the minds of the
faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these things are
particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are loosed
by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on Easter-eve, on which day our
Lord's burial is commemorated, because "we are buried together with
Christ by baptism unto death" (Rm. 6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival
the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory of eternity,
which Christ restored by rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered
a fast to be observed immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the
same reason, on the eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that
one ought to make ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is
the custom in the Church for Holy orders to be conferred every quarter of
the year (in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven
loaves, which signify the New Testament year as Jerome says [*Comment. in
Marc. viii]): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for
ordination, and even the whole people, for whose good they are ordained,
need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the ordination. Hence
it is related (Lk. 6:12) that before choosing His disciples our Lord
"went out into a mountain to pray": and Ambrose [*Exposit. in Luc.]
commenting on these words says: "What shouldst thou do, when thou
desirest to undertake some pious work, since Christ prayed before sending
His apostles?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi in
Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First, "because the power
of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy Gospels:
since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four." Or "because we are
composed of four elements in this mortal body through whose lusts we
transgress the Lord's commandments which are delivered to us in the
Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that same body forty
times. or, because, just as under the Law it was commanded that tithes
should be paid of things, so we strive to pay God a tithe of days, for
since a year is composed of three hundred and sixty-six days, by
punishing ourselves for thirty-six days" (namely, the fasting days during
the six weeks of Lent) "we pay God a tithe of our year." According to
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For
the Creator is the "Trinity," Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: while the
number "three" refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded
to love God, with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our
whole mind: and the number "four" refers to the visible creature, by
reason of heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the number "ten" [*Ten is the sum
of three, three, and four] signifies all things, and if this be
multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of
things, we have the number forty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of the
number of months in each season: or on account of the number of Holy
orders which are conferred at these times.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in order to
commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to fast, not
before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to fast before our
baptism.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very same
time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in July,
which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the first),
because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai broke the
tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, according to Jer. 39:2, "the walls
of the city were first broken through." In the fifth month, which we call
August, they fasted because they were commanded not to go up on to the
mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the spies (Num. 14):
also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt down by
Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) and afterwards by Titus. In the seventh month
which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the remnants of the people
were dispersed (Jer. 51). In the tenth month, which we call January, the
people who were with Ezechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of
the temple (Ezech. 4).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The "fasting of joy" proceeds from the instigation of the
Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting should
not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by the
commandment of the Church are rather "fasts of sorrow" which are
inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered by
the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on Sundays: and if
anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to the custom of
Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi) "is to be
considered as law," or even through some erroneous opinion (thus the
Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of obligation)---he
would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting considered in itself is
commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi): "Would
that we might fast always."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that one eat
but once. For, as stated above (A[2]), fasting is an act of the virtue of
abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not less than the number
of meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited for those who fast.
Therefore neither should the number of meals be limited.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink:
wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot receive
the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink at
various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be
forbidden to eat several times.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take them on
fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to fasting to
take only one meal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Christian people.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle
concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is
seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is able to
satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by
minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the Church,
in her moderation, that those who fast should take one meal in the day.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food for
all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result being that
one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for the most part,
all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A[1], ad 3]. One is the
natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This is
broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not lawful
to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another kind and is
called the "fasting of the faster," and this is not broken save by such
things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the fast. Now the
Church does not intend to command abstinence from drink, for this is
taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the food consumed,
although it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible to sin and lose
the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink: as also by eating
immoderately at one meal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken
chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break
one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to take
digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and by way of
food.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster's meal?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed for the
faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect than the
state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted until evening,
for it is written (Lev. 23:32): "It is a sabbath . . . you shall afflict
your souls," and then the text continues: "From evening until evening
you shall celebrate your sabbaths." Much more therefore under the New
Testament should the fast be ordered until the evening.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all. But
all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it seems that
the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the commandment to
fast.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as stated
above (A[2]). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in the same way
to all, since what is much for one is little for another, as stated in
Ethic. ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not be fixed for those who
fast.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the
Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and is
said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De
Consecratione] says: "During Lent those are by no means to be credited
with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers,"
which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour. Therefore we
ought to fast until the ninth hour.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],3,5), fasting is directed to the
deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something to the
common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now the
right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour: both
because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being withdrawn
inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold of the night),
and the humor spread about through the limbs (to which result the heat of
the day conduces until the sun has reached its zenith), and again because
it is then chiefly that the nature of the human body needs assistance
against the external heat that is in the air, lest the humors be parched
within. Hence, in order that those who fast may feel some pain in
satisfaction for their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their
meal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion, which
was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing His head, He gave
up the ghost" (Jn. 19:30): because those who fast by punishing their
flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Gal. 5:24,
"They that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh with the vices and
concupiscences."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the night,
while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day, according to
Rm. 13:12, "The night is passed and the day is at hand." Therefore in the
Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the New Testament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict
calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be about
the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now it
is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for the most
part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed for those who
fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do much harm to anyone,
whatever his circumstances may be. If however this were to prove a heavy
burden to a man on account of sickness, age, or some similar reason, he
should be dispensed from fasting, or be allowed to forestall the hour by
a little.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain
from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be bidden to
abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has been stated
above (A[6]) that fasting was instituted as a curb on the concupiscence
of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking wine more than by
eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, "Wine is a luxurious thing," and
Eph. 5:18, "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is luxury." Since then those
who fast are not forbidden to drink wine, it seems that they should not
be forbidden to eat flesh meat.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of
certain animals. Now "concupiscence is desire of the delectable," as
stated above (FS, Q[30], A[1]). Therefore since fasting which was
instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating
of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and
cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the Lenten
fast.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), fasting was instituted by the
Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which regard
pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore the Church
forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both afford most
pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great incentive to lust.
Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest on the earth, and of
those that breathe the air and their products, such as milk from those
that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds. For, since such like animals
are more like man in body, they afford greater pleasure as food, and
greater nourishment to the human body, so that from their consumption
there results a greater surplus available for seminal matter, which when
abundant becomes a great incentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden
those who fast to abstain especially from these foods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely,
heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A[1], ad 3], and humor. Wine and other
things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent foods
seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital spirit: but it is
chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of nourishment,
that conduces to the production of humor. Now the alteration occasioned
by heat, and the increase in vital spirits are of short duration, whereas
the substance of the humor remains a long time. Hence those who fast are
forbidden the use of flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which
are flatulent foods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account of
the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh meat
affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not always the
case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh meat, rather
than to eat fish.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[147] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast, for as
much as they originate from animals that provide us with flesh: wherefore
the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the prohibition of eggs
and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the most solemn of all, both
because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and because it disposes us to
celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our redemption. For this reason the
eating of flesh meat is forbidden in every fast, while the Lenten fast
lays a general prohibition even on eggs and milk foods. As to the use of
the latter things in other fasts the custom varies among different
people, and each person is bound to conform to that custom which is in
vogue with those among whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says
[*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: "Let each
province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the
elders as though they were the laws of the apostles."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] Out. Para. 1/1
OF GLUTTONY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether gluttony is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Its species;
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) Its daughters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether gluttony is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord said (Mt.
15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man." Now
gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since every sin
defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [*Ep. lxxi, ad
Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid this,
for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure and
necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of necessity
and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Who
is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than necessary?" Therefore
gluttony is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin. But
the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and thirst
would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we first
tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we
have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat." But man's
inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking,
but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through
leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists:
and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue.
Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of its
substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the Jews,
against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain foods
to make a man unclean, not on account of their signification, but by
reason of their nature [*Cf. FS, Q[102], A[6], ad 1]. It is the
inordinate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard the
substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated by
reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of
food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this pertains, not to
gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a case of gluttony only
when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in eating, from a desire for the
pleasures of the palate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite,
which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers virtue
and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to reason;
wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the powers of
secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and thirst are to
be referred. Besides this there is another, the sensitive appetite, and
it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that the vice of gluttony
consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in
the sensitive appetite, and this is not without sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether gluttony is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every mortal
sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this, apparently, does
not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above
(Q[132], A[3]). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither as
regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one's neighbor.
Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf. Append. to
St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]: "Whenever a man
takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is
one of the lesser sins." But this pertains to gluttony. Therefore
gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to say venial, sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "As long as the
vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done valiantly is
forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is unrestrained, all virtue
comes to naught." But virtue is not done away save by mortal sin.
Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the vice of gluttony properly
consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of reason in
regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two points of view.
First, with regard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as they may be
incommensurate and consequently improportionate to the end; secondly,
with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence turns man away
from his due end. Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in
gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a
mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony
as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God, being ready to disobey
God's commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other
hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of gluttony be found to
affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when a
man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet would not
for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning man
away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction, it is
opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands us to
rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly opposed to the
precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which contain injustice:
because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain specially to justice and
its parts, as stated above (Q[122], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In so far as it turns man away from his last end, gluttony
is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last end, above
all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting
inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much on
its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it. For
Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by gluttony,
the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For the
grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the punishment.
Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says
[*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: "Gluttony turned Adam out of Paradise, gluttony
it was that drew down the deluge at the time of Noah." According to
Ezech. 16:49, "This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy sister . . . fulness
of bread," etc. Therefore the sin of gluttony is the greatest of all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now
gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps.
135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust,
concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony." Therefore gluttony
is the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after God, as
stated above (Q[25], A[4]). Now man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an
injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus. 37:34): "By surfeiting many
have perished." Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins, at least
excepting those that are against God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is
reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways. First
and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is committed: and
in this way sins committed in connection with Divine things are the
greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the greatest sin, for
it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the body. Secondly,
the gravity of a sin depends on the person who sins, and from this point
of view the sin of gluttony is diminished rather than aggravated, both on
account of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the difficulty
of proper discretion and moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the
point of view of the result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a
certain gravity, inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices that
resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang, rather
than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on
account of pride, from which he went on to an act of gluttony: while the
deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom were inflicted for sins
occasioned by gluttony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins that
result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful, unless it
be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the
accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the
pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is
accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of gluttony,
the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur some bodily
injury through taking too much food.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/2
OBJ 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly
distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of gluttony
tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of need;
sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food to be
daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment by
taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of an immoderate
appetite"---which are contained in the following verse: "Hastily,
sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 2/2
For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance.
Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do not differentiate
its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished
according to the aforesaid.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then gluttony
admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that there should
likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do the
other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the other
moral virtues are not distinguished according to various circumstances.
Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony distinguished thus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), gluttony denotes inordinate
concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating,
namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly, the
inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with
regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or
species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"---i.e. costly food; as regards
its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely---i.e. "daintily"; and as
regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the
consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for
eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the due manner
of eating, by eating "greedily."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under one
heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in "what" he eats, or in
"how much," "how" or "when he eats."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes the various
species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by reason of
which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that
seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very species of the
food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is disordered through
impatience of delay, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Place and other circumstances include no special motive
connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In all other vices, whenever different circumstances
correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances argues a
specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all
circumstances, as stated above (FS, Q[72], A[9]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether gluttony is a capital vice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For capital
vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause, other vices
originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect
of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but for the body's
nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain pre-eminence
in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which, in respect of
its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin
to what is in respect of its genus, is apparently the least gluttony is
not a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the food of virtue on
account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing to the
senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there is but
one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly, there would
be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this is lust, which
is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater pleasures.
Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the
capital vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[84], A[3]), a capital vice denotes
one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a most
desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring that end
men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most
desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which is
desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to happiness,
according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8. Therefore the vice of gluttony, being
about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is
fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is true that food itself is directed to something as its
end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most desirable
and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food
too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil of man's life is
directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, "All the labor of man is for
his mouth." Yet gluttony seems to be about pleasures of food rather than
about food itself; wherefore, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii),
"with such food as is good for the worthless body, men desire to be fed,"
wherein namely the pleasure consists, "rather than to be filled: since
the whole end of that desire is this---not to thirst and not to hunger."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the
conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the
aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has the
most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and
consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital vices,
namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is
desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else: wherefore
seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desirability. Hence
there is but one capital vice, in respect of such things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to
gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness,
and dullness of mind as regards the understanding." For unseemly joy
results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, "Who are glad when they
have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Likewise dullness of
mind is associated with every sin, according to Prov. 14:22, "They err
that work evil." Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters
of gluttony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of
gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Is. 28:8,
"All tables were full of vomit and filth." But this seems to be not a sin
but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of counsel,
according to Ecclus. 31:25, "If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise,
go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee." Therefore it should not be
reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a
daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters
of gluttony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to
gluttony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2,3), gluttony consists properly
in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore those vices
are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of
eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on
the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on the part of the soul
these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the reason, whose
keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we
reckon as a daughter of gluttony, "dullness of sense in the
understanding," on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain.
Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the penetrating power
of wisdom, according to Eccles. 2:3, "I thought in my heart to withdraw
my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in wisdom." Secondly, as
regards the. appetite, which is disordered in many ways by immoderation
in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm,
and in this respect "unseemly joy" is reckoned, because all the other
inordinate passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic.
ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdra 3:20, that "wine . . .
gives every one a confident and joyful mind." Thirdly, as regards
inordinate words, and thus we have "loquaciousness," because as Gregory
says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless gluttons were carried away by immoderate
speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day
would not have been so tortured in his tongue." Fourthly, as regards
inordinate action, and in this way we have "scurrility," i.e. a kind of
levity resulting from lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle
the speech, but also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph.
5:4, "Or foolish talking or scurrility," says that "fools call this
geniality---i.e. jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh." Both
of these, however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be
sinful, either by reason of excess which belongs to "loquaciousness," or
by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may
refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities, or
especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3, "But
fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind of
incontinence that has reference to lust."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin,
especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous joy
which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from immoderate partaking
of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of sense as
regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas dullness of sense
in speculative matters arises chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much,
yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate meat or
drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sickness
if the physician prescribes it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[148] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from
the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be referred
to either vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] Out. Para. 1/1
OF SOBRIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness.
As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of sobriety?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?
(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to sobriety.
For it is written (Rm. 12:3): "Not to be more wise than it behooveth to
be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Therefore sobriety is also about
wisdom, and not only about drink.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis. 8:7)
that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence, and
justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for temperance. Now
temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual
matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from "measure"
[*'Bria,' a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's Lexicon]. Now
we ought to be guided by the measure in all things appertaining to us:
for it is written (Titus 2:12): "We should live soberly and justly and
godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in ourselves"; and (1 Tim. 2:9):
"Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and
sobriety." Consequently it would seem that sobriety regards not only the
interior man, but also things appertaining to external apparel.
Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): "Wine taken with
sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be
sober."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from some condition common
to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which it
is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of
virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about
pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from "measure," for a man
is said to be sober because he observes the "bria," i.e. the measure.
Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein /the
observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter is the
drinking of intoxicants, because the measured use thereof is most
profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since it
hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 31:37,38): "Sober drinking is health to soul and body;
wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins." For
this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of
drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb
the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may
be employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]; Q[141], A[2]) with regard to fortitude and
temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his body,
so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is said to be
an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its delight,
according to Ps. 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how goodly is
it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in speaking of the
contemplation of wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance are
necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore it
behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the business
of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to designate
temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than in other
things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety is
not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in those
wherein there is most need for a measure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special virtue.
For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there is no
special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about
drink, a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch as
sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make food,
since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. Therefore
sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink is
distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and of
drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly
there will be a special virtue corresponding to each different kind of
meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem that
sobriety is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety to be
a special part of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[146], A[2]), it belongs to moral
virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may
hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason, there
must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a
special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as it disturbs
the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this hindrance to
reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is requisite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good of
reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in this
respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicating
drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above, wherefore it
requires a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink,
considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not
follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of hindrance
to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears an
accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call for a
difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference of meats.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the use of wine is altogether unlawful. For
without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation: since it is
written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom,"
and further on (Wis. 9:19): "By wisdom they were healed, whosoever have
pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning." Now the use of wine is a
hindrance to wisdom, for it is written (Eccles. 2:3): "I thought in my
heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to
wisdom." Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 14:21): "It is good not to eat
flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is
offended or scandalized, or made weak." Now it is sinful to forsake the
good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren. Therefore it is
unlawful to make use of wine.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that "after the deluge
wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of the ages
and brought back the end into line with the beginning." Therefore it
seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23): "Do not still drink
water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy frequent
infirmities"; and it is written (Ecclus. 31:36): "Wine drunken with
moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful,
according to Mt. 15:11, "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a
man." Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may
become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance
on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the worse for
taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes
it results from the mode of drinking, because to wit he exceeds the
measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who would
be scandalized thereby.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general way,
according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it is
required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from
wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use. Secondly, a man may
have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in this way, in order to
receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for certain persons that they
abstain altogether from wine, and this depends on circumstances of
certain persons and places.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to
abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would give
scandal to certain people.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Christ withdraws us from some things as being altogether
unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to perfection. It is in the
latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim
at perfection, even as from riches and the like.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons of
greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing; wherefore
honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Lev. 19:32, "Rise
up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man." Now the
Apostle declares that old men especially should be exhorted to sobriety,
according to Titus 2:2, "That the aged man be sober." Therefore sobriety
is most requisite in persons of standing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and the
Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. 3:2, "It behooveth
. . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent,"
etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons of high standing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is
forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs: while it
is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, according to Prov.
31:4, "Give not wine to kings," and further on (Prov. 31:6), "Give strong
drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind."
Therefore sobriety is more requisite in persons of standing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11): "The women in like
manner, chaste . . . sober," etc., and (Titus 2:6) "Young men in like
manner exhort that they be sober."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the
contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads.
Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons for
two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the concupiscences
which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are removed
by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most requisite in the young and
in women, because concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the young on
account of the heat of youth, while in women there is not sufficient
strength of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius
Maximus [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank
no wine. Secondly, sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as
being more necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate
use of wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore
sobriety is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be
vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the
Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and
to kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[149] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] Out. Para. 1/1
OF DRUNKENNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the most grievous sin?
(4) Whether it excuses from sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether drunkenness is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every sin has a
corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to daring, and
presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness.
Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera Relig. xiv].
But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be deprived of the
use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself. Therefore,
if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a sin to ask a man
to drink that which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is not
applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4 where
Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of Canterbury]
says that "we must forbear with their ways, lest they become worse if
they be compelled to give up the habit." Therefore drunkenness is not a
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 13:13): "Not in rioting and
drunkenness."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it may
signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking much wine,
the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In this sense
drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect resulting from a fault.
Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which a man incurs this
defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two ways. In one way, through
the wine being too strong, without the drinker being cognizant of this:
and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, especially if it
is not through his negligence, and thus we believe that Noah was made
drunk as related in Gn. 9. In another way drunkenness may result from
inordinate concupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted a
sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a species under its genus. For
gluttony is divided into "surfeiting [Douay:,'rioting'] and drunkenness,"
which are forbidden by the Apostle (Rm. 13:13).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility
which is opposed to temperance "is not very common," so that like its
species which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no name.
Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a man were
knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting nature
grievously, he would not be free from sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This objection regards the resulting defect which is
involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is in
this that the sin consists.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the
strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink excused
from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of person to be
made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be lacking neither is
excused from sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be foregone, as
stated above (Q[33], A[6]). Hence Augustine says in a letter (Ad Aurel.
Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured not by bitterness,
severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than commanding, by advice
rather than threats. Such is the course to be followed with the majority
of sinners: few are they whose sins should be treated with severity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For Augustine
says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St.
Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is a
mortal sin." Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does not change
the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin infinitely, and
make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as shown above (FS, Q[88], A[5]).
Therefore if drunkenness /is not a mortal sin for some other reason,
neither is it for this.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St.
Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is
necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." Now the
lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is caused by
immoderate drink, is a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of
medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, that
they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink drunkenness
ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli, xlii):
"A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or gambling, or
incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon,
reader or precentor who does these things must either give them up or be
excommunicated; the same applies to the laity." Now such punishments are
not inflicted save for mortal sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing
Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now
this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the
drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness may be
without sin, as stated above (A[1]). Secondly, so that he perceives the
drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be intoxicating, and
then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly, it may happen that a
man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicating, and yet
he would rather be drunk than abstain from drink. Such a man is a
drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their species not from
things that occur accidentally and beside the intention, but from that
which is directly intended. In this way drunkenness is a mortal sin,
because then a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of
reason, whereby he performs virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he
sins mortally by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says
(De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i.]): "We learn that we should shun
drunkenness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the
things we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness."
Therefore drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on account of
the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible for a man to
become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunkenness
knowingly and willingly, since he has many times experienced the strength
of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to the
vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly to take
too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Drunkenness is far from me: Thou wilt
have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding sometimes hath
crept upon Thy servant."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[141], A[6]), meat and drink should be
moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's health. Wherefore,
just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which are moderate
for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too it may happen
conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for one
that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or drinks much at the
physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed
to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no need for
intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting, since this is caused by
drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no sufficient cause for
excusing a man from drunkenness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For
Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that "nothing gains the devil's
favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices." And
it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia):
"Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy,
for it foments and fosters all the vices."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of
reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of drunkenness.
Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its
punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for
Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no slavery,
were there no drunkards." Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual
vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the carnal
vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good.
Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil.
Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good.
Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver than the sin
of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such
like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this
reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not for
being graver than other sins, but because they occur more frequently
among men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way by
that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes away the
use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the
character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of reason for a
time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by drunkenness, may be
either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue, which are taken away by
things that are contrary to reason, are always good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so far
as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for having
laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery was not
the direct punishment of drunkenness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "the drunkard deserves double
punishment." Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excusing
from it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it. Now
drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as man's
reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But
concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot
was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated
above (A[1]), namely the resulting defect and the preceding act. on the
part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is fettered,
drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes an act to be
involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the preceding act, a
distinction would seem necessary; because, if the drunkenness that
results from that act be without sin, the subsequent sin is entirely
excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the
preceding act was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the
subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary through the
voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as it was through doing
something unlawful that he fell into the subsequent sin. Nevertheless,
the resulting sin is diminished, even as the character of voluntariness
is diminished. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that
"Lot's guilt is to be measured, not by the incest, but by his
drunkenness."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves
more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for his
twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of a
certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered "those guilty
of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than if they had been
sober, because they do wrong in more ways than one." In this, as
Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), "he seems to have considered the
advantage," namely of the prevention of wrong, "rather than the leniency
which one should have for drunkards," seeing that they are not in
possession of their faculties.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point of
its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that results from
it, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[150] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as
drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a man
insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it is
less grievous to sin through weakness than through malice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] Out. Para. 1/1
OF CHASTITY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2)
virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the contrary
vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether chastity is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a general virtue?
(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?
(4) Of its relation to purity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether chastity is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we are
treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs to the
body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain
way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore chastity
is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue is "a voluntary habit," as stated in Ethic. ii,
6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be taken away
by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that
chastity is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers
are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But chastity
is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chastity is not a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de
Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since
chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust, while
thou wishest thy wife to be victorious."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason
"chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue
consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above (FS,
Q[64], A[1]). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject,
though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a man
make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of
his reason and the choice of his will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long as her mind
holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in body,
not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of its
holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency." He also
says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there is a virtue which is the
companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer any evil
whatsoever rather than consent to evil."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is
impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it
possible to be just unless one live by faith." Whence he argues that in
unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue,
because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds
(Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from vices not by their
functions," i.e. their acts, "but by their ends."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in accordance
with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is reckoned
among the fruits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether chastity is a general virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For Augustine
says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the well-ordered
movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater
things." But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity is a
general virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" [*Cf. A[1]
]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised by
reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the
appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication
seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps. 72:27):
"Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go awhoring
from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee." Therefore chastity is a general
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be a
part of temperance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First,
properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, namely
the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word
"chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies
conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of chastity and
of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of the mind with
certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual
chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication
likewise metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the
spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united, namely
God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things against the
requirements of the order established by God, this may be called a
spiritual chastity, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have espoused you to one
husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ." If, on the
other hand, the mind be united to any other things whatsoever, against
the prescription of the Divine order, it will be called spiritual
fornication, according to Jer. 3:1, "But thou hast prostituted thyself
to many lovers." Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue,
because every virtue withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union
with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists
principally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the
human mind is united to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (A[1]; Q[142], A[2]), the concupiscence of
that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the
desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch
which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it is that if the
concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will
wax very strong, as in the case of a child left to his own will.
Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need
of being chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antonomastically
to such like concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters
wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication
metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as
stated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from
abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one virtue
suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same sense are
of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which are the
matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the matter of
chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity is not a distinct
virtue from abstinence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of
intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then
certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is
chastity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of
temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are the
matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter
of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the matter
of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf. Gratian,
Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, "Not given to wine, no striker,"
etc.: "The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors, that the
neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in vice."
Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5,6) reckons "chastity" together
with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[141], A[4]), temperance is properly
about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that where there
are different kinds of pleasure, there are different virtues comprised
under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions whose
perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5: and it is evident that
actions connected with the use of food whereby the nature of the
individual is maintained differ generically from actions connected with
the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature of the species is
preserved. Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a
distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures of the palate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as
regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch. which
judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as
regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Now
the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in character.
Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though they regard the
one sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more
oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore
they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one
consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and weakens the
strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider
that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its heights as the
fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married
state."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the
maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed to
pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no
other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of the palate,
though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are essentially directed
to the preservation of man's life: wherefore by their very nature they
have a special virtue, although this virtue which is called abstinence
directs its act to chastity as its end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to chastity.
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is a virtue of the
soul." Therefore it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of
itself a virtue distinct from chastity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "pudicitia" [purity] is derived from "pudor," which is
equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth.
ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all sinful
acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the other
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every kind
of intemperance is most deserving of reproach." Now it would seem to
belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore
purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not especially to
chastity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must give
praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a
lawful use the organs intended for procreation." Now the use of these
organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs
properly to chastity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ[2]), "pudicitia" [purity] takes its
name from "pudor," which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be
properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most
ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so
much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty [*Cf.
Q[145]] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this because the
movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the command of
reason, as are the movements of the other external members. Now man is
ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the signs thereof,
as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently purity regards
venereal matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as
impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont to
be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while chastity
regards rather sexual union. Therefore purity is directed to chastity,
not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of
chastity. Nevertheless the one is sometimes used to designate the other.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating
chastity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices of
intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (Q[142], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[151] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most
deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the
genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is
absorbed.
