OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian,
however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual and
appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge
of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our
consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be
divided into three parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are
a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly,
the appetitive powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The powers of the soul considered generally;
(2) The various species of the vegetative part;
(3) The exterior senses;
(4) The interior senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera
of powers in the soul---namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive,
locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its
parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned---namely,
the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Therefore
there are only three genera of powers in the soul, and not five.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its vital
operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): "In several ways a thing is said to
live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said to
live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly,
movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment." Therefore there
are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive is excluded.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as
regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to each
power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible object;
whence we read (Ecclus. 40:22): "The eye desireth favor and beauty, but
more than these green sown fields." In the same way every other power
desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive power should not
be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the moving principle in animals is sense, intellect or
appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore the
motive power should not be added to the above as a special genus of soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers are
the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion, and the
intellectual."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above
numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes of
living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being
distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the
operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the whole
corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its
matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation of the soul
which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed
by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of the "rational soul."
Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed
performed through a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality,
and this is the operation of the "sensitive soul"; for though hot and
cold, wet and dry, and other such corporeal qualities are required for
the work of the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the
operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only
for the proper disposition of the organ. The lowest of the operations of
the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue
of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the
corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an
extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic
principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul; since
every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of
the "vegetative soul"; for digestion, and what follows, is caused
instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima
ii, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their
objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object to
which it extends, as we have said above (Q[77], A[3], ad 4). But the
object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For
in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body that is
united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called "vegetative" for
the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united.
There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a
more universal object---namely, every sensible body, not only the body to
which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in the powers of
the soul, which genus regards a still more universal object---namely, not
only the sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is
evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation
in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but also to
something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be
united to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity
that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's
operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First,
inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united
to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are
two kinds of powers ---namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less
common object---the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard to
the most common object---universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as the soul
itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. And in
this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one---the
"appetitive"---in respect of which the soul is referred to something
extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the other---the
"locomotive" power---in respect of which the soul is referred to
something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for
every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and
intentions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living
things. There are some living things in which there exists only
vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the
vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power;
such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides
this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require many
things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessaries of
life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these
have intellectual power---namely, men. But the appetitive power does not
constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense
there is also appetite (De Anima ii, 3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The "natural appetite" is that inclination which each thing
has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural appetite
each power desires something suitable to itself. But the "animal
appetite" results from the form apprehended; this sort of appetite
requires a special power of the soul---mere apprehension does not
suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature, whereas
in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own nature, but
according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires
naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act only---namely, for
the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive power desires the
thing seen, not merely for the purpose of seeing it, but also for other
purposes. But if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses,
except on account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose
of sensing them; there would be no need for a special genus of appetitive
powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although sense and appetite are principles of movement in
perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not sufficient to
cause movement, unless another power be added to them; for immovable
animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not the power of
motion. Now this motive power is not only in the appetite and sense as
commanding the movement, but also in the parts of the body, to make them
obey the appetite of the soul which moves them. Of this we have a sign in
the fact that when the members are deprived of their natural disposition,
they do not move in obedience to the appetite.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the
nutritive, augmentative, and generative?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not
fittingly described---namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and
generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of the
soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class the
above forces as powers of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to
that which is common to living and non-living things. But generation is
common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living
or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be classed as a
power of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by
the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, does the
soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from
the generative power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it
exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing exists.
Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the
nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing (De
Anima ii, 4), being "a power which is capable of preserving whatever
receives it." Therefore we should not distinguish the nutritive power
from the generative.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the
operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf. De
Anima iii, 9) "growth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative
part, as we have said (A[1]), has for its object the body itself, living
by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required.
One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the
"generative" power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its due
quantity; to this is directed the "augmentative" power. Another is
whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in
its due quantity; to this is directed the "nutritive" power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive
and the augmentative have their effect where they exist, since the body
itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and
nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But the generative
power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a
thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way,
approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation
extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more
universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature
approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear
by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the
generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is
already perfect to "produce another like unto itself." And the generative
power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the
augmentative power by the nutritive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Such forces are called natural, both because they produce
an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity and
preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more
perfect way); and because those forces perform their actions
instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the
principles of natural actions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an
extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher
way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen
containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be
in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the
generative power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it
is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated.
For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought
to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated from
determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once
its nature and its quantity, according to the condition of the matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As we have said above (A[1]), the operation of the
vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which
is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus
lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into
the substance of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the
augmentative and generative powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. But
there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished
by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to
the number of the kinds of accidents.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called
"common sensibles," are "not sensibles by accident," but are
contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now
the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since,
therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it
seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power than can
grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards
white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries; such
as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single
sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is
a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense
of touch.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is no
other besides the five senses."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, The reason of the distinction and number of the senses
has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the
elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been
assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic and
is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the
various natures of the sensible qualities, according as such quality
belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. But none of these
explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the
organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the
reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has
nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to
various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the
various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of the powers.
And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain
to the senses, but to the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 2/5
The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must
therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and
"per se." Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the
exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is
what is "per se" perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity
of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 3/5
Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual.
Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received
according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is
received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place
by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode
of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received
into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the
operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an
intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ.
Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action,
all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 4/5
But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in "sight"
while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural immutation;
either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the
organ. On the part of the object we find natural immutation, as to
place, in sound which is the object of "hearing"; for sound is caused by
percussion and commotion of air: and we find natural immutation by
alteration, in odor which is the object of "smelling"; for in order to
exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part
of an organ, natural immutation takes place in "touch" and "taste"; for
the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is
moistened by the humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of
smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by
any natural immutation unless indirectly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 5/5
Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ
or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most
universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the
smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the object;
while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the
motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch
and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction of which we
shall speak later on (ad 3,4). Hence it is that the three other senses
are not exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural
immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but
only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of
alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the
senses; because "the senses are affected by the same things whereby
inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii, 2.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common
sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper
sensibles," which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles
first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are
qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all
reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are
species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. Shape is a
quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the
bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the
subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject
or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion,
or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in
the movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a
way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate subject
of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore
the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own
nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason
of color. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a
certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted
differently by a large and by a small surface: since whiteness itself is
said to be great or small, and therefore it is divided according to its
proper subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11), the
sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific
senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which
senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ, but
are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not
evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, accompanies
touch in the tongue, but not in the whole body; so it is easily
distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties
agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a common genus, which is
the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however,
unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The sense of taste, according to a saying of the
Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue
only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species
of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on
account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is
distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality of
immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a spiritual,
immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper
object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural
immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that
the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by reason of a quality
which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavor, which quality
is moisture, the object of touch.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably
distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper.
Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior
sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of
apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the proper
and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things; for each
sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice
for the perception of their own actions; for since the action of the
sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it seems that sight
must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as being nearer to it,
than the color; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for
this there is no need to assign an interior power, called the common
sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. i),
the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first sensitive." But
passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and
imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power
of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what it
receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that "those who
lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." Therefore much less should we
assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the "estimative"
power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in
comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, which
consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is
not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative
powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the
imagination. Therefore either we must add the cognitive and reminiscitive
to the estimative and memorative powers, or the estimative and memorative
powers should not be made distinct from the imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7,24) describes three
kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the sense;
spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and
intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no
interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior
sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the
estimative and memorative powers."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must
needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the
life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to
the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a
power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the
soul's operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Body Para. 2/5
Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal
should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but
also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow
apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent: the
contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are
moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended
and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only
receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by
them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and
retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist
things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the
reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act
of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the
species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which
preserves them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Body Para. 3/5
Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and
disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need
to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those
forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure,
or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to
avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to
the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or
disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on
account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy: and again a bird
gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but
because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need
to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive.
And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception
of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is
not the case with the perception of those intentions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Body Para. 4/5
Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper sense"
and the "common sense" are appointed, and of their distinction we shall
speak farther on (ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of
these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" is appointed; which are the
same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms
received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of
intentions which are not received through the senses, the "estimative"
power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the "memorative"
power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we
have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some
such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And
the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned
among these intentions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] Body Para. 5/5
Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference
between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the
extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions:
for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural
instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas.
Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the natural
estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some sort of
collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the
"particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain particular
organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual
intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal
intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other
animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also
"reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection
of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna,
however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth
power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the
imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the
one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this
operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the
imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute
this action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no
need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive
part---namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and
memorative powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The interior sense is called "common" not by predication,
as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the
exterior senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by
discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for
instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor
taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between two
things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned
to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of
the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of
the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this
cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the
sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight
is completed, and from immutation follows another in the common sense
which perceives the act of vision.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as
we have seen above (Q[77], A[7]), so also the soul is the subject of one
power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are
called passions of the "first sensitive."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in
the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the
intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like
manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their
excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a
certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to
speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but
the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[78] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by
the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear that it
is common to all interior apprehensions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head
there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?
(2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?
(3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?
(4) Whether it is something in the soul?
(5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?
(6) Whether memory is in the intellect?
(7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?
(8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?
(9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?
(10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?
(11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers?
(12) Whether "synderesis" is a power of the intellectual part?
(13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but
the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the
mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for
Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not relative
things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the
essence of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in
some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive
and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in the mind, for
Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind.
Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the very essence of the
soul and not a power thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension
(xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels are called
"minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not
a power of the soul, but the soul itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is
immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore it
seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a
power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In accordance with what has been already shown (Q[54],
A[3]; Q[77], A[1]) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power
of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the
essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation,
when operation itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its
act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of
understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect
His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is
power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for
the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief
power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is
sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we read (De
Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also
Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv,
16).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera
of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their
objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual
power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either
through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows
apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind; and
the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the angels there is no other power besides the
intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason
an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power
consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the
sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is
not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power of
intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the
substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellect is a passive power?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For
everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the
intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent
substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said
above (Q[79], A[6]). But "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible"
(De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all the
powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among
the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual
powers, which are the highest, are active.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to
understand is in a way to be passive."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its
most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to
it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when
water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad.
Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something,
whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way
not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed;
not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he
be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be
passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something
receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of
anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may
be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to
understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For
the intellect, as we have seen above (Q[78], A[1]), has an operation
extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect
be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the
relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect
whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and
such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which
originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And
therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act.
But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal
being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every
created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of
its very existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a
potentiality to act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality
which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of the heavenly
bodies (Q[58], A[1]). And there is another potentiality which is not
always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in
things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect
is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by
reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we
have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the
order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine
intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is
at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact,
that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards
we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to
understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third
sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection is verified of passion in the first and
second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense
passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the
sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite
is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason"
(Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the
cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each
case "passive" may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch as this
so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect
which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this
reason Aristotle calls the "possible" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not
passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal
organ. Hence it is incorruptible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the
passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to
different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the
whole universal being: while the vegetative power is active in regard to
some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore
nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active
one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is an active intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the
senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things
intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible,
the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since
our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we
cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something
active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight,
inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its
own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the
intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act.
Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient
according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect is an
immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to
be received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from
the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an
active intellect to make the species actually intelligible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every
nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things,
and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must admit an
active intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for
an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; but
perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will
be explained farther on (A[4]). For Plato supposed that the forms of
natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they
are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible from the very
fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms "species or ideas";
from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was
formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their
proper genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by such
participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of
things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things
exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually
intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things
which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced
from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as
made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the
part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by
abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the
necessity for an active intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and
hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in
the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive
part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something
active and something passive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some
say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually
visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for
understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as light is
required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for
sight; not for the colors to become actually visible; but in order that
the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De
Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active
intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for
understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its
likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their
dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the
recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible in act
is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things
sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order
to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would
not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes
things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the
soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light for the
purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the
soul: according to Jn. 1:9, "He was the true light that enlighteneth
every man coming into this world." Therefore the active intellect is not
something in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active
intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not
understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it
understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active
intellect is not something in our soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the
passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something belonging to
the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an active power: it
follows that a man would always be able to understand when he wished,
which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something
in our soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active
intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can be in
potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the
passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all things intelligible,
is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to
be also something in our soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it
must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since habits
and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity
of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the passive power;
while habit is something which results from acts. But every power flows
from the essence of the soul. It would therefore follow that the active
intellect flows from the essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in
the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: which is
unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is
necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active
intellect, "to be in the soul."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is
something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe
that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior
intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For
what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect
always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such,
immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by
reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that
it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to
the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning
and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it
does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it
does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must
needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the
active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes
them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of
such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign
to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by
which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in
other perfect natural things, besides the universal active causes, each
one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal
causes: for the sun alone does not generate man; but in man is the power
of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now
among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul.
Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a
higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we
know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal
forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually
intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some
principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive
intellect (Q[76], A[1]). Therefore the power which is the principle of
this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De
Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something
received into the air: while Plato compared the separate intellect
impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on
De Anima iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of
our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude;
as will be shown later on (Q[90], A[3]; FS, Q[3], A[7]). Wherefore the
human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7,
"The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which
the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher says those words not of the active
intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said:
"Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those words
to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to
the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not
understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were
that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the visible
in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things
instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in
act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that
whereby the objects are made to be in act: for which, besides the
presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms,
the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort
of operation; since through one thing understood, other things come to be
understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first
principles, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether
the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something
separate from the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it
is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are
actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality.
Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is
actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually
immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter:
which power is called the "active intellect"; and another power,
receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by
reason of its being in potentiality to such species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the
supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the
supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the
essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the active intellect is one in all?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what
is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of
bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the Philosopher says
(De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many human
bodies, but is one for all men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal,
which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still more
itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to
these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all agree in one
active intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active
intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things
enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have
already said (A[4]). For if the active intellect were not something
belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be
one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold
that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect
is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to
say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which
are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above
(Q[76], A[2]). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various
substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is
separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, as
he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than the patient."
Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the
act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is
also called "separate"; but not as a separate substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by
abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same
intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its
relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal,
with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the
active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All things which are of one species enjoy in common the
action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the
power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be
identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the
action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common
the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the
active intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet
it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by
all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the
separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of
the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the
soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the higher part of
the soul belongs those things which are not "common to man and beast."
But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8)
that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body,
and commit them to memory." Therefore memory does not belong to the
intellectual part of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something
with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a
condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions
of "here" and "now." But this is not the province of the intellect, but
of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only
in the sensitive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things
of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in the
intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the
intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act
implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually
understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the memory
is not in the intellectual part.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory,
understanding, and will are one mind."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the
species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must first
of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in
the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For he
admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers,
inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species
may be preserved apart from actual apprehension. But in the intellect,
which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists.
Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must
be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we
cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases
to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we
must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate
substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again
into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to
the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain
aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect;
which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to
this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is
not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit
memory in the intellectual part.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he
says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is identified
with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and that "this
happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in
potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and
discovering." Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing,
inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the
fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it
owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be
always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense,
though otherwise than before the act of understanding---namely, in the
sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual
consideration.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received
into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient.
But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than
corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which
it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but
also after ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there
for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly,
whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some
superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power
of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part.
But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past,
then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive
part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it
signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not
common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the
sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united:
since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in
itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal
organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "the soul is
the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The condition of past may be referred to two
things---namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of
knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which
apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present
sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed
before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as
concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in
itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect
understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he
exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the
condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the
intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of
understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time,
inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow.
And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an
act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial
act, as we have said above of the intellect (Q[76], A[1]); and therefore,
as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual
intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an
individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the
notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in
the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood:
but not in the sense that it understands the past as something "here" and
"now."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only
in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality.
Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the
ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And
sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between
potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way
the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in
act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the
intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul memory,
understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct
power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the
sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in the
sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (Q[78], A[4]).
Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory,
understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the
other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power.
Therefore they are not the same power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the treasury or
storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this
to the intellect, as we have said (A[6], ad 1). Therefore the memory is
not another power from the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As has been said above (Q[77], A[3]), the powers of the
soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects:
since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is
directed and which is its object. It has also been said above (Q[59],
A[4]) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according
to the common ratio of the object, that power will not be differentiated
according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power
of sight, which regards its object under the common ratio of color, is
not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect
regards its object under the common ratio of being: since the passive
intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality." Wherefore the
passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being.
Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active
intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same
object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be
distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in
act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is
to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary,
is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act.
Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect,
but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not
a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a
passive power to retain as well as to receive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect,
and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of
Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory,
intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually
attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by
intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking;
and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its
parent." Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above
three for three powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of
retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the
act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers,
but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in
this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the
intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to
rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then
imagination, then reason, then the intellect." Therefore the reason is
distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is
compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the
same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and
intellect are not the same power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense
in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he
is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is
it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which
properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in
which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence
or whatever appropriate name we like to give it." Therefore, reason,
intellect and mind are one power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers.
We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions.
For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to
reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know
an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their
nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to
advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and
without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man
arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one
thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning,
therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or
acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other
to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something
immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human
reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things
simply understood---namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of
judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which
it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are
not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in
natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a
certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand
and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the
same power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That enumeration is made according to the order of actions,
not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of
great authority.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is
compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the
intellect to eternity, and reason to time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot
attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains,
although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which
angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a
different genus fro that which is in the human reason, but is compared to
it as the perfect to the imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct
powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image of the
Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But
the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower
reason are two powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows
from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the higher
reason is another power from the lower.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the
scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things,
is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative" and
"reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this
from the principle that for those things which are "generically
different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained." Now
contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and
incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and
temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls
the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason, which,
according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration
and consultation of things eternal"; and that what the Philosopher calls
the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as the lower reason,
which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the disposal of temporal
things." Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion rises
from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or error of
the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's (mind) "is derived from"
metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore the intellect regards those things
which are already subject to judgment and true decision." Therefore the
opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind
and the intellect, by which we may understand the higher reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and
lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore they are
not two powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by
Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that "the
higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and
consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it sees
them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from
them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent on the disposal
of temporal things." Now these two---namely, eternal and temporal ---are
related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of
knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of
temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the
Apostle (Rm. 1:20), "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made": while by way of judgment, from
eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according
to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to
different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the
habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them
belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the
principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science---for
example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both
medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were,
a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes
through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower
reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are
distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their
various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to
the lower.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And
so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and
lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be
ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are
drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is
not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found even
among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat.
And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part is more limited than the
lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say,
without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows
necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent
things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect---namely,
under the aspect of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows
necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates
to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents.
On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch
as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in
the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the
mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the
habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser
parts of the soul---namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not
because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a
different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the variety
of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing
according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect
of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously
compared as perfect and imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[9] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: That distinction given by Damascene is according to the
variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For "opinion"
signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a
contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or "measure"
[mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to
examine propositions. From this is taken the word "mens" [mind]. Lastly,
to "understand" is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the
intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise
from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then
imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence."
But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect
and intelligence are distinct.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense considers
man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence
in another." But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore,
seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is
a distinct power from imagination or sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher says
(De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from others
attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
"the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which
is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and
conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and
invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of
itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated
makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say,
comes speech expressed by the tongue." Therefore it seems that
intelligence is some special power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that
"intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false."
But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore
intelligence is not another power than the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, This word "intelligence" properly signifies the
intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works
translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels
are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that such
substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated
from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds." Thus
intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but
as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the
philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects---namely, the
"active" and "passive" intellects, the intellect "in habit," and the
"actual" intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are
different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from
the passive. But three of these are distinct, as three states of the
passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it
is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge,
and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the
second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act,
or actual intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the
act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as act
against power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the
intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says
that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone
belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without
any investigation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one
power---namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only
apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence." Secondly, it
directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some
operation; and this is called "intention." And when it goes on in search
of what it "intends," it is called "invention." When, by reference to
something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to
know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it
belongs to the wise man to judge," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i,
2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully
examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and
this is the ordering of "interior speech," from which proceeds "external
speech." For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but
only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said
above (Q[78], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are
distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of
powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is
merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive
power. Therefore they are distinct powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the
power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," and of the
practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative
and practical intellect are distinct powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is
compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative
power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the
imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above (Q[78], A[4]).
Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes
practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another.
Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct
powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[11] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct
powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above (Q[77], A[3]),
what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not
differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing colored to be
man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by
the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it
is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not, and according
to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the
speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation,
but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that
which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from
the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one
speculative, the other practical---i.e. operative.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing
movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according
to its mode of apprehension.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is something
good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true,
otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the
appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for
example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the
practical intellect is good directed to the operation, and under the
aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the
speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which
do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above (A[7]
, ad 2; Q[77], A[3], ad 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the
others?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power, distinct from
the others. For those things which fall under one division, seem to be of
the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. 1:6, "synderesis" is
divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which
are powers. Therefore "synderesis" is a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But "synderesis"
and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because "synderesis"
always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence
it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii,
12,13). It seems, therefore, that 'synderesis' is a power just as
sensuality is.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the natural
power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of virtue, both true
and unchangeable." And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore,
the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to the reason as
to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that
"synderesis" is the same as reason: and thus it is a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2),
"rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not
regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is
not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since
it is not found in brute animals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[12] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some held
that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf. Alexander of
Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q[73]] said that it is reason itself, not as
reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe
that, as we have said above (A[8]), man's act of reasoning, since it is a
kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain
things---namely, those which are naturally known without any
investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle---and
ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles
naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by
reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about
speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical
things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only
speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first
speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a
special power, but to a special habit, which is called "the understanding
of principles," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the
first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a
special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call
"synderesis." Whence "synderesis" is said to incite to good, and to
murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to
discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear
that "synderesis" is not a power, but a natural habit.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of
acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can belong to
one power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to "syneresis"
is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of one genus.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those unchangeable notions are the first practical
principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to
reason as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore we
judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether conscience be a power?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says
[*Commentary on Rm. 2:15] that "conscience is a correcting and guiding
spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made
to cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a power---either
the mind itself, according to the text (Eph. 4:13), "Be ye renewed in the
spirit of your mind"---or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is
called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore
conscience is a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul.
But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that "their
mind and conscience are defiled" (Titus 1:15). Therefore it seems that
conscience is a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit,
or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always exist in
man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since
we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Therefore
conscience is a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be
laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act.
This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in
the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience,
according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of
knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio
scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case. But the
application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore from
this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] Body Para. 2/2
The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to
conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and
also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application
of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is made in three
ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done
something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of
others" (Eccles. 7:23), and according to this, conscience is said to
witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that
something should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is
said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we
judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense
conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that
all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we
do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But
since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given
to the first natural habit---namely, 'synderesis': thus Jerome calls
'synderesis' conscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil [*Hom. in princ.
Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth.
iv. 22] says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary
for causes and effects to be called after one another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same
as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject, but
as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is defiled.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[79] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it
always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits
by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their
efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is
called "synderesis." And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes
called conscience, as we have said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)
Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four
heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general; second,
sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the
soul?
(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and
sensitive as distinct powers?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the
soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which
are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to
animate and inanimate things: since "all desire good," as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we
desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not
distinct from the apprehensive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each
power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing---namely its
own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the
desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power distinct
from the others, called the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the
appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22)
distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the
soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows
every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to
generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect
existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which
lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to
determine each thing only to its own being---that is, to its nature.
Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which
is called the natural appetite. But in those things which have knowledge,
each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in
such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other
things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible,
and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man
is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those
things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in
Whom all things pre-exist," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a
higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in
them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called
the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the
appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire
what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its
natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the
common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above.
Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in
reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something
sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now,
it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity,
which demands a diversity of powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a
natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the
natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which
natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension,
and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power,
such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to
the animal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are
not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by accidental
differences, as we have seen above (Q[77], A[3]). But it is accidental to
the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the
intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not
distinct powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it is
distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things. But
there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part: for since
the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things, seemingly
every act of the appetite regards an individual thing. Therefore the
intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the sensitive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is
subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the motive
power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive
power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like reason,
neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a
double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite
moves the lower.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a
distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is a
passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended:
wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while
the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii,
10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and movable are
differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active
and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the
movable, and the active to the passive: indeed, the passive power itself
has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore,
since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by
sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite
is distinct from the sensitive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended
by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this belongs to it by its
nature; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is
apprehended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of
themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are
distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as their
proper objects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[80] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual
things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing under
the universal; as when it desires something because it is good.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred can regard a
universal, as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the same way by the
intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial good, which is not
apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)
Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?
(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct
powers?
(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sensuality is only appetitive?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also
cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the sensual
movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to
us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers.
Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one
genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality against the
higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality
also is apprehensive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of
the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the serpent
presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which
belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things
belonging to the body."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual
movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the
name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing.
Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension.
For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a
movement as the act of the appetite: since the operation of the
apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing
apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the
appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne
towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive
power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the appetitive power
is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we
understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is
the name of the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed
to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand that the
bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of
sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire
things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the
bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as
having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive
power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as
is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also
incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by
the serpent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and
concupiscible as distinct powers?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the
irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the
soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and
white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and
harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what
is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it
seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable
according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible
power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the
concupiscible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on Mt.
13:33: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power." But
hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore
the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive
appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is
called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species
of the sensitive appetite---the irascible and the concupiscible. In order
to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things
there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is
suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance
against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the
acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For
example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower
position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is
suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action.
Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following
sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following
the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two
appetitive powers---one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek
what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is
hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an
animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict
harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is
something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above
obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for
sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the
inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the
impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles.
Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the
passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being
aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes
concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the
irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible
when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable
things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm,
from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions
of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible
appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness,
and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the
quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible---namely, food and
sex, as the Philosopher says [*De Animal. Histor. viii.].
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and
what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to resist
the onslaught of the unsuitable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there
is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress
the senses, as we have said above (Q[78], A[2]); so also in the sensitive
appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as
suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to
the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by
reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the
irascible appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do
not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts of
sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is
signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13).
Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the
irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to the
Apostle (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting against the
law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do
not obey reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part
of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of
the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we
wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive
appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the part of
the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into
concupiscence and anger."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey
the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will;
first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in
their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is
naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming
the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have
said above (Q[78], A[4]), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is
called by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual
intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by
this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally
guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in
syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal
propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the
sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible;
and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions
from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but
of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said
to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can
experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal
considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which
is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement
follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance,
the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior
counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once,
according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the
command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there
is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue
of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause
movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the
lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way,
therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper
to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible powers
denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which
they are led by the reason, as we have said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in an
animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the
body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a
politic and royal power." For a power is called despotic whereby a man
rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders
of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But
that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free
subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have
nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist
the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body
by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way
resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and
foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are
moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible
and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has
something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of
reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the
estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power
which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense.
Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible
powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something
pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And
so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in
something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[81] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible
things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled
by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do
not require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of
reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the
appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)
We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?
(2) Whether it desires anything of necessity?
(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?
(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?
(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will desires something of necessity?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not voluntary.
But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the
will desires is desired of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational
power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in the
reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it
is determined to nothing of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we
are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the
will cannot be necessitated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire
happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but contingent,
there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires
something of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For that
which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by
an intrinsic principle---either material, as when we say that everything
composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible---or formal, as when
we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be
equal to two right angles. And this is "natural" and "absolute
necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason
of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part
of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well
attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a
horse is necessary for a journey. This is called "necessity of end," and
sometimes also "utility." On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when
someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the
contrary. This is called "necessity of coercion."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For
we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But the
very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a
thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of
nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the
inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing
to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a
thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot
be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea,
arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.
Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the
first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end,
which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the
principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally
and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining
thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and
every movement arises from something immovable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the
necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away the
liberty of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally,
corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to
the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect
it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being
able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but "the
means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the
desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are
masters.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity,
whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is
outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will tends of necessity to
the good which is proposed to it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the
mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable necessarily
follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of
necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the
sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the
object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what
is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity:
for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by
things seen." Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the
intellect moves the will of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by
which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite things.
Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it
desires.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it
desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the
intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so
the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (A[1]). Now
there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection
with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of
which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the
intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions
which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as
demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the
first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when
once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with
the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the
demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the
same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not
a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be
happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are
some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of
which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists.
Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the
necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of
necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man
who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we
desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does
not desire of necessity whatever it desires.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of
good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not
of necessity determined to one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing
movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that
its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the
will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not
subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity
moved by it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sensitive power does not compare different things with
each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one thing.
Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite
in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several
things together: therefore from several things the intellectual
appetite---that is, the will---may be moved; but not of necessity from
one thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect.
For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first
and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress
from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of
the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the
act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect.
Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections
to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the
will---namely, charity---is more noble than the habits which perfect the
intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should know all
mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am
nothing." Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher
power than the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The superiority of one thing over another can be
considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is
considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but
relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the
intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the
intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their
respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is
more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the
object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the
appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of
the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the
nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the
intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the
proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that
the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the
will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that
the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the
object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs
the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing
is relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is
sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color is
nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above (Q[16], A[1];
Q[27], A[4]), the action of the intellect consists in this---that the
idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act
of the will consists in this---that the will is inclined to the thing
itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in
Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the
will, "are in things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the
intellect, "are in the mind." When, therefore, the thing in which there
is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood;
by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the intellect.
But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even
in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will.
Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on
the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love
thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing
to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be
nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the
idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something true. But, again,
truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth
its end. And among other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the
intellect among the other powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less
perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, and
imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the
order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And
in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes
the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive; for good which
is understood moves the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with what
is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will moves the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what
moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent,
and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). But the intellect
excels and precedes the will, as we have said above (A[3]). Therefore the
will does not move the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps
accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good
apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the
appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If,
therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to
understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the
intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and
so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not
move the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our
power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our power by
the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end;
for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the
intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of
the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an
agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what
is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers
of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is,
because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that
power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard
particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things
politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of
things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies,
each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the
individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole
kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom
rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good
and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good
proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the
intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves
all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural
powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as
apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a
particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will
may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its
object---that is to say, as appetitive of universal good---and as a
determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore,
the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the
universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above
(A[3]), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If,
however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object
and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher
and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is
contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore
the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as
it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are
contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the
will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the
intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and
its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of
good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the
will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can
easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts,
because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills
the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth,
inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it
is a desired good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will
moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at
the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will
must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not
preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and
understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect
---namely, God---as also Aristotle says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in
this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the
superior appetite?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and
concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For the
concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" [to desire], and the
irascible part from "irasci" [to be angry]. But there is a concupiscence
which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the
intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which
it is said (Ws. 6:21): "The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the
eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to
the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger
is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on Mt. 13:33 warns
us "to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part." Therefore we
should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual
soul as well as in the sensitive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible,
and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the sensitive
appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual.
Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible power to the
intellectual part.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul has
these powers"---namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and
rational---"before it is united to the body." But no power of the
sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body
united, as we have said above (Q[78], AA[5],8). Therefore the irascible
and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual
appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says "that
the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and
irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while in
the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or "desire
and animus."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said
above (Q[59], A[4]; Q[79], A[7]), a power which is directed to an object
according to some common notion is not differentiated by special
differences which are contained under that common notion. For instance,
because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of
something colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the
different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding white as
white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power
regarding black as black.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good,
because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the
parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different
notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it
the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to
nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something
that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good
according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which
is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive
powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power
distinct from a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the
intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on
the part of the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two
ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions---arising, that is, with a
certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and
in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may, however,
be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without
passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And
in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if
taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to
one power, which is called the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it
wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but from
a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be
concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in the
irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the will
as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand the
words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible
powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we
understand priority of nature, and not of time), although there is no
need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third
objection is clear.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] Out. Para. 1/1
OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man has free-will?
(2) What is free-will---a power, an act, or a habit?
(3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?
(4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man has free-will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has
free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is
written (Rm. 7:19): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil
which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to
will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for it is
written (Rm. 9:16): "It is not of him that willeth"---namely, to
will---"nor of him that runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has not
free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the Philosopher
says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But
God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. 21:1): "The heart of the
king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it"
and (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to
accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But
man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jer. 10:23):
"The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk." Therefore
man has not free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each
one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our power to be
of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it
is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not
free in so doing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the
beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss
adds: "That is of his free-will."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations,
commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In
order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without
judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which
lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as
brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be
shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not
from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said
of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by
his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or
sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is
not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the
reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of
being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may
follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical
arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in
such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is
not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary
that man have a free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As we have said above (Q[81], A[3], ad 2), the sensitive
appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by
desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man
does not when he wishes---namely, "not to desire against reason," as
Augustine says.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though
man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the
free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his
free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong
to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as
neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause.
God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and
voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their
acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive
their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very
thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of his
choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice
itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious.
Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body
and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue
of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally
desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a
natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we
have said above (Q[82], AA[1],2). But on the part of the body and its
powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is
of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever
produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part,
since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by
virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him,
because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject
something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason,
which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (Q[81], A[3]). Wherefore
this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 2/2
The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a
man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these
inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too,
are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them,
whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject
them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether free-will is a power?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is
nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a
power. Therefore free-will is not a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and
reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a
habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia
et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of disposing of
itself." Therefore it is not a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will
is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by abusing
free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is not a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a
habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it
chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium---i.e. free
judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of
speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by
which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power
and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the
intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a power or a
habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power
together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all,
because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural
to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with
respect to those things which come under free-will: for we are naturally
inclined to those things of which we have natural habits---for instance,
to assent to first principles: while those things which we are naturally
inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the desire of
happiness (Q[82], AA[1],2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of
free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a
non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a
habit.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of
which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions"
(Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards
concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are
well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by
the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good and
evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit.
Therefore it is a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And
so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is
the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it
would not always remain in man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation,
and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will. But
Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a
certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And
this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it
were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well
or ill.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not
as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards
freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the
treatise on Morals in the second part of this work (FS, Q[85], seqq.;
Q[109]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether free-will is an appetitive power?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a
cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that
"free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason is a
cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free
judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore
free-will is a cognitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But
choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain
comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power.
Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is
"the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act of the
appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by
which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we
have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another;
and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of
free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in
choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of
the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is
required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on
the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should
accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves
it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the
cognitive power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive
intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines
to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a
desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of this is because the
proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in
the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as
such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is
principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an
appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in
this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the
rational power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now
counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the
acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says
that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with
that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which
free-will takes its name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to
the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite
does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the
apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison
by choosing one in preference to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will.
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that {thelesis} is one thing
and {boulesis} another. But {thelesis} is the will, while {boulesis}
seems to be the free-will, because {boulesis}, according to him, is will
as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things.
Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the
act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because "the act
of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end"
(Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the
intellect there are two powers---the active and the passive. Therefore,
also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another
power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will.
Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is
nothing else than the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the
apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q[64], A[2]). Now, as on the
part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on
the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which
is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their
relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of
"understanding" implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we
say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves
without any comparison. But to "reason," properly speaking, is to come
from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking,
we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like
manner on the part of the appetite to "will" implies the simple appetite
for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is
desired for itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake
of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the
means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are
related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the
principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the
means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident
that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of
choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q[79], A[8])
that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even
as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement.
Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on
this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: {Boulesis} is distinct from {thelesis} on account of a
distinction, not of powers, but of acts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Choice and will---that is, the act of willing ---are
different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand
and to reason, as we have said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[83] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will.
And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a
passive will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] Out. Para. 1/5
HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS
BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the
intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the soul
do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian.
Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the
consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them
in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral
matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat
now.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] Out. Para. 2/5
In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order:
First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body;
secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] Out. Para. 3/5
The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul
understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands itself
and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial
substances, which are above it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] Out. Para. 4/5
In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points
to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul know them? (2) How and
in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] Out. Para. 5/5
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?
(2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any
species?
(3) If through some species, whether the species of all things
intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?
(4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate
immaterial forms?
(5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands?
(6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?
(7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is
possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?
(8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in
the sensitive powers?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the
intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that "bodies cannot be
understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can
be perceived by the senses." He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) that
intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their
essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies
through the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect to
the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the senses,
understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no
means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are
necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable.
Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the
intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of
bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, It should be said in order to elucidate this question,
that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things,
thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And because they
observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them to be ever in a
state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge
of the true nature of things. For what is in a continual state of flux,
cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, for it passes away ere
the mind can form a judgment thereon: according to the saying of
Heraclitus, that "it is not possible twice to touch a drop of water in a
passing torrent," as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our
knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides these
things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from matter
and movement, which beings he called "species" or "ideas," by
participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is
said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said that
sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of the
intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those beings
immaterial and separate: so that according to this the soul does not
understand these corporeal things, but the separate species thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because, since
those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of movement and
matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to
natural science), and likewise all demonstration through moving and
material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek for
knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to introduce other beings,
which cannot be the substance of those others, since they differ from
them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowledge of those
separate substances, we cannot for that reason claim to form a judgment
concerning these sensible things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed
that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he
thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the
knower in the same manner as in the thing known. Then he observed that
the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of
universality, immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from the
very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding has a
universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for
the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent's form. Wherefore
he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves
an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is to
be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another:
for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less
intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another
without sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is conditioned
differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses
which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such
as the color of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect,
according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and
immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received
is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver. We must
conclude, therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by
a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring
to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. For the
intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies,
nor through material and corporeal species; but through immaterial and
intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not correct
to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows only
spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels would not know
corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that the lower power
does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power; whereas
the higher power operates in a more excellent manner those things which
belong to the lower power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a
change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there
is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the
various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable; for
instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable
truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason
there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through
its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul "collects
and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of
the soul: for in forming them it gives them something of its own
substance." But the soul understands bodies by images of bodies.
Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it employs for
the formation of such images, and from which it forms them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that "the soul,
after a fashion, is everything." Since, therefore, like is known by like,
it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now lower
things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in themselves, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist
in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves. Therefore the
soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind gathers
knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses." But the soul
itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not
know corporeal things through itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies
through its essence. For it was universally admitted that "like is known
by like." But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the
knower in the same mode as in the thing known. The Platonists however
were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the
intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an immaterial mode of
knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist immaterially.
While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are
corporeal and material, held that things known must exist materially even
in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to the
soul a knowledge of all things, they held that it has the same nature in
common with all. And because the nature of a result is determined by its
principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that
those who thought fire to be the principle of all, held that the soul had
the nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly,
Empedocles, who held the existence of our four material elements and two
principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these.
Consequently, since they held that things exist in the soul materially,
they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is material, thus failing
to discern intellect from sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material principle
of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save in
potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in
potentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown Metaph. ix
(Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known except through its
act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature of
the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, unless we
further admit in the soul natures and forms of each individual result,
for instance, of bone, flesh, and the like; thus does Aristotle argue
against Empedocles (De Anima i, 5). Secondly, because if it were
necessary for the thing known to exist materially in the knower, there
would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the
soul should be devoid of knowledge; why, for instance, if by fire the
soul knows fire, that fire also which is outside the soul should not have
knowledge of fire.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs exist
in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of this is,
because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we
know things even that are external to us. Now by matter the form of a
thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that
knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And consequently things
that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no power of
knowledge whatever---such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima
ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing
known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which
abstracts the species not only from matter, but also from the
individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the
senses, which receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed,
but subject to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has
the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have
remarked above (Q[78], A[3]): while among intellects the more perfect is
the more immaterial.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect
which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have
all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that
the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually
composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to
God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects
pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, therefore, understands all
things through His Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can
do so.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary
vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the formation
of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is
given in order to be informed by some form. In this way the soul makes
such images from itself; not that the soul or some part of the soul be
turned into this or that image; but just as we say that a body is made
into something colored because of its being informed with color. That
this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the soul
"keeps something"---namely, not informed with such image---"which is able
freely to judge of the species of these images": and that this is the
"mind" or "intellect." And he says that the part which is informed with
these images---namely, the imagination---is "common to us and beasts."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed
of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the soul is
all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in potentiality to
all---through the senses, to all things sensible---through the intellect,
to all things intelligible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every creature has a finite and determinate essence.
Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain
likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in
common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof, because
it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower
creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever
may be found to exist in things created, being the universal principle of
all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul understands all things through innate
species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.),
that "man has understanding in common with the angels." But angels
understand all things through innate species: wherefore in the book De
Causis it is said that "every intelligence is full of forms." Therefore
the soul also has innate species of things, by means of which it
understands corporeal things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal
primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under the forms to
which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul
created by God under intelligible species. And so the soul understands
corporeal things through innate species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what he
knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge,
answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion, as
we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, concerning a certain
individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we
acquire knowledge; which would not be the case unless we had innate
species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal things through innate
species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De
Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be
related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is to that
action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that
which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially
light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually
light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower, both
as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from such potentiality
to act---through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act
of sensation---by instruction or discovery, to the act of understanding.
Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to
the images which are the principles of sensing, and to those which are
the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii,
4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate
species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act
according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing may
be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that
naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but
that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of
its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First, because, if the soul
has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems impossible for the soul
so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to
be possessed thereof: for no man forgets what he knows naturally; that,
for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like. And
especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural
to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established above (Q[76]
, A[1]): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be
totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the
falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense
be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is
wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge
of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of
all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude that the soul does
not know corporeal things through innate species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels, but
not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades of bodies,
which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on Ascension, xxix In
Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection as the higher bodies. For
the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by its form, but
is in potentiality to forms which it has not: whereas the matter of
heavenly bodies is totally completed by its form, so that it is not in
potentiality to any other form, as we have said above (Q[66], A[2]). In
the same way the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species,
in accordance with its nature; whereas the human intellect is in
potentiality to such species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Primary matter has substantial being through its form,
consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would not
be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality
to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not receive substantial
being through the intelligible species; and therefore there is no
comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from
universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by such a
process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when
he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is not because he had
knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For
it matters not whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to
conclusions by questioning or by asserting; for in either case the mind
of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain
separate forms?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the
soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation is
caused by what is such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire
is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul
forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the thing
understood: for, in a way, the intellect in act is the thing understood
in act. Therefore what in itself and in its essence is understood in act,
is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands. Now that
which in its essence is actually understood is a form existing without
matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the soul
understands, are caused by some separate forms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the sensible is
to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the senses, and by
which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which exists actually
outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible species, by which our
intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible,
existing outside the soul. But these can be nothing else than forms
separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible forms of our intellect
are derived from some separate substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by
something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in
potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be caused
by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate
intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually
understand, are caused by some separate substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, If this were true we should not need the senses in
order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the
fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of
the sensibles corresponding to that sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible species of our
intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And this
in two ways. For Plato, as we have said (A[1]), held that the forms of
sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the
form of a man which he called "per se" man, and the form or idea of a
horse which is called "per se" horse, and so forth. He said therefore
that these forms are participated both by our soul and by corporeal
matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal
matter to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by
participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individuating stone, so our
intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a
stone. Now participation of an idea takes place by some image of the idea
in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just
as he held that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are
derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the
intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived
therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said above (A[1]), he referred
sciences and definitions to those ideas.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 2/5
But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their
forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways
(Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held that
the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of subsisting in
themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate
intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species are derived by
a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which he called the
"active intelligence," from which, according to him, intelligible species
flow into our souls, and sensible species into corporeal matter. And so
Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our
intellect are derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held
to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the "active
intelligence." They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that
the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after it has
ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active
intellect) in order to receive them anew. Consequently he does not hold
that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the
participated ideas remain immovably in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 3/5
But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul
being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual
soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is form
for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the moved, but
rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the
intellectual soul, for the latter's proper operation which is to
understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the body.
But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving
intelligible species through the influence of only certain separate
principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not
need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose would it be
united to the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 4/5
But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand,
through being in some way awakened by them to the consideration of those
things, the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate
principles: even this seems an insufficient explanation. For this
awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in as far as it is
overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists expressed it, and by
forgetfulness, through its union with the body: and thus the senses would
be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing
the obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with the body.
Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still
remains to be sought.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 5/5
And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the
soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the "active intelligence"
from which it receives the species: neither is this a sufficient
explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to understand through
species derived from the "active intelligence," it follows that at times
the soul of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the
active intelligence, either from the inclination of its very nature, or
through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the
intelligible species of which the corresponding sensible species are
wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colors; which
is clearly untrue. We must therefore conclude that the intelligible
species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate
forms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intelligible species which are participated by our
intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle
which is by its essence intelligible---namely, God. But they proceed from
that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things, from
which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Material things, as to the being which they have outside
the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible.
Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act
by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power
of the soul, as we have said (Q[79], A[4]); and not by a separate
intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material
things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is known must
itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual soul of man,
in the present state of life, does not know the eternal types: for it
does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but is "united to God
as to the unknown," as Dionysius says (Myst. Theolog. i). Therefore the
soul does not know all in the eternal types.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Rm. 1:20) that "the invisible things of
God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made." But among the
invisible things of God are the eternal types. Therefore the eternal
types are known through creatures and not the converse.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that "ideas are permanent types existing
in the Divine mind." If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows
all things in the eternal types, we come back to the opinion of Plato who
said that all knowledge is derived from them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we both see that
what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where
do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in
me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our
minds." Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types.
Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true things in the eternal
types.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): "If those
who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and
consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust
possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spurious
imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid
when we renounce the society of the heathens." Consequently whenever
Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in
their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it: and those
thing which he found contrary to faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we
have said above (A[4]), that the forms of things subsist of themselves
apart from matter; and these he called ideas, by participation of which
he said that our intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal
matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our
intellect, by participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But
since it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves, outside
the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held,
asserting that "per se" life or "per se" wisdom are creative substances,
as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine (QQ. 83, qu.
46), for the ideas defended by Plato, substituted the types of all
creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to which types all
things are made in themselves, and are known to the human soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] Body Para. 2/5
When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all
things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to be
known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known; as
one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this
way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the
eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all things in Him, thus
know all things in the eternal types. Secondly, on thing is said to be
known in another as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might say that
we see in the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must needs say that
the human soul knows all things in the eternal types, since by
participation of these types we know all things. For the intellectual
light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness
of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence
it is written (Ps. 4:6,7), "Many say: Who showeth us good things?" which
question the Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is
signed upon us," as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine
light in us, all things are made known to us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] Body Para. 3/5
But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible
species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to
have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not
due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists
held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for
knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16): "Although the
philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time
according to the eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal
types, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are and
the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from the story
of times and places?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] Body Para. 4/5
But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their
"eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as though the eternal
types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu.
46)---viz. that "not each and every rational soul can be said to be
worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those
that are holy and pure," such as the souls of the blessed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[5] Body Para. 5/5
From what has been said the objections are easily solved.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from
sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we cannot
expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body." This
he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever the bodily senses reach,
is continually being changed; and what is never the same cannot be
perceived." Secondly, because, "whatever we perceive by the body, even
when not present to the senses, may be present to the imagination, as
when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses, whether
what we perceive be the sensible object or the deceptive image thereof.
Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its
counterfeit." And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the
truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth.
Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): "We must not
thing that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though the
spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's action;
for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that which it
acts on." Whence he concludes that "the body does not cause its image in
the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself." Therefore intellectual
knowledge is not derived from sensible things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But
intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for we understand
some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore
intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15)
that the principle of knowledge is in the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For
Democritus held that "all knowledge is caused by images issuing from the
bodies we think of and entering into our souls," as Augustine says in his
letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.)
that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by a "discharge of images."
And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and the other
early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as
Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is
affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is affected
by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which
impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] Body Para. 2/4
Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the
senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal
organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the
corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by
sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible
forms being participated by the intellect, as we have said above (AA[4]
,5). Moreover he held that sense is a power operating of itself.
Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by
the sensible: but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the
result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the
species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that the "body feels not, but the soul
through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for
reproducing within itself what is announced from without." Thus according
to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible
knowledge, nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but
these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse
the intellect to the act of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] Body Para. 3/4
Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect
and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper
operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an
act of the soul alone, but of the "composite." And he held the same in
regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it
is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul
should produce some effect in the "composite," Aristotle agreed with
Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused
by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as
Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained
that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from
De Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation
which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can
make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause
the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused
by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required,
for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i,
5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected
in us by the mere intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere
impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher
and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we
have spoken above (Q[79], AA[3],4) causes the phantasms received from the
senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] Body Para. 4/4
According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms,
intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms
cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made
actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that
sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual
knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the
entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect is
needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable
things, and discern things themselves from their likeness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual but of
imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of Plato, the
imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine,
in order to show that corporeal images are impressed on the imagination,
not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does
in proving that the active intellect must be separate, namely, because
"the agent is more noble than the patient." And without doubt, according
to the above opinion, in the imagination there must needs be not only a
passive but also an active power. But if we hold, according to the
opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imagination, is an action of
the "composite," there is no difficulty; because the sensible body is
more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far as it is compared to
it as a being in act to a being in potentiality; even as the object
actually colored is compared to the pupil which is potentially colored.
It may, however, be said, although the first impression of the
imagination is through the agency of the sensible, since "fancy is
movement produced in accordance with sensation" (De Anima iii, 3), that
nevertheless there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis
forms images of various things, even of things not perceived by the
senses. And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual
knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual knowledge
should extend further than sensitive knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible
species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through
the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the
phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species
by which it is informed. But if the intellect is in act, it understands.
Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to
understand actually, without turning to the phantasms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the
intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually imagine in
the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect
understand without turning to the phantasms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the imagination
does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our intellect cannot
understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows
that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. Which is clearly false:
for we understand truth, and God, and the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the soul
understands nothing without a phantasm."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In the present state of life in which the soul is united
to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand
anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. First of all
because the intellect, being a power that does not make use of a
corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the
lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not required the
act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now sense,
imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make
use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect to
understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also
when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of
the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the
imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance
in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the
case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually
understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. Secondly,
anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand
something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in
which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For
this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand
something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for
the purpose of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to
the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic intellect,
which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance
separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect,
which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal
matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain
knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist
in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for
instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual
stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so
forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be
known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing
in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and
the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually
its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to
perceive the universal nature existing in the individual. But if the
proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as the
Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the
individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the
phantasms whenever it understands.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there
habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we have said
above (Q[79], A[6]). Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact
that the species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to make
use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the
species, which things are natures existing in individuals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing;
wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of the
individual, whereas the intellect does.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are
known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are
phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we
possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we know as
cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal
substances we know, in the present state of life, only by way of remotion
or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we
understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of
bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of
the sensitive powers?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered
by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does not depend
on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the
senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through
suspension of the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during
sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn. et Vigil. i and
yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the
judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the
senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, What a man does while asleep, against the moral law, is
not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).
But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his
reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered
by suspension of the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As we have said above (A[7]), our intellect's proper and
proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect
judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains
to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be ignored which is
the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii),
that "as the end of a practical science is action, so the end of natural
science is that which is perceived principally through the senses"; for
the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of
action, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in
like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a
stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential
properties of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is
clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the
action of the knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot
judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. But
in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by
comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible
for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are
suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the intellect is superior to the senses,
nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and
principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore
suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment
of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[84] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain
evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in De
Somn. et Vigil. iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such
evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the amount
is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the
imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen,
especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously.
If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but
distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever. And
if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a
certain sequence: thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep
in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the
evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain its
freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; so that sometimes
while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as
it were, between things, and their images. Nevertheless, the common sense
remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some
images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular.
Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are
free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not
entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes
up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this
head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from
the phantasms?
(2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are
what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?
(3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal?
(4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?
(5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and
division?
(6) Whether the intellect can err?
(7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?
(8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the
divisible?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by
abstraction from phantasms?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal
and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For the intellect
is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now
the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the
particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we
understand material things by abstraction of the species from the
phantasm, there will be error in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, material things are those natural things which include
matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood apart from that
which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be
understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle of
individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by
abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is the process
whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the phantasm
is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. But seeing is not
caused by abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing
itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of understanding take
place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm
impressing itself on the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are two
things in the intellectual soul---the passive intellect and the active
intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract
the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive them when
abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active
intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to color; since
light does not abstract anything from color, but rather streams on to it.
Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that "the
intellect understands the species in the phantasm"; and not, therefore,
by abstraction.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "things are
intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter." Therefore
material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted
from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[84], A[7]), the object of knowledge is
proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of
the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the
act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive
power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is
the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive
part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of
cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any
way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the
object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from
matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them
save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But
the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an
organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is
clear from what we have said above (Q[76], A[1]). And therefore it is
proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter,
but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in
individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the
form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms.
Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material
things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things
thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as,
on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect,
and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects of
the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by
abstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above (Q[84]
, A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of
composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does not
exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way
of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one thing
without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one
from another things which are not really abstract from one another, does,
in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second
mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not
really abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly
appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that
color is not in a colored body, or that it is separate from it, there
would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider color and
its properties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or if we
express in word what we thus understand, there is no error in such an
opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and
therefore color can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise,
the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a
stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the
individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the
species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the
particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is, by
considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities
represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be
false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if
the word "otherwise" refers to the thing understood; for the intellect
is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; and so the
intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its
matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter,
as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word "otherwise" be taken as
referring to the one who understands. For it is quite true that the mode
of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of
a thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the
one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not
materially, according to the mode of a material thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a
form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so,
matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore
it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and "signate"
or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this
flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a
natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the
common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from
"this flesh and these bones," which do not belong to the species as such,
but to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be
considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be
abstracted by the intellect form "flesh and bones."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from
sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter;
not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For
sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities,
such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible
matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that
quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. Hence
quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the
terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible
qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they
cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject
to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common
intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that
substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible
matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible
matter, such as "being," "unity," "power," "act," and the like; all these
can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things.
Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as
above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have
stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the
same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can impress
their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of
individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of
existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of
themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect. This is done
by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the
phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which
represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in
the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be
abstracted from the phantasm; not that the identical form which
previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect,
as a body transferred from one place to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Not only does the active intellect throw light on the
phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible
species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just
as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with
the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the
phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible
intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible
species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active
intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and
to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which
informs the passive intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from
the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in
universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms
since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the
species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q[84],
A[7]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related
to our intellect as that which is understood?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the
phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. For the
understood in act is in the one who understands: since the understood in
act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is understood is
in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible
species. Therefore this species is what is actually understood.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else
it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the soul: for,
since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be
actually understood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the
intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid
intelligible species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that "words are
signs of the passions in the soul." But words signify the things
understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these
passions of the soul---viz. the intelligible species, are what is
actually understood.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the intellect what the
sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is
perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the
intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by
which the intellect understands.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know
only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is
cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this
theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the
intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what
is understood.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the
things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if what we
understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would
follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the
soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus,
according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas,
which they held to be actually understood [*Q[84], A[1]]. Secondly, it is
untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who
maintained that "whatever seems, is true" [*Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5],
and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the
faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a
thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty.
Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own
impression as such; and so every judgment will be true: for instance, if
taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste
perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a
corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true;
for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every
opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to
the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus.
There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains
in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which
passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and
each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form
from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness
of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the
thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the
agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees
is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing
understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the
intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by
such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the
species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that
which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood
is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears
from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is
known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside
itself, by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we
take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to
Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the soul,
but only the likeness of the stone"; it follows that the soul knows
external things by means of its intelligible species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The thing understood is in the intellect by its own
likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually
understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing
understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible
thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the
intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood; but
rather that it is the likeness thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In these words "the thing actually understood" there is a
double implication---the thing which is understood, and the fact that it
is understood. In like manner the words "abstract universal" imply two
things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality.
Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood,
abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals; but that it
is understood, abstracted or considered as universal is in the intellect.
We see something similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the
color of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where
is the color which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite clear that
the color which is seen is only in the apple: but that it be perceived
apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the
faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like
manner humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity
be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be
abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity
inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in
which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the
principles of individuality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in
regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes
place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is
formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an
absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations
are found in the intellect. For in the first place there is the passion
of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species; and
then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a
division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept
conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the
intellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the
intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for
itself for the purpose of judging of external things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in our
intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its own
nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But
universals come first as regards their nature, because "that is first
which does not involve the existence of its correlative" (Categor. ix).
Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards our intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to us.
But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known secondarily
by us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object
defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. But
the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal, as
"animal" is part of the definition of "man." Therefore the universals are
secondarily known by us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But
universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known by
us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "We must proceed from the universal to the singular and
individual" (Phys. i, 1)
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In our knowledge there are two things to be considered.
First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible
knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for its
object, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows that
our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter.
Secondly, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of
potentiality to a state of actuality; and every power thus proceeding
from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is
the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the
perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when
the object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete
act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and as
it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in
act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher says (Phys. i,
1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us at first
confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and
elements." Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many
things, without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to
know that thing confusedly. In this way we can have knowledge not only of
the universal whole, which contains parts potentially, but also of the
integral whole; for each whole can be known confusedly, without its parts
being known. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal
whole is to know the less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know
it as "animal"; whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as
"rational" or "irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion:
therefore our intellect knows "animal" before it knows man; and the same
reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to
act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense we
judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to
place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off it
is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an
animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it seen to
be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time, for a child
can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from
that, and therefore "children at first call men fathers, and later on
distinguish each one from the others" (Phys. i, 1). The reason of this is
clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of
potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows
"genus" is in a state of potentiality as regards "difference." Thus it is
evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual
is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal; as sensible
knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and
intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of the
less common.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the
universal nature may be considered together with the intention of
universality. And since the intention of universality---viz. the relation
of one and the same to many---is due to intellectual abstraction, the
universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said
(De Anima i, 1) that the "universal animal is either nothing or something
secondary." But according to Plato, who held that universals are
subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the
particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere participations of
the subsistent universals which he called ideas.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself---for
instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And thus
we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and
time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way
the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in
the generation of man and animal; for "the animal is generated before
man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). The other order
is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance,
act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, and the
perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the
more common; as man comes before animal. For the intention of nature does
not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of
man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The more common universal may be compared to the less
common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that in
the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal,
but also other things, as in "animal" is contained not only "man" but
also "horse." As part, considering that the less common contains in its
idea not only the more common, but also more; as "man" contains not only
"animal" but also "rational." Therefore "animal" in itself comes into our
knowledge before "man"; but "man" comes before "animal" considered as
part of the same idea.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely
considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known
before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Secondly
as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know the whole
before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its
different parts. So likewise principles of definition are known before
the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined would not be
known at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we
know man vaguely as man before we know how to distinguish all that
belongs to human nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The universal, as understood with the intention of
universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far
as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding
by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of
necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we
know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents.
Wherefore the universal thus considered, according to the opinion of
Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he
makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 13). But if we consider the generic or
specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is
in the nature of a formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the
singular is the result of matter, while the idea of species is from the
form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather
after the fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is
taken from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species
is taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken
from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the
intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to
the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because the form is
the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither
is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any cause or principle
should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become
acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we can understand many things at the same time?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we can understand many things at the same
time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of before and
after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand
different things in succession, but at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed
to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, for instance,
color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species are not
opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same
intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and
thus it can understand many things at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such
as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore the
intellect understands many things at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, we cannot know the difference between two things unless
we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the same is to be
said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and
comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it knows many things
at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that "understanding is of
one thing only, knowledge is of many."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one,
but not as many: that is to say by "one" but not by "many" intelligible
species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the
principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the intellect can
understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence
it is that God sees all things at the same time, because He sees all in
one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever things the intellect
understands under different species, it does not understand at the same
time. The reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same
subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and
diverse species, just as it is impossible for one and the same body at
the same time to have different colors or different shapes. Now all
intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the
perfections of one intellectual faculty: although the things which the
species represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible
for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by
different intelligible species so as actually to understand different
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of
the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of
intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible
operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this
vicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
20,22), that "God moves the spiritual creature through time."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at
the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms belonging to
the same genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear
from the examples of colors and shapes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused
way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through the one
form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are
known distinctly: thus each is known by its species; and so they are not
understood at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between
one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their difference or
comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in
the whole.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand by
composition and division. For composition and division are only of many;
whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time.
Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or
future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as also from other
individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by
composition and division.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect understands things by a process of
assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, for
nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the
subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the composition be
true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore the intellect does
not act by composition and division.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the
Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition and
division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore
the intellect acts by composition and division.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity understand by
composition and division. For since the intellect passes from
potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated,
which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees:
so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the
first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something about its
object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and proper object;
and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various
relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily compares one thing with
another by composition or division; and from one composition and division
it proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things,
have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the angelic and
the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and
perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they know at
once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning.
Therefore the human intellect knows by composition, division and
reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic intellect know,
indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself,
but by understanding the simple essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Composition and division of the intellect are made by
differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things by
composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it
does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we have
said (A[1]; Q[84], A[7]). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms,
composition and division of the intellect involve time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect
according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of the
thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the
composition and division of the intellect; but it does not exist in the
same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the
human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which comes under
the action of the senses and the imagination. Now in a material thing
there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form
with matter; and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect
whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part: for the genus is
derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the
species is derived from the form, and the particular from individual
matter. The second comparison is of accident with subject: and to this
real composition corresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby
accident is predicated of subject, as when we say "the man is white."
Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of
things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of
the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above
composition of the intellect does not imply that "man" and "whiteness"
are identical, but the assertion, "the man is white," means that "the man
is something having whiteness": and the subject, which is a man, is
identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the
composition of form and matter: for animal signifies that which has a
sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellectual nature; man,
that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these things
together with individual matter; and according to this kind of identity
our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellect can be false?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and falsehood are in
the mind." But the mind and intellect are the same, as is shown above
(Q[79], A[1]). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But
falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves
falsehood: for "those err that work evil" (Prov. 14:22). Therefore
falsehood can be in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that "everyone who is
deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived." And
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that "the intellect is always
true."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect with
sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper object, as
sight in regard to color; has accidentally through some hindrance
occurring to the sensile organ---for example, the taste of a
fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his
tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be deceived as
regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when, for example, it
judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it
exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived concerning
accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by
reason of the color being the same. The reason of this is evident; for
every faculty, as such, is "per se" directed to its proper object; and
things of this kind are always the same. Hence, as long as the faculty
exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail. Now
the proper object of the intellect is the "quiddity" of a material thing;
and hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning
this quiddity; whereas it may go astray as regards the surroundings of
the thing in its essence or quiddity, in referring one thing to another,
as regards composition or division, or also in the process of reasoning.
Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, which are understood,
the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles from which
arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of
composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect is a
faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the part of the
composition affecting the definition, when, for instance, the definition
of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a
circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is false in itself as
involving the composition of things incompatible; as, for instance, to
describe anything as "a rational winged animal." Hence as regards simple
objects not subject to composite definitions we cannot be deceived
unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is said
Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 10.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect in
regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to the Second
Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third Objection,
concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in the practical judgment of
the appetible object. But in the absolute consideration of the quiddity
of a thing, and of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is
never deceived. In this sense are to be understood the authorities quoted
in proof of the opposite conclusion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than
another can?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one person cannot understand one and the same
thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32),
"Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not understand
it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect understanding, than
which none other is more perfect: and therefore there are not infinite
degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one person understand a thing
better than another can."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding. But
truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing, is not subject
to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal.
Therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in man.
But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one man
understands better than another, it would seem that they do not belong to
the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Experience shows that some understand more profoundly
than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its first principles
and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it
only to its proximate causes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A thing being understood more by one than by another may
be taken in two senses. First, so that the word "more" be taken as
determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood; and
thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another, because to
understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or worse, would
entail being deceived, and such a one would not understand it, as
Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. 32). In another sense the word "more" can
be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who
understands; and so one may understand the same thing better than someone
else, through having a greater power of understanding: just as a man may
see a thing better with his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and
whose sight is more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two
ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more perfect. For
it is plain that the better the disposition of a body, the better the
soul allotted to it; which clearly appears in things of different
species: and the reason thereof is that act and form are received into
matter according to matter's capacity: thus because some men have bodies
of better disposition, their souls have a greater power of understanding,
wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that "it is to be observed that
those who have soft flesh are of apt mind." Secondly, this occurs in
regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has need in its
operation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative
powers are of better disposition, are better disposed to understand.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the
reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect consists in the
intellect understanding a thing as it is.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The difference of form which is due only to the different
disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a numerical
difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified
according to the difference of matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible
before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1) that "we
understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements." But
principles are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things.
Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known
previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more known," as
is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of
the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as
Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which
are points"; also unity comes into the definition of number, for "number
is multitude measured by one," as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6.
Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Like is known by like." But the indivisible is more
like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the intellect is
simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the
indivisible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible is
expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily. Therefore
likewise is the indivisible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present state is the
quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as
above stated (Q[84], A[7]). And since that which is known first and of
itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its
relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the
indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said De
Anima iii, 6. First, the continuous is indivisible, since actually it is
undivided, although potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known
to us before its division, which is a division into parts: because
confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said above
(A[3]). Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as
man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is
understood before its division into logical parts, as we have said above
(De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect disposes and divides by
affirmation and negation. The reason of this is that both these kinds of
indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its
proper object. The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether
indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either
actually or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily,
through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by
way of privation "as that which has no parts"; and in like manner the
notion of "one" is that is "indivisible," as stated in Metaph. x, Did.
ix, 1. And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain
opposition to a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and
proper object of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate
indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that a
like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the Platonists
what is first is first participated by things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements
are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects we
arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in
perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always depends on the
knowledge of principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the
same passage: "Then do we consider that we know, when we can resolve
principles into their causes."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A point is not included in the definition of a line in
general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and in a
circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a
finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a point in the
definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is limited.
Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in the
definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the definition
of the divisible, but rather conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The likeness through which we understand is the species of
the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on
account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of
the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would perceive
hearing rather than color.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] Out. Para. 1/1
WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it knows singulars?
(2) Whether it knows the infinite?
(3) Whether it knows contingent things?
(4) Whether it knows future things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our intellect knows singulars?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For whoever
knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our intellect
knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs to the
intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this
singular, Socrates.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But action
has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows the
singular.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it is a
singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for actions
belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an inferior
power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, can the
intellect know it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that "the universal
is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things
directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of
singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our
intellect, as have said above (Q[85], A[1]), understands by abstracting
the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from
individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly
the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a kind of
reflection, it can know the singular, because, as we have said above
(Q[85], A[7]), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the
intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in
which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore
it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species,
and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it
forms the proposition "Socrates is a man." Wherefore the reply to the
first objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the
conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is said
Ethic. vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded
from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a singular
proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect
does not move save through the medium of the particular apprehension of
the sensitive part, as is said De Anima iii, 11.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as
such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise than
immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as the
intellect, there is no reason why it should not be intelligible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The higher power can do what the lower power can, but in a
more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and
concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows
immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the universal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our intellect can know the infinite?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God
excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as we have
said above (Q[12], A[1]). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know
all other infinite things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, our intellect can naturally know "genera" and "species."
But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in number,
proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place,
there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being in one
place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same
intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the same time.
Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite
number of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have
said (Q[76], A[1]), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite
power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can
know the infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite, considered
as such, is unknown."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each
other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object,
which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the
infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in the sense of
one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is
potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing
after another: because never does our intellect understand so many
things, that it cannot understand more.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either
actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot know
actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But
the infinite is not represented by one species, for if it were it would
be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood
except by a successive consideration of one part after another, as is
clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the infinite is that "from
which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be
taken." Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all its
parts were counted: which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite:
because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration: since
by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore
it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity of things
distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity
thereof, counting them according to the succession of our knowledge:
which is impossible. And therefore neither actually nor habitually can
our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As we have said above (Q[7], A[1]), God is called infinite,
because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in material things, the
term 'infinite' is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term.
And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without
form, it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But
the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by
reason of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural
aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our
present life except through material effects. In the future life this
defect of intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall
be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to
comprehend Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from
phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually species of
numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except in a general
way and in their universal principles; and this is to know them
potentially and confusedly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would
be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order for the
things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation.
On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our intellect
successively; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same
time: and therefore there must be a definite and not an infinite number
of species in our intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the
infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not
terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which
is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is not
limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an
infinite number of individuals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our intellect can know contingent things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things:
because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects of
understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and
sometimes is not, is measured by time." Now the intellect abstracts from
time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a
contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that
contingent things are not known by the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences
are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of which
are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences
in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible. Therefore
the intellect knows contingent things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either
as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since every
contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that
Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to
motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs.
Now contingency arises from matter, for contingency is a potentiality to
be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; whereas necessity
results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity
in the subject. But matter is the individualizing principle: whereas the
universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular
matter. Moreover it was laid down above (A[1]) that the intellect of
itself and directly has the universal for its object; while the object of
sense is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of
the intellect, as we have said above (A[1]). Therefore the contingent,
considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the
intellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent
things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects
of science in their universal principles, then all science is of
necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some
sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
From which the replies to the objections are clear.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our intellect can know the future?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our
intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the
"here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it can know
the present. Therefore it can know the future.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some
future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect is freer and
more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own
nature can know the future.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of
brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by their frequent
cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the
future.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 8:6,7), "There is a great
affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to
come he cannot know by any messenger."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We must apply the same distinction to future things, as
we applied above (A[3]) to contingent things. For future things
considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows
them by reflection only, as stated above (A[1]). But the principles of
future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the
intellect and become the objects of science.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we
must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in itself,
or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone;
to Whom even that is present which in the course of events is future,
forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time,
as we have said above when treating of God's knowledge (Q[14], A[13]).
But forasmuch as it exists in its cause, the future can be known by us
also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection
with its future result, then the future is known with scientific
certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. If,
however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently
than not, then can the future be known more or less conjecturally,
according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from
universal causal principles; from these the future may be known,
according to the order of the effects to the cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit. xii. 13]),
the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very nature
it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and,
as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the knowledge of the
future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the
soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the Platonists
maintained, because in that case the soul by its nature would know the
universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its
knowledge by the body, and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses
it would know the future.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus,
but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for the
soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it
know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal
causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is
enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are
directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the influence of
demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the
demons, as explained above (Q[57], A[3]). The soul is naturally more
inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is
withdrawn from the senses, as it is then nearer to the spiritual world,
and freer from external distractions. The same may also come from
superior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence
inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the sensitive faculties being
acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the
imagination to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many
future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such
events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than
in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in De Somn. et
Vigil. ii [*De Divinat. per somn. ii.], "impressions made by day are
evanescent. The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence bodily
impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt
more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in the imagination
images from which the future may be foreseen."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[86] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith
to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination
follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such
animals' movements some future things, such as rain and the like, may be
known rather from human movements directed by reason. Hence the
Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), that "some who are most imprudent
are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened with cares,
but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at the caprice of
whatever is brought to bear on it."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] Out. Para. 1/1
HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all
within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?
(2) Whether it knows its own habits?
(3) How does the intellect know its own act?
(4) How does it know the act of the will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own
essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the mind knows
itself, because it is incorporeal."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of
intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own
essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that which
is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human mind is void
of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above (Q[76], A[1]).
Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind;
and therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect
understands itself in the same way as it understands other things." But
it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their
similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not,
so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a thing
is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is
actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye does
not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner
it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, does
not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know primary matter
except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently
immaterial substances are intelligible by their own essence according as
each one is actual by its own essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is
simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own
Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence
belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as "act," but not as
a "pure act," nor as a "complete act," and hence the angel's act of
intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel
understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all
other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself
by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in
the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a
potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called
"possible" [*Possibilis---elsewhere in this translation rendered
"passive"---Ed.]. Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially
understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not
to be understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists
asserted than an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of
intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation
of the intelligible; for they said that the participator is below what it
participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held,
became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it would
understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But as in
this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper
natural object, as stated above (Q[84], A[7]), it understands itself
according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible
things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only
actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their
instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect
knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two
ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives
that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he
understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the
nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is
true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we
know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of
our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of
all things as above stated (Q[84], A[5]). Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as
possible define, not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be in
the light of the eternal types." There is, however, a difference between
these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere
presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the
principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to
know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of
knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is
further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of
the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: "Let the mind strive not to
see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present"---i.e.
to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its essence
and nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length
it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own act:
because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in
the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways,
either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first
principles are called self-evident; or because it is not accidentally
knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas substance is visible by
its accident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of
intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing
understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not
so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to
intelligible things---as is the passive intellect---or is the act of
intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms---as is the active
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every
kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason
of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise
the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the
likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in
act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the
object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own
form. Now to say that in "things without matter the intellect and what is
understood are the same," is equal to saying that "as regards things
actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same."
For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a
distinction must be drawn: since the essences of some things are
immaterial---as the separate substances called angels, each of which is
understood and understands, whereas there are other things whose essences
are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof.
Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is
true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in
their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated
(Reply OBJ 2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by
their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith is not seen
in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by
another from the movement of the body; but we know most certainly that it
is there, and conscience proclaims its existence"; and the same principle
applies to the other habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul
are not known by their acts, but by themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by their
likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be known by
their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their essence in
the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still
more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by
the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as
is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior to
powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus
habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere
act. Now, it has been said (A[1]) that nothing is known but as it is
actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it
falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its
act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he
can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the
nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of
knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact
of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of
knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained
above of the mind (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although faith is not known by external movement of the
body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior
act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that
he believes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object
since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the nature
of a material thing as stated above (Q[84], A[7]), but as that by which
it understands.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is
still more so," is true of things that are of the same order, for
instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health
is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more desirable
still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true:
for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does not follow
that medicine is more desirable than health, for health belongs to the
order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient
causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order of the
objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being
known, is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions.
But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge;
nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object
known, but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject
knows: and therefore the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our intellect knows its own act?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For
what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the act differs
from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the
intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it knows
that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems
impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense
has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act, for this
belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither
does the intellect understand its own act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I
understand."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2) a thing is intelligible
according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect
consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to
something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as
building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the
agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8.
Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of
understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects.
For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of
intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and
the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His
Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect, the
angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above
(Q[79], A[1]), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic
essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the
act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he
understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act;
because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his
essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with its
perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human
intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own
essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is
the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known
by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known
secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act
the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of
understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects
are known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The object of the intellect is something universal, namely,
"being" and "the true," in which the act also of understanding is
comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not
primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state of
life, is not every being and everything true, but "being" and "true," as
considered in material things, as we have said above (Q[84], A[7]), from
which it acquires knowledge of all other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act
and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature of the
material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just
as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the act
whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act
whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so on. Nor is
there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as
explained above (Q[86], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the
material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object,
however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and
therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense.
The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding
by the material immutation of an organ; and so there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of
the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in some way
present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the
intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the
act of the will is not known by the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of
the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore the
act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the
intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that
"they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their
presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not seem
that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but either the
essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems
impossible for the intellect to known such affections of the soul as the
acts of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I
will."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[59], A[1]), the act of the will is
nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the
natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. Now
the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of
existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing
naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is in the
sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible inclination, which
is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in
its principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself
thus (De Anima iii, 9)---that "the will is in the reason." Now whatever
is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that
subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect,
both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the
nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which
is the habit or power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect
were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for then
whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are
rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in a certain
way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a
certain way, also in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The "good" and the "true" which are the objects of the will
and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in the
other, as we have said above (Q[82], A[4], ad 1; Q[16], A[4], ad 1); for
the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will
fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[87] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by
similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, as
the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains
some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul's
affections are in the memory by certain notions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] Out. Para. 1/1
HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz.
immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand
the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?
(2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of
material things?
(3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand
immaterial substances in themselves?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the human soul in the present state of life
can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine (De
Trin. ix, 3) says: "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of
corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from
itself the knowledge of incorporeal things." But these are the immaterial
substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more akin
to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is
immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above (Q[76], A[1]). Since
then our mind understands material things, much more is it able to
understand immaterial things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most
sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted by
their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a
corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De Anima iii, 4.
Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of
intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material
things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them actually so
by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those
substances are more intelligible in themselves whose nature is
immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that "nature would be
frustrated in its end" were we unable to understand abstract substances,
"because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not
to be understood at all." But in nature nothing is idle or purposeless.
Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the
intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether
superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our
intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the superior
and immaterial.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 9:16): "The things that are in
heaven, who shall search out?" But these substances are said to be in
heaven, according to Mt. 18:10, "Their angels in heaven," etc. Therefore
immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 1/7
I answer that, In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not
only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all.
For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called
"Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus first and "per
se" understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by
the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence
the purer the intellect is, so much the more clearly does it perceive the
intelligible truth of immaterial things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 2/7
But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect
in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of
material things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the
phantasms, as we have said above (Q[84], A[7]). Thus it clearly appears
that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination,
cannot first and "per se" be known by us, according to the mode of
knowledge which experience proves us to have.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 3/7
Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this
present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate
substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which
he calls the "active intellect," and which, being a separate substance
itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is
perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to understand
perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate substances, as in
the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to
us, we can understand material things. Now he said that the active
intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand by means of both
the active intellect and intelligible objects, as, for instance, we
understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that the
active intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either as
the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For an
action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a
principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting to the workman and the
saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both
these ways the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible
object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to
potentiality. Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection
at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible
synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the
passive intellect receives the intelligible object and the active
intellect together; and the more numerous the intelligible objects
received, so much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union
between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we
understand all the intelligible objects, the active intellect becomes one
with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material
and immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to
consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether the
passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate
substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he himself
maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive intellect
can never understand separate substances (because according to him it is
corruptible), but man understands separate substances by means of the
active intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 4/7
This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active
intellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand by
its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action consists
in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its actuality,
as was said of the passive intellect (Q[70], A[1]). Secondly, this
opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the active
intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would not be joined
to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated in things
understood; and would not extend to the other acts of the active
intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances; just as
when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not united to the substance
of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its light only is united to us,
that we may see the colors. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because
granted that, as above explained, the active intellect were united to us
in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard
to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all
intelligible objects. But all such objects together do not equal the
force of the active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to
understand separate substances than to understand all material things.
Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things would
not make the active intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by
its instrumentality to understand separate substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 5/7
Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for
anyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no one,
or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against what the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a "kind of common good,
communicable to all capable of virtue." Further, it is unreasonable that
only the few of any species attain to the end of the species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 6/7
Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that happiness
is "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and after enumerating many
virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that ultimate
happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelligible
is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter he
had named as the chief of speculative sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly
places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge of separate
substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united to
the active intellect as some imagined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 7/7
Sixthly, as was shown above (Q[79], A[4]), the active intellect is not a
separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively
to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends receptively;
because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is "all
things potentially," and the active intellect is "all things in act."
Therefore both intellects, according to the present state of life, extend
to material things only, which are made actually intelligible by the
active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the
present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances
in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of
incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This is
so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul
is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. For by knowing
itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances, such as
is within its compass; not that the knowledge of itself gives it a
perfect and absolute knowledge of them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of
knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true ---that the soul
needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge
requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as a kind
of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state of
life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from
phantasms: and therefore it knows material things rather than immaterial
substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There must needs be some proportion between the object and
the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, and of
perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power
are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they
corrupt the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the
sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial substances are
improportionate to our intellect, in our present state of life, so that
it cannot understand them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways.
First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it does
not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are
understood by themselves, and by one another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances:
while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails to attain its end.
It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are
purposeless, even if they are not understood by us at all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in the
same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do not
understand material and immaterial substances in the same way. The former
we understand by a process of abstraction, which is impossible in the
case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its
knowledge of material things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances
through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
i) that "the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation
of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led thereto by material
guidance according to its own nature." Therefore we can be led by
material things to know immaterial substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences
and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene defines an angel
(De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and
philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial
substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which it
understands material things. Therefore also other material substances can
be understood by us, through their material effects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its
effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this belongs
to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be
understood by us through material things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible things
cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things
through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher named
Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught that by the
understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true
philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial substances. For
since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of material
things from matter, anything material residing in that abstracted
quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction; and as the process of
abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at length at some
immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and this would be the
understanding of immaterial substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms and
species of these material things; as the Platonists supposed. But
supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ altogether
from the quiddity of material things, it follows that however much our
intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, it could
never arrive at anything akin to immaterial substance. Therefore we are
not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances through material
substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge
of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof; for there
is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial
things, and the likenesses drawn from material things for the
understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Science treats of higher things principally by way of
negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies by
denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much
less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a way as to make us
know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by
way of negation and by their relation to material things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The human soul understands itself through its own act of
understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power and
nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be
perfectly known through such act, nor through any other material thing,
because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the
former.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural
genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or in
matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even
immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their
essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection with
material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus;
because God is in no genus, as stated above (Q[3], A[5]). Hence through
the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive
concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though not
according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such
knowledge at all about God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God is the first object known by the human
mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by which we
judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and
first principles to the intellect. But we know all things in the light of
the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as Augustine says (De
Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi; [*Confess. xii, 25]). Therefore God is
the first object known to us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God
is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light which
enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" (Jn. 1:9). Therefore
God is our first and most known object.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to
which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to our mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "No man hath seen God at any time" (Jn. 1:18).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since the human intellect in the present state of life
cannot understand even immaterial created substances (A[1]), much less
can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must
be said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather
do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Rm. 1:20),
"the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made": while the first object of our knowledge in this
life is the "quiddity of a material thing," which is the proper object of
our intellect, as appears above in many passages (Q[84], A[7]; Q[85],
A[8]; Q[87], A[2], ad 2)
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We see and judge of all things in the light of the first
truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural or
gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon
it, as stated above (Q[12], A[2]). Hence, as the light itself of our
intellect is not the object it understands, much less can it be said that
God is the first object known by our intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so,"
must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order, as
explained above (Q[81], A[2], ad 3). Other things than God are known
because of God; not as if He were the first known object, but because He
is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[88] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God, as
the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know God at
once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does not
prove.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this
head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?
(2) Whether it understands separate substances?
(3) Whether it understands all natural things?
(4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?
(5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?
(6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?
(7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?
(8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the separated soul can understand anything?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can
understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that
"the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle."
But by death all human interior principles are corrupted. Therefore also
the intellect itself is corrupted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when the
senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained above
(Q[84], AA[7],8). But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we
have shown above (Q[77], A[8]). Therefore after death the soul
understands nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be by
means of some species. But it does not understand by means of innate
species, because it has none such; being at first "like a tablet on which
nothing is written": nor does it understand by species abstracted from
things, for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination
which are necessary for the abstraction of species: nor does it
understand by means of species, formerly abstracted and retained in the
soul; for if that were so, a child's soul would have no means of
understanding at all: nor does it understand by means of intelligible
species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be natural, such
as we treat of now, but the effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart
from the body understands nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), "If the soul had
no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body." But the
soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper operation and
above all, that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul can
understand when it is apart from the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question arises from the
fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to
the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the soul's
very nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with the body,
as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in that case
when the body was once removed, the soul would at once return to its own
nature, and would understand intelligible things simply, without turning
to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate
substances. In that case, however, the union of soul and body would not
be for the soul's good, for evidently it would understand worse in the
body than out of it; but for the good of the body, which would be
unreasonable, since matter exists on account of the form, and not the
form for the sake of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul
requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem,
since death does not change its nature, that it can then naturally
understand nothing; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so
far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its
mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body,
and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; but
this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing,
for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the
nature of a light object is not changed, when it is in its proper place,
which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its
nature. The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with
that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to
corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is
separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to
simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances.
Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the
phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated
from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to
understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it; and
hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and
an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises.
For since nature is always ordered to what is best, and since it is
better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by
turning to the phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so
that the nobler way of understanding would have been natural to it, and
it would not have needed the body for that purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is
true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something
higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a
mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to
the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual
substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine
light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther
off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more
is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines radiating
from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence
understands all things; while the superior intellectual substances
understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer
and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because
of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such natures: whereas
the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species,
which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in
proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher
natures. If, therefore, the inferior substances received species in the
same degree of universality as the superior substances, since they are
not so strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive
through them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We
can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker
intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal
conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are
explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the
natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual
substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades of
being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the same way
as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from
being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to make it
possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they
were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and
thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from
the sensible things themselves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men
that they have to be taught by sensible examples.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a
body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless
it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to
understand in another way.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show that
he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a movement
of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet
explained the difference between intellect and sense. We may also say
that he is referring to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms.
This is also the meaning of the second objection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The separated soul does not understand by way of innate
species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained,
and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by
means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine
light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances; though in a
lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal
(phantasms), the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this
way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx of both
of the light of grace and of the light of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand
separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body
than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human
nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that
whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances
as shown above (Q[88], A[1]). Therefore much less is it able to do so
when apart from the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by
its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul by their
presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species
abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a
soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate
substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of
man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, therefore, the
separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be
secured by its separation alone; which cannot be reasonably be said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know other separated souls;
as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and
Abraham (Lk. 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the
angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the
knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"---i.e. by knowing itself
(Q[88], A[1], ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated
soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. Now
it was said above (A[1]), that as long as it is united to the body the
soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not
understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of
ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through
its own act, as shown above (Q[87], A[1]). When, however, it is
separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to
phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects; hence in that
state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance
"understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to
the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood
according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in
another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of
existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the
same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the
body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an
imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural
knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its
nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but it has a
greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is
a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The separated soul understands the angels by means of
divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge
of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an
angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of
any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by
grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood
gives great happiness---not final and ultimate happiness. But the
separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in
this article.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things.
For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances.
Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know
all natural things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be
able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the separated
soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree
of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural
things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The devils have greater natural knowledge than the
separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to
learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i).
Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the separated soul, like the
angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of
the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an
angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the
body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a
general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, have
the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused
knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge
thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things
perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of
natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated
souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge,
but in a general and confused manner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even an angel does not understand all natural things
through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above
(Q[87], A[1]). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural
things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly
understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural
things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in
this article.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither
angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as future
things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But
we are here treating of the knowledge of natural things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the
knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to
study in order to learn is useless.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the separated soul knows singulars?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars.
For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the separated
soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Q[77], A[8]). But the
intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q[86], A[1]).
Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than
knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no determinate
knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it
know singulars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same
reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars.
Therefore it knows none.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren" (Lk.
16:28).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not
even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that
there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction
from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the
intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q[86], A[1]). The other
way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that
way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows
all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of
universal and individual principles (Q[14], A[2]), so likewise separate
substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated
similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, between
angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the
angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated
have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their
perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific
natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species;
whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to
which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some
affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine
order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned
according to the mode of the recipient.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intellect does not know the singular by way of
abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as
explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those
species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate
relation, as we have said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to all
singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore
there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated
soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life
does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the Apostle
says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Cor. 13:8).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge
denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of knowledge
remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less
good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better; which
seems unreasonable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of
the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here acquired
remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the
same species would co-exist in the same subject which cannot be.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4,5), that "a habit
is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed by
sickness or the like." But in this life there is no change so thorough as
death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by
death.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn on
earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the
intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative,
cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not
kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that
when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also
be entirely destroyed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of
species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of
knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers
and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very
actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions
whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of the
intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind
turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through
such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in
considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers
acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when
it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the
intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself,
whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers,
the same distinction is to be applied to habit.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in
the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but
as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because,
as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be
corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary,
as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is
corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted
through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible
faculty, as above stated (Q[79], A[2], ad 2). Neither can the
intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their
contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible "intentions," above
all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing is." But contrariety
may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division,
or also reasoning; so far as what is false in statement or argument is
contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary
when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For
this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which
knowledge is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of
the memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false argument.
But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude
that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in
the separated soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as
to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion
quoted, "Now, I know in part."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily
stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the
future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however,
cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species,
so there is no impossibility.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the
part of the sensitive powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not
remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4),
that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither remembers nor loves."
But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory. Therefore
the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the
separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But in this
life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to
phantasms, as shown above (Q[84], A[7]). Therefore the separated soul
cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible
species acquired in this life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits
produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But the habit
of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to
phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts,
however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the
state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in this
life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It was said to Dives in hell (Lk. 16:25): "Remember
thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Action offers two things for our consideration---its
species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the
faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is
the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of
the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the
stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye's visual
power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain in the separated
soul, as stated above (A[5]), and since the state of the separated soul
is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the
intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body
can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way; not
by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart
from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the
separated soul, but in a different way.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory
belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to the
intellect, as explained above (Q[79], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The different mode of intelligence is produced by the
different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by
that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things,
but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political
justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8: Magn.
Moral. i, 34).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul's
knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that "the souls
of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here." But they know
what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance impedes the
knowledge in the separated soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the
demon's rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us."
But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their
knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a much
greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is
inferior to the demon's.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of
time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated soul, for
the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of
place also impedes its knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 16:23), that Dives, "lifting up his
eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore local
distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular
by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be that local
distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need
to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and in either case a
determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible
because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the
senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the
soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands
singulars by species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent
to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not
hindered by local distance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see
what is done here, not because they are 'there,' as if impeded by local
distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain (A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that
demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive
powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets
down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of
assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei xxi, 10.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The future, which is distant in time, does not actually
exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing
falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But
what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself. Hence
we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on
earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have,
according to what Dives said (Lk. 16:27,28), "I have five brethren . . .
he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of
torments." Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake,
and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to Saul (1
Kgs. 28:11). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place
here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If,
therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be by
reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false (A[7]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:21): "He will not understand
whether his children come to honor or dishonor."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the
souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows from
what has been laid down (A[4]), since the separated soul has knowledge of
singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige
of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls
departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine
order and by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world
of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of what
goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: "The dead do not
know how the living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life
of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in
genus, so they are distinct in knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems
to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, "the
souls of the dead have no concern in the affairs of the living."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards
the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the passage
above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for since they
see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that external things are
unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii) expressly says:
"The dead, even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by
their own children," as a gloss quotes on the text, "Abraham hath not
known us" (Is. 63:16). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not
visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and
he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier
state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that
he should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions (4 Kgs.
22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, "Let every one
take, as he pleases, what I say." Gregory, on the other hand, is
positive, since he says, "We cannot believe." His opinion, indeed, seems
to be the more probable one---that the souls of the blessed who see God
do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom
Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth.
But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine
justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane
affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if
ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth
prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover,
the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but
the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by
"the revelation of the Holy Ghost," as Augustine says in the same book.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is
either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls of the
dead may interfere in affairs of the living---and this is to be accounted
as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality
of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may
likewise happen when the living appear, without their own knowledge, to
others living, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may be said
of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to
Ecclus. 46:23, "he slept, and told the king the end of his life." Or,
again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the
authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by
the Jews as canonical Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[89] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle
of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man,
concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: (1) the production
of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and
condition of the first man; (4) the place of his abode. Concerning the
production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the
production of man's soul; (2) the production of man's body; (3) the
production of the woman.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine
substance?
(2) Whether, if made, it was created?
(3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?
(4) Whether it was made before the body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul was made or was of God's substance?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's
substance. For it is written (Gn. 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of
the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was
made a living soul." But he who breathes sends forth something of
himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine
substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as above explained (Q[75], A[5]), the soul is a simple
form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which
applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But God
and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be
differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite.
Therefore God and the human mind are the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain
opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary
to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God
made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves
a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said (Q[77]
, A[2]; Q[79], A[2]; Q[84], A[6]), the human soul is sometimes in a state
of potentiality to the act of intelligence ---acquires its knowledge
somehow from things---and thus has various powers; all of which are
incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act---receives
nothing from any other---and admits of no variety in itself, as we have
proved (Q[3], AA[1],7; Q[9], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients.
For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable
to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies
existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered
to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul
was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first
principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the soul was of
the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the
Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held that the soul
was part of that light bound up with the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence
of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a
body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world by movement
and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [*The words as
quoted are to be found iv. 31.]) So some supposed man's soul to be part
of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were
unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual
substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Q[3], AA[1],8;
and Q[75], A[1]), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the
substance of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material
sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is the same
as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing
does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous
thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it
is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above
explained (Q[75], A[5], ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which differs, properly speaking, differs in
something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also
resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be
compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each
other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all
things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; yet
do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their
composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of
rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these again differ by
some further difference.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul was produced by creation?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For
that which has in itself something material is produced from matter. But
the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the
soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the
potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act,
any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of
corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is
educed from the potentiality of matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created,
all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence
by generation; which is not true.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:27): "God created man to His own
image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was
created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by creation; which,
however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be
made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is
suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself
has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore
only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident
has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it
called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it
something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an
accident should be described as "of something rather than as something."
The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly
speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but
such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On
the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above
explained (Q[75], A[2]). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made.
And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter---whether corporeal,
which would render it a corporeal being---or spiritual, which would
involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we
must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while
its participated existence is its formal element; which participated
existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because
existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul
is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain;
because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as
neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be
corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent
matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The production of act from the potentiality of matter is
nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in
potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its
existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the
capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q[75], A[2]), it is not
educed from the potentiality of matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As we have said, there is no comparison between the
rational soul and other forms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by
God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have
more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by
means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also
the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means
of the superior spirits, the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God
is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things from their
beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But
"inferior things are forwarded by the higher," as Dionysius says (Eccl.
Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the
higher, and souls by angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as is
stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than
corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own
species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically
inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7) that God Himself "breathed into
the face of man the breath of life."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God,
produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against
faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced
except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone
can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second
cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above
explained (Q[75], A[3]): and every agent, that presupposes something to
its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts
by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since,
therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it
cannot be produced, save immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce
their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher
things lead forward the inferior---all these things are effected through
a certain transmutation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the human soul was produced before the body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For
the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as
shown above (Q[66], A[1]; Q[70], A[1]). But the soul was made by
creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment.
Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels
than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at
least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man
was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore
the soul of man was created before the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the
end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created
before the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality.
Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was
produced in the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul
of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same
time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all
spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural
condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them---namely, the
souls of men or of heavenly bodies---are united to bodies while others
remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this
opinion we have already spoken (Q[47], A[2]); and so we need say nothing
about it here.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the
first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body,
for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the
work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some
"causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was
it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it
be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul
itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was
created, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will,
was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of
assertion; as his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): "We
may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on
the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal
virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already
created."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a
complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its
form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as
its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition
is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in
their perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as
a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the
body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created
without the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the
six days (Q[74], A[2]), we may say that the human soul preceded in the
work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has
intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at
the same time as the body. According to the other saints, both the body
and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that
it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul
was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the
form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the
body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same observation applies to the second objection. For
if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in
common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the
animal genus, as a formal principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of
the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul was first
created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] Out. Para. 1/1
THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The matter from which it was produced;
(2) The author by whom it was produced;
(3) The disposition it received in its production;
(4) The mode and order of its production.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the
slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something
out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is farther off
from actual existence than "being in potentiality." But since man is the
most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the
production of man's body, the power of God should be most clearly shown.
Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out
of nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But
the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected by the
noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made
of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is
clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most noble,
it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the
earth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the human body is composed of the four elements.
Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four
elements.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): "God made man of the slime of
the earth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on
all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" (Dt.
32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are
pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united in one
simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as
various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue.
This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which
are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their
knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For
he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in
a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul
of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly
bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the
elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that the
higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for
life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and where
there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in
man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be
evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less power,
predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been
formed from the slime of the earth; because earth and water mingled are
called slime, and for this reason man is called 'a little world,' because
all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's
body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting that
the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have
something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something between
spiritual and corporeal substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the
earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is
less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a
certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed of a
heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the
fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body,
as some say, who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of
light. For, first of all, what they say is false---that light is a body.
Secondly, it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth
essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements,
since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the
composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If fire and air, whose action is of greater power,
predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw
the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling,
such as is required in the composition of man, for the sense of touch,
which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any
particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that
sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in such a way that
it is entirely void of the whole "genus" of such contraries---thus, for
instance, the pupil of the eye is without color, so as to be in
potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of
touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which
are perceived by that sense---or so that the organ is a medium between
two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to touch; for the
medium is in potentiality to the extremes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding the
earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention,
because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and
because also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire
and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as
those to whom the Scripture was immediately addressed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the human body was not produced by God
immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal things
are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was made of
corporeal matter, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore it was produced by
the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not
necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be
produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain
animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly
body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold
are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the human body was
not necessarily produced immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some
material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a
heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human
body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body
had part in its production.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's body
was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues
which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was
actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by
reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body.
Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not
immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): "God created man out of
the earth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by the
instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God. Some,
indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived
from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this opinion
(Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves,
but only in the composite, as we have explained (Q[65], A[4]); and
because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure
form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter,
and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a
form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in
matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He
is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by
creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the
aid of any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot
transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a
seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing
body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be
generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards
what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the
angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to
the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the
slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the
formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do
at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the
sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power
of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural
generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), "man and the sun
beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate temperature
is required for the production of man and other animals. But the power of
heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals
from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are
required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not
changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine
Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see:
like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of
creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive
potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing
matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it.
Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing
matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine,
the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their causal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt
disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to
be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense
and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement
than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight.
Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks
more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with covering
and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human
body is very imperfectly disposed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the
brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in
stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and
so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give to
his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as
regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the
artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for
the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the
object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this
be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an
obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural
being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its
proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And because
it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its
operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are
for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the
human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a
form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the
human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary
result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order
to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other
senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for this
reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals.
Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers,
as is clear from what we have said above (Q[78], A[4]). But by a kind of
necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior
senses; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man
needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater
freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual
operations, as we have seen above (Q[84], A[7]); and in order that the
low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has
to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand erect. So that size
of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell,
which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some
animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely,
on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the
perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to
explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this
excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human
temperament.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and
toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the
clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element;
which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human
temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead
of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and
clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore
the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ of
organs." Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is
capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for
itself an infinite number of instruments.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons.
First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of
procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other
animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other
animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food
and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for
its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face,
other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the
purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his
face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is
more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may
freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly,
so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the
greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein
these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up
above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were
prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus
their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's
stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he
would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would
have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard
tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in
other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech,
which is reason's proper operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For
man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the
world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and
therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his
body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since
their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the
upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the
superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the
inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in
Scripture?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is not
fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by God,
so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it
is written, "God said; Let it be made, and it was made." Therefore the
same should have been said of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as
explained above (A[2]). Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let us make
man."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is
the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man of the slime of
the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed into him the
breath of life."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole
body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly said: "He
breathed into his face the breath of life."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the
image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to Augustine
(Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said:
"To His image He made them," he should not have added, "male and female
He created them."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses
other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though He did
not make other things; since it is written (Ps. 101:26), "The work of Thy
hands is the heaven," and elsewhere (Ps. 94:5), "His hands laid down the
dry land"; but in this, that man is made to God's image. Yet in
describing man's production, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to
show that other things were made for man's sake. For we are accustomed to
do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We must not imagine that when God said "Let us make man,"
He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. But by
these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image
is more clearly expressed in man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Some have thought that man's body was formed first in
priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the
formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production
of things, that God should have made either the body without the soul, or
the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is
especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the
soul, and not the soul on the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made man,"
must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and that
the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the breath of life,"
should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His
Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (Jn. 20:22). But this
explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the
very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, "And man was made a
living soul"; which words the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:45) refers not to
spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must
understand the soul, so that the words, "He breathed into his face the
breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the
soul is the form of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face,
on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore Scripture
says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works of
the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him man's
soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made
before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the first man
was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors
hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] Out. Para. 1/1
THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of
things?
(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?
(3) Whether of man's rib?
(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the
first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3),
that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing misbegotten or
defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore
woman should not have been made at that first production.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to
the woman was it said after sin (Gn. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under the
man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there is no
inequality." But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than
man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have
been made in the first production of things before sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that
the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not
have made woman.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:18): "It is not good for man to be
alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture
says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as
some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in
other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be made
clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living
things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of
generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some
plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some
fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive
generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from
seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore
we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably
accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of
generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female.
And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation,
to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is
not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only
at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the
male and female are one, as in plants they are always united; although in
some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is
yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is
intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the
distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be
produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for
generation. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said:
"And they shall be two in one flesh" (Gn. 2:24).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and
misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the
production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the
production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some
material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as
that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De
Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in
general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention
as directed to the work of generation. Now the general intention of
nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore,
in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also the female.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a
superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of
subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is
called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects
for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even
before sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if
some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind
of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the
discretion of reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded
by the state of innocence, as we shall prove (Q[96], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If God had deprived the world of all those things which
proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. Nor
was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that
individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that
He can direct any evil to a good end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether woman should have been made from man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For
sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals the female
was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with
man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But
male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was made of
the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and
not from man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of
generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that office;
hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Lev.
18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): "He created of him," that
is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, When all things were first formed, it was more suitable
for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from the
male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a
certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the
whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle
of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that "God made the whole
human race from one" (Acts 17:26). Secondly, that man might love woman
all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned
from himself. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23,24): "She was taken out of
man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to
his wife." This was most necessary as regards the human race, in which
the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with
other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as
with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in which
each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of
the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man,
as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for
this. For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from
Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32): "This is a great
sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1 is clear from the foregoing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now created
nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to one
thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from
determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species. On the
other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the
same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the
earth, and a woman from out of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this
is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced from man
by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is
not called the daughter of Adam; and so this argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the
rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's body. Now from
a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only---either by addition (and
then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was
added, rather than out of the rib itself)---or by rarefaction, because,
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x): "A body cannot increase in bulk
except by rarefaction." But the woman's body is not more rarefied than
man's---at least, not in the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore
Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in those things which were first created there was
nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the integrity of
his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is
unreasonable to suppose.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there
was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken
from the man, that Eve might be made from it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:22): "God built the rib, which He
took from Adam, into a woman."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man.
First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman should
neither "use authority over man," and so she was not made from his head;
nor was it right for her to be subject to man's contempt as his slave,
and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the sacramental
signification; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the
Sacraments flowed---namely, blood and water---on which the Church was
established.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material
increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord
multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an
increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of
the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the
substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in itself, is
quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing
but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous
to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore multiplication of matter is
quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same
without anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This
implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater
dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that
the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is to combine
contradictories ---viz. the definition with the absence of the thing
defined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of
matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or which
is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in
Joan.) that "Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the
same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn"---that is,
by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we say that the
crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from the rib,
because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves
and of the rib.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as
an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as the semen
belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural
and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it possible that by
the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man's
rib.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God.
For no individual is produced immediately by God from another individual
alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same
species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal things
are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body was formed
from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the
angels, and not immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their
causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and not
immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal
virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to Whom
all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from the
man's rib."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As was said above (A[2], ad 2), the natural generation of
every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence man
is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from
any other matter an individual of the human species cannot naturally be
generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect
into existence outside the ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone
could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from
the rib of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is verified when an individual is begotten,
by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not know
whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman;
but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels
from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed
by them from the man's rib.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[92] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first
creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it made
it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the woman did
indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first created;
not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive
in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] Out. Para. 1/1
THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)
We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is
said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." There are under this
head nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the image of God is in man?
(2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?
(3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?
(4) Whether the image of God is in every man?
(5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence,
or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?
(6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?
(7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and acts?
(8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object?
(9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness."
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the image of God is in man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is
written (Is. 40:18): "To whom have you likened God? or what image will
you make for Him?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the
First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): "Who is the image
of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature." Therefore the
image of God is not to be found in man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.])
that "an image is of the same species as that which it represents"; and
he also says that "an image is the undivided and united likeness of one
thing adequately representing another." But there is no species common to
both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God
and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): "Let Us make man to Our own
image and likeness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image
exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there
is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is
essential to an image; and that an image adds something to
likeness---namely, that it is copied from something else. For an "image"
is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else;
wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another
egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied
from it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is not
necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a
glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect
image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a
copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God,
copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of
equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore
there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but
imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made
"to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain
approach, as of something at a distance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore
he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But God made a
spiritual image to Himself in man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God,
reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to
be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both
"image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason of the
imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be
except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born
Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as
himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of
the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem
Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be
the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only
numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a
certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God,
or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately
represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect image.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational
creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are contingent
images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of rational, but
also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found
in irrational creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it
approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness."
Therefore it is made to the image of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is
like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man;
for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called
"very good" (Gn. 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of
God, and not only man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the
world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the whole
world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's excellence
consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an
intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field."
Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's image.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from
something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be
only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does
not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a
worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image,
merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white
like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for
whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an
image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in
his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the
shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says
pointedly that "an image is of the same species."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate
difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly
because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they
know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51)
"approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing
comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures
alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect.
Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it
possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the
nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are "contingent images
of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen [contingit] to be so,
but not absolutely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as
regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is
involved in the idea of an image.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the
intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively
and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in
the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or
else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but
only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual
nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in
any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the likeness
which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of
the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof
in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word "image" in this
sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all
things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the
First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God
than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de verbis
Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to
His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than
man to the image of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so much
to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and
man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a creature is called
God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels are not
more to the image of God than man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is
of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of
intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a
substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is
called a "seal of resemblance" [Ezech. 28:12] because in him the
resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may
consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the
intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels
than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is
clear from what has been said (Q[58], A[3]; Q[79], A[8]). Secondly, we
may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities,
so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the
fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact
that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God from God; and also
in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in
every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like
things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels.
But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image
in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the
intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to God's
image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to
the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking,
the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some
respects man is more like to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason
from the image of God; but not the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of
bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than
another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul
in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said
previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness
that of all creatures none are nearer." Wherefore this does not mean that
the angels are not more to God's image.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more or less,
we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than
another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its
specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do we mean that a
species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater
or lesser degree.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the image of God is found in every man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man.
For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman is the
image [Vulg. glory] of man" (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is an
individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not
an image of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 8:29): "Whom God foreknew, He also
predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." But all men
are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above
explained (A[1]). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses
the image of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:7): "Surely man passeth as an
image."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his
intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that
in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the
intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands
and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in
three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for
understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very
nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man
actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this
image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows
and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of
glory. Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is
signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of
"creation," of "re-creation," and of "likeness." The first is found in
all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The image of God, in its principal signification, namely
the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence after
the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is added, "Male and
female He created them" (Gn. 1:27). Moreover it is said "them" in the
plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be
thought that both sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary
sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the
beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every
creature. So when the Apostle had said that "man is the image and glory
of God, but woman is the glory of man," he adds his reason for saying
this: "For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created
for woman, but woman for man."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in the
conformity of grace and glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to
the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide ad Petrum
i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the
image to which man was made." And Hilary (De Trin. v) says: "Man is made
to the image of that which is common in the Trinity." Therefore the image
of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in
man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii,
12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an intelligent being
endowed with free-will and self-movement." Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin.
Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that "man was made
to the image of God, it means that human nature was made a participator
of all good: for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness." Now all these
things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of
the Persons. Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity
of Persons, but the unity of the Essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is
the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to the
Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it
follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the
Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above (Q[32], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three
Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2) that
"the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in man there
were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of
the Trinity, but only of the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the Divine
Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the
image of God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, as we have seen (Q[40], A[2]), the distinction of the
Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of
origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each
thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced
in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in
another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine
Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the
image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to
the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather
one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there
exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards
the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in
Three Persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument would avail if the image of God in man
represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and
the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: "We see, rather than
believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather
than see that God is Trinity."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son
only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, because
as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would
follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is
made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were made
only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have said, "Let Us
make man to Our own image and likeness"; but "to Thy image." When,
therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image of God," the sense is
not that the Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as
some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image,
that is, of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God "made man to His
image," this can be understood in two ways: first, so that this
preposition "to" points to the term of the making, and then the sense is,
"Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him." Secondly,
this preposition 'to' may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say,
"This book is made (like) to that one." Thus the image of God is the very
Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image
is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an
image because thereby one Person imitates another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind.
For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7) that "the man is the image . . . of
God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be
observed not only in his mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Gn. 1:27): "God created man to His own
image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created
them." But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore
the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a
thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be
seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is
a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or imaginary, and
"intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to
the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to
the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in
the others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): "Be renewed in the
spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to
understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man,
belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): "Putting on the new" man;
"him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to the image of
Him that created him," where the renewal which consists in putting on the
new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of
God belongs to the mind only.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to
God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we
have explained above (AA[1],2); whereas in other creatures we find a
likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby
the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God
is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in
the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we
find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in
reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may
easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a
"trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image"
represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a
"trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the
cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For
imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces":
so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of
a hostile army.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and
others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine
Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the
uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational
creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the
species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but
also in intelligence, as above explained (A[2]); whereas other creatures
do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the
Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise
as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word
from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q[28],
A[3]); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a
procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in
the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain
representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not
find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in
them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced
them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature,
proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the
(mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the
idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of
which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house
points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God
by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by
way of a "trace."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that he is
essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind;
as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king.
Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in
every part of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that
the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held
that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man
denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in
likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be
his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it
would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the
woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man
would be only the image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case
Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after
the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when
Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," it added, "male
and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came
through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both
sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction of
sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the
mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col.
3:10), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him,"
added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [*these words are in
reality from Gal. 3:28] (Vulg. "neither Gentile nor Jew").
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his
bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial
animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look
upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to
God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as
Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is not to be understood as
though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the
very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by
way of a trace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may
find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal
vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act
of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain
likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying
the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the
memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative
power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the
species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both
together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image.
For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the
soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul,
is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of
representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The
corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the
external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the
seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which
is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these
reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably
represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together,
does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision.
Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is
not thus properly represented.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of
the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man was made to
God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this
existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore
the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in the
soul to these three things---mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not
signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual
soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the
Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these three
are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1
Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not
extend to the acts of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But
an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not
extend to the acts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in
the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether
sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by
reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred to actual
vision.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above explained (A[2]), a certain representation of
the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the
Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the
soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the
Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by
reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession
of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without
actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first
and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the
soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual
thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But,
since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything
exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and
consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in
the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually
exist therein.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our being bears the image of God so far as if is proper to
us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we
are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that
which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists in mind,
knowledge, and love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the
mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain
degree, yet also in a way does not know itself---namely, as being
distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine
subsequently proves---De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge
were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul
which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will;
which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the
Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation
were in part deficient.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to
understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually
consider them, and when we do not thing of them. When they are not under
our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in
his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and
love [*Cf. Q[79], A[7], ad 1]. "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be
there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even
if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue),
this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding,
and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand
with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which
unites this child with its parent." From which it is clear that he places
the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will,
than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory;
although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a
certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that
memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the
Sentences.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement
(De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands
itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever
actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this
interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as
actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear that the soul
always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though
we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself
whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually
understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts,
although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their
principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin.
xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense
that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider
God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its
existence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison
with God as its object?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul
not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image of the
Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (A[7]),
according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from
both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Therefore the
image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek
trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without
separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the
consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of the Trinity is
to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If,
therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of the
memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man
by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to
the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2 Cor.
3:18): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to
glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore
the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of God
exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves
itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember,
understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less, therefore, is
the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above explained (AA[2],7), image means a likeness
which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the
species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in
the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so
far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above
stated (AA[6],7), are distinguished from each other according to the
procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from
both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of
Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it
is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and
love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically
different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of
them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to
the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived
therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the
soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God.
Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and
immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone
sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned
towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the "the mind
remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive
this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly
called the image of God." But this is due to the fact, not that the mind
reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn
to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: For the notion of an image it is not enough that something
proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds
and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from
knowledge of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however,
as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of
eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make up the
trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of the reason
which is concerned with temporal things, "although a trinity may be
found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there," as he says farther
on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to
the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are
not always present; but sometimes they are actually present, and
sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the
soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally
for this present life; while in the future life faith will no longer
exist, but only the remembrance of faith.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only
by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above
(Q[12], A[12]; Q[56], A[3]; Q[60], A[5]). This, too, is natural that the
mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense
we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul;
"whether this image of God be so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as
almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason;
"or obscured and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as
in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God
Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of
God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that
"in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it
sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the Uncreated Word are the
types of all creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "likeness" is properly distinguished from "image"?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from
"image." For "genus" is not properly distinguished from "species." Now,
"likeness" is to "image" as genus to species: because, "where there is
image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely" as Augustine says
(QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness" is not properly to be
distinguished from "image."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the
representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of
the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and
indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the
essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in
other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the image of God in man is threefold---the image of
nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (A[4]). But innocence
and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said
(Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the memory, the
understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and
righteousness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of
virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore
it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image consists in the
knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider that
these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and
"likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality
causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now,
since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to
each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good
can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as
subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the
same way there exists a kind of comparison between "likeness" and
"image." For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an
individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as
we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect
virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a
preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image,
as we have said above (A[1]): and, again, it may be considered as
subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of
image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents,
according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness
may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and
existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which
are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is
properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that
"the spirit" (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of
God. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior
faculties, or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's
likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness
of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and
incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be
considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of
the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the
image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and
self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as
this may be possible in man." In the same sense "likeness" is said to
belong to "the love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general
notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far as
any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects the idea
of "image."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing
the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual
nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of
being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in
their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness"
exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one
point of view and from another the term "likeness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[93] A[9] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the
nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as virtue
itself belongs to likeness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT
(FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as
regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first
there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to his
intellect; (2) the condition of man as to his will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?
(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?
(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?
(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. For
man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the
first man, "while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the
enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If man was gifted with the same
tastes as now, how happy must he have been in paradise, that place of
ineffable happiness!" Therefore the first man in paradise saw God through
His Essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that "the
first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." But our
good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine
Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the vision of God is His Essence is whereby God is seen
without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence "saw God
immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He
also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in
the primitive state saw God through His Essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not first
which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God through
His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive
state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The first man did not see God through His Essence if we
consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said
that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam" (Gn.
2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude
itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same
relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man
cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and
necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who
sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which means to
sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established
in the love of God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as
Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now.
Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the
present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God
through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the vision
of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God
through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like
it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it; for instance, a man is
seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly
expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more perfect manner through His
intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or
corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full
and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is
distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written
(Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right." And man was made right by God in
this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher,
and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower.
Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear
and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived
by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a
gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that,
"perhaps God used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels;
by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without
bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the
participation of the Divine Essence." Therefore, through these
intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know
Him now.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect
happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the
Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of happiness in a
certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18), so far as he
was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the
first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in the
state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and,
at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is
seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of
medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something unknown;
such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second
kind of medium, but not without the first kind. For there was no need for
the first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration drawn
from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His
effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to His
capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in
the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is
something obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine light;
and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created
effect: secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as
man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being
preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God in
an enigma.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their
essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw the
angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): "In
paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of
heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the
knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which
"is a load upon the soul," as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore the
separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained (Q[89],
A[2]). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; for
the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to see separate
substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate substance,
by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the first man knew
itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours. But
our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore neither
could Adam's soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two
ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and in
this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the
state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul is
distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of
natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state of innocence is
distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's soul, in the state of
innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body; wherefore the
first man is said to have been made into a "living soul"; that is, a soul
giving life to the body---namely animal life. But he was endowed with
integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the
soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above (A[1]). Now it is
clear from what has been already said (Q[84], A[7]; Q[85], A[1]; Q[89],
A[1]) that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as
regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of
understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of
understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of
movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is by
the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on
itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be associated with
the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when the
soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good," that is, to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to
itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the
intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external
things, as we have said above (Q[87], A[3]): and so by the knowledge
thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act
through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself, the
human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper
act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge.
Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but
by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (Q[55], A[2]); the
above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not
sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel. Much less does the
third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves,
by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the
knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing
excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels
in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge
regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of
intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our
knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that
Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
This makes clear the reply to the first objection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge
regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body
was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell
short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present state,
fall short on account of both these reasons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at
knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we
have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in its
own measure.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the first man knew all things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if
he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or by
connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired
species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated
in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all
things. Nor through connatural species, because he was of the same nature
as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a
clean tablet on which nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by
infused species, it would have been of a different kind from ours, which
we acquire from things themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of
arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning,
knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time
according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things
when he was first created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that
his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be
united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit
in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore he was not
endowed with knowledge of all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man named the animals (Gn. 2:20). But names should be
adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals'
natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all
other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes before
imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in
potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God
created things not only for their own existence, but also that they might
be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their
perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can be the
principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by
instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his
perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also
was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first
man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all
those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever
are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is,
whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to
direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those
things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural
knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end:
just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to
direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a
knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction
of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by
merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of
human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men,
future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the
number of pebbles in a stream; and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely
infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as the
eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from
those given by nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To Adam, as being the first man, was due to a degree of
perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is above
explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the
number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what he
knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as
regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have advanced as regards
the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance
by further enlightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between advance
in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of
merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man in his first state could be deceived?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been
deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14) that "the woman being
seduced was in the transgression."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman was
not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had
received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue. Therefore
before sin the woman was deceived.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us,
the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not changed by
sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence.
Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just
as he is deceived now.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the
soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things
themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and
consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been
deceived, adhering to images as to realities.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men's
thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above (A[3]). So if
anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been
deceived.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what
is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment
of man condemned."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things;
namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as
though it were true, but without the assent of belief---or it may mean a
firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of
these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but
as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might have
been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any
surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea
that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in such
matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be
blamed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the
primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and while
it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is clear that as truth is
the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence
continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to
falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity,
were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could
be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some
knowledge, but no false opinion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by
virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower
faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to
their action. And from what has preceded (Q[85], A[6]), it is clear that
as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is
never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed
to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we see
that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by
such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep.
Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was
incompatible with deception of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed,
still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have
believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the
love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The woman thought that the serpent had received this
faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some
supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the
Sentences in this point.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the
first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have
been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as
he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper
action.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 5: If anyone had said something untrue as regards future
contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state
would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a
thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false
opinion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 2/3
It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from
above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did
not extend.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[94] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 3/3
If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though
he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already
sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine
aid.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL---NAMELY, GRACE AND
RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning
which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace and righteousness
of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion
over other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the first man was created in grace?
(2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?
(3) Whether he had all virtues?
(4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the first man was created in grace?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For
the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor. 15:45):
"The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a
quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore
Christ alone was made in grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [*Work
of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace
has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so
ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could
do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the
discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and angels in
the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on
them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was
created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to
advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first
man was not created in grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the
recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between
God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did
not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from
glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes glory.
Therefore much more did nature precede grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the
angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9):
"God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with
grace." Therefore man also was created in grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it
was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the
Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed
by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace,
according to Eccles. 7:30, "God made man right." For this rectitude
consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason,
and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both
the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the
lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ.
Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16]. Now it is clear that
such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to
reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin;
since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as
Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the
primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was
not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it
is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the
cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they
disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were
ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in
the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own
disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the
flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected
to the soul through grace existing therein.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a
spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual
life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as
the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's words,
therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul;
but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed
that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy
Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess
Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or
men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but
that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed
in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those
who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of
nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was
not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance
by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is
nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first
moment of his existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit
grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by
the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal.
5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the
state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was
impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral
virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the
passions were entirely excluded from him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first
parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the
object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are
directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as
fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither
present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could
desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore
Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and
the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but
to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which
regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be
had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed
in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in
ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not
entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and
hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment,
accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in
the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to
reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as
consequent upon the judgment of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the
passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as
regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be
explained later on (Q[97], A[2]); likewise the soul was impassible as
regards the passions which impede the free use of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the
passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought
to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Adam had all the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues
are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is
restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the
state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore
neither did these virtues then exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have
evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But
these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above
(A[2]). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy,
too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of
innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did
those virtues exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as
proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of
innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be
incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos):
"The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth
to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance,
refulgent with brightness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain sense
possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For
it was shown above (A[1]) that such was the rectitude of the primitive
state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason.
Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is
directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the
dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues
(FS, Q[63], A[2]). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state
required that man should in a sense possess every virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not
involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these virtues did
exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But
other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in
their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be
consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues
necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not seen,
and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that
state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the
possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and
hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act.
But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the
perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit,
but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin
committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because
sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of
the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the
first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would
repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen
unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it.
This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which
regards what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only
conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did
wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue
superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens
to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per se'
competent to moderate the passions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible
with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one
affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which
relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the
primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as
he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such
passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act.
Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same
subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the
primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of
penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not
to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates
not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not
only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance
could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and
in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as
moderating sorrow and fear.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: appears from what has been said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a
particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of
persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In
another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a
certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not
possess perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: appears from what has been said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were less
meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of
God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need
of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more
copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our
actions are more meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it
is written (2 Tm. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive
lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue
is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and difficulty
now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would not
have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he
resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the
primitive state.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be better off after
sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First,
in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds
in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of
God; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more
perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured
by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of two kinds, absolute
and proportional. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed
a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums
therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord
said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these
cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which
consists in rejoicing for created good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were
more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree
of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as
meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we
consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have
had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works. But if we
consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists
after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more
beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is
beyond one who performs it easily.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: After sin man requires grace for more things than before
sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before sin
required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the
need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of
sin, and for the support of his weakness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit
according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above
explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after
what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by
the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an
easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed;
because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the
actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy
for sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[95] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The first man would not have gained merit in resisting
temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not
possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace.
But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive
state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state.
Hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of
innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?
(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?
(3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?
(4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no
mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14),
that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels,
to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have intervened
thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state
of innocence man had no mastership of the animals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another
should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are
hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals
were not brought under the mastership of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St. Jerome's
works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as quoted in the
Glossa ordinaria on Gn. 1:26]: "God gave man mastership over the animals,
although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after
sin animals would become useful to man." Therefore, at least before sin,
it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is
not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no
mastership over the irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): "Let him have dominion over
the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the
earth" [Vulg."and the whole earth"].
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above stated (Q[95], A[1]) for his disobedience to
God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should
be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before man had
disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now
all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three
ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the
generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the
perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the
imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in
the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use of the
perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and
animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals.
Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be
master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the
hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby
exercises a natural right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of
Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior.
Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other
animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, this is
proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the
latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to
certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as
regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to
what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection of other
animals to man is proved to be natural.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A higher power can do many things that an inferior power
cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally
higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be
done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid
gathering together of all the animals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce
and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard
to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite
unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, as
if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then
have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on Gn.
1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and
birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy
between some animals. They would not, however, on this account have been
excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for
that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has
ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor,
as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given
by men as food to the trained falcon.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily
need of animals---neither for clothing, since then they were naked and
not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence---nor for
food, since they fed on the trees of paradise---nor to carry him about,
his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in
order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified
by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them
names expressive of their respective natures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: All animals by their natural instinct have a certain
participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that
cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals
would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some
domestic animals obey him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have
had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a
greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8),
"corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels." Much less
therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are
nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these doe not naturally obey
reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is
by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in
the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man
could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this
belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore
man had no dominion over them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): "That he may have dominion
over . . . every creature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so
according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he
can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in
man: his "reason," which makes him like to the angels'; his "sensitive
powers," whereby he is like the animals; his "natural forces," which
liken him to the plants; and "the body itself," wherein he is like to
inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not
of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the
primitive state; so when we read "all creatures," we must understand the
creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the sensitive powers,
as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the
soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had
mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers
and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them.
Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and
inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in
making use of them without hindrance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
The answers to the objections appear from the above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been
equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no sin, there is no
inequality." But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore
all were equal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love,
according to Ecclus. 13:19, "Every beast loveth its like; so also every
man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there was among
men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were
equal in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause
of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from
the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of
nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born
weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been
the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 13:1): "The things which are of God,
are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of God"]. But order
chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13):
"Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place."
Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly,
inequality would have existed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive state there
would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because
generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age;
for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been
sterile.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to
righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his
own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to
action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater
advance in virtue and knowledge than others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not
entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from
exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was
dependent on food wherewith to sustain life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the
stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and
also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that,
however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no
defect or fault either in soul or body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as
exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are
placed in subjection to others as a penalty.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet
between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between
equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally
loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son
does not love his father as much as he is loved by him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not
indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He would
exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine
forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as
above described, without any defect of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have
been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "God
willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image,
should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men, but over
cattle."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not
have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject to man
as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Gn. 3:16): "Thou
shalt be under thy husband's power." Therefore in the state of innocence
man would not have been subject to man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of
the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state of
innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could desire,"
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would not have
been master over man in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of innocence was not
more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels some
rule over others; and so one order is called that of "Dominations."
Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that
one man should be subject to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed to
slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as
a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to
any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the office of
governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of
innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but in
the latter sense. This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave
differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself,
as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is
ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as his slave
when he refers the one whose master he is, to his own---namely the
master's use. And since every man's proper good is desirable to himself,
and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another
what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity
a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of
innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either
towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of
mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and
man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social being, and
so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a
social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the
presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek
many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher
says, in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many things are
directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them.
Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this
would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of
others, according to 1 Pt. 4:10, "As every man hath received grace,
ministering the same one to another." Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xix, 14): "Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by
the service of counsel": and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The natural order of
things requires this; and thus did God make man."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the
first-mentioned mode of mastership.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man:
first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as
regards the preservation of the species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?
(2) Whether he was impassible?
(3) Whether he stood in need of food?
(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not
immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But if
you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore
as long as man was man he could not be immortal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct,
as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no
passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was
incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this
would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, for
since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have
been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the
first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wis. 10:2: "He
brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained his
immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not
immortal in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to
Apoc. 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not created in the
state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was
not immortal in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 5:12): "By sin death came into the
world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the
part of matter---that is to say, either because it possesses no matter,
like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to
one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are
incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in
its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent
disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called
incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.):
"God made man's soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of
beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor
of incorruption." Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of
its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in
the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test.
qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of
St. Augustine]): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so
that he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was
indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by
reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was
enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained
itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the
rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above
explained (Q[76], A[1]), it was most properly endowed at the beginning
with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity
of corporeal matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural
incorruptibility and immortality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to the
soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as
regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover
immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was
reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be
restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (TP, Q[14]
, A[4], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs
from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible.
For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of innocence man
would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state
of innocence, according to Gn. 2:21, "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam."
Therefore he would have been passible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib out
of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out
of part of his body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally
passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in
contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have
suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would have been also
corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive
suffering wastes the very substance."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its
proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its
natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature
contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing changes
another from its natural disposition. Secondly, "passion" can be taken in
a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the
perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said
to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of
innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man
was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for
he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he
refrained from sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since
sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but
are ordered to his natural welfare.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As already explained (Q[92], A[3], ad 2), the rib was in
Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a
principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural
deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation
of the rib.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved
from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason,
whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine
Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could
come upon him unawares.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require
food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost. But
Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no
need of food.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves
passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does not appear
how food could be needful to him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam
could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would not
have died. Therefore he did not require food.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus,
which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that
man did not take food in the primitive state.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:16): "Of every tree in paradise ye
shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an animal life
requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life
needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the
rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of
what it possesses in common with other souls---that is, as giving life to
the body; whence it is written (Gn. 2:7): "Man was made into a living
soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the soul is called a
spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other
souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body
what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called "animal"
[*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq.], through having its life
from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior
creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative
soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and
growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence.
But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a
certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself
as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to
the good, whose bodies will be called "spiritual." So, after the
resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the
state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Works of
an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]):
"How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since
an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." For we have explained
(A[1]) that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a
supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of
the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its
humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man
was obliged to take food.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the
part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. So we
cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible, but that the food
taken was passible; although this kind of passion conduced to the
perfection of the nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also
sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same time,
to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of
every other tree of Paradise.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have
taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing
superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that
there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there was need for
voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and
suitable to the state.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by
the tree of life?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of
immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as an effect
does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible,
otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the
substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not
give incorruptibility or immortality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural
agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused immortality,
this would have been natural immortality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that
the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the
Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 3:22): "Lest perhaps he put forth
his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever."
Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an
anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "A
taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even
after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of
the tree of life."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of
immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe that
in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two
remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the lost of
humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul's
instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with food,
taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided with the
food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the
Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that the humor
which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humor already
existing, lessens the specific active power: as water added to wine takes
at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of
the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, we
may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong
that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to
replace the lost tissue, as well as what suffices for growth; later on,
however, the assimilated food does not suffice for growth, but only
replaces what is lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even
for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from
natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the
tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species
against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous
nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food
to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to
banish the breaking up of old age"; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19
[*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine]) "The tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily
corruption."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul's
intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was
it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality,
whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that
every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not
go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite
time, but only for a definite time. For it is manifest that the greater a
force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore, since the power of
the tree of life was finite, man's life was to be preserved for a
definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed,
man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat
once more of the tree of life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first
proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality; while
the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption,
according to the explanation above given.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and,
first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under the
first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation?
(2) Whether generation would have been through coition?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem there would have been no generation in the state of
innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v, 5, "corruption is contrary to
generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also there would
have been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore neither
would there have been generation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the
species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore there
is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in
the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the
state of innocence there would have been no generation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication
of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion of
mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would
have been necessary to make a division of rights when the human race
increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to
which all things are in common, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore
there would have been no generation in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:28): "Increase and multiply, and
fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by
generation, since the original number of mankind was two only. Therefore
there would have been generation in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In the state of innocence there would have been
generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race;
otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great
blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by his
nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and
incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while
his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's
purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible
things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is
invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not
the chief purpose of nature, but as it were, subordinate to something
else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature's purpose would become
void.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent
except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the
good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is
ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only
in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the
individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally
corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, it
is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose
of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of
the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human
race, He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of
innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the state of innocence the human body was in itself
corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul.
Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not
to be deprived thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although generation in the state of innocence might not
have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have
been required for the multiplication of the individual.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In our present state a division of possessions is necessary
on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of
possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii,
5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been
so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in
common, according to each one's need, those things of which they were
masters---a state of things to be observed even now among many good men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by
coition?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed
in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11;
iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was "like an angel."
But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like the
angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as is written Mt.
22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by
coition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect
development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before sin,
they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not
the case according to Scripture (Gn. 4:1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man
becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which he
takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains
from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin,
according to Ps. 48:13: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand;
he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them."
Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man
and woman.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no
corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore
there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, God made man and woman before sin (Gn. 1,2). But
nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned,
there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex
is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to
man (Gn. 2:18,20). But she is not fitted to help man except in
generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help
in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation also
in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of
concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded that
in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the
same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. Opif. xvii) that in
paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means,
as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation of the
Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and female before sin,
because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after
sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For what is natural to
man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that
generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life,
which he possessed even before sin, as above explained (Q[97], A[3]),
just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members
make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members would not have had a
natural use, as other members had, before sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state
of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from nature, is
the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an
active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is
distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is
female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation
there should be concurrence of male and female. The second thing to be
observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the
state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers were
entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
26): "We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten
without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally
moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of
soul and body."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In paradise man would have been like an angel in his
spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the
resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body.
Wherefore there is no parallel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents
did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they were
ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or
because, having received the general Divine command relative to
generation, they awaited the special command relative to time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it
were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In
the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was
not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some
say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in
proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility
of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so
inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason,
whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the
force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By
"immoderately" I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober
person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the
glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is
what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity
of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and
restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been
praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our
present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes
inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[98] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state
"intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity;
this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in
giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by
the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of
lustful desire, but of deliberate action."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the condition of the offspring---first, as regards
the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge. Under the
first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full
powers of the body immediately after birth?
(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect
strength of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have
had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members,
immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.
i, 38): "This weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind." But in
the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind.
Therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use
their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore much more
is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and
thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes
affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their
limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable
offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was not
possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would
not have been deprived of the use of their limbs.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of
infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness
of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such weakness in
infancy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the
state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation.
Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size
and power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature,
and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any
assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those
things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine
authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to
the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient
strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. Because in
proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore
it is natural, on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in
children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not
be apt for moving the limbs. On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it
possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs
immediately after birth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that "God made man right"
(Eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 11),
consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As,
therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human
limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it impossible
for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands. Now the human
will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are befitting to man.
But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. We
must, therefore, conclude that children would not have had sufficient
strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every
kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such
as suckling, and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in
children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy; as
is clear from his preceding remark that "even when close to the breast,
and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs
immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more
perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and
to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that a small
amount of strength suffices them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that they
would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and only what
was befitting to their state of life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not
subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have been
certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects
leading to corruption.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have
been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that woman
is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product outside the purpose
of nature. But in that state nothing would have been unnatural in human
generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by
insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot burn
green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male. Since,
therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was not subject
to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems
that males would always have been born.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the
multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been
sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that
they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence,
there was no need for women to be born.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nature's process in generation would have been in
harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But
established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gn. 1,2).
Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been
born.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature
would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different
grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex
belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of
innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a
product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case:
but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained
(Q[92], A[1], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a
defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes;
but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says
(De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind favors the generation of
males, and the southern wind that of females": sometimes also by some
impression in the soul (of the parents), which may easily have some
effect on the body (of the child). Especially was this the case in the
state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that
by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be
diversified.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[99] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life,
as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that all
should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to
follow that males and females would have been in equal number.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to
righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?
(2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have
been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De
Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children
sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says
(Rm. 5:16,21). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus
it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children
would not have been born righteous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not
transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have
been transmitted from parents, to the children.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did
not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness
together with the rational soul."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself.
Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the
species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its
operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But
individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child.
Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an
accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the
principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire
human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same
genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is
called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to
the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been
assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not
to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Some say that children would have been born, not with the
righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with
original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness,
which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists
in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection
results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q[95], A[1]), we must
conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would
also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man
was created in grace (Q[95], A[1]). This grace, however, would not have
been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the
semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving
a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not
transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is
apt to receive it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
From this the reply to the third objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed
in righteousness?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have
been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv) on the
words of Job 3:13: "For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful
corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten
"children of hell"; no children would have been born of him but such as
were destined to be saved by the Redeemer." Therefore all would have been
born confirmed in righteousness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first parents
had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been
confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been
unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been born
confirmed in righteousness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first
man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin.
Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his
descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving
righteousness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the
others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable
henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been
confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten
children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed
in righteousness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have
been the whole human race if neither they---that is our first
parents---had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants,
nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have
been condemned." From which words we gather that even if our first
parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil;
and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence
children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it is clear
that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their
parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot
children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the
rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude
given by the clear vision of God; and when once it has seen God, it
cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one
can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of
good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in
the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the
Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy
state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in
soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there
is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born
confirmed in righteousness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten
"children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin
which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they
could have become "children of hell." If, however, they did not become
"children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to
their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence
preserving them free from sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as
an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: "It
seems that if they had lived, etc."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to
have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. For
the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such
that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with
the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their
descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[100] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: There is no comparison between man and the angels; for
man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the
angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the
angels (Q[64], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under
this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with
perfect knowledge?
(2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of
birth?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with
perfect knowledge?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have
been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children
like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (Q[94], A[3]).
Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. FS,
Q[85], A[3]). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before
sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from
birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our
actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on
which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). But
the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state
of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without
knowledge at birth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above stated (Q[99], A[1]), as regards belief in
matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when
authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature.
Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as
above explained (Q[55], A[2]; Q[84], A[6]); and for this reason is the
soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and
this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not
acquired through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in
the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect
knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge
without difficulty by discovery or learning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of
our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and
instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like
himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were
natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular
time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they
would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no
ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to
certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them
to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal
principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much
more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their
knowledge of other universal principles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason
at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present
state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not
the case in paradise, because, as it is written, "The corruptible body is
a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15). Therefore, before sin and the
corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect
use of reason at birth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural
powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, therefore,
would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at
birth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In all things produced by generation nature proceeds
from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had
the perfect use of reason from the very outset.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above stated (Q[84], A[7]), the use of reason depends
in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while
the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has
not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or
delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and
therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former
is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of
reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account
of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of
these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence,
children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would
have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use
than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as
explained above regarding the use of their limbs (Q[99], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it
hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at
all ages.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[101] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of
their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact
that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in
other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the
humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q[99], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] Out. Para. 1/1
OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?
(2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?
(3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?
(4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether paradise is a corporeal place?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede
[*Strabus, Gloss on Gn. 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar
circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both because it
is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and
because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the
earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise
(Gn. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources
elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore
paradise is not a corporeal place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world,
yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore apparently
it is not a corporeal place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise.
But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of Wisdom
that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her" (Prov. 3:18).
Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of
paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal
trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of
paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore paradise
was not a corporeal place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general
opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely
corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose
opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing
prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so
long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there
occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as
matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we
must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of
whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore
says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the east, its name being the
Greek for garden." It was fitting that it should be in the east; for it
is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the
earth. Now the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher
explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than the left:
hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the
east.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense.
It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon,
not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3),
the atmosphere there is "a continually even temperature"; and in this
respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing
elements. Mention, however, is made of the moon rather than of other
bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us,
and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be
overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that
paradise reached to the moon---that is, to the middle space of the air,
where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to
have influence on such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit
place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not
attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the
neighborhood of the earth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable that
man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose sources
are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then
sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the case with some
other streams?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable
world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be
crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention
of it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because
its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated (Q[97]
, A[4]). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert
was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the
tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in
view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by
experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good
of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify
spiritually the free-will as some say.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the
plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal
virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of
paradise and others, were actually produced. According to other holy
writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on
the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what is said of the
trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six days is to be
understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads:
"The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning" (Gn.
2:8).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the
abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. But
the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell
in the abode of the blessed---that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the
place of man's habitation should have been there also.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode,
this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. If
on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted
to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted in
all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than
the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all
adapted to be the abode of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after
sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted as a
dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for
him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an even
temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator---a situation of
extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the
heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place
for man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was a
divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's image."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above stated (Q[97], A[1]), Man was incorruptible and
immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but
because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from
corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from
without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the
humors, and by old age, as above explained (Q[97], A[4]), and man was
able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which
corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of
unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an
atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions were found;
because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was
permeated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, and
exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants." Whence it
is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and
in keeping with his original state of immortality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and
is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it
is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De
Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures."
Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above
the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. By the second
condition, it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude, which is
endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude
was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore he was created
there. But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a
ruler over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man
in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the
beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred
thither in the state of his final beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is
natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some
particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual
substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as
regards both his body and his soul---that is, inasmuch as in his soul was
the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not
be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a
certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam;
and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the
devil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by
man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain,
though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and
what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still
dwell in that paradise.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are
of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the
unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there,
because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because,
although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not
remain long in that position. However, Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor.
ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable on account of the heat. This
seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does
not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere
proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must
hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on
the equator or elsewhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and
keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not
have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation
of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gn. 3:17). Therefore man was not
placed in paradise to dress and keep it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of
trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of trespass
with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man
would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not
contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in
paradise to dress and keep it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2: 15): "The Lord God took man and
placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in
Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that God
placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by
sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into
darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by
keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly, that man might dress
and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labor, as it
did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical
knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have kept paradise
against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for
himself lest he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man's good;
wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man was created in paradise?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was
created in his dwelling-place---namely, the empyrean heaven. But before
sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was
created in paradise.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, other animals remain in the place where they are
produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth from
which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he
was created (Q[97], A[4]). Therefore he was created in paradise.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than
woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:15): "God took man and placed him
in paradise."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the
incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was
man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that
this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man
outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during
the whole of his animal life; and, having attained to the spiritual life,
to be transferred thence to heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as
regards their nature, and therefore they were created there.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit
those animals in their nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[102] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own
dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her
body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in
paradise, where their parents were already.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] Out. Para. 1/1
TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now
consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the
government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this
government. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?
(2) What is the end of this government?
(3) Whether the world is governed by one?
(4) Of the effects of this government?
(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?
(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?
(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the world is governed by anyone?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it
belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end.
But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not
move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end.
Therefore the world is not governed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an
object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has
stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one
particular thing, does not require any external principle of government.
But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity
determined to something particular in their actions and movements.
Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, O Father,
governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol.
iii): "Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of
the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an opinion
can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things
themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly
always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of
providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern.
Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their
being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather
therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De
Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear
from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above
(Q[44], A[4]; Q[65], A[2]), was the cause of the production of things in
existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is not
fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without
giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists
in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine
goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their
end: and this is to govern.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First,
in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and
such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end.
Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved
or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the
archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the
movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is
directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural
things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is
governed by some reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In all created things there is a stable element, at least
primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we
include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even
that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to
nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be
explained later (Q[104], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are
determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God,
directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved
so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer,
and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which
creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural
things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent.
Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows
the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the
government of Divine Providence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the
world?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not
something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a
thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a
thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is
brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end
of government of things is some good not outside, but within the things
themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an
operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced by an operation. But nothing
can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation
exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the
government of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and
peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things.
Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in
things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is
not an extrinsic good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe.
Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is
not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their
beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something
outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been
expounded above (Q[44], AA[1],2), that we must conclude that the end of
all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it
is clear that good has the nature of an end; wherefore, a particular end
of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of
all things is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of
Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular
good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole
created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation.
Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good
outside the universe.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form
existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something done
by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as
something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of a field
attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing
prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is
directed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts;
for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the end of
a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in
something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building,
but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is
the end not only as made, but also as possessed or acquired or even as
represented, as if we were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue
made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the
whole universe is the end of the government of the universe, as something
possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation
thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the
universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate end, but
is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army
is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the world is governed by one?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we
judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the
universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some
contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore
the world is not governed by one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each
other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler; which
cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act
against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore
the world is not governed by one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is
better that two should be together than one" (Eccles. 4:9). Therefore the
world is not governed by one, but by many.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God and one Lord,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 8:6): "To us there is but
one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to
government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name
of God is taken from Providence as stated above (Q[13], A[8]). Therefore
the world is governed by one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world is governed by
one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is
essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world
must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is the
government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but
the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some
good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boethius proves (De
Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they
desire unity; without which they would cease to exist. For a thing so far
exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as
far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect
therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or
peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several
cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are
united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better
cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is
better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the
government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by
one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10):
"Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a
bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the
mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of
things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the
universe (Q[47], AA[1],2; Q[48], A[2]), and not by a diversity of
governors.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although contraries do not agree with each other in their
proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so far as
they are included in the one order of the universe.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If we consider individual goods, then two are better than
one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is possible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the effect of government is one or many?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of
the world and not many. For the effect of government is that which is
caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which
consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an army. Therefore
the government of the world has but one effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world
is governed by one as we have proved (A[3]). Therefore also the effect of
this government is but one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the
unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many things
governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot
assign any definite number to the effects of government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and
fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs
to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine
government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged from its end;
because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now
the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the
participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the
effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First,
on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one effect,
that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Secondly, the effect of the
government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by
means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in
general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated
to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and
so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard
to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature
becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two
effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and
the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual
the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are
without number.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The order of the universe includes both the preservation of
things created by God and their movement. As regards these two things we
find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one
is moved by another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other
two objections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine
government. For it is written (Eccles. 9:11): "I saw that under the sun
the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to
the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time
and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine government are not
ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not
subject to the Divine government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God hath no care for
oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore
all things are not subject to the Divine government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by
another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master
of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another,
which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are
not subject to the Divine government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven
and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal,
even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree,
hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature." Therefore
all things are subject to His government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is
their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and
this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some
particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved
above (Q[44], AA[1],2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not
created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His
government. This can also be proved from the nature of the end of
government. For a man's government extends over all those things which
come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine
government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (A[2]). Wherefore, as
there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its
end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q[44], A[4]; Q[65], A[2]),
so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible
lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not
subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, "God
hath abandoned the earth" (Ezech. 9:9).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These things are said to be under the sun which are
generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such
things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such
things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very
fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they
are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things
were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite,
especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would
happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore
to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of
a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all
things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects may be found
in these things according to some order of time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Government implies a certain change effected by the
governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a
movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii,
3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act.
Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as
regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the
Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their
variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having
dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in
this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly;
but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from
evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But
irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus
governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that "God hath no care for
oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but
only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and
will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine
intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational
creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be
governed by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately.
For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of
Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to
the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the
second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the
round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he
ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth
of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately
governed by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible,
than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But God can by
Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it
seems that He governs all things immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems
to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus an earthly
king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and
because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by
means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and
grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater
subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of
life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just
spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered; the
design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of
the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things
immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of
others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so
everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness.
Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or
knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing the
individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only
give his attention to general principles, but who can consider the least
details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say that God has
the design of the government of all things, even of the very least.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by
government, this government will be so much the better in the degree the
things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection
for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in
others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things
that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a
master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the
faculty of teaching others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God
did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government;
this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the
design of government, into three parts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the
perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would
not be accomplished by one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his
laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity;
because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into
greater evidence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order
of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that "God
disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order
of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of
a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order
of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and
casual.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and
unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design.
Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government,
it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is
contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to
occur outside the order of the Divine government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Esther 13:9): "O Lord, Lord, almighty
King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy
will."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result outside the order
of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal
cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of
a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which other
cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion
may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such
impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed
to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause.
Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but
of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside
the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one
point of view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence
considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come
back to that order as regards some other cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever
founded on good, as shown above (Q[48], A[3]). Therefore something is
said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular
good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it
would wholly cease to exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular
cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine
providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine
declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to
their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as
though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine
government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some
proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the
Divine government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the
order of the Divine government. For it is written (Is. 3:8): "Their
tongue and their devices are against the Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel
against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's
commands, no one would be justly punished by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine
government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel
against the order of the Divine government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that
can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign
good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is
said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two
ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of
all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular
cause which executes the order of the Divine government.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine
government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the fact that
the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and
everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only, "for no
one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from
the fact that, as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2), every
inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a
kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow
towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer.
Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely
appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said
"to order all things sweetly."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not
that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for even
the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they
resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state.
Therefore they are justly punished by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2 is clear from the above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[103] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows
that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not
that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] Out. Para. 1/1
THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular;
concerning which four points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?
(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?
(3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?
(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by
God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as
that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But
some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore not all
creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is
proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a thing is
necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it; thus a
multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd
number. Now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually
in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms,
as we have said of the angels (Q[50], AA[2],5): and thus to be is in them
of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter
is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly
bodies (Q[66], A[2]). Therefore such creatures as these have in their
nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no
potentiality to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself,
or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not
in potentiality to any other form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a
created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be
preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder
has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire
has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to
be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active
cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any
creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no
creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of
corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can
cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies.
Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to
withdraw His action.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some
action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious,
produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God
must produce something in the creature. But this is not so; because this
action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to
that which already is: nor does it add anything new to the creature;
because either God would not keep the creature in being continually, or
He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of
which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:3): "Upholding all things by the
word of His power."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are
kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing
is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally;
thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its
corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from
falling into the fire. In this way God preserves some things, but not
all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt
them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly,
a thing is said to preserve another 'per se' and directly, namely, when
what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot
exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by
God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a
moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept
in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral.
xvi).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Body Para. 2/6
This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far
as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of
the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its "being." This may
be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes
the house in its "becoming," but he is not the direct cause of its
"being." For it is clear that the "being" of the house is a result of its
form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the
materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus
a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a
builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood
which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it.
Therefore the "being" of a house depends on the nature of these
materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the action of the builder.
The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the
cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of
"being" which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the
effect, in its "becoming" only.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Body Para. 3/6
Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot
directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the cause
of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other;
but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter---in
other words, it may be the cause that "this matter" receives "this form."
And this is to be the cause of "becoming," as when man begets man, and
fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an
aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the
same as in that active cause, then the "becoming" of the effect, but not
its "being," depends on the agent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Body Para. 4/6
Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the
impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as
may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the
same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation
of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can
be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this
matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of "becoming" but also
the cause of "being."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Body Para. 5/6
Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of
the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of the effect: so neither
can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the agent has
ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in "becoming" but also
in "being." This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the
fire's action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be
lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because
water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it
exists in the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect
form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the
form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time
only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat.
On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the
same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light.
Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the
action of the sun.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] Body Para. 6/6
Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun
which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as
the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being
in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas
every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its
existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the
ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would
at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad
lit. viii, 12) he says: "As the air becomes light by the presence of the
sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence
returns at once to darkness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Being" naturally results from the form of a creature,
given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the
diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the
potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is
rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form
or matter of those creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being
after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it
not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be
preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause
of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not
the cause of 'being' but only of "becoming."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation which
consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to
be preserved thus, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that
action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion
or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual
influence of the sun.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God preserves every creature immediately?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For
God creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated
(A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He
preserves all things immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it
cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can
it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves
all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its
"becoming," but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to
cause their effects except in their "becoming," for they cause only by
moving, as above stated (Q[45], A[3]). Therefore they do not cause so as
to keep their effects in being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being.
But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He
also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), a thing keeps another in being
in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering
the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and "per se," by the
fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of the
effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps
another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal things there are
many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that
reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from
putrefaction; and in like manner with many other things. It happens also
that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a
series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that,
while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it
also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the
first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect
which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all
the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and
continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the
diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated;
whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of
diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner astrologers
ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are
permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in
being, by means of certain causes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God created all things immediately, but in the creation
itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on
others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the
principal cause of their preservation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which
it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce
another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of
self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards
the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some
change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But
after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh
change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in
the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken
place, while the preservation of the light is without any further change
in the air due to the presence of the source of light.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can annihilate anything?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine
says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything tending to
non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate
anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist,
since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because God is good,
we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause
things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to annihilate
anything.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His
action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is
existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in
something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes
corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but
yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving existence to
creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not
annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said
above (Q[19], A[4]), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely
contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things
of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6: "Whatsoever the Lord
pleased, He hath done." Therefore that God gives existence to a creature
depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise
than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said.
Therefore, just as before things existed, God was free not to give them
existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not
to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this
would be to annihilate them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause
except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a
cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend
to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since
it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of
things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing His action
therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by
natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on
creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His
goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so, without
prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an
action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anything is annihilated?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end
corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing but
God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be
nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power
extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,
10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." Therefore a
creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it
will be reduced to nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of
themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are
reduced to nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all
the works that God hath made continue for ever."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in
accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously,
and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained
(Q[105], A[6]). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural
order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things which
occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according
to the Apostle, "To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit,
unto profit" (1 Cor. 12:7); and subsequently he mentions, among others,
the working of miracles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For,
either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to
non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at
least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of
generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not
pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power and
goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in
existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything
at all will be annihilated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That things are brought into existence from a state of
non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that
they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since
the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all things in
existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of
His power" (Heb. 1:3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive;
the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence is derived.
Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the
infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is given a
determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be
hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence
which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite,
but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although
they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[104] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do
not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for it is
called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of
existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not
that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality
of the matter, or of the subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the
change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God; secondly,
the change of one creature by another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?
(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?
(3) Whether He can move the intellect?
(4) Whether He can move the will?
(5) Whether God works in every worker?
(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?
(7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?
(8) Of the diversity of miracles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to
receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi,
8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form
which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is not a form in
matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none
of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause;
for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does
not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. But
the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it
cannot produce any particular form, except by means of a particular agent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so
determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we have
seen above (Q[104], A[2]). But the determinate being of a particular
thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by
God, only by means of particular causes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): "God formed man of the slime
of the earth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever
is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power
which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power
extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced to act by the
Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form;
for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways.
First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and
fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the
form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals
produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and
stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like
its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause
extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have
said above (Q[14], A[2]; Q[44], A[2]); wherefore if a composite thing be
produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is
likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore
just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a
composite thing like itself; so also can God. But no other form not
existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate
substance extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible
matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal
seeds.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument would hold if God were to act of natural
necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows the
particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows
that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate
effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes to
certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without
any other cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can move a body immediately?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the
mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says
(Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the
mover and moved. But there can be no contact between God and a body; for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no contact with God." Therefore
God cannot move a body immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable
object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object of desire and
apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which
is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore God cannot move a body
immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite
power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body to be moved
in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows
that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is
impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite
power. But God's power is infinite, as we have explained (Q[25], A[2]).
Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, God produced the works of the six days immediately
among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gn. 1:9
"Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God alone
can move a body immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce
all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause.
Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we
cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies whatever.
This indeed follows from what is above stated (A[1]). For every movement
of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of
things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their
generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or
else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it
belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to that form,
and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only
generates fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as
God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move
any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two
bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is
said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact,
God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according
to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not
touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him.
Thus did Dionysius understand the words, "There is no contact with God";
that is, so that God Himself be touched.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it
does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by
that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He
does all things for His own goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the
power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover "of bulk," by
the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which
he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time).
Now an infinite power, if it were a power "of bulk," would move without
time, which is impossible; therefore the infinite power of the first
mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk. Whence it
is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result
of an infinite power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its
entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an infinite
power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater
the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement.
Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows
that an infinite power does not move in any time; for between one time
and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power
which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates
in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since
it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not
follow that it moves without time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God does not immediately move the created
intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its own
subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in
Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another does
not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the
intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently God cannot move the
created intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of
movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the intellect is
its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand
or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a
sufficient principle of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by
another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the
intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible to
us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move
our intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But
it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore God
moves the human intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which
gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move
the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of
the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now
there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the
intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself, which
principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the
other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of
the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to
move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of
understanding; or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First
immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it
follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each
order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that
from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the
First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First
Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of
His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first
of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects in order that
these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that
they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch
as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded;
and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and
maintains and preserves both power and species in existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in
which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as
from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the
one who understands.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of the
thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a
secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far
as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the
intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God
impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the
created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen
above (Q[12], A[2]; Q[56], A[3]). Hence He moves the created intellect,
and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q[12],
A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can move the created will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever
is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced.
Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the
same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be
voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another.
Therefore God cannot move the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the
one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the
thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary
actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false.
Therefore God does not move the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God who worketh in
us [Vulgate---'you'] both to will and to accomplish."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver
of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A[3]), so is the will
moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of
willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by God
alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable
thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at
least equals the potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality
of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the
universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal
being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the
universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and
moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the power of willing
is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards
the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards
the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end
is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the
community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal.
Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially
in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its
natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the
proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is
made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced.
In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He
gives the will its own natural inclination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that
is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused
by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant
to being moved by another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be
moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for
reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent
its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not
thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God works in every agent?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must
not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works in every
agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous
for the created agent to work at all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two
sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable
things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in
the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and
so no creature works at all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing
made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is the
cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as
He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when
He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the
operating creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all
our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a
way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is
the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not
fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is
impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken
away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the
Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active
power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen
to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these
wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a
way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since
the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is
always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter
is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for
the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is
the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in
things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds
of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that
receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and
the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first
principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the
agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action
(although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly
seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the
end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and
applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three
things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of
some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or
apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the
Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of
every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there
are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the
first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents
act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in
every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to
operated, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just
as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not
give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and
preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action not only by
giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is
said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as
preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be
the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and
preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form
of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer
to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God Himself
is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all
things; it follows that in all things God works intimately. For this
reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God
as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11: "Thou hast clothed me
with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it
does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is
superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same
order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary
and a secondary agent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves
them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of
every action, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established
order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: "God the
Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that
which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore
God can do nothing outside the natural order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of
nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then
He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the
order of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God
does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is
changeable; which cannot be said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes
does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its
effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected
one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher
cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An
example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family
depends the order of the household; which order is contained in the order
of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while
this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is
ordered.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first
cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He
would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if
we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus
God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the
order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to
Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the
choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of
things. Wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him,
when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary
causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary
causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God
acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act
against the supreme law; because He does not act against Himself."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In natural things something may happen outside this natural
order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not
give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a
heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to
move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by
the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; and this
is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which
is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of
water in a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a
heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends.
Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does
anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing
which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in
nature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause,
Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing against
such order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at
the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise
than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does
not change.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside the
natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the world,
and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God
outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any
natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not
everything that God does outside the natural order is a miracle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs,
surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our hopes as to
compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.].
But some things outside the order of nature are not arduous; for they
occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor
are they of rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the
sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the shadow of Peter
(Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people
are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope
for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the
course of nature. Therefore not all things are outside the course of
natur are miraculous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now
admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things
happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses;
as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or
being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of
nature is miraculous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does
anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to
observe, we call it a miracle."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises
when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when a man
sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the
beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a manifest effect may be
known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to
one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not
to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder; as
having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God.
Wherefore those things which God does outside those causes which we know,
are called miracles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though
done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are
not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur
outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the
excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the
faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it
does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual natural course
of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of
nature, not only by reason of the substance of the thing done, but also
on account of the manner and order in which it is done. Again, a miracle
is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace,"
which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future
resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in
itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown to
be wonderful.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one miracle is greater than another?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For
Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In miraculous deeds, the
whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." But by the same
power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one miracle is not greater
than another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds
the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason exists to
wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is
not greater than another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (Jn.
14:12): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these
shall he do."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine
Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of
God, according to Is. 40:15: "Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a
bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing
is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it
surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the
miracle. Now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in
the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same
place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified:
such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest
rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not
in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead,
and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life,
but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly,
a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which it is
done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or
the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed
into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the
prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles.
Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the
different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[105] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do
from the Divine power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] Out. Para. 1/4
HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will
be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual
creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a
spiritual and a corporeal nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] Out. Para. 2/4
Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1)
How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal
nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] Out. Para. 3/4
The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech
of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and of
the bad angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] Out. Para. 4/4
Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?
(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?
(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he
knows himself?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one angel enlightens another?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the
angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one
man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: "They shall
teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother."
Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace,
and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the
Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by
the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does not
enlighten another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is
"informed by God alone, without created intervention," as Augustine says
(QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of
another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of
the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the
angels of the first hierarchy."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must
observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of
truth, according to Eph. 5:13: "All that is made manifest is light."
Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the
manifestation of the known truth; according to the Apostle (Eph. 3:8):
"To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten
all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which
hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one angel is said to
enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "Theologians plainly show that the
orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher
minds."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have
said (Q[105], A[3]), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of
the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known
truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for
just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the
neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot is made
hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so the intellectual power of an
inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him:
since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds
to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the
truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the
superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal
conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not
sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a
more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a
way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped
by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it
is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides
into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This
is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual
substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform
knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its
inferiors upwards by analogy."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence
of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. It is
of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "They shall
teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know the Lord': for all
shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But all the
types of the Divine works, which are known in God as in their cause, God
knows in Himself, because He comprehends Himself; but of others who see
God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence
a superior angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an
inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter;
and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are
enlightened by the types of existing things."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light
of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and
by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace,
and of glory, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as
the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God
alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created
mind is always considered to be unformed, except it adhere to the first
truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or
angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this ultimate form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one angel moves another angel's will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will.
Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A[1]), as one angel
enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing
and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems to point
to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to
obtain an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can
move another angel's will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of the
angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are so called
because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs
to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher
appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior angel is
higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel
can change the will of another angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it
belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of
the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel
cannot change another angel's will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As was said above (Q[105], A[4]), the will is changed in
two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the
part of the object, both the good itself which is the object of the will,
moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points
out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good.
But as we have said above (Q[105], A[4]), other goods in a measure
incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the
universal good, and that is God. And this good He alone shows, that it
may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory,"
answered: "I will show thee all good" (Ex. 33:18,19). Therefore an angel
does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing
the object. But he inclines the will as something lovable, and as
manifesting some created good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can
incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of
persuasion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by
God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer
to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who
bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can
change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows
that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the creature the power to
will, because He alone is the author of the intellectual nature.
Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to
the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing the
intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and
will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But the
enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained
above (A[1]); therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from
the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the
consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the
chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things unknown,
that leads them to more perfect knowledge." For instance, we might say
that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened
by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the
perception of the colored object.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as
explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite
which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it
belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite
is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior
angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and represents
the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our
mother" (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and
taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:31): "You may
all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted."
Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be
enlightened by inferiors.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will
of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as was said
above (Q[105], A[6]), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal
substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of
spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through
their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened by God
can enlighten superiors.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was
above explained (A[1]). But since this turning to another is voluntary,
the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others.
Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can
enlighten his superiors.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable
law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier.
iv; Eccl. Hier. v).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are
always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained
(Q[105], A[6]), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and
hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore there
is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the
inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior cause, as in human affairs
the command of the president is passed over from obedience to the prince.
So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of corporeal
nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing
over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs
to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made
known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order
which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so
that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some
degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy the
perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that
those who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in grade, and more
clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never
enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy,
sometimes those who are the nearer to God in sanctity, are in the lowest
grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in
one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that account superiors
may be taught by inferiors.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As above explained, there is no similarity between what God
does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature.
Hence the argument does not hold.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but
the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made the order
in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he
himself knows?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the
inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the
inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But more is
contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge.
Therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by the
inferior, through these being enlightened by the former.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the
superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereas
the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we
find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in ignorance: "Who
is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of
Hosts, He is the King of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii).
But this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the inferior
concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all
they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown to the
inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing
more to the inferior; which appears open to objection. Therefore the
superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory,
Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there are
some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius
says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift
derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as
to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature of
good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give
their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is
established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it
strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as possible. Hence
the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace share in the Divine
goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same
one to another; as good stewards of the manifold grace of God" (1 Pt.
4:10). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of
participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same to those below them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as
by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in a
higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master
understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more
universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Master's words are not to be understood as if the
inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation
but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that
they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when the Mystery was
accomplished.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[106] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being
revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the
world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always
something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] Out. Para. 1/1
THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether one angel speaks to another?
(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?
(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?
(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?
(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one angel speaks to another?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For
Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection "each
one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less,
therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech manifests
to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary
that one angel should speak to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to
oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior speech
takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some
bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to
the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he
says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen;
for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does
not speak to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): "If I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says
(Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of
bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of
interior speech."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as
we explained above (Q[82], A[4]), when treating of the actions and powers
of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an
intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first,
habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7);
secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to
something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object passes from
the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in
the definition of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he
wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the
third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is
ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to the performing of
an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns
itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a
person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the
interior word." And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is
ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the
concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel
speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known the
mental concept to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The
first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can
direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another,
according to 1 Cor. 2:11: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but the
spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental
concept is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body;
and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind
to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but some
sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says
(Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the
wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as
it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are." But an
angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to
another at once.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us
on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel;
but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the
interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to
another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called
metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels,
inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one ever sees
the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by
their very nature they can speak to each other, and even now the bad
angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by
the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object.
Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an
angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the
superior. For on the text (1 Cor. 13:1), "If I speak with the tongues of
men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an
enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior. But the
inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (Q[106],
A[3]). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as was said above (Q[106], A[1]), to enlighten means
merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to
speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the same
conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by
the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and invisible
things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks,
He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening.
Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier.
vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of
Glory?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make
this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an
angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an
enlightening; because, as we have said (A[1]), for one angel to speak to
another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his
mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now
what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold principle; to God
Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who
understands, whereby we actually consider anything. But because truth is
the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; the
manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the
primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for example, when one
man says to another: "Heaven was created by God"; or, "Man is an animal."
The manifestation, however, of what depends on the will of the one who
understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for
instance, when one says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do
this or that." The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a
rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes
from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know what
you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the
perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by
comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, which
depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior
angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the principle, he who
wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what
belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. In that
manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the inferior
speak to the superior.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening;
because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the
perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God
wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as was
explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel speaks to God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech
makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make known anything
to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to
another, as was shown above (A[1]). But an angel ever orders his mental
concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God;
which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes
speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks to
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Zach. 1:12): "The angel of the Lord
answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on
Jerusalem." Therefore an angel speaks to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As was said above (AA[1],2), the angel speaks by ordering
his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another
in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to
another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in
human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an
angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns the truth, or of
whatever depends on the created will; because God is the principle and
source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered
to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is
ordered to the agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and
in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will
of what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he
can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to
emotions of admiration."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making something
known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of
manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask
instruction from the master.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of
praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by
consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform
any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works where he is."
But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a
determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is limited by the
bounds of that place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the
hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one to another"
(Is. 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham,
notwithstanding the local distance (Lk. 16:24). Much less therefore does
local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation,
as explained above (AA[1],2,3). And the intellectual operation of an
angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our own intellectual
operation takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except
accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at all in
an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now,"
neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever.
Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad 2), is
interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists in
the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But
as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, so neither
does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of
another; and this is to perceive his speech.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of
the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is
said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says
(Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less one cries out."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to
another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not know
what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance
has no effect, as above explained (A[4]). Therefore all the angels know
what one speaks to another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So
if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by one, it is
for the same reason known by all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment
of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, as Dionysius
says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what
he learns to the others." Therefore the speech of one angel to another
extends to all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, One man can speak to another alone; much more can this
be the case among the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As above explained (AA[1],2), the mental concept of one
angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the
concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be ordered
through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the
concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and
therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another;
whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of local distance, but on
account of the will so ordering, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[107] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the
first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; and
in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of
something ordered to the principle of the created will, which is proper
to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches
should be common to all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and
orders; for it was said above (Q[106], A[3]), that the superior angels
enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] Out. Para. 2/2
Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?
(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?
(3) Whether in one order there are many angels?
(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?
(5) Of the names and properties of each order.
(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.
(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?
(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For
since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident that they are
ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to
be governed by one authority, as the Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did.
xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred
principality, it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is
order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one order
towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled.
Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found
among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. Therefore
likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three
hierarchies of angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above
explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and
the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one
God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all
creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but
also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred
things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are two
cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other
of the wicked." But if we consider the principality on the part of the
multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one"
accordingly as the multitude can be subject in "one" way to the
government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same
way by a prince belong to different principalities: thus, under one king
there are different cities, which are governed by different laws and
administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine
enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; for the angels receive
them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under
sensible signs, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must
needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In
the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was
shown above (Q[55], A[3]), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the
superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the
inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the
angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are
enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding
from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge
belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as
it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created
causes which in some way are already multiplied; which mode belongs to
the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to
particular things as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the
lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each
of the orders (A[6]). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on
the part of the multitude of subjects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of
Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it the
"supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists,
indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order, for as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so directed
that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and that others
cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to the
Divine Persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection considers principality on the part of the
ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the
Philosopher asserts in those passages.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one
way---that is, in His essence---there is no hierarchical distinction
among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of
created things, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of
understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence the same
argument does not apply to both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several
orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined is also
multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii).
Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but
many.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among
spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among the
angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is
possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not
different orders of angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are
distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening,"
and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of
priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting," as Dionysius
says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and
perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that "God has set the
Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion":
which are the various orders of the angels, and some of them belong to
one hierarchy, as will be explained (A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is one
principality---that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule
of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if
there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy
requires diversity of orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and
actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders
according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who
judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who labor in
the fields, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced
to three, when we consider that every multitude has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be
seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last, as
the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the
middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each
angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and
offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three---namely, to the
summit, the middle, and the base; and so in every hierarchy Dionysius
places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order
comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy is
called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that
sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All things are possessed in common by the angelic society,
some things, however, being held more excellently by some than by others.
Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it,
than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the hot thing which can
communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And
the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he
occupies, as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership who can teach
a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of
grades or orders among the angels, according to their different offices
and actions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our
hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the kingdom
of heaven, is greater than he"---namely, John the Baptist, than whom
"there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of women" (Mt.
11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only
cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher way than can the
orders of our hierarchy. Thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished
by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are many angels in one order?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was
shown above (Q[50], A[4]), that all the angels are unequal. But equals
belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which
can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one angelic
office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently
than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as the angel
is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are
distinguished by their offices, as stated above (A[2]), several angels in
one order would be superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are
unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four), are
of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to
the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his own order;
and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than
with the former. Therefore there are not many angels of one order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another" (Is.
6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish
its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he
who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a
general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who knows
natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general
way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior bodies
in another, plants in another, and animals in another; whilst he who
knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders
in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders
in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew
the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know
perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among
things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a
common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely
speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in
one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle,
and last.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each
angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the
two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards
their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in
quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more
akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of
its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar offices, which
fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic
nature?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders
is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a sacred
principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches
a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. Hier. iii). But sanctity
and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature.
Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by
grace, and not by nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes not
from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rm. 5:5): "which is said not only of holy
men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii).
Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but from grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the
heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift
of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and
another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels
are the orders from nature, but from grace only.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a
multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some gift
of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts."
Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts
of grace, but also by gifts of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The order of government, which is the order of a
multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the
angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of
nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge and love;
and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are
distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, the end of the angelic
multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which
consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable
fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and
hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately
distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts,
forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the
capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above
explained (Q[62], A[6]). Hence among men the orders are distinguished
according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural
gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
From the above the replies to the objections are evident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly
named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly
virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals.
Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the
words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one order
of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and
likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore these three
names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this
name ought not to be given to any other order than to the
"Principalities."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which
pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But charity
and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought
not to be names of any particular orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and
loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it. Therefore there
ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the "Cherubim" and
"Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not
properly styled.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so
named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in Is. 6:2; the name "Cherubim"
in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in Col. 1:16; "Dominations,"
"Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in Eph. 1:21; the
name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name
"Angels" is found in many places of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the
angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each
order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each
order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something may be
found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by
way of participation. A thing is said to be in another by way of
property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature: by excess
when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is
possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated (Q[13], A[2])
concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation,
when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially; thus
holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to
be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named
from what it participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses
in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance,
when we wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational
substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter is the
proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel
as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him a
"sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense
is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more
excellent way than to other animals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections
are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in
the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these
perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the
superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by
participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the
inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and
thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the
orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify.
Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in
Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for he says that
"angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels
in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers
hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities preside over the good
spirits themselves."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits, so
far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But the
superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this
manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The lowest
order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and
therefore it is denominated from manifestation only; and thus the common
name remains as it were proper to the lowest order, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially
called the order of "angels," forasmuch as they announce things to us
immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
"Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the
medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all the
heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly
essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and
thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. viii) that the "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile
and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine operations
which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it
signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine behests appointed to
them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is attributed
to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word gives
the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation,
through whom the inferior angels receive the Divine gifts." Hence
Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Domination" means
first "a certain liberty, free from servile condition and common
subjection, such as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression,"
endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies "a certain
rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not bend to any servile act, or
to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants."
Thirdly, it signifies "the desire and participation of the true dominion
which belongs to God." Likewise the name of each order signifies the
participation of what belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the
participation of the Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the
rest.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality" belong
to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to prescribe
what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that "some
companies of the angels, because others are subject to obedience to them,
are called dominations." The name "Power" points out a kind of order,
according to what the Apostle says, "He that resisteth the power,
resisteth the ordination of God" (Rm. 13:2). And so Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. viii) that the name "Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as
regards the reception of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions
performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above.
Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be
done by those who are subject to them. To preside [principari] as Gregory
says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first in
carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities" signifies "one who leads in a
sacred order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are
properly called "princes," according to the words, "Princes went before
joined with singers" (Ps. 67:26).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix),
are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium compared to
one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both
extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and hot compared to
cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as
they are princes as regards the "Angels," and angels as regards the
Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are
called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order of the
"Angels"; as it were, announcing greater things: and the "Principalities"
are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the
Divine commands.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 5: The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but
from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire. Hence
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim" according to the
properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. Now in fire we may
consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and
continuous. This signifies that they are borne inflexibly towards God.
Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which is not found in fire
simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating
action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and as it were, with
superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels,
exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to
a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we
consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies
that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that
they also perfectly enlighten others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 2/2
In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of
knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," which
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the
perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their
contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to
the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth
copiously upon others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders as
having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works; whereas
the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "Seraphim" the
excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent attributes include
the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones" does not include the
other two; and so the order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the
orders of the "Cherubim" and the "Seraphim." For it is a common rule in
all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the
superior, but not conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains
the name "Thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may
consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the
earth, and to the angels who are called "Thrones" are raised up to the
immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in
material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly
on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are
made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits
thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive God
in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures.
Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the
sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve
Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly
assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the names of
"Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves imply
prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the
order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer to the
sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher
than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher than the
"Seraphim."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the
"Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed
immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest
hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle, the
"Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the
"Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the "Powers"
last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the
"Archangels," and lastly the "Angels."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Body Para. 1/7
I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory
(Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as regards
all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius places the
"Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above the "Powers"; the
"Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels."
Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" between the "Dominations"
and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers" and the
"Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words
of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21) enumerates the middle orders,
beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His
right hand in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and
Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers" and
"Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to
the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same orders from the highest, he
says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all
things were created by Him and in Him." Here he places the
"Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Body Para. 2/7
Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in
which we see, that, as said above (A[1]), the highest hierarchy
contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the
universal causes; and third in their application to particular effects.
And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but
also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider
the end; to the middle one belongs the universal disposition of what is
to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition
to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear
that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius,
considering the properties of the orders as derived from their names,
places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are taken
from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones";
and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a
certain kind of common government or disposition---the "Dominations,"
"Virtues," and "Powers"; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders
whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities,"
"Angels," and "Archangels."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Body Para. 3/7
As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we
consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end; thirdly,
we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to
the first, and the third an addition to both. And because God is the end
of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher
says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen
in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the dignity of being able
with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are
privileged to know his secrets; and others above these ever abide with
him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand
the disposition in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones"
are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves,
in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and
this is proper to the whole of the first hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know
the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is
the supreme excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all
this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the
"Thrones"; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together,
they are all called "Angels."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Body Para. 4/7
As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of
which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this belongs
to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out
what is to be done, which belongs to the "Virtues"; the third is to order
how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by
others, which belongs to the "Powers."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Body Para. 5/7
The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine
things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners and
leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and
officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." There are others who
simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others
hold a middle place; and these are the "Archangels," as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Body Para. 6/7
This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the
highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the
higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first
order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the Holy Ghost,
Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first
hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of love. The
lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones," who in
their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones,"
according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called "because through
them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him
in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second
hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations.
The order of the "Powers" is akin to the order of the "Principalities";
for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on those subject to
them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of
"Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples and
kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine
ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; "for the good of
a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2); and
hence it is written, "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted
me" (Dan. 10:13).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] Body Para. 7/7
The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also
reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order what belongs to
the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged
according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine
ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii),
"bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and
all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good
spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of
"Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then the "Powers," who
coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly
powers, as it is written (Rm. 13:3,4). After these come the "Virtues,"
which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after
these are the "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men either
great things above reason, or small things within the purview of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The angel's subjection to God is greater than their
presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the
former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not
the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from
their nearness and relation to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the
"Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more
excellent way, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As above explained (Q[27], A[3]), knowledge takes place
accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is
united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way in
themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher
things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know
lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things,
God above all, is better than to know them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no difference
exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according to
Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name "Principalities"
from their "presiding over good spirits," which also agrees with the
"Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving
efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of the Divine
ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the "Virtues" seem to be the
same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the
first place in the Divine ministrations; since thereby the way is
prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day
of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ will "bring
to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the
kingdom to God and the Father," and this will be in the final
consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished
in that state.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to
cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one angel
will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not
advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders would remain
for no purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. 1:14), that "they
are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive
the inheritance of salvation"; whence it appears that the angelic offices
are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the
elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore
the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Judges 5:20): "Stars remaining in their
order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels
will ever remain in their orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the
distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The
distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the
difference of grace and nature, as above explained (A[4]); and these
differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of
natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be corrupted.
The difference of glory will also ever remain in them according to the
difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic
offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day of Judgment,
and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their
offices are directed towards leading others to their end; but it will
remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. Thus
also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in
battle and in triumph.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end in that
final consummation as regards their office of leading others to their
end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend
towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle, "When He
shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father," i.e. when He
shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are to be
considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. In
ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according
to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually arrive at one
conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge
of a conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms not only in the
new acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the
knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of
the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or belief about the
conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the
causes. So, since the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works
by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light
of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge,
but also as regards the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So,
although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the
knowledge of some things, still this will not prevent their being
enlightened by the superior angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any
more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who are
already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the
angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly
hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle
beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never
transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men
transferred to the angelic orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as
to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like; which do
not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not
transferred to the angelic orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to
what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are
changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.).
Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be
transferred to the orders of angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the
angels of God" (Mt. 22:30). I answer that, As above explained (AA[4],7),
the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of
nature and according to the gifts of grace. Considered only as regards
the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic
orders; for the natural distinction will always remain. In view of this
distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an
equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting as it does
the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will
be equal to the angels in heaven (Lk. 20:36). For whatever belongs to
nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is
from grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order
of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a
degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and
this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some,
however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic
orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will
constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole
society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies of men and angels, but
only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural
gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained (A[4];
Q[62], A[6]). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the
natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to the
superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace,
but not of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The angels according to the order of nature are between us
and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human affairs
are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men
even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves; and hence
according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do
they interfere in the things of the living," as Augustine says (De cura
pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain special dispensation it is
sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by
working miracles, by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that
kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[108] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the
penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons are
nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] Out. Para. 1/1
THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?
(2) Whether among them there is precedence?
(3) Whether one enlightens another?
(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are orders among the demons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For
order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says (De
Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there
is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad angels
there are no orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But
the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy
principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the
demons there are no orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as
is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to belong to an
order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them
the names of each of those orders. But we never find that they are called
"Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore on the same ground
they are not to be placed in any other order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling . . . is
against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of
this darkness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As explained above (Q[108], AA[4],7,8), order in the
angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according
to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is
that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the
perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and
never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in
that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell
away from them, according to what was said above (Q[62], A[3]), that all
the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of
nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have
not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist
without good (Q[49], A[3]); so there is order in the demons, as
possessing a good nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of
God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself;
but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because
they abuse their nature for evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and
the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name "Dominations"
imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore
these names are not given to the angels who sinned.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether among the demons there is precedence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For
every precedence is according to some order of justice. But the demons
are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among
them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do
not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is not to be found
among the demons, according to the text, "Among the proud there are
always contentions" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore there is no precedence among
the demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according to
nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not according
to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but
from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or punishment,
because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most
grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there is no
precedence among the demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world lasts,
angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures
are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. Thus it
is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are
below the heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are subject to the
actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what
we have said (A[1]), that the demons are by natural order subject to
others; and hence their actions are subject to the action of those above
them, and this is what we mean by precedence---that the action of the
subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural
disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among
them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing
inordinate, which "reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all
things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on their
justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does
not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness
whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to
wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be
stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there
exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, who are
naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not
for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because
since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it
follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For
enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can
manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural
knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient
in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior demons abound
in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the
superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting,
as stated above (Q[106], A[1]). But to cleanse does not befit the demons,
according to the words: "What can be made clean by the unclean?" (Ecclus.
34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the
demons. For, as above explained (Q[107], A[2]), enlightenment properly
speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who
enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of the truth is
speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the
demon's perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather
to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten
another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of
speech.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is
enlightenment, but only that which is above described.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no
necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the
demons, because, as above explained (Q[55], A[2]; Q[58], A[2]; Q[79],
A[2]), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural
knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior demons
does not prove that they can enlighten others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the
bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected with
enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by
the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the
evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. Therefore if
they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be
charged to the good angels; which cannot be admitted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature,
as above explained (A[2]). But if the demons fell from every order, as is
commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the
natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the
bad angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous
and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just
spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the
angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in
God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer to
God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have
the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that which
brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the
holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived; and therefore
the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by
the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice requires
the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the
trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors make known
his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the
angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they
direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the
demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their
own wickedness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom.
Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or
men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do
not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[109] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over
demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the power of
Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the
natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, "the spiritual man
judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human
acts."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] Out. Para. 1/1
HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?
(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies
locally?
(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by
angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to
be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we
do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions determined
by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the
government of angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some
corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore they
need not be governed by the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by
different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels,
there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So
also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of
things; which is against what is laid down above (Q[108], A[2]).
Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are
ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, 6),
that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the
invisible creature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is generally found both in human affairs and in
natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the
universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the
power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above (Q[55], A[3]
; Q[108], A[1]), the superior angels who preside over the inferior
possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power of
any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual
substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter,
and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are
absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the inferior angels who have the
less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal
things ruled by the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy
doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of
incorporeal substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they
exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it
belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature
must be moved by a spiritual creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle
who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by
spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign
according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But
he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate
rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls; and this was
because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the
inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the
heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert that many things are done
in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which
the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our
opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency
not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial
substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and
species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than
others; and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately
over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But
Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible
bodies, but something higher and more universal; and so he did not
attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only
over the universal agents, the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a
middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual
substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive
elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these
sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed
from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside
over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual
substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83,
qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed
over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): "The devil was one of
the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and Origen
says on the text, "When the ass saw the angel" (Num. 22:23), that "the
world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over the birth of
animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other
things" (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an
angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than over
plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more
universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is to be
sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over
different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders
of angels, because, as above expounded (Q[108], A[2]), the orders are
distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all
the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of
the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those
angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by
their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an
angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But
corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is
changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and
sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is
corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done
by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal
power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as
appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more efficaciously can an
angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as
appears above (A[1]), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments
to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in
effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal
agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument; and this
it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example,
digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of
the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the
power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but
that it assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the
[joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal
place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore
matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this
visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p.
218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial
forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of
immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent,
for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept
of the "intellect"; and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for
the forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, through
supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the
effect of a formal principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph.
vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite":
for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the
form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which
something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking,
made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to
existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as
every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a
likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when
fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both matter and
form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every
informing of matter is either immediately from God, or form some
corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is
not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept;
especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is
accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of
reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural
bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power
can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example,
the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense
knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent
way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents
themselves, as being the superior cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking
place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not
suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does
matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire
according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire
could not have produced by itself); since to reduce matter to the act of
the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for
it is natural for like to make like.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion.
For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms. But the
angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above (A[2]).
Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion
is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other
movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they
cause local motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as
regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of life.
In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they
do not obey the angels in local motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use
corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this
without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local
motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has
joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence it
is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction
with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the spiritual nature.
But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as
the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what
is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic,
but only to something extrinsic---that is, to place. Therefore the
corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the
spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted
that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances;
whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local
motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides those
which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the sea
does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the
influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result from the
power of spiritual substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion,
can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal agents
to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of
the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the body
united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other
things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it can
move locally bodies not joined to it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether angels can work miracles?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says
(Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues by whom signs
and miracles are usually done."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work
miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, bad
Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles
because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere in the same
work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works
of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work miracles. Therefore much
more can the good angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi,
Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] that
"it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be
brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere." But when
an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural
cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a
fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels and demons
can work miracles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an
inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore
an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work
miracles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): "Who alone doth great
wonders."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when something is done
outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if
something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for
otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as
such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle
is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature. But
God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any other creature
does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and
thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God
works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are said to
work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the
miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the general
resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things
which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. But as we
do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when
anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown
to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do
anything of their own natural power, these things are called "miracles"
not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this way the
magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done
by "private contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the
universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city.
Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is
done as it were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine
justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city.
Therefore good Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine
justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad
Christians by the "signs of public justice," as by invoking the name of
Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in
this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[110] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside the
order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside the whole
created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] Out. Para. 1/2
THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How
far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are
sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?
(2) Whether he can change man's will?
(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?
(4) Whether he can change man's senses?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel can enlighten man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is
enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes
enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is
immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God."
Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (Rm.
1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the
manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His
work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God---that
is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God enlightens man
immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being
enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
Therefore he is not enlightened by them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of
Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such
revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated (Q[106], A[1]; Q[107],
A[2]). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower
things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (Q[109],
A[2]); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men,
who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike
and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q[106], A[1]), the
enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two
functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by
the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible
species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior
so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the angels when the
superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to
the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained above (Q[106], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself
unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the
phantasms, as above explained (Q[84], A[7]). So the angels propose the
intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things,
according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible
for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety
of the sacred veils." On the other hand, the human intellect as the
inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in
these two ways man is enlightened by an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the
habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will tending to
Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as
convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence Augustine
says, "No one believes except willingly." In this respect faith comes
from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that what is to be believed be
proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by man, according to Rm.
10:17, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by
whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part
in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the
angels not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards
what is to be done.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be
strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the
human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can
be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted
by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge
of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood
in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus whoever
understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is
enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to him.
Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that
whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is, which is the
principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner not everyone who
is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels can change the will of man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For,
upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a flame
of fire" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being
spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could not be,
however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change
the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does
not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however, says
that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and
unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men" (De Fide
Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle
good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will. Therefore
the will is changed by them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human
intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which serves
the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite
which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corporeal
organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to
Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord,
whithersoever He will He shall turn it."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within;
in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the
inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change
the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the
intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who
gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who
causes the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can
be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in
as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an
appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God alone
can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by
way of persuasion, as above explained (Q[106], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in
another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite:
thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In
this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can move
the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to
consent to, or to resist, the passion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are
said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them
from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the
will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch
as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way
of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling
"a putting in" because such a work is accomplished within. But good
thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, though they
may be procured by the ministry of the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand
only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something
following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive
appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel can change man's imagination?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For
the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion caused by the sense
in act." But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be
caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the
phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by
an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they
are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an angel
cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (Q[110], A[2]). Therefore he
cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit by
intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the other
spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself,
or accepts it as understood by the other." But it does not seem that an
angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination
can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel
cannot change the imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes
of the things as to the things themselves. But in this there is
deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems
that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by
imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears
from Mt. 1:20;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph
in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power
can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For it
was said above (Q[110], A[3]), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as
regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local
movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it
is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by
the local movement of animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De
Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of
visions in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in
abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend with it,"
that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the
animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle"; so that a certain
appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed
by the external objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits
and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those
who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this
happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the
will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so
also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel,
sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such
alienation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in
act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses,
either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color.
Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the
act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved
within.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the
impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from the
senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local
movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human
imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect
which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he
shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes
enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these
images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the
angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the
imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by
the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus neither was
Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people in
parables, which He did not explain to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel can change the human senses?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the
sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation does not
come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation
cannot be caused by an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive.
But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other natural forms.
Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects.
But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Q[110], A[4]). Therefore
an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the
sensible object.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of
Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the door"
(Gn. 19:11). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in
the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses, in
fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom---namely, dazzling
(French version, "eblouissement"), which the Latin "caecitas" (blindness)
does not necessarily imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom
Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kgs. 6:18).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from
without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for we
see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are
disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with choleric
humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses.
Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change in the senses both
ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without,
formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as
we have said above (Q[51], A[2]). Likewise he can move the spirits and
humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in
various ways.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without
the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this interior
principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above
explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel
can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, and
also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using
a corporeal organ.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[111] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of
creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since he
is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work
a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] Out. Para. 1/1
THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?
(2) Whether all are sent?
(3) Whether those who are sent, assist?
(4) From what orders they are sent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry.
For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual actions
do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and
"now." Since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual, it appears
that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the
angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it seems
that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom;
hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive wisdom"
(Ecclus. 38:25). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations,
they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole of
their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were
sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is unfitting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is
written (Lk. 22:27): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or
he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the angels are
naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer
to us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:20): "Behold I will send My
angels who shall go before thee."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, From what has been said above (Q[108], A[6]), it may be
shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have
already stated (Q[43], A[1]), in treating of the mission of the Divine
Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as
to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he
already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent as
proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by
grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by the presence of
His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because,
since He is the universal agent, His power reaches to all being, and
hence He exists in all things (Q[8], A[1]). An angel's power, however,
as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches
to one thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is "here"
in such a manner as not to be "there." But it is clear from what was
above stated (Q[110], A[1]), that the corporeal creature is governed by
the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a
corporeal creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his
power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this takes
place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as
from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the angels
work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant
by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent instrument; while an
instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another.
Hence angels' actions are called 'ministries'; and for this reason they
are said to be sent in ministry.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way,
as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an operation
does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin.
iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting something eternal, are
not in this world." In another sense an action is said to be intellectual
because it is regulated and commanded by some intellect; in that sense
the intellectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way
of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body should be
attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an
angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven; so when he is
not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as
neither does a king lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his
regal throne, which suits his dignity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by
exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the
sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action
of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary, regulates his
exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that
his external occupations in no respect impede his contemplation; because
given two actions, one of which is the rule and the reason of the other,
one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.
ii) that "the angels do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the
delights of inward contemplation."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to
God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them,
absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to
God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior to every
creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): "Esteeming others better
than themselves."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the
Apostle says (Heb. 1:14): "All are ministering spirits, sent to minister"
[Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim,
as stated above (Q[108], A[6]). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips
of the prophet (Is. 6:6,7). Therefore much more are the inferior orders
sent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic
orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even the
highest angels sent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external
ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the
Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels
are unequal, as stated above (Q[50], A[4]), each angel has an angel
inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel
would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words, "Thousands of
thousands ministered to Him" (Dan. 7:10).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the
statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks fulfil
no exterior service."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (Q[106], A[3];
Q[110], A[1]), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only
among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior things
are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, however,
this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal things, for
the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for the
manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that
Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished immediately by God
without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad
angels can work some effect in these bodies independently of the heavenly
bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some
such effects. Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things
to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels without
the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the
general law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet
that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is
greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law; in
order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law.
Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those
who were sent to give the law.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who
was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; but
was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense,
because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. It may also be said
that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they
are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of
the Seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as
if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his
power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by
means of someone else.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said
to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been said
(Q[43], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence
there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent
immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are
sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior ministries.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. For
Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent, and assist;
for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God,
is not limited."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said,
"I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the Lord"
(Tob. 12:15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet
Satan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: "When the sons of God came to
stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them." Therefore much
more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is
because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but
through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine
enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all.
Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the
text of Dan. 7:10: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before
Him." Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says, on Job 25:3: "Is there any numbering of
His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go forth
as messengers to men." Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not
assist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and
"administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some
of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while
others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who are
in attendance---for instance, those who are placed at the head of the
administration of various cities; these are said to administer, not to
assist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine
Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister, are
said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who are sent
on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the
face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of
the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but
only the superior angels who announce them to the inferior: and in that
respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are
said to assist, whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened
immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections,
which are based on the first mode of assisting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present
among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii), "though he has
lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory
of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative
of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by
God; while the higher ones among them see more than is seen by the
inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist
the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are
sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according to Dan.
7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are
enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are
sent in ministry.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who
minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the angels of
the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels
of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "Dominations
are above all subjection." But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore
the dominations are not sent to minister.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above stated (A[1]), to be sent to external ministry
properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in
respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the execution of the
Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their
names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of
those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind
of administration. But the name "dominations" does not signify any such
administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the
other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for
the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the
"Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is
right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in
Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five
orders to be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels,
not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by
others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his
art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of
the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those who
minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the
words (Dan. 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a
multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands";
thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies
excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added,
"and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him." This
explanation rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the
nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in
number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than
multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as
six administer and three assist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[112] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of
angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the
superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable
degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures
in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more
multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the ministers
there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way, the words
"thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify
"a thousand times a thousand." And because ten times a hundred is a
thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean
that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since it is written
"ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that
the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this
said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but rather
that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This
is signified by the multiplication together of all the greatest numbers,
namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same
passage.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and
their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight points
of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?
(2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?
(3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?
(4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?
(5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?
(6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?
(7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?
(8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their
guardianship?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men are guarded by the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For
guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, or are
not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able
to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural knowledge
of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men
are guarded by God, according to Ps. 120:4: "He shall neither slumber nor
sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need to be guarded by
an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of
the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this man; and if
he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (3 Kgs. 20:39). Now
many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by
visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some such-like way. The angels
would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But
that is clearly false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 90:11): "He hath given His angels
charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that
in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by the
immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual
substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are invariable
in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions,
about which we may have various opinions, by the principles which we hold
in an invariable manner. It is moreover manifest that as regards things
to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in
many ways; and so it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the
guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but
not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection
towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise
universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to man,
to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree;
because in the application of the universal principles of law to
particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is
written (Wis. 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our
counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Two things are required for a good action; first, that the
affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the habit of
mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods
to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher (Ethic. vi)
attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately
by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards
man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium
of the angels, as above stated (Q[111], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason
of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the
good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he
may do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the
negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes
appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a
special grace of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order
of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether each man is guarded by an angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an
angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard many men.
Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium
of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But as all the
angels are unequal (Q[50], A[4]), there is only one angel between whom
and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who
immediately keeps men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices.
But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than another; since
all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is
greater than another, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that
different men are not guarded by different angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (Mt. 8:10),
Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an
angel deputed to guard it from its birth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This
rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the
execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts
differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible creatures,
for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not
only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the proper forms of
each individual, which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of
other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God
is chiefly exercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards
things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their
existence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God
is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things
corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the
different orders are deputed to the different "genera" of things, for
instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to work
miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the different
species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it
is also reasonable to suppose that different angels are appointed to the
guardianship of different men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first,
inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian is
due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch
as a man is part of a community, and thus one man is appointed as
guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what
concerns one man in his relation to the whole community, such as external
works, which are sources of strength or weakness to others. But angel
guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things,
concerning the salvation of each one in his own regard. Hence individual
angels are appointed to guard individual men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As above stated (Q[112], A[3], ad 4), all the angels of the
first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but
as to other things, only the superior are directly enlightened by God,
and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the
inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one
of the highest, and in other respects by the one immediately above him.
Thus it is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and
yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists
among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater,
and others to the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11,12: "With
much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways:
some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of them hath He cursed
and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than
another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only
to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that the text (Mt.
18:10), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood not of any
angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels guard men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to minister for
them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb. 1:14); and
thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the
guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external ministry
(Q[112], A[4]). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed
to the guardianship of men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially
necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the Powers,
according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which
belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are also deputed to the
work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed
to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius
(Coel. Hier. v, ix).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above stated (A[2]), man is guarded in two ways; in
one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is
appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order
of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce the
"lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to
procure what concerns the salvation of only one man. The other kind of
guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders.
For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the
guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities,"
or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes. Hence,
Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes"
(Dan. 10:13). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the
"Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits
by the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in
Ev.).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest
order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each order
there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the
greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by God for the higher
degree of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of
individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater or
less, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior,
as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors'
power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the
demons, and work miracles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship
of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that "He was made in
the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If therefore angels
are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ also would have had
an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all
the angels. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all
men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting
that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state of
innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are
not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that
they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, encourage
them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons.
But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain to eternal life.
Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform
them well, for they have not a right intention: for "faith directs the
intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 31). Moreover, the coming
of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan," as it is
written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels are not deputed to the
guardianship of all men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, is the authority of Jerome quoted above (A[2]), for he
says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a
road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is
threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according
to Ps. 159:4: "In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for
me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have to pass by
an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as
he is a wayfarer. When, however, he arrives at the end of life he no
longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to
reign with him, in hell a demon to punish him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God:
wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards His
soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He
was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right that He should have
not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as
inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Mt. 4:11) that "angels came and
ministered to Him."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any
peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we have
said above (Q[95], AA[1],3). But peril threatened from without on account
of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason
he needed a guardian angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ,
are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither are
they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human
race---namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the help which
they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by
good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from
certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. For even the
demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they
would. In like manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would
wish.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from
his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who shall receive
the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14). But men
begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized.
Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his
baptism, not of his birth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten
and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction as soon as
they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are
not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth,
just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is appointed
to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the
sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard men
from the moment of their birth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome says (vide A, 4) that "each soul has an angel
appointed to guard it from its birth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two
opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian is
appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the
time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves (vide A, 4), and with
reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a
Christian, begin with his baptism; such as receiving the Eucharist, and
the like. But those which are conferred by God on man as a rational
being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives
that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of
angels, as we have said above (AA[1],4). Wherefore from the very moment
of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed,
for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if we consider
the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that
inheritance. But for all that, the angelic ministrations are not
withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring
them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they
ward off many evils.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction,
as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many other
effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons,
and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not
entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part
of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree.
And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the
angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at
its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is
appointed to it; as Jerome, above quoted, says.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man
whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in the person
of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let
us forsake her." And (Is. 5:5) it is written: "I will take away the
hedge"---that is, "the guardianship of the angels" [gloss]---"and it
shall be wasted."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God
forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: "O God, my God, look upon
me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does an angel
guardian forsake man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When the
angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes they are
in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1 Pt.
5:8: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking
whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As appears above (A[2]), the guardianship of the angels
is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident
that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the
providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is
it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is
said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but
only in so far as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of
fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never
forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular,
for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or
even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine
judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House of Israel are said to have
been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not
prevent them from being subject to tribulation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he
does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his
guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to
man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be with man
in an instant.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they
guard. For it is written (Is. 33:7): "The angels of peace shall weep
bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels
grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is
for those things that happen against our will." But the loss of the man
whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore
angels grieve for the loss of men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to
sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are told,
Lk. 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: "Whatsoever first-fruits they offer,"
etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to judgment as to
whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own
fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have
brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect
happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 21:4): "Death shall be no more,
nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are perfectly
happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains
inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But
nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the
other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of
Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save what is effected
or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply speaking, nothing occurs
in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a
particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the
circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be
voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into
the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the
threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary
rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore
universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the
pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the
ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are
subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e.
the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of
Rabsaces, as related Is. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal sense.
According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles
and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical
sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the
expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking the
angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute
passions to God and the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one
reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the
Divine Providence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men,
not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be strife or discord among the
angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): "Who maketh peace in His high
places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels
there is no strife.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there
can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore there
is no strife among the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard,
one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the opposite side.
But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will
follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of wrong; which is
unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 10:13): "The prince of the kingdom
of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this prince of the
Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the
Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is
strife among them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The raising of this question is occasioned by this
passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the
kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the
people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being offered
to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by
some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in Persia into
sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which
Daniel put up for that same people.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of
Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom. To
see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note
that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men
are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by
the Divine decree. But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various
men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject
to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on
such matters, the angels cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and
so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as
they consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing
merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their wills are in
opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the
Divine decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in
opposition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[113] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?
(2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?
(3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or
temptations of the demons?
(4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men
astray?
(5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making
further assaults?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men are assailed by the demons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels
are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by God: for the
demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of
souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against
the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are weak and
ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore
to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men should be
assailed by demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for
man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed that they may be
exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the
demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling is not
against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against
the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of
wickedness in the high places."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the assault of the
demons---the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself
is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder
man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine power, by
deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their
various offices minister to man's salvation. But the ordering of the
assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by
ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both
their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to God as
their first author.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by
instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail us,
but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments.
But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus they are
sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of
Israel, as is related in 3 Kgs. 22:20. For punishment is referred to God
as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do
so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they
punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of
His justice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal,
there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally
through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the
angels. Wherefore (4 Kgs. 6:16), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not,
for there are more with us than with them."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for
the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's
malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the
Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God
is said to tempt, according to Gn. 22:1, "God tempted Abraham." Moreover
man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt
God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know
what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the
will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears
from what has been said above (Q[111], A[2]), it seems that it is not in
their province to tempt.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): "Lest perhaps he that
tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds, "that is, the
devil, whose office it is to tempt."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of
something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something
about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But
sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired
through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to
know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue,
with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought
with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various
ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of
knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man,
being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of God's
power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to
hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man
into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for
thought at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil.
God is said to tempt that He may know, in the same sense as that is said
to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written (Dt. 13:3): "The
Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter
of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man someone is,
according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and
according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which
things the devil also makes use in tempting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the
inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher of
spirits" (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more prone
to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore
this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to
which he is most prone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated
above (Q[111], A[3]), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a
certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can
nevertheless be inclined.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the
devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude of demons is
the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." And Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all malice and all uncleanness have been
devised by the devil."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the
Jews (Jn. 8:44): "You are of your father the devil." But this was in as
far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. Therefore every sin
is due to the devil's instigation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are
deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the
suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us
by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of
the devil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all our
evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from
the movement of our free-will."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another in two ways;
directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a
disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and
indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who
dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must
admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was who
instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a
proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take
the words of Damascene and Dionysius.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action
tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the cause of
every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but
some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as
Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would
have the desire for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to
which many disorders may arise unless those desires are curbed by reason,
especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in
the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep it in order.
Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation
of the devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates
"through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our first
parents," as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by
the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so
far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot
advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man by
the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all
our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the demons'
instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes
due to the demons' suggestion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of
real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show itself especially
in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:9), his
"coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs,
and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other times do the demons
perform lying wonders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But
demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive
the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power." Therefore the
demons cannot work real miracles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If
therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of what
is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This
is unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): "The Lord working withal,
and confirming the word with signs that followed."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Q[83]; [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among
the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "Often by means of the magic
art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of
God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said above (Q[110], A[4]),
if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work
miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the strict sense
a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created
nature, under which order every power of a creature is contained. But
sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the
human power and experience. And thus demons can work miracles, that is,
things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond
his power and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing
what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at
what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a
miracle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which
appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes
nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons'
power produced real serpents and frogs. And "when fire came down from
heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm
struck down his house and with it his children---these were the work of
Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 19).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of
Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive
men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he
will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they will lead
those into falsehood who believe in him."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: As we have said above (Q[110], A[2]), corporeal matter does
not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able
by their power to transmute matter from one form to another; but they can
employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to
produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore
it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal things which
can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the
seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the operation of the
demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of
certain things into serpents or frogs, which can be produced by
putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be
produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be effected by the
operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed
into the body of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life.
And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by the
operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a
demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses, so
that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (Q[111],
AA[3],4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power
of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as he can from the
air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in
it visibly: so, in the same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with
any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "Man's imagination, which whether thinking or
dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, appears to
other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal."
This not to be understood as though the imagination itself or the images
formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the
senses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's
imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do what
holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different right. The
former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the
former, by certain private compacts; the latter by the evident assistance
and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from
making further assaults?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for
that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ overcame the
tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by
instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not true that the devil
when conquered ceases his assaults.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a
fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not befitting
God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from
further assaults.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 4:11): "Then the devil left Him,"
i.e. Christ Who overcame.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can
no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin.
And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems
more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain
definite time: wherefore (Lk. 4:13) it is written: "All temptation being
ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for
this. One is on the part of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super
Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works],
"the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as
long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time,
He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken
from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13:
"The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent
defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the
assault, is apparent from Mt. 12:44: "I will return into my house from
whence I came out."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[114] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate,
which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a body can be active?
(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?
(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by
the inferior bodies?
(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?
(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?
(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which
are subject to their influence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a body can be active?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but do not act;
such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is
God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the
spiritual substances."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work
a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance below the
corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action;
since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. Therefore corporeal
substance is not active.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But
quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds
it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving
light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity, the
heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal
substance is active.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its
propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most composite,
are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple.
Therefore no bodies are active.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either
a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial form;
for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an
active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause
of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the
effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does
not extend beyond its subject," as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4).
Therefore no bodies are active.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other
qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and
power on that of which it lays hold."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active.
But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. For
some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his
book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments mentioned above, he
endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which
seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power
that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire
that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire.
And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held
that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, and
determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and
as it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the
causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form
which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized
by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and
imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be
unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual
and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue
forth by acting on something else.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but
that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is
participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper
thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the
participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to
make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such;
wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its
being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes
its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it
is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and
particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the
Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every
ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the
cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such
an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato
held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred accidents
to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which
he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to the
"the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who
follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through
their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form; but
that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the
substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this is the
second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken
above when treating of the creation (Q[45], A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes
place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while passion
consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body.
This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would
follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of
the active body would be diminished through its action; which things are
manifestly untrue.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a
body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole
corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no nature inferior
to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the
corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one body
is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which
the other has in act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be
observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not moved,
to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there
exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is to be
conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure
potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of
potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from
action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a
form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The
proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. First,
because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De
Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight retards
movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement,
if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is
not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by something
being reduced from potentiality to act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it
participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it
has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which
is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and
a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself
an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its
instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form;
thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action
terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its own virtue it produces
an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpass its
subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one
were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the
agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of
atoms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal
matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual order. But in
corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that
is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no
seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce
certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which
they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed
with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are
seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active
principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is
not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal
virtues in corporeal matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues"
(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the
production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for
miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal
virtues in corporeal matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things
which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie
hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more
perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole
corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word
"nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things.
For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did.
iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things,
which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from
a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from
the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been
applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved.
Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the
generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are
generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal
virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and passive virtues
which are the principles of natural generation and movement.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders.
For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are
principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas."
Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced
altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are
in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by
universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in
"particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from
animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular
effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought
not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal
matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin,
forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes ideales].
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of
corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the
production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the
generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the
female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed"
covers both active and passive principles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal
virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as
seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother
is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant
with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be
called "causal virtues," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues,"
because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not
wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are
miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in
the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God
commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the
natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered
to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they
are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies
here below?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what
is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are not the cause
of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and
atmospheric changes."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter
suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there are
contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the
production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to
the heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed
that everything which is produced here below is produced through the
action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities,
which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies are
not the cause of what is produced here below.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more
corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign
of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be
male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause
of things produced in bodies here below.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser
and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more
subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the
light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves
them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what
is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is moved
has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of
nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore the more
immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things
which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the
most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. Therefore the
movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be
referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying
that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption
here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly
bodies are gods.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 2: The active principles of bodies here below are only the
active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. If
therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified
save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which the
early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there
would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies,
for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But to anyone who
considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely
material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural
bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it
is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material
dispositions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/3
This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species,
by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial
forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since
they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of
being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and
corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 3/3
Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10),
to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or
absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates
here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of
a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and
the sun generate man."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the
bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of
their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is
contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in
inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it
happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly
disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male,
sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against
divination by stars: because the effects of the stars are varied even in
corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human
actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
substances, as stated above (Q[110], A[3]), they act by virtue thereof as
their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our
souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls,
and thereby cause human actions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But
human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that they are
reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their
principles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the
outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and will
are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly
bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions. Therefore the
heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly
bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on
bodies, as stated above (A[3]). They can act directly indeed on those
powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but
accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by
obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well.
Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal
organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from
sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the
cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led by
natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there
are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for
whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies,
is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will,
and that he would have determinate actions, like other natural things.
All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be
observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of
heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as
both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which
are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are
differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the
inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative,
or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of
necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of
necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although
the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in
inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following
the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the
heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed,
has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human
actions, than on the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human
actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from
sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is
the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii
135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not
acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the
cause of human actions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do
indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they
act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other
hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (Q[111], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is
reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: so
the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is
reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect and will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are
movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly
bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions.
Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority
of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for
nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-will. Wherefore
the astrologers themselves are wont to say that "the wise man is stronger
than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit,
he conquers his passions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the
demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on
that account are called lunatics, as appears from Mt. 4:24 and 17:14. But
this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies.
Therefore the demons are subject to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to
invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the heavenly
bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to
them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies.
But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, "herbs,
stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as
Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more
therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the
heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the
action of heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the
first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held
that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is
effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on
earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of
the stars." But this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by
experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of
heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a
state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and
authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make
statues to speak and move, and other like things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals
with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says, quoted by
Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions
mentioned above: according to which it could be said that demons are
subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject
thereto (A[4]). But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have
said above (Q[51], A[1]): for we hold that demons are spiritual
substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject
to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally,
neither directly nor indirectly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the
moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame God's
creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom
(Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as they are unable to effect
anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (Q[114],
A[4], ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the
intended result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of
all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7:
De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most
subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what
is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate:
wherefore the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb
man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come
for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of
believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because
they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is
better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are
enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs,
rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs";
that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of
the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their
action?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things
subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the effect follows
of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their
effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements and
dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of
necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when
the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself
entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the
power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs.
Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in
corporeal matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of
necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal cause,
that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of
necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly
bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore,
since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows that the
effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. Consequently it
would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin.
per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed in
bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not
be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take
place of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above
(A[4]); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that
although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in
corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow
these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of
heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man
himself, but also in other things to which human action extends.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] Body Para. 2/4
But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom
to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents.
Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of
necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who
supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the
cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things happen
of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v,
3) as to this double supposition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] Body Para. 3/4
For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to
their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority
of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But that such
cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause;
consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided,
since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] Body Para. 4/4
Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a
being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a
thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has not
a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because
it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause
which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to
produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by
accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is
accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of
causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which
it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take
fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by
some heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth
some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But
that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is
not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all
the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place
here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can
fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it
requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local distance
and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as
local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the sun has not
the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of
matter, its low or high temperature or other such disposition, can hinder
the effect of a heavenly body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[115] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause
can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing
of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a
heavenly body, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] Out. Para. 1/1
ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Is there such a thing as fate?
(2) Where is it?
(3) Is it unchangeable?
(4) Are all things subject to fate?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there be such a thing as fate?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily
for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the hearts of the
faithful to think that fate is anything real."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived from the verb
'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to happen by
fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to happen. Now what
is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen
by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De
Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper
order."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like
as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause,
is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by their
master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to
themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who had ordered
it, it is directly intended.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the existence
of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9).
And this is contrary to what we have said above about Providence (Q[22],
A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place
here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human
affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly
bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a disposition of
the stars under which each one is begotten or born" [*Cf. St. Augustine
De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not hold. First, as to human
affairs: because we have proved above (Q[115], A[4]) that human actions
are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and
indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things
that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the
cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen
accidentally: for it has been said (Q[115], A[6]) that what is
accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every
action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible
for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural
principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that
a man intending to dig a grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that
a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore
its effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that
any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by
accident here below, whether by luck or by chance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause,
which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by
accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect
could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a
treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect
it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden,
might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there.
Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or
by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the
intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the
will, as shown above (Q[105], A[4]). Consequently the ordering of human
actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God
alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken,"
we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the
use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a
certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the
will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue."
For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first
objection's solution is manifest.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by
chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to
Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fate is in created things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is called fate."
But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore
fate is not in creatures but in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their
cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that
of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone,
as stated above (A[1]). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an
accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the
number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only,
it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition
inherent to changeable things."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above (Q[22], A[3];
Q[103], A[6]), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes.
We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways.
Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is
called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the
mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus
it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv):
"Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits;
whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by
the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by
the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the
chain of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above
(A[1]; Q[104], A[2]; Q[110], A[1]; Q[113]; Q[114]). It is therefore
manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God
to the production of their effects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De
Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature of fate,
except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be
called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very
disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second
causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is
a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which
is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in
relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be
considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this
fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fate is unchangeable?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to
that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is
the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be moved,
what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent to
changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is
changeable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens
unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem
principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no
contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
unchangeable disposition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can
be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which
are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle,
namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that
the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so
that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each
effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of
necessity. But this is false, as proved above (Q[115], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as
dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate
could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says
(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason
that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes,
is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain
unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this
sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If God
foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." Wherefore Boethius,
having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards
adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must
also itself be unchangeable."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all things are subject to fate?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars,
tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal
transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and
perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed."
Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something
real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is
cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1
seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a
disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are
changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Q[9],
A[2]). Therefore fate is in all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject
to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), fate is the ordering of second
causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to
second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately
by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject
to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances,
and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that
"those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and
exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further
a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of
fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by
means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order
of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to
its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is
subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already
stated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[116] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some
of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these,
therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of
man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In the
first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in
regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his
knowledge?
(2) Whether man can teach an angel?
(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?
(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] Out. Para. 2/2
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one man can teach another?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord
says (Mt. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome
says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to be a
master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to
teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he
acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other.
But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an
active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality
just as heat is.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the
species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of these
in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in
another man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to
propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or
gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge
in him, by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of things
that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows,
he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of
knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of
things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for
instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he
would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause
knowledge in another by teaching him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tm. 2:7): "Whereunto I am appointed
a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and
truth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions. For
Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one
passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q[76], A[2]). From this it
follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men.
Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a
knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he
communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him
to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly
disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as
knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the
identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by
both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one
passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as
to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (Q[76], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our
souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the
participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q[84], AA[3],4); but
that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free
consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the
disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused
by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else
than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only
dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a
participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved
above (Q[79], A[2]; Q[84], A[3]) that the passive intellect of the human
soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says
(De Anima iii, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the
teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from
potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to
make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an
exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as
the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas other
effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an
interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an
exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior
principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter
effects two things must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates
nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection
of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must
remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent,
but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent,
which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing
it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes
use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and
employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is
clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an
exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For
in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light
of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of
all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the
intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain
particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through
the senses; then by his own research advancing from the known to the
unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore
anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter,
to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what
the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning
proceed from previous knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the
unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps
or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition
of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal
propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from
previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples,
either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort,
from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth
previously unknown. Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the
learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as
explained above (Q[106], A[1]; Q[111], A[1]) of the angelic
enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the
natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of
principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient
collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles.
Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a
syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his
hearer to know.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as
the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the principal
cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the
principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God. Therefore
as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Ps. 102:3); so
of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Ps. 93:10),
inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7),
through which light all things are shown to us.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in
the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore
knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which
one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is
directed in working.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light in the
disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he
moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his
intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed
to him from without.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of
things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail
and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he
cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own master because
perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a
master.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man can teach the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says (Eph.
3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the
principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church." But
the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are
made known to angels through men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately
concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as
stated above (Q[116], A[1]; Q[112], A[3]). But some men are instructed
immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears
principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1,2: "Last of all, in these days
(God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore some men have been able to
teach the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But
some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up to the
highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in
Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men
concerning Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine
enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to
them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened
by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior
angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to
the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's words (Mt. 11:11):
"There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a greater than
John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is
greater than he." Therefore angels are never enlightened by men
concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to
angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to
know the heart's secrets.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage
of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least of
all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they
may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden
from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was
made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places---that
is, through the Church." As though he were to say: This mystery was
hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in
the principalities and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before
all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the
resurrection this Church composed of men will be gathered together."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the
angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place and is
made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus
when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the
apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the
angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can understand
what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)---that from the preaching of
the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say,
through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were realized in the
things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were
converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of
God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His
human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain
angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great
charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that
possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed
of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually
it is much smaller.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change
corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work
miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by
prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered to
death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working of miracles a
change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of the
soul, can change corporeal matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): "Who hath bewitched you, that
you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing
eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially children." But this
would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter.
Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But
by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat
and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change
sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. Much more, then,
can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter
obeys God alone at will."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[110], A[2]), corporeal matter is not
changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed
of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and form
pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the
angels also we have stated (Q[110], A[2]) that they cannot change
corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal
agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the
soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of
bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace,
not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same place:
"Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what wonder is there
that they should work miracles by that power?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that
corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance
rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong
imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says is the cause of
the "evil eye."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/3
But it has been shown above (Q[110], A[2]) that corporeal matter does
not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore
it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits
of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits
takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can
reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a
certain distance: in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a
tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et
Vigil.; [*De Insomniis ii]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 3/3
Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs
mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the
countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who
have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by
God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons
co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and the
sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated
above (Q[81], A[3]), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the
apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs be
moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of
the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies,
except by means of a change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad
2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least
locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local
motion, as stated above (Q[110], A[5]). But the separate soul is a
spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its
command.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative
of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained power over the
soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked
magical wonders. But this could not have been without some corporeal
change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power
to move bodies locally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul
cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a
body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the body,
it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of
the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local
motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate
soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul
cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the power of God, it
can exceed those limits.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not
determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally
unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to
movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally
determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to
move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree: thus
according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the
higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to
move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power
move any other body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[117] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom.
xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the
dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is
therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who
pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul;
secondly, as to the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?
(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the
semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not composed of
matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by
generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from matter.
But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not
move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not composed of
matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by
creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is the
generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the vegetative
soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts
beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the
animal's generating power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the
generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But neither the
sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for
no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body;
while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because
there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and
by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced
through the semen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the
sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is
begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it
would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; which
is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and
begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and again
this is impossible, for it has been proved above (Q[76], A[4]) that in
one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on
the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems
to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction,
which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from
the semen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally
generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals
produced from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the
latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according to
Gn. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having
life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are
produced by the seminal power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are
created by God (Q[65], A[4]). This opinion would hold if the sensitive
soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as
having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to
it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by
creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at
existence by creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are
proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q[75], A[3]):
for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore,
it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the
corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them,
but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist
through them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is
like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul,
and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain
corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through
some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for
instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat
carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in
the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, but by
themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as
being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both without and
with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of nutrition, in which
flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of generation, because
the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the
soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive
power from the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that
something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, so
neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is
caused by the soul of the generator, or by some seminal power derived
therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent
substance. We have said enough (Q[25], A[3]) on this point, nor need we
repeat it here.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but
by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the
generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal
begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more
perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This active force which is in the semen, and which is
derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain
movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul,
save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but
a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for
this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital)
spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. In
which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of
the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act
towards the production of the species as stated above (Q[115], A[3], ad
2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent
with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun
generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the
soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force
is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal.
ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter,
the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second
act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps.
But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates
in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the
semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul;
not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the
sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be
identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than
generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the
power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of
the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive
soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own
body, by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the
semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital)
spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this,
because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and
the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been
produced.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the
semen. For it is written (Gn. 46:26): "All the souls that came out of
[Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a
man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced
from the semen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as shown above (Q[76], A[3]), the intellectual,
sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But
the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in other
animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that
the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but first of all
the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the
intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to
the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the form there would
not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of
the human body, which is produced by the power of the semen. Therefore
the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species
is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational soul is from
the begetter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the
rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin of
adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse.
Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the
rational soul is not engendered by coition."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It is impossible for an active power existing in matter
to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is
manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it
has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is
therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual
principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter
according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use
of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in
the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual
principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher
says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone
comes from without."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the
body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q[75], A[2]): therefore to be
and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial
substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through
creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused
by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be
non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore
heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the
whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/5
Reply OBJ 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo
are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from the
formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for
vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from
an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in
the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive,
lastly the intellectual soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/5
Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed
first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in addition to
this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in
man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. This
has been disproved above (Q[76], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 3/5
Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely
vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a
sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not
indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher
agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason
the Philosopher says that the intellect comes from without. But this will
not hold. First, because no substantial form is susceptible of more or
less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species,
just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number. Now
it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different
species. Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an
animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the
imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it
would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation
simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the
vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring, and is
subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of
further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And
this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called.
Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is
something subsistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from
the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come
back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in
the body---or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the
pre-existing soul: and from this it follows of necessity that the
intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 4/5
There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all
men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved above
(Q[76], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 5/5
We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in
other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is
corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of
the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that
through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate
substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is apparent
to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude
therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of
human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and
nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not
ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to one
another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to
the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to
some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the
seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the soul gives the
form. Now it is manifest from what has been said above (Q[105], A[5];
Q[110], A[1]) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument
of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the
formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the
intellectual soul is from God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the
matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good;
in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; in
this God does not concur.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at the
beginning of the world. For it is written (Gn. 2:2): "God rested Him from
all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new
souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the
perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the
bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the
perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the universe
would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gn. 2:2, where it is said
that "God ended" all "His work."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the
intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it began to
exist before the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul
is created together with the body."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some have maintained that it is accidental to the
intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of
the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a
body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created
together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false.
Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were
accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man
who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a
man, which is false, as proved above (Q[75], A[4]). Moreover, that the
human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the
different mode of understanding, as shown above (Q[55], A[2]; Q[85], A[1]
): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to
phantasms, as stated above (Q[84], AA[6],7; Q[85], A[1]). For this reason
the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for
the operation of the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an
angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it
is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it to
be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of
its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God should begin His
work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without
a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore,
did He make the soul without a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to
the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the
reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other
reason. If because the soul willed it---this seems incongruous. First,
because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the
body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be
natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in what is
necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been
created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a
long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual
substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions.
Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by
chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to
concur---to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. If,
however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the
soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul
would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping
with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in
punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable,
we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are
created at the same time as they are infused into them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all
work, since we read (Jn. 5:17): "My Father worketh until now"; but from
the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already
existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are
created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the
first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of the
universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of
species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[118] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the
corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was
not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the
beginning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13,16): "God made not death . . .
but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)
We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?
(2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is
produced from the surplus food?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human
nature. For it is written (Mt. 15:17): "Whatsoever entereth into the
mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is
cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none
of the food is changed into true human nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh
belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter"; and says
that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and
goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter,
not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the
species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of
human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to
physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the
humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature,
whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due only to
the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to
insure himself against death in perpetuity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is
nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated
in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a
man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be
left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he
would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the
thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But
this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food
when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the
texture of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true
human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation
of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore that
belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the
constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways:
firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the
individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a
thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and
the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature
considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to
the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter
and Martin belong this soul and this body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Body Para. 2/6
Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one
individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the
matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the
human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they
said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that
whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from
the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not
receiving in truth the form of human nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Body Para. 3/6
But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of
the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude
of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to
these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they
stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and
prevent the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is
mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Body Para. 4/6
But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the
same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease
to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated
are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form
can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else
the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to
exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true
human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is
contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species:
as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would
only be one individual of the human species. Thirdly, because
multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in
respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their
matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of
the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it
cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the
addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from
division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either
by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no
matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made
from water; or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied
by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that
the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by
rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more
imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of
flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were
created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the
specific form." Consequently the multiplication of the human body can
only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature.
Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in
regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals
and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body
so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which
multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally
extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase
naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else
into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment,
which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is
altogether inadmissible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Body Para. 5/6
Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist
in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not
if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form
remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first
imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves
that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this
matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since
this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other
matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of
the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the
increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to
the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary
existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if
anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true
human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible.
First, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate
bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in
species, there is not the power of generating their like in the
individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing,
therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if
their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly, because the
active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the
begetter, as stated above (Q[118], A[1]). Hence it cannot have a greater
power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore,
by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human
nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true
form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because
food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food
would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the
action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is
formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as
that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also
does that which is formed from the food.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] Body Para. 6/6
Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really
changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific
form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially
flesh."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into
the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of food is cast
out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from
food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the
pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood
that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the
begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh
belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and
this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But
this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just
as in things which have their species in matter"---for instance, wood or
stone---"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and
something belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has
no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or
nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by
mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as
the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and
that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they are
already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason
for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is
not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from
different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the
species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it
remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with
its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter,
then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in
the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is
gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue
of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed;
as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is
that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on
the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be
taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not
destroyed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous
action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming
virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough
for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can
only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth
ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine,
when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of
wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further
additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher
says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain
matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be
generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already
existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter
together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into
fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of
wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece
is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time:
because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same
with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed
which was consumed by natural heat.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus
food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature, producing, from the
substance of the begetter, that which is begotten." But that which is
generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced
from the substance of the begetter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he
receives from him. But if the semen from which something is generated, is
produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his
grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. Therefore a
man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any
other men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of
cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from
surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the
cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam
"not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body."
But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food.
Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal.
i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been stated
above (A[1]; Q[118], A[1]). For if human nature has a virtue for the
communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also
in its own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is
dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated to
it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced
from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe
that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is
clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is
to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation of an animal, the
animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food
first of all receives a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts
of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that
part.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is
already transformed into the substance of the members. For this solution,
if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would
no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a process
of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of
transforming something else into the likeness of that nature. But if it
retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then, since it is
limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of
moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature
of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all
the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus
the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal from
animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as
animals which continue to live after being cut in two: which is
inadmissible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something
separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole,
though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the
begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (A[1]; Q[108], A[1]
). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is
generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of
the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the
nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is
transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative
power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of
great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to
the size of their bodies, and generated seldom; in like manner fat men,
and for the same reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals
and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form of the
begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account
not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like.
Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need
that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather;
but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the
grandfather through the father. In like manner the third objection is
answered. For kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the
derivation of the forms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though
the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this
individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in
Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by
the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally
derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father,
which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[119] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal
substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter from
which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother,
was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not derived from
Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but
by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a birth was becoming to
Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL
GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.
