In the next place we must consider second marriage. Under this head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful?
(2) Whether it is a sacrament?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a second marriage is lawful?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a second marriage is unlawful. Because we
should judge of things according to truth. Now Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in
the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that
"to take a second husband is in truth fornication," which is unlawful.
Therefore neither is a second marriage lawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is not good is unlawful. Now Ambrose [*On 1
Cor. 7:40 and De Viduis] says that a second marriage is not good.
Therefore it is unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one should be debarred from being present at such
things as are becoming and lawful. Yet priests are debarred from being
present at second marriages, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).
Therefore they are unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no one incurs a penalty save for sin. Now a person
incurs the penalty of irregularity on account of being married twice.
Therefore a second marriage is unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, We read of Abraham having contracted a second marriage
(Gn. 25:1).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:14): "I will . . . that the
younger," namely widows, "should marry, bear children." Therefore second
marriages are lawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The marriage tie lasts only until death (Rm. 7:2),
wherefore at the death of either spouse the marriage tie ceases: and
consequently when one dies the other is not hindered from marrying a
second time on account of the previous marriage. Therefore not only
second marriages are lawful, but even third and so on.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Chrysostom is speaking in reference to the cause which is
wont at times to incite a person to a second marriage, namely
concupiscence which incites also to fornication.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A second marriage is stated not to be good, not that it is
unlawful, but because it lacks the honor of the signification which is in
a first marriage, where one husband has one wife, as in the case of
Christ and the Church.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Men who are consecrated to Divine things are debarred not
only from unlawful things, but even from things which have any appearance
of turpitude; and consequently they are debarred from second marriages,
which lack the decorum which was in a first marriage.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Irregularity is not always incurred on account of a sin,
and may be incurred through a defect in a sacrament [*"Defectus
sacramenti," i.e. defect of signification; Cf. A[2], OBJ[3]]. Hence the
argument is not to the point.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a second marriage is a sacrament?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a second marriage is not a sacrament. For he
who repeats a sacrament injures the sacrament. But no sacrament should be
done an injury. Therefore if a second marriage were a sacrament, marriage
ought nowise to be repeated.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in every sacrament some kind of blessing is given. But
no blessing is given in a second marriage, as stated in the text (Sent.
iv, D, 42). Therefore no sacrament is conferred therein.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, signification is essential to a sacrament. But the
signification of marriage is not preserved in a second marriage, because
there is not a union of only one woman with only one man, as in the case
of Christ and the Church. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, one sacrament is not an impediment to receiving another.
But a second marriage is an impediment to receiving orders. Therefore it
is not a sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Marital intercourse is excused from sin in a second
marriage even as in a first marriage. Now marital intercourse is excused
[*Cf. Q[69], A[1]] by the marriage goods which are fidelity, offspring,
and sacrament. Therefore a second marriage is a sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, irregularity is not contracted through a second and
non-sacramental union, such as fornication. Yet irregularity is
contracted through a second marriage. Therefore it is a sacramental union.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Wherever we find the essentials of a sacrament, there is
a true sacrament. Wherefore, since in a second marriage we find all the
essentials of the sacrament of marriage (namely the due matter---which
results from the parties having the conditions prescribed by law---and
the due form, which is the expression of the inward consent by words of
the present), it is clear that a second marriage is a sacrament even as a
first.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This is true of a sacrament which causes an everlasting
effect: for then, if the sacrament be repeated, it is implied that the
first was not effective, and thus an injury is done to the first, as is
clear in all those sacraments which imprint a character. But those
sacraments which have not an everlasting effect can be repeated without
injury to the sacrament, as in the case of Penance. And, since the
marriage tie ceases with death, no injury is done to the sacrament if a
woman marry again after her husband's death.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the second marriage, considered in itself, is a
perfect sacrament, yet if we consider it in relation to the first
marriage, it is somewhat a defective sacrament, because it has not its
full signification, since there is not a union of only one woman with
only one man as in the marriage of Christ with the Church. And on account
of this defect the blessing is omitted in a second marriage. This,
however, refers to the case when it is a second marriage on the part of
both man and woman, or on the part of the woman only. For if a virgin
marry a man who has had another wife, the marriage is blessed
nevertheless. Because the signification is preserved to a certain extent
even in relation to the former marriage, since though Christ has but one
Church for His spouse, there are many persons espoused to Him in the one
Church. But the soul cannot be espoused to another besides Christ, else
it commits fornication with the devil. Nor is there a spiritual marriage.
For this reason when a woman marries a second time the marriage is not
blessed on account of the defect in the sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The perfect signification is found in a second marriage
considered in itself, not however if it be considered in relation to the
previous marriage, and it is thus that it is a defective sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A second marriage in so far as there is a defect in the
sacrament, but not as a sacrament, is an impediment to the sacrament of
Order.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE, AND FIRST OF THE PAYMENT OF THE
MARRIAGE DEBT (TEN ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider those things which are annexed to
marriage: (1) the payment of the marriage debt; (2) plurality of wives;
(3) bigamy; (4) the bill of divorce; (5) illegitimate children.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one spouse is bound to pay the marriage debt to the other?
(2) Whether one is sometimes bound to pay without being asked?
(3) Whether a wife may demand the debt during the menses?
(4) Whether she is bound to pay it at that time?
(5) Whether husband and wife are equal in this matter?
(6) Whether the one without the other's consent may take a vow that
prohibits the payment of the debt?
(7) Whether it is forbidden to ask for the debt at any particular time?
(8) Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for it at a holy time?
(9) Whether it is an obligation to pay it at the time of a festival?
(10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the
marriage debt?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not mutually bound, under
the obligation of a precept, to the payment of the marriage debt. For no
one is forbidden to receive the Eucharist on account of fulfilling a
precept. Yet he who has had intercourse with his wife cannot partake of
the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome [*Serm. de Esu Agni viii]
quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32). Therefore the payment of the debt
does not come under the obligation of a precept.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is lawful to everyone to abstain from what is hurtful
to his person. But it is sometimes harmful to a person to pay the debt
when asked, whether on account of sickness, or because they have already
paid it. Therefore it would seem allowable to refuse the one who asks.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit to fulfill an
obligation of precept. If, therefore, the payment of the debt comes under
the obligation of a precept, it would seem sinful to render oneself unfit
for paying the debt, by fasting or otherwise weakening the body: but
apparently this is untrue.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), marriage
is directed to the begetting and rearing of children, as well as to the
community of life. Now leprosy is opposed to both these ends of marriage,
for since it is a contagious disease, the wife is not bound to cohabit
with a leprous husband; and besides this disease is often transmitted to
the offspring. Therefore it would seem that a wife is not bound to pay
the debt to a leprous husband.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, As the slave is in the power of his master, so is one
spouse in the power of the other (1 Cor. 7:4). But a slave is bound by an
obligation of precept to pay his master the debt of his service according
to Rm. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues, tribute to whom tribute
is due," etc. Therefore husband and wife are mutually bound to the
payment of the marriage debt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of fornication (1 Cor.
7:2). But this could not be the effect of marriage, if the one were not
bound to pay the debt to the other when the latter is troubled with
concupiscence. Therefore the payment of the debt is an obligation of
precept.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Marriage was instituted especially as fulfilling an
office of nature. Wherefore in its act the movement of nature must be
observed according to which the nutritive power administers to the
generative power that alone which is in excess of what is required for
the preservation of the individual: for the natural order requires that a
thing should be first perfected in itself, and that afterwards it should
communicate of its perfection to others: and this is also the order of
charity which perfects nature. And therefore, since the wife has power
over her husband only in relation to the generative power and not in
relation to things directed to the preservation of the individual, the
husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife, in matters pertaining to
the begetting of children, with due regard however to his own welfare.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is possible through fulfilling a precept to render
oneself unfit for the exercise of a sacred duty: thus a judge becomes
irregular by sentencing a man to death. In like manner he who pays the
marriage debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes unfit for the
exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question is sinful,
but on account of its carnal nature. And so, according to the Master
(Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking only of the ministers of the
Church, and not of others who should be left to use their own discretion,
because without sin they may either abstain out of reverence or receive
Christ's body out of devotion.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The wife has no power over her husband's body, except as is
consistent with the welfare of his person, as stated above. Wherefore if
she go beyond this in her demands, it is not a request for the debt, but
an unjust exaction; and for this reason the husband is not bound to
satisfy her.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the husband be rendered incapable of paying the debt
through a cause consequent upon marriage, for instance through having
already paid the debt and being unable to pay it, the wife has no right
to ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot rather than as a
wife. But if he be rendered incapable through some other cause, then if
this be a lawful cause, he is not bound, and she cannot ask, but if it be
an unlawful cause, then he sins, and his wife's sin, should she fall into
fornication on this account, is somewhat imputable to him. Hence he
should endeavor to do his best that his wife may remain continent.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a marriage. Wherefore a
wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous husband. But she is not
bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable to infection from
marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation. And though the child
begotten of them be diseased, it is better to be thus than not at all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for
it?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the husband is not bound to pay the marriage
debt if his wife does not ask for it. For an affirmative precept is
binding only at a certain time. But the time fixed for the payment of the
debt can only be when it is asked for. Therefore he is not bound to
payment otherwise.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we ought to presume the better things of everyone. Now
even for married people it is better to be continent than to make use of
marriage. Therefore unless she ask expressly for the debt, the husband
should presume that it pleases her to be continent, and so he is not
bound to pay her the debt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the wife has power over her husband, so has a master
over his slave. Now a slave is not bound to serve his master save when
the latter commands him. Therefore neither is a husband bound to pay the
debt to his wife except when she demands it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the husband can sometimes request his wife not to exact
the debt when she asks for it. Much more therefore may he not pay it when
he is not asked.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, By the payment of the debt a remedy is afforded against
the wife's concupiscence. Now a physician who has the care of a sick
person is bound to remedy the disease without being asked. Therefore the
husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife although she ask not for it.
Further, a superior is bound to apply a remedy for the sins of his
subjects even though they rebel against it. But the payment of the debt
on the husband's part is directed against the sins of his wife. Therefore
sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife even though
she ask it not of him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The debt may be demanded in two ways. First, explicitly,
as when they ask one another by words; secondly, implicitly, when namely
the husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to pay
the debt, but is silent through shame. And so even though she does not
ask for the debt explicitly in words, the husband is bound to pay it,
whenever his wife shows signs of wishing him to do so.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The appointed time is not only when it is demanded but also
when on account of certain signs there is fear of danger (to avoid which
is the purpose of the payment of the debt) unless it be paid then.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The husband may presume this of his wife when he perceives
in her no signs of the contrary; but it would be foolish of him to admit
this presumption if he does see such signs.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The master is not ashamed to demand of his slave the duty
of his service, as a wife is to ask the marriage debt of her husband. Yet
if the master were not to demand it, either through ignorance or some
other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound to fulfill his duty,
if some danger were threatening. For this is what is meant by "not
serving to the eye" (Eph. 6:6; Col. 3:22) which is the Apostle's command
to servants.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A husband should not dissuade his wife from asking for the
debt, except for a reasonable cause; and even then he should not be too
insistent, on account of the besetting danger.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage
debt? [*This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the Leonine edition.]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for a menstruous wife to ask for the
marriage debt. For in the Law a man who had an issue of seed was unclean,
even as a menstruous woman. Yet a man who has an issue of seed may ask
for the debt. Therefore a menstruous wife may also.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, leprosy is a worse complaint than suffering from monthly
periods, and would seem to cause a greater corruption in the offspring.
Yet a leper can ask for the debt. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a menstruous wife is not allowed to ask for the debt,
this can only be because it is feared this may be detrimental to the
offspring. Yet if the wife be unfruitful there is no such fear.
Therefore, seemingly, at least an unfruitful wife may ask for the debt
during her menses.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, "Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her flowers"
(Lev. 18:19) where Augustine observes: "Although he has already
sufficiently forbidden this he repeats the prohibition here lest he seem
to have spoken figuratively."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, "All our justices" are become "as the rag of a menstruous
woman" (Is. 64:6) where Jerome observes: "Men ought then to keep away
from their wives because thus is a deformed blind lame leprous offspring
conceived: so that those parents who are not ashamed to come together in
sexual intercourse have their sin made obvious to all": and thus the same
conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It was forbidden in the Law to approach to a menstruous
woman, for two reasons both on account of her uncleanness, and on account
of the harm that frequently resulted to the offspring from such
intercourse. With regard to the first reason, it was a ceremonial
precept, but with regard to the second it was a moral precept. For since
marriage is chiefly directed to the good of the offspring, all use of
marriage which is intended for the good of the offspring is in order.
Consequently this precept is binding even in the New Law on account of
the second reason, although not on account of the first. Now, the
menstrual issue may be natural or unnatural. The natural issue is that to
which women are subject at stated periods when they are in good health;
and it is unnatural when they suffer from an issue of blood through some
disorder resulting from sickness. Accordingly if the menstrual flow be
unnatural it is not forbidden in the New Law to approach to a menstruous
woman both on account of her infirmity since a woman in that state
cannot conceive, and because an issue of this kind is lasting and
continuous, so that the husband would have to abstain for always. When
however the woman is subject to a natural issue of the menstruum, she can
conceive; moreover, the said issue lasts only a short time, wherefore it
is forbidden to approach to her. In like manner a woman is forbidden to
ask for the debt during the period of that issue.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The issue of seed in a man is the result of infirmity, nor
is the seed in this case apt for generation. Moreover a complaint of this
kind is continual or lasting like leprosy: wherefore the comparison falls.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As long as a woman is subject to the menses it cannot be
certain that she is sterile. For some are sterile in youth, and in course
of time become fruitful, and "vice versa," as the Philosopher observes
(De Gener. Anim. xvi).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt
to her husband if he ask for it? [*This and the previous article are
omitted in the Leonine edition.]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a menstruous wife may not pay the marriage
debt to her husband at his asking. For it is written (Lev. 20:18) that if
any man approach to a menstruous woman both shall be put to death.
Therefore it would seem that both he who asks and she who grants are
guilty of mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Not only they that do them but they also that consent
to them are worthy of death" (Rm. 1:32). Now he who knowingly asks for
the debt from a menstruous woman sins mortally. Therefore she also sins
mortally by consenting to pay the debt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a madman must not be given back his sword lest he kill
himself or another. Therefore in like manner neither should a wife give
her body to her husband during her menses, lest he be guilty of spiritual
murder.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, "The wife hath not power of her own body, but the
husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore at his asking his wife must pay the debt
even during her menses.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the menstruous wife should not be an occasion of sin to her
husband. But she would give her husband an occasion of sin, if she paid
him not the debt at his asking; since he might commit fornication.
Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In this regard some have asserted that a menstruous woman
may not pay the debt even as she may not ask for it. For just as she
would not be bound to pay it if she had some personal ailment so as to
make it dangerous for herself, so is she not bound to pay for fear of
danger to the offspring. But this opinion would seem to derogate from
marriage, by which the husband is given entire power of his wife's body
with regard to the marriage act. Nor is there any parallel between bodily
affliction of the offspring and the danger to her own body: since, if the
wife be ailing, it is quite certain that she would be endangered by the
carnal act, whereas this is by no means so certain with regard to the
offspring which perhaps would not be forthcoming.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Wherefore others say that a menstruous woman is never allowed to ask for
the debt; and that if her husband ask, he does so either knowingly or in
ignorance. If knowingly, she ought to dissuade him by her prayers and
admonitions; yet not so insistently as possibly to afford him an occasion
of falling into other, and those sinful, practices, if he be deemed that
way inclined. If however, he ask in ignorance, the wife may put forward
some motive, or allege sickness as a reason for not paying the debt,
unless there be fear of danger to her husband. If, however, the husband
ultimately persists in his request, she must yield to his demand. But it
would not be safe for her to make known [*"Indicare," as in the
commentary on the Sentences; the Leonine edition reads "judicare."] her
disaffection, lest this make her husband entertain a repulsion towards
her, unless his prudence may be taken for granted.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This refers to the case when both willingly consent, but
not when the woman pays the debt by force as it were.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since there is no consent without the concurrence of the
will, the woman is not deemed to consent in her husband's sin unless she
pay the debt willingly. For when she is unwilling she is passive rather
than consenting.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A madman should be given back his sword if a greater danger
were feared from its not being returned to him: and thus it is in the
case in point.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not equal in the marriage
act. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) the agent is more
noble than the patient. But in the marriage act the husband is as agent
and the wife as patient. Therefore they are not equal in that act.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt
without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above (AA[1],2).
Therefore they are not equal in the marriage act.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the woman was made on the man's account in reference to
marriage according to Gn. 2:18, "Let us make him a help like unto
himself." But that on account of which another thing is, is always the
principal. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act. But in
marriage "the husband is the head of the wife" (Eph. 5:23). Therefore
they are not equal in the aforesaid act.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:4): "The husband . . . hath not
power of his own body," and the same is said of the wife. Therefore they
are equal in the marriage act.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of
union, as stated above (Q[44], AA[1],3). Therefore husband and wife are
equal in the marriage act.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Equality is twofold, of quantity and of proportion.
Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities of
the same measure, for instance a thing two cubits long and another two
cubits in length. But equality of proportion is that which is observed
between two proportions of the same kind as double to double.
Accordingly, speaking of the first equality, husband and wife are not
equal in marriage; neither as regards the marriage act, wherein the more
noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household
management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband rules. But with
reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both matters,
because just as in both the marriage act and in the management of the
household the husband is bound to the wife in all things pertaining to
the husband, so is the wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining
to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text (Sent. iv,
D, 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the debt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although it is more noble to be active than passive, there
is the same proportion between patient and passivity as between agent and
activity; and accordingly there is equality of proportion between them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This is accidental. For the husband having the more noble
part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be less ashamed
than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not bound
to pay the debt to her husband without being asked, whereas the husband
is bound to pay it to the wife.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This proves that they are not equal absolutely, but not
that they are not equal in proportion.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although the head is the principal member, yet just as the
members are bound to the head in their own respective capacities, so is
the head in its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is
equality of proportion between them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt
without their mutual consent?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow contrary to
the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For husband and wife are
equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above (A[5]). Now it is lawful
for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the cross in
defense of the Holy Land: and consequently this is also lawful to the
wife. Therefore, since this prevents the payment of the debt, either
husband or wife may without the other's consent take the aforesaid vow.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent of
another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife cannot,
without sin, refuse their consent to the other's taking a vow of
continence whether absolutely or for a time; because to prevent a
person's spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore
the one can take a vow of continence either absolutely or for a time,
without the other's consent.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded just as
it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other's consent, vow not
to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore
he can equally take a vow not to pay the debt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior to do
what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must not obey in what
is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the husband not to
pay the debt to his wife for a time, by occupying him in some service.
Therefore he might, of his own accord, do or vow that which would hinder
him from paying the debt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): "Defraud not one another,
except . . . by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to
prayer."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, no one can vow that which belongs to another. Now "the husband
. . hath not power of his own body, but the wife" (1 Cor. 7:4).
Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of
continence whether absolutely or for a time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and
consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject to our
will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under
this head. Therefore in matters of this kind one person cannot take a vow
without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since
husband and wife are mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt
which is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot vow continence without
the other's consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep
the vow, but must do penance for an ill-taken vow [*Cf. Q[53], AA[1],4;
Q[61], A[1]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be
willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need of
the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross
is given to him, it is laid down that the husband may take the cross
without his wife's consent, even as he might go fighting without the
consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And yet the wife is not
entirely deprived of her right, since she can follow him. Nor is there a
parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule
the wife and not "vice versa," the wife is bound to follow her husband
rather than the husband the wife. Moreover there would be more danger to
the wife's chastity as a result of wandering from country to country,
than to the husband's, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife
cannot take this vow without her husband's consent.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other's vow
of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent is to
hinder not the other's good, but the harm to himself.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are two opinions on this point. For some say that one
can without the other's consent vow not to demand the debt, not however
not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their own
rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however, that if one were never to
ask for the debt, marriage would become too burdensome to the other who
would always have to undergo the shame of asking for the debt, others
assert with greater probability that neither vow can be lawfully taken by
one spouse without the other's consent.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Just as the wife receives power over her husband's body,
without prejudice to the husband's duty to his own body, so also is it
without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot
ask her husband for the debt to the detriment of his bodily health, so
neither can she do this so as to hinder him in his duty to his master.
And yet the master cannot for this reason prevent her from paying the
debt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to ask for
the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied when the disease
gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast
day. Therefore the remedy should be applied then by asking for the debt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the only reason why the debt should not be demanded on
feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet on those days
certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore one may ask for the
debt at some other time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Just as certain places are holy because they are
devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason.
But it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place. Therefore
neither is it lawful at a holy time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless
since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it
renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on those days when
one ought especially to give one's time to spiritual things, it is not
lawful to ask for the debt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: At such a time other means may be employed for the
repression of concupiscence; for instance, prayer and many similar
things, to which even those who observe perpetual continence have
recourse.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although one is not bound to pray at all hours, one is
bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a
holy time. For Gregory says (Dial. i) that the devil took possession of a
woman who had intercourse with her husband at night and came in the
morning to the procession. But this would not have happened had she not
sinned mortally. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever disobeys a Divine command commits a mortal sin.
Now the Lord commanded (Ex. 19:15): "Come not near your wives," when
namely they were about to receive the Law. Much more therefore do
husbands sin mortally if they have intercourse with their wives at a time
when they should be intent on the sacred observances of the New Law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No circumstance aggravates infinitely. But undue time
is a circumstance. Therefore it does not aggravate a sin infinitely, so
as to make mortal what was otherwise venial.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance
drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate
infinitely. Consequently a wife or husband does not sin mortally by
asking for the debt on a feast day. It is however a more grievous sin to
ask for the sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness of
the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This woman was punished not because she paid the debt, but
because afterwards she rashly intruded into the divine service against
her conscience.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The authority quoted shows not that it is a mortal sin but
that it is unbecoming. For under the Old Law which was given to a carnal
people many things were required under an obligation of precept, for the
sake of bodily cleanness, which are not required in the New Law which is
the law of the spirit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that neither are they bound to pay the debt at a
festal time. For those who commit a sin as well as those who consent
thereto are equally punished (Rm. 1:32). But the one who pays the debt
consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore he sins also.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is an affirmative precept that binds us to pray, and
therefore we are bound to do so at a fixed time. Therefore one ought not
to pay the debt at a time when one is bound to pray, as neither ought one
at a time when one is bound to fulfill a special duty towards a temporal
master.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): "Defraud not one another,
except by consent, for a time," etc. Therefore when one spouse asks the
other must pay.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since the wife has power of her husband's body, and "vice
versa," with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound to pay
the debt to the other, at any season or hour, with due regard to the
decorum required in such matters, for this must not be done at once
openly.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As far as he is concerned he does not consent, but grants
unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and consequently
he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weakness of
the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to the one who asks lest he
be afforded an occasion of sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: No hour is fixed for praying, but that compensation can be
made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is not cogent.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? [*This article is
omitted in the Leonine edition.]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that weddings ought not to be forbidden at certain
times. For marriage is a sacrament: and the celebration of the others
sacraments is not forbidden at those times. Therefore neither should the
celebration of marriage be forbidden then.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, asking for the marriage debt is more unbecoming on feast
days than the celebration of marriage. Yet the debt may be asked for on
those days. Therefore also marriages may be solemnized.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, marriages that are contracted in despite of the law of
the Church ought to be dissolved. Yet marriages are not dissolved if they
be contracted at those times. Therefore it should not be forbidden by a
commandment of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:5): "A time to embrace, and a
time to be far from embraces."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, When the newly married spouse is given to her husband,
the minds of husband and wife are taken up with carnal preoccupations by
reason of the very newness of things, wherefore weddings are wont to be
signalized by much unrestrained rejoicing. On this account it is
forbidden to celebrate marriages at those times when men ought especially
to arise to spiritual things. Those times are from Advent until the
Epiphany because of the Communion which, according to the ancient Canons,
is wont to be made at Christmas (as was observed in its proper place, TP,
Q[30]), from Septuagesima until the octave day of Easter, on account of
the Easter Communion, and from the three days before the Ascension until
the octave day of Pentecost, on account of the preparation for Communion
to be received at that time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The celebration of marriage has a certain worldly and
carnal rejoicing connected with it, which does not apply to the other
sacraments. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There is not such a distraction of minds caused by the
payment of a request for the debt as by the celebration of a marriage;
and consequently the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[64] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since time is not essential to a marriage contracted within
the forbidden seasons, the marriage is nevertheless a true sacrament. Nor
is the marriage dissolved absolutely, but for a time, that they may do
penance for having disobeyed the commandment of the Church. It is thus
that we are to understand the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 33),
namely that should a marriage have been contracted or a wedding
celebrated at the aforesaid times, those who have done so "ought to be
separated." Nor does he say this on his own authority, but in reference
to some canonical ordinance, such as that of the Council of Lerida, which
decision is quoted by the Decretals.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PLURALITY OF WIVES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the plurality of wives. Under this head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?
(2) Whether this was ever lawful?
(3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?
(5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not against the natural law to have
several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature. But "it
was not a sin" to have several wives "when this was the custom,"
according to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted in the text (Sent.
iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natural law to have
several wives.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law, disobeys
a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments even as the
written law has. Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ. Dei xv,
38) that "it was not contrary to a commandment" to have several wives,
"because by no law was it forbidden." Therefore it is not against the
natural law to have several wives.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of
offspring. But one man may get children of several women, by causing them
to be pregnant. Therefore It is not against the natural law to have
several wives.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "Natural right is that which nature has taught all
animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests (1, i, ff. De just.
et jure). Now nature has not taught all animals that one male should be
united to but one female, since with many animals the one male is united
to several females. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have
several wives.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, 20),
in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female as agent to
patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is not against
the order of nature for one agent to act on several patients, or for one
craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore neither is it contrary
to the law of nature for one husband to have many wives.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: On the contrary, That which was instilled into man at the
formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the natural
law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature
that one man should have one wife, according to Gn. 2:24, "They shall be
two in one flesh." Therefore it is of natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind
himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one should be given
to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power
of his body, so that he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks.
Therefore it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give
the power of his body to another, because it would be impossible for him
to pay both were both to ask at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to
thyself" [*Cf. Tobias 4:16] is a precept of the natural law. But a
husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another
husband. Therefore he would be acting against the law of nature, were he
to have another wife in addition.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to
the natural law. Now a husband's jealousy of his wife and the wife's
jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all.
Therefore, since jealousy is "love impatient of sharing the beloved," it
would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should
share one husband.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, All natural things are imbued with certain principles
whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions, but
also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such
actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue
of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards
by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract iron by virtue of its
specific nature. Now just as in those things which act from natural
necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper
actions proceed proportionately to their end, so in things which are
endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and
appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there needs to be a natural
concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the
action befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the
end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the end, and the
proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a
natural concept, whereby he is directed to act in a befitting manner, and
this is called "the natural law" or "the natural right," but in other
animals "the natural instinct." For brutes are rather impelled by the
force of nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their own
judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else than a concept
naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act in a befitting
manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue
of his generic nature, as, for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, or
belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to
reason and so forth. Now whatever renders an action improportionate to
the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be
contrary to the natural law. But an action may be improportionate either
to the principal or to the secondary end, and in either case this happens
in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end;
for instance a very great excess or a very great deficiency in eating
hinders both the health of the body, which is the principal end of food,
and aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary end.
Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the
principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance
eating inordinately in respect of undue time. Accordingly if an action be
improportionate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal
end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of the natural law,
which hold the same place in practical matters, as the general concepts
of the mind in speculative matters. If, however, it be in any way
improportionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end, as
rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden,
not indeed by the first precepts of the natural law, but by the second
which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative
matters receive our assent by virtue of self-known principles: and thus
the act in question is said to be against the law of nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of
children, and this end is competent to man according to his generic
nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and
thus it is that the "offspring" is assigned as a marriage good. But for
its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has,
among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life, as
stated above (Q[41], A[1]). And in reference to this they owe one another
"fidelity" which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has
another end, as regards marriage between believers, namely the
signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the "sacrament" is said
to be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the
marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he
is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality
of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of
marriage, since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives,
and to rear the children born of them. But though it does not wholly
destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot
easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one
husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions of
several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation
is a cause of strife: thus "potters quarrel with one another"
[*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one
husband. The third end, it removes altogether, because as Christ is one,
so also is the Church one. It is therefore evident from what has been
said that plurality of wives is in a way against the law of nature, and
in a way not against it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the
first precepts of the latter, which are like the general concepts of the
mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn like conclusions
from these custom enforces, as Tully declares (De Inv. Rhet. ii), or
weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: As Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii), "fear of the law and
religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are
approved by custom." Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the
natural law, which are derived from the first principles as it were of
the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment,
except when they have been sanctioned by Divine or human law. This is
what Augustine means by saying that "they did not disobey the
commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/4
Reply OBJ 4: Natural right has several significations. First a right is
said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled by nature:
and thus Tully defines it (De Inv. Rhet. ii) when he says: "Natural right
is not the result of opinion but the product of an innate force." And
since even in natural things certain movements are called natural, not
that they be from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a
higher moving principle---thus the movements that are caused in the
elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the
Commentator states (De Coelo et Mundo iii, 28), therefore those things
that are of Divine right are said to be of natural right, because they
are caused by the impress and influence of a higher principle, namely
God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he says (Etym. v) that "the
natural right is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel."
Thirdly, right is said to be natural not only from its principle but also
from its matter, because it is about natural things. And since nature is
contradistinguished with reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if
we take natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are
dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not said to be of
natural right, but only those which are dictated by natural reason and
are common to man and other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid
definition, namely: "Natural right is what nature has taught all
animals." Accordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural
right taken in the third sense, is nevertheless against natural right
taken in the second sense, because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It
is also against natural right taken in the first sense, as appears from
what has been said, for such is nature's dictate to every animal
according to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain
animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands the care of both, namely
the male and female, by natural instinct cling to the union of one with
one, for instance the turtle-dove, the dove, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 2/4
The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 3/4
Since, however, the arguments adduced "on the contrary side" would seem
to show that plurality of wives is against the first principles of the
natural law, we must reply to them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 4/4
Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that human nature was
founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed not only with
those things without which the principal end of marriage is impossible of
attainment, but also with those without which the secondary end of
marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: and in this way it
sufficed man when he was first formed to have one wife, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: In marriage the husband gives his wife power of his body,
not in all respects, but only in those things that are required by
marriage. Now marriage does not require the husband to pay the debt every
time his wife asks for it, if we consider the principal end for which
marriage was instituted, namely the good of the offspring, but only as
far as is necessary for impregnation. But in so far as it is instituted
as a remedy (which is its secondary end), marriage does require the debt
to be paid at all times on being asked for. Hence it is evident that by
taking several wives a man does not bind himself to the impossible,
considering the principal end of marriage; and therefore plurality of
wives is not against the first principles of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: This precept of the natural law, "Do not to another what
thou wouldst not were done to thyself," should be understood with the
proviso that there be equal proportion. For if a superior is unwilling to
be withstood by his subject, he is not therefore bound not to withstand
his subject. Hence it does not follow in virtue of this precept that as a
husband is unwilling for his wife to have another husband, he must not
have another wife: because for one man to have several wives is not
contrary to the first principles of the natural law, as stated above:
whereas for one wife to have several husbands is contrary to the first
principles of the natural law, since thereby the good of the offspring
which is the principal end of marriage is, in one respect, entirely
destroyed, and in another respect hindered. For the good of the offspring
means not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting of
offspring, though not wholly voided (since a woman may be impregnated a
second time after impregnation has already taken place, as stated in De
Gener. Animal. vii. 4), is nevertheless considerably hindered, because
this can scarcely happen without injury either to both fetus or to one of
them. But the rearing of the offspring is altogether done away, because
as a result of one woman having several husbands there follows
uncertainty of the offspring in relation to its father, whose care is
necessary for its education. Wherefore the marriage of one wife with
several husbands has not been sanctioned by any law or custom, whereas
the converse has been.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the
natural concept in the cognitive power. And since it is not so much
opposed to the natural concept for a man to have several wives as for a
wife to have several husbands, it follows that a wife's love is not so
averse to another sharing the same husband with her, as a husband's love
is to another sharing the same wife with him. Consequently both in man
and in other animals the male is more jealous of the female than "vice
versa."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it can never have been lawful to have several
wives. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7), "The natural law
has the same power at all times and places." Now plurality of wives is
forbidden by the natural law, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore as it is
unlawful now, it was unlawful at all times.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if it was ever lawful, this could only be because it was
lawful either in itself, or by dispensation. If the former, it would also
be lawful now; if the latter, this is impossible, for according to
Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3), "as God is the founder of nature, He
does nothing contrary to the principles which He has planted in nature."
Since then God has planted in our nature the principle that one man
should be united to one wife, it would seem that He has never dispensed
man from this.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a thing be lawful by dispensation, it is only lawful
for those who receive the dispensation. Now we do not read in the Law of
a general dispensation having been granted to all. Since then in the Old
Testament all who wished to do so, without any distinction, took to
themselves several wives, nor were reproached on that account, either by
the law or by the prophets, it would seem that it was not made lawful by
dispensation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, where there is the same reason for dispensation, the
same dispensation should be given. Now we cannot assign any other reason
for dispensation than the multiplying of the offspring for the worship of
God, and this is necessary also now. Therefore this dispensation would be
still in force, especially as we read nowhere of its having been recalled.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, in granting a dispensation the greater good should not
be overlooked for the sake of a lesser good. Now fidelity and the
sacrament, which it would seem impossible to safeguard in a marriage
where one man is joined to several wives, are greater goods than the
multiplication of the offspring. Therefore this dispensation ought not to
have been granted with a view to this multiplication.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is stated (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set because
of transgressors [Vulg.: 'transgressions']," namely in order to prohibit
them. Now the Old Law mentions plurality of wives without any prohibition
thereof, as appears from Dt. 21:15, "If a man have two wives," etc.
Therefore they were not transgressors through having two wives; and so it
was lawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who
are stated to have had several wives, and yet were most pleasing to God,
for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one time it
was lawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8), plurality of wives is
said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts,
but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn
from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary
according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other
circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not proceed from the first
precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all cases, but only
in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence, when they cease to be binding, it is
lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine the
above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose authority he
derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of the law in
those cases to which the force of the law ought not to extend, and this
permission is called a dispensation. Now the law prescribing the one wife
was framed not by man but by God, nor was it ever given by word or in
writing, but was imprinted on the heart, like other things belonging in
any way to the natural law. Consequently a dispensation in this matter
could be granted by God alone through an inward inspiration, vouchsafed
originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their example continued to
others, at a time when it behooved the aforesaid precept not to be
observed, in order to ensure the multiplication of the offspring to be
brought up in the worship of God. For the principal end is ever to be
borne in mind before the secondary end. Wherefore, since the good of the
offspring is the principal end of marriage, it behooved to disregard for
a time the impediment that might arise to the secondary ends, when it was
necessary for the offspring to be multiplied; because it was for the
removal of this impediment that the precept forbidding a plurality of
wives was framed, as stated above (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The natural law, considered in itself, has the same force
at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some impediment
it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher (Ethic. i,
3,7) instances in the case of other natural things. For at all times and
places the right hand is better than the left according to nature, but it
may happen accidentally that a person is ambidextrous, because our nature
is variable; and the same applies to the natural, just as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 3,7).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is asserted
that is was never lawful to have several wives without having a
dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the dispensation
thus granted a contradiction to the principles which God has implanted in
nature, but an exception to them, because those principles are not
intended to apply to all cases but to the majority, as stated. Even so it
is not contrary to nature when certain occurrences take place in natural
things miraculously, by way of exception to more frequent occurrences.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Dispensation from a law should follow the quality of the
law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the heart, it was
not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining to the natural
law to be given under the form of a written law but by internal
inspiration.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When Christ came it was the time of the fulness of the
grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad among all
nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the same reason
for a dispensation as before Christ's coming, when the worship of God was
spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The offspring, considered as one of the marriage goods,
includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why it is
reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to its
being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith to be kept with God
is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife, which is
reckoned a marriage good, and than the signification which pertains to
the sacrament, since the signification is subordinate to the knowledge of
faith. Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken from the two other
goods for the sake of the good of the offspring. Nor are they entirely
done away, since there remains faith towards several wives; and the
sacrament remains after a fashion, for though it did not signify the
union of Christ with the Church as one, nevertheless the plurality of
wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church, which
distinction is not only in the Church militant but also in the Church
triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the union of
Christ not only with the Church militant, as some say, but also with the
Church triumphant where there are "many mansions" [*Jn. 19:2].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to have a concubine is not against the natural
law. For the ceremonies of the Law are not of the natural law. But
fornication is forbidden (Acts 15:29) in conjunction with ceremonies of
the law which for the time were being imposed on those who were brought
to the faith from among the heathens. Therefore simple fornication which
is intercourse with a concubine is not against the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, positive law is an outcome of the natural law, as Tully
says (De Invent. ii). Now fornication was not forbidden by positive law;
indeed according to the ancient laws women used to be sentenced to be
taken to brothels. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have a
concubine.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the natural law does not forbid that which is given
simply, to be given for a time or under certain restrictions. Now one
unmarried woman may give the power of her body for ever to an unmarried
man, so that he may use her when he will. Therefore it is not against the
law of nature, if she give him power of her body for a time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whoever uses his own property as he will, injures no
one. But a bondswoman is her master's property. Therefore if her master
use her as he will, he injures no one: and consequently it is not against
the natural law to have a concubine.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, everyone may give his own property to another. Now the
wife has power of her husband's body (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore if his wife
be willing, the husband can have intercourse with another woman without
sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, According to all laws the children born of a concubine
are children of shame. But this would not be so unless the union of which
they are born were naturally shameful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, as stated above (Q[41], A[1]), marriage is natural. But this
would not be so if without prejudice to the natural law a man could be
united to a woman otherwise than by marriage. Therefore it is against the
natural law to have a concubine.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), an action is said to be against
the natural law, if it is not in keeping with the due end intended by
nature, whether through not being directed thereto by the action of the
agent, or through being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or
through being in itself improportionate to that end. Now the end which
nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and rearing of the
offspring. and that this good might be sought after, it attached pleasure
to the union; as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 8). Accordingly to
make use of sexual intercourse on account of its inherent pleasure,
without reference to the end for which nature intended it, is to act
against nature, as also is it if the intercourse be not such as may
fittingly be directed to that end. And since, for the most part, things
are denominated from their end, as being that which is of most
consequence to them, just as the marriage union took its name from the
good of the offspring [*Cf. Q[44], A[2]], which is the end chiefly sought
after in marriage, so the name of concubine is expressive of that union
where sexual intercourse is sought after for its own sake. Moreover even
though sometimes a man may seek to have offspring of such an intercourse,
this is not befitting to the good of the offspring, which signifies not
only the begetting of children from which they take their being, but also
their rearing and instruction, by which means they receive nourishment
and learning from their parents, in respect of which three things the
parents are bound to their children, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 11,12). Now since the rearing and teaching of the children remain a
duty of the parents during a long period of time, the law of nature
requires the father and mother to dwell together for a long time, in
order that together they may be of assistance to their children. Hence
birds that unite together in rearing their young do not sever their
mutual fellowship from the time when they first come together until the
young are fully fledged. Now this obligation which binds the female and
her mate to remain together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it is
evident that it is contrary to the natural law for a man to have
intercourse with a woman who is not married to him, which is the
signification of a concubine.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Among the Gentiles the natural law was obscured in many
points: and consequently they did not think it wrong to have intercourse
with a concubine, and in many cases practiced fornication as though it
were lawful, as also other things contrary to the ceremonial laws of the
Jews, though not contrary to the law of nature. Wherefore the apostles
inserted the prohibition of fornication among that of other ceremonial
observances, because in both cases there was a difference of opinion
between Jews and Gentiles.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This law was the result of the darkness just mentioned,
into which the Gentiles had fallen, by not giving due honor to God as
stated in Rm. 1:21, and did not proceed from the instinct of the natural
law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this law was abolished.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In certain cases no evil results ensue if a person
surrenders his right to a thing whether absolutely or for a time, so that
in neither case is the surrender against the natural law. But that does
not apply to the case in point, wherefore the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Injury is opposed to justice. Now the natural law forbids
not only injustice, but also whatever is opposed to any of the virtues:
for instance it is contrary to the natural law to eat immoderately,
although by doing so a man uses his own property without injury to
anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her master's property that she
may serve him, she is not his that she may be his concubine. And again it
depends how a person makes use of his property. For such a man does an
injury to the offspring he begets, since such a union is not directed to
its good, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The wife has power of her husband's body, not simply and in
all respects, but only in relation to marriage, and consequently she
cannot transfer her husband's body to another to the detriment of the
good of marriage.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to have intercourse
with a concubine. For a lie is a greater sin than simple fornication: and
a proof of this is that Juda, who did not abhor to commit fornication
with Thamar, recoiled from telling a lie, saying (Gn. 38:23): "Surely she
cannot charge us with a lie." But a lie is not always a mortal sin.
Neither therefore is simple fornication.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a deadly sin should be punished with death. But the Old
Law did not punish with death intercourse with a concubine, save in a
certain case (Dt. 22:25). Therefore it is not a deadly sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), the sins of
the flesh are less blameworthy than spiritual sins. Now pride and
covetousness, which are spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins.
Therefore fornication, which is a sin of the flesh, is not always a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, where the incentive is greater the sin is less grievous,
because he sins more who is overcome by a lighter temptation. But
concupiscence is the greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since lustful
actions are not always mortal sins, neither is simple fornication a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin excludes from the kingdom of
God. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God (1 Cor.
6:9,10). Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all fornication is a
crime according to Tobias 4:13, "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all
fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know crime." Therefore,
etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 42, Q[1], A[4]),
those sins are mortal in their genus which violate the bond of friendship
between man and God, and between man and man; for such sins are against
the two precepts of charity which is the life of the soul. Wherefore
since the intercourse of fornication destroys the due relations of the
parent with the offspring that is nature's aim in sexual intercourse,
there can be no doubt that simple fornication by its very nature is a
mortal sin even though there were no written law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It often happens that a man who does not avoid a mortal
sin, avoids a venial sin to which he has not so great an incentive. Thus,
too, Juda avoided a lie while he avoided not fornication. Nevertheless
that would have been a pernicious lie, for it would have involved an
injury if he had not kept his promise.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A sin is called deadly, not because it is punished with
temporal, but because it is punished with eternal death. Hence also
theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other sins are sometimes not
punished with temporal death by the law. The same applies to fornication.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal sin, so
neither is every movement of lust, because the first movements of lust
and the like are venial sins, even sometimes marriage intercourse.
Nevertheless some acts of lust are mortal sins, while some movements of
pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory are to be
understood as comparing vices in their genus and not in their particular
acts.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A circumstance is the more effective in aggravating a sin
according as it comes nearer to the nature of sin. Hence although
fornication is less grave on account of the greatness of its incentive,
yet on account of the matter about which it is, it has a greater gravity
than immoderate eating, because it is about those things which tighten
the bond of human fellowship, as stated above. Hence the argument does
not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it has been sometimes lawful to have a
concubine. For just as the natural law requires a man to have but one
wife, so does it forbid him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has been
lawful to have several wives. Therefore it has also been lawful to have
a concubine.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a woman cannot be at the same time a slave and a wife;
wherefore according to the Law (Dt. 21:11, seqq.) a bondswoman gained her
freedom by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we read that
certain men who were most beloved of God, for instance Abraham and Jacob,
had intercourse with their bondswomen. Therefore these were not wives,
and consequently it was sometime lawful to have a concubine.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a woman who is taken in marriage cannot be cast out, and
her son should have a share in the inheritance. Yet Abraham sent Agar
away, and her son was not his heir (Gn. 21:14). Therefore she was not
Abraham's wife.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were
never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the
decalogue, namely, "Thou shalt not commit adultery." Therefore it was
never lawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs (De Abraham i, 4):
"What is unlawful to a wife is unlawful to a husband." But it is never
lawful for a wife to put aside her own husband and have intercourse with
another man. Therefore it was never lawful for a husband to have a
concubine.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) that before the
time of the Law fornication was not a sin; and he proved his assertion
from the fact that Juda had intercourse with Thamar. But this argument is
not conclusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob's sons from mortal
sin, since they were accused to their father of a most wicked crime (Gn.
37:2), and consented kill Joseph and to sell him. Wherefore we must say
that since it is against the natural law to have a concubine outside
wedlock, as stated above (A[3]), it was never lawful either in itself or
by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) intercourse
with a woman outside wedlock is an action improportionate to the good of
the offspring which is the principal end of marriage: and consequently it
is against the first precepts of the natural law which admit of no
dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old Testament we read of concubines
being taken by such men as we ought to excuse from mortal sin, we must
needs understand them to have been taken in marriage, and yet to have
been called concubines, because they had something of the character of a
wife and something of the character of a concubine. In so far as marriage
is directed to its principal end, which is the good of the offspring, the
union of wife and husband is indissoluble or at least of a lasting
nature, as shown above (A[1]), and in regard to this there is no
dispensation. But in regard to the secondary end, which is the management
of the household and community of works, the wife is united to the
husband as his mate: and this was lacking in those who were known as
concubines. For in this respect a dispensation was possible, since it is
the secondary end of marriage. And from this point of view they bore some
resemblance to concubines, and for this reason they were known as such.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8) to have several wives is not
against the first precepts of the natural law, as it is to have a
concubine; wherefore the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The patriarchs of old by virtue of the dispensation which
allowed them several wives, approached their bondswomen with the
disposition of a husband towards his wife. For these women were wives as
to the principal and first end of marriage, but not as to the other union
which regards the secondary end, to which bondage is opposed since a
woman cannot be at once mate and slave.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[65] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As in the Mosaic law it was allowable by dispensation to
grant a bill of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder (as we shall state
further on, Q[67], A[6]), so by the same dispensation Abraham was allowed
to send Agar away, in order to signify the mystery which the Apostle
explains (Gal. 4:22, seqq.). Again, that this son did not inherit belongs
to the mystery, as explained in the same place. Even so Esau, the son of
a free woman, did not inherit (Rm. 9:13, seqq.). In like manner on
account of the mystery it came about that the sons of Jacob born of bond
and free women inherited, as Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.) because
"sons and heirs are born to Christ both of good ministers denoted by the
free woman and of evil ministers denoted by the bondswoman."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] Out. Para. 1/1
OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (FIVE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity
contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having
two successive wives?
(2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at once?
(3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a
virgin?
(4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
(5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that irregularity is not attached to the bigamy
that consists in having two wives successively. For multitude and unity
are consequent upon being. Since then non-being does not cause plurality,
a man who has two wives successively, the one in being, the other in
non-being, does not thereby become the husband of more than one wife, so
as to be debarred, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 3:2; Titus 1:6), from
the episcopate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man who commits fornication with several women gives
more evidence of incontinence than one who has several wives
successively. Yet in the first case a man does not become irregular.
Therefore neither in the second should he become irregular.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, this is either because of
the sacrament, or because of the carnal intercourse. Now it is not on
account of the former, for if a man had contracted marriage by words of
the present and, his wife dying before the consummation of the marriage,
he were to marry another, he would become irregular, which is against the
decree of Innocent III (cap. Dubium, De bigamia). Nor again is it on
account of the second, for then a man who had committed fornication with
several women would become irregular: which is false. Therefore bigamy
nowise causes irregularity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, By the sacrament of order a man is appointed to the
ministry of the sacraments; and he who has to administer the sacraments
to others must suffer from no defect in the sacraments. Now there is a
defect in a sacrament when the entire signification of the sacrament is
not found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the union of
Christ with the Church, which is the union of one with one. Therefore the
perfect signification of the sacrament requires the husband to have only
one wife, and the wife to have but one husband; and consequently bigamy,
which does away with this, causes irregularity. And there are four kinds
of bigamy: the first is when a man has several lawful wives successively;
the second is when a man has several wives at once, one in law, the other
in fact; the third, when he has several successively, one in law, the
other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow. Accordingly
irregularity attaches to all of these.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
There is another consequent reason assigned, since those who receive the
sacrament of order should be signalized by the greatest spirituality,
both because they administer spiritual things, namely the sacraments, and
because they teach spiritual things, and should be occupied in spiritual
matters. Wherefore since concupiscence is most incompatible with
spirituality, inasmuch as it makes a man to be wholly carnal, they should
give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which does indeed show itself
in bigamous persons, seeing that they were unwilling to be content with
one wife. The first reason however is the better.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The multitude of several wives at the same time is a
multitude simply, wherefore a multitude of this kind is wholly
inconsistent with the signification of the sacrament, so that the
sacrament is voided on that account. But the multitude of several
successive wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not
entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void the
sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, which is required of
those who are the dispensers of sacraments.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although those who are guilty of fornication give proof of
greater concupiscence, theirs is not a so persistent concupiscence, since
by fornication one party is not bound to the other for ever; and
consequently no defect attaches to the sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above, bigamy causes irregularity, because it
destroys the perfect signification of the sacrament: which signification
is seated both in the union of minds, as expressed by the consent, and in
the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect both of these at the
same time in order to cause irregularity. Hence the decree of Innocent
III disposes of the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 27), namely
that consent alone by words of the present is sufficient to cause
irregularity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives,
one in law, the other in fact?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that irregularity does not result from bigamy when
one husband has two wives at the same time, one in law and one in fact.
For when the sacrament is void there can be no defect in the sacrament.
Now when a man marries a woman in fact but not in law there is no
sacrament, since such a union does not signify the union of Christ with
the Church. Therefore since irregularity does not result from bigamy
except on account of a defect in the sacrament, it would seem that no
irregularity attaches to bigamy of this kind.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if a man has intercourse with a woman whom he has
married in fact and not in law, he commits fornication if he has not a
lawful wife, or adultery if he has. But a man does not become irregular
by dividing his flesh among several women by fornication or adultery.
Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it may happen that a man, before knowing carnally the
woman he has married in law, marries another in fact and not in law, and
knows her carnally, whether the former woman be living or dead. Now this
man has contracted marriage with several women either in law or in fact,
and yet he is not irregular, since he has not divided his flesh among
several women. Therefore irregularity is not contracted by reason of the
aforesaid kind of bigamy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Irregularity is contracted in the two second kinds of
bigamy, for although in the one there is no sacrament, there is a certain
likeness to a sacrament. Wherefore these two kinds are secondary, and the
first is the principal kind in causing irregularity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Although there is no sacrament in this case there is a
certain likeness to a sacrament, whereas there is no such likeness in
fornication or adultery. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In this case the man is not reckoned a bigamist, because
the first marriage lacked its perfect signification. Nevertheless if, by
the judgment of the Church, he be compelled to return to his first wife
and carnally to know her, he becomes irregular forthwith, because the
irregularity is the result not of the sin but of imperfect signification.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that irregularity is not contracted by marrying one
who is not a virgin. For a man's own defect is a greater impediment to
him than the defect of another. But if the man himself who marries is not
a virgin he does not become irregular. Therefore much less does he if his
wife is not a virgin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it may happen that a man marries a woman after
corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such a man does not become irregular,
since he has not divided his flesh among several, nor has his wife done
so, and yet he marries a woman who is not a virgin. Therefore this kind
of bigamy does not cause irregularity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man can become irregular except voluntarily. But
sometimes a man marries involuntarily one who is not a virgin, for
instance when he thinks her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her
carnally, finds that she is not. Therefore this kind does not always
cause irregularity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, unlawful intercourse after marriage is more guilty than
before marriage. Now if a wife, after the marriage has been consummated,
has intercourse with another man, her husband does not become irregular,
otherwise he would be punished for his wife's sin. Moreover, it might
happen that, after knowing of this, he pays her the debt at her asking,
before she is accused and convicted of adultery. Therefore it would seem
that this kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): "We command thee
never to make unlawful ordinations, nor to admit to holy orders a
bigamist, or one who has married a woman that is not a virgin, or one who
is unlettered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound to do
penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any state of
subjection."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In the union of Christ with the Church unity is found on
either side. Consequently whether we find division of the flesh on the
part of the husband, or on the part of the wife, there is a defect of
sacrament. There is, however, a difference, because on the part of the
husband it is required that he should not have married another wife, but
not that he should be a virgin, whereas on the part of the wife it is
also required that she be a virgin. The reason assigned by those versed
in the Decretals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church militant
which is entrusted to the care of a bishop, and in which there are many
corruptions, while the spouse signifies Christ Who was a virgin:
wherefore virginity on the part of the spouse, but not on the part of the
bridegroom, is required in order that a man be made a bishop. This
reason, however, is expressly contrary to the words of the Apostle (Eph.
5:25): "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church,"
which show that the bride signifies the Church, and the bridegroom
Christ; and again he says (Eph. 5:23): "Because the husband is the head
of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church." Wherefore others say
that Christ is signified by the bridegroom, and that the bride signifies
the Church triumphant in which there is no stain. Also that the synagogue
was first united to Christ as a concubine; so that the sacrament loses
nothing of its signification if the bridegroom previously had a
concubine. But this is most absurd, since just as the faith of ancients
and of moderns is one, so is the Church one. Wherefore those who served
God at the time of the synagogue belonged to the unity of the Church in
which we serve God. Moreover this is expressly contrary to Jer. 3:14,
Ezech. 16:8, Osee 2:16, where the espousals of the synagogue are
mentioned explicitly: so that she was not as a concubine but as a wife.
Again, according to this, fornication would be the sacred sign
[sacramentum] of that union, which is absurd. Wherefore heathendom,
before being espoused to Christ in the faith of the Church, was corrupted
by the devil through idolatry. Hence we must say otherwise that
irregularity is caused by a defect in the sacrament itself. Now when
corruption of the flesh occurs outside wedlock on account of a preceding
marriage, it causes no defect in the sacrament on the part of the person
corrupted, but it causes a defect in the other person, because the act of
one who contracts marriage terminates not in himself, but in the other
party, wherefore it takes its species from its term, which, moreover, in
regard to that act, is the matter as it were of the sacrament.
Consequently if a woman were able to receive orders, just as her husband
becomes irregular through marrying one who is not a virgin, but not
through his not being a virgin when he marries, so also would a woman
become irregular if she were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not
if she were no longer a virgin when she married ---unless she had been
corrupted by reason of a previous marriage.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In this case opinions differ. It is, however, more probable
that he is not irregular, because he has not divided his flesh among
several women.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Irregularity is not the infliction of a punishment, but the
defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not always necessary for bigamy
to be voluntary in order to cause irregularity. Hence a man who marries a
woman, thinking her to be a virgin, whereas she is not, becomes irregular
by knowing her carnally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: If a woman commits fornication after being married, her
husband does not become irregular on that account, unless he again knows
her carnally after she has been corrupted by adultery, since otherwise
the corruption of the wife nowise affects the marriage act of the
husband. But though he be compelled by law to pay her the debt, or if he
do so at her request, being compelled by his own conscience, even before
she is convicted of adultery, he becomes irregular, albeit opinions
differ on this point. However, what we have said is more probable, since
here it is not a question of sin, but of signification only.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that bigamy is removed by Baptism. For Jerome says
in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus (1:6, "the husband of one
wife") that if a man has had several wives before receiving Baptism, or
one before and another after Baptism, he is not a bigamist. Therefore
bigamy is removed by Baptism.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he who does what is more, does what is less. Now Baptism
removes all sin, and sin is a greater thing than irregularity. Therefore
it removes irregularity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Baptism takes away all punishment resulting from an act.
Now such is the irregularity of bigamy. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a bigamist is irregular because he is deficient in the
representation of Christ. Now by Baptism we are fully conformed to
Christ. Therefore this irregularity is removed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than
the sacraments of the Old Law. But the sacraments of the Old Law removed
irregularities according to the Master's statement (Sent. iv,). Therefore
Baptism also, being the most efficacious of the sacraments of the New
Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon bigamy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii): "Those
understand the question more correctly who maintain that a man who has
married a second wife, though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at the
time, cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacrament, not of
a sin."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Conjug. xviii) "a
woman who has been corrupted while a catechumen or a pagan cannot after
Baptism be consecrated among God's virgins." Therefore in like manner one
who was a bigamist before Baptism cannot be ordained.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Baptism removes sin, but does not dissolve marriage.
Wherefore since irregularity results from marriage, it cannot be removed
by Baptism, as Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In this case Jerome's opinion is not followed: unless
perhaps he wished to explain that he means that a dispensation should be
more easily granted.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It does not follow that what does a greater thing, does a
lesser, unless it be directed to the latter. This is not so in the case
in point, because Baptism is not directed to the removal of an
irregularity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This must be understood of punishments consequent upon
actual sin, which are, or have yet to be, inflicted: for one does not
recover virginity by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Baptism conforms a man to Christ as regards the virtue of
the mind, but not as to the condition of the body, which is effected by
virginity or division of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Those irregularities were contracted through slight and
temporary causes, and consequently they could be removed by those
sacraments. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose, whereas
Baptism is not.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful for a bigamist to be granted a
dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De bigamis, cap. Nuper): "It is not
lawful to grant a dispensation to clerics who, as far as they could do
so, have taken to themselves a second wife."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is not lawful to grant a dispensation from the Divine
law. Now whatever is in the canonical writings belongs to the Divine law.
Since then in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:2): "It
behooveth . . . a bishop to be . . . the husband of one wife," it would
seem that a dispensation cannot be granted in this matter.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one can receive a dispensation in what is essential
to a sacrament. But it is essential to the sacrament of order that the
recipient be not irregular, since the signification which is essential to
a sacrament is lacking in one who is irregular. Therefore he cannot be
granted a dispensation in this.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, what is reasonably done cannot be reasonably undone. If,
therefore, a bigamist can lawfully receive a dispensation, it was
unreasonable that he should be irregular: which is inadmissible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Pope Lucius granted a dispensation to the bishop of
Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in the gloss on can. Lector, dist.
34.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Pope Martin [*Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii] says: "If a
Reader marry a widow, let him remain a Reader, or if there be need for
it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: and the same
applies if he should be a bigamist." Therefore he may at least receive a
dispensation as far as the Subdiaconate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by natural, but by
positive law; nor again is it one of the essentials of order that a man
be not a bigamist, which is evident from the fact that if a bigamist
present himself for orders, he receives the character. Wherefore the Pope
can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a bishop, only as
regards the minor orders, though some say that in order to prevent
religious wandering abroad he can dispense therefrom as regards the major
orders in those who wish to serve God in religion.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This Decretal shows that there is the same difficulty
against granting a dispensation in those who have married several wives
in fact, as if they had married them in law; but it does not prove that
the Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such cases.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This is true as regards things belonging to the natural
law, and those which are essential to the sacraments, and to faith. But
in those which owe their institution to the apostles, since the Church
has the same power now as then of setting up and of putting down, she can
grant a dispensation through him who holds the primacy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not every signification is essential to a sacrament, but
that alone which belongs to the sacramental effect,* and this is not
removed by irregularity. [*Leonine edition reads "officium," some read
"effectum"; the meaning is the same, and is best rendered as above.]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[66] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In particular cases there is no ratio that applies to all
equally, on account of their variety. Hence what is reasonably
established for all, in consideration of what happens in the majority of
cases, can be with equal reason done away in a certain definite case.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE (SEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are
seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law?
(2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife?
(3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law?
(4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband?
(5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced?
(6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife?
(7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that inseparableness of the wife is not of natural
law. For the natural law is the same for all. But no law save Christ's
has forbidden the divorcing of a wife. Therefore inseparableness of a
wife is not of natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sacraments are not of the natural law. But the
indissolubility of marriage is one of the marriage goods. Therefore it is
not of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly
directed to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of the offspring. But
all things are complete by a certain time. Therefore after that time it
is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice to the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the good of the offspring is the principal end of
marriage. But the indissolubility of marriage is opposed to the good of
the offspring, because, according to philosophers, a certain man cannot
beget offspring of a certain woman, and yet he might beget of another,
even though she may have had intercourse with another man. Therefore the
indissolubility of marriage is against rather than according to the
natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Those things which were assigned to nature when it was
well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of nature.
Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things according to
Mt. 19:4,6. Therefore it is of natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to God.
Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if he were to sunder "what
God hath joined together." Since then the indissolubility of marriage is
gathered from this passage (Mt. 19:6) it would seem that it is of natural
law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the
rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole
life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their
children, and that children should be their parents' heirs (2 Cor.
12:14). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of husband and
wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter to live together
for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility of marriage is of
natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Christ's law alone brought mankind "to perfection" [*Cf.
Heb. 7:19] by bringing man back to the state of the newness of nature.
Wherefore neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove all that was
contrary to the law of nature, for this was reserved exclusively to "the
law of the spirit of life" [*Cf. Rm. 8:2].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as the latter
is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church, and in so far
as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to the good of the
offspring, as stated above. But since divorce is more directly
incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with the good
of the offspring, with which it is incompatible consequently, as stated
above (Q[65], A[2], ad 5), the indissolubility of marriage is implied in
the good of the sacrament rather than in the good of the offspring,
although it may be connected with both. And in so far as it is connected
with the good of the offspring, it is of the natural law, but not as
connected with the good of the sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good in respect
of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring; although in
respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of the
contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature a remedy for
concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is expedient for all
rather than what may be suitable for one. Therefore although the
indissolubility of marriage hinder the good of the offspring with regard
to some individual, it is proportionate with the good of the offspring
absolutely speaking: and for this reason the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that it could not be lawful by dispensation to put away
a wife. For in marriage anything that is opposed to the good of the
offspring is against the first precepts of the natural law, which admit
of no dispensation. Now such is the putting away of a wife, as stated
above (A[1]). Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a concubine differs from a wife especially in the fact
that she is not inseparably united. But by no dispensation could a man
have a concubine. Therefore by no dispensation could he put his wife away.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, men are as fit to receive a dispensation now as of old.
But now a man cannot receive a dispensation to divorce his wife. Neither,
therefore, could he in olden times.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a
husband towards his wife, as stated above (Q[65], A[5], ad 2,3). Now by
Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore it could
be lawful by dispensation for a man to put away his wife.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In the commandments, especially those which in some way
are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural course
of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change. First, by some
natural cause whereby another natural cause is hindered from following
its course: it is thus in all things that happen by chance less
frequently in nature. In this way, however, there is no variation in the
course of those natural things which happen always, but only in the
course of those which happen frequently. Secondly, by a cause altogether
supernatural, as in the case of miracles: and in this way there can be a
variation in the course of nature, not only in the course which is
appointed for the majority of cases, but also in the course which is
appointed for all cases, as instanced by the sun standing still at the
time of Josue, and by its turning back at the time of Ezechias, and by
the miraculous eclipse at the time of Christ's Passion [*Jos. 10:14; 4
Kgs. 20:10; Is. 38:8; Mt. 27:15]. In like manner the reason for a
dispensation from a precept of the law of nature is sometimes found in
the lower causes, and in this way a dispensation may bear upon the
secondary precepts of the natural law, but not on the first precepts
because these are always existent as it were, as stated above (Q[65],
A[1]) in reference to the plurality of wives and so forth. But sometimes
this reason is found in the higher causes, and then a dispensation may be
given by God even from the first precepts of the natural law, for the
sake of signifying or showing some Divine mystery, as instanced in the
dispensation vouchsafed to Abraham in the slaying of his innocent son.
Such dispensations, however, are not granted to all generally, but to
certain individual persons, as also happens in regard to miracles.
Accordingly, if the indissolubility of marriage is contained among the
first precepts of the natural law, it could only be a matter of
dispensation in this second way; but, if it be one of the second precepts
of the natural law, it could be a matter of dispensation even in the
first way. Now it would seem to belong rather to the secondary precepts
of the natural law. For the indissolubility of marriage is not directed
to the good of the offspring, which is the principal end of marriage,
except in so far as parents have to provide for their children for their
whole life, by due preparation of those things that are necessary in
life. Now this preparation does not pertain to the first intention of
nature, in respect of which all things are common. And therefore it would
seem that to put away one's wife is not contrary to the first intention
of nature, and consequently that it is contrary not to the first but to
the second precepts of the natural law. Therefore, seemingly, it can be a
matter of dispensation even in the first way.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The good of the offspring, in so far as it belongs to the
first intention of nature, includes procreation, nourishment, and
instruction, until the offspring comes to perfect age. But that provision
be made for the children by bequeathing to them the inheritance or other
goods belongs seemingly to the second intention of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To have a concubine is contrary to the good of the
offspring, in respect of nature's first intention in that good, namely
the rearing and instruction of the child, for which purpose it is
necessary that the parents remain together permanently; which is not the
case with a concubine, since she is taken for a time. Hence the
comparison fails. But in respect of nature's second intention, even the
having of a concubine may be a matter of dispensation as evidenced by
Osee 1.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of
marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its first
intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was
made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such it cannot be a
matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it was lawful to divorce a wife under the
Mosaic law. For one way of giving consent is to refrain from prohibiting
when one can prohibit. It is also unlawful to consent to what is
unlawful. Since then the Mosaic law did not forbid the putting away of a
wife and did no wrong by not forbidding it, for "the law . . . is holy"
(Rm. 7:12), it would seem that divorce was at one time lawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the prophets spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost, according
to 2 Pt. 1:21. Now it is written (Malachi 2:16): "When thou shalt hate
her, put her away." Since then that which the Holy Ghost inspires is not
unlawful, it would seem that it was not always unlawful to divorce a wife.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that even as the apostles permitted
second marriages, so Moses allowed the bill of divorce. But second
marriages are not sinful. Therefore neither was it sinful under the
Mosaic law to divorce a wife.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, our Lord said (Mt. 19:8) that Moses granted the
Jews the bill of divorce by reason of the hardness of their heart. But
their hardness of heart did not excuse them from sin. Neither therefore
did the law about the bill of divorce.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "Moses, by granting the
bill of divorce, did not indicate the justice of God, but deprived their
sin of its guilt, for while the Jews acted as though they were keeping
the law, their sin seemed to be no sin."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, on this point there are two opinions. For some say that
under the Law those who put away their wives, after giving them a bill of
divorce, were not excused from sin, although they were excused from the
punishment which they should have suffered according to the Law: and that
for this reason Moses is stated to have permitted the bill of divorce.
Accordingly they reckon four kinds of permission: one by absence of
precept, so that when a greater good is not prescribed, a lesser good is
said to be permitted: thus the Apostle by not prescribing virginity,
permitted marriage (1 Cor. 7). The second is by absence of prohibition:
thus venial sins are said to be permitted because they are not forbidden.
The third is by absence of prevention, and thus all sins are said to be
permitted by God, in so far as He does not prevent them whereas He can.
The fourth is by omission of punishment, and in this way the bill of
divorce was permitted in the Law, not indeed for the sake of obtaining a
greater good, as was the dispensation to have several wives, but for the
sake of preventing a greater evil, namely wife-murder to which the Jews
were prone on account of the corruption of their irascible appetite. Even
so they were allowed to lend money for usury to strangers, on account of
corruption in their concupiscible appetite, lest they should exact usury
of their brethren; and again on account of the corruption of suspicion in
the reason they were allowed the sacrifice of jealousy, lest mere
suspicion should corrupt their judgment. But because the Old Law, though
it did not confer grace, was given that it might indicate sin, as the
saints are agreed in saying, others are of opinion that if it had been a
sin for a man to put away his wife, this ought to have been indicated to
him, at least by the law or the prophets: "Show My people their wicked
doings" (Is. 58:1): else they would seem to have been neglected, if those
things which are necessary for salvation and which they knew not were
never made known to them: and this cannot be admitted, because the
righteousness of the Law observed at the time of the Law would merit
eternal life. For this reason they say that although to put away one's
wife is wrong in itself, it nevertheless became lawful by God's
permitting it, and they confirm this by the authority of Chrysostom, who
says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom] that "the Lawgiver by permitting divorce removed the guilt
from the sin." Although this opinion has some probability the former is
more generally held: wherefore we must reply to the arguments on both
sides [*Cf. FS, Q[105], A[4], ad 8; FS, Q[108], A[3], ad 2; Contra Gentes
iii, cap. 123].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He who can forbid, sins not by omitting to forbid if he has
no hope of correcting, but fears by forbidding to furnish the occasion of
a greater evil. Thus it happened to Moses: wherefore acting on Divine
authority he did not forbid the bill of divorce.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The prophets, inspired by the Holy Ghost, said that a wife
ought to be put away, not as though this were a command of the Holy
Ghost, but as being permitted lest greater evils should be perpetrated.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This likeness of permission must not be applied to every
detail, but only to the cause which was the same in both cases, since
both permissions were granted in order to avoid some form of wickedness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although their hardness of heart excused them not from sin,
the permission given on account of that hardness excused them. For
certain things are forbidden those who are healthy in body, which are not
forbidden the sick, and yet the sick sin not by availing themselves of
the permission granted to them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A good may be omitted in two ways. First, in order to
obtain a greater good, and then the omission of that good becomes
virtuous by being directed to a greater good; thus Jacob rightly omitted
to have only one wife, on account of the good of the offspring. In
another way a good is omitted in order to avoid a greater evil, and then
if this is done with the authority of one who can grant a dispensation,
the omission of that good is not sinful, and yet it does not also become
virtuous. In this way the indissolubility of marriage was suspended in
the law of Moses in order to avoid a greater evil, namely wife-murder.
Hence Chrysostom says that "he removed the guilt from the sin." For
though divorce remained inordinate, for which reason it is called a sin,
it did not incur the debt of punishment, either temporal or eternal, in
so far as it was done by Divine permission: and thus its guilt was taken
away from it. And therefore he says again [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "divorce was
permitted, an evil indeed, yet lawful." Those who hold the first opinion
understand by this only that divorce incurred the debt of temporal
punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it was lawful for a divorced wife to have
another husband. For in divorce the husband did a greater wrong by
divorcing his wife than the wife by being divorced. But the husband
could, without sin, marry another wife. Therefore the wife could without
sin, marry another husband.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine, speaking about bigamy, says (De Bono Conjug.
xv, xviii) that "when it was the manner it was no sin." Now at the time
of the Old Law it was the custom for a wife after divorce to marry
another husband: "When she is departed and marrieth another husband,"
etc. Therefore the wife sinned not by marrying another husband.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, our Lord showed that the justice of the New Testament is
superabundant in comparison with the justice of the Old Testament (Mt.
5). Now He said that it belongs to the superabundant justice of the New
Testament that the divorced wife marry not another husband (Mt. 5:32).
Therefore it was lawful in the Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, are the words of Mt. 5:32, "He that shall marry
her that is put away committeth adultery." Now adultery was never
permitted in the Old Law. Therefore it was not lawful for the divorced
wife to have another husband.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is written (Dt. 24:3) that a divorced woman who
marries another husband "is defiled, and is become abominable before the
Lord." Therefore she sinned by marrying another husband.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the first above mentioned opinion (A[3]),
she sinned by marrying another husband after being divorced, because her
first marriage still held good. For "the woman . . . whilst her husband
liveth, is bound to the law of her husband" (Rm. 7:2): and she could not
have several husbands at one time. But according to the second opinion,
just as it was lawful by virtue of the Divine dispensation for a husband
to divorce his wife, so could the wife marry another husband, because the
indissolubility of marriage was removed by reason of the divine
dispensation: and as long as that indissolubility remains the saying of
the Apostle holds.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly to reply to the arguments on either side:
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It was lawful for a husband to have several wives at one
time by virtue of the divine dispensation: wherefore having put one away
he could marry another even though the former marriage were not
dissolved. But it was never lawful for a wife to have several husbands.
Wherefore the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In this saying of Augustine manner [mos] does not signify
custom but good manners; in the same sense a person is said to have
manners [morigeratus] because he has good manners; and "moral" philosophy
takes its name from the same source.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Our Lord shows the superabundance of the New Law over the
Old in respect of the counsels, not only as regards those things which
the Old Law permitted, but also as regards those things which were
forbidden in the Old Law, and yet were thought by many to be permitted on
account of the precepts being incorrectly explained---for instance that
of the hatred towards our enemies. and so is it in the matter of divorce.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The saying of our Lord refers to the time of the New Law,
when the aforesaid permission was recalled. In the same way we are to
understand the statement of Chrysostom [*Hom. xii in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], who says that "a man who
divorces his wife according to the law is guilty of four crimes: for in
God's sight he is a murderer," in so far as he has the purpose of killing
his wife unless he divorce her; "and because he divorces her without her
having committed fornication," in which case alone the law of the Gospel
allows a man to put away his wife; "and again, because he makes her an
adulteress, and the man whom she marries an adulterer."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A gloss observes here: "She is defiled and abominable,
namely in the judgment of him who first put her away as being defiled,"
and consequently it does not follow that she is defiled absolutely
speaking; or she is said to be defiled just as a person who had touched a
dead or leprous body was said to be unclean with the uncleanness, not of
sin, but of a certain legal irregularity. Wherefore a priest could not
marry a widow or a divorced woman.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a husband could lawfully take back the wife he
had divorced. For it is lawful to undo what was ill done. But for the
husband to divorce his wife was ill done. Therefore it was lawful for him
to undo it, by taking back his wife.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it has always been lawful to be indulgent to the sinner,
because this is a moral precept, which obtains in every law. Now the
husband by taking back the wife he had divorced was indulgent to one who
had sinned. Therefore this also was lawful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the reason given (Dt. 24:4) for its being unlawful to
take back a divorced wife was "because she is defiled." But the divorced
wife is not defiled except by marrying another husband. Therefore at
least it was lawful to take back a divorced wife before she married again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 24:4) that "the former husband cannot
take her again," etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In the law concerning the bill of divorce two things were
permitted, namely for the husband to put away the wife, and for the
divorced wife to take another husband; and two things were commanded,
namely that the bill of divorce should be written, and secondly that the
husband who divorced his wife could not take her back. According to those
who hold the first opinion (A[3]) this was done in punishment of the
woman who married again, and that it was by this sin that she was
defiled: but according to the others it was done that a husband might not
be too ready to divorce his wife if he could nowise take her back
afterwards.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In order to prevent the evil committed by a man in
divorcing his wife, it was ordered that the husband could not take back
his divorced wife, as stated above: and for this reason it was ordered by
God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It was always lawful to be indulgent to the sinner as
regards the unkindly feelings of the heart, but not as regards the
punishment appointed by God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are two opinions on this point. For some say that it
was lawful for a divorced wife to be reconciled to her husband, unless
she were joined in marriage to another husband. For then, on account of
the adultery to which she had voluntarily yielded, it was assigned to her
in punishment that she should not return to her former husband. Since,
however, the law makes no distinction in its prohibition, others say that
from the moment that she was put away she could not be taken back, even
before marrying again, because the defilement must be understood not in
reference to sin, but as explained above (A[4], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the reason for divorce was hatred for the
wife. For it is written (Malachi 2:16): "When thou shalt hate her put her
away." Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 24:1): "If . . . she find not favor
in his eyes, for some uncleanness," etc. Therefore the same conclusion
follows as before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: On the contrary, Barrenness and fornication are more opposed to
marriage than hatred. Therefore they ought to have been reasons for
divorce rather than hatred.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, hatred may be caused by the virtue of the person hated.
Therefore, if hatred is a sufficient reason, a woman could be divorced on
account of her virtue, which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, "If a man marry a wife and afterwards hate her, and seek
occasions to put her away"* alleging that she was not a virgin when he
married her, should he fail to prove this, he shall be beaten, and shall
be condemned in a hundred sicles of silver, and he shall be unable to put
her away all the days of his life (Dt. 22:13-19). [*The rest of the
passage is apparently quoted from memory.] Therefore hatred is not a
sufficient reason for divorce.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is the general opinion of holy men that the reason for
permission being given to divorce a wife was the avoidance of
wife-murder. Now the proximate cause of murder is hatred: wherefore the
proximate cause of divorce was hatred. But hatred proceeds, like love,
from a cause. Wherefore we must assign to divorce certain remote causes
which were a cause of hatred. For Augustine says in his gloss (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 14): "In the Law there were many causes for divorcing a
wife: Christ admitted none but fornication: and He commands other
grievances to be borne for conjugal fidelity and chastity." Such causes
are imperfections either of body, as sickness or some notable deformity,
or in soul as fornication or the like which amounts to moral depravity.
Some, however, restrict these causes within narrower limits, saying with
sufficient probability that it was not lawful to divorce a wife except
for some cause subsequent to the marriage; and that not even then could
it be done for any such cause, but only for such as could hinder the good
of the offspring, whether in body as barrenness, or leprosy and the
like, or in soul, for instance if she were a woman of wicked habits which
her children through continual contact with her would imitate. There is
however a gloss on Dt. 24:1, "If . . . she find not favor in his eyes,"
which would seem to restrict them yet more, namely to sin, by saying that
there "uncleanness" denotes sin: but "sin" in the gloss refers not only
to the morality of the soul but also to the condition of the body.
Accordingly we grant the first two objections.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Barrenness and other like things are causes of hatred, and
so they are remote causes of divorce.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: No one is hateful on account of virtue as such, because
goodness is the cause of love. Wherefore the argument does not hold.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[6] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The husband was punished in that case by being unable to
put away his wife for ever, just as in the case when he had corrupted a
maid (Dt. 22:28-30).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the causes of divorce had to be written in the
bill: because the husband was absolved from the punishment of the law by
the written bill of divorce. But this would seem altogether unjust,
unless sufficient causes were alleged for a divorce. Therefore it was
necessary for them to be written in the bill.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, seemingly this document was of no use except to show the
causes for divorce. Therefore, if they were not written down, the bill
was delivered for no purpose.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Master says that it was so in the text (Sent. iv, D,
33).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The causes for divorce were either sufficient or not.
If they were sufficient, the wife was debarred from a second marriage,
though this was allowed her by the Law. If they were insufficient, the
divorce was proved to be unjust, and therefore could not be effected.
Therefore the causes for divorce were by no means particularized in the
bill.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The causes for divorce were not particularized in the
bill, but were indicated in a general way, so as to prove the justice of
the divorce. According to Josephus (Antiq. iv, 6) this was in order that
the woman, having the written bill of divorce, might take another
husband, else she would not have been believed. Wherefore according to
him it was written in this wise: "I promise never to have thee with me
again." But according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, 26) the bill was
put into writing in order to cause a delay, and that the husband might be
dissuaded by the counsel of the notaries to refrain from his purpose of
divorce.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[67] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] Out. Para. 1/1
OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider children of illegitimate birth. Under this head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether those born out of true marriage are illegitimate?
(2) Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?
(3) Whether they can be legitimized?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether children born out of true marriage are illegitimate?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that children born out of true marriage are
legitimate. For he that is born according to law is called a legitimate
son. Now everyone is born according to law, at least the law of nature,
which has more force than any other. Therefore every child is to be
called legitimate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is the common saying that a legitimate child is one
born of a legitimate marriage, or of a marriage that is deemed legitimate
in the eyes of the Church. Now it happens sometimes that a marriage is
deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Church, whereas there is some
impediment affecting its validity; which impediment may be known to the
parties who marry in the presence of the Church: or they may marry in
secret and be ignorant of the impediment, in which case their marriage
would seem legitimate in the eyes of the Church, for the very reason that
it is not prevented by the Church. Therefore children born out of true
marriage are not illegitimate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Illegitimate is that which is against the law. Now
those who are born out of wedlock are born contrary to the law. Therefore
they are illegitimate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Children are of four conditions. Some are natural and
legitimate, for instance those who are born of a true and lawful
marriage; some are natural and illegitimate, as those who are born of
fornication; some are legitimate and not natural, as adopted children;
some are neither legitimate nor natural; such are those born of adultery
or incest, for these are born not only against the positive law, but
against the express natural law. Hence we must grant that some children
are illegitimate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although those who are born of an unlawful intercourse are
born according to the nature common to man and all animals, they are born
contrary to the law of nature which is proper to man: since fornication,
adultery, and the like are contrary to the law of nature. Hence the like
are not legitimate by any law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Ignorance, unless it be affected, excuses unlawful
intercourse from sin. Wherefore those who contract together in good faith
in the presence of the Church, although there be an impediment, of which
however they are ignorant, sin not, nor are their children illegitimate.
If, however, they know of the impediment, although the Church upholds
their marriage because she knows not of the impediment, they are not
excused from sin, nor do their children avoid being illegitimate. Neither
are they excused if they know not of the impediment and marry secretly,
because such ignorance would appear to be affected.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that children ought not to suffer any loss through
being illegitimate. For a child should not be punished on account of his
father's sin, according to the Lord's saying (Ezech. 18:20). But it is
not his own but his father's fault that he is born of an unlawful union.
Therefore he should not incur a loss on this account.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, human justice is copied from Divine. Now God confers
natural goods equally on legitimate and illegitimate children. Therefore
illegitimate should be equalled to legitimate children according to human
laws.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated (Gn. 25:5,6) that "Abraham gave all his
possessions to Isaac, and that to the children of the concubines he gave
gifts": and yet the latter were not born of an unlawful intercourse. Much
more, therefore, ought those born of an unlawful intercourse to incur
loss by not inheriting their father's property.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A person is said to incur a loss for some cause in two
ways: First, because he is deprived of his due, and thus an illegitimate
child incurs no loss. Secondly, because something is not due to him,
which might have been due otherwise, and thus an illegitimate son incurs
a twofold loss. First because he is excluded from legitimate acts such as
offices and dignities, which require a certain respectability in those
who perform them. Secondly, he incurs a loss by not succeeding to his
father's inheritance. Nevertheless natural sons can inherit a sixth only,
whereas spurious children cannot inherit any portion, although by natural
law their parents are bound to provide for their needs. Hence it is part
of a bishop's care to compel both parents to provide for them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To incur a loss in this second way is not a punishment.
Hence we do not say that a person is punished by not succeeding to the
throne through not being the king's son. In like manner it is no
punishment to an illegitimate child that he has no right to that which
belongs to the legitimate children.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Illegitimate intercourse is contrary to the law, not as an
act of the generative power, but as proceeding from a wicked will. Hence
an illegitimate son incurs a loss, not in those things which come to him
by his natural origin, but in those things which are dependent on the
will for being done or possessed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an illegitimate son can be legitimized?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an illegitimate son cannot be legitimized. For
the legitimate child is as far removed from the illegitimate as the
illegitimate from the legitimate. But a legitimate child is never made
illegitimate. Neither, therefore, is an illegitimate child ever made
legitimate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, illegitimate intercourse begets an illegitimate child.
But illegitimate intercourse never becomes legitimate. Neither,
therefore, can an illegitimate son become legitimate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, What is done by the law can be undone by the law. Now
the illegitimacy of children is an effect of positive law. Therefore an
illegitimate child can be legitimized by one who has legal authority.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, An illegitimate child can be legitimized, not so that he
be born of a legitimate intercourse, because this intercourse is a thing
of the past and can never be legitimized from the moment that it was once
illegitimate. But the child is said to be legitimized, in so far as the
losses which an illegitimate child ought to incur are withdrawn by the
authority of the law.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
There are six ways of becoming legitimate: two according to the canons
(Cap. Conquestus; Cap. Tanta), namely when a man marries the woman of
whom he has an unlawful child (if it were not a case of adultery), and by
special indulgence and dispensation of the lord Pope. The other four ways
are according to the laws: (1) If the father offer his natural son to the
emperor's court, for by this very fact the son is legitimate on account
of the reputation of the court; (2) if the father designate him in his
will as his legitimate heir, and the son afterwards offer the will to the
emperor; (3) if there be no legitimate son and the son himself offer
himself to the emperor; (4) if the father designate him as legitimate in
a public document or in a document signed by three witnesses, without
calling him natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A favor may be bestowed on a person without injustice, but
a person cannot be damnified except for a fault. Hence an illegitimate
child can be legitimized rather than "vice versa"; for although a
legitimate son is sometimes deprived of his inheritance on account of his
fault, he is not said to be illegitimate, because he was legitimately
begotten.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[68] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Illegitimate intercourse has an inherent inseparable defect
whereby it is opposed to the law: and consequently it cannot be
legitimized. Nor is there any comparison with an illegitimate child who
has no such defect.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] Out. Para. 1/3
TREATISE ON THE RESURRECTION (QQ[69]-86)
OF MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, AND FIRST OF THE PLACE WHERE
SOULS ARE AFTER DEATH (SEVEN ARTICLES)
In sequence to the foregoing we must treat of matters concerning the
state of resurrection: for after speaking of the sacraments whereby man
is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak of the
resurrection whereby man is delivered from the death of punishment. The
treatise on the resurrection offers a threefold consideration, namely the
things that precede, those that accompany, and those that follow the
resurrection. Consequently we must speak (1) of those things which
partly, though not wholly, precede the resurrection; (2) of the
resurrection itself and its circumstances; (3) of the things which follow
it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] Out. Para. 2/3
Among the things which precede the resurrection we must consider (1) the
places appointed for the reception of bodies after death; (2) the quality
of separated souls, and the punishment inflicted on them by fire; (3) the
suffrages whereby the souls of the departed are assisted by the living;
(4) the prayers of the saints in heaven; (5) the signs preceding the
general judgment; (6) the fire of the world's final conflagration which
will precede the appearance of the Judge.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any places are appointed to receive souls after death?
(2) Whether souls are conveyed thither immediately after death?
(3) Whether they are able to leave those places?
(4) Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?
(5) Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?
(6) Whether the limbo of the patriarchs is the same as the limbo of
children?
(7) Whether so many places should be distinguished?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that places are not appointed to receive souls
after death. For as Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Wise men are agreed that
incorporeal things are not in a place," and this agrees with the words of
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): "We can answer without hesitation that
the soul is not conveyed to corporeal places, except with a body, or that
it is not conveyed locally." Now the soul separated from the body is
without a body, as Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32). Therefore
it is absurd to assign any places for the reception of souls.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever has a definite place has more in common with
that place than with any other. Now separated souls, like certain other
spiritual substances, are indifferent to all places; for it cannot be
said that they agree with certain bodies, and differ from others, since
they are utterly removed from all corporeal conditions. Therefore places
should not be assigned for their reception.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is assigned to separated souls after death,
except what conduces to their punishment or to their reward. But a
corporeal place cannot conduce to their punishment or reward, since they
receive nothing from bodies. Therefore definite places should not be
assigned to receive them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The empyrean heaven is a corporeal place, and yet as
soon as it was made it was filled with the holy angels, as Bede [*Hexaem.
i, ad Gn. 1:2] says. Since then angels even as separated souls are
incorporeal, it would seem that some place should also be assigned to
receive separated souls.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, this appears from Gregory's statement (Dial. iv) that souls
after death are conveyed to various corporeal places, as in the case of
Paschasius whom Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found at the baths, and of the
soul of King Theodoric, which he asserts to have been conveyed to hell.
Therefore after death souls have certain places for their reception.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Although spiritual substances do not depend on a body in
respect of their being, nevertheless the corporeal world is governed by
God by means of the spiritual world, as asserted by Augustine (De Trin.
iii, 4) and Gregory (Dial. iv, 6). Hence it is that there is a certain
fittingness by way of congruity of spiritual substances to corporeal
substances, in that the more noble bodies are adapted to the more noble
substances: wherefore also the philosophers held that the order of
separate substances is according to the order of movables. And though
after death souls have no bodies assigned to them whereof they be the
forms or determinate motors, nevertheless certain corporeal places are
appointed to them by way of congruity in reference to their degree of
nobility (wherein they are as though in a place, after the manner in
which incorporeal things can be in a place), according as they more or
less approach to the first substance (to which the highest place it
fittingly assigned), namely God, whose throne the Scriptures proclaim
heaven to be (Ps. 102:19, Is. 66:1). Wherefore we hold that those souls
that have a perfect share of the Godhead are in heaven, and that those
souls that are deprived of that share are assigned to a contrary place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Incorporeal things are not in place after a manner known
and familiar to us, in which way we say that bodies are properly in
place; but they are in place after a manner befitting spiritual
substances, a manner that cannot be fully manifest to us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Things have something in common with or a likeness to one
another in two ways. First, by sharing a same quality: thus hot things
have something in common, and incorporeal things can have nothing in
common with corporeal things in this way. Secondly, by a kind of
proportionateness, by reason of which the Scriptures apply the corporeal
world to the spiritual metaphorically. Thus the Scriptures speak of God
as the sun, because He is the principle of spiritual life, as the sun is
of corporeal life. In this way certain souls have more in common with
certain places: for instance, souls that are spiritually enlightened,
with luminous bodies, and souls that are plunged in darkness by sin, with
dark places.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The separated soul receives nothing directly from corporeal
places in the same way as bodies which are maintained by their respective
places: yet these same souls, through knowing themselves to be appointed
to such places, gather joy or sorrow therefrom; and thus their place
conduces to their punishment or reward.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no souls are conveyed to heaven or hell
immediately after death. For a gloss on Ps. 36:10, "Yet a little while
and the wicked shall not be," says that "the saints are delivered at the
end of life; yet after this life they will not yet be where the saints
will be when it is said to them: Come ye blessed of My Father." Now those
saints will be in heaven. Therefore after this life the saints do not go
immediately up to heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cix) that "the time which
lies between man's death and the final resurrection holds the souls in
secret receptacles according as each one is worthy of rest or of
suffering." Now these secret abodes cannot denote heaven and hell, since
also after the final resurrection the souls will be there together with
their bodies: so that he would have no reason to distinguish between the
time before and the time after the resurrection. Therefore they will be
neither in hell nor in heaven until the day of judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the glory of the soul is greater than that of bodies.
Now the glory of the body is awarded to all at the same time, so that
each one may have the greater joy in the common rejoicing of all, as
appears from a gloss on Heb. 11:40, "God providing some better thing for
us---that the common joy may make each one rejoice the more." Much more,
therefore, ought the glory of souls to be deferred until the end, so as
to be awarded to all at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, punishment and reward, being pronounced by the sentence
of the judge, should not precede the judgment. Now hell fire and the joys
of heaven will be awarded to all by the sentence of Christ judging them,
namely at the last judgment, according to Mt. 25. Therefore no one will
go up to heaven or down to hell before the day of judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 5:1): "If our earthly house of
this habitation be dissolved, that we have . . . a house not made with
hands, but reserved in heaven [*Vulg.: 'eternal in heaven'; cf. 1 Pt.
1:4]." Therefore, after the body's dissolution, the soul has an abode,
which had been reserved for it in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the Apostle says (Phil. 1:23): "I desire [Vulg.: 'Having a
desire'] to be dissolved and to be with Christ." From these words Gregory
argues as follows (Dial. iv, 25): "If there is no doubt that Christ is in
heaven, it cannot be denied that Paul's soul is in heaven likewise." Now
it cannot be gainsaid that Christ is in heaven, since this is an article
of faith. Therefore neither is it to be denied that the souls of the
saints are borne to heaven. That also some souls go down to hell
immediately after death is evident from Lk. 16:22, "And the rich man
died, and he was buried in hell."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Even as in bodies there is gravity or levity whereby they
are borne to their own place which is the end of their movement, so in
souls there is merit or demerit whereby they reach their reward or
punishment, which are the ends of their deeds. Wherefore just as a body
is conveyed at once to its place, by its gravity or levity, unless there
be an obstacle, so too the soul, the bonds of the flesh being broken,
whereby it was detained in the state of the way, receives at once its
reward or punishment, unless there be an obstacle. Thus sometimes venial
sin, though needing first of all to be cleansed, is an obstacle to the
receiving of the reward; the result being that the reward is delayed. And
since a place is assigned to souls in keeping with their reward or
punishment, as soon as the soul is set free from the body it is either
plunged into hell or soars to heaven, unless it be held back by some
debt, for which its flight must needs be delayed until the soul is first
of all cleansed. This truth is attested by the manifest authority of the
canonical Scriptures and the doctrine of the holy Fathers; wherefore the
contrary must be judged heretical as stated in Dial. iv, 25, and in De
Eccl. Dogm. xlvi.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The gloss explains itself: for it expounds the words, "They
will not yet be where the saints will be," etc., by saying immediately
afterwards: "That is to say, they will not have the double stole which
the saints will have at the resurrection."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Among the secret abodes of which Augustine speaks, we must
also reckon hell and heaven, where some souls are detained before the
resurrection. The reason why a distinction is drawn between the time
before and the time after the resurrection is because before the
resurrection they are there without the body whereas afterwards they are
with the body, and because in certain places there are souls now which
will not be there after the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is a kind of continuity among men as regards the
body, because in respect thereof is verified the saying of Acts 17:24,26,
"God . . . hath made of one all mankind": whereas He has fashioned souls
independently of one another. Consequently it is not so fitting that all
men should be glorified together in the soul as that they should be
glorified together in the body. Moreover the glory of the body is not so
essential as the glory of the soul; wherefore it would be more derogatory
to the saints if the glory of the soul were delayed, than that the glory
of the body be deferred: nor could this detriment to their glory be
compensated on account of the joy of each one being increased by the
common joy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Gregory proposes and solves this very difficulty (Dial. iv,
25): "If then," he says, "the souls of the just are in heaven now, what
will they receive in reward for their justice on the judgment day?" And
he answers: "Surely it will be a gain to them at the judgment, that
whereas now they enjoy only the happiness of the soul, afterwards they
will enjoy also that of the body, so as to rejoice also in the flesh
wherein they bore sorrow and torments for the Lord." The same is to be
said in reference to the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the souls who are in heaven or hell are able to go from thence?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the souls in heaven or hell are unable to go
from thence. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii): "If the souls
of the dead took any part in the affairs of the living, to say nothing of
others, there is myself whom not for a single night would my loving
mother fail to visit since she followed me by land and sea in order to
abide with me": and from this he concludes that the souls of the departed
do not mingle in the affairs of the living. But they would be able to do
so if they were to leave their abode. Therefore they do not go forth from
their abode.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 26:4): "That I may dwell in the house
of the Lord all the days of my life," and (Job 7:9): "He that shall go
down to hell shall not come up." Therefore neither the good nor the
wicked quit their abode.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (A[2]), abodes are awarded to souls
after death as a reward or punishment. Now after death neither the
rewards of the saints nor the punishments of the damned are increased.
Therefore they do not quit their abodes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, Jerome writing against Vigilantius addresses him thus:
"For thou sayest that the souls of the apostles and martyrs have taken up
their abode either in Abraham's bosom or in the place of refreshment, or
under the altar of God, and that they are unable to visit their graves
when they will. Wouldst thou then lay down the law for God? Wouldst thou
put the apostles in chains, imprison them until the day of judgment, and
forbid them to be with their lord, them of whom it is written: They
follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth? And if the Lamb is everywhere,
therefore we must believe that those also who are with Him are
everywhere." Therefore it is absurd to say that the souls of the departed
do not leave their abode.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, Jerome argues as follows: "Since the devil and the demons
wander throughout the whole world, and are everywhere present with
wondrous speed, why should the martyrs, after shedding their blood be
imprisoned and unable to go forth?" Hence we may infer that not only the
good sometimes leave their abode, but also the wicked, since their
damnation does not exceed that of the demons who wander about everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, the same conclusion may be gathered from Gregory (Dial. iv),
where he relates many cases of the dead having appeared to the living.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two ways of understanding a person to leave
hell or heaven. First, that he goes from thence simply, so that heaven or
hell be no longer his place: and in this way no one who is finally
consigned to hell or heaven can go from thence, as we shall state further
on (Q[71], A[5], ad 5). Secondly, they may be understood to go forth for
a time: and here we must distinguish what befits them according to the
order of nature, and what according to the order of Divine providence;
for as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi): "Human affairs have their
limits other than have the wonders of the Divine power, nature's works
differ from those which are done miraculously." Consequently, according
to the natural course, the separated souls consigned to their respective
abodes are utterly cut off from communication with the living. For
according to the course of nature men living in mortal bodies are not
immediately united to separate substances, since their entire knowledge
arises from the senses: nor would it be fitting for them to leave their
abode for any purpose other than to take part in the affairs of the
living. Nevertheless, according to the disposition of Divine providence
separated souls sometimes come forth from their abode and appear to men,
as Augustine, in the book quoted above, relates of the martyr Felix who
appeared visibly to the people of Nola when they were besieged by the
barbarians. It is also credible that this may occur sometimes to the
damned, and that for man's instruction and intimidation they be permitted
to appear to the living; or again in order to seek our suffrages, as to
those who are detained in purgatory, as evidenced by many instances
related in the fourth book of the Dialogues. There is, however, this
difference between the saints and the damned, that the saints can appear
when they will to the living, but not the damned; for even as the saints
while living in the flesh are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to
heal and work wonders, which can only be done miraculously by the Divine
power, and cannot be done by those who lack this gift, so it is not
unfitting for the souls of the saints to be endowed with a power in
virtue of their glory, so that they are able to appear wondrously to the
living, when they will: while others are unable to do so unless they be
sometimes permitted.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine, as may be gathered from what he says afterwards,
is speaking according to the common course of nature, And yet it does not
follow, although the dead be able to appear to the living as they will,
that they appear as often as when living in the flesh: because when they
are separated from the flesh, they are either wholly conformed to the
divine will, so that they may do nothing but what they see to be
agreeable with the Divine disposition, or else they are so overwhelmed by
their punishments that their grief for their unhappiness surpasses their
desire to appear to others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The authorities quoted speak in the sense that no one comes
forth from heaven or hell simply, and do not imply that one may not come
forth for a time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 3) the soul's place conduces to
its punishment or reward in so far as the soul, through being consigned
to that place, is affected either by joy or by grief. Now this joy or
grief at being consigned to such a place remains in the soul even when it
is outside that place. Thus a bishop who is given the honor of sitting on
a throne in the church incurs no dishonor when he leaves the throne, for
though he sits not therein actually, the place remains assigned to him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary sense.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Jerome is speaking of the apostles and martyrs in reference
to that which they gain from their power of glory, and not to that which
befits them as due to them by nature. And when he says that they are
everywhere, he does not mean that they are in several places or
everywhere at once, but that they can be wherever they will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: There is no parity between demons and angels on the one
hand and the souls of the saints and of the damned on the other. For the
good or bad angels have allotted to them the office of presiding over
men, to watch over them or to try them; but this cannot be said of the
souls of men. Nevertheless, according to the power of glory, it is
competent to the souls of the saints that they can be where they will;
and this is what Jerome means to say.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Although the souls of the saints or of the damned are
sometimes actually present where they appear, we are not to believe that
this is always so: for sometimes these apparitions occur to persons
whether asleep or awake by the activity of good or wicked angels in order
to instruct or deceive the living. Thus sometimes even the living appear
to others and tell them many things in their sleep; and yet it is clear
that they are not present, as Augustine proves from many instances (De
Cura pro Mort. xi, xii).
�Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the limbo of hell is not the same as Abraham's
bosom. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): "I have not yet
found Scripture mentioning hell in a favorable sense." Now Abraham's
bosom is taken in a favorable sense, as Augustine goes on to say (Gen. ad
lit. xxxiii): "Surely no one would be allowed to give an unfavorable
signification to Abraham's bosom and the place of rest whither the godly
poor man was carried by the angels." Therefore Abraham's bosom is not the
same as the limbo of hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those who are in hell see not God. Yet God is seen by
those who are in Abraham's bosom, as may be gathered from Augustine
(Confess. ix, 3) who, speaking of Nebridius, says: "Whatever that be,
which is signified by thut bosom, there lives my Nebridius," and further
on: "Now lays he not his ear to my mouth, but his spiritual mouth unto
Thy fountain, and drinketh as much as he can receive wisdom in proportion
to his thirst, endlessly happy." Therefore Abraham's bosom is not the
same as the limbo of hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Church prays not that a man be taken to hell: and
yet she prays that the angels may carry the departed soul to Abraham's
bosom. Therefore it would seem that Abraham's bosom is not the same as
limbo.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The place whither the beggar Lazarus was taken is
called Abraham's bosom. Now he was taken to hell, for as a gloss [*St.
Gregory, Moral. xx] on Job 30:23, "Where a house is appointed for every
one that liveth," says: "Hell was the house of all the living until the
coming of Christ." Therefore Abraham's bosom is the same as limbo.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Jacob said to his sons (Gn. 44:38): "You will bring down my
grey hairs with sorrow to hell": wherefore Jacob knew that he would be
taken to hell after his death. Therefore Abraham likewise was taken to
hell after his death; and consequently Abraham's bosom would seem to be a
part of hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, After death men's souls cannot find rest save by the
merit of faith, because "he that cometh to God must believe" (Heb. 11:6).
Now the first example of faith was given to men in the person of Abraham,
who was the first to sever himself from the body of unbelievers, and to
receive a special sign of faith: for which reason "the place of rest
given to men after death is called Abraham's bosom," as Augustine
declares (Gen. ad lit. xii). But the souls of the saints have not at all
times had the same rest after death; because, since Christ's coming they
have had complete rest through enjoying the vision of God, whereas before
Christ's coming they had rest through being exempt from punishment, but
their desire was not set at rest by their attaining their end.
Consequently the state of the saints before Christ's coming may be
considered both as regards the rest it afforded, and thus it is called
Abraham's bosom, and as regards its lack of rest, and thus it is called
the limbo of hell. Accordingly, before Christ's coming the limbo of hell
and Abraham's bosom were one place accidentally and not essentially: and
consequently, nothing prevents Abraham's bosom from being after Christ's
coming, and from being altogether distinct from limbo, since things that
are one accidentally may be parted from one another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The state of the holy Fathers as regards what was good in
it was called Abraham's bosom, but as regards its deficiencies it was
called hell. Accordingly, neither is Abraham's bosom taken in an
unfavorable sense nor hell in a favorable sense, although in a way they
are one.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The place of rest of the holy Fathers was called Abraham's
bosom before as well as after Christ's coming, but in different ways. For
since before Christ's coming the saints' rest had a lack of rest attached
to it, it was called both hell and Abraham's bosom, wherefore God was not
seen there. But since after the coming of Christ the saints' rest is
complete through their seeing God, this rest is called Abraham's bosom,
but not hell by any means. It is to this bosom of Abraham that the Church
prays for the faithful to be brought.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident: and the same meaning
applies to a gloss on Lk. 16:22, "It came to pass that the beggar died,"
etc., which says: "Abraham's bosom is the rest of the blessed poor, whose
is the kingdom of heaven."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the limbo of hell is the same as the hell of
the damned. For Christ is said to have "bitten" [*Allusion to Osee 13:14]
hell, but not to have swallowed it, because He took some from thence but
not all. Now He would not be said to have "bitten" hell if those whom He
set free were not part of the multitude shut up in hell. Therefore since
those whom He set free were shut up in hell, the same were shut up in
limbo and in hell. Therefore limbo is either the same as hell, or is a
part of hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the Creed Christ is said to have descended into hell.
But he did not descend save to the limbo of the Fathers. Therefore the
limbo of the Fathers is the same as hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Job 17:16): "All that I have shall go
down into the deepest hell [Douay: 'pit']." Now since Job was a holy and
just man, he went down to limbo. Therefore limbo is the same as the
deepest hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, In hell there is no redemption [*Office of the Dead,
Resp. vii]. But the saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore limbo is
not the same as hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "I do not see how we can
believe that the rest which Lazarus received was in hell." Now the soul
of Lazarus went down into limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The abodes of souls after death may be distinguished in
two ways; either as to their situation, or as to the quality of the
places, inasmuch as souls are punished or rewarded in certain places.
Accordingly if we consider the limbo of the Fathers and hell in respect
of the aforesaid quality of the places, there is no doubt that they are
distinct, both because in hell there is sensible punishment, which was
not in the limbo of the Fathers, and because in hell there is eternal
punishment, whereas the saints were detained but temporally in the limbo
of the Fathers. On the other hand, if we consider them as to the
situation of the place, it is probable that hell and limbo are the same
place, or that they are continuous as it were yet so that some higher
part of hell be called the limbo of the Fathers. For those who are in
hell receive diverse punishments according to the diversity of their
guilt, so that those who are condemned are consigned to darker and deeper
parts of hell according as they have been guilty of graver sins, and
consequently the holy Fathers in whom there was the least amount of sin
were consigned to a higher and less darksome part than all those who were
condemned to punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: When Christ, by His descent, delivered the Fathers from
limbo, He is said to have "bitten" hell and to have descended into hell,
in so far as hell and limbo are the same as to situation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Job descended, not to the hell of the damned, but to the
limbo of the Fathers. The latter is called the deepest place not in
reference to the places of punishment, but in comparison with other
places, as including all penal places under one head. Again we may reply
with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii): who says of Jacob: "When Jacob said to
his sons, 'You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell,' he
seems to have feared most, lest he should be troubled with so great a
sorrow as to obtain, not the rest of good men, but the hell of sinners."
The saying of Job may be expounded in the same way, as being the
utterance of one in fear, rather than an assertion.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the limbo of children is the same as the limbo
of the Fathers. For punishment should correspond to sin. Now the Fathers
were detained in limbo for the same sin as children, namely for original
sin. Therefore the place of punishment should be the same for both.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchir. xciii): "The punishment of
children who die in none but original sin is most lenient." But no
punishment is more lenient than that of the holy Fathers. Therefore the
place of punishment is the same for both.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Even as temporal punishment in purgatory and eternal
punishment in hell are due to actual sin, so temporal punishment in the
limbo of the Fathers and eternal punishment in the limbo of the children
were due to original sin. If, therefore, hell and purgatory be not the
same it would seem that neither are the limbo of children and the limbo
of the Fathers the same.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The limbo of the Fathers and the limbo of children,
without any doubt, differ as to the quality of punishment or reward. For
children have no hope of the blessed life, as the Fathers in limbo had,
in whom, moreover, shone forth the light of faith and grace. But as
regards their situation, there is reason to believe that the place of
both is the same; except that the limbo of the Fathers is placed higher
than the limbo of children, just as we have stated in reference to limbo
and hell (A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Fathers did not stand in the same relation to original
sin as children. For in the Fathers original sin was expiated in so far
as it infected the person, while there remained an obstacle on the part
of nature, on account of which their satisfaction was not yet complete.
On the other hand, in children there is an obstacle both on the part of
the person and on the part of nature: and for this reason different
abodes are appointed to the Fathers and to children.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine is speaking of punishments due to some one by
reason of his person. Of these the most lenient are due to those who are
burdened with none but original sin. But lighter still is the punishment
due to those who are debarred from the reception of glory by no personal
defect but only by a defect of nature, so that this very delay of glory
is called a kind of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether so many abodes should be distinguished?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish so many abodes. For
after death, just as abodes are due to souls on account of sin, so are
they due on account of merit. Now there is only one abode due on account
of merit, namely paradise. Therefore neither should there be more than
one abode due on account of sin, namely hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, abodes are appointed to souls after death on account of
merits or demerits. Now there is one place where they merit or demerit.
Therefore only one abode should be assigned to them after death.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the places of punishment should correspond to the sins.
Now there are only three kinds of sin, namely original, venial, and
mortal. Therefore there should only be three penal abodes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the other hand, it would seem that there should be many more
than those assigned. For this darksome air is the prison house of the
demons (2 Pt. 2:17), and yet it is not reckoned among the five abodes
which are mentioned by certain authors. Therefore there are more than
five abodes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the earthly paradise is distinct from the heavenly
paradise. Now some were borne away to the earthly paradise after this
state of life, as is related of Enoch and Elias. Since then the earthly
paradise is not counted among the five abodes, it would seem that there
are more than five.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, some penal place should correspond to each state of
sinners. Now if we suppose a person to die in original sin who has
committed only venial sins, none of the assigned abodes will be befitting
to him. For it is clear that he would not be in heaven, since he would be
without grace, and for the same reason neither would he be in the limbo
of the Fathers; nor again, would he be in the limbo of children, since
there is no sensible punishment there, which is due to such a person by
reason of venial sin: nor would he be in purgatory, where there is none
but temporal punishment, whereas everlasting punishment is due to him:
nor would he be in the hell of the damned, since he is not guilty of
actual mortal sin. Therefore a sixth abode should be assigned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, rewards and punishments vary in quantity according to
the differences of sins and merits. Now the degrees of merit and sin are
infinite. Therefore we should distinguish an infinite number of abodes,
in which souls are punished or rewarded after death.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, souls are sometimes punished in the places where they
sinned, as Gregory states (Dial. iv, 55). But they sinned in the place
which we inhabit. Therefore this place should be reckoned among the
abodes, especially since some are punished for their sins in this world,
as the Master said above (Sent. iv, D, 21).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, just as some die in a state of grace and have some
venial sins for which they deserve punishment, so some die in mortal sin
and have some good for which they would deserve a reward. Now to those
who die in grace with venial sins an abode is assigned where they are
punished ere they receive their reward, which abode is purgatory.
Therefore, on the other hand, there should be equally an abode for those
who die in mortal sin together with some good works.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, just as the Fathers were delayed from obtaining full
glory of the soul before Christ's coming, so are they now detained from
receiving the glory of the body. Therefore as we distinguish an abode of
the saints before the coming of Christ from the one where they are
received now, so ought we to distinguish the one in which they are
received now from the one where they will be received after the
resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The abodes of souls are distinguished according to the
souls' various states. Now the soul united to a mortal body is in the
state of meriting, while the soul separated from the body is in the state
of receiving good or evil for its merits; so that after death it is
either in the state of receiving its final reward, or in the state of
being hindered from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving its
final retribution, this happens in two ways: either in the respect of
good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and thus as regards
actual sin it is hell, and as regards original sin it is the limbo of
children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is hindered
from receiving its final reward, this is either on account of a defect of
the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are detained from
receiving their reward at once on account of the sins they have
committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature, and thus we
have the limbo of the Fathers, where the Fathers were detained from
obtaining glory on account of the guilt of human nature which could not
yet be expiated.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Good happens in one way, but evil in many ways, according
to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore
it is not unfitting if there be one place of blissful reward and several
places of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The state of meriting and demeriting is one state, since
the same person is able to merit and demerit: wherefore it is fitting
that one place should be assigned to all: whereas of those who receive
according to their merits there are various states, and consequently the
comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One may be punished in two ways for original sin, as stated
above, either in reference to the person, or in reference to nature only.
Consequently there is a twofold limbo corresponding to that sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This darksome air is assigned to the demons, not as the
place where they receive retribution for their merits, but as a place
befitting their office, in so far as they are appointed to try us. Hence
it is not reckoned among the abodes of which we are treating now: since
hell fire is assigned to them in the first place (Mt. 25).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The earthly paradise belongs to the state of the wayfarer
rather than to the state of those who receive for their merits; and
consequently it is not reckoned among the abodes whereof we are treating
now.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: This supposition is impossible [*Cf. FS, Q[89], A[6]]. If,
however, it were possible, such a one would be punished in hell
eternally: for it is accidental to venial sin that it be punished
temporally in purgatory, through its having grace annexed to it:
wherefore if it be annexed to a mortal sin, which is without grace, it
will be punished eternally in hell. And since this one who dies in
original sin has a venial sin without grace, it is not unfitting to
suppose that he be punished eternally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: Diversity of degrees in punishments or rewards does not
diversify the state, and it is according to the diversity of state that
we distinguish various abodes. Hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: Although separated souls are sometimes punished in the
place where we dwell, it does not follow that this is their proper place
of punishment: but this is done for our instruction, that seeing their
punishment we may be deterred from sin. That souls while yet in the flesh
are punished here for their sins has nothing to do with the question,
because a punishment of this kind does not place a man outside the state
of meriting or demeriting: whereas we are treating now of the abodes to
which souls are assigned after the state of merit or demerit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: It is impossible for evil to be pure and without the
admixture of good, just as the supreme good is without any admixture of
evil. Consequently those who are to be conveyed to beatitude which is a
supreme good must be cleansed of all evil. wherefore there must needs be
a place where such persons are cleansed if they go hence without being
perfectly clean. But those who will be thrust into hell will not be free
from all good: and consequently the comparison fails, since those who are
in hell can receive the reward of their goods, in so far as their past
goods avail for the mitigation of their punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[69] A[7] R.O. 10 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 10: The essential reward consists in the glory of the soul,
but the body's glory, since it overflows from the soul, is entirely
founded as it were on the soul: and consequently lack of the soul's glory
causes a difference of state, whereas lack of the body's glory does not.
For this reason, too, the same place, namely the empyrean, is assigned to
the holy souls separated from their bodies and united to glorious bodies:
whereas the same place was not assigned to the souls of the Fathers both
before and after the glorification of souls.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE BODY, AND OF THE PUNISHMENT
INFLICTED ON IT BY MATERIAL FIRE (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the general quality of the soul after leaving the
body, and the punishment inflicted on it by material fire. Under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?
(2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid powers remain in the soul?
(3) Whether the separated soul can suffer from a material fire?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? [*Cf. FP,
Q[77], A[8]]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sensitive powers remain in the sensitive
soul. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Anim. xv): "The soul withdraws from
the body taking all with itself, sense and imagination, reason,
understanding and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible powers."
Now sense, imagination, concupiscible and irascible are sensitive powers.
Therefore the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xvi): "We believe that
man alone has a substantial soul, which lives though separated from the
body, and clings keenly to its senses and wits." Therefore the soul
retains its senses after being separated from the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the soul's powers are either its essential parts as some
maintain, or at least are its natural properties. Now that which is in a
thing essentially cannot be separated from it, nor is a subject severed
from its natural properties. Therefore it is impossible for the soul to
lose any of its powers after being separated from the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a whole is not entire if one of its parts be lacking.
Now the soul's powers are called its parts. Therefore, if the soul lose
any of its powers after death, it will not be entire after death: and
this is unfitting.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the soul's powers co-operate in merit more even than the
body, since the body is a mere instrument of action, while the powers are
principles of action. Now the body must of necessity be rewarded together
with the soul, since it co-operated in merit. Much more, therefore, is it
necessary that the powers of the soul be rewarded together with it.
Therefore the separated soul does not lose them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, if the soul after separation from the body loses its
sensitive power, that must needs come to naught. For it cannot be said
that it is dissolved into some matter, since it has no matter as a part
of itself. Now that which entirely comes to naught is not restored in
identity; wherefore at the resurrection the soul will not have the same
identical sensitive powers. Now according to the Philosopher (De Anima
ii, 1), as the soul is to the body so are the soul's powers to the parts
of the body, for instance the sight to the eye. But if it were not
identically the same soul that returns to the body, it would not be
identically the same man. Therefore for the same reason it would not be
identically the same eye, if the visual power were not identically the
same; and in like manner no other part would rise again in identity, and
consequently neither would the whole man be identically the same.
Therefore it is impossible for the separated soul to lose its sensitive
powers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, if the sensitive powers were to be corrupted when the
body is corrupted, it would follow that they are weakened when the body
is weakened. Yet this is not the case, for according to De Anima i, "if
an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would, without doubt,
see as well as a young man." Therefore neither are the sensitive powers
corrupted when the body is corrupted.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xix): "Of two substances
alone does man consist, soul and body: the soul with its reason, and the
body with its senses." Therefore the sensitive powers belong to the body:
and consequently when the body is corrupted the sensitive powers remain
not in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the separation of the soul,
expresses himself thus (Metaph. xi, 3): "If, however, anything remain at
last, we must ask what this is: because in certain subjects it is not
impossible, for instance if the soul be of such a disposition, not the
whole soul but the intellect; for as regards the whole soul this is
probably impossible." Hence it seems that the whole soul is not separated
from the body, but only the intellective powers of the soul, and
consequently not the sensitive or vegetative powers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima ii,
2): "This alone is ever separated, as the everlasting from the
corruptible: for it is hereby clear that the remaining parts are not
separable as some maintain." Therefore the sensitive powers do not remain
in the separated soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some,
holding the view that all the powers are in the soul in the same way as
color is in a body, hold that the soul separated from the body takes all
its powers away with it: because, if it lacked any one of them, it would
follow that the soul is changed in its natural properties, since these
cannot change so long as their subject remains. But the aforesaid view is
false, for since a power is so called because it enables us to do or
suffer something, and since to do and to be able belong to the same
subject, it follows that the subject of a power is the same as that which
is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that
"where we find power there we find action." Now it is evident that
certain operations, whereof the soul's powers are the principles, do not
belong to the soul properly speaking but to the soul as united to the
body, because they are not performed except through the medium of the
body---such as to see, to hear, and so forth. Hence it follows that such
like powers belong to the united soul and body as their subject, but to
the soul as their quickening principle, just as the form is the principle
of the properties of a composite being. Some operations, however, are
performed by the soul without a bodily organ---for instance to
understand, to consider, to will: wherefore, since these actions are
proper to the soul, the powers that are the principles thereof belong to
the soul not only as their principle but also as their subject.
Therefore, since so long as the proper subject remains its proper
passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted they also must be
corrupted, it follows that these powers which use no bodily organ for
their actions must needs remain in the separated body, while those which
use a bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the body is corrupted:
and such are all the powers belonging to the sensitive and the vegetative
soul. On this account some draw a distinction in the sensitive powers of
the soul: for they say that they are of two kinds---some being acts of
organs and emanating from the soul into the body are corrupted with the
body; others, whence the former originate, are in the soul, because by
them the soul sensitizes the body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and
these primary powers remain in the separated soul. But this statement
seems unreasonable: because the soul, by its essence and not through the
medium of certain other powers, is the origin of those powers which are
the acts of organs, even as any form, from the very fact that by its
essence it informs its matter, is the origin of the properties which
result naturally in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose other
powers in the soul, by means of which the powers that perfect the organs
may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same reason it would be
necessary to suppose other powers by means of which these mean powers
flow from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity, and if we have
to stop it is better to do so at the first step.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Hence others say that the sensitive and other like powers do not remain
in the separated soul except in a restricted sense, namely radically, in
the same way as a result is in its principle: because there remains in
the separated soul the ability to produce these powers if it should be
reunited to the body; nor is it necessary for this ability to be anything
in addition to the essence of the soul, as stated above. This opinion
appears to be the more reasonable.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of Augustine is to be understood as meaning
that the soul takes away with it some of those powers actually, namely
understanding and intelligence, and some radically, as stated above [*Cf.
FP, Q[77], A[8], ad 1 and infra A[2], ad 1].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The senses which the soul takes away with it are not these
external senses, but the internal, those, namely, which pertain to the
intellective part, for the intellect is sometimes called sense, as Basil
states in his commentary on the Proverbs, and again the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 11). If, however, he means the external senses we must reply
as above to the first objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above, the sensitive powers are related to the
soul, not as natural passions to their subject, but as compared to their
origin: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The powers of the soul are not called its integral but its
potential parts. Now the nature of such like wholes is that the entire
energy of the whole is found perfectly in one of the parts, but partially
in the others; thus in the soul the soul's energy is found perfectly in
the intellective part, but partially in the others. Wherefore, as the
powers of the intellective part remain in the separated soul, the latter
will remain entire and undiminished, although the sensitive powers do not
remain actually: as neither is the king's power decreased by the death of
a mayor who shared his authority.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The body co-operates in merit, as an essential part of the
man who merits. The sensitive powers, however, do not co-operate thus,
since they are of the genus of accidents. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The powers of the sensitive soul are said to be acts of the
organs, not as though they were the essential forms of those organs,
except in reference to the soul whose powers they are. But they are the
acts of the organs, by perfecting them for their proper operations, as
heat is the act of fire by perfecting it for the purpose of heating.
Wherefore, just as a fire would remain identically the same, although
another individual heat were in it (even so the cold of water that has
been heated returns not identically the same, although the water remains
the same in identity), so the organs will be the same identically,
although the powers be not identically the same.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The Philosopher is speaking there of these powers as being
rooted in the soul. This is clear from his saying that "old age is an
affection not of the soul, but of that in which the soul is," namely the
body. For in this way the powers of the soul are neither weakened nor
corrupted on account of the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the
separated soul. For Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima xv): "When the
soul leaves the body it derives pleasure or sorrow through being affected
with these" (namely the imagination, and the concupiscible and irascible
faculties) "according to its merits." But the imagination, the
concupiscible, and the irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore the
separated soul will be affected as regards the sensitive powers, and
consequently will be in some act by reason of them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that "the body feels
not, but the soul through the body," and further on: "The soul feels
certain things, not through the body but without the body." Now that
which befits the soul without the body can be in the soul separated from
the body. Therefore the soul will then be able to feel actually.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to see images of bodies, as occurs in sleep, belongs to
imaginary vision which is in the sensitive part. Now it happens that the
separated soul sees images of bodies in the same way as when we sleep.
Thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "For I see not why the soul has
an image of its own body when, the body lying senseless, yet not quite
dead, it sees some things which many have related after returning to life
from this suspended animation and yet has it not when it has left the
body through death having taken place." For it is unintelligible that the
soul should have an image of its body, except in so far as it sees that
image: wherefore he said before of those who lie senseless that "they
have a certain image of their own body, by which they are able to be
borne to corporeal places and by means of sensible images to take
cognizance of such things as they see." Therefore the separated soul can
exercise the acts of the sensitive powers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the memory is a power of the sensitive part, as proved
in De Memor. et Remin. i. Now separated souls will actually remember the
things they did in this world: wherefore it is said to the rich glutton
(Lk. 16:25): "Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy
lifetime." Therefore the separated soul will exercise the act of a
sensitive power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) the
irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. But joy and
sorrow, love and hatred, fear and hope, and similar emotions which
according to our faith we hold to be in separated souls, are in the
irascible and concupiscible. Therefore separated souls will not be
deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, That which is common to soul and body cannot remain in
the separated soul. Now all the operations of the sensitive powers are
common to the soul and body: and this is evident from the fact that no
sensitive power exercises an act except through a bodily organ. Therefore
the separated soul will be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that "when the body is
corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves," and the same applies to
all the acts of the sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul does
not exercise the act of any sensitive power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some distinguish two kinds of acts in the sensitive
powers: external acts which the soul exercises through the body. and
these do not remain in the separated soul; and internal acts which the
soul performs by itself; and these will be in the separated soul. This
statement would seem to have originated from the opinion of Plato, who
held that the soul is united to the body, as a perfect substance nowise
dependant on the body, and merely as a mover is united to the thing
moved. This is an evident consequence of transmigration which he held.
And since according to him nothing is in motion except what is moved, and
lest he should go on indefinitely, he said that the first mover moves
itself, and he maintained that the soul is the cause of its own movement.
Accordingly there would be a twofold movement of the soul, one by which
it moves itself, and another whereby the body is moved by the soul: so
that this act "to see" is first of all in the soul itself as moving
itself, and secondly in the bodily organ in so far as the soul moves the
body. This opinion is refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima i, 3) who
proves that the soul does not move itself, and that it is nowise moved in
respect of such operations as seeing, feeling, and the like, but that
such operations are movements of the composite only. We must therefore
conclude that the acts of the sensitive powers nowise remain in the
separated soul, except perhaps as in their remote origin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some deny that this book is Augustine's: for it is ascribed
to a Cistercian who compiled it from Augustine's works and added things
of his own. Hence we are not to take what is written there, as having
authority. If, however, its authority should be maintained, it must be
said that the meaning is that the separated soul is affected with
imagination and other like powers, not as though such affection were the
act of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that the soul will be
affected in the future life for good or ill, according to the things
which it committed in the body through the imagination and other like
powers: so that the imagination and such like powers are not supposed to
elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body the merit of that
affection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The soul is said to feel through the body, not as though
the act of feeling belonged to the soul by itself, but as belonging to
the whole composite by reason of the soul, just as we say that heat
heats. That which is added, namely that the soul feels some things
without the body, such as fear and so forth, means that it feels such
things without the outward movement of the body that takes place in the
acts of the proper senses: since fear and like passions do not occur
without any bodily movement.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the
opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Augustine speaks there as nearly throughout that book, as
one inquiring and not deciding. For it is clear that there is no
comparison between the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul: since
the soul of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein corporeal
images are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated soul. Or we
may reply that images of things are in the soul, both as to the sensitive
and imaginative power and as to the intellective power, with greater or
lesser abstraction from matter and material conditions. Wherefore
Augustine's comparison holds in this respect that just as the images of
corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who is carried
out of his mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated soul
intellectively: but not that they are in the separated soul imaginatively.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As stated in the first book (Sent. i, D, 3, qu. 4), memory
has a twofold signification. Sometimes it means a power of the sensitive
part, in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and in this way the
act of the memory will not be in the separated soul. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that "when this," the body to wit, "is
corrupted, the soul remembers not." In another way memory is used to
designate that part of the imagination which pertains to the intellective
faculty, in so far namely as it abstracts from all differences of time,
since it regards not only the past but also the present, and the future
as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 11). Taking memory in this sense the
separated soul will remember [*Cf. FP, Q[77], A[8]; FP, Q[89], A[6]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, have a twofold
signification. Sometimes they denote passions of the sensitive appetite,
and thus they will not be in the separated soul, because in this way they
are not exercised without a definite movement of the heart. In another
way they denote acts of the will which is in the intellective part: and
in this way they will be in the separated soul, even as delight will be
there without bodily movement, even as it is in God, namely in so far as
it is a simple movement of the will. In this sense the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 14) that "God's joy is one simple delight."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a bodily
fire. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "The things that affect the
soul well or ill after its separation from the body, are not corporeal
but resemble corporeal things." Therefore the separated soul is not
punished with a bodily fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) says that "the agent is
always more excellent than the patient." But it is impossible for any
body to be more excellent than the separated soul. Therefore it cannot
suffer from a body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i) and Boethius
(De Duab. Natur.) only those things that agree in matter are active and
passive in relation to one another. But the soul and corporeal fire do
not agree in matter, since there is no matter common to spiritual and
corporeal things: wherefore they cannot be changed into one another, as
Boethius says (De Duab. Natur.). Therefore the separated soul does not
suffer from a bodily fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatsoever is patient receives something from the agent.
Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily fire, it will receive
something therefrom. Now whatsoever is received in a thing is received
according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore that which is received
in the soul from the fire, is in it not materially but spiritually. Now
the forms of things existing spiritually in the soul are its perfections.
Therefore though it be granted that the soul suffer from the bodily fire,
this will not conduce to its punishment, but rather to its perfection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if it be said that the soul is punished merely by seeing
the fire, as Gregory would seem to say (Dial. iv, 29). On the contrary,
if the soul sees the fire of hell, it cannot see it save by intellectual
vision, since it has not the organs by which sensitive or imaginative
vision is effected. But it would seem impossible for intellectual vision
to be the cause of sorrow, since "there is no sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of considering," according to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13).
Therefore the soul is not punished by that vision.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, if it be said that the soul suffers from the corporeal
fire, through being held thereby, even as now it is held by the body
while living in the body; on the contrary, the soul while living in the
body is held by the body in so far as there results one thing from the
soul and the body, as from form and matter. But the soul will not be the
form of that corporeal fire. Therefore it cannot be held by the fire in
the manner aforesaid.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, every bodily agent acts by contact. But a corporeal fire
cannot be in contact with the soul, since contact is only between
corporeal things whose bounds come together. Therefore the soul suffers
not from that fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, an organic agent does not act on a remote object, except
through acting on the intermediate objects; wherefore it is able to act
at a fixed distance in proportion to its power. But souls, or at least
the demons to whom this equally applies, are sometimes outside the place
of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in this world: and yet
they are not then free from punishment, for just as the glory of the
saints is never interrupted, so neither is the punishment of the damned.
And yet we do not find that all the intermediate things suffer from the
fire of hell: nor again is it credible that any corporeal thing of an
elemental nature has such a power that its action can reach to such a
distance. Therefore it does not seem that the pains suffered by the souls
of the damned are inflicted by a corporeal fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, The possibility of suffering from a corporeal fire is
equally consistent with separated souls and with demons. Now demons
suffer therefrom since they are punished by that fire into which the
bodies of the damned will be cast after the resurrection, and which must
needs be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our Lord
(Mt. 25:41), "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which
was prepared for the devil," etc. Therefore separated souls also can
suffer from that fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, punishment should correspond to sin. Now in sinning the soul
subjected itself to the body by sinful concupiscence. Therefore it is
just that it should be punished by being made subject to a bodily thing
by suffering therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, there is greater union between form and matter than between
agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature
does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore
neither is it an obstacle to its suffering from a body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 1/8
I answer that, Given that the fire of hell is not so called
metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we must
needs say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal fire,
since our Lord said (Mt. 25:41) that this fire was prepared for the devil
and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But how it is that
they can thus suffer is explained in many ways.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 2/8
For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes
the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) says:
"The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it." But this does not
seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is seen,
is a perfection of the seer. wherefore it cannot conduce to his
punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or unpleasant
nature accidentally, in so far, to wit, as it is apprehended as something
hurtful, and consequently, besides the fact that the soul sees the fire,
there must needs be some relation of the soul to the fire, according to
which the fire is hurtful to the soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 3/8
Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn the
soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful to itself, and in
consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in
fulfillment of Ps. 13:5, "They have trembled for fear, where there was no
fear." Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29) that "the soul burns through
seeing itself aflame." But this, again, seems insufficient, because in
this case the soul would suffer from the fire, not in reality but only in
apprehension: for although a real passion of sorrow or pain may result
from a false imagination, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii), it
cannot be said in relation to that passion that one really suffers from
the thing, but from the image of the thing that is present to one's
fancy. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be more unlike real
suffering than that which results from imaginary vision, since the latter
is stated to result from real images of things, which images the soul
carries about with it, whereas the former results from false fancies
which the erring soul imagines: and furthermore, it is not probable that
separated souls or demons, who are endowed with keen intelligence, would
think it possible for a corporeal fire to hurt them, if they were nowise
distressed thereby.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 4/8
Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers
even really from the corporeal fire: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv,
29): "We can gather from the words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers
from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it." They
explain the possibility of this as follows. They say that this corporeal
fire can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal thing, and thus
it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as the instrument of
the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of Divine justice demands
that the soul which by sinning subjected itself to corporeal things
should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now an instrument acts
not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in virtue of the principal
agent: wherefore it is not unreasonable if that fire, seeing that it acts
in virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on the spirit of a man or
demon, in the same way as we have explained the sanctification of the
soul by the sacraments (TP, Q[62], AA[1],4).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 5/8
But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in
acting on that on which it is used instrumentally, has its own connatural
action besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the principal
agent: in fact it is by fulfilling the former that it effects the latter
action, even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that water
sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the shape of a
house.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 6/8
Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul an action
connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the instrument of Divine
justice in the punishment of sin: and for this reason we must say that a
body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be hurtful or
distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some way united
to a body: for thus we observe that "the corruptible body is a load upon
the soul" (Wis. 9:15). Now a spirit is united to a body in two ways. In
one way as form to matter, so that from their union there results one
thing simply: and the spirit that is thus united to a body both quickens
the body and is somewhat burdened by the body: but it is not thus that
the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal fire. In another
way as the mover is united to the things moved, or as a thing placed is
united to place, even as incorporeal things are in a place. In this way
created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place, being in one place
in such a way as not to be in another. Now although of its nature a
corporeal thing is able to confine an incorporeal spirit to a place, it
is not able of its nature to detain an incorporeal spirit in the place to
which it is confined, and so to tie it to that place that it be unable to
seek another, since a spirit is not by nature in a place so as to be
subject to place. But the corporeal fire is enabled as the instrument of
the vengeance of Divine justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has
a penal effect on it, by hindering it from fulfilling its own will, that
is by hindering it from acting where it will and as it will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 7/8
This way is asserted by Gregory (Dial. iv, 29). For in explaining how
the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself as
follows: "Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to fire,
will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are imprisoned in
flames?" Julian [*Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic ii, 17] says the same as
quoted by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 44): "If the incorporeal spirit of a
living man is held by the body, why shall it not be held after death by a
corporeal fire?" and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that "just as,
although the soul is spiritual and the body corporeal, man is so
fashioned that the soul is united to the body as giving it life, and on
account of this union conceives a great love for its body, so it is
chained to the fire, as receiving punishment therefrom, and from this
union conceives a loathing."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 8/8
Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid modes together, in order to
understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire: so as to
say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit
united to it as a thing placed is united to a place; that as the
instrument of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained as it
were, and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to the spirit, and
thus the soul seeing the fire as something hurtful to it is tormented by
the fire. Hence Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) mentions all these in order, as
may be seen from the above quotations.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine speaks there as one inquiring: wherefore he
expresses himself otherwise when deciding the point, as quoted above (De
Civ. Dei xxi). Or we may reply that Augustine means to say that the
things which are the proximate occasion of the soul's pain or sorrow are
spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it apprehended the
fire as hurtful to it: wherefore the fire as apprehended is the proximate
cause of its distress, whereas the corporeal fire which exists outside
the soul is the remote cause of its distress.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the soul is simply more excellent than the fire,
the fire is relatively more excellent than the soul, in so far, to wit,
as it is the instrument of Divine justice.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher and Boethius are speaking of the action
whereby the patient is changed into the nature of the agent. Such is not
the action of the fire on the soul: and consequently the argument is not
conclusive.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on it but
detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the point.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by the fact
that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can nowise be
contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the thing seen, by
its very action on the sight so as to be seen, there may be accidentally
something corruptive of the sight, in so far as it destroys the harmony
of the organ Nevertheless, intellectual vision may cause sorrow, in so
far as the thing seen is apprehended as hurtful, not that it hurts
through being seen, but in some other way no matter which. It is thus
that the soul in seeing the fire is distressed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The comparison does not hold in every respect, but it does
in some, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: Although there is no bodily contact between the soul and
body, there is a certain spiritual contact between them (even as the
mover of the heaven, being spiritual, touches the heaven, when it moves
it, with a spiritual contact) in the same way as a "painful object is
said to touch," as stated in De Gener. i. This mode of contact is
sufficient for action.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: The souls of the damned are never outside hell, except by
Divine permission, either for the instruction or for the trial of the
elect. And wherever they are outside hell they nevertheless always see
the fire thereof as prepared for their punishment. Wherefore, since this
vision is the immediate cause of their distress, as stated above,
wherever they are, they suffer from hell-fire. Even so prisoners, though
outside the prison, suffer somewhat from the prison, seeing themselves
condemned thereto. Hence just as the glory of the elect is not
diminished, neither as to the essential, nor as to the accidental reward,
if they happen to be outside the empyrean, in fact this somewhat conduces
to their glory, so the punishment of the damned is nowise diminished, if
by God's permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on
James 3:6, "inflameth the wheel of our nativity," etc., is in agreement
with this, for it is worded thus: "The devil, wherever he is, whether in
the air or under the earth, drags with him the torments of his flames."
But the objection argues as though the corporeal fire tortured the spirit
immediately in the same way as it torments bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD (FOURTEEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under this head there
are fourteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether suffrages performed by one person can profit others?
(2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?
(3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the dead?
(4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those who perform them?
(5) Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?
(6) Whether they profit those who are in purgatory?
(7) Whether they avail the children in limbo?
(8) Whether in any way they profit those who are heaven?
(9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and
almsgiving profit the departed?
(10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them?
(11) Whether the burial service profits the departed?
(12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that person more than
others?
(13) Whether suffrages for many avail each one as much as if they were
offered for each individual?
(14) Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages
are not offered, as much as special and general suffrages together avail
those for whom they are offered?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the suffrages of one person can profit others?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the suffrages of one person cannot profit
others. For it is written (Gal. 6:8): "What things a man shall sow, those
also shall he reap." Now if one person reaped fruit from the suffrages of
another, he would reap from another's sowing. Therefore a person receives
no fruit from the suffrages of others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to God's justice, that each one should
receive according to his merits, wherefore the psalm (Ps. 61:13) says:
"Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Now it is
impossible for God's justice to fail. Therefore it is impossible for one
man to be assisted by the works of another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a work is meritorious on the same count as it is
praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it is voluntary. Now one man is not
praised for the work of another. Therefore neither can the work of one
man be meritorious and fruitful for another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it belongs to Divine justice to repay good for good in
the same way as evil for evil. But no man is punished for the evildoings
of another; indeed, according to Ezech. 18:4, "the soul that sinneth, the
same shall die." Therefore neither does one person profit by another's
good.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:63): "I am a partaker with all
them that fear Thee," etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, all the faithful united together by charity are members of the
one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted by another. Therefore
one man can be assisted by the merits of another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, our actions can avail for two purposes. First, for
acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the
state of bliss. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus by
some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of punishment.
And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two ways: first, by
way of merit; secondly, by way of prayer: the difference being that merit
relies on justice, and prayer on mercy; since he who prays obtains his
petition from the mere liberality of the one he prays. Accordingly we
must say that the work of one person nowise can avail another for
acquiring a state by way of merit, so that, to wit, a man be able to
merit eternal life by the works which I do, because the share of glory is
awarded according to the measure of the recipient, and each one is
disposed by his own and not by another's actions---disposed, that is to
say, by being worthy of reward. By way of prayer, however, the work of
one may profit another while he is a wayfarer, even for acquiring a
state; for instance, one man may obtain the first grace for another [*Cf.
FS, Q[114], A[6]]: and since the impetration of prayer depends on the
liberality of God Whom we pray, it may extend to whatever is ordinately
subject to the Divine power. On the other hand, as regards that which is
consequent upon or accessory to a state, the work of one may avail
another, not only by way of prayer but even by way of merit: and this
happens in two ways. First, on account of their communion in the root of
the work, which root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all who
are united together by charity acquire some benefit from one another's
works, albeit according to the measure of each one's state, since even in
heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that the
communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. Secondly,
through the intention of the doer who does certain works specially for
the purpose that they may profit such persons: so that those works become
somewhat the works of those for whom they are done, as though they were
bestowed on them by the doer. Wherefore they can avail them either for
the fulfillment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose that does not
change their state.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This reaping is the receiving of eternal life, as stated in
Jn. 4:36, "And he that reapeth . . . gathereth fruit unto life
everlasting." Now a share of eternal life is not given to a man save for
his own works, for although we may impetrate for another that he obtain
life, this never happens except by means of his own works, when namely,
at the prayers of one, another is given the grace whereby he merits
eternal life.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The work that is done for another becomes his for whom it
is done: and in like manner the work done by a man who is one with me is
somewhat mine. Hence it is not contrary to Divine justice if a man
receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is one with him in
charity, or of works done for him. This also happens according to human
justice, so that the satisfaction offered by one is accepted in lieu of
another's.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Praise is not given to a person save according to his
relation to an act, wherefore praise is "in relation to something"
(Ethic. i, 12). And since no man is made or shown to be well- or
ill-disposed to something by another's deed, it follows that no man is
praised for another's deeds save accidentally in so far as he is somewhat
the cause of those deeds, by giving counsel, assistance, inducement, or
by any other means. on the other hand, a work is meritorious to a person,
not only by reason of his disposition, but also in view of something
consequent upon his disposition or state, as evidenced by what has been
said.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It is directly contrary to justice to take away from a
person that which is his due: but to give a person what is not his due is
not contrary to justice, but surpasses the bounds of justice, for it is
liberality. Now a person cannot be hurt by the ills of another, unless he
be deprived of something of his own. Consequently it is not becoming that
one should be punished for another's sins, as it is that one should
acquire some advantage from deeds of another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the works of
the living. First, because the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:10): "We must all
be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may
receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done."
Therefore nothing can accrue to a man from the works of others, which are
done after his death and when he is no longer in the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, this also seems to follow from the words of Apoc. 14:13,
"Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord . . . for their works follow
them."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs only to one who is on the way to advance on
account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer wayfarers,
because to them the words of Job 19:8, refer: "He hath hedged in my path
round about, and I cannot pass." Therefore the dead cannot be assisted by
a person's suffrages.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no one is assisted by the deed of another, unless there
be some community of life between them. Now there is no community between
the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 11).
Therefore the suffrages of the living do not profit the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary are the words of 2 Macc. 12:46: "It is . . . a holy and
wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from
sins." But this would not be profitable unless it were a help to them.
Therefore the suffrages of the living profit the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Augustine says (De Cure pro Mort. i): "Of no small weight is
the authority of the Church whereby she clearly approves of the custom
whereby a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the
priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar." This custom was
established by the apostles themselves according to the Damascene in a
sermon on suffrages for the dead [*De his qui in fide dormierunt, 3],
where he expresses himself thus: "Realizing the nature of the Mysteries
the disciples of the Saviour and His holy apostles sanctioned a
commemoration of those who had died in the faith, being made in the
awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries." This is also confirmed by the
authority of Dionysius (Hier. Eccl.), where he mentions the rite of the
Early Church in praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts that the
suffrages of the living profit the dead. Therefore we must believe this
without any doubt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the
Church, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who die in
charity. For charity which is the life of the soul, even as the soul is
the life of the body, has no end: "Charity never falleth away" (1 Cor.
13:8). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the living: wherefore
the intention of the living can be directed to them. Hence the suffrages
of the living profit the dead in two ways even as they profit the living,
both on account of the bond of charity and on account of the intention
being directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not believe that the
suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their state from
unhappiness to happiness or "vice versa"; but they avail for the
diminution of punishment or something of the kind that involves no change
in the state of the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Man while living in the body merited that such things
should avail him after death. Wherefore if he is assisted thereby after
this life, this is, nevertheless, the result of the things he has done in
the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the sermon quoted
above, that these words refer to the retribution which will be made at
the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then
each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the body.
Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the living.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of eternal
retribution as is clear from the opening words: "Blessed are the dead,"
etc. Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat their
own, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although, strictly speaking, after death souls are not in
the state of the way, yet in a certain respect they are still on the way,
in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance towards their final
award. Wherefore, strictly speaking, their way is hedged in round about,
so that they can no more be changed by any works in respect of the state
of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is not so hedged around that
they cannot be helped by others in the matter of their being delayed from
receiving their final award, because in this respect they are still
wayfarers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although the communion of civic deeds whereof the
Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the dead and the living,
because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the
spiritual life is possible between them, for that life is founded on
charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that suffrages performed by sinners do not profit
the dead. For, according to Jn. 9:31, "God doth not hear sinners." Now if
their prayers were to profit those for whom they pray, they would be
heard by God. Therefore the suffrages performed by them do not profit the
dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Pastoral i, 11) that "when an offensive
person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered party is provoked
to harsher measures." Now every sinner is offensive to God. Therefore God
is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, and consequently
their suffrages are of no avail.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a person's deed would seem to be more fruitful to the
doer than to another. But a sinner merits naught for himself by his
deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every meritorious work must be a living work, that is to
say, informed by charity. Now works done by sinners are dead. Therefore
the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted thereby.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: On the contrary, No man can know for certain about another man
whether the latter be in a state of sin or of grace. If, therefore, only
those suffrages were profitable that are done by those who are in a state
of grace, a man could not know of whom to ask suffrages for his dead, and
consequently many would be deterred from obtaining suffrages.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cix), as quoted in
the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), the dead are assisted by suffrages according
as while living they merited to be assisted after death. Therefore the
worth of suffrages is measured according to the disposition of the person
for whom they are performed. Therefore it would appear that it differs
not whether they be performed by good or by wicked persons.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the suffrages performed
by the wicked. First, the deed done, for instance the sacrifice of the
altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves
independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by
whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of the
wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider the deed of the
doer, and then we must draw a distinction; because the deed of a sinner
who offers suffrage may be considered---in one way in so far as it is his
own deed, and thus it can nowise be meritorious either to himself or to
another; in another way in so far as it is another's deed, and this
happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering suffrages,
represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the
burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead a
thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts (Coel.
Hier. xiii), it follows that the suffrages of that priest, albeit a
sinner, profit the departed. Secondly, when he acts as the instrument of
another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to the principal
agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument of another be
not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on account of the
principal agent: for instance if a servant being in sin do any work of
mercy at the command of his master who has charity. Hence, if a person
dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for him, or if some
other person having charity prescribe them, those suffrages avail for
the departed, even though the persons by whom they are performed be in
sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if those persons were in charity,
because then those works would be meritorious on two counts.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not his but
another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be heard by God.
Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, to wit, they ask for
something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His goods not only to the
righteous but also to sinners (Mt. 5:45), not indeed on account of their
merits, but of His loving kindness. Hence a gloss on Jn. 9:31, "God doth
not hear sinners," says that "he speaks as one unanointed and as not
seeing clearly."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the sinner's prayer is not acceptable in so far as
he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God on account of another in
whose stead or at whose command he offers the prayer.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reason why the sinner who performs these suffrages
gains nothing thereby is because he is not capable of profiting by reason
of his own indisposition. Nevertheless, as stated above, it may in some
way profit another, who is disposed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: Although the sinner's deed is not living in so far as it is
his own, it may be living in so far as it is another's, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show
that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from good or from evil
persons, we must reply to them also.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although one cannot know for certain about another whether
he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with probability from
what one sees outwardly of a man: for a tree is known by its fruit (Mt.
7:16).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: In order that suffrage avail another, it is requisite that
the one for whom it is performed be capable of availing by it: and a man
has become capable of this by his own works which he did in his
life-time. This is what Augustine means to say. Nevertheless, those works
must be such that they can profit him, and this depends not on the person
for whom the suffrage is performed, but rather on the one who offers the
suffrages whether by performing them or by commanding them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who
offer them?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that suffrages offered by the living for the dead
do not profit those who offer them. For according to human justice a man
is not absolved from his own debt if he pay a debt for another man.
Therefore a man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason that by
offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for whom he offered
them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever a man does, he should do it as best he can. Now
it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who by suffrages
has paid the debt of a dead person is freed from his own debt, it would
seem that one ought never to satisfy for oneself, but always for another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the satisfaction of one who satisfies for another
profits him equally with the one for whom he satisfies, it will likewise
equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the same time, and
likewise a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy for all by one
work of satisfaction; which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 34:13): "My prayer shall be turned
into my bosom." Therefore, in like manner, suffrages that are offered for
others profit those who satisfy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the Damascene says in the sermon "On those who fell asleep in
the faith: Just as when about to anoint a sick man with the ointment or
other holy oil, first of all he, " namely the anointer, "shares in the
anointing and thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever strives for
his neighbor's salvation first of all profits himself and afterwards his
neighbor." And thus the question at issue is answered.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The work of suffrage that is done for another may be
considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of
compensation which is a condition of satisfaction: and in this way the
work of suffrage that is counted as belonging to the person for whom it
is done, while absolving him from the debt of punishment, does not
absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this
compensation we have to consider the equality of justice: and this work
of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the
other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satisfaction than
the debt of one. Secondly, it may be considered as meriting eternal life,
and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity: and in
this way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but also and
still more the doer.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first
considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction, while the
others consider it as meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that suffrages profit those who are in hell. For it
is written (2 Macc. 12:40): "They found under the coats of the slain some
of the donaries of the idols . . . which the law forbiddeth to the Jews,"
and yet we read further on (2 Macc. 12:43) that Judas "sent twelve
thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem . . . to be offered for the sins
of the dead." Now it is clear that they sinned mortally through acting
against the Law, and consequently that they died in mortal sin, and were
taken to hell. Therefore suffrages profit those who are in hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the saying of
Augustine (Enchiridion cx) that "those whom suffrages profit gain either
entire forgiveness, or at least an abatement of their damnation." Now
only those who are in hell are said to be damned. Therefore suffrages
profit even those who are in hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.): "If here the prayers of
the righteous avail those who are alive, how much more do they, after
death, profit those alone who are worthy of their holy prayers?" Hence we
may gather that suffrages are more profitable to the dead than to the
living. Now they profit the living even though they be in mortal sin, for
the Church prays daily for sinners that they be converted to God.
Therefore suffrages avail also for the dead who are in mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in the Lives of the Fathers (iii, 172; vi, 3) we read,
and the Damascene relates in his sermon [*De his qui in fide dormierunt]
that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man on the road, and that
after praying he asked whose head it was, and the head replied that it
had belonged to a pagan priest who was condemned to hell; and yet he
confessed that he and others were assisted by the prayers of Macarius.
Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit even those who are in hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the Damascene in the same sermon relates that Gregory,
while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from heaven saying to him: "I
have heard thy voice, and I pardon Trajan": and of this fact the
Damascene adds in the same sermon, "the whole East and West are
witnesses." Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since "he put many
martyrs to a cruel death" [*De his qui fide dormierunt]. Therefore the
suffrages of the Church avail even for those who are in hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii): "The high priest
prays not for the unclean, because by so doing he would act counter to
the Divine order," and consequently he says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that "he
prays not that sinners be forgiven, because his prayer for them would not
be heard." Therefore suffrages avail not those who are in hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 19): "There is the same reason for
not praying then" (namely after the judgment day) "for men condemned to
the everlasting fire, as there is now for not praying for the devil and
his angels who are sentenced to eternal punishment, and for this reason
the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because,
forsooth, knowing them to be already condemned to eternal punishment,
they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their prayers before
they are summoned to the presence of the just Judge."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the words of Augustine (De
Verb. A post. Serm. xxxii): "If a man depart this life without the faith
that worketh by charity and its sacraments, in vain do his friends have
recourse to such like acts of kindness." Now all the damned come under
that head. Therefore suffrages profit them not.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, There have been three opinions about the damned. For some
have said that a twofold distinction must be made in this matter. First,
as to time; for they said that after the judgment day no one in hell will
be assisted by any suffrage, but that before the judgment day some are
assisted by the suffrages of the Church. Secondly, they made a
distinction among those who are detained in hell. Some of these, they
said, are very bad, those namely who have died without faith and the
sacraments, and these, since they were not of the Church, neither "by
grace nor, by name" [*Cf. Oratio ad Vesperas, Fer. ii, post Dom. Pass.]
can the suffrages of the Church avail; while others are not very bad,
those namely who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had the
faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works generically good,
and for these the suffrages of the Church ought to avail. Yet they were
confronted with a difficulty which troubled them, for it would seem to
follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity
although infinite in duration) that a multiplicity of suffrages would
take away that punishment altogether, which is the error of Origen (Peri
Archon. i; cf. Gregory, Moral. xxxiv): and consequently endeavored in
various ways to avoid this difficulty.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Body Para. 2/5
Praepositivus [*Gilbert Prevostin, Chancellor of the See of Paris, A.D.
1205-9] said that suffrages for the damned can be so multiplied that they
are entirely freed from punishment, not absolutely as Origen maintained,
but for a time, namely till the judgment day: for their souls will be
reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the punishments of
hell without hope of pardon. But this opinion seems incompatible with
Divine providence, which leaves nothing inordinate in the world. For
guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment: wherefore it is
impossible for punishment to cease, unless first of all guilt be
expiated: so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned, their
punishment will nowise be interrupted.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Body Para. 3/5
For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree devised another
explanation. These said that the process in the diminution of punishments
by suffrages is as the process in dividing a line, which though finite,
is indefinitely divisible, and is never destroyed by division, if it be
diminished not by equal but by proportionate quantities, for instance if
we begin by taking away a quarter of the whole, and secondly, a quarter
of that quarter, and then a quarter of this second quarter, and so on
indefinitely. In like manner, they say by the first suffrage a certain
proportion of the punishment is taken away, and by the second an equally
proportionate part of the remainder. But this explanation is in many
ways defective. First, because it seems that indefinite division which is
applicable to continuous quantity cannot be transferred to spiritual
quantity: secondly, because there is no reason why the second suffrage,
if it be of equal worth, should diminish the punishment less than the
first: thirdly, because punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be
diminished, even as it cannot be done away unless the guilt be done away:
fourthly, because in the division of a line we come at length to
something which is not sensible, for a sensible body is not indefinitely
divisible: and thus it would follow that after many suffrages the
remaining punishment would be so little as not to be felt, and thus would
no longer be a punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Body Para. 4/5
Hence others found another explanation. For Antissiodorensis [*William
of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais] (Sent. iv, Tract. 14) said that
suffrages profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their
punishment, but by fortifying the person punished: even as a man who is
carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would be
enabled to carry it better, and yet his load would be none the lighter.
But this again is impossible, because according to Gregory (Moral. ix) a
man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according as his guilt
deserves; and consequently some suffer more, some less, from the same
fire. wherefore since the guilt of the damned remains unchanged, it
cannot be that he suffers less punishment. Moreover, the aforesaid
opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the statements of holy
men, and groundless as being based on no authority. It is also
unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off from the bond
of charity in virtue of which the departed are in touch with the works of
the living. Secondly, because they have entirely come to the end of life,
and have received the final award for their merits, even as the saints
who are in heaven. For the remaining punishment or glory of the body does
not make them to be wayfarers, since glory essentially and radically
resides in the soul. It is the same with the unhappiness of the damned,
wherefore their punishment cannot be diminished as neither can the glory
of the saints be increased as to the essential reward.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] Body Para. 5/5
However, we may admit, in a certain measure, the manner in which,
according to some, suffrages profit the damned, if it be said that they
profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor
again by diminishing their sense of punishment, but by withdrawing from
the damned some matter of grief, which matter they might have if they
knew themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one; and this
matter of grief is withdrawn from them when suffrages are offered for
them. Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because
as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii)---and this applies especially
to the damned---"the spirits of the departed are where they see nothing
of what men do or of what happens to them in this life," and consequently
they know not when suffrages are offered for them, unless this relief be
granted from above to some of the damned in spite of the general law.
This, however, is a matter of great uncertainty; wherefore it is safer to
say simply that suffrages profit not the damned, nor does the Church
intend to pray for them, as appears from the authors quoted above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The donaries to the idols were not found on those dead so
that they might be taken as a sign that they were carried off in
reverence to the idols: but they took them as conquerors because they
were due to them by right of war. They sinned, however, venially by
covetousness: and consequently they were not damned in hell, and thus
suffrages could profit them. or we may say, according to some, that in
the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, they repented of their
sin, according to Ps. 77:34, "When He slew them, then they sought Him":
and this is a probable opinion. Wherefore the offering was made for them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In these words damnation is taken in a broad sense for any
kind of punishment, so as to include also the punishment of purgatory
which is sometimes entirely expiated by suffrages, and sometimes not
entirety, but diminished.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Suffrage for a dead person is more acceptable than for a
living person, as regards his being in greater want, since he cannot help
himself as a living person can. But a living person is better off in that
he can be taken from the state of mortal sin to the state of grace, which
cannot be said of the dead. Hence there is not the same reason for
praying for the dead as for the living.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This assistance did not consist in a diminishment of their
punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the same place) that when he
prayed they were permitted to see one another, and in this they had a
certain joy, not real but imaginary, in the fulfillment of their desire.
Even so the demons are said to rejoice when they draw men into sin,
although this nowise diminishes their punishment, as neither is the joy
of the angels diminished by the fact that they take pity on our ills.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 5: Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be supposed with
probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers of blessed
Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the pardon of
his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The same applies
to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead, many of whom
were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must needs say likewise of
all such persons that they were consigned to hell, not finally, but as
was actually due to their own merits according to justice: and that
according to higher causes, in view of which it was foreseen that they
would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 2/2
Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not simply freed from the
debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a
time, that is, until the judgment day. Nor does it follow that this is
the general result of suffrages, because things happen differently in
accordance with the general law from that which is permitted in
particular cases and by privilege. Even so the bounds of human affairs
differ from those of the miracles of the Divine power as Augustine says
(De Cura pro Mort. xvi).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that suffrages do not profit even those who are in
purgatory. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now "there is no redemption
in hell" [*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii], and it is written (Ps. 6:6),
"Who shall confess to Thee in hell?" Therefore suffrages do not profit
those who are in purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the punishment of purgatory is finite. Therefore if some
of the punishment is abated by suffrages, it would be possible to have
such a great number of suffrages, that the punishment would be entirely
remitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished: and this would
seem incompatible with Divine justice.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, souls are in purgatory in order that they may be
purified there, and being pure may come to the kingdom. Now nothing can
be purified, unless something be done to it. Therefore suffrages offered
by the living do not diminish the punishment of purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if suffrages availed those who are in purgatory, those
especially would seem to avail them which are offered at their behest.
Yet these do not always avail: for instance, if a person before dying
were to provide for so many suffrages to be offered for him that if they
were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire
punishment. Now supposing these suffrages to be delayed until he is
released from punishment, they will profit him nothing. For it cannot be
said that they profit him before they are discharged; and after they are
fulfilled, he no longer needs them, since he is already released.
Therefore suffrages do not avail those who are in purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), Augustine says
(Enchiridion cx): "Suffrages profit those who are not very good or not
very bad." Now such are those who are detained in purgatory. Therefore,
etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that the "godlike priest in
praying for the departed prays for those who lived a holy life, and yet
contracted certain stains through human frailty." Now such persons are
detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The punishment of purgatory is intended to supplement the
satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body. Consequently,
since, as stated above (AA[1],2; Q[13], A[2]), the works of one person
can avail for another's satisfaction, whether the latter be living or
dead, the suffrages of the living, without any doubt, profit those who
are in purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words quoted refer to those who are in the hell of the
damned, where there is no redemption for those who are finally consigned
to that punishment. We may also reply with Damascene (Serm.: De his qui
in fide dormierunt) that such statements are to be explained with
reference to the lower causes, that is according to the demands of the
merits of those who are consigned to those punishments. But according to
the Divine mercy which transcends human merits, it happens otherwise
through the prayers of the righteous, than is implied by the expressions
quoted in the aforesaid authorities. Now "God changes His sentence but
not his counsel," as Gregory says (Moral. xx): wherefore the Damascene
(Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes as instances of this the
Ninevites, Achab and Ezechias, in whom it is apparent that the sentence
pronounced against them by God was commuted by the Divine mercy [*Cf. FP,
Q[19], A[7], ad 2].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not unreasonable that the punishment of those who are
in purgatory be entirely done away by the multiplicity of suffrages. But
it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished, because the
punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited to that other.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The purifying of the soul by the punishment of purgatory is
nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that hinders it from
obtaining glory. And since, as stated above (Q[13], A[2]), the guilt of
one person can be expiated by the punishment which another undergoes in
his stead, it is not unreasonable that one person be purified by another
satisfying for him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Suffrages avail on two counts, namely the action of the
agent [*"Ex opere operante" and "ex opere operato"] and the action done.
By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, but the
effect incidental to that action---thus from the giving of alms there
follow the relief of the poor and their prayer to God for the deceased.
In like manner the action of the agent may be considered in relation
either to the principal agent or to the executor. I say, then, that the
dying person, as soon as he provides for certain suffrages to be offered
for him, receives the full meed of those suffrages, even before they are
discharged, as regards the efficacy of the suffrages that results from
the action as proceeding from the principal agent. But as regards the
efficacy of the suffrages arising from the action done or from the action
as proceeding from the executor, he does not receive the fruit before the
suffrages are discharged. And if, before this, he happens to be released
from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived of the fruit of
the suffrages, and this will fall back upon those by whose fault he was
then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded in
temporal matters by another's fault---and the punishment of purgatory is
temporal---although as regards the eternal retribution none can be
defrauded save by his own fault.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether suffrages avail the children who are in limbo?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that suffrages avail the children who are in limbo.
For they are not detained there except for another's sin. Therefore it is
most becoming that they should be assisted by the suffrages of others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) the words of Augustine
(Enchiridion cx) are quoted: "The suffrages of the Church obtain
forgiveness for those who are not very bad." Now children are not
reckoned among those who are very bad, since their punishment is very
light. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes Augustine as saying
(Serm. xxxii, De Verb Ap.) that "suffrages avail not those who have
departed hence without the faith that works by love." Now the children
departed thus. Therefore suffrages avail them not.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Unbaptized children are not detained in limbo save
because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since the state of the dead
cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as regards the
merit of the essential reward or punishment, the suffrages of the living
cannot profit the children in limbo.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although original sin is such that one person can be
assisted by another on its account, nevertheless the souls of the
children in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be assisted,
because after this life there is no time for obtaining grace.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine is speaking of those who are not very bad, but
have been baptized. This is clear from what precedes: "Since these
sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any alms whatsoever are offered
for those who have been baptized," etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in some way suffrages profit the saints in
heaven; on account of the words of the Collect in the Mass
[*Postcommunion, Feast of St. Andrew, Apostle]: "Even as they" (i.e. the
sacraments) "avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us unto
healing." Now foremost among all suffrages is the sacrifice of the altar.
Therefore suffrages profit the saints in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sacraments cause what they signify. Now the third
part of the host, that namely which is dropped into the chalice,
signifies those who lead a happy life in heaven. Therefore the suffrages
of the Church profit those who are in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the saints rejoice in heaven not only in their own
goods, but also in the goods of others: hence it is written (Lk. 15:10):
"There is [Vulg.: 'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one
sinner doing penance." Therefore the joy of the saints in heaven
increases on account of the good works of the living: and consequently
our suffrages also profit them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Damascene says (Serm.: De his qui in fide
dormierunt) quoting the words of Chrysostom: "For if the heathens," he
says, "burn the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much
more shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer together with what
has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought to ashes like him,
but that thou mayest surround him with greater glory by so doing; and if
he be a sinner who has died, that thou mayest loose him from his sins,
and if he be righteous, that thou mayest add to his meed and reward!" And
thus the same conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), Augustine says
(De Verb Ap., Serm. xvii): "It is insulting to pray for a martyr in
church, since we ought to commend ourselves to his prayers."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, to be assisted belongs to one who is in need. But the saints in
heaven are without any need whatever. Therefore they are not assisted by
the suffrages of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Suffrage by its very nature implies the giving of some
assistance, which does not apply to one who suffers no default: since no
one is competent to be assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as the
saints in heaven are free from all need, being inebriated with the plenty
of God's house (Ps. 35:10), they are not competent to be assisted by
suffrages.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Such like expressions do not mean that the saints receive
an increase of glory in themselves through our observing their feasts,
but that we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with greater
solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising God, and through His
glory thus increasing some what in us, there accrues something, not to
God, but to us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the sacraments cause what thy signify, they do not
produce this effect in respect of everything that they signify: else,
since they signify Christ, they would produce something in Christ (which
is absurd). But they produce their effect on the recipient of the
sacrament in virtue of that which is signified by the sacrament. Thus it
does not follow that the sacrifices offered for the faithful departed
profit the saints, but that by the merits of the saints which we
commemorate, or which are signified in the sacrament, they profit others
for whom they are offered.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all our goods, it
does not follow, that if our joys be increased their joy is also
increased formally, but only materially, because every passion is
increased formally in respect of the formal aspect of its object. Now the
formal aspect of the saints' joy, no matter what they rejoice in, is God
Himself, in Whom they cannot rejoice more and less, for otherwise their
essential reward, consisting of their joy in God, would vary. Hence from
the fact that the goods are multiplied, wherein they rejoice with God as
the formal aspect of their joy, it does not follow that their joy is
intensified, but that they rejoice in more things. Consequently it does
not follow that they are assisted by our works.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The sense is not that an increase of meed or reward accrues
to the saint from the suffrages offered by a person, but that this
accrues to the offerer. Or we may reply that the blessed departed may
derive a reward from suffrages through having, while living, provided for
suffrage to be offered for himself, and this was meritorious for him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms
profit the departed?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the souls of the departed are not assisted
only by the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms,
or that they are not assisted by them chiefly. For punishment should
compensate for punishment. Now fasting is more penal than almsgiving or
prayer. Therefore fasting profits more as suffrage than any of the above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory reckons fasting together with these three, as
stated in the Decretals (xiii, Q. ii, Cap. 22): "The souls of the
departed are released in four ways, either by the offerings of priests,
or the alms of their friends, or the prayers of the saints, or the
fasting of their kinsfolk." Therefore the three mentioned above are
insufficiently reckoned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments, especially as
regards its effect. Therefore Baptism and other sacraments ought to be
offered for the departed equally with or more than the Sacrament of the
altar.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, this would seem to follow from the words of 1 Cor.
15:29, "If the dead rise not again at all, why are they then baptized for
them?" Therefore Baptism avails as suffrage for the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, in different Masses there is the same Sacrifice of the
altar. If, therefore, sacrifice, and not the Mass, be reckoned among the
suffrages, it would seem that the effect would be the same whatever Mass
be said for a deceased person, whether in honor of the Blessed Virgin or
of the Holy Ghost, or any other. Yet this seems contrary to the ordinance
of the Church which has appointed a special Mass for the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt)
teaches that candles and oil should be offered for the dead. Therefore
not only the offering of the sacrifice of the altar, but also other
offerings should be reckoned among suffrages for the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The suffrages of the living profit the dead in so far as
the latter are united to the living in charity, and in so far as the
intention of the living is directed to the dead. Consequently those whose
works are by nature best adapted to assist the dead, which pertain
chiefly to the communication of charity, or to the directing of one's
intention to another person. Now the sacrament of the Eucharist belongs
chiefly to charity, since it is the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity,
inasmuch as it contains Him in Whom the whole Church is united and
incorporated, namely Christ: wherefore the Eucharist is as it were the
origin and bond of charity. Again, chief among the effects of charity is
the work of almsgiving: wherefore on the part of charity these two,
namely the sacrifice of the Church and almsgiving are the chief suffrages
for the dead. But on the part of the intention directed to the dead the
chief suffrage is prayer, because prayer by its very nature implies
relation not only to the person who prays, even as other works do, but
more directly still to that which we pray for. Hence these three are
reckoned the principal means of succoring the dead, although we must
allow that any other goods whatsoever that are done out of charity for
the dead are profitable to them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When one person satisfies for another, the point to
consider, in order that the effect of his satisfaction reach the other,
is the thing whereby the satisfaction of one passes to another, rather
than even the punishment undergone by way of satisfaction; although the
punishment expiates more the guilt of the one who satisfies, in so far as
it is a kind of medicine. And consequently the three aforesaid are more
profitable to the departed than fasting.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is true that fasting can profit the departed by reason
of charity, and on account of the intention being directed to the
departed. Nevertheless, fasting does not by its nature contain anything
pertaining to charity or to the directing of the intention, and these
things are extrinsic thereto as it were, and for this reason Augustine
did not reckon, while Gregory did reckon, fasting among the suffrages for
the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, wherefore just as by
generation being does not accrue save to the object generated, so Baptism
produces its effect only in the person baptized, as regards the deed
done: and yet as regards the deed of the doer whether of the baptizer or
of the baptized, it may profit others even as other meritorious works. On
the other hand, the Eucharist is the sign of ecclesiastical unity,
wherefore by reason of the deed done its effect can pass to another,
which is not the case with the other sacraments.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: According to a gloss this passage may be expounded in two
ways. First, thus: "If the dead rise not again, nor did Christ rise
again, why are they baptized for them? i.e. for sins, since they are not
pardoned if Christ rose not again, because in Baptism not only Christ's
passion but also His resurrection operates, for the latter is in a sense
the cause of our spiritual resurrection." Secondly, thus: There have been
some misguided persons who were baptized for those who had departed this
life without baptism, thinking that this would profit them: and according
to this explanation the Apostle is speaking, in the above words, merely
according to the opinion of certain persons.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: In the office of the Mass there is not only a sacrifice but
also prayers. Hence the suffrage of the Mass contains two of the things
mentioned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii), namely "prayer" and
"sacrifice." As regards the sacrifice offered the Mass profits equally
the departed, no matter in whose honor it be said: and this is the
principal thing done in the Mass. But as regards the prayers, that Mass
is most profitable in which the prayers are appointed for this purpose.
Nevertheless, this defect may be supplied by the greater devotion, either
of the one who says Mass, or of the one who orders the Mass to be said,
or again, by the intercession of the saint whose suffrage is besought in
the Mass.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[9] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: This offering of candles or oil may profit the departed in
so far as they are a kind of alms: for they are given for the worship of
the Church or for the use of the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the indulgences of the Church profit the dead?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the indulgences granted by the Church profit
even the dead. First, on account of the custom of the Church, who orders
the preaching of a crusade in order that some one may gain an indulgence
for himself and for two or three and sometimes even ten souls, both of
the living and of the dead. But this would amount to a deception unless
they profited the dead. Therefore indulgences profit the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the merit of the whole Church is more efficacious than
that of one person. Now personal merit serves as a suffrage for the
departed, for instance in the case of almsgiving. Much more therefore
does the merit of the Church whereon indulgences are founded.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the indulgences of the Church profit those who are
members of the Church. Now those who are in purgatory are members of the
Church, else the suffrages of the Church would not profit them. Therefore
it would seem that indulgences profit the departed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[10] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, In order that indulgences may avail a person, there
must be a fitting cause for granting the indulgence [*Cf. Q[25], A[2]].
Now there can be no such cause on the part of the dead, since they can do
nothing that is of profit to the Church, and it is for such a cause that
indulgences are chiefly granted. Therefore, seemingly, indulgences profit
not the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[10] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, indulgences are regulated according to the decision of the
party who grants them. If, therefore, indulgences could avail the dead,
it would be in the power of the party granting them to release a deceased
person entirely from punishment: which is apparently absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, An indulgence may profit a person in two ways: in one
way, principally; in another, secondarily. It profits principally the
person who avails himself of an indulgence, who, namely, does that for
which the indulgence is granted, for instance one who visits the shrine
of some saint. Hence since the dead can do none of those things for which
indulgences are granted, indulgences cannot avail them directly. However,
they profit secondarily and indirectly the person for whom one does that
which is the cause of the indulgence. This is sometimes feasible and
sometimes not, according to the different forms of indulgence. For if the
form of indulgence be such as this: "Whosoever does this or that shall
gain so much indulgence," he who does this cannot transfer the fruit of
the indulgence to another, because it is not in his power to apply to a
particular person the intention of the Church who dispenses the common
suffrages whence indulgences derive their value, as stated above (Q[27],
A[3], ad 2). If, however, the indulgence be granted in this form:
"Whosoever does this or that, he, his father, or any other person
connected with him and detained in purgatory, will gain so much
indulgence," an indulgence of this kind will avail not only a living but
also a deceased person. For there is no reason why the Church is able to
transfer the common merits, whereon indulgences are based, to the living
and not to the dead. Nor does it follow that a prelate of the Church can
release souls from purgatory just as he lists, since for indulgences to
avail there must be a fitting cause for granting them, as stated above
(Q[26], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the burial service profits the dead?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the burial service profits the dead. For
Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes Athanasius as
saying: "Even though he who has departed in godliness be taken up to
heaven, do not hesitate to call upon God and to burn oil and wax at his
tomb; for such things are pleasing to God and receive a great reward from
Him." Now the like pertain to the burial service. Therefore the burial
service profits the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Cura pro mort. iii), "In
olden times the funerals of just men were cared for with dutiful piety,
their obsequies celebrated, their graves provided, and themselves while
living charged their children touching the burial or even the translation
of their bodies." But they would not have done this unless the tomb and
things of this kind conferred something on the dead. Therefore the like
profit the dead somewhat.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one does a work of mercy on some one's behalf unless
it profit him. Now burying the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy,
therefore Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): "Tobias, as attested by
the angel, is declared to have found favor with God by burying the dead."
Therefore such like burial observances profit the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is unbecoming to assert that the devotion of the
faithful is fruitless. Now some, out of devotion, arrange for their
burial in some religious locality. Therefore the burial service profits
the dead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, God is more inclined to pity than to condemn. Now burial
in a sacred place is hurtful to some if they be unworthy: wherefore
Gregory says (Dial. iv): "If those who are burdened with grievous sins
are buried in the church this will lead to their more severe condemnation
rather than to their release." Much more, therefore, should we say that
the burial service profits the good.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): "Whatever
service is done the body is no aid to salvation, but an office of
humanity."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii; De Civ. Dei i): "The
funereal equipment, the disposition of the grace, the solemnity of the
obsequies are a comfort to the living rather than a help to the dead."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, Our Lord said (Lk. 12:4): "Be not afraid of them who kill the
body, and after that have no more that they can do." Now after death the
bodies of the saints can be hindered from being buried, as we read of
having been done to certain martyrs at Lyons in Gaul (Eusebius, Eccl.
Hist. v, 1). Therefore the dead take no harm if their bodies remain
unburied: and consequently the burial service does not profit them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We have recourse to burial for the sake of both the
living and the dead. For the sake of the living, lest their eyes be
revolted by the disfigurement of the corpse, and their bodies be infected
by the stench, and this as regards the body. But it profits the living
also spiritually inasmuch as our belief in the resurrection is confirmed
thereby. It profits the dead in so far as one bears the dead in mind and
prays for them through looking on their burial place, wherefore a
"monument" takes its name from remembrance, for a monument is something
that recalls the mind [monens mentem], as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei
i; De Cura pro Mort. iv). It was, however, a pagan error that burial was
profitable to the dead by procuring rest for his soul: for they believed
that the soul could not be at rest until the body was buried, which is
altogether ridiculous and absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] Body Para. 2/2
That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the dead, does not
result from the action done, but rather from the action itself of the
doer: when, to wit, the dead person himself, or another, arranges for his
body to be buried in a sacred place, and commends him to the patronage of
some saint, by whose prayers we must believe that he is assisted, as well
as to the suffrages of those who serve the holy place, and pray more
frequently and more specially for those who are buried in their midst.
But such things as are done for the display of the obsequies are
profitable to the living, as being a consolation to them; and yet they
can also profit the dead, not directly but indirectly, in so far as men
are aroused to pity thereby and consequently to pray, or in so far as the
outlay on the burial brings either assistance to the poor or adornment to
the church: for it is in this sense that the burial of the dead is
reckoned among the works of mercy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By bringing oil and candles to the tombs of the dead we
profit them indirectly, either as offering them to the Church and as
giving them to the poor, or as doing this in reverence of God. Hence,
after the words quoted we read: "For oil and candles are a holocaust."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fathers of old arranged for the burial of their bodies,
so as to show that "the bodies of the dead" are the object of Divine
providence, not that there is any feeling in a dead body, but in order to
confirm the belief in the resurrection, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i,
13). Hence, also, they wished to be buried in the land of promise, where
they believed Christ's birth and death would take place, Whose
resurrection is the cause of our rising again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since flesh is a part of man's nature, man has a natural
affection for his flesh, according to Eph. 5:29, "No man ever hated his
own flesh." Hence in accordance with this natural affection a man has
during life a certain solicitude for what will become of his body after
death: and he would grieve if he had a presentiment that something
untoward would happen to his body. Consequently those who love a man,
through being conformed to the one they love in his affection for
himself, treat his body with loving care. For as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei i, 13): "If a father's garment and ring, and whatever such like is
the more dear to those whom they leave behind the greater their affection
is towards their parents, in no wise are the bodies themselves to be
spurned which truly we wear in more familiar and close conjunction than
anything else we put on."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iv), the devotion of
the faithful is not fruitless when they arrange for their friends to be
buried in holy places, since by so doing they commend their dead to the
suffrages of the saints, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[11] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The wicked man dead takes no harm by being buried in a holy
place, except in so far as he rendered such a burial place unfitting for
him by reason of human glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether suffrages offered for one deceased person profit the person for
whom they are offered more than others?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that suffrages offered for one deceased person are
not more profitable to the one for whom they are offered, than to others.
For spiritual light is more communicable than a material light. Now a
material light, for instance of a candle, though kindled for one person
only, avails equally all those who are gathered together, though the
candle be not lit for them. Therefore, since suffrages are a kind of
spiritual light, though they be offered for one person in particular, do
not avail him any more than the others who are in purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), suffrages avail
the dead "in so far as during this life they merited that they might
avail them afterwards" [*St. Augustine, Enchiridion cx]. Now some merited
that suffrages might avail them more than those for whom they are
offered. Therefore they profit more by those suffrages, else their merits
would be rendered unavailing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the poor have not so many suffrages given them as the
rich. Therefore if the suffrages offered for certain people profit them
alone, or profit them more than others, the poor would be worse off: yet
this is contrary to our Lord's saying (Lk. 6:20): "Blessed are ye poor,
for yours is the kingdom of God."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Human justice is copied from Divine justice. But if a
person pay another's debt human justice releases the latter alone.
Therefore since he who offers suffrages for another pays the debt, in a
sense, of the person for whom he offers them, they profit this person
alone.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, just as a man by offering suffrages satisfies somewhat for a
deceased person, so, too, sometimes a person can satisfy for a living
person. Now where one satisfies for a living person the satisfaction
counts only for the person for whom it is offered. Therefore one also who
offers suffrages profits him alone for whom he offers them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question. Some, like
Praepositivus, have said that suffrages offered for one particular person
do avail chiefly, not the person for whom they are offered, but those who
are most worthy. And they instanced a candle which is lit for a rich man
and profits those who are with him no less than the rich man himself, and
perhaps even more, if they have keener sight. They also gave the instance
of a lesson which profits the person to whom it is given no more than
others who listen with him, but perhaps profits these others more, if
they be more intelligent. And if it were pointed out to them that in this
case the Church's ordinance in appointing certain special prayers for
certain persons is futile, they said that the Church did this to excite
the devotion of the faithful, who are more inclined to offer special than
common suffrages, and pray more fervently for their kinsfolk than for
strangers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] Body Para. 2/2
Others, on the contrary, said that suffrages avail more those for whom
they are offered. Now both opinions have a certain amount of truth: for
the value of suffrages may be gauged from two sources. For their value is
derived in the first place from the virtue of charity, which makes all
goods common, and in this respect they avail more the person who is more
full of charity, although they are not offered specially for him. In this
way the value of suffrages regards more a certain inward consolation by
reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the goods of another
after death in respect of the diminution of punishment; for after death
there is no possibility of obtaining or increasing grace, whereas during
life the works of others avail for this purpose by the virtue of charity.
In the second place suffrages derive their value from being applied to
another person by one's intention. In this way the satisfaction of one
person counts for another, and there can be no doubt that thus they avail
more the person for whom they are offered: in fact, they avail him alone
in this way, because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed to the
remission of punishment. Consequently, as regards the remission of
punishment, suffrages avail chiefly the person for whom they are offered,
and accordingly there is more truth in the second opinion than in the
first.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Suffrages avail, after the manner of a light, in so far as
they reach the dead, who thereby receive a certain amount of consolation:
and this is all the greater according as they are endowed with a greater
charity. But in so far as suffrages are a satisfaction applied to another
by the intention of the offerer, they do not resemble a light, but rather
the payment of a debt: and it does not follow, if one person's debt be
paid, that the debt of others is paid likewise.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Such a merit is conditional, for in this way they merited
that suffrages would profit them if offered for them, and this was merely
to render themselves fit recipients of those suffrages. It is therefore
clear that they did not directly merit the assistance of those suffrages,
but made themselves fit by their preceding merits to receive the fruit of
suffrages. Hence it does not follow that their merit is rendered
unavailing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing hinders the rich from being in some respects better
off than the poor, for instance as regards the expiation of their
punishment. But this is as nothing in comparison with the kingdom of
heaven, where the poor are shown to be better off by the authority quoted.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as
if they had been offered for each in particular?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that suffrages offered for several are of as much
value to each one as if they had been offered for each in particular. For
it is clear that if one person receives a lesson he loses nothing if
others receive the lesson with him. Therefore in like manner a person for
whom a suffrage is offered loses nothing if some one else is reckoned
together with him: and consequently if it be offered for several, it is
of as much value to each one as if it were offered for each in particular.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is to be observed that according to the common
practice of the Church, when Mass is said for one deceased person, other
prayers are added for other deceased persons. Now this would not be done,
if the dead person for whom the Mass is said were to lose something
thereby. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, suffrages, especially of prayers, rely on the Divine
power. But with God, just as it makes no difference whether He helps by
means of many or by means of a few, so it differs not whether He assists
many or a few. Therefore if the one same prayer be said for many, each
one of them will receive as much assistance as one person would if that
same prayer were said for him alone.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is better to assist many than one. If therefore a
suffrage offered for several is of as much value to each one as if it
were offered for one alone, it would seem that the Church ought not to
have appointed a Mass and prayer to be said for one person in particular,
but that Mass ought always to be said for all the faithful departed: and
this is evidently false.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, a suffrage has a finite efficiency. Therefore if it be divided
among many it avails less for each one than if it were offered for one
only.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, If the value of suffrages be considered according as it
is derived from the virtue of charity uniting the members of the Church
together, suffrages offered for several persons avail each one as much as
if they were offered for one alone, because charity is not diminished if
its effect be divided among many, in fact rather is it increased; and in
like manner joy increases through being shared by many, as Augustine says
(Confess. viii). Consequently many in purgatory rejoice in one good deed
no less than one does. On the other hand, if we consider the value of
suffrages, inasmuch as they are a kind of satisfaction applied to the
dead by the intention of the person offering them, then the suffrage for
some person in particular avails him more than that which is offered for
him in common with many others; for in this case the effect of the
suffrages is divided in virtue of Divine justice among those for whom the
suffrages are offered. Hence it is evident that this question depends on
the first; and, moreover, it is made clear why special suffrages are
appointed to be offered in the Church.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Suffrages considered as works of satisfaction do not profit
after the manner of an action as teaching does; for teaching, like any
other action, produces its effect according to the disposition of the
recipient. But they profit after the manner of the payment of a debt, as
stated above (A[12], ad 1); and so the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since suffrages offered for one person avail others in a
certain way, as stated (A[1]), it follows that when Mass is said for one
person, it is not unfitting for prayers to be said for others also. For
these prayers are said, not that the satisfaction offered by one suffrage
be applied to those others chiefly, but that the prayer offered for them
in particular may profit them also.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Prayer may be considered both on the part of the one who
prays, and on the part of the person prayed: and its effect depends on
both. Consequently though it is no more difficult to the Divine power to
absolve many than to absolve one, nevertheless the prayer of one who
prays thus is not as satisfactory for many as for one.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[14] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not
offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are
offered in addition to general suffrages?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[14] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that general suffrages avail those for whom special
suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for
whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages. For in the life
to come each one will be rewarded according to his merits. Now a person
for whom no suffrages are offered merited to be assisted after death as
much as one for whom special suffrages are offered. Therefore the former
will be assisted by general suffrages as much as the latter by special
and general suffrages.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[14] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Eucharist is the chief of the suffrages of the
Church. Now the Eucharist, since it contains Christ whole, has infinite
efficacy so to speak. Therefore one offering of the Eucharist for all in
general is of sufficient value to release all who are in purgatory: and
consequently general suffrages alone afford as much assistance as special
and general suffrages together.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[14] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Two goods are more eligible than one. Therefore special
suffrages, together with general suffrages, are more profitable to the
person for whom they are offered than general suffrages alone.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[14] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The reply to this question depends on that which is given
to the twelfth inquiry (A[12]): for if the suffrages offered for one
person in particular avail indifferently for all, then all suffrages are
common; and consequently one for whom the special suffrages are not
offered will be assisted as much as the one for whom they are offered, if
he be equally worthy. On the other hand, if the suffrages offered for a
person do not profit all indifferently, but those chiefly for whom they
are offered, then there is no doubt that general and special suffrages
together avail a person more than general suffrages alone. Hence the
Master, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), mentions two opinions: one, when
he says that a rich man derives from general, together with special
suffrages, an equal profit to that which a poor man derives from special
suffrages alone; for although the one receives assistance from more
sources than the other, he does not receive a greater assistance: the
other opinion he mentions when he says that a person for whom special
suffrages are offered obtains a more speedy but not a more complete
release, because each will be finally released from all punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[14] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[12], ad 2) the assistance derived from
suffrages is not directly and simply an object of merit, but
conditionally as it were: hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[71] A[14] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the power of Christ Who is contained in the
Sacrament of the Eucharist is infinite, yet there is a definite effect to
which that sacrament is directed. Hence it does not follow that the whole
punishment of those who are in purgatory is expiated by one sacrifice of
the altar: even so, by the one sacrifice which a man offers, he is not
released from the whole satisfaction due for his sins, wherefore
sometimes several Masses are enjoined in satisfaction for one sin.
Nevertheless, if any thing from special suffrages be left over for those
for whom they are offered (for instance if they need them not) we may
well believe that by God's mercy this is granted to others for whom those
suffrages are not offered, if they need them: as affirmed by Damascene
(Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) who says: "Truly God, forasmuch as
He is just will adapt ability to the disabled, and will arrange for an
exchange of deficiencies": and this exchange is effected when what is
lacking to one is supplied by another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider prayer with regard to the saints in heaven. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?
(2) Whether we should beseech them to pray for us?
(3) Whether the prayers they pour forth for us are always granted?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the saints have no knowledge of our prayers.
For a gloss on Is. 62:16, "Thou art our father and Abraham hath not known
us, and Israel hath been ignorant of us," says that "the dead saints
know not what the living, even their own children, are doing." This is
taken from Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), where he quotes the
aforesaid authority, and the following are his words: "If such great men
as the patriarchs knew not what was happening to the people begotten of
them, how can the dead occupy themselves in watching and helping the
affairs and actions of the living?" Therefore the saints cannot be
cognizant of our prayers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the following words are addressed to King Joas (4 Kgs.
22:20): "Therefore" (i.e. because thou hast wept before Me), "I will
gather thee to thy fathers . . . that thy eyes may not see all the evils
which I will bring upon this place." But Joas would have gained no such
advantage from his death if he were to know after death what was
happening to his people. Therefore the saints after death know not our
actions, and thus they are not cognizant of our prayers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more perfect a man is in charity, the more he
succors his neighbor when the latter is in danger. Now the saints, in
this life, watch over their neighbor, especially their kinsfolk, when
these are in danger, and manifestly assist them. Since then, after death,
their charity is much greater, if they were cognizant of our deeds, much
more would they watch over their friends and kindred and assist them in
their needs: and yet, seemingly, they do not. Therefore it would seem
that our deeds and prayers are not known to them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, even as the saints after death see the Word, so do the
angels of whom it is stated (Mt. 18:10) that "their angels in heaven
always see the face of My Father." Yet the angels through seeing the Word
do not therefore know all things, since the lower angels are cleansed
from their lack of knowledge by the higher angels [*Cf. FP, Q[106], A[1]
], as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore although the saints
see the Word, they do not see therein our prayers and other things that
happen in our regard.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, God alone is the searcher of hearts. Now prayer is
seated chiefly in the heart. Therefore it belongs to God alone to know
our prayers. Therefore our prayers are unknown to the saints.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Gregory, commenting on Job 14:21, "Whether his children
come to honor or dishonor, he shall not understand," says (Moral. xii):
"This does not apply to the souls of the saints, for since they have an
insight of Almighty God's glory we must nowise believe that anything
outside that glory is unknown to them." Therefore they are cognizant of
our prayers. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii): "All creatures are little
to the soul that sees God: because however little it sees of the
Creator's light, every created thing appears foreshortened to it." Now
apparently the chief obstacle to the souls of the saints being cognizant
of our prayers and other happenings in our regard is that they are far
removed from us. Since then distance does not prevent these things, as
appears from the authority quoted, it would seem that the souls of the
saints are cognizant of our prayers and of what happens here below.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, unless they were aware of what happens in our regard they would
not pray for us, since they would be ignorant of our needs. But this is
the error of Vigilantius, as Jerome asserts in his letter against him.
Therefore the saints are cognizant of what happens in our regard.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The Divine essence is a sufficient medium for knowing all
things, and this is evident from the fact that God, by seeing His
essence, sees all things. But it does not follow that whoever sees God's
essence knows all things, but only those who comprehend the essence of
God [*Cf. FP, Q[12], AA[7],8]: even as the knowledge of a principle does
not involve the knowledge of all that follows from that principle unless
the whole virtue of the principle be comprehended. Wherefore, since the
souls of the saints do not comprehend the Divine essence, it does not
follow that they know all that can be known by the Divine essence---for
which reason the lower angels are taught concerning certain matters by
the higher angels, though they all see the essence of God; but each of
the blessed must needs see in the Divine essence as many other things as
the perfection of his happiness requires. For the perfection of a man's
happiness requires him to have whatever he will, and to will nothing
amiss: and each one wills with a right will, to know what concerns
himself. Hence since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish to
know what concerns themselves, and consequently it follows that they know
it in the Word. Now it pertains to their glory that they assist the needy
for their salvation: for thus they become God's co-operators, "than which
nothing is more Godlike," as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii).
Wherefore it is evident that the saints are cognizant of such things as
are required for this purpose; and so it is manifest that they know in
the Word the vows, devotions, and prayers of those who have recourse to
their assistance.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood as referring to
the natural knowledge of separated souls, which knowledge is devoid of
obscurity in holy men. But he is not speaking of their knowledge in the
Word, for it is clear that when Isaias said this, Abraham had no such
knowledge, since no one had come to the vision of God before Christ's
passion.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the saints, after this life, know what happens
here below, we must not believe that they grieve through knowing the woes
of those whom they loved in this world: for they are so filled with
heavenly joy, that sorrow finds no place in them. Wherefore if after
death they know the woes of their friends, their grief is forestalled by
their removal from this world before their woes occur. Perhaps, however,
the non-glorified souls would grieve somewhat, if they were aware of the
distress of their dear ones: and since the soul of Josias was not
glorified as soon as it went out from his body, it is in this respect
that Augustine uses this argument to show that the souls of the dead have
no knowledge of the deeds of the living.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The souls of the saints have their will fully conformed to
the Divine will even as regards the things willed. and consequently,
although they retain the love of charity towards their neighbor, they do
not succor him otherwise than they see to be in conformity with the
disposition of Divine justice. Nevertheless, it is to be believed that
they help their neighbor very much by interceding for him to God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although it does not follow that those who see the Word see
all things in the Word, they see those things that pertain to the
perfection of their happiness, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: God alone of Himself knows the thoughts of the heart: yet
others know them, in so far as these are revealed to them, either by
their vision of the Word or by any other means.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to call upon the saints to pray for us?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not to call upon the saints to pray
for us. For no man asks anyone's friends to pray for him, except in so
far as he believes he will more easily find favor with them. But God is
infinitely more merciful than any saint, and consequently His will is
more easily inclined to give us a gracious hearing, than the will of a
saint. Therefore it would seem unnecessary to make the saints mediators
between us and God, that they may intercede for us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if we ought to beseech them to pray for us, this is only
because we know their prayer to be acceptable to God. Now among the
saints the holier a man is, the more is his prayer acceptable to God.
Therefore we ought always to bespeak the greater saints to intercede for
us with God, and never the lesser ones.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Christ, even as man, is called the "Holy of Holies,"
and, as man, it is competent to Him to pray. Yet we never call upon
Christ to pray for us. Therefore neither should we ask the other saints
to do so.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whenever one person intercedes for another at the
latter's request, he presents his petition to the one with whom he
intercedes for him. Now it is unnecessary to present anything to one to
whom all things are present. Therefore it is unnecessary to make the
saints our intercessors with God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is unnecessary to do a thing if, without doing it,
the purpose for which it is done would be achieved in the same way, or
else not achieved at all. Now the saints would pray for us just the same,
or would not pray for us at all, whether we pray to them or not: for if
we be worthy of their prayers, they would pray for us even though we
prayed not to them, while if we be unworthy they pray not for us even
though we ask them to. Therefore it seems altogether unnecessary to call
on them to pray for us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1): "Call . . . if there be any
that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints." Now, as Gregory
says (Moral. v, 30) on this passage, "we call upon God when we beseech
Him in humble prayer." Therefore when we wish to pray God, we should turn
to the saints, that they may pray God for us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, the saints who are in heaven are more acceptable to God than
those who are on the way. Now we should make the saints, who are on the
way, our intercessors with God, after the example of the Apostle, who
said (Rm. 15:30): "I beseech you . . . brethren, through our Lord Jesus
Christ, and by the charity of the Holy Ghost, that you help me in your
prayers for me to God." Much more, therefore, should we ask the saints
who are in heaven to help us by their prayers to God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, an additional argument is provided by the common custom of the
Church which asks for the prayers of the saints in the Litany.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) the order
established by God among things is that "the last should be led to God by
those that are midway between." Wherefore, since the saints who are in
heaven are nearest to God, the order of the Divine law requires that we,
who while we remain in the body are pilgrims from the Lord, should be
brought back to God by the saints who are between us and Him: and this
happens when the Divine goodness pours forth its effect into us through
them. And since our return to God should correspond to the outflow of His
boons upon us, just as the Divine favors reach us by means of the saints
intercession, so should we, by their means, be brought back to God, that
we may receive His favors again. Hence it is that we make them our
intercessors with God, and our mediators as it were, when we ask them to
pray for us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not on account of any defect in God's power that He
works by means of second causes, but it is for the perfection of the
order of the universe, and the more manifold outpouring of His goodness
on things, through His bestowing on them not only the goodness which is
proper to them, but also the faculty of causing goodness in others. Even
so it is not through any defect in His mercy, that we need to bespeak His
clemency through the prayers of the saints, but to the end that the
aforesaid order in things be observed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the greater saints are more acceptable to God than
the lesser, it is sometimes profitable to pray to the lesser; and this
for five reasons. First, because sometimes one has greater devotion for a
lesser saint than for a greater, and the effect of prayer depends very
much on one's devotion. Secondly, in order to avoid tediousness, for
continual attention to one thing makes a person weary; whereas by praying
to different saints, the fervor of our devotion is aroused anew as it
were. Thirdly, because it is granted to some saints to exercise their
patronage in certain special cases, for instance to Saint Anthony against
the fire of hell. Fourthly, that due honor be given by us to all.
Fifthly, because the prayers of several sometimes obtain that which would
not have been obtained by the prayers of one.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Prayer is an act, and acts belong to particular persons
[supposita]. Hence, were we to say: "Christ, pray for us," except we
added something, this would seem to refer to Christ's person, and
consequently to agree with the error either of Nestorius, who
distinguished in Christ the person of the son of man from the person of
the Son of God, or of Arius, who asserted that the person of the Son is
less than the Father. Wherefore to avoid these errors the Church says
not: "Christ, pray for us," but "Christ, hear us," or "have mercy on us."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As we shall state further on (A[3]) the saints are said to
present our prayers to God, not as though they notified things unknown to
Him, but because they ask God to grant those prayers a gracious hearing,
or because they seek the Divine truth about them, namely what ought to be
done according to His providence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A person is rendered worthy of a saint's prayers for him by
the very fact that in his need he has recourse to him with pure devotion.
Hence it is not unnecessary to pray to the saints.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are always
granted?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the prayers which the saints pour forth to God
for us are not always granted. For if they were always granted, the
saints would be heard especially in regard to matters concerning
themselves. But they are not heard in reference to these things;
wherefore it is stated in the Apocalypse (6:11) that on the martyrs
beseeching vengeance on them that dwell on earth, "it was said to them
that they should rest for a little while till the number of their
brethren should be filled up [*Vulg.: 'till their fellow-servants and
their brethren . . . should be filled up']." Much less therefore, are
they heard in reference to matters concerning others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall
stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people." Therefore, the
saints are not always heard when they pray God for us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the saints in heaven are stated to be equal to the
angels of God (Mt. 22:30). But the angels are not always heard in the
prayers which they offer up to God. This is evident from Dan. 10:12,13,
where it is written: "I am come for thy words: but the prince of the
kingdom of the Persians resisted me one-and-twenty days." But the angel
who spoke had not come to Daniel's aid except by asking of God to be set
free; and yet the fulfillment of his prayer was hindered. Therefore
neither are other saints always heard by God when they pray for us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whosoever obtains something by prayer merits it in a
sense. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of meriting.
Therefore they cannot obtain anything for us from God by their prayers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the saints, in all things, conform their will to the
will of God. Therefore they will nothing but what they know God to will.
But no one prays save for what he wills. Therefore they pray not save for
what they know God to will. Now that which God wills would be done even
without their praying for it. Therefore their prayers are not efficacious
for obtaining anything.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the prayers of the whole heavenly court, if they could
obtain anything, would be more efficacious than all the petitions of the
Church here below. Now if the suffrages of the Church here below for some
one in purgatory were to be multiplied, he would be wholly delivered from
punishment. Since then the saints in heaven pray for those who are in
purgatory on the same account as for us, if they obtain anything for us,
their prayers would deliver entirely from punishment those who are in
purgatory. But this is not true because, then the Church's suffrages for
the dead would be unnecessary.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is he that prayeth
much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the prophet of
God": and that his prayer was granted is clear from what follows (2 Macc.
15:15): "Jeremias stretched forth his right hand, and gave to Judas a
sword of gold, saying: Take this holy sword, a gift from God," etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, Jerome says (Ep. contra Vigilant.): "Thou sayest in thy
pamphlets, that while we live, we can pray for one another, but that when
we are dead no one's prayer for another will be heard": and afterwards he
refutes this in the following words: "If the apostles and martyrs while
yet in the body can pray for others, while they are still solicitous for
themselves, how much more can they do so when the crown, the victory, the
triumph is already theirs!"
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, this is confirmed by the custom of the Church, which often asks
to be assisted by the prayers of the saints.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The saints are said to pray for us in two ways. First, by
"express" prayer, when by their prayers they seek a hearing of the Divine
clemency on our behalf: secondly, by "interpretive" prayer, namely by
their merits which, being known to God, avail not only them unto glory,
but also us as suffrages and prayers, even as the shedding of Christ's
blood is said to ask pardon for us. In both ways the saints' prayers
considered in themselves avail to obtain what they ask, yet on our part
they may fail so that we obtain not the fruit of their prayers, in so far
as they are said to pray for us by reason of their merits availing on our
behalf. But in so far as they pray for us by asking something for us in
their prayers, their prayers are always granted, since they will only
what God wills, nor do they ask save for what they will to be done; and
what God wills is always fulfilled---unless we speak of His "antecedent"
will, whereby "He wishes all men to be saved" [*Cf. FP, Q[19], A[6], ad
1]. For this will is not always fulfilled; wherefore no wonder if that
also which the saints will according to this kind of will be not
fulfilled sometimes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This prayer of the martyrs is merely their desire to obtain
the robe of the body and the fellowship of those who will be saved, and
their consent to God's justice in punishing the wicked. Hence a gloss on
Apoc. 6:11, "How long, O Lord," says: "They desire an increase of joy and
the fellowship of the saints, and they consent to God's justice."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Lord speaks there of Moses and Samuel according to
their state in this life. For we read that they withstood God's anger by
praying for the people. And yet even if they had been living at the time
in question, they would have been unable to placate God towards the
people by their prayers, on account of the wickedness of this same
people: and it is thus that we are to understand this passage.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This dispute among the good angels does not mean that they
offered contradictory prayers to God, but that they submitted contrary
merits on various sides to the Divine inquiry, with a view of God's
pronouncing sentence thereon. This, in fact, is what Gregory says (Moral.
xvii) in explanation of the aforesaid words of Daniel: "The lofty spirits
that are set over the nations never fight in behalf of those that act
unjustly, but they justly judge and try their deeds. And when the guilt
or innocence of any particular nation is brought into the debate of the
court above, the ruling spirit of that nation is said to have won or lost
in the conflict. Yet the supreme will of their Maker is victorious over
all, for since they have it ever before their eyes, they will not what
they are unable to obtain," wherefore neither do they seek for it. And
consequently it is clear that their prayers are always heard.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: Although the saints are not in a state to merit for
themselves, when once they are in heaven, they are in a state to merit
for others, or rather to assist others by reason of their previous merit:
for while living they merited that their prayers should be heard after
their death.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one count, and impetratory
on another. For merit consists in a certain equation of the act to the
end for which it is intended, and which is given to it as its reward;
while the impetration of a prayer depends on the liberality of the
person supplicated. Hence prayer sometimes, through the liberality of the
person supplicated, obtains that which was not merited either by the
suppliant, or by the person supplicated for: and so, although the saints
are not in the state of meriting, it does not follow that they are not in
the state of impetrating.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: As appears from the authority of Gregory quoted above (ad
3), the saints and angels will nothing but what they see to be in the
Divine will: and so neither do they pray for aught else. Nor is their
prayer fruitless, since as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. [*De Dono
Persever. xxii]): "The prayers of the saints profit the predestinate,
because it is perhaps pre-ordained that they shall be saved through the
prayers of those who intercede for them": and consequently God also wills
that what the saints see Him to will shall be fulfilled through their
prayers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[72] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The suffrages of the Church for the dead are as so many
satisfactions of the living in lieu of the dead: and accordingly they
free the dead from the punishment which the latter have not paid. But the
saints in heaven are not in the state of making satisfaction; and
consequently the parallel fails between their prayers and the suffrages
of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the signs that will precede the judgment: and
under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?
(2) Whether in very truth the sun and moon will be darkened?
(3) Whether the powers of the heavens will be moved when the Lord shall
come?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Lord's coming to judgment will not be
preceded by any signs. Because it is written (1 Thess. 5:3): "When they
shall say: Peace and security; then shall sudden destruction come upon
them." Now there would be no peace and security if men were terrified by
previous signs. Therefore signs will not precede that coming
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, signs are ordained for the manifestation of something.
But His coming is to be hidden; wherefore it is written (1 Thess. 5:2):
"The day of the Lord shall come as a thief in the night." Therefore signs
ought not to precede it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the time of His first coming was foreknown by the
prophets, which does not apply to His second coming. Now no such signs
preceded the first coming of Christ. Therefore neither will they precede
the second.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:25): "There shall be signs in the
sun, and in the moon, and in the stars," etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Jerome [*St. Peter Damian, Opuscul. xlix; he quotes St. Jerome,
but the reference is not known.] mentions fifteen signs preceding the
judgment. He says that on the "first" day all the seas will rise fifteen
cubits above the mountains; in the "second" day all the waters will be
plunged into the depths, so that scarcely will they be visible; on the
"third" day they will be restored to their previous condition; on the
"fourth" day all the great fishes and other things that move in the
waters will gather together and, raising their heads above the sea, roar
at one another contentiously; on the "fifth" day, all the birds of the
air will gather together in the fields, wailing to one another, with
neither bite nor sup; on the "sixth" day rivers of fire will arise
towards the firmament rushing together from the west to the east; on the
"seventh" day all the stars, both planets and fixed stars, will throw out
fiery tails like comets; on the "eighth" day there will be a great
earthquake, and all animals will be laid low; on the "ninth" day all the
plants will be bedewed as it were with blood; on the "tenth" day all
stones, little and great, will be divided into four parts dashing against
one another; on the "eleventh" day all hills and mountains and buildings
will be reduced to dust; on the "twelfth" day all animals will come from
forest and mountain to the fields, roaring and tasting of nothing; on the
"thirteenth" day all graves from east to west will open to allow the
bodies to rise again; on the "fourteenth" day all men will leave their
abode, neither understanding nor speaking, but rushing hither and thither
like madmen; on the "fifteenth" day all will die and will rise again with
those who died long before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, When Christ shall come to judge He will appear in the
form of glory, on account of the authority becoming a judge. Now it
pertains to the dignity of judicial power to have certain signs that
induce people to reverence and subjection: and consequently many signs
will precede the advent of Christ when He shall come to judgment, in
order that the hearts of men be brought to subjection to the coming
judge, and be prepared for the judgment, being forewarned by those signs.
But it is not easy to know what these signs may be: for the signs of
which we read in the gospels, as Augustine says, writing to Hesychius
about the end of the world (Ep. lxxx), refer not only to Christ's coming
to judgment, but also to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, and to the
coming of Christ in ceaselessly visiting His Church. So that, perhaps, if
we consider them carefully, we shall find that none of them refers to the
coming advent, as he remarks: because these signs that are mentioned in
the gospels, such as wars, fears, and so forth, have been from the
beginning of the human race: unless perhaps we say that at that time they
will be more prevalent: although it is uncertain in what degree this
increase will foretell the imminence of the advent. The signs mentioned
by Jerome are not asserted by him; he merely says that he found them
written in the annals of the Hebrews: and, indeed, they contain very
little likelihood.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: According to Augustine (Ad Hesych., Ep. lxxx) towards the
end of the world there will be a general persecution of the good by the
wicked: so that at the same time some will fear, namely the good, and
some will be secure, namely the wicked. The words: "When they shall say:
Peace and security," refer to the wicked, who will pay little heed to the
signs of the coming judgment: while the words of Lk. 21:26, "men
withering away," etc., should be referred to the good.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
We may also reply that all these signs that will happen about the time
of the judgment are reckoned to occur within the time occupied by the
judgment, so that the judgment day contains them all. Wherefore although
men be terrified by the signs appearing about the judgment day, yet
before those signs begin to appear the wicked will think themselves to be
in peace and security, after the death of Antichrist and before the
coming of Christ, seeing that the world is not at once destroyed, as they
thought hitherto.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The day of the Lord is said to come as a thief, because the
exact time is not known, since it will not be possible to know it from
those signs: although, as we have already said, all these most manifest
sings which will precede the judgment immediately may be comprised under
the judgment day.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: At His first advent Christ came secretly, although the
appointed time was known beforehand by the prophets. Hence there was no
need for such signs to appear at His first coming, as will appear at His
second advent, when He will come openly, although the appointed time is
hidden.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be
darkened in very truth?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that towards the time of the judgment the sun and
moon will be darkened in very truth. For, as Rabanus says, commenting on
Mt. 24:29 "nothing hinders us from gathering that the sun moon, and stars
will then be deprived of their light, as we know happened to the sun at
the time of our Lord's passion."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the light of the heavenly bodies is directed to the
generation of inferior bodies, because by its means and not only by their
movement they act upon this lower world as Averroes says (De Subst.
Orbis.). But generation will cease then. Therefore neither will light
remain in the heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to some the inferior bodies will be cleansed
of the qualities by which they act. Now heavenly bodies act not only by
movement, but also by light, as stated above (OBJ[2]). Therefore as the
movement of heaven will cease, so will the light of the heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, According to astronomers the sun and moon cannot be
eclipsed at the same time. But this darkening of the sun and moon is
stated to be simultaneous, when the Lord shall come to judgment.
Therefore the darkening will not be in very truth due to a natural
eclipse.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is not seemly for the same to be the cause of a thing's
failing and increasing. Now when our Lord shall come the light of the
luminaries will increase according to Is. 30:26, "The light of the moon
shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be
sevenfold." Therefore it is unfitting for the light of these bodies to
cease when our Lord comes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, If we speak of the sun and moon in respect of the very
moment of Christ's coming, it is not credible that they will be darkened
through being bereft of their light, since when Christ comes and the
saints rise again the whole world will be renewed, as we shall state
further on (Q[74]). If, however, we speak of them in respect of the time
immediately preceding the judgment, it is possible that by the Divine
power the sun, moon, and other luminaries of the heavens will be
darkened, either at various times or all together, in order to inspire
men with fear.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Rabanus is speaking of the time preceding the judgment:
wherefore he adds that when the judgment day is over the words of Isaias
shall be fulfilled.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Light is in the heavenly bodies not only for the purpose of
causing generation in these lower bodies, but also for their own
perfection and beauty. Hence it does not follow that where generation
ceases, the light of the heavenly bodies will cease, but rather that it
will increase.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It does not seem probable that the elemental qualities will
be removed from the elements, although some have asserted this. If,
however, they be removed, there would still be no parallel between them
and light, since the elemental qualities are in opposition to one
another, so that their action is corruptive: whereas light is a principle
of action not by way of opposition, but by way of a principle regulating
things in opposition to one another and bringing them back to harmony.
Nor is there a parallel with the movement of heavenly bodies, for
movement is the act of that which is imperfect, wherefore it must needs
cease when the imperfection ceases: whereas this cannot be said of light.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the virtues of heaven will be moved when our Lord shall come?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the virtues of heaven will not be moved when
our Lord shall come. For the virtues of heaven can de. note only the
blessed angels. Now immobility is essential to blessedness. Therefore it
will be impossible for them to be moved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, ignorance is the cause of wonder (Metaph. i, 2). Now
ignorance, like fear, is far from the angels, for as Gregory says (Dial.
iv, 33; Moral. ii, 3), "what do they not see, who see Him Who sees all."
Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved with wonder, as
stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all the angels will be present at the Divine judgment;
wherefore it is stated (Apoc. 7:11): "All the angels stood round about
the throne." Now the virtues denote one particular order of angels.
Therefore it should not be said of them rather than of others, that they
are moved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Job 26:11): "The pillars of heaven
tremble, and dread at His beck." Now the pillars of heaven can denote
only the virtues of heaven. Therefore the virtues of heaven will be moved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Mt. 24:29): "The stars shall fall from heaven,
and the virtues [Douay: 'powers'] of heaven shall be moved."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Virtue is twofold as applied to the angels, [*Cf. FP,
Q[108], A[5], ad 1] as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xi). For sometimes
the name of "virtues" is appropriated to one order, which according to
him, is the middle order of the middle hierarchy, but according to
Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) is the highest order of the lowest
hierarchy. In another sense it is employed to denote all the angels: and
then they are said to the question at issue it may be taken either way.
For in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48) it is explained according to the second
acceptation, so as to denote all the angels: and then they are said to be
moved through wonder at the renewing of the world, as stated in the text.
It can also be explained in reference to virtue as the name of a
particular order; and then that order is said to be moved more than the
others by reason of the effect, since according to Gregory (Hom. in
Evang. xxxiv) we ascribe to that order the working of miracles which
especially will be worked about that time: or again, because that
order---since, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi), it belongs to the
middle hierarchy---is not limited in its power, wherefore its ministry
must needs regard universal causes. Consequently the proper office of the
virtues is seemingly to move the heavenly bodies which are the cause of
what happens in nature here below. And again the very name denotes this,
since they are called the "virtues of heaven." Accordingly they will be
moved then, because they will no more produce their effect, by ceasing to
move the heavenly bodies: even as the angels who are appointed to watch
over men will no longer fulfill the office of guardians.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This movement changes nothing pertaining to their state;
but refers either to their effects which may vary without any change on
their part, or to some new consideration of things which hitherto they
were unable to see by means of their concreated species, which change of
thought is not taken from them by their state of blessedness. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20) that "God moves the spiritual
creature through time."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Wonder is wont to be about things surpassing our knowledge
or ability: and accordingly the virtues of heaven will wonder at the
Divine power doing such things, in so far as they fail to do or
comprehend them. In this sense the blessed Agnes said that the "sun and
moon wonder at His beauty": and this does not imply ignorance in the
angels, but removes the comprehension of God from them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[73] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the fire of the final conflagration: and under this
head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any cleansing of the world is to take place?
(2) Whether it will be effected by fire?
(3) Whether that fire is of the same species as elemental fire?
(4) Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?
(5) Whether that fire will consume the other elements?
(6) Whether it will cleanse all the elements?
(7) Whether that fire precedes or follows the judgment?
(8) Whether men are to be consumed by that fire?
(9) Whether the wicked will be involved therein?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the world is to be cleansed?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not to be any cleansing of the world.
For only that which is unclean needs cleansing. Now God's creatures are
not unclean, wherefore it is written (Acts 10:15): "That which God hath
cleansed, do not thou call common," i.e. unclean. Therefore the creatures
of the world shall not be cleansed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Divine justice cleansing is directed to the
removal of the uncleanness of sin, as instanced in the cleansing after
death. But there can be no stain of sin in the elements of this world.
Therefore, seemingly, they need not to be cleansed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a thing is said to be cleansed when any foreign matter
that depreciates it is removed therefrom: for the removal of that which
ennobles a thing is not called a cleansing, but rather a diminishing. Now
it pertains to the perfection and nobility of the elements that something
of a foreign nature is mingled with them, since the form of a mixed body
is more noble than the form of a simple body. Therefore it would seem
nowise fitting that the elements of this world can possibly be cleansed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, All renewal is effected by some kind of cleansing. But
the elements will be renewed; hence it is written (Apoc. 21:1): "I saw a
new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth was
gone." Therefore the elements shall be cleansed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xx, 16] on 1 Cor. 7:31,
"The fashion of this earth passeth away," says: "The beauty of this world
will perish in the burning of worldly flames." Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since the world was, in a way, made for man's sake, it
follows that, when man shall be glorified in the body, the other bodies
of the world shall also be changed to a better state, so that it is
rendered a more fitting place for him and more pleasant to look upon. Now
in order that man obtain the glory of the body, it behooves first of all
those things to be removed which are opposed to glory. There are two,
namely the corruption and stain of sin---because according to 1 Cor.
15:50, "neither shall corruption possess incorruption," and all the
unclean shall be without the city of glory (Apoc. 22:15)---and again, the
elements require to be cleansed from the contrary dispositions, ere they
be brought to the newness of glory, proportionately to what we have said
with regard to man. Now although, properly speaking, a corporeal thing
cannot be the subject of the stain of sin, nevertheless, on account of
sin corporeal things contract a certain unfittingness for being appointed
to spiritual purposes; and for this reason we find that places where
crimes have been committed are reckoned unfit for the performance of
sacred actions therein, unless they be cleansed beforehand. Accordingly
that part of the world which is given to our use contracts from men's
sins a certain unfitness for being glorified, wherefore in this respect
it needs to be cleansed. In like manner with regard to the intervening
space, on account of the contact of the elements, there are many
corruptions, generations and alterations of the elements, which diminish
their purity: wherefore the elements need to be cleansed from these also,
so that they be fit to receive the newness of glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When it is asserted that every creature of God is clean we
are to understand this as meaning that its substance contains no alloy of
evil, as the Manichees maintained, saying that evil and good are two
substances in some places severed from one another, in others mingled
together. But it does not exclude a creature from having an admixture of
a foreign nature, which in itself is also good, but is inconsistent with
the perfection of that creature. Nor does this prevent evil from being
accidental to a creature, although not mingled with it as part of its
substance.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although corporeal elements cannot be the subject of sin,
nevertheless, from the sin that is committed in them they contract a
certain unfitness for receiving the perfection of glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The form of a mixed body and the form of an element may be
considered in two ways: either as regards the perfection of the species,
and thus a mixed body is more perfect---or as regards their continual
endurance; and thus the simple body is more noble, because it has not in
itself the cause of corruption, unless it be corrupted by something
extrinsic: whereas a mixed body has in itself the cause of its
corruption, namely the composition of contraries. Wherefore a simple
body, although it be corruptible in part is incorruptible as a whole,
which cannot be said of a mixed body. And since incorruption belongs to
the perfection of glory, it follows that the perfection of a simple is
more in keeping with the perfection of glory, than the perfection of a
mixed body, unless the mixed body has also in itself some principle of
incorruption, as the human body has, the form of which is incorruptible.
Nevertheless, although a mixed body is somewhat more noble than a simple
body, a simple body that exists by itself has a more noble being than if
it exist in a mixed body, because in a mixed body simple bodies are
somewhat in potentiality, whereas, existing by themselves, they are in
their ultimate perfection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the cleansing of the world will be effected by fire?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this cleansing will not be effected by fire.
For since fire is a part of the world, it needs to be cleansed like the
other parts. Now, the same thing should not be both cleanser and
cleansed. Therefore it would seem that the cleansing will not be by fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as fire has a cleansing virtue so has water. Since
then all things are not capable of being cleansed by fire, and some need
to be cleansed by water---which distinction is moreover observed by the
Old Law---it would seem that fire will not at any rate cleanse all things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the
parts of the world by separating them from one another. Now the
separation of the parts of the world from one another at the world's
beginning was effected by God's power alone, for the work of distinction
was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the
separation was effected by the act of the intellect which moves all
things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, 9). Therefore it would seem that at
the end of the world the cleansing will be done immediately by God and
not by fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 49:3): "A fire shall burn before
Him, and a mighty tempest shall be around Him"; and afterwards in
reference to the judgment (Ps. 49:4): "He shall call heaven from above,
and the earth to judge His people." Therefore it would seem that the
final cleansing of the world will be by means of fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (2 Pt. 3:12): "The heavens being on fire will be
dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat." Therefore
this cleansing will be effected by fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]) this cleansing of the world will
remove from it the stain contracted from sin, and the impurity resulting
from mixture, and will be a disposition to the perfection of glory; and
consequently in this threefold respect it will be most fitting for it to
be effected by fire. First, because since fire is the most noble of the
elements, its natural properties are more like the properties of glory,
and this is especially clear in regard to light. Secondly, because fire,
on account of the efficacy of its active virtue, is not as susceptible as
the other elements to the admixture of a foreign matter. Thirdly, because
the sphere of fire is far removed from our abode; nor are we so familiar
with the use of fire as with that of earth, water, and air, so that it is
not so liable to depreciation. Moreover, it is most efficacious in
cleansing and in separating by a process of rarefaction.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fire is not employed by us in its proper matter (since thus
it is far removed from us), but only in a foreign matter: and in this
respect it will be possible for the world to be cleansed by fire as
existing in its pure state. But in so far as it has an admixture of some
foreign matter it will be possible for it to be cleansed; and thus it
will be cleanser and cleansed under different aspects. and this is not
unreasonable.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The first cleansing of the world by the deluge regarded
only the stain of sin. Now the sin which was most prevalent then was the
sin of concupiscence, and consequently it was fitting that the cleansing
should be by means of its contrary, namely water. But the second
cleansing regards both the stain of sin and the impurity of mixture, and
in respect of both it is more fitting for it to be effected by fire than
by water. For the power of water tends to unite rather than to separate;
wherefore the natural impurity of the elements could not be removed by
water as by fire. Moreover, at the end of the world the prevalent sin
will be that of tepidity, as though the world were already growing old,
because then, according to Mt. 24:12, "the charity of many shall grow
cold," and consequently the cleansing will then be fittingly effected by
fire. Nor is there any thing that cannot in some way be cleansed by fire:
some things, however, cannot be cleansed by fire without being destroyed
themselves, such as cloths and wooden vessels, and these the Law ordered
to be cleansed with water; yet all these things will be finally destroyed
by fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: By the work of distinction things received different forms
whereby they are distinct from one another: and consequently this could
only be done by Him Who is the author of nature. But by the final
cleansing things will be restored to the purity wherein they were
created, wherefore created nature will be able to minister to its Creator
to this effect; and for this reason is a creature employed as a minister,
that it is ennobled thereby.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fire whereby the world will be cleansed will be of the same
species with elemental fire?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fire in question is not of the same
species as elemental fire. For nothing consumes itself. But that fire
will consume the four elements according to a gloss on 2 Pt. 3:12.
Therefore that fire will not be of the same species as elemental fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as power is made known by operation, so is nature made
known by power. Now that fire will have a different power from the fire
which is an element: because it will cleanse the universe, whereas this
fire cannot do that. Therefore it will not be of the same species as this.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in natural bodies those that are of the same species
have the same movement. But that fire will have a different movement from
the fire that is an element, because it will move in all directions so as
to cleanse the whole. Therefore it is not of the same species.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), and his words are
contained in a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:31, that "the fashion of this world will
perish in the burning of worldly flames." Therefore that fire will be of
the same nature as the fire which is now in the world.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, just as the future cleansing is to be by fire, so was the past
cleansing by water: and they are both compared to one another, 2 Pt. 3:5.
Now in the first cleansing the water was of the same species with
elemental water. Therefore in like manner the fire of the second
cleansing will be of the same species with elemental fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We meet with three opinions on this question. For some
say that the element of fire which is in its own sphere will come down to
cleanse the world: and they explain this descent by way of
multiplication, because the fire will spread through finding combustible
matter on all sides. And this will result all the more then since the
virtue of the fire will be raised over all the elements. Against this,
however, would seem to be not only the fact that this fire will come
down, but also the statement of the saints that it will rise up; thus (2
Pt. 3:10) it is declared that the fire of the judgment will rise as high
as the waters of the deluge; whence it would seem to follow that this
fire is situated towards the middle of the place of generation. Hence
others say that this fire will be generated towards the intervening space
through the focusing together of the rays of the heavenly bodies, just as
we see them focused together in a burning-glass; for at that time in lieu
of glasses there will be concave clouds, on which the rays will strike
But this again does not seem probable: for since the effects of heavenly
bodies depend on certain fixed positions and aspects, if this fire
resulted from the virtue of the heavenly bodies, the time of this
cleansing would be known to those who observe the movements of the stars
and this is contrary to the authority of Scripture. Consequently others,
following Augustine, say that "just as the deluge resulted from an
outpouring of the waters of the world, so the fashion of this world will
perish by a burning of worldly flames" (De Civ. Dei. xx, 16). This
burning is nothing else but the assembly of all those lower and higher
causes that by their nature have a kindling virtue: and this assembly
will take place not in the ordinary course of things, but by the Divine
power: and from all these causes thus assembled the fire that will burn
the surface of this world will result. If we consider aright these
opinions, we shall find that they differ as to the cause producing this
fire and not as to its species. For fire, whether produced by the sun or
by some lower heating cause, is of the same species as fire in its own
sphere, except in so far as the former has some admixture of foreign
matter. And this will of necessity be the case then, since fire cannot
cleanse a thing, unless this become its matter in some way. Hence we must
grant that the fire in question is simply of the same species as ours.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The fire in question, although of the same species as ours,
is not identically the same. Now we see that of two fires of the same
species one destroys the other, namely the greater destroys the lesser,
by consuming its matter. In like manner that fire will be able to destroy
our fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as an operation that proceeds from the virtue of a
thing is an indication of that virtue, so is its virtue an indication of
its essence or nature, if it proceed from the essential principles of the
thing. But an operation that does not proceed from the virtue of the
operator does not indicate its virtue. This appears in instruments: for
the action of an instrument shows forth the virtue of the mover rather
than that of the instrument, since it shows forth the virtue of the agent
in so far as the latter is the first principle of the action, whereas it
does not show forth the virtue of the instrument, except in so far as it
is susceptive of the influence of the principal agent as moving that
instrument. In like manner a virtue that does not proceed from the
essential principles of a thing does not indicate the nature of that
thing except in the point of susceptibility. Thus the virtue whereby hot
water can heat is no indication of the nature of water except in the
point of its being receptive of heat. Consequently nothing prevents water
that has this virtue from being of the same species as water that has it
not. In like manner it is not unreasonable that this fire, which will
have the power to cleanse the surface of the world, will be of the same
species as the fire to which we are used, since the heating power therein
arises, not from its essential principles but from the divine power or
operation: whether we say that this power is an absolute quality, such as
heat in hot water, or a kind of intention as we have ascribed to
instrumental virtue (Sent. iv, D, 1, qu. 1, A[4]) [*Cf. TP, Q[62], A[4],
ad 1]. The latter is more probable since that fire will not act save as
the instrument of the Divine power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Of its own nature fire tends only upwards; but in so far
as it pursues its matter, which it requires when it is outside its own
sphere, it follows the site of combustible matter. Accordingly it is not
unreasonable for it to take a circular or a downward course, especially
in so far as it acts as the instrument of the Divine power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that that fire will cleanse also the higher
heavens. For it is written (Ps. 101:26,27): "The heavens are the works of
Thy hands: they shall perish but Thou remainest." Now the higher heavens
also are the work of God's hands. Therefore they also shall perish in the
final burning of the world.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (2 Pt. 3:12): "The heavens being on fire
shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat of
fire." Now the heavens that are distinct from the elements are the higher
heavens, wherein the stars are fixed. Therefore it would seem that they
also will be cleansed by that fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the purpose of that fire will be to remove from bodies
their indisposition to the perfection of glory. Now in the higher heaven
we find this indisposition both as regards guilt, since the devil sinned
there, and as regards natural deficiency, since a gloss on Rm. 8:22, "We
know that every creature groaneth and is in labor even until now," says:
"All the elements fulfill their duty with labor: even as it is not
without labor that the sun and moon travel their appointed course."
Therefore the higher heavens also will be cleansed by that fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, "The heavenly bodies are not receptive of impressions
from without" [*Cf. Sent. Philosop. ex Arist. collect. lit. c.---Among
the works of Bede].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, a gloss on 2 Thess. 1:8, "In a flame of fire giving vengeance,"
says: "There will be in the world a fire that shall precede Him, and
shall rise in the air to the same height as did the waters of the
deluge." But the waters of the deluge did not rise to the height of the
higher heavens but only 15 cubits higher than the mountain summits (Gn.
7:20). Therefore the higher heavens will not be cleansed by that fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The cleansing of the world will be for the purpose of
removing from bodies the disposition contrary to the perfection of glory,
and this perfection is the final consummation of the universe: and this
disposition is to be found in all bodies, but differently in different
bodies. For in some this indisposition regards something inherent to
their substance: as in these lower bodies which by being mixed together
fall away from their own purity. In others this indisposition does not
regard something inherent to their substance; as in the heavenly bodies,
wherein nothing is to be found contrary to the final perfection of the
universe, except movement which is the way to perfection, and this not
any kind of movement, but only local movement, which changes nothing
intrinsic to a thing, such as its substance, quantity, or quality, but
only its place which is extrinsic to it. Consequently there is no need to
take anything away from the substance of the higher heavens, but only to
set its movement at rest. Now local movement is brought to rest not by
the action of a counter agent, but by the mover ceasing to move; and
therefore the heavenly bodies will not be cleansed, neither by fire nor
by the action of any creature, but in lieu of being cleansed they will be
set at rest by God's will alone.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18,24): "Those words of
the psalm refer to the aerial heavens which will be cleansed by the fire
of the final conflagration." Or we may reply that if they refer also to
the higher heavens, these are said to perish as regards their movement
whereby now they are moved without cessation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Peter explains himself to which heavens he refers. For
before the words quoted, he had said (2 Pt. 3:5-7): "The heavens . . .
first, and the earth . . . through water . . . perished . . . which . . .
now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire unto the day
of judgment." [*The entire text differs somewhat from St. Thomas's
quotation; but the sense is the same.] Therefore the heavens to be
cleansed are those which before were cleansed by the waters of the
deluge, namely the aerial heavens.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This labor and service of the creature, that Ambrose
ascribes to the heavenly bodies, is nothing else than the successive
movements whereby they are subject to time, and the lack of that final
consummation which they will attain in the end. Nor did the empyrean
heaven contract any stain from the sin of the demons, because they were
expelled from that heaven as soon as they sinned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether that fire will consume the other elements?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fire in question will consume the other
elements. For a gloss of Bede on 2 Pt. 3:12 says: "This exceeding great
fire will engulf the four elements whereof the world consists: yet it
will not so engulf all things that they will cease to be, but it will
consume two of them entirely, and will restore two of them to a better
fashion." Therefore it would seem that at least two of the elements are
to be entirely destroyed by that fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Apoc. 21:1): "The first heaven and the
first earth have passed away and the sea is no more." Now the heaven here
denotes the air, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xx, 18); and the sea
denotes the gathering together of the waters. Therefore it would seem
that these three elements will be wholly destroyed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fire does not cleanse except in so far as other things
are made to be its matter. If, then, fire cleanses the other elements,
they must needs become its matter. Therefore they must pass into its
nature, and consequently be voided of their own nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the form of fire is the most noble of the forms to which
elemental matter can attain. Now all things will be brought to the most
noble state by this cleansing. Therefore the other elements will be
wholly transformed into fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 7:31, "The fashion of this world
passeth away," says: "The beauty, not the substance, passeth." But the
very substance of the elements belongs to the perfection of the world.
Therefore the elements will not be consumed as to their substance.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, this final cleansing that will be effected by fire will
correspond to the first cleansing which was effected by water. Now the
latter did not corrupt the substance of the elements. Therefore neither
will the former which will be the work of fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some say
that all the elements will remain as to their matter, while all will be
changed as regards their imperfection; but that two of them will retain
their respective substantial form, namely air and earth, while two of
them, namely fire and water, will not retain their substantial form but
will be changed to the form of heaven. In this way three elements, namely
air, fire, and water, will be called "heaven"; although air will retain
the same substantial form as it has now, since even now it is called
"heaven." Wherefore (Apoc. 21:1) only heaven and earth are mentioned: "I
saw," says he, "a new heaven and a new earth." But this opinion is
altogether absurd: for it is opposed both to philosophy---which holds it
impossible for the lower bodies to be in potentiality to the form of
heaven, since they have neither a common matter, nor mutual
contrariety---and to theology, since according to this opinion the
perfection of the universe with the integrity of its parts will not be
assured on account of two of the elements being destroyed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Consequently "heaven" is taken to denote the fifth body, while all the
elements are designated by "earth," as expressed in Ps. 148:7,8, "Praise
the Lord from the earth" and afterwards, "fire, hail, snow, ice," etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
Hence others say that all the elements will remain as to their
substance, but that their active and passive qualities will be taken from
them: even as they say too, that in a mixed body the elements retain
their substantial form without having their proper qualities, since these
are reduced to a mean, and a mean is neither of the extremes. And
seemingly the following words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 16) would
seem in agreement with this: "In this conflagration of the world the
qualities of the corruptible elements that were befitting our corruptible
bodies will entirely perish by fire: and the substance itself will have
those qualities that become an immortal body."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
However, this does not seem probable, for since the proper qualities of
the elements are the effects of their substantial form, it seems
impossible, as long as the substantial forms remain, for the aforesaid
qualities to be changed, except for a time by some violent action: thus
in hot water we see that by virtue of its species it returns to the cold
temperature which it had lost by the action of fire, provided the species
of water remain. Moreover, these same elemental qualities belong to the
second perfection of the elements, as being their proper passions: nor is
it probable that in this final consummation the elements will lose
anything of their natural perfection. Wherefore it would seem that the
reply to this question should be that the elements will remain as to
their substance and proper qualities, but that they will be cleansed both
from the stain which they contracted from the sins of men, and from the
impurity resulting in them through their mutual action and passion:
because when once the movement of the first movable body ceases, mutual
action and passion will be impossible in the lower elements: and this is
what Augustine calls the "qualities of corruptible elements," namely
their unnatural dispositions by reason of which they come near to
corruption.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That fire is said to engulf the four elements in so far as
in some way it will cleanse them. But when it is said further that "it
will consume two entirely," this does not mean that two of the elements
are to be destroyed as to their substance, but that two will be more
changed from the property which they have now. Some say that these two
are fire and water which excel the others in their active qualities,
namely heat and cold, which are the chief principles of corruption in
other bodies; and since then there will be no action of fire and water
which surpass the others in activity, they would seem especially to be
changed from the virtue which they have now. Others, however, say that
these two are air and water, on account of the various movements of these
two elements, which movements they derive from the movement of the
heavenly bodies. And since these movements will cease (such as the ebb
and flow of the sea, and the disturbances of winds and so forth),
therefore these elements especially will be changed from the property
which they have now.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), when it is stated:
"And the sea is no more," by the sea we may understand the present world
of which he had said previously (De Civ. Dei xx, 13): "The sea gave up
the dead that were in it." If, however, the sea be taken literally we
must reply that by the sea two things are to be understood, namely the
substance of the waters, and their disposition, as containing salt and as
to the movement of the waves. The sea will remain, not as to this second,
but as to the first.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This fire will not act save as the instrument of God's
providence and power; wherefore it will not act on the other elements so
as to consume them but only so as to cleanse them. Nor is it necessary
for that which becomes the matter of fire, to be voided of its proper
species entirely, as instanced by incandescent iron, which by virtue of
its species that remains returns to its proper and former state as soon
as it is taken from the furnace. It will be the same with the elements
after they are cleansed by fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the elemental parts we must consider not only what is
befitting a part considered in itself, but also what is befitting it in
its relation to the whole. I say, then, that although water would be more
noble if it had the form of fire, as likewise would earth and air, yet
the universe would be more imperfect, if all elemental matter were to
assume the form of fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the elements will be cleansed by that fire?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that neither will all the elements be cleansed by
that fire. Because that fire, as stated already (A[3]), will not rise
higher than the waters of the deluge. But the waters of the deluge did
not reach to the sphere of fire. Therefore neither will the element of
fire be cleansed by the final cleansing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Apoc. 21:1, "I saw a new heaven," etc., says:
"There can be no doubt that the transformation of the air and earth will
be caused by fire; but it is doubtful about water, since it is believed
to have the power of cleansing itself." Therefore at least it is
uncertain that all the elements will be cleansed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a place where there is an everlasting stain is never
cleansed. Now there will always be a stain in hell. Since, then, hell is
situated among the elements, it would seem that the elements will not be
wholly cleansed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the earthly paradise is situated on the earth. Yet it
will not be cleansed by fire, since not even the waters of the deluge
reached it, as Bede says (Hexaem. i, ad Gen. 2:8), as is stated in
Sentent. ii, D, 7. Therefore it would seem that the elements will not all
be wholly cleansed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The gloss quoted above (A[5], OBJ[1]) on 2 Pt. 3:12
declares that "this fire will engulf the four elements."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some [*St. Bonaventure, Sentent. iv, D, 47, A[2], Q[3]]
say that the fire in question will rise to the summit of the space
containing the four elements: so that the elements would be entirely
cleansed both from the stain of sin by which also the higher parts of the
elements were infected (as instanced by the smoke of idolatry which
stained the higher regions), and again from corruption, since the
elements are corruptible in all their parts. But this opinion is opposed
to the authority of Scripture, because it is written (2 Pt. 3:7) that
those heavens are "kept in store unto fire," which were cleansed by
water; and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) that "the same world which
perished in the deluge is reserved unto fire." Now it is clear that the
waters of the deluge did not rise to the summit of the space occupied by
the elements, but only 15 cubits above the mountain tops; and moreover it
is known that vapors or any smoke whatever rising from the earth cannot
pierce the entire sphere of fire so as to reach its summit; and so the
stain of sin did not reach the aforesaid space. Nor can the elements be
cleansed from corruptibility by the removal of something that might be
consumed by fire: whereas it will be possible for the impurities of the
elements arising from their mingling together to be consumed by fire. And
these impurities are chiefly round about the earth as far as the middle
of the air: wherefore the fire of the final conflagration will cleanse up
to that point, since the waters of the deluge rose to a height which can
be approximately calculated from the height of the mountains which they
surpassed in a fixed measure.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
We therefore grant the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason for doubt is expressed in the gloss, because, to
wit, water is believed to have in itself the power of cleansing, yet not
such a power as will be competent to the future state, as stated above
(A[5]; A[2], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The purpose of this cleansing will be chiefly to remove all
imperfection from the abode of the saints; and consequently in this
cleansing all that is foul will be brought together to the place of the
damned: so hell will not be cleansed, and the dregs of the whole earth
will be brought thither, according to Ps. 74:9, "The dregs thereof are
not emptied, all the sinners of the earth shall drink."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although the sin of the first man was committed in the
earthly paradise, this is not the place of sinners, as neither is the
empyrean heaven: since from both places man and devil were expelled
forthwith after their sin. Consequently that place needs no cleansing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fire of the final conflagration is to
follow the judgment. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 30) gives the
following order of the things to take place at the judgment, saying: "At
this judgment we have learned that the following things will occur. Elias
the Thesbite will appear, the Jews will believe, Antichrist will
persecute, Christ will judge, the dead shall rise again, the good shall
be separated from the wicked, the world shall be set on fire and shall be
renewed." Therefore the burning will follow the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): "After the wicked
have been judged, and cast into everlasting fire, the figure of this
world will perish in the furnace of worldly flames." Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, when the Lord comes to judgment He will find some men
living, as appears from the words of 1 Thess. 4:16, where the Apostle
speaking in their person says: "Then we who are alive, who remain unto
the coming of the Lord [*Vulg.: 'who are left, shall be taken . . . to
meet Christ'---the words "who remain," etc., are from 1 Thess. 4:14]."
But it would not be so, if the burning of the world were to come first,
since they would be destroyed by the fire. Therefore this fire will
follow the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is said that our Lord will come to judge the earth by
fire, and consequently the final conflagration would seem to be the
execution of the sentence of Divine judgment. Now execution follows
judgment. Therefore that fire will follow the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 96:3): "A fire shall go before Him."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the resurrection will precede the judgment, else every eye
would not see Christ judging. Now the burning of the world will precede
the resurrection, for the saints who will rise again will have spiritual
and impassible bodies, so that it will be impossible for the fire to
cleanse them, and yet the text (Sent. iv, D, 47) quotes Augustine (De
Civ. Dei xx, 18) as saying that "whatever needs cleansing in any way
shall be cleansed by that fire." Therefore that fire will precede the
judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The fire in question will in reality, as regards its
beginning, precede the judgment. This can clearly be gathered from the
fact that the resurrection of the dead will precede the judgment, since
according to 1 Thess. 4:13-16, those who have slept "shall be taken up .
. in the clouds . . . into the air . . . to meet Christ coming to
judgment." Now the general resurrection and the glorification of the
bodies of the saints will happen at the same time; for the saints in
rising again will assume a glorified body, as evidenced by 1 Cor. 15:43,
"It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory": and at the same time as
the saints' bodies shall be glorified, all creatures shall be renewed,
each in its own way, as appears from the statement (Rm. 8:21) that "the
creature . . . itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption
into the liberty of the glory of the children of God." Since then the
burning of the world is a disposition to the aforesaid renewal, as stated
above (AA[1],4); it can clearly be gathered that this burning, so far as
it shall cleanse the world, will precede the judgment, but as regards a
certain action thereof, whereby it will engulf the wicked, it will follow
the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking not as one who decides the point, but
as expressing an opinion. This is clear from his continuing thus: "That
all these things are to happen is a matter of faith, but how and in what
order we shall learn more then by experience of the things themselves
than now by seeking a definite conclusion by arguing about them.
Methinks, however, they will occur in the order I have given." Hence it
is clear that he is speaking as offering his opinion. The same answer
applies to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All men shall die and rise again: yet those are said to be
found alive who will live in the body until the time of the conflagration.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: That fire will not carry out the sentence of the judge
except as regards the engulfing of the wicked: in this respect it will
follow the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether that fire will have such an effect on men as is described?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this fire will not have such an effect on men
as is described in the text (Sent. iv, D, 47). For a thing is said to be
consumed when it is reduced to naught. Now the bodies of the wicked will
not be reduced to naught, but will be kept for eternity, that they may
bear an eternal punishment. Therefore this fire will not consume the
wicked, as stated in the text.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if it be said that it will consume the bodies of the
wicked by reducing them to ashes; on the contrary, as the bodies of the
wicked, so will those of the good be brought to ashes: for it is the
privilege of Christ alone that His flesh see not corruption. Therefore it
will consume also the good who will then be found.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the stain of sin is more abundant in the elements, as
combining together to the formation of the human body wherein is the
corruption of the fomes [*Cf. FS, Q[83], A[3]; FS, Q[91], A[6]] even in
the good, than in the elements existing outside the human body. Now the
elements existing outside the human body will be cleansed on account of
the stain of sin. Much therefore will the elements in the human body
whether of the good or of the wicked need to be cleansed, and
consequently the bodies of both will need to be destroyed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as long as the state of the way lasts the elements act
in like manner on the good and the wicked. Now the state of the way will
still endure in that conflagration, since after this state of the way
death will not be natural, and yet it will be caused by that fire.
Therefore that fire will act equally on good and wicked; and consequently
it does not seem that any distinction is made between them as to their
being affected by that fire, as stated in the text.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, this fire will have done its work in a moment as it
were. Yet there will be many among the living in whom there will be many
things to be cleansed. Therefore that fire will not suffice for their
cleansing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, This fire of the final conflagration, in so far as it
will precede the judgment, will act as the instrument of Divine justice
as well as by the natural virtue of fire. Accordingly, as regards its
natural virtue, it will act in like manner on the wicked and good who
will be alive, by reducing the bodies of both to ashes. But in so far as
it acts as the instrument of Divine justice, it will act differently on
different people as regards the sense of pain. For the wicked will be
tortured by the action of the fire; whereas the good in whom there will
be nothing to cleanse will feel no pain at all from the fire, as neither
did the children in the fiery furnace (Dan. 3); although their bodies
will not be kept whole, as were the bodies of the children: and it will
be possible by God's power for their bodies to be destroyed without their
suffering pain. But the good, in whom matter for cleansing will be found,
will suffer pain from that fire, more or less according to their
different merits.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, as regards the action which this fire will have after
the judgment, it will act on the damned alone, since the good will all
have impassible bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Consumption there signifies being brought, not to nothing,
but to ashes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the bodies of the good will be reduced to ashes by
the fire, they will not suffer pain thereby, as neither did the children
in the Babylonian furnace. In this respect a distinction is drawn between
the good and the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The elements that are in human bodies, even in the bodies
of the elect, will be cleansed by fire. But this will be done, by God's
power, without their suffering pain.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This fire will act not only according to the natural power
of the element, but also as the instrument of Divine justice.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[8] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: There are three reasons why those who will be found living
will be able to be cleansed suddenly. One is because there will be few
things in them to be cleansed, since they will be already cleansed by the
previous fears and persecutions. The second is because they will suffer
pain both while living and of their own will: and pain suffered in this
life voluntarily cleanses much more than pain inflicted after death, as
in the case of the martyrs, because "if anything needing to be cleansed
be found in them, it is cut off by the sickle of suffering," as Augustine
says (De Unic. Bap. xiii), although the pain of martyrdom is of short
duration in comparison with the pain endured in purgatory. The third is
because the heat will gain in intensity what it loses in shortness of
time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether that fire will engulf the wicked?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that that fire will not engulf the wicked. For a
gloss on Malachi 3:3, "He shall purify the sons of Levi," says that "it
is a fire consuming the wicked and refining the good"; and a gloss on 1
Cor. 3:13, "Fire shall try every man's work," says: "We read that there
will be a twofold fire, one that will cleanse the elect and will precede
the judgment, another that will torture the wicked." Now the latter is
the fire of hell that shall engulf the wicked, while the former is the
fire of the final conflagration. Therefore the fire of the final
conflagration will not be that which will engulf the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that fire will obey God in the cleansing of the world:
therefore it should receive its reward like the other elements,
especially since fire is the most noble of the elements. Therefore it
would seem that it ought not to be cast into hell for the punishment of
the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the fire that will engulf the wicked will be the fire of
hell: and this fire was prepared from the beginning of the world for the
damned; hence it is written (Mt. 25:41): "Depart . . . you cursed . . .
into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil," etc., and (Is.
30:33): "Tophet is prepared from yesterday, prepared by the king," etc.,
where a gloss observes: "From yesterday, i.e. from the
beginning---Tophet, i.e. the valley of hell." But this fire of the final
conflagration was not prepared from the beginning, but will result from
the meeting together of the fires of the world. Therefore that fire is
not the fire of hell which will engulf the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, are the words of Ps. 96:3, where it is said of this
fire that it "shall burn His enemies round about."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Dan. 7:10): "A swift stream of fire issued forth
from before Him"; and a gloss adds, "to drag sinners into hell." Now the
passage quoted refers to that fire of which we are now speaking, as
appears from a gloss which observes on the same words: "In order to
punish the wicked and cleanse the good." Therefore the fire of the final
conflagration will be plunged into hell together with the wicked
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The entire cleansing of the world and the renewal for the
purpose of cleansing will be directed to the renewal of man: and
consequently the cleansing and renewal of the world must needs correspond
with the cleansing and renewal of mankind. Now mankind will be cleansed
in one way by the separation of the wicked from the good: wherefore it is
said (Lk. 3:17): "Whose fan is in His hand, and He will purge His poor,
and will gather the wheat," i.e. the elect, "into His barn, but the
chaff," i.e. the wicked, "He will burn with unquenchable fire." Hence it
will be thus with the cleansing of the world, so that all that is ugly
and vile will be cast with the wicked into hell, and all that is
beautiful and noble will be taken up above for the glory of the elect:
and so too will it be with the fire of that conflagration, as Basil says
in Ps. 28:7, "The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of fire," because
whatever fire contains of burning heat and gross matter will go down into
hell for the punishment of the wicked, and whatever is subtle and
lightsome will remain above for the glory of the elect.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The fire that will cleanse the elect before the judgment
will be the same as the fire that will burn the world, although some say
the contrary. For it is fitting that man, being a part of the world, be
cleansed with the same fire as the world. They are, however, described as
two fires, that will cleanse the good, and torture the wicked, both in
reference to their respective offices, and somewhat in reference to their
substance: since the substance of the cleansing fire will not all be cast
into hell, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This fire will be rewarded because whatever it contains of
gross matter will be separated from it, and cast into hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[74] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The punishment of the wicked, even as the glory of the
elect, will be greater after the judgment than before. Wherefore, just as
charity will be added to the higher creature in order to increase the
glory of the elect, so too whatever is vile in creatures will be thrust
down into hell in order to add to the misery of the damned. Consequently
it is not unbecoming that another fire be added to the fire of the damned
that was prepared from the beginning of the world.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider things connected with and
accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be considered will
be the resurrection itself; the second will be the cause of the
resurrection; the third its time and manner. the fourth its term
"wherefrom"; the fifth the condition of those who rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there will be three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?
(2) Whether it is universally of all bodies?
(3) Whether it is natural or miraculous?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not to be a resurrection of the body:
for it is written (Job 14:12): "Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not
rise again till the heavens be broken." But the heavens shall never be
broken, since the earth, to which seemingly this is still less
applicable, "standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Therefore the man that is
dead shall never rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Our Lord proves the resurrection by quoting the words:
"I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He
is not the God of the dead but of the living" (Mt. 22:32; Ex. 3:6). But
it is clear that when those words were uttered, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob
lived not in body, but only in the soul. Therefore there will be no
resurrection of bodies but only of souls.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle (1 Cor. 15) seemingly proves the
resurrection from the reward for labors endured by the saints in this
life. For if they trusted in this life alone, they would be the most
unhappy of all men. Now there can be sufficient reward for labor in the
soul alone: since it is not necessary for the instrument to be repaid
together with the worker, and the body is the soul's instrument.
Wherefore even in purgatory, where souls will be punished for what they
did in the body, the soul is punished without the body. Therefore there
is no need to hold a resurrection of the body, but it is enough to hold a
resurrection of souls, which consists in their being taken from the death
of sin and unhappiness to the life of grace and glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the last state of a thing is the most perfect, since
thereby it attains its end. Now the most perfect state of the soul is to
be separated from the body, since in that state it is more conformed to
God and the angels, and is more pure, as being separated from any
extraneous nature. Therefore separation from the body is its final state,
and consequently it returns not from this state to the body, as neither
does a man end in becoming a boy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, bodily death is the punishment inflicted on man for his
own transgression, as appears from Gn. 2, even as spiritual death, which
is the separation of the soul from God, is inflicted on man for mortal
sin. Now man never returns to life from spiritual death after receiving
the sentence of his damnation. Therefore neither will there be any return
from bodily death to bodily life, and so there will be no resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:25-26): "I know that my Redeemer
liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and I shall be
clothed again with my skin," etc. Therefore there will be a resurrection
of the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as appears
from Rm. 5:15. Now death was brought in by sin, for if sin had not been,
there had been no death. Therefore by the gift of Christ man will be
restored from death to life.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, the members should be conformed to the head. Now our Head lives
and will live eternally in body and soul, since "Christ rising again from
the dead dieth now no more" (Rm. 6:8). Therefore men who are His members
will live in body and soul; and consequently there must needs be a
resurrection of the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, According to the various opinions about man's last end
there have been various opinions holding or denying the resurrection. For
man's last end which all men desire naturally is happiness. Some have
held that man is able to attain this end in this life: wherefore they had
no need to admit another life after this, wherein man would be able to
attain to his perfection: and so they denied the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
This opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by the
changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the human body, the
imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all of which are
hindrances to the perfection of happiness, as Augustine argues at the end
of De Civ. Dei (xxii, 22).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
Hence others maintained that after this there is another life wherein,
after death, man lives according to the soul only, and they held that
such a life sufficed to satisfy the natural desire to obtain happiness:
wherefore Porphyrius said as Augustine states (De Civ. De. xxii, 26):
"The soul, to be happy, must avoid all bodies": and consequently these
did not hold the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
This opinion was based by various people on various false foundations.
For certain heretics asserted that all bodily things are from the evil
principle, but that spiritual things are from the good principle: and
from this it follows that the soul cannot reach the height of its
perfection unless it be separated from the body, since the latter
withdraws it from its principle, the participation of which makes it
happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold corporeal things to have
been created or fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of the body.
The falsehood of this principle has been shown at the beginning of the
Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 4, qu. 1, A[3]; *[Cf. FP, Q[49], A[3]]).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so that
the soul makes use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses his
ship: wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if happiness
is attained by the soul alone, man would not be balked in his natural
desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection.
But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation (De Anima ii,
2), where he shows that the soul is united to the body as form to matter.
Hence it is clear that if man cannot be happy in this life, we must of
necessity hold the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The heavens will never be broken as to their substance, but
as to the effect of their power whereby their movement is the cause of
generation and corruption of lower things: for this reason the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 7:31): "The fashion of this world passeth away."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Abraham's soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham himself,
but a part of him (and the same as regards the others). Hence life in
Abraham's soul does not suffice to make Abraham a living being, or to
make the God of Abraham the God of a living man. But there needs to be
life in the whole composite, i.e. the soul and body: and although this
life were not actually when these words were uttered, it was in each part
as ordained to the resurrection. Wherefore our Lord proves the
resurrection with the greatest subtlety and efficacy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The soul is compared to the body, not only as a worker to
the instrument with which he works, but also as form to matter: wherefore
the work belongs to the composite and not to the soul alone, as the
Philosopher shows (De Anima i, 4). And since to the worker is due the
reward of the work, it behooves man himself, who is composed of soul and
body, to receive the reward of his work. Now as venial offenses are
called sins as being dispositions to sin, and not as having simply and
perfectly the character of sin, so the punishment which is awarded to
them in purgatory is not a retribution simply, but rather a cleansing,
which is wrought separately in the body, by death and by its being
reduced to ashes, and in the soul by the fire of purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body
is more perfect than outside the body, because it is a part of the whole
composite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the
whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is not
simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed to God when
it has all that the condition of its nature requires, since then most of
all it imitates the Divine perfection. Hence the heart of an animal is
more conformed to an immovable God when it is in movement than when it is
at rest, because the perfection of the heart is in its movement, and its
rest is its undoing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Bodily death was brought about by Adam's sin which was
blotted out by Christ's death: hence its punishment lasts not for ever.
But mortal sin which causes everlasting death through impenitence will
not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will be everlasting.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be for all without
exception. For it is written (Ps. 1:5): "The wicked shall not rise again
in judgment." Now men will not rise again except at the time of the
general judgment. Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 12:2): "Many of those that sleep in
the dust of the earth shall awake." But these words imply a restriction.
Therefore all will not rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by the resurrection men are conformed to Christ rising
again; wherefore the Apostle argues (1 Cor. 15:12, seqq.) that if Christ
rose again, we also shall rise again. Now those alone should be conformed
to Christ rising again who have borne His image, and this belongs to the
good alone. Therefore they alone shall rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, punishment is not remitted unless the fault be condoned.
Now bodily death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore, as
original sin is not forgiven to all, all will not rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, as we are born again by the grace of Christ, even so
shall we rise again by His grace. Now those who die in their mother's
womb can never be born again: therefore neither can they rise again, and
consequently all will not rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:28,25): "All that are in the graves
shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they that hear shall
live." Therefore the dead shall all rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:51): "We shall all indeed rise again,"
etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, the resurrection is necessary in order that those who rise
again may receive punishment or reward according to their merits. Now
either punishment or reward is due to all, either for their own merits,
as to adults, or for others' merits, as to children. Therefore all will
rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Those things, the reason of which comes from the nature
of a species, must needs be found likewise in all the members of that
same species. Now such is the resurrection: because the reason thereof,
as stated above (A[1]), is that the soul cannot have the final perfection
of the human species, so long as it is separated from the body. Hence no
soul will remain for ever separated from the body. Therefore it is
necessary for all, as well as for one, to rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As a gloss expounds these words, they refer to the
spiritual resurrection whereby the wicked shall not rise again in the
particular judgment. or else they refer to the wicked who are altogether
unbelievers, who will not rise again to be judged, since they are already
judged [*Jn. 3:18].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 23) explains "many" as meaning
"all": in fact, this way of speaking is often met with in Holy Writ. Or
else the restriction may refer to the children consigned to limbo who,
although they shall rise again, are not properly said to awake, since
they will have no sense either of pain or of glory, and waking is the
unchaining of the senses.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All, both good and wicked, are conformed to Christ, while
living in this life, as regards things pertaining to the nature of the
species, but not as regards matters pertaining to grace. Hence all will
be conformed to Him in the restoration of natural life, but not in the
likeness of glory, except the good alone.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Those who have died in original sin have, by dying,
discharged the obligation of death which is the punishment of original
sin. Hence, notwithstanding original sin, they can rise again from death:
for the punishment of original sin is to die, rather than to be detained
by death.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: We are born again by the grace of Christ that is given to
us, but we rise again by the grace of Christ whereby it came about that
He took our nature, since it is by this that we are conformed to Him in
natural things. Hence those who die in their mother's womb, although they
are not born again by receiving grace, will nevertheless rise again on
account of the conformity of their nature with Him, which conformity they
acquired by attaining to the perfection of the human species.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the resurrection is natural?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the resurrection is natural. For, as the
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14), "that which is commonly observed
in all, marks the nature of the individuals contained under it." Now
resurrection applies commonly to all. Therefore it is natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 55): "Those who do not hold
the resurrection on the principle of obedience ought certainly to hold it
on the principle of reason. For what does the world every day but
imitate, in its elements, our resurrection?" And he offers as examples
the light which "as it were dies . . . and is withdrawn from our sight .
. and again rises anew, as it were, and is recalled---the shrubs which
lose their greenery, and again by a kind of resurrection are
renewed---and the seeds which rot and die and then sprout and rise again
as it were": which same example is adduced by the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:36).
Now from the works of nature nothing can be known save what is natural.
Therefore the resurrection is natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things that are against nature abide not for long,
because they are violent, so to speak. But the life that is restored by
the resurrection will last for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be
natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, that to which the entire expectation of nature looks
forward would seem to be natural. Now such a thing is the resurrection
and the glorification of the saints according to Rm. 8:19. Therefore the
resurrection will be natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the resurrection is a kind of movement towards the
everlasting union of soul and body. Now movement is natural if it
terminate in a natural rest (Phys. v, 6): and the everlasting union of
soul and body will be natural, for since the soul is the body's proper
mover, it has a body proportionate to it: so that the body is likewise
for ever capable of being quickened by it, even as the soul lives for
ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, There is no natural return from privation to habit. But
death is privation of life. Therefore the resurrection whereby one
returns from death to life is not natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, things of the one species have one fixed way of origin:
wherefore animals begotten of putrefaction are never of the same species
as those begotten of seed, as the Commentator says on Phys. viii. Now the
natural way of man's origin is for him to be begotten of a like in
species: and such is not the case in the resurrection. Therefore it will
not be natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A movement or an action stands related to nature in three
ways. For there is a movement or action whereof nature is neither the
principle nor the term: and such a movement is sometimes from a principle
above nature as in the case of a glorified body; and sometimes from any
other principle whatever; for instance, the violent upward movement of a
stone which terminates in a violent rest. Again, there is a movement
whereof nature is both principle and term: for instance, the downward
movement of a stone. And there is another movement whereof nature is the
term, but not the principle, the latter being sometimes something above
nature (as in giving sight to a blind man, for sight is natural, but the
principle of the sight-giving is above nature), and sometimes something
else, as in the forcing of flowers or fruit by artificial process. It is
impossible for nature to be the principle and not the term, because
natural principles are appointed to definite effects, beyond which they
cannot extend.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly the action or movement that is related to nature in the
first way can nowise be natural, but is either miraculous if it come from
a principle above nature, or violent if from any other principle. The
action or movement that is related to nature in the second way is simply
natural: but the action that is related to nature in the third way cannot
be described as natural simply, but as natural in a restricted sense, in
so far, to wit, as it leads to that which is according to nature: but it
is called either miraculous or artificial or violent. For, properly
speaking, natural is that which is according to nature, and a thing is
according to nature if it has that nature and whatever results from that
nature (Phys. ii, 1). Consequently, speaking simply, movement cannot be
described as natural unless its principle be natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Now nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, although
resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For nature is the
principle of movement in the thing wherein nature is---either the active
principle, as in the movement of heavy and light bodies and in the
natural alterations of animals---or the passive principle, as in the
generation of simple bodies. The passive principle of natural generation
is the natural passive potentiality which always has an active principle
corresponding to it in nature, according to Metaphysics viii, 1: nor as
to this does it matter whether the active principle in nature correspond
to the passive principle in respect of its ultimate perfection, namely
the form; or in respect of a disposition in virtue of which it demands
the ultimate form, as in the generation of a man according to the
teaching of faith, or in all other generations according to the opinions
of Plato and Avicenna. But in nature there is no active principle of the
resurrection, neither as regards the union of the soul with the body, nor
as regards the disposition which is the demand for that union: since such
a disposition cannot be produced by nature, except in a definite way by
the process of generation from seed. Wherefore even granted a passive
potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to its
union with the soul, it is not such as to suffice for the conditions of
natural movement. Therefore the resurrection, strictly speaking, is
miraculous and not natural except in a restricted sense, as we have
explained.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Damascene is speaking of those things that are found in all
individuals and are caused by the principles of nature. For supposing by
a divine operation all men to be made white, or to be gathered together
in one place, as happened at the time of the deluge, it would not follow
that whiteness or existence in some particular place is a natural
property of man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From natural things one does not come by a demonstration of
reason to know non-natural things, but by the induction of reason one may
know something above nature, since the natural bears a certain
resemblance to the supernatural. Thus the union of soul and body
resembles the union of the soul with God by the glory of fruition, as the
Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1): and in like manner the examples, quoted by
the Apostle and Gregory, are confirmatory evidences of our faith in the
resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument regards an operation which terminates in
something that is not natural but contrary to nature. Such is not the
resurrection, and hence the argument is not to the point.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The entire operation of nature is subordinate to the Divine
operation, just as the working of a lower art is subordinate to the
working of a higher art. Hence just as all the work of a lower art has in
view an end unattainable save by the operation of the higher art that
produces the form, or makes use of what has been made by art: so the last
end which the whole expectation of nature has in view is unattainable by
the operation of nature, and for which reason the attaining thereto is
not natural.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[75] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although there can be no natural movement terminating in a
violent rest, there can be a non-natural movement terminating in a
natural rest, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the cause of our resurrection. Under this head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?
(2) Whether the sound of the trumpet is?
(3) Whether the angels are?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the resurrection of Christ is not the cause of
our resurrection. For, given the cause, the effect follows. Yet given the
resurrection of Christ the resurrection of the other dead did not follow
at once. Therefore His resurrection is not the cause of ours.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an effect cannot be unless the cause precede. But the
resurrection of the dead would be even if Christ had not risen again: for
God could have delivered man in some other way. Therefore Christ's
resurrection is not the cause of ours.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same thing produces the one effect throughout the
one same species. Now the resurrection will be common to all men. Since
then Christ's resurrection is not its own cause, it is not the cause of
the resurrection of others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, an effect retains some likeness to its cause. But the
resurrection, at least of some, namely the wicked, bears no likeness to
the resurrection of Christ. Therefore Christ's resurrection will not be
the cause of theirs.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, "In every genus that which is first is the cause of
those that come after it" (Metaph. ii, 1). Now Christ, by reason of His
bodily resurrection, is called "the first-fruits of them that sleep" (1
Cor. 15:20), and "the first-begotten of the dead" (Apoc. 1:5). Therefore
His resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Christ's resurrection has more in common with our bodily
resurrection than with our spiritual resurrection which is by
justification. But Christ's resurrection is the cause of our
justification, as appears from Rm. 4:25, where it is said that He "rose
again for our justification." Therefore Christ's resurrection is the
cause of our bodily resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Christ by reason of His nature is called the mediator of
God and men: wherefore the Divine gifts are bestowed on men by means of
Christ's humanity. Now just as we cannot be delivered from spiritual
death save by the gift of grace bestowed by God, so neither can we be
delivered from bodily death except by resurrection wrought by the Divine
power. And therefore as Christ, in respect of His human nature, received
the firstfruits of grace from above, and His grace is the cause of our
grace, because "of His fulness we all have received . . . grace for
grace" (Jn. 1:16), so in Christ has our resurrection begun, and His
resurrection is the cause of ours. Thus Christ as God is, as it were, the
equivocal cause of our resurrection, but as God and man rising again, He
is the proximate and, so to say, the univocal cause of our resurrection.
Now a univocal efficient cause produces its effect in likeness to its own
form, so that not only is it an efficient, but also an exemplar cause in
relation to that effect. This happens in two ways. For sometimes this
very form, whereby the agent is likened to its effect, is the direct
principle of the action by which the effect is produced, as heat in the
fire that heats: and sometimes it is not the form in respect of which
this likeness is observed, that is primarily and directly the principle
of that action, but the principles of that form. For instance, if a white
man beget a white man, the whiteness of the begetter is not the principle
of active generation, and yet the whiteness of the begetter is said to be
the cause of the whiteness of the begotten, because the principles of
whiteness in the begetter are the generative principles causing whiteness
in the begotten. In this way the resurrection of Christ is the cause of
our resurrection, because the same thing that wrought the resurrection of
Christ, which is the univocal efficient cause of our resurrection, is the
active cause of our resurrection, namely the power of Christ's Godhead
which is common to Him and the Father. Hence it is written (Rm. 8:11):
"He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your
mortal bodies." And this very resurrection of Christ by virtue of His
indwelling Godhead is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection:
since the Divine operations were wrought by means of Christ's flesh, as
though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene instances as an
example (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) the touch of His body whereby He healed
the leper (Mt. 8:3).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A sufficient cause produces at once its effect to which it
is immediately directed, but not the effect to which it is directed by
means of something else, no matter how sufficient it may be: thus heat,
however intense it be, does not cause heat at once in the first instant,
but it begins at once to set up a movement towards heat, because heat is
its effect by means of movement. Now Christ's resurrection is said to be
the cause of ours, in that it works our resurrection, not immediately,
but by means of its principle, namely the Divine power which will work
our resurrection in likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Now God's
power works by means of His will which is nearest to the effect; hence it
is not necessary that our resurrection should follow straightway after He
has wrought the resurrection of Christ, but that it should happen at the
time which God's will has decreed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God's power is not tied to any particular second causes,
but that He can produce their effects either immediately or by means of
other causes: thus He might work the generation of lower bodies even
though there were no movement of the heaven: and yet according to the
order which He has established in things, the movement of the heaven is
the cause of the generation of the lower bodies. In like manner according
to the order appointed to human things by Divine providence, Christ's
resurrection is the cause of ours: and yet He could have appointed
another order, and then our resurrection would have had another cause
ordained by God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument holds when all the things of one species have
the same order to the first cause of the effect to be produced in the
whole of that species. But it is not so in the case in point, because
Christ's humanity is nearer to His Godhead, Whose power is the first
cause of the resurrection, than is the humanity of others. Hence Christ's
Godhead caused His resurrection immediately, but it causes the
resurrection of others by means of Christ-man rising again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The resurrection of all men will bear some resemblance to
Christ's resurrection, as regards that which pertains to the life of
nature, in respect of which all were conformed to Christ. Hence all will
rise again to immortal life; but in the saints who were conformed to
Christ by grace, there will be conformity as to things pertaining to
glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of our resurrection?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sound of the trumpet will not be the cause
of our resurrection. For the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "Thou
must believe that the resurrection will take place by God's will, power,
and nod." Therefore since these are a sufficient cause of our
resurrection, we ought not to assign the sound of the trumpet as a cause
thereof.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is useless to make sounds to one who cannot hear. But
the dead will not have hearing. Therefore it is unfitting to make a sound
to arouse them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if any sound is the cause of the resurrection, this will
only be by a power given by God to the sound: wherefore a gloss on Ps.
67:34, "He will give to His voice the voice of power," says: "to arouse
our bodies." Now from the moment that a power is given to a thing, though
it be given miraculously, the act that ensues is natural, as instanced in
the man born blind who, after being restored to sight, saw naturally.
Therefore if a sound be the cause of resurrection, the resurrection would
be natural: which is false.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 4:15): "The Lord Himself will
come down from heaven . . . with the trumpet of God; and the dead who are
in Christ shall rise."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Jn. 5:28) that they "who are in the graves shall
hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and (Jn. 5:25) they that hear
shall live." Now this voice is called the trumpet, as stated in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Cause and effect must needs in some way be united
together, since mover and moved, maker and made, are simultaneous (Phys.
vii, 2). Now Christ rising again is the univocal cause of our
resurrection: wherefore at the resurrection of bodies, it behooves Christ
to work the resurrection at the giving of some common bodily sign.
According to some this sign will be literally Christ's voice commanding
the resurrection, even as He commanded the sea and the storm ceased (Mt.
8:26). Others say that this sign will be nothing else than the manifest
appearance of the Son of God in the world, according to the words of Mt.
24:27: "As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the
west, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be." These rely on the
authority of Gregory [*Moral. xxxi, as quoted by St. Albert the Great,
Sentent. iv, D, 42, A[4]] who says that "the sound of the trumpet is
nothing else but the Son appearing to the world as judge." According to
this, the visible presence of the Son of God is called His voice, because
as soon as He appears all nature will obey His command in restoring human
bodies: hence He is described as coming "with commandment" (1 Thess.
4:15). In this way His appearing, in so far as it has the force of a
command, is called His voice: which voice, whatever it be, is sometimes
called a cry [*Mt 25:6], as of a crier summoning to judgment; sometimes
the sound of a trumpet [*1 Cor. 15:52; 1 Thess. 4:15], either on account
of its distinctness, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), or as being
in keeping with the use of the trumpet in the Old Testament: for by the
trumpet they were summoned to the council, stirred to the battle, and
called to the feast; and those who rise again will be summoned to the
council of judgment, to the battle in which "the world shall fight . . .
against the unwise" (Wis. 5:21), and to the feast of everlasting
solemnity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In those words the Damascene touches on three things
respecting the material cause of the resurrection: to wit, the Divine
will which commands, the power which executes, and the ease of execution,
when he adds "bidding," in resemblance to our own affairs: since it is
very easy for us to do what is done at once at our word. But the ease is
much more evident, if before we say a word, our servants execute our will
at once at the first sign of our will, which sign is called a nod: and
this nod is a kind of cause of that execution, in so far as others are
led thereby to accomplish our will. And the Divine nod, at which the
resurrection will take place, is nothing but the sign given by God, which
all nature will obey by concurring in the resurrection of the dead. This
sign is the same as the sound of the trumpet, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the forms of the Sacrament have the power to sanctify,
not through being heard, but through being spoken: so this sound,
whatever it be, will have an instrumental efficacy of resuscitation, not
through being perceived, but through being uttered. Even so a sound by
the pulsation of the air arouses the sleeper, by loosing the organ of
perception, and not because it is known: since judgment about the sound
that reaches the ears is subsequent to the awakening and is not its
cause.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument would avail, if the power given to that sound
were a complete being in nature: because then that which would proceed
therefrom would have for principle a power already rendered natural. But
this power is not of that kind but such as we have ascribed above to the
forms of the Sacraments (Sent. iv, D, 1; FP, Q[62], AA[1],4).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels will do anything towards the resurrection?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels will do nothing at all towards the
resurrection. For raising the dead shows a greater power than does
begetting men. Now when men are begotten, the soul is not infused into
the body by means of the angels. Therefore neither will the resurrection,
which is reunion of soul and body, be wrought by the ministry of the
angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if this is to be ascribed to the instrumentality of any
angels at all, it would seem especially referable to the virtues, to whom
it belongs to work miracles. Yet it is referred, not to them, but to the
archangels, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore the
resurrection will not be wrought by the ministry of the angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated (1 Thess. 4:15) that "the Lord . . . shall
come down from heaven . . . with the voice of an archangel . . . and the
dead shall rise again." Therefore the resurrection of the dead will be
accomplished by the angelic ministry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "just as the
grosser and inferior bodies are ruled in a certain order by the more
subtle and more powerful bodies, so are all bodies ruled by God by the
rational spirit of life": and Gregory speaks in the same sense (Dial. iv,
6). Consequently in all God's bodily works, He employs the ministry of
the angels. Now in the resurrection there is something pertaining to the
transmutation of the bodies, to wit the gathering together of the mortal
remains and the disposal thereof for the restoration of the human body;
wherefore in this respect God will employ the ministry of the angels in
the resurrection. But the soul, even as it is immediately created by God,
so will it be reunited to the body immediately by God without any
operation of the angels: and in like manner He Himself will glorify the
body without the ministry of the angels, just as He immediately glorifies
man's soul. This ministry of the angels is called their voice, according
to one explanation given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been
said.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[76] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This ministry will be exercised chiefly by one Archangel,
namely Michael, who is the prince of the Church as he was of the
Synagogue (Dan. 10:13,21). Yet he will act under the influence of the
Virtues and the other higher orders: so that what he shall do, the higher
orders will, in a way, do also. In like manner the lower angels will
co-operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual to whose
guardianship they were appointed: so that this voice can be ascribed
either to one or to many angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the end
of the world?
(2) Whether that time is hidden?
(3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time?
(4) Whether it will happen suddenly?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of
the world?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not to be
delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together. For
there is more conformity between head and members than between one member
and another, as there is more between cause and effect than between one
effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head, did not delay His
resurrection until the end of the world, so as to rise again together
with all men. Therefore there is no need for the resurrection of the
early saints to be deferred until the end of the world, so that they may
rise again together with the others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the resurrection of the Head is the cause of the
resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of certain members that
desire nobility from their being closely connected with the Head was not
delayed till the end of the world, but followed immediately after
Christ's resurrection, as is piously believed concerning the Blessed
Virgin and John the Evangelist [*Ep. de Assump. B.V., cap. ii, among St.
Jerome's works]. Therefore the resurrection of others will be so much
nearer Christ's resurrection, according as they have been more conformed
to Him by grace and merit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the state of the New Testament is more perfect, and
bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the state of the Old
Testament. Yet some of the fathers of the Old Testament rose again when
Christ rose, according to Mt. 27:52: "Many of the bodies of the saints,
that had slept, arose." Therefore it would seem that the resurrection of
the Old Testament saints should not be delayed till the end of the world,
so that all may rise together.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, there will be no numbering of years after the end of the
world. Yet after the resurrection of the dead, the years are still
reckoned until the resurrection of others, as appears from Apoc. 20:4,5.
For it is stated there that "I saw . . . the souls of them that were
beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God," and
further on: "And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years."
And "the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were
finished." Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed until the end
of the world, that all may rise together.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:12): "Man when he is fallen
asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken, he shall not
wake, nor rise out of his sleep," and it is a question of the sleep of
death. Therefore the resurrection of men will be delayed until the end of
the world when the heavens shall be broken.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Heb. 11:39): "All these being approved by the
testimony of faith received not the promise," i.e. full beatitude of soul
and body, since "God has provided something better for us, lest they
should be consummated," i.e. perfected, "without us---in order that," as
a gloss observes, "through all rejoicing each one might rejoice the
more." But the resurrection will not precede the glorification of bodies,
because "He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of
His glory" (Phil. 3:21), and the children of the resurrection will be "as
the angels . . . in heaven" (Mt. 22:30). Therefore the resurrection will
be delayed till the end of the world, when all shall rise together.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 4) "Divine providence
decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should be ruled in a certain
order by the more subtle and powerful bodies": wherefore the entire
matter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according to the
movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would be contrary to the order
established in things by Divine providence if the matter of lower bodies
were brought to the state of incorruption, so long as there remains
movement in the higher bodies. And since, according to the teaching of
faith, the resurrection will bring men to immortal life conformably to
Christ Who "rising again from the dead dieth now no more" (Rm. 6:9), the
resurrection of human bodies will be delayed until the end of the world
when the heavenly movement will cease. For this reason, too, certain
philosophers, who held that the movement of the heavens will never cease,
maintained that human souls will return to mortal bodies such as we have
now---whether, as Empedocles, they stated that the soul would return to
the same body at the end of the great year, or that it would return to
another body; thus Pythagoras asserted that "any soul will enter any
body," as stated in De Anima i, 3.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the head is more conformed to the members by
conformity of proportion (which is requisite in order that it have
influence over the members) than one member is to another, yet the head
has a certain causality over the members which the members have not; and
in this the members differ from the head and agree with one another.
Hence Christ's resurrection is an exemplar of ours, and through our faith
therein there arises in us the hope of our own resurrection. But the
resurrection of one of Christ's members is not the cause of the
resurrection of other members, and consequently Christ's resurrection had
to precede the resurrection of others who have all to rise again at the
consummation of the world.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although among the members some rank higher than others and
are more conformed to the Head, they do not attain to the character of
headship so as to be the cause of others. Consequently greater conformity
to Christ does not give them a right to rise again before others as
though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as we have said in
reference to Christ's resurrection: and if it has been granted to others
that their resurrection should not be delayed until the general
resurrection, this has been by special privilege of grace, and not as due
on account of conformity to Christ.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ep. x ad Paul. et
Eustoch., now recognized as spurious], seems to be doubtful of this
resurrection of the saints with Christ, namely as to whether, having been
witnesses to the resurrection, they died again, so that theirs was a
resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died again) rather than a
resurrection such as will be at the end of the world---or really rose
again to immortal life, to live for ever in the body, and to ascend
bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says on Mt. 27:52. The latter
seems more probable, because, as Jerome says, in order that they might
bear true witness to Christ's true resurrection, it was fitting that they
should truly rise again. Nor was their resurrection hastened for their
sake, but for the sake of bearing witness to Christ's resurrection: and
that by bearing witness thereto they might lay the foundation of the
faith of the New Testament: wherefore it was more fitting that it should
be borne by the fathers of the Old Testament, than by those who died
after the foundation of the New. It must, however, be observed that,
although the Gospel mentions their resurrection before Christ's, we must
take this statement as made in anticipation, as is often the case with
writers of history. For none rose again with a true resurrection before
Christ, since He is the "first-fruits of them that sleep" (1 Cor. 15:20),
although some were resuscitated before Christ's resurrection, as in the
case of Lazarus.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: On account of these words, as Augustine relates (De Civ.
Dei xx, 7), certain heretics asserted that there will be a first
resurrection of the dead that they may reign with Christ on earth for a
thousand years; whence they were called "chiliasts" or "millenarians."
Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 7) that these words are to be
understood otherwise, namely of the spiritual resurrection, whereby men
shall rise again from their sins to the gift of grace: while the second
resurrection is of bodies. The reign of Christ denotes the Church wherein
not only martyrs but also the other elect reign, the part denoting the
whole; or they reign with Christ in glory as regards all, special mention
being made of the martyrs, because they especially reign after death who
fought for the truth, even unto death. The number of a thousand years
denotes not a fixed number, but the whole of the present time wherein the
saints now reign with Christ, because the number 1,000 designates
universality more than the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10,
whereas 1,000 is a cube resulting from the multiplication of ten by its
square, for 10 X 10 = 100, and 100 X 10 = 1,000. Again in Ps. 104:8, "The
word which He commanded to a thousand," i.e. all, "generations."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when we know
exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly, since "all
things are measured by a certain period" (De Generat. ii). Now the
beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its end can also be
known exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection and
judgment. Therefore that time is not hidden.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is stated (Apoc. 12:6) that "the woman who represents
the Church had a place prepared by God, that there she might feed [Vulg.:
'they should feed her'] a thousand two hundred sixty days." Again (Dan.
12:11), a certain fixed number of days is mentioned, which apparently
signify years, according to Ezech. 4:6: "A day for a year, yea a day for
a year I have appointed to thee." Therefore the time of the end of the
world and of the resurrection can be known exactly from Holy Writ.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the state of the New Testament was foreshadowed in the
Old Testament. Now we know exactly the time wherein the state of the Old
Testament endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time wherein
the state of the New Testament will endure. But the state of the New
Testament will last to the end of the world, wherefore it is said (Mt.
28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . to the consummation of the world."
Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be
known exactly.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, That which is unknown to the angels will be much more
unknown to men: because those things to which men attain by natural
reason are much more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their
natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made to men save by means
of the angels as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. iv). Now the angels have
no exact knowledge of that time, as appears from Mt. 24:36: "Of that day
and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of heaven." Therefore that
time is hidden from men.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the apostles were more cognizant of God's secrets than others
who followed them, because they had "the first-fruits of the spirit" (Rm.
8:23)---" before others in point of time and more abundantly," as a gloss
observes. And yet when they questioned our Lord about this very matter,
He answered them (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the times or
moments which the Father hath put in His own power." Much more,
therefore, is it hidden from others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 58) "as to the last
age of the human race, which begins from our Lord's coming and lasts
until the end of the world, it is uncertain of how many generations it
will consist: even so old age, which is man's last age, has no fixed time
according to the measure of the other ages, since sometimes alone it
lasts as long a time as all the others." The reason of this is because
the exact length of future time cannot be known except either by
revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection
cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the
end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous as stated above (A[1]).
And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to happen at a fixed
time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible from the movement of
the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is circular, it is for this
very reason able by its nature to endure for ever: and consequently the
time between this and the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural
reason. Again it cannot be known by revelation, so that all may be on the
watch and ready to meet Christ: and for this reason when the apostles
asked Him about this, Christ answered (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to
know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power,"
whereby, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53): "He scatters the
fingers of all calculators and bids them be still." For what He refused
to tell the apostles, He will not reveal to others: wherefore all those
who have been misled to reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to
be untruthful; for some, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53),
stated that from our Lord's Ascension to His last coming 400 years would
elapse, others 500, others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is
evident, as will likewise be the falseness of those who even now cease
not to calculate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When we know a thing's beginning and also its end it
follows that its measure is known to us: wherefore if we know the
beginning of a thing the duration of which is measured by the movement of
the heaven, we are able to know its end, since the movement of heaven is
known to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly movement is
God's ordinance alone, which is unknown to us. Wherefore however much we
may know its beginning, we are unable to know its end.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in the
Apocalypse (12:6) denote all the time during which the Church endures,
and not any definite number of years. The reason whereof is because the
preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted three years and a
half, which time contains almost an equal number of days as the aforesaid
number. Again the number of days appointed by Daniel does not refer to a
number of years to elapse before the end of the world or until the
preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of Antichrist's preaching and
the duration of his persecution.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the state of the New Testament in general is
foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testament it does not follow that
individuals correspond to individuals: especially since all the figures
of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence Augustine (De Civ.
Dei xviii, 52) answers certain persons who wished to liken the number of
persecutions suffered by the Church to the number of the plagues of
Egypt, in these words: "I do not think that the occurrences in Egypt were
in their signification prophetic of these persecutions, although those
who think so have shown nicety and ingenuity in adapting them severally
the one to the other, not indeed by a prophetic spirit, but by the
guess-work of the human mind, which sometimes reaches the truth and
sometimes not." The same remarks would seem applicable to the statements
of Abbot Joachim, who by means of such conjectures about the future
foretold some things that were true, and in others was deceived.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be at night-time.
For the resurrection will not be "till the heavens be broken" (Job
14:12). Now when the heavenly movement ceases, which is signified by its
breaking, there will be no time, neither night nor day. Therefore the
resurrection will not be at night-time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the end of a thing ought to be most perfect. Now the end
of time will be then: wherefore it is said (Apoc. 10:6) that "time shall
be no longer." Therefore time ought to be then in its most perfect
disposition and consequently it should be the daytime.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the time should be such as to be adapted to what is done
therein: wherefore (Jn. 13:30) the night is mentioned as being the time
when Judas went out from the fellowship of the light. Now, all things
that are hidden at the present time will then be made most manifest,
because when the Lord shall come He "will bring to light the hidden
things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts" (1
Cor. 4:5). Therefore it ought to be during the day.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Now
Christ's resurrection was at night, as Gregory says in a homily for
Easter (xxi in Evang.). Therefore our resurrection will also be at
night-time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the coming of our Lord is compared to the coming of a thief
into the house (Lk. 12:39,40). But the thief comes to the house at
night-time. Therefore our Lord will also come in the night. Now, when He
comes the resurrection will take place, as stated above (Q[76], A[2]).
Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will be
cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43).
Nevertheless some assert with sufficient probability that it will be
towards the twilight, the moon being in the east and the sun in the west;
because the sun and moon are believed to have been created in these
positions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether completed by
their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said that Christ arose at
such an hour.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When the resurrection occurs, it will not be time but the
end of time; because at the very instant that the heavens will cease to
move the dead will rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be in the same
position as they occupy now at any fixed hour: and accordingly it is said
that the resurrection will be at this or that hour.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The most perfect disposition of time is said to be midday,
on account of the light given by the sun. But then the city of God will
need neither sun nor moon, because the glory of God will enlighten it
(Apoc. 22:5). Wherefore in this respect it matters not whether the
resurrection be in the day or in the night.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That time should be adapted to manifestation as regards the
things that will happen then, and to secrecy as regards the fixing of the
time. Hence either may happen fittingly, namely that the resurrection be
in the day or in the night.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not happen suddenly but
by degrees. For the resurrection of the dead is foretold (Ezech. 37:7,8)
where it is written: "The bones came together . . . and I saw and behold
the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin was stretched
out over them, but there was no spirit in them." Therefore the
restoration of the bodies will precede in time their reunion with the
souls, and thus the resurrection will not be sudden.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing does not happen suddenly if it require several
actions following one another. Now the resurrection requires several
actions following one another, namely the gathering of the ashes, the
refashioning of the body, the infusion of the soul. Therefore the
resurrection will not be sudden.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all sound is measured by time. Now the sound of the
trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection, as stated above (Q[76],
A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will take time and will not happen
suddenly.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no local movement can be sudden as stated in De Sensu et
Sensato vii. Now the resurrection requires local movement in the
gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:51,52): "We shall all indeed
rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." Therefore the
resurrection will be sudden.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, infinite power works suddenly. But the Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iv): "Thou shalt believe in the resurrection to be wrought by the
power of God," and it is evident that this is infinite. Therefore the
resurrection will be sudden.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, At the resurrection something will be done by the
ministry of the angels, and something immediately by the power of God, as
stated above (Q[76], A[3]). Accordingly that which is done by the
ministry of the angels, will not be instantaneous, if by instant we mean
an indivisible point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by instant
we mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done immediately by
God's power will happen suddenly, namely at the end of the time wherein
the work of the angels will be done, because the higher power brings the
lower to perfection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Ezechiel spoke, like Moses to a rough people, and
therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days, in
order that the uncultured people might be able to understand, although
all things were made together according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv),
so Ezechiel expressed the various things that will happen in the
resurrection, although they will all happen together in an instant.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although these actions follow one another in nature, they
are all together in time: because either they are together in the same
instant, or one is in the instant that terminates the other.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: The same would seem to apply to that sound as to the forms of the
sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect in its last
instant.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[77] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The gathering of the ashes which cannot be without local
movement will be done by the ministry of the angels. Hence it will be in
time though imperceptible on account of the facility of operation which
is competent to the angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE TERM "WHEREFROM" OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection; and under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether death is the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in every
case?
(2) Whether ashes are, or dust?
(3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether death will be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all
cases?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that death will not be the term "wherefrom" of the
resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but shall be
clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord "will
come to judge the living and the dead." Now this cannot refer to the time
of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this distinction
must refer to the previous time, and consequently all will not die before
the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a natural and common desire cannot be empty and vain,
but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:4)
it is a common desire that "we would not be unclothed but clothed upon."
Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped of the body by
death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cxv) that the four last
petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present life: and one of them
is: "Forgive us our debts [Douay: 'trespasses']." Therefore the Church
prays that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the Church's
prayer cannot be void and not granted: "If you ask the Father anything in
My name, He will give it you" (Jn. 16:23). Therefore at some time of this
life the Church will receive the remission of all debts: and one of the
debts to which we are bound by the sin of our first parent is that we be
born in original sin. Therefore at some time God will grant to the Church
that men be born without original sin. But death is the punishment of
original sin. Therefore at the end of the world there will be some men
who will not die: and so the same conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the wise man should always choose the shortest way. Now
the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living to be
transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them to
die first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality. Therefore
God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who shall be
found living.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:36): "That which thou sowest
is not quickened except it die first," and he is speaking of the
resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:22): "As in Adam all die, so also in
Christ all shall be made alive." Now all shall be made alive in Christ.
Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from death.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may be
seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). However, the safer and more common
opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and this for
three reasons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine justice,
which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent, that all
who by the act of nature derive their origin from him should contract the
stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors of death.
Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture which
foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not predicted
properly except of that "which has fallen and perished," as the Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iv). Thirdly, because it is more in harmony with the
order of nature where we find that what is corrupted and decayed is not
renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar does not become wine
unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the juice of the grape.
Wherefore since human nature has incurred the defect of the necessity of
death, it cannot return to immortality save by means of death. It is also
in keeping with the order of nature for another reason, because, as it is
stated in Phys. viii, 1, "the movement of heaven is as a kind of life to
all existing in nature," just as the movement of the heart is a kind of
life of the whole body: wherefore even as all the members become dead on
the heart ceasing to move, so when the heavenly movement ceases nothing
can remain living with that life which was sustained by the influence of
that movement. Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore
it follows that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven
comes to a standstill must depart from this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This distinction of the dead and the living does not apply
to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole preceding time,
since all who are to be judged were living at some time, and dead at some
time: but it applies to that particular time which shall precede the
judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs of the judgment shall begin
to appear.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void; but
nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the desire
whereby we would not be "unclothed," but "clothed upon," namely if that
be possible: and this desire is called by some a "velleity."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ is
conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived
without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by
Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men [*See
Editor's note which follows TP, Q[26]]. Nor can it be said that they
needed not this redemption, because it was granted to them that they
should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was vouchsafed---either
to their parents, that the sin of nature might be healed in them (because
so long as that sin remained they were unable to beget without
communicating original sin)---or to nature itself which was healed. Now
we must allow that every one needs the redemption of Christ personally,
and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot be delivered from an
evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil:
and consequently all could not reap in themselves the fruit of the
Lord's prayer, unless all were born debtors and subject to evil. Hence
the forgiveness of debts or delivery from evil cannot be applied to one
who is born without a debt or free from evil, but only to one who is born
with a debt and is afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does
it follow, if it can be asserted without error that some die not, that
they are born without original sin, although death is a punishment of
original sin; because God can of His mercy remit the punishment which one
has incurred by a past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without
punishment (Jn. 8): and in like manner He can deliver from death those
who have contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And
thus it does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born
without original sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The shortest way is not always the one to be chosen, but
only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the end. It is not
so here, as is clear from what we have said.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all will rise again from ashes?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For
Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was
not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to Ps. 15:10;
Acts 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing cannot
be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all will rise
again from ashes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes
immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death,
according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found
living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the term "wherefrom" corresponds to the term "whereto."
Now the term "whereto" of the resurrection is not the same in the good as
in the wicked: "We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be
changed" (1 Cor. 15:51). Therefore the term "wherefrom" is not the same.
And thus, if the wicked rise again from ashes, the good will not rise
again from ashes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rm. 5:10, "For if when we were
enemies"): "All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence:
Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go." Now all who shall rise
again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at
their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb.
Therefore all will rise again from ashes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly
belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all
bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown (A[1]) that all
rise again from death prove also that at the general resurrection all
will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such as the hastening of
their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special
privilege of grace. For just as holy writ foretells the resurrection, so
does it foretell the reformation of bodies (Phil. 3:21). And thus it
follows that even as all die that the bodies of all may be able truly to
rise again, so will the bodies of all perish that they may be able to be
reformed. For just as death was inflicted by Divine justice as a
punishment on man, so was the decay of the body, as appears from Gn.
3:19, "Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go [*Vulg.: 'Dust thou
art and into dust thou shalt return']."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the
union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even as
vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it first be
dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the elements is
both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and when this
ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure elements.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as to the
term "whereto," but not as to the term "wherefrom."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By ashes we mean all the remains that are left after the
dissolution of the body---for two reasons. First, because it was the
common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead, and to keep
the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the remains of a human
body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of dissolution, which is
the flame of the fomes [*Cf. FS, Q[82], A[3]] whereby the human body is
radically infected. Hence, in order to be cleansed of this infection the
human body must needs be dissolved into its primary components: and when
a thing is destroyed by fire it is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore
the name of ashes is given to those things into which the human body is
dissolved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth will be
able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will be found
living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their prejacent
matter.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Movement does not take its species from its term
"wherefrom" but from its term "whereto." Hence the resurrection of the
saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection of
the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term "whereto,"
and not in respect of the term "wherefrom." And it often happens that the
term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term "wherefrom" is the
same---for instance, a thing may be moved from blackness to whiteness and
to pallor.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any
natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the ashes from which the human body will be
restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which will be
united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the soul, they
would stand in the same relation to that soul as other ashes. Therefore
it would make no difference whether the body that is to be united to that
soul were restored from those ashes or from others: and this is false.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the soul on
the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still somewhat
dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is retarded on
account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii).
Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from the soul, a
natural inclination towards that soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Job 20:11): "His bones shall be filled
with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in the dust."
But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still remain in
those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into the very elements,
or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements are
homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since then in
the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural
inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards
the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The
first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine
(Enchiridion lxxxviii): "The human body, although changed into the
substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has
become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will in
an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, making it a
living and growing man."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural agent:
else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid ashes cannot be
reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore there is not in
them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that the
human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there always
remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which gives a
natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in
contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as
with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries can
be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that these
parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved retain more
light, through having been united to the soul, and for this reason have a
natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical, since
the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an equal share
of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that in those ashes
there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the ordering
of Divine providence, which decreed that those ashes should be reunited
to the soul: it is on this account that those parts of the elements shall
be reunited and not others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The soul separated from the body remains in the same nature
that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the body, and
consequently the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[78] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These words of Job do not mean that the vices actually
remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain according to the
ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are destined to the
restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for the sins
committed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY
(THREE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise
again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern the good and
wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those which
concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked in
common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality: and we
shall inquire (1) about their identity; (2) about their integrity; (3)
about their quality.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same?
(2) Whether it will be the self-same man?
(3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the
same parts in which they were before?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same
identical body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the same
identical body at the resurrection, for "thou sowest not the body that
shall be, but bare grain" (1 Cor. 15:37). Now the Apostle is there
comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore the
same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to every form some matter is adapted according to its
condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now the body is
compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to agent. Since
then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same condition as
now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the heavenly life to
which it adhered while living in the world, or will be cast down into the
life of the brutes if it lived as a brute in this world) it would seem
that it will not resume the same body, but either a heavenly or a brutish
body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, after death, as stated above (Q[78], A[3]), the human
body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental parts into which
the human body has been dissolved do not agree with the human body
dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as any other
elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body were to be
formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be described as
identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the self-same body if
it be restored from these parts.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, there cannot be numerical identity where there is
numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the mixed body,
which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its form,
cannot be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will not be
identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which passes away
into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This is clear from
the fact that there cannot be identity where there is distinction of
existence: and existence, which is the act of a being, is differentiated
by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now the form of a mixed
body passes away into complete nonentity by death, since it is a bodily
form, and so also do the contrary qualities from which the mixture
results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not return in identity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see God
my Saviour [Vulg.: 'my God']," where he is speaking of the vision after
the resurrection, as appears from the preceding words: "In the last day I
shall rise out of the earth." Therefore the selfsame body will rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 27): "Resurrection is the
second rising of that which has fallen." But the body which we have now
fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, on this point the philosophers erred and certain modern
heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated
from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways.
First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to be
naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as to
the body to which it was reunited, for they held that this second union
was not with the selfsame body that was laid aside in death, but with
another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species. Of a
different species when the soul while existing in the body had led a life
contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after death from
the body of a man into the body of some other animal to whose manner of
living it had conformed in this life, for instance into the body of a dog
on account of lust, into the body of a lion on account of robbery and
violence, and so forth---and into a body of the same species when the
soul has led a good life in the body, and having after death experienced
some happiness, after some centuries began to wish to return to the body;
and thus it was reunited to a human body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that
they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form to
matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved, [*Cf. FP,
Q[76], A[1]] or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was possible for them
to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being infused into the body
begotten of natural generation, as also that it is united to various
bodies. The second is that they held intellect not to differ from sense
except accidentally, so that man would be said to surpass other animals
in intelligence, because the sensitive power is more acute in him on
account of the excellence of his bodily complexion; and hence it was
possible for them to assert that man's soul passes into the soul of a
brute animal, especially when the human soul has been habituated to
brutish actions. But these two sources are refuted by the Philosopher (De
Anima ii, 1), and in consequence of these being refuted, it is clear that
the above opinion is false.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them
fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held
that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle as
the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople, in
his exposition of Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc.
Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that
they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by Holy
Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to the
same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same thing
rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which after
death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And
consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will
not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A comparison does not apply to every particular, but to
some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain that is
born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition, since it
was first sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the body will
rise again identically the same, but of a different condition, since it
was mortal and will rise in immortality.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The soul rising again and the soul living in this world
differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which is an
accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising again
differs, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference of
bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which is understood as though it were in matter
before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when that
which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet remain.
Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Physics and in De
Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things subject to generation and
corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions, by reason of
which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive various forms in
its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of the substantial form
from matter, these dimensions still remain the same: and consequently the
matter existing under those dimensions, whatever form it receive, is more
identified with that which was generated from it, than any other part of
matter existing under any form whatever. Thus the matter that will be
brought back to restore the human body will be the same as that body's
previous matter.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Even as a simple quality is not the substantial form of an
element, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby its matter
is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a mixed body, which
form is a quality resulting from simple qualities reduced to a mean, is
not the substantial form of the mixed body, but its proper accident, and
the disposition whereby the matter is in need of the form. Now the human
body has no substantial form besides this form of the mixed body, except
the rational soul, for if it had any previous substantial form, this
would give it substantial being, and would establish it in the genus of
substance: so that the soul would be united to a body already established
in the genus of substance, and thus the soul would be compared to the
body as artificial forms are to their matter, in respect of their being
established in the genus of substance by their matter. Hence the union of
the soul to the body would be accidental, which is the error of the
ancient philosophers refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2 [*Cf. FP,
Q[76], A[1]]). It would also follow that the human body and each of its
parts would not retain their former names in the same sense, which is
contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). Therefore
since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body
falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental forms
does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame body will
rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated in a previous
reply (ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it will not be identically the same man that
shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii):
"Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not
repeated identically." Now such is man's substance in his present state.
Therefore after the change wrought by death the self-same man cannot be
repeated .
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, where there is a distinction of human nature there is
not the same identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are two men and
not one man, since each has his own distinct human nature. Now the human
nature of one who rises again is distinct from that which he has now.
Therefore he is not the same identical man. The minor can be proved in
two ways. First, because human nature which is the form of the whole is
not both form and substance as the soul is, but is a form only. Now such
like forms pass away into complete nonentity, and consequently they
cannot be restored. Secondly, because human nature results from union of
parts. Now the same identical union as that which was heretofore cannot
be resumed, because repetition is opposed to identity, since repetition
implies number, whereas identity implies unity, and these are
incompatible with one another. But resurrection is a repeated union:
therefore the union is not the same, and consequently there is not the
same human nature nor the same man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one same man is not several animals: wherefore if it is
not the same animal it is not the same identical man. Now where sense is
not the same, there is not the same animal, since animal is defined from
the primary sense, namely touch. But sense, as it does not remain in the
separated soul (as some maintain), cannot be resumed in identity.
Therefore the man who rises again will not be the same identical animal,
and consequently he will not be the same man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the matter of a statue ranks higher in the statue than
the matter of a man does in man: because artificial things belong to the
genus of substance by reason of their matter, but natural things by
reason of their form, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 1), and
again from the Commentator (De Anima ii). But if a statue is remade from
the same brass, it will not be the same identically. Therefore much less
will it be identically the same man if he be reformed from the same ashes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:27): "Whom I myself shall see . .
and not another," and he is speaking of the vision after the
resurrection. Therefore the same identical man will rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 5) that "to rise again is naught
else but to live again." Now unless the same identical man that died
return to life, he would not be said to live again. Therefore he would
not rise again, which is contrary to faith.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The necessity of holding the resurrection arises from
this---that man may obtain the last end for which he was made; for this
cannot be accomplished in this life, nor in the life of the separated
soul, as stated above (Q[75], AA[1],2): otherwise man would have been
made in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was made.
And since it behooves the end to be obtained by the selfsame thing that
was made for that end, lest it appear to be made without purpose, it is
necessary for the selfsame man to rise again; and this is effected by the
selfsame soul being united to the selfsame body. For otherwise there
would be no resurrection properly speaking, if the same man were not
reformed. Hence to maintain that he who rises again is not the selfsame
man is heretical, since it is contrary to the truth of Scripture which
proclaims the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by movement or
natural change. For he shows the difference between the recurrence that
occurs in generation and corruption and that which is observed in the
movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven by local movement
returns to the beginning of its movement, since it has a moved
incorruptible substance. On the other hand, things subject to generation
and corruption return by generation to specific but not numerical
identity, because from man blood is engendered, from blood seed, and so
on until a man is begotten, not the selfsame man, but the man
specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from air water, from
water earth, whence fire is produced, not the selfsame fire, but the same
in species. Hence it is clear that the argument, so far as the meaning of
the Philosopher is concerned, is not to the point.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation
and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain
after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul.
For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the being
which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share that
being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and the being of
the soul in the body are not distinct from one another, otherwise the
union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently there has been
no interruption in the substantial being of man, as would make it
impossible for the self-same man to return on account of an interruption
in his being, as is the case with other things that are corrupted, the
being of which is interrupted altogether, since their form remains not,
and their matter remains under another being.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
Nevertheless neither does the self-same man recur by natural generation,
because the body of the man begotten is not composed of the whole body of
his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct, and consequently
his soul and the whole man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/4
Reply OBJ 2: There are two opinions about humanity and about any form of
a whole. For some say that the form of the whole and the form of the part
are really one and the same: but that it is called the form of the part
inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and the form of the whole inasmuch as
the whole specific nature results therefrom. According to this opinion
humanity is really nothing else than the rational soul: and so, since the
selfsame rational soul is resumed, there will be the same identical
humanity, which will remain even after death, albeit not under the aspect
of humanity, because the composite does not derive the specific nature
from a separated humanity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/4
The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna's,
according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of a part only,
nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole
resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing both within
itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or quiddity. Since
then at the resurrection there will be the selfsame body, and the
selfsame rational soul, there will be, of necessity, the same humanity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 3/4
The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity
was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct form
supervening form and matter; which is false.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 4/4
The second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because
union implies action or passion, and though there be a different union,
this cannot prevent the identity of humanity, because the action and
passion from which humanity resulted are not of the essence of humanity,
wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a distinction of
humanity: for it is clear that generation and resurrection are not the
self-same movement. Yet the identity of the rising man with the begotten
man is not hindered for this reason: and in like manner neither is the
identity of humanity prevented if we take union for the relation itself:
because this relation is not essential to but concomitant with humanity,
since humanity is not one of those forms that are composition or order
(Phys. ii, 1), as are the forms of things produced by art, so that if
there be another distinct composition there is another distinct form of a
house.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: This argument affords a very good proof against those who
held a distinction between the sensitive and rational souls in man:
because in that case the sensitive soul in man would not be
incorruptible, as neither is it in other animals; and consequently in the
resurrection there would not be the same sensitive soul, and consequently
neither the same animal nor the same man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both
rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this
question, because animal is defined from sense, i.e. the sensitive soul
as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i.e. the sensitive power,
we know its definition as from an accidental form "that contributes more
than another to our knowledge of the quiddity" (De Anima i, 1).
Accordingly after death there remains the sensitive soul, even as the
rational soul, according to its substance: whereas the sensitive powers,
according to some, do not remain. And since these powers are accidental
properties, diversity on their part cannot prevent the identity of the
whole animal, not even of the animal's parts: nor are powers to be called
perfections or acts of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in
fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A statue may be considered in two ways, either as a
particular substance, or as something artificial. And since it is placed
in the genus of substance by reason of its matter, it follows that if we
consider it as a particular substance, it is the selfsame statue that is
remade from the same matter. On the other hand, it is placed in the genus
of artificial things inasmuch as it has an accidental form which, if the
statue be destroyed, passes away also. Consequently it does not return
identically the same, nor can the statue be identically the same. But
man's form, namely the soul, remains after the body has perished:
wherefore the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by the resurrection,
return to the same parts of the body that were dissolved into them?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem necessary for the ashes of the human body to
return, by the resurrection, to the same parts that were dissolved into
them. For, according to the Philosopher, "as the whole soul is to the
whole body, so is a part of the soul to a part of the body, as sight to
the pupil" (De Anima ii, 1). Now it is necessary that after the
resurrection the body be resumed by the same soul. Therefore it is also
necessary for the same parts of the body to return to the same limbs, in
which they were perfected by the same parts of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, difference of matter causes difference of identity. But
if the ashes return not to the same parts, each part will not be remade
from the same matter of which it consisted before. Therefore they will
not be the same identically. Now if the parts are different the whole
will also be different, since parts are to the whole as matter is to form
(Phys. ii, 3). Therefore it will not be the self-same man; which is
contrary to the truth of the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the resurrection is directed to the end that man may
receive the meed of his works. Now different parts of the body are
employed in different works, whether of merit or of demerit. Therefore at
the resurrection each part must needs return to its former state that it
may be rewarded in due measure.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Artificial things are more dependent on their matter
than natural things. Now in artificial things, in order that the same
artificial thing be remade, from the same matter, there is no need for
the parts to be brought back to the same position. Neither therefore is
it necessary in man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, change of an accident does not cause a change of identity. Now
the situation of parts is an accident. Therefore its change in a man does
not cause a change of identity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In this question it makes a difference whether we ask
what can be done without prejudice to identity, and what will be done for
the sake of congruity. As regards the first it must be observed that in
man we may speak of parts in two ways: first as of the various parts of a
homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh, or the
various parts of bone; secondly, as of various parts of various species
of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone and flesh. Accordingly if it
be said that one part of matter will return to another part of the same
species, this causes no change except in the position of the parts: and
change of position of parts does not change the species in homogeneous
wholes: and so if the matter of one part return to another part, this is
nowise prejudicial to the identity of the whole. Thus is it in the
example given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44), because a statue, after
being remade, is identically the same, not as to its form, but as to its
matter, in respect of which it is a particular substance, and in this way
a statue is homogeneous, although it is not according to its artificial
form. But if it be said that the matter of one part returns to another
part of another species, it follows of necessity that there is a change
not only in the position of parts, but also in their identity: yet so
that the whole matter, or something belonging to the truth of human
nature in one is transferred to another. but not if what was superfluous
in one part is transferred to another. Now the identity of parts being
taken away, the identity of the whole is removed, if we speak of
essential parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts, such as hair
and nails, to which apparently Augustine refers (De Civ. Dei xxii). It is
thus clear how the transference of matter from one part of another
destroys the identity, and how it does not.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts
will retain their position at the resurrection, especially as regards the
essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the
accidental parts, such as nails and hair.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers organic or heterogeneous parts, but
no homogeneous or like parts.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A change in the position of the parts of matter does not
cause a change of identity, although difference of matter does.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[79] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Operation, properly speaking, is not ascribed to the part
but to the whole, wherefore the reward is due, not to the part but to the
whole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection.
Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein?
(2) Whether the hair and nails will?
(3) Whether the humors will?
(4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human
nature will rise again?
(5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the members of the human body will rise again?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all the members of the human body will
rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair the
means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing useless
is done in the Divine works, and since the use of certain members is not
fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the use of the genital
members, for then they "shall neither marry, nor be married" (Mt. 22:30),
it would seem that not all the members shall rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the entrails are members: and yet they will not rise
again. For they can neither rise full, since thus they contain
impurities, nor empty, since nothing is empty in nature. Therefore the
members shall not all rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the body shall rise again that it may be rewarded for
the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a thief
has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is
saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any good deed,
since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since the
punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of man.
Therefore the members will not all rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The other members belong more to the truth of human
nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the
resurrection according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 4). Much more therefore
does this apply to the other members.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, "The works of God are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). But the resurrection
will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade perfect in all his
members.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated in De Anima ii, 4, "the soul stands in relation
to the body not only as its form and end, but also as efficient cause."
For the soul is compared to the body as art to the thing made by art, as
the Philosopher says (De Anim. Gener. ii, 4), and whatever is shown forth
explicitly in the product of art is all contained implicitly and
originally in the art. In like manner whatever appears in the parts of
the body is all contained originally and, in a way, implicitly in the
soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not be perfect, if its
product lacked any of the things contained in the art, so neither could
man be perfect, unless the whole that is contained enfolded in the soul
be outwardly unfolded in the body, nor would the body correspond in full
proportion to the soul. Since then at the resurrection it behooves man's
body to correspond entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again
except according to the relation it bears to the rational soul, it
follows that man also must rise again perfect, seeing that he is thereby
repaired in order that he may obtain his ultimate perfection.
Consequently all the members that are now in man's body must needs be
restored at the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The members may be considered in two ways in relation to
the soul: either according to the relation of matter to form, or
according to the relation of instrument to agent, since "the whole body
is compared to the whole soul in the same way as one part is to another"
(De Anima ii, 1). If then the members be considered in the light of the
first relationship, their end is not operation, but rather the perfect
being of the species, and this is also required after the resurrection:
but if they be considered in the light of the second relationship, then
their end is operation. And yet it does not follow that when the
operation fails the instrument is useless, because an instrument serves
not only to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show its
virtue. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue of the soul's powers to
be shown in their bodily instruments, even though they never proceed to
action, so that the wisdom of God be thereby glorified.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The entrails will rise again in the body even as the other
members: and they will be filled not with vile superfluities but with
goodly humors.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The acts whereby we merit are not the acts, properly
speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man; even as the work of art
is ascribed not to the instrument but to the craftsman. Therefore though
the member which was cut off before a man's repentance did not co-operate
with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet man himself merits
that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his whole being serves God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again in the
human body. For just as hair and nails result from the surplus of food,
so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will not
rise again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and nails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, of all the superfluities that are produced from food,
seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though superfluous
it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again in the human body. Much less
therefore will hair and nails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is perfected by a rational soul that is not
perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails are not perfected by a
sensitive soul, for "we do not feel with them" (De Anima i, 5; iii, 13).
Therefore since the human body rises not again except because it is
perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will
not rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall
not perish."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, hair and nails were given to man as an ornament. Now the bodies
of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise again with all their
adornment. Therefore they ought to rise again with the hair.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The soul is to the animated body, as art is to the work
of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to its instruments:
wherefore an animated body is called an organic body. Now art employs
certain instruments for the accomplishment of the work intended, and
these instruments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also
uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal instruments,
and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus the art of
warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the safe-keeping
of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body, some are
directed to the accomplishment of the souls' operations, for instance the
heart, liver, hand, foot; while others are directed to the safe-keeping
of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are
in man for the protection of other parts. Consequently, although they do
not belong to the primary perfection of the human body, they belong to
the secondary perfection: and since man will rise again with all the
perfections of his nature, it follows that hair and nails will rise again
in him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those superfluities are voided by nature, as being useful
for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of the human
body. It is not so with the superfluities which nature reserves for the
production of hair and nails which she needs for the protection of the
members.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Seed is not required for the perfection of the individual,
as hair and nails are, but only for the protection of the species.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it is clear
that they share in some operation, which would not be possible unless
they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man there
is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that they are
perfected by the rational soul, although not so far as to share in the
operation of sense, as neither do bones, and yet it is certain that these
will rise again and that they belong to the integrity of the individual.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the humors will rise again in the body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the humors will not rise again in the body.
For it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood cannot possess the
kingdom of God." Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will not rise
again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and much less
in others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, humors are intended to make up for the waste. Now after
the resurrection there will be no waste. Therefore the body will not rise
again with humors.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is in process of generation in the human body
is not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the humors are still in
process of generation because they are potentially flesh and bone.
Therefore they are not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the human
body is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is
perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humors will not rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Whatever enters into the constitution of the human body
will rise again with it. Now this applies to the humors, as appears from
the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima xv) that "the body consists
of functional members; the functional members of homogeneous parts; and
the homogeneous parts of humors." Therefore the humors will rise again in
the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of
Christ. Now in Christ's resurrection His blood rose again, else the wine
would not now be changed into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar.
Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in like manner the
other humors.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in
those who take part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated above
(AA[1],2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to the integrity
of human nature must needs rise again in man. Now there is a threefold
humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the
perfection of the individual---either because it is on the way to
corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat, matter,
and so forth---or because it is directed by nature to the preservation of
the species in some individual, either by the act of the generative
power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None of
these humidities will rise again, because they do not belong to the
perfection of the person rising again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its ultimate
perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is directed
thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that
has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the body, for
instance the blood and the other humors which nature has directed to the
members that are produced or nourished therefrom: and yet they have
certain definite forms like the other parts of the body, and consequently
will rise again with the other parts of the body: while another kind of
humidity is in transition from form to form, namely from the form of
humor to the form of member. Humidities of this kind will not rise again,
because after the resurrection each part of the body will be established
in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Wherefore this
humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not
rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a twofold
state---either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus
it is called "ros," namely the humidity that is found in the cavities of
the smaller veins---or as in the course of transformation and already
beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it is called "cambium": but in
neither state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity is that
which has already reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends in
the body of the individual, and has already undergone transformation and
become incorporate with the members. This is called "gluten," and since
it belongs to the members it will rise again just as the members will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood do not denote
the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and blood, which are
either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say
with Augustine in his letter to Consentius (Ep. cxlvi) that "flesh and
blood here signify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and
blood"; wherefore the Apostle's words continue: "Neither shall corruption
possess incorruption."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as the members that serve for generation will be after
the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, and not for the
operation accomplished now by them, so will the humors be in the body not
to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity of human nature and to
show forth its natural power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as the elements are in the course of generation in
relation to mixed bodies, because they are their matter, yet not so as to
be always in transition when in the mixed body, so too are the humors in
relation to the members. And for this reason as the elements in the parts
of the universe have definite forms, by reason of which they, like mixed
bodies, belong to the perfection of the universe, so too the humors
belong to the perfection of the human body, just as the other parts do,
although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the other parts do,
and although the elements have not perfect forms as mixed bodies have.
But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfection from God,
not equally, but each one according to its mode, so too the humors are in
some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as
the more perfect parts.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will
rise again in it?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the truth
of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is changed into
the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other
animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged to the truth of
human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of other animals
will also rise again: which is inadmissible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human nature in him,
as ours does in us. But Adam's rib will rise again not in Adam but in
Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since she was made from that
rib. Therefore whatever belonged in man to the truth of human nature will
not all rise again in him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is impossible for the same thing from different men
to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in different men to
belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a man were to
partake of human flesh which would be changed into his substance.
Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever belonged in him to
the truth of human nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if it be said that not all the flesh partaken of belongs
to the truth of human nature and that consequently some of it may
possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other---on the
contrary: That which is derived from one's parents would especially seem
to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of nothing
but human flesh were to beget children that which his child derives from
him must needs be of the flesh of other men partaken of by his father,
since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves (De
Gen. Animal. i). Therefore what belongs to the truth of human nature in
that child belonged also to the truth of human nature in other men of
whose flesh his father had partaken.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if it be said that what was changed into seed was not
that which belong to the truth of human nature in the flesh of the men
eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human nature---on the
contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely on embryos in
which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the truth of human
nature since whatever is in them is derived from the parents. If then the
surplus food be changed into seed, that which belonged to the truth of
human nature in the embryos---and after these have received a rational
soul, the resurrection applies to them---must needs belong to the truth
of human nature in the child begotten of that seed. And thus, since the
same cannot rise again in two subjects, it will be impossible for
whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise again in
both of them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was
perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by the
rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection.
Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again
in each one.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be
taken from his body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now all
imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection, especially in
the elect, to whom it was promised (Lk. 21:18) that not a hair of their
head should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human
nature in a man will rise again in him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Body Para. 1/8
I answer that, "Everything is related to truth in the same way as to
being" (Metaph. ii), because a thing is true when it is as it appears to
him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna (Metaph. ii) says
that "the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably attached
thereto." Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth of human
nature, because it belongs properly to the being of human nature, and
this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true gold is what
has the true form of gold whence gold derives its proper being. In order
therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth of human nature, we
must observe that there have been three opinions on the question. For
some have maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of
human nature and that whatever belongs to the truth of human nature, all
of it belonged to the truth of human nature when this was created; and
that this multiplies by itself, so that it is possible for the seed
whereof the child is begotten to be detached therefrom by the begetter,
and that again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he
reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on, and that thus was the
whole human race multiplied. Wherefore according to this opinion,
whatever is produced by nourishment. although it seem to have the
appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth of human
nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Body Para. 2/8
Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by
the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we
consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation of
which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we
consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the preservation
and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is directed, that
which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human nature of the
individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they assert that the truth
of human nature, first and foremost, consists in the radical humor, that
namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human race was
originally fashioned: and that what is changed from food into true flesh
and blood does not belong principally to the truth of human nature in
this particular individual, but secondarily: and that nevertheless this
can belong principally to the truth of human nature in another individual
who is begotten of the seed of the former. For they assert that seed is
the surplus from food, either mingled with something belonging
principally to the truth of human nature in the begetter, according to
some, or without any such admixture, as others maintain. And thus the
nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical humor in another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Body Para. 3/8
The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to
the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction in
the human body does not require that any signate material part must needs
remain throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one may take is
indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to
the species in it, albeit as regards what is material therein it may ebb
and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is not distinct from the radical
on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical when begotten
of the seed, and nutrimental when produced by the food), but rather on
the part of the term, so that it be called radical when it reaches the
term of generation by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power,
but nutrimental, when it has not yet reached this term, but is still on
the way to give nourishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Body Para. 4/8
These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the
Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); wherefore there is no need for repetition
here, except in so far as the question at issue is concerned. It must
accordingly be observed that this question requires different answers
according to these opinions.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Body Para. 5/8
For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of
multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human nature,
both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the due quantity
of each individual, without taking into account that which is produced
from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the
destruction that might result from the action of natural heat, as lead is
added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. Wherefore since at the
resurrection it behooves human nature to be restored to its perfection,
nor does the natural heat tend to destroy the natural humor, there will
be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but
that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the human
nature of the individual, and this reaches the aforesaid perfection in
number and quantity by being detached and multiplied.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Body Para. 6/8
The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food
is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the
multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that
something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however,
but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human
nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that
was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was
begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human
nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from
nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the
perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not belong to
the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires it
for the perfection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humor is
subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this order,
that what first belonged to the substance of a man's body, will all be
restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly, and so on, as
much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two reasons.
First, because that which was added was intended to restore what was
wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to the truth of
human nature to the same extent as that which came first. Secondly,
because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical humors
results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature
as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher instances as an
example (De Gener. i) the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens
the strength of the wine, so that in the end the wine becomes watery: so
that although the second water be drawn into the species of wine, it does
not share the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to
the wine. Even so that which is secondly changed from food into flesh
does not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was
changed first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the
truth of human nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear
that this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth
of human nature principally will rise again, but not the whole of what
belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Body Para. 7/8
The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects
agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under
the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature,
because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during his
whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily
to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing, that
belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on account of the perfection
of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as
the second opinion asserted. But it states that all the parts that are
not beside the intention of the nature generated belong to the truth of
human nature, as regards what they have of the species, since thus they
remain; but not as regards what they have of matter, since thus they are
indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are to understand that the same
thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole population of a
city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while
others take their place: wherefore the parts of the people flow back and
forth materially, but remain formally, since these others occupy the very
same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that
the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame. In like manner, while
certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same
shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter,
but remain as to their species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] Body Para. 8/8
On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because it
holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of
the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently the
third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the
second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds
that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again, not
because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that which
comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more
perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things
that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two
opinions agree.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A natural thing is what it is, not from its matter but from
its form; wherefore, although that part of matter which at one time was
under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of human
flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox rises again, but the
flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the clay from which Adam's
body was fashioned shall rise again. The second opinion, however, grants
this argument.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That rib did not belong to the perfection of the individual
in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the species. Hence it
will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the seed will rise again,
not in the begetter, but in the begotten.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to the first opinion it is easy to reply to this
argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the truth of
human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature
in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will rise again in the latter
but not in the former. according to the second and third opinions, each
one will rise again in that wherein he approached nearest to the perfect
participation of the virtue of the species, and if he approached equally
in both, he will rise again in that wherein he was first, because in that
he first was directed to the resurrection by union with the rational soul
of that man. Hence if there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not
belonging to the truth of human nature in the first man, it will be
possible for it to rise again in the second: otherwise what belonged to
the resurrection in the first will rise again in him and not in the
second; but in the second its place is taken either by something of that
which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any
other food than human flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so
far as the perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die
before the perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity,
as neither does the ebb and flow of parts.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: According to the first opinion this argument is easily
answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the surplus
food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed whereof the
child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions we must reply
that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into
seed, because it is after much separation that the seed is distilled from
the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the
eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human
nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh
the seed was the product. Hence according to the rule already laid down
(ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person
born of the seed; while the remaining matter will rise again in him of
whose flesh the seed was the product.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection before it
is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been added to the
seminal substance from the substance of food, since the child is
nourished in the mother's womb. Consequently on the supposition that a
man partook of such food, and that some one were begotten of the surplus
thereof, that which was in the seminal substance will indeed rise again
in the one begotten of that seed; unless it contain something that would
have belonged to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being
eaten the seed was produced, for this would rise again in the first but
not in the second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed
into seed, will clearly rise again in the first the Divine power
supplying deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not troubled by this
objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food:
but there are many other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second
Book (Sent. ii, D, 30; FP, Q[119], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's members
will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned in the
resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will
all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D,
44). Much more therefore whatever was materially in the other members
will all rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as to
species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. But the
human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a
rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species but also the parts
of matter will all rise again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the body derives its totality from the same cause as it
derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts belongs to a
body in respect of matter the disposition of which is quantity in respect
of which it is divided. Therefore totality is ascribed to the body in
respect of its parts of matter. If then all the parts of matter rise not
again, neither will the whole body rise again: which is inadmissible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The parts of matter are not permanent in the body but
ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. i. If, therefore, all the parts of
matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body of
one who rises again will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in
quantity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can
all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to partake of
his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to rise
again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which belongs
to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, What is in man materially, is not directed to the
resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human
nature; because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the
human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed to the
truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but
not all, if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter
that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end would surpass
the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states, which
opinion seems to me more probable than the others. Wherefore the whole
of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the
species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order of
parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality of
matter. The second and first opinions, however, do not make this
distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the species
and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state what is
produced from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of totality
of matter: while they differ in this that the first opinion maintains
that nothing will rise again of that which was engendered from food,
whereas the second holds that something but not all, thereof will rise
again, as stated above (A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as all that is in the other parts of the body will
rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but not if we
speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the other parts
something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and this is
reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species, since it
occupies another place and position in the body, and is under other parts
of dimension: and there accrues something which does not cause growth,
but serves to make up for waste by nourishing. and this is not reckoned
as another part of the whole considered in relation to the species, since
it does not occupy another place or position in the body than that which
was occupied by the part that has passed away: although it may be
reckoned another part if we consider the totality of matter. The same
applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking of the cutting of
hair that was a part causing growth of the body; wherefore it must needs
rise again, not however as regards the quantity of hair, lest it should
be immoderate, but it will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient
by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when something will
be lacking to the other parts, for then it will be possible for this to
be supplied from the surplus of hair.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the third opinion parts of species are the
same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not make this
distinction (De Gener. i) in order to distinguish different parts, but in
order to show that the same parts may be considered both in respect of
species, as to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in
respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now it
is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the rational
soul except in so far as it is under such a form, and consequently by
reason thereof it is directed to the resurrection. But the first and
second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of species and
parts of matter say that although the rational soul perfects both parts,
it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts of
species, wherefore they are not equally directed to the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[80] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the matter of things subject to generation and
corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before the
reception of the substantial form. Consequently division which is made
according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But complete
and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form;
wherefore division that is made in reference to definite quantity regards
the species especially when definite position of parts belongs to the
essence of the species, as in the human body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the quality of those who rise again. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all will rise again in the youthful age?
(2) Whether they will be of equal stature?
(3) Whether all will be of the same sex?
(4) Whether they will rise again to the animal life?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all will rise again of the same age?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all will not rise again of the same, namely
the youthful age. Because God will take nothing pertaining to man's
perfection from those who rise again, especially from the blessed. Now
age pertains to the perfection of man, since old age is the age that
demands reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again of a youthful
age.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, age is reckoned according to the length of past time.
Now it is impossible for past time not to have passed. Therefore it is
impossible for those who were of greater age to be brought back to a
youthful age.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which belonged most to the truth of human nature in
each individual will especially rise again in him. Now the sooner a thing
was in man the more would it seem to have belonged to the truth of human
nature, because in the end, through the strength of the species being
weakened the human body is likened to watery wine according to the
Philosopher (De Gener. i). Therefore if all are to rise again of the same
age, it is more fitting that they should rise again in the age of
childhood.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:13): "Until we all meet . . .
unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] OTC Para. 2/3
Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of
thirty years, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii). Therefore others also
will rise again of a youthful age.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, man will rise again at the most perfect stage of nature. Now
human nature is at the most perfect stage in the age of youth. Therefore
all will rise again of that age.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man will rise again without any defect of human nature,
because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will He
restore it without defect. Now human nature has a twofold defect. First,
because it has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection. Secondly,
because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfection. The first
defect is found in children, the second in the aged: and consequently in
each of these human nature will be brought by the resurrection to the
state of its ultimate perfection which is in the youthful age, at which
the movement of growth terminates, and from which the movement of
decrease begins.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Old age calls for reverence, not on account of the state of
the body which is at fault; but on account of the soul's wisdom which is
taken for granted on account of its being advanced in years. Wherefore in
the elect there will remain the reverence due to old age on account of
the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but the defect of old
age will not be in them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We speak of age not as regards the number of years, but as
regards the state which the human body acquires from years. Hence Adam is
said to have been formed in the youthful age on account of the particular
condition of body which he had at the first day of his formation. Thus
the argument is not to the point.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The strength of the species is said to be more perfect in a
child than in a young man, as regards the ability to transform
nourishment in a certain way, even as it is more perfect in the seed than
in the mature man. In youth, however, it is more perfect as regards the
term of completion. Wherefore that which belonged principally to the
truth of human nature will be brought to that perfection which it has in
the age of youth, and not to that perfection which it has in the age of a
child, wherein the humors have not yet reached their ultimate disposition.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all will rise again of the same stature?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the same stature. For
just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by the quantity
of time. Now the quantity of time will be reduced to the same measure in
all, since all will rise again of the same age. Therefore the dimensive
quantity will also be reduced to the same measure in all, so that all
will rise again of the same stature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "all things
in nature have a certain limit end measure of size and growth." Now this
limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity
as well as all the other accidents ought to agree. Therefore since all
men have the same specific form, there should be the same measure of
quantity in respect of matter in all, unless an error should occur. But
the error of nature will be set right at the resurrection. Therefore all
will rise again of the same stature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it will be impossible for man in rising again to be of a
quantity proportionate to the natural power which first formed his body;
for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater quantity by the
power of nature will never rise again of a greater quantity, which is
false. Therefore that quantity must needs be proportionate to the power
which will restore the human body by the resurrection, and to the matter
from which it is restored. Now the selfsame, namely the Divine, power
will restore all bodies; and all the ashes from which the human bodies
will be restored are equally disposed to receive the action of that
power. Therefore the resurrection of all men will bring them to the same
quantity: and so the same conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Natural quantity results from each individual's nature.
Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the resurrection.
Therefore neither will its natural quantity. But all are not of the same
natural quantity. Therefore all will not rise again of the same stature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, human nature will be restored by resurrection unto glory or
unto punishment. But there will not be the same quantity of glory or
punishment in all those who rise again. Neither therefore will there be
the same quantity of stature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, At the resurrection human nature will be restored not
only in the self-same species but also in the selfsame individual: and
consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not
only to the specific but also to the individual nature. Now the specific
nature has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor fails without
error, and yet this quantity has certain degrees of latitude and is not
to be attached to one fixed measure; and each individual in the human
species aims at some degree of quantity befitting his individual nature
within the bounds of that latitude, and reaches it at the end of his
growth, if there has been no error in the working of nature, resulting in
the addition of something to or the subtraction of something from the
aforesaid quantity: the measure whereof is gauged according to the
proportion of heat as expanding, and of humidity as expansive, in point
of which all are not of the same power. Therefore all will not rise again
of the same quantity, but each one will rise again of that quantity which
would have been his at the end of his growth if nature had not erred or
failed: and the Divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive
or lacking in man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It has already been explained (A[1], ad 2) that all are
said to rise again of the same age, not as though the same length of time
were befitting to each one, but because the same state of perfection will
be in all, which state is indifferent to a great or small quantity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The quantity of a particular individual corresponds not
only to the form of the species, but also to the nature or matter of the
individual: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The quantity of those who will be raised from the dead is
not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter does not
belong to the power of the body---nor to the ashes, as to the state in
which they are before the resurrection---but to nature which the
individual had at first. Nevertheless if the formative power on account
of some defect was unable to effect the due quantity that is befitting to
the species, the Divine power will supply the defect at the resurrection,
as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by immoderate size have
exceeded the due bounds of nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all will rise again of the male sex?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the male sex. For it is
written (Eph. 4:13) that we shall all meet "unto a perfect man," etc.
Therefore there will be none but the male sex.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the world to come all pre-eminence will cease, as a
gloss observes on 1 Cor. 15:24. Now woman is subject to man in the
natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in
the male sex.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is produced incidentally and beside the
intention of nature will not rise again, since all error will be removed
at the resurrection. Now the female sex is produced beside the intention
of nature, through a fault in the formative power of the seed, which is
unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male form: wherefore the
Philosopher says (De Anima xvi, i.e. De Generat. Animal. ii) that "the
female is a misbegotten male." Therefore the female sex will not rise
again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): "Those are wiser,
seemingly, who doubt not that both sexes will rise again."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, at the resurrection God will restore man to what He made him at
the creation. Now He made woman from the man's rib (Gn. 2:22). Therefore
He will also restore the female sex at the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as, considering the nature of the individual, a
different quantity is due to different men, so also, considering the
nature of the individual, a different sex is due to different men.
Moreover, this same diversity is becoming to the perfection of the
species, the different degrees whereof are filled by this very difference
of sex and quantity. Wherefore just as men will rise again of various
stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And though there be
difference of sex there will be no shame in seeing one another, since
there will no lust to invite them to shameful deeds which are the cause
of shame.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When it is said: We shall all meet "Christ unto a perfect
man," this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of soul which
will be in all, both men and women.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty of
nature, as regards both vigor of soul and strength of body. After the
resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on
account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of
merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the begetting of a woman is beside the intention
of a particular nature, it is in the intention of universal nature, which
requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will any
defect result from sex as stated above (ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the
functions of nutrition and generation?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that they will rise again to the animal life, or in
other words that they will make use of the acts of the nutritive and
generative powers. For our resurrection will be conformed to Christ's.
But Christ is said to have ate after His resurrection (Jn. 21; Lk. 24).
Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in like manner beget.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the distinction of sexes is directed to generation; and
in like manner the instruments which serve the nutritive power are
directed to eating. Now man will rise again with all these. Therefore he
will exercise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the whole man will be beatified both in soul and in
body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i,
7), consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must needs be that all
the powers of the soul and all the members should have their respective
acts after the resurrection. And so the same conclusion follows as above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, after the resurrection there will be perfect joy in the
blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since "happiness"
according to Boethius is "a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of
all goods" (De Consol. iii), and the perfect is that which lacks nothing.
Since then there is much pleasure in the act of the generative and
nutritive powers it would seem that such acts belonging to animal life
will be in the blessed, and much more in others, who will have less
spiritual bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 22:30): "In the resurrection they
shall neither marry nor be married."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, generation is directed to supply the defect resulting from
death, and to the multiplication of the human race: and eating is
directed to make up for waste, and to increase quantity. But in the state
of the resurrection the human race will already have the number of
individuals preordained by God, since generation will continue up to that
point. In like manner each man will rise again in due quantity; neither
will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man. Therefore
the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void of purpose.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account
of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of those
things that belong to his nature, since man can attain to this in his
present state of life by the action of natural causes; but the necessity
of the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate perfection,
which consists in his reaching his ultimate end. Consequently those
natural operations which are directed to cause or preserve the primary
perfection of human nature will not be in the resurrection: such are the
actions of the animal life in man, the action of the elements on one
another, and the movement of the heavens; wherefore all these will cease
at the resurrection. And since to eat, drink, sleep, beget, pertain to
the animal life, being directed to the primary perfection of nature, it
follows that they will not be in the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When Christ partook of that meal, His eating was an act,
not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the
resurrection, but of power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true
human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with His
disciples. There will be no need of such proof at the general
resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence Christ is said to
have ate by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that a
"dispensation is a relaxation of the general law": because Christ made an
exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely not to
partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does not
prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The distinction of sexes and the difference of members will
be for the restoration of the perfection of human nature both in the
species and in the individual. Hence it does not follow that they are
without purpose, although they lack their animal operations.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The aforesaid operations do not belong to man as man, as
also the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7), wherefore the happiness of the
human body does not consist therein. But the human body will be glorified
by an overflow from the reason whereby man is man, inasmuch as the body
will be subject to reason.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[81] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, x, 5), the
pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are applied to man for
the removal of weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so far as man
indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they were real
pleasures: just as a man whose taste is vitiated delights in things which
are not delightful to the healthy. Consequently it does not follow that
such pleasures as these belong to the perfection of beatitude, as the
Jews and Turks maintain, and certain heretics known as the Chiliasts
asserted; who, moreover, according to the Philosopher's teaching, would
seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none but
spiritual pleasures are pleasures simply, and to be sought for their own
sake: wherefore these alone are requisite for beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR
RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again,
and (1) the impassibility of their bodies; (2) their subtlety; (3) their
agility; (4) their clarity. Under the first head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the
resurrection?
(2) Whether all will be equally impassible?
(3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies?
(4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the
resurrection?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be impassible
after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible. But man, after
the resurrection, will be "a mortal rational animal," for such is the
definition of man, which will never be dissociated from him. Therefore
the body will be passible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is in potentiality to have the form of another
thing is passible in relation to something else; for this is what is
meant by being passive to another thing (De Gener. i). Now the bodies of
the saints will be in potentiality to the form of another thing after the
resurrection; since matter, according as it is under one form, does not
lose its potentiality to another form. But the bodies of the saints after
the resurrection will have matter in common with the elements, because
they will be restored out of the same matter of which they are now
composed. Therefore they will be in potentiality to another form, and
thus will be passible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i), contraries
have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards one another.
Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of contraries after the
resurrection, even as now. Therefore they will be passible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in the human body the blood and humors will rise again,
as stated above (Q[80], AA[3],4). Now, sickness and such like passions
arise in the body through the antipathy of the humors. Therefore the
bodies of the saints will be passible after the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, actual defect is more inconsistent with perfection than
potential defect. But passibility denotes merely potential defect. Since
then there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed,
such as the scars of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they were in
Christ, it would seem that their perfections will not suffer, if we grant
their bodies to be passible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Everything passible is corruptible, because "increase
of passion results in loss of substance" [*Aristotle, Topic. vi, 1]. Now
the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the resurrection,
according to 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in
incorruption." Therefore they will be impassible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be
stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is written (1 Cor.
15:43): "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power." Therefore they
will be impassible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We speak of a thing being "passive" in two ways [*Cf. FS,
Q[22], A[1]]. First in a broad sense, and thus every reception is called
a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to the receiver and
perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. The glorious bodies are not
said to be impassible by the removal of this kind of passion, since
nothing pertaining to perfection is to be removed from them. In another
way we use the word "passive" properly, and thus the Damascene defines
passion (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) as being "a movement contrary to nature."
Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a
moderate movement is called its operation. The reason of this is that
whatever is patient is drawn to the bounds of the agent, since the agent
assimilates the patient to itself, so that, therefore, the patient as
such is drawn beyond its own bounds within which it was confined.
Accordingly taking passion in its proper sense there will be no
potentiality to passion in the bodies of the saints after resurrection;
wherefore they are said to be impassible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
The reason however of this impassibility is assigned differently by
different persons. Some ascribe it to the condition of the elements,
which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the
elements will remain, then, as to substance, yet that they will be
deprived of their active and passive qualities. But this does not seem to
be true: because the active and passive qualities belong to the
perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored without
them in the body of the man that rises again, they would be less perfect
than now. Moreover since these qualities are the proper accidents of the
elements, being caused by their form and matter, it would seem most
absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be removed. Wherefore
others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of their proper
activities, the Divine power so doing for the preservation of the human
body. This however would seem to be untenable, since the action and
passion of the active and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture
(of the elements), and according as one or the other preponderates the
mixed (bodies) differ in their respective complexions, and this must
apply to the bodies of those who rise again, for they will contain flesh
and bones and like parts, all of which demand different complexions.
Moreover, according to this, impassibility could not be one of their
gifts, because it would not imply a disposition in the impassible
substance, but merely an external preventive to passion, namely the power
of God, which might produce the same effect in a human body even in this
state of life. Consequently others say that in the body itself there will
be something preventing the passion of a glorified body, namely the
nature of a fifth [*The other four being the elements; this fifth element
was known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which
they held heavenly bodies to be formed]: or heavenly body, which they
maintain enters into the composition of a human body, to the effect of
blending the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for
the rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account of the
preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like
other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth body
will predominate, so that the human body will be made impassible in
likeness to the heavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the fifth
body does not enter materially into the composition of a human body, as
was proved above (Sent. ii, D, 12, Q. 1, A[1]). Moreover it is absurd to
say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly body, should
endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the impassibility
of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to Christ's power the
transformation of the human body, because "such as is the heavenly, such
also are they that are heavenly" (1 Cor. 15:48), and "He will reform the
body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory, according to the
operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto Himself"
(Phil. 3:21). And again, a heavenly nature cannot exercise such power
over the human body as to take from it its elemental nature which is
passible by reason of its essential constituents. Consequently we must
say otherwise that all passion results from the agent overcoming the
patient, else it would not draw it to its own bounds. Now it is
impossible for agent to overcome patient except through the weakening of
the hold which the form of the patient has over its matter, if we speak
of the passion which is against nature, for it is of passion in this
sense that we are speaking now: for matter is not subject to one of two
contraries, except through the cessation or at least the diminution of
the hold which the other contrary has on it. Now the human body and all
that it contains will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as
the soul will be perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will be
impossible for the glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to
the disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul; and consequently
those bodies will be impassible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Anselm (Cur Deus Homo ii, 11), "mortal is
included in the philosophers' definition of man, because they did not
believe that the whole man could be ever immortal, for they had no
experience of man otherwise than in this state of mortality." Or we may
say that since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 12), essential
differences are unknown to us, we sometimes employ accidental differences
in order to signify essential differences from which the accidental
differences result. Hence "mortal" is put in the definition of man, not
as though mortality were essential to man, but because that which causes
passibility and mortality in the present state of life, namely
composition of contraries, is essential to man, but it will not cause it
then, on account of the triumph of the soul over the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Potentiality is twofold, tied and free: and this is true
not only of active but also of passive potentiality. For the form ties
the potentiality of matter, by determining it to one thing, and it is
thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible things form does not
perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so as to prevent
it from sometimes receiving a disposition contrary to the form through
some passion. But in the saints after the resurrection, the soul will
have complete dominion over the body, and it will be altogether
impossible for it to lose this dominion, because it will be immutably
subject to God, which was not the case in the state of innocence.
Consequently those bodies will retain substantially the same potentiality
as they have now to another form; yet that potentiality will remain tied
by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it will never be
realized by actual passion.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The elemental qualities are the instruments of the soul, as
stated in De Anima ii, text. 38, seqq., for the heat of fire in an
animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the soul's power.
When, however, the principal agent is perfect, and there is no defect in
the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument, except in
accordance with the disposition of the principal agent. Consequently in
the bodies of the saints after the resurrection, no action or passion
will result from the elemental qualities that is contrary to the
disposition of the soul which has the preservation of the body in view.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: According to Augustine (Ep. ad Consent. cxlvi) "the Divine
power is able to remove" whatever qualities He will "from this visible
and tangible body, other qualities remaining." Hence even as in a certain
respect "He deprived the flames of the Chaldees' furnace of the power to
burn, since the bodies of the children were preserved without hurt, while
in another respect that power remained, since those flames consumed the
wood, so will He remove passibility from the humors while leaving their
nature unchanged." It has been explained in the Article how this is
brought about.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The scars of wounds will not be in the saints, nor were
they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs of the
most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake of justice
and faith: so that this will increase their own and others' joy (Cf. TP,
Q[54], A[4], ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 19): "We
feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see
in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore
for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall see them for this will not
make them less comely but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in
them, a beauty though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue."
Nevertheless those martyrs who have been maimed and deprived of their
limbs will not be without those limbs in the resurrection of the dead,
for to them it is said (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall not
perish."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all will be equally impassible?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a gloss on
1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption," says that "all have equal
immunity from suffering." Now the gift of impassibility consists in
immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, negations are not subject to be more or less. Now
impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore it
cannot be greater in one subject than in another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a thing is more white if it have less admixture of
black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the
saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of
the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since
impassibility is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in
others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the
latter will not be equal in all, according to 1 Cor. 15:41. Therefore
neither will impassibility be equal in all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in
itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself, since
it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be more or
less, but will be equal in all the blessed. on the other hand, if we
consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in one
person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul over
the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable
enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfectly,
there is a greater cause of impassibility.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself and not
in relation to its cause.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although negations and privations considered in themselves
are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to increase and
diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is said to be more
darksome from having more and greater obstacles to light.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some things increase not only by receding from their
contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases.
Consequently impassibility also is greater in one subject than in
another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation from
glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11),
"sensation is a kind of passion." But the glorified bodies will be
impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, natural alteration precedes spiritual* alteration, just
as natural being precedes intentional being. Now glorified bodies, by
reason of their impassibility, will not be subject to natural alteration.
[*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"---the mind. Cf. FS,
Q[50], A[1],3m; FS, Q[52], A[1],3m.] Therefore they will not be subject
to spiritual alteration which is requisite for sensation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new perception,
there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no new judgment,
because "our thoughts will not then be unchangeable," as Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will be no actual sensation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, when the act of one of the soul's powers is intense, the
acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will be supremely
intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating God.
Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation whatever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:7): "Every eye shall see Him."
Therefore there will be actual sensation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) "the animate is
distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement." Now there will be
actual movement since they "shall run to and fro like sparks among the
reeds" (Wis. 3:7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, All are agreed that there is some sensation in the bodies
of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the resurrection
would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now this is not
befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible body is not in the
ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described as half-life.
[*This is what Aristotle says: "The good and the bad are in sleep least
distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives there is no
difference between the happy and the unhappy" (Ethic. i, 13)] But there
is a difference of opinion as to the mode of sensation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and
consequently "not susceptible to impressions from without" [*Cf. Q[74],
A[4], On the contrary] and much less so than the heavenly bodies, because
they will have actual sensations, not by receiving species from
sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is impossible, since in
the resurrection the specific nature will remain the same in man and in
all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be a passive power as the
Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54). Wherefore if the saints,
in the resurrection, were to have sensations by emitting and not by
receiving species, sense in them would be not a passive but an active
power, and thus it would not be the same specifically with sense as it is
now, but would be some other power bestowed on them; for just as matter
never becomes form, so a passive power never becomes active. Consequently
others say that the senses will be actualized by receiving species, not
indeed from external sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers,
so that as now the higher powers receive from the lower, so on the
contrary the lower powers will then receive from the higher. But this
mode of reception does not result in real sensation, because every
passive power, according to its specific nature, is determined to some
special active principle, since a power as such bears relation to that
with respect to which it is said to be the power. Wherefore since the
proper active principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside
the soul and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or
reason, if the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the
imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation.
Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there
is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on
account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real
sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations.
Consequently we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies
will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must,
however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things
outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when
namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing
outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand is
heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact with
a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when a
sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a spiritual
mode of being, when, namely, the species or the intention of a quality,
and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil receives the
species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white. Accordingly
the first reception does not cause sensation, properly speaking, because
the senses are receptive of species in matter but without matter. that is
to say without the material "being" which the species had outside the
soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). This reception transmutes the nature of
the recipient, because in this way the quality is received according to
its material "being." Consequently this kind of reception will not be in
the glorified bodies, but the second, which of itself causes actual
sensation, without changing the nature of the recipient.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As already explained, by this passion that takes place in
actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception of species,
the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is perfected by a
spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of glorified bodies does
not exclude this kind of passion.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every subject of passion receives the action of the agent
according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that is naturally
adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a natural and a
spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the spiritual
alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If however a
thing be naturally adapted to be altered only with a spiritual alteration
it does not follow that it is altered naturally. For instance the air is
not receptive of color, according to its natural being, but only
according to its spiritual being, wherefore in this way alone is it
altered: whereas, on the contrary, inanimate bodies are altered by
sensible qualities only naturally and not spiritually. But in the
glorified bodies there cannot be any natural alteration, and consequently
there will be only spiritual alteration.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as there will be new reception of species in the
organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common sense:
but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect; such is
the case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying of Augustine,
that "there our thoughts will not be changeable," refers to the thoughts
of the intellectual part: therefore it is not to the point.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When one of two things is the type of the other, the
attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its attention
to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not less but
more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the colors of
urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the type of all
things that will be done or known by them, their attention to perceiving
sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else will nowise hinder
their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say that the reason
why one power is hindered in its act when another power is intensely
engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for such an intense
operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the principle of life
the inflow that the other powers or members should receive. And since in
the saints all the powers will be most perfect, one will be able to
operate intensely without thereby hindering the operation of another
power even as it was with Christ.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in
act?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the senses are not in act there. For touch
is the first of all the senses (De Anima ii, 2). But the glorified body
will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of touch becomes
actual by the alteration of an animal body by some external body
preponderating in some one of the active or passive qualities which touch
is capable of discerning: and such an alteration will then be impossible.
Therefore all the senses will not be in act there.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sense of taste assists the action of the nutritive
power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such action, as stated
above (Q[81], A[4]). Therefore taste would be useless there.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing will be corrupted after the resurrection because
the whole creature will be invested with a certain virtue of
incorruption. Now the sense of smell cannot have its act without some
corruption having taken place, because smell is not perceived without a
volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the
sense of smell is not there in its act.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "Hearing assists teaching" (De Sensu et Sensato i). But
the blessed, after the resurrection, will require no teaching by means of
sensible objects, since they will be filled with Divine wisdom by the
very vision of God. Therefore hearing will not be there.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further. seeing results from the pupil receiving the species of
the thing seen. But after the resurrection this will be impossible in the
blessed. Therefore there will be no actual seeing there, and yet this is
the most noble of the senses. The minor is proved thus: That which is
actually lightsome is not receptive of a visible species; and
consequently a mirror placed under the sun's rays does not reflect the
image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil like the whole body will be
endowed with clarity. Therefore it will not receive the image of a
colored body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, according to the science of perspective, whatever is
seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply to the glorified
bodies. Therefore they will not have actual sense of sight. The minor is
proved thus. Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be
proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen
from a greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that the
angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object. Therefore if
the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things within
a certain distance, and that consequently it does not see a thing from a
greater distance than we see now: and this would seem very absurd. And
thus it would seem that the sense of sight will not be actual in
glorified bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A power conjoined to its act is more perfect than one
not so conjoined. Now human nature in the blessed will be in its greatest
perfection. Therefore all the senses will be actual there.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than the body is.
But the body will be rewarded or punished on account of the merits or
demerits of the soul. Therefore all the senses in the blessed will also
be rewarded and in the wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure
and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that in the glorified bodies there will be all the sensitive powers, but
that only two senses will be in act, namely touch and sight; nor will
this be owing to defective senses, but from lack of medium and object;
and that the senses will not be useless, because they will conduce to the
integrity of human nature and will show forth the wisdom of their
Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the medium in these senses
is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium is the air, and
this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (De Anima ii, 7). Again,
the taste, like the touch, has the medium in contact, since taste is a
kind of touch (De Anima ii, 9). Smell also which is the object of the
sense of smell will be there, since the Church sings that the bodies of
the saints will be a most sweet smell. There will also be vocal praise in
heaven; hence a gloss says on Ps. 149:6, "The high praises of God shall
be in their mouth" that "hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise
God." The same is had on the authority of a gloss on 2 Esdra 12:27, "With
singing and with cymbals." Wherefore, according to others we may say that
smelling and hearing will be in act there, but taste will not be in act,
in the sense of being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears
from what we have said (Q[81], A[4]): unless perchance we say that there
will be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some
neighboring humor.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The qualities perceived by the touch are those which
constitute the animal body. Wherefore the body of an animal has, through
its tangible qualities according to the present state of life, a natural
aptitude to be affected with a natural and spiritual alteration by the
object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to be the most
material of the senses, since it has a greater measure of material
alteration connected with it. Yet material alteration is only
accidentally related to the act of sensation which is effected by a
spiritual alteration. Consequently the glorified bodies, which by reason
of their impassibility are immune from natural alteration, will be
subject only to spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it was
with the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, nor pierced
by sword, although he had the sense of such things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Taste, in so far as it is the perception of food, will not
be in act; but perhaps it will be possible in so far as it is cognizant
of flavors in the way mentioned above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some have considered smell to be merely a volatile
evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true; which is evident from the
fact that vultures hasten to a corpse on perceiving the odor from a very
great distance, whereas it would be impossible for an evaporation to
travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though the whole corpse
were to be dissolved into vapor. This is confirmed by the fact that
sensible objects at an equal distance exercise their influence in all
directions: so that smell affects the medium sometimes, and the
instrument of sensation with a spiritual alteration, without any
evaporation reaching the organ. That some evaporation should be necessary
is due to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed with humidity; wherefore
it is necessary for dissolution to take place in order for the smell to
be perceived. But in the glorified bodies odor will be in its ultimate
perfection, being nowise hampered by humidity: wherefore it will affect
the organ with a spiritual alteration, like the odor of a volatile
evaporation. Such will be the sense of smell in the saints, because it
will not be hindered by any humidity: and it will take cognizance not
only of the excellences of odors, as happens with us now on account of
the very great humidity of the brain, but also of the minutest
differences of odors.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In heaven there will be vocal praise (though indeed some
think otherwise), and in the blessed it will affect the organ of hearing
by a merely spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for the sake of learning
whereby they may acquire knowledge, but for the sake of the perfection of
the sense and for the sake pleasure. How it is possible for the voice to
give sound there, we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 2; Q[2], A[2], ad
5).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The intensity of light does not hinder the spiritual
reception of the image of color, so long as the pupil retains its
diaphanous nature; thus it is evident that however much the air be filled
with light, it can be the medium of sight, and the more it is illumined,
the more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there be a fault
through defective sight. The fact that the image of an object placed in
opposition to a mirror directly opposite the sun's rays does not appear
therein, is not due to the reception being hindered, but to the hindering
of reflection: because for an image to appear in a mirror it must needs
be thrown back by an opaque body, for which reason lead is affixed to the
glass in a mirror. The sun's ray dispels this opacity so that no image
can appear in the mirror. But the clarity of a glorified body does not
destroy the diaphanous nature of the pupil, since glory does not destroy
nature; and consequently the greatness of clarity in the pupil renders
the sight keen rather than defective.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[82] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The more perfect the sense the less does it require to be
altered in order to perceive its object. Now the smaller the angle at
which the sight is affected by the visible object, the less is the organ
altered. Hence it is that a stronger sight can see from a distance more
than a weaker sight; because the greater the distance the smaller the
angle at which a thing is seen. And since the sight of a glorified body
will be most perfect it will be able to see by the very least alteration
(of the organ); and consequently at a very much smaller angle than now,
and therefore from a much greater distance.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under
this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?
(2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with
another not glorified body?
(3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place?
(4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another
glorified body?
(5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to
itself?
(6) Whether a glorified body is palpable?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the glorified
body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of nature, even
as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun, which is the
greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety be a property of the
glorified body, it would seem that the glorified body will be more subtle
than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it will be "more subtle
than the wind and the air," which was condemned by Gregory in the city of
Constantinople, as he relates (Moral. xiv, 56).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as heat and cold are simple qualities of bodies, i.e. of
the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and other qualities of the
elements will not be intensified in the glorified bodies any more than
they are now, in fact, they will be more reduced to the mean. Neither,
therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity of matter,
wherefore bodies that have less matter within equal dimensions are said
to be more subtle; as fire in comparison with air, and air as compared
with water, and water as compared with earth. But there will be as much
matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will their dimensions
be greater. Therefore they will not be more subtle then than now.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:44): "It is sown a corruptible
body, it shall rise a spiritual," i.e. a spirit-like, "body." But the
subtlety of a spirit surpasses all bodily subtlety. Therefore the
glorified bodies will be most subtle.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the more subtle a body is the more exalted it is. But the
glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore they will be most subtle.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, Subtlety takes its name from the power to penetrate.
Hence it is said in De Gener. ii that "a subtle thing fills all the parts
and the parts of parts." Now that a body has the power of penetrating may
happen through two causes. First, through smallness of quantity,
especially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of length, because
penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not an obstacle to
penetration. Secondly, through paucity of matter, wherefore rarity is
synonymous with subtlety: and since in rare bodies the form is more
predominant over the matter, the term "subtlety" has been transferred to
those bodies which are most perfectly subject to their form, and are most
fully perfected thereby: thus we speak of subtlety in the sun and moon
and like bodies, just as gold and similar things may be called subtle,
when they are most perfectly complete in their specific being and power.
And since incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, the term
"subtlety" is applied to them, not only by reason of their substance, but
also on account of their power. For just as a subtle thing is said to be
penetrative, for the reason that it reaches to the inmost part of a
thing, so is an intellect said to be subtle because it reaches to the
insight of the intrinsic principles and the hidden natural properties of
a thing. In like manner a person is said to have subtle sight, because he
is able to perceive by sight things of the smallest size: and the same
applies to the other senses. Accordingly people have differed by
ascribing subtlety to the glorified bodies in different ways.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 2/6
For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xiii, 22),
ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances are said to be
subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be
transformed into a spirit, and that for this reason the Apostle describes
as being "spiritual" the bodies of those who rise again (1 Cor. 15:44).
But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body cannot be changed
into a spirit, since there is no community of matter between them: and
Boethius proves this (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because, if this were
possible, and one's body were changed into a spirit, one would not rise
again a man, for a man naturally consists of a soul and body. Thirdly,
because if this were the Apostle's meaning, just as he speaks of
spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural [animale] bodies, as being
changed into souls [animam]: and this is clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 3/6
Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the
resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means of
rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air or
the wind, as Gregory relates (Moral. xiv, 56). But this again cannot be
maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the Resurrection,
as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must believe that His
body was supremely subtle. Moreover the human body will rise again with
flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord, according to Lk. 24:39, "A
spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have," and Job 19:26,
"In my flesh I shall see God," my Saviour: and the nature of flesh and
bone is incompatible with the aforesaid rarity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 4/6
Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified
bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account of the most complete
perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in
relation to the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then
predominant in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all the
fifth essence can nowise enter into the composition of a body, as we have
shown above (Sent. D, 12, qu. 1). Secondly, because granted that it
entered into the composition of the human body, it would be impossible to
account for its having a greater predominance over the elemental nature
then than now, unless---either the amount of the heavenly nature in human
bodies were increased (thus human bodies would not be of the same
stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were decreased, which is
inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise again)---or unless
elemental nature were endowed with the properties of the heavenly nature
through the latter's dominion over the body, and in that case a natural
power would be the cause of a property of glory, which seems absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 5/6
Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which
human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the dominion of the
glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason
of which dominion the glorified body is said to be "spiritual," as being
wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the body is
subject to the soul is to the effect of its participating in its specific
being, in so far as it is subject to the soul as matter to form; and
secondly it is subject to the soul in respect of the other operations of
the soul, in so far as the soul is a principle of movement. Consequently
the first reason for spirituality in the body is subtlety, and, after
that, agility and the other properties of a glorified body. Hence the
Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking of spirituality indicates
subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 56) that "the glorified
body is said to be subtle as a result of a spiritual power."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 6/6
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections which refer to the
subtlety of rarefaction.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the
same place with another body not glorified?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is able to
be in the same place with another body not glorified. For according to
Phil. 3:21, "He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body
of His glory." Now the body of Christ was able to be in the same place
with another body, as appears from the fact that after His Resurrection
He went in to His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19,26).
Therefore also the glorified bodies by reason of their subtlety will be
able to be in the same place with other bodies not glorified.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, glorified bodies will be superior to all other bodies.
Yet by reason of their superiority certain bodies, to wit the solar rays,
are able now to occupy the same place together with other bodies. Much
more therefore is this befitting glorified bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a heavenly body cannot be severed, at least as regards
the substance of the spheres: hence it is written (Job 37:18) that "the
heavens . . . are most strong, as if they were of molten brass." If then
the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same
place together with another body, it will never be able to ascend to the
empyrean,* and this is erroneous. [*The empyrean was the highest of the
concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers
with the abode of God. Cf. FP, Q[56], A[3]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a body which is unable to be in the same place with
another body can be hindered in its movement or even surrounded by others
standing in its way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies.
Therefore they will be able to be together in the same place with other
bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, as point is to point, so is line to line, surface to
surface, and body to body. Now two points can be coincident, as in the
case of two lines touching one another, and two lines when two surfaces
are in contact with one another, and two surfaces when two bodies touch
one another, because "contiguous things are those whose boundaries
coincide" (Phys. vi, 6). Therefore it is not against the nature of a body
to be in the same place together with another body. Now whatever
excellence is competent to the nature of a body will all be bestowed on
the glorified body. Therefore a glorified body, by reason of its
subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together with another body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. i): "Difference of accidents
makes distinction in number. For three men differ not in genus, nor in
species, but in their accidents. If we were to remove absolutely every
accident from them, still each one has a different place; and it is quite
conceivable that they should all occupy the same place." Therefore if we
suppose two bodies to occupy the same place, there will be but one body
numerically.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason
of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body,
unless the obstacle to its being now in the same place with another body
be removed by that subtlety. Some say that in the present state this
obstacle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy a
place; and that this grossness is removed by the gift of subtlety. But
there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. First, because the
grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect, for
instance an inordinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject to
its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will rise
again in the body, both as regards the matter and as regards the form.
And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by reason
of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of any defect
of nature. For since fulness is opposed to vacancy, that alone does not
fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless leaves a place
vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 6,7) as
being "a place not filled by a sensible body." And a body is said to be
sensible by reason of its matter, form, and natural accidents, all of
which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also plain that the
glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as evidenced by the body
of our Lord (Lk. 24:39): nor will it lack matter, or form, or natural
accidents, namely heat, cold, and so forth. Hence it is evident that the
glorified body, the gift of subtlety notwithstanding, will fill a place:
for it would seem madness to say that the place in which there will be a
glorified body will be empty. Secondly their aforesaid argument does not
avail, because to hinder the co-existence of a body in the same place is
more than to fill a place. For if we suppose dimensions separate from
matter, those dimensions do not fill a place. Hence some who held the
possibility of a vacuum, said that a vacuum is a place wherein such like
dimensions exist apart from a sensible body; and yet those dimensions
hinder another body from being together with them in the same place. This
is made clear by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 1,8; Metaph. ii, 2), where he
considers it impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but
separate dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body.
Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it
from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this
reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the
removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's being now in the
same place with another body can nowise be removed by the gift of
subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place
together with another body, except something in it that requires a
different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that
which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not
required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place, not
by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the fact of
its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the necessity of
the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv), and as
is self-evident. In like manner neither can matter cause the necessity of
the aforesaid distinction, because matter does not occupy a place except
through its dimensive quantity. Again neither does form occupy a place,
unless it have a place through its matter. It remains therefore that the
necessity for two bodies occupying each a distinct place results from the
nature of dimensive quantity, to which a place is essentially befitting.
For this forms part of its definition, since dimensive quantity is
quantity occupying a place. Hence it is that if we remove all else in a
thing from it, the necessity of this distinction is found in its
dimensive quantity alone. Thus take the example of a separate line,
supposing there to be two such lines, or two parts of one line, they must
needs occupy distinct places, else one line added to another would not
make something greater, and this is against common sense. The same
applies to surfaces and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands
place, through being the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity
results in placed matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to
be two lines, or two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places,
so is it impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter,
without there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is
the principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as
Boethius says (De Trin.), "we cannot possibly conceive two bodies
occupying one place," so that this distinction of individuals requires
this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the glorified
body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it the aforesaid
necessity of occupying a distinct place from another body. Therefore the
subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place
together with another body, but it will be possible for it to be together
with another body by the operation of the Divine power: even as the body
of Peter had the power whereby the sick were healed at the passing of
Peter's shadow (Acts 5:15) not through any inherent property, but by the
power of God for the upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power
make it possible for a glorified body to be in the same place together
with another body for the perfection of glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That Christ's body was able to be together with another
body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but resulted from the
power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as in His birth [*Cf.
TP, Q[28], A[2], ad 3]. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): "The
same body went into His disciples the doors being shut, which to human
eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin at His birth." Therefore
there is no reason why this should be befitting to glorified bodies on
account of their subtlety.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Light is not a body as we have said above (Sent. ii, Q[13],
A[3]; FP, Q[67], A[2]): hence the objection proceeds on a false
supposition.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The glorified body will pass through the heavenly spheres
without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by the Divine
power, which will assist them in all things at will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: From the fact that God will come to the aid of the blessed
at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they cannot be
surrounded or imprisoned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: As stated in Phys. iv, 5, "a point is not in a place":
hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental, because
the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the whole place
corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the place corresponds to
the term of the body. But it happens that two places have one term, even
as two lines terminate in one point. And consequently though two bodies
must needs be in distinct places, yet the same term of two places
corresponds to the two terms of the two bodies. It is in this sense that
the bounds of contiguous bodies are said to coincide.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same
place?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible for two
bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, by a
miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply that
contradictions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two bodies to
be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies are one.
Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus.
Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The dimensions of A
will either be the same as the dimensions of the place, or they will
differ from them. If they differ, then some of the dimensions will be
separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions that are within the
bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they be in a placed body.
If they be the same, then for the same reason the dimensions of B will be
the same as the dimensions of the place. "Now things that are the same
with one and the same thing are the same with one another." Therefore the
dimensions of A and B are the same. But two bodies cannot have identical
dimensions just as they cannot have the same whiteness. Therefore A and B
are one body and yet they were two. Therefore they are at the same time
one and two.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing cannot be done miraculously either against the
common principles---for instance that the part be not less than the
whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a direct
contradiction---or contrary to the conclusions of geometry which are
infallible deductions from common principles---for instance that the
three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles. In
like manner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the
definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined is
to make two contradictories true at the same time. Now it is contrary to
common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and to the
definition of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place. Therefore
this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as follows: It is a
conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one another only at a
point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same place, the two circles
described in them would touch one another as a whole. Again it is
contrary to the definition of a line that there be more than one straight
line between two points: yet this would be the case were two bodies in
the same place, since between two given points in the various surfaces of
the place, there would be two straight lines corresponding to the two
bodies in that place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it would seem impossible that by a miracle a body which
is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for then it would
have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet this
would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore this cannot
be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two bodies to
be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as to every
dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater, and the place
occupied by the greater body will be its common place; while it will have
no proper place, because no given surface of the body will contain it,
and this is essential to place. Therefore it will not have a proper place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, place corresponds in proportion to the thing placed. Now
it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is at the same time
in different places, except by some kind of transformation, as in the
Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it can nowise happen by a miracle that
two bodies be together in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle.
Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be together
in the same place, because the body of her child when coming forth did
not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity. Therefore it is
possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, this may again be proved from the fact that our Lord went in to
His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19, 26).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As shown above (A[2]) the reason why two bodies must
needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires distinction
in place. Wherefore we observe that when two bodies merge into one, each
loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being accrues to the two
combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is impossible for two
bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each retain its distinct
being which it had hitherto, in so much as each of them was a being
undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this distinct being
depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its proximate
causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first cause can
preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done away, as
appears from the first proposition of De Causis, therefore by God's power
and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be without substance
as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the power of God, and by
that alone, it is possible for a body to retain its distinct being from
that of another body, although its matter be not distinct as to place
from the matter of the other body: and thus it is possible by a miracle
for two bodies to be together in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is sophistical because it is based on a
false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the existence,
between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension proper to the
place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put in occupation of
the place would have to be identified: because it would then follow that
the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place would become one
dimension, if each of them were identified with the dimension of the
place. But this supposition is false, because if it were true whenever a
body acquires a new place, it would follow that a change takes place in
the dimensions of the place or of thing placed: since it is impossible
for two things to become one anew, except one of them be changed. Whereas
if, as is the case in truth, no other dimensions belong to a place than
those of the thing occupying the place, it is clear that the argument
proves nothing, but begs the question, because according to this nothing
else has been said, but that the dimensions of a thing placed are the
same as the dimensions of the place; excepting that the dimensions of the
thing placed are contained within the bounds of the place, and that the
distance between the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance
between the bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be
distant by their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the
dimensions of two bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else
than that two bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at
issue.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together in the
same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or against
the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of geometry. For, as
stated above (A[2]), dimensive quantity differs from all other accidents
in that it has a special reason of individuality and distinction, namely
on account of the placing of the parts, besides the reason of
individuality and distinction which is common to it and all other
accidents, arising namely from the matter which is its subject. Thus then
one line may be understood as being distinct from another, either because
it is in another subject (in which case we are considering a material
line), or because it is placed at a distance from another (in which case
we are considering a mathematical line, which is understood apart from
matter). Accordingly if we remove matter, there can be no distinction
between lines save in respect of a different placing: and in like manner
neither can there be a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of
any dimensions whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to
be added to another, as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as
to place. But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject
without a distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines;
and these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the
distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a difference of points,
and thus different lines described on two bodies that are in the same
place are drawn from different points to different points; for the point
that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the placed body,
because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from a point which
is its term. In like manner the two circles described in two spherical
bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account of the
difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a whole,
but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while wholly
touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle described by
a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other circle described
by the locating body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God could make a body not to be in a place; and yet
supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a
place, because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by
reason of its superficies which is described by contact with the terms of
the lesser body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It is impossible for one body to be miraculously in two
places locally (for Christ's body is not locally on the altar), although
it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same place.
Because to be in several places at once is incompatible with the
individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it
would follow that it is divided as to place. on the other hand, to be in
the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual as
distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in
indivision (Metaph. v), whereas distinction from others is a result of
the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several
places at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack reason,
while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a
contradiction, as explained above. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another
glorified body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same place
together with another glorified body. Because where there is greater
subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is more
subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to a
glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place with
a non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, even as a glorified body will be more subtle than a
non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle than
another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a
non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same place
with a less subtle glorified body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the body of heaven is subtle, and will then be
glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in the
same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at will
to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will be able
to occupy the same place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like
spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same
place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated
above (Sent. i, D, 37, Q[3], A[3]; FP, Q[52], A[3]). Therefore neither
will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the
other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection which will be
altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be
impossible for two glorified bodies to be in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The property of a glorified body does not make it able to
be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to be in the
same place with a non-glorified body. But it would be possible by the
Divine power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies to be
in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified body.
Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in the same
place with another glorified body, both because a becoming order will be
observed in them, which demands distinction, and because one glorified
body will not be in the way of another. Consequently two glorified bodies
will never be in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: This argument supposes that a glorified body is able by
reason of its subtlety to be in the same place with another body: and
this is not true.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The same answer applies to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The body of heaven and the other bodies will be said
equivocally to be glorified, in so far as they will have a certain share
in glory, and not as though it were becoming for them to have the gifts
of glorified human bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body will no longer need to
be in an equal place?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that by virtue of its subtlety, a glorified body
will no longer need to be in an equal place. For the glorified bodies
will be made like to the body of Christ according to Phil. 3:21. Now
Christ's body is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal place:
wherefore it is contained whole under the small or great dimensions of a
consecrated host. Therefore the same will be true of the glorified bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv, 6), that two bodies
are not in the same place, because it would follow that the greatest body
would occupy the smallest place, since its various parts could be in the
same part of the place: for it makes no difference whether two bodies or
however many be in the same place. Now a glorified body will be in the
same place with another body, as is commonly admitted. Therefore it will
be possible for it to be in any place however small.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, even as a body is seen by reason of its color, so is it
measured by reason of its quantity. Now the glorified body will be so
subject to the spirit that it will be able at will to be seen, and not
seen, especially by a non-glorified eye, as evidenced in the case of
Christ. Therefore its quantity will be so subject to the spirit's will
that it will be able to be in a little or great place, and to have a
little or great quantity at will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 30) that
"whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to itself." Now the
glorified body will be in a place. Therefore it will occupy a place equal
to itself.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the dimensions of a place and of that which is in that place
are the same, as shown in Phys. iv, text. 30,76,77. Therefore if the
place were larger than that which is in the place the same thing would be
greater and smaller than itself, which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A body is not related to place save through the medium of
its proper dimensions, in respect of which a located body is confined
through contact with the locating body. Hence it is not possible for a
body to occupy a place smaller than its quantity, unless its proper
quantity be made in some way less than itself: and this can only be
understood in two ways. First, by a variation in quantity in respect of
the same matter, so that in fact the matter which at first is subject to
a greater quantity is afterwards subject to a lesser. Some have held this
to be the case with the glorified bodies, saying that quantity is subject
to them at will, so that when they list, they are able to have a great
quantity, and when they list a small quantity. But this is impossible,
because no movement affecting that which is intrinsic to a thing is
possible without passion to the detriment [*Cf. FS, Q[22], A[1]; FS,
Q[41], A[1]] of its substance. Hence in incorruptible, i.e. heavenly,
bodies, there is only local movement, which is not according to something
intrinsic. Thus it is clear that change of quantity in respect of matter
would be incompatible with the impassibility and incorruptibility of a
glorified body. Moreover, it would follow that a glorified body would be
sometimes rarer and sometimes denser, because since it cannot be deprived
of any of its matter, sometimes the same matter would be under great
dimensions and sometimes under small dimensions, and thus it would be
rarefied and densified, which is impossible. Secondly, that the quantity
of a glorified body become smaller than itself may be understood by a
variation of place; so, to wit, that the parts of a glorified body
insinuate themselves into one another, so that it is reduced in quantity
however small it may become. And some have held this to be the case,
saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will be able to be
in the same place with a non-glorified body: and that in like manner its
parts can be one within the other, so much so that a whole glorified body
will be able to pass through the minutest opening in another body: and
thus they explain how Christ's body came out of the Virgin's womb; and
how it went into His disciples, the doors being shut. But this is
impossible; both because the glorified body will not be able, by reason
of its subtlety, to be in the same place with another body, and because,
even if it were able to be in the same place with another body, this
would not be possible if the other were a glorified body, as many say;
and again because this would be inconsistent with the right disposition
of the human body, which requires the parts to be in a certain fixed
place and at a certain fixed distance from one another. Wherefore this
will never happen, not even by a miracle. Consequently we must say that
the glorified body will always be in a place equal to itself.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Christ's body is not locally in the Sacrament of the Altar,
as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 10, Q[1], A[1], ad 5; TP, Q[77], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher's argument is that for the same reason one
part might permeate another. But this permeation of the parts of a
glorified body into one another is impossible, as stated above. Therefore
the objection does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A body is seen because it acts on the sight: but that it
does or does not act on the sight causes no change in the body. Hence it
is not unfitting, if it can be seen when it will, and not seen when it
will [*Cf. TP, Q[55], A[4]]. On the other hand, being in a place is not
an action proceeding from a body by reason of its quantity, as being seen
is by reason of its color. Consequently the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be impalpable?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety,
is impalpable. For Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.): "What is palpable
must needs be corruptible." But the glorified body is incorruptible.
Therefore it is impalpable.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is palpable resists one who handles it. But
that which can be in the same place with another does not resist it.
Since then a glorified body can be in the same place with another body,
it will not be palpable.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every palpable body is tangible. Now every tangible body
has tangible qualities in excess of the qualities of the one touching it.
Since then in the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not in
excess but are reduced to a supreme degree of equality, it would seem
that they are impalpable.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, our Lord rose again with a glorified body; and yet His
body was palpable, as appears from Lk. 24:39: "Handle, and see; for a
spirit hath not flesh and bones." Therefore the glorified bodies also
will be palpable.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, this is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, as
Gregory states (Moral. xxiv): for he said that in the glory of the
resurrection our bodies will be impalpable.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Every palpable body is tangible, but not conversely. For
every body is tangible that has qualities whereby the sense of touch has
a natural aptitude to be affected: wherefore air, fire, and the like are
tangible bodies: but a palpable body, in addition to this, resists the
touch; wherefore the air which never resists that which passes through
it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible indeed but not palpable.
Accordingly it is clear that a body is said to be palpable for two
reasons, namely on account of its tangible qualities, and on account of
its resisting that which touches it, so as to hinder it from piercing it.
And since the tangible qualities are hot and cold and so forth, which are
not found save in heavy and light bodies, which through being contrary to
one another are therefore corruptible, it follows that the heavenly
bodies, which by their nature are incorruptible, are sensible to the
sight but not tangible, and therefore neither are they palpable. This is
what Gregory means when he says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that "whatever is
palpable must needs be corruptible." Accordingly the glorified body has
by its nature those qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the
touch, and yet since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it is
in its power thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like manner
it is competent by its nature to resist any other passing body, so that
the latter cannot be in the same place together with it: although,
according to its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it
occupy the same place with another body, and thus offer no resistance to
a passing body. Wherefore according to its nature the glorified body is
palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable to a non-glorified
body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.)
that "our Lord offered His flesh to be handled, which He had brought in
through the closed doors, so as to afford a complete proof that after His
resurrection His body was unchanged in nature though changed in glory."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The incorruptibility of a glorified body does not result
from the nature of its component parts; and it is on account of that
nature that whatever is palpable is corruptible, as stated above. Hence
the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although in a way it is possible for a glorified body to be
in the same place with another body: nevertheless the glorified body has
it in its power to resist at will any one touching it, and thus it is
palpable.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[83] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not
reduced to the real mean that is measured according to equal distance
from the extremes, but to the proportionate mean, according as is most
becoming to the human complexion in each part. Wherefore the touch of
those bodies will be most delightful, because a power always delights in
a becoming object, and is grieved by excess.
�Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed in the
resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?
(2) Whether they will move?
(3) Whether they will move instantaneously?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the glorified bodies will not be agile. For
that which is agile by itself needs not to be carried in order to move.
But the glorified bodies will, after the resurrection, be taken up by the
angels (according to a gloss) in the clouds "to meet Christ, into the
air" (1 Thess. 4:16). Therefore the glorified bodies will not be agile.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no body that moves with labor and pain can be said to be
agile. Yet the glorified bodies will move thus, since the principle of
their movement, namely the soul, moves them counter to their nature, else
they would always move in the same direction. Therefore they are not
agile.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, of all the animal operations sense surpasses movement in
nobility and priority. Yet no property is ascribed to glorified bodies as
perfecting them in sensation. Therefore neither should agility be
ascribed to them as perfecting them in movement.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, nature gives different animals instruments of different
disposition according to their different powers: hence she does not give
instruments of the same disposition to slow as to fleet animals. Now
God's works are much more orderly than those of nature. Since then the
glorified body's members will have the same disposition, shape and
quantity as they now have, it would seem that it will have no agility
other than it has now.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in weakness,
it shall rise in power," that is, according to a gloss, "mobile and
living." But mobility can only signify agility in movement. Therefore the
glorified bodies will be agile.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, slowness of movement would seem especially inconsistent with
the nature of a spirit. But the glorified bodies will be most spiritual
according to 1 Cor. 15:44. Therefore they will be agile.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The glorified body will be altogether subject to the
glorified soul, so that not only will there be nothing in it to resist
the will of the spirit, for it was even so in the case of Adam's body,
but also from the glorified soul there will flow into the body a certain
perfection, whereby it will become adapted to that subjection: and this
perfection is called "the gift of the glorified body." Now the soul is
united to body not only as its form, but also as its mover; and in both
ways the glorified body must needs be most perfectly subject to the
glorified soul. Wherefore even as by the gift of subtlety the body is
wholly subject to the soul as its form, whence it derives its specific
being, so by the gift of agility it is subject to the soul as its mover,
so that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the movements and
actions of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the fifth, i.e. the
heavenly essence, which will then be predominant in the glorified bodies.
But of this we have frequently observed that it does not seem probable
(Q[82], A[1]; Q[83], A[1]). Wherefore it is better to ascribe it to the
soul, whence glory flows to the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Glorified bodies are said to be borne by the angels and
also on the clouds, not as though they needed them, but in order to
signify the reverence which both angels and all creatures will show them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The more the power of the moving soul dominates over the
body, the less is the labor of movement, even though it be counter to the
body's nature. Hence those in whom the motive power is stronger, and
those who through exercise have the body more adapted to obey the moving
spirit, labor less in being moved. And since, after the resurrection, the
soul will perfectly dominate the body, both on account of the perfection
of its own power, and on account of the glorified body's aptitude
resulting from the outflow of glory which it receives from the soul,
there will be no labor in the saints' movements, and thus it may be said
that the bodies of the saints' will be agile.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: By the gift of agility the glorified body will be rendered
apt not only for local movement but also for sensation, and for the
execution of all the other operations of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Even as nature gives to fleeter animals instruments of a
different disposition in shape and quantity, so God will give to the
bodies of the saints a disposition other than that which they have now,
not indeed in shape and quantity, but in that property of glory which is
called agility.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of
movement?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the saints will never use their agility for
the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii,
2), "movement is the act of the imperfect." But there will be no
imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither therefore will there be any
movement.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all movement is on account of some need, because
whatever is in motion is moved for the sake of obtaining some end. But
glorified bodies will have no need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu
et Anima, lxiii [*Cf. Q[70], A[2], ad 1]), "all thou willest will be
there, and nothing that thou willest not." Therefore they will not move.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo ii),
"that which shares the Divine goodness without movement shares it more
excellently than that which shares it with movement." Now the glorified
body shares the Divine goodness more excellently than any other body.
Since then certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will remain
altogether without movement, it seems that much more will human bodies
remain so.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii) that the soul being
established in God will in consequence establish its body. Now the soul
will be so established in God, that in no way will it move away from Him.
Therefore in the body there will be no movement caused by the soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the more noble a body is, the more noble a place is due
to it: wherefore Christ's body which is the most exalted of all has the
highest place of all, according to Heb. 7:26, "Made higher than the
heavens," where a gloss [*Gloss on Heb. 1:3: "On the right hand of the
majesty"] says, "in place and dignity." And again each glorified body
will, in like manner, have a place befitting it according to the measure
of its dignity. Now a fitting place is one of the conditions pertaining
to glory. Since then after the resurrection the glory of the saints will
never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because they will then
have reached the final term of all, it would seem that their bodies will
never leave the place assigned to them, and consequently will not be
moved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 40:31): "They shall run and not be
weary, they shall walk and not faint"; and (Wis. 3:7): "(The just) shall
run to and fro like sparks among the reeds." Therefore there will be some
movement in glorified bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is necessary to suppose that the glorified bodies are
moved sometimes, since even Christ's body was moved in His ascension, and
likewise the bodies of the saints, which will arise from the earth, will
ascend to the empyrean [*The empyrean was the highest of the concentric
spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the
abode of God. Cf. FP, Q[56], A[3]]. But even after they have climbed the
heavens, it is likely that they will sometimes move according as it
pleases them; so that by actually putting into practice that which is in
their power, they may show forth the excellence of Divine wisdom, and
that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by the beauty of the
variety of creatures, in which God's wisdom will shine forth with great
evidence: for sense can only perceive that which is present, although
glorified bodies can perceive from a greater distance than non-glorified
bodies. And yet movement will nowise diminish their happiness which
consists in seeing God, for He will be everywhere present to them; thus
Gregory says of the angels (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that "wherever they are
sent their course lies in God."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Local movement changes nothing that is intrinsic to a
thing, but only that which is without namely place. Hence that which is
moved locally is perfect as to those things which are within (Phys. viii,
7), although it has an imperfection as to place, because while it is in
one place it is in potentiality with regard to another place, since it
cannot be in several places at the same time, for this belongs to God
alone. But this defect is not inconsistent with the perfection of glory,
as neither is the defect whereby a creature is formed from nothing. Hence
such like defects will remain in glorified bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A person is said to need a thing in two ways, namely
absolutely and relatively. One needs absolutely that without which one
cannot retain one's being or one's perfection: and thus movement in
glorified bodies will not be on account of a need, because their
happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we need a thing
relatively when without it some end we have in view cannot be obtained by
us, or not so well, or not in some particular way. It is thus that
movement will be in the blessed on account of need, for they will be
unable to show forth their motive power practically, unless they be in
motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind being in glorified
bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument would prove if the glorified body were unable
even without movement to share the Divine goodness much more perfectly
than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence glorified bodies will be
moved, not in order to gain a perfect participation in the Divine
goodness (since they have this through glory), but in order to show the
soul's power. On the other hand, the movement of the heavenly bodies
could not show their power, except the power they have in moving lower
bodies to generation and corruption, which is not becoming to that state.
Hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Local movement takes nothing away from the stability of the
soul that is established in God, since it does not affect that which is
intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The fitting place assigned to each glorified body according
to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental reward. Nor does
it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the body is outside its
place; because that place pertains to reward, not as actually containing
the body located therein (since nothing flows therefrom into the
glorified body, but rather does it receive splendor therefrom), but as
being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of that place, they will still
continue to rejoice in it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that movement of the saints will be instantaneous.
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "wherever the spirit
listeth there will the body be." Now the movement of the will, whereby
the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. Therefore the body's
movement will be instantaneous.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 8) proves that there is no
movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something moves
instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to a thing
that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so there
would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a vacuum and
that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio of movements in point of
velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the medium. Now the
velocities of any two movements that take place in time must needs be
proportional, since any one space of time is proportional to any other.
But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified body since this
can be in the same place with another body, no matter how this may occur;
even as neither can a vacuum resist a body. Therefore if it moves at all,
it moves instantaneously.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the power of a glorified soul surpasses the power of a
non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now the
non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore the glorified soul
moves the body instantaneously.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatever is moved equally soon to what is near and what
is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement of a
glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is moved, the
time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore Augustine says (QQ.
De Resurrectione, Ep. cii, qu. 1) that "the glorified body reaches
equally soon to any distance, like the sun's ray." Therefore the
glorified body is moved instantaneously.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, whatever is in motion is moved either in time or in an
instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will not be moved
in time, since time will not be then according to Apoc. 10:6. Therefore
this movement will be instantaneous.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, In local movement space. movement and time are equally
divisible, as is demonstrated in Phys. vi, 4. Now the space traversed by
a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement and
the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore this
movement will not be instantaneous.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, a thing cannot be at the same time wholly in one place and
partly in another place, since it would follow that the remaining part is
in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is in
motion is partly in a term "wherefrom" and partly in a term "whereto," as
is proved in Phys. vi, 6: while whatever has been in motion is wholly in
the term whereto the movement is directed; and it is impossible at the
same time for it to be moved and to have been moved. Now that which is
moved instantaneously is being moved and has been moved at the same time.
Therefore the local movement of a glorified body cannot be instantaneous.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that
a glorified body passes from one place to another without passing through
the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another without
passing through the interval, and that consequently it is possible for
the movement of a glorified body like that of the will to be
instantaneous. But this will not hold: because the glorified body will
never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it will
never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move from
one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place to
place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it is
directed to one place after being directed by the intention to another:
and in this sense it is said to move from one place to another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Body Para. 2/5
Hence others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Th. III, Q[23], mem. 3] say that
it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a body,
to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in time, but
that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain infinitude above
the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass through the
interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously. But this is
impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as follows.
Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to B. It is
clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A is not in motion; and in like
manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is past.
Therefore if it is at any time in motion it must needs be neither wholly
in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is either
nowhere, or partly in A, and partly in B, or wholly in some other
intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C and B. But
it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would be a
dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again is it
possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being in some
way in the intervening space. for since B is a place distant from A, it
would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z which is in B is
not continuous with the part which is in A. Therefore it follows that it
is either wholly in C, or partly in C, and partly in some other place
that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore it
follows that Z does not pass form A to B unless first of all it be in all
the intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes from A to B
without ever being moved, which implies a contradiction, because the very
succession of places is local movement. The same applies to any change
whatever having two opposite terms, each of which is a positive entity,
but not to those changes which have only one positive term, the other
being a pure privation, since between affirmation and negation or
privation there is no fixed distance: wherefore that which is in the
negation may be nearer to or more remote from affirmation, and
conversely, by reason of something that causes either of them or disposes
thereto: so that while that which is moved is wholly under a negation it
is changed into affirmation, and "vice versa"; wherefore in such things
"to be changing precedes to be changed," as is proved in Phys. vi, 5. Nor
is there any comparison with the movement of an angel, because being in a
place is predicated equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear
that it is altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to
another, unless it pass through every interval.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Body Para. 3/5
Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified
body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a glorified
body is at the same instant in two or more places together, namely in the
ultimate term, and in all the intervening places, which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Body Para. 4/5
To this, however, they reply that, although it is the same instant
really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different
lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures the
instantaneous, according to its reality and not according to our way of
considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in a
different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are not
simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a
different way does not make it possible for one point of place to contain
things that are locally distant from one another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] Body Para. 5/5
Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves
in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and that
nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in less
time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility of time,
no matter how short a space we may take.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That which is little lacking is as it were not lacking at
all (Phys. ii, 5); wherefore we say: "I do so and so at once," when it is
to be done after a short time. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks
when he says that "wheresoever the will shall be, there shall the body be
forthwith." Or we may say that in the blessed there will never be an
inordinate will: so that they never will wish their body to be
instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently whatever instant the
will shall choose, at that same instant the body will be in whatever
place the will shall determine.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/5
Reply OBJ 2: Some have demurred to this proposition of the
Philosopher's, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the
ratio of one whole movement to another whole movement is not necessarily
as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting medium, but
that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the ratio of
retardations attending the movements on account of the resistance of the
medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed, either fast or
slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although there be no
resistance on the part of the medium; as evidenced in heavenly bodies,
which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet they do not move
instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to the power of the
mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently it is clear that even
if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does not follow that it
moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to the time which that
movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of the mover to the
movable, because the movement is not retarded.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/5
But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in
the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from
the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural
movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in
comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for
the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the
proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made. [*The same
applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio 2 + 1 to 4 + 1
is not as 2 to 4.] And so there would not be the same proportion between
one whole sensible movement and another, as between the retardations
resulting from the resistance of the medium. This is an error of the
imagination, because each part of a movement has as much speed as the
whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as much of the
dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any retardation or
acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its parts, which is
not the case with lines: and consequently the retardation that comes to a
movement is not another part of the movement, whereas in the case of the
lines that which is added is a part of the total line.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 3/5
Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher's argument, as the
Commentator explains, we must take the whole as being one, that is we
must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power, but
also the resistance of the medium through which the movement takes place,
and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the amount of
retardation in the whole movement as being proportionate to the moving
power in comparison with the resisting movable, no matter in what way it
resist, whether by itself or by reason of something extrinsic. For the
movable must needs always resist the mover somewhat, since mover and
moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one another. Now
sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the mover by
itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a contrary
movement, as appears in violent movements, or at least because it has a
place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the mover; and
such like resistance even heavenly bodies offer their movers. Sometimes
the movable resists the power of the mover, by reason only of something
else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural movement of heavy and
light things, because by their very form they are inclined to such a
movement: for the form is an impression of their generator, which is the
mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the part of matter we find no
resistance, neither of a force inclining to a contrary movement nor of a
contrary place, since place is not due to matter except in so far as the
latter, being circumscribed by its dimensions, is perfected by its
natural form. Hence there can be no resistance save on the part of the
medium, and this resistance is connatural to their movement. Sometimes
again the resistance results from both, as may be seen in the movements
of animals.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 4/5
Accordingly when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part
of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is
measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and the
Philosopher's argument does not apply to these, since if there be no
medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. on the other
hand, in those movements where there is resistance on the part of the
medium only, the measure of time is taken only according to the obstacle
on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be removed there will be
no longer an obstacle; and so either it will move instantaneously, or it
will move in an equal time through a vacuum and through a plenum, because
granted that it moves in time through a vacuum, that time will bear some
proportion to the time in which it moves through a plenum. Now it is
possible to imagine another body more subtle in the same proportion than
the body which filled the space, and then if this body fill some other
equal space it will move in as little time through that plenum as it did
previously through a vacuum, since by as much as the subtlety of the
medium is increased by so much is the length of time decreased, and the
more subtle the medium the less it resists. But in those other movements
where resistance is offered by both the movable and the medium, the
quantity of time must be proportionate to the power of the mover as
compared with the resistance of both movable and medium together. Hence
granted that the medium be taken away altogether, or that it cease to
hinder, it does not follow that the movement is instantaneous, but that
the time is measured according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor
will there be any inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a
vacuum, and through a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable,
since the greater the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less is it
naturally inclined to retard the movement. Wherefore it is possible to
imagine so great a subtlety, as will naturally retard the movement less
than does the resistance of the movable, so that the resistance of the
medium will add no retardation to the movement.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 5/5
It is therefore evident that although the medium offer no resistance to
the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible for them to be in the
same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be
instantaneous, because the movable body itself will resist the motive
power from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have said
in reference to the heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the power of a glorified soul surpasses
immeasurably the power of a non-glorified soul, it does not surpass it
infinitely, because both powers are finite: hence it does not follow that
it causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power were simply
infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous movement,
unless the resistance of the movable were overcome altogether. Now
although the resistance of the movable to the mover, that results from
opposition to such a movement by reason of its being inclined to a
contrary movement, can be altogether overcome by a mover of infinite
power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through contrariety towards
the place which the mover intends by the movement cannot be overcome
altogether except by depriving it of its being in such and such a place
or position. For just as white resists black by reason of whiteness, and
all the more according as whiteness is the more distant from blackness,
so a body resists a certain place through having an opposite place and
its resistance is all the greater, according as the distance is greater.
Now it is impossible to take away from a body its being in some place or
position, except one deprive it of its corporeity, by reason of which it
requires a place or position: wherefore so long as it retains the nature
of a body, it can nowise be moved instantaneously, however greater be the
motive power. Now the glorified body will never lose its corporeity, and
therefore it will never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the words of Augustine, the speed is said to be equal
because the excess of one over the other is imperceptible, just as the
time taken by the whole movement is imperceptible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[84] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although after the resurrection the time which is the
measure of the heaven's movement will be no more, there will nevertheless
be time resulting from the before and after in any kind of movement.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the
resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies?
(2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye?
(3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity be seen by a
non-glorified body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether clarity is becoming to the glorified body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that clarity is unbecoming to the glorified body.
Because according to Avicenna (Natural. vi, 2), "every luminous body
consists of transparent parts." But the parts of a glorified body will
not be transparent, since in some of them, such as flesh and bones, earth
is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies are not lightsome.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every lightsome body hides one that is behind it;
wherefore one luminary behind another is eclipsed, and a flame of fire
prevents one seeing what is behind it. But the glorified bodies will not
hide that which is within them, for as Gregory says on Job 28:17, "Gold
or crystal cannot equal it" (Moral. xviii, 48). "There," that is in the
heavenly country, "the grossness of the members will not hide one's mind
from another's eyes, and the very harmony of the body will be evident to
the bodily sight." Therefore those bodies will not be lightsome.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, light and color require a contrary disposition in their
subject, since "light is the extreme point of visibility in an
indeterminate body; color, in a determinate body" (De Sensu et Sensato
iii). But glorified bodies will have color, for as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xxii, 3), "the body's beauty is harmony of parts with a certain
charm of color": and it will be impossible for the glorified bodies to
lack beauty. Therefore the glorified bodies will not be lightsome.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if there be clarity in the glorified bodies, it will
need to be equal in all the parts of the body, just as all the parts will
be equally impassible, subtle and agile. But this is not becoming, since
one part has a greater disposition to clarity than another, for instance
the eye than the hand, the spirits [*"Animalem," as though it were
derived from "animus"---the mind. Cf. FS, Q[50], A[1],3m; FS, Q[52], A[1]
,3m] than the bones, the humors than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it
would seem unfitting for those bodies to be lightsome.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 13:43): "The just shall shine as the
sun in the kingdom of their Father," and (Wis. 3:7): "The just shall
shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in dishonor, it shall
rise in glory," which refers to clarity, as evidenced by the previous
context where the glory of the rising bodies is compared to the clarity
of the stars. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be lightsome.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection the
bodies of the saints will be lightsome, on account of the authority of
Scripture which makes this promise. But the cause of this clarity is
ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then
predominate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we have
often remarked (Q[84], A[1]), it is better to say that this clarity will
result from the overflow of the soul's glory into the body. For whatever
is received into anything is received not according to the mode of the
source whence it flows, but according to the mode of the recipient.
Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received into the
body as corporeal. And consequently according to the greater clarity of
the soul by reason of its greater merit, so too will the body differ in
clarity, as the Apostle affirms (1 Cor. 15:41). Thus in the glorified
body the glory of the soul will be known, even as through a crystal is
known the color of a body contained in a crystal vessel, as Gregory says
on Job 28:17, "Gold or crystal cannot equal it."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Avicenna is speaking of a body that has clarity through the
nature of its component parts. It is not thus but rather by merit of
virtue that the glorified body will have clarity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Gregory compares the glorified body to gold on account of
clarity, and to crystal on account of its transparency. Wherefore
seemingly we should say that they will be both transparent and lightsome;
for that a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to the fact that
the clarity of that body results from the density of the lightsome parts,
and density is opposed to transparency. Then, however, clarity will
result from another cause, as stated above: and the density of the
glorified body will not deprive it of transparency, as neither does the
density of a crystal deprive crystal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal, not
because they are transparent, but on account of this likeness, for as
much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of the
soul enclosed in the glorified body will not be hidden. But the first
explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity of the
glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of Gregory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The glory of the body will not destroy nature but will
perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain the color due to it by reason
of the nature of its component parts, but in addition to this it will
have clarity resulting from the soul's glory. Thus we see bodies which
have color by their nature aglow with the resplendence of the sun, or
from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Even as the clarity of glory will overflow from the soul
into the body according to the mode of the body, and is there otherwise
than in the soul, so again it will overflow into each part of the soul
according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not unreasonable that the
different parts should have clarity in different ways, according as they
are differently disposed thereto by their nature. Nor is there any
comparison with the other gifts of the body, for the various parts of the
body are not differently disposed in their regard.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified
eye?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the clarity of the glorified body is invisible
to the non-glorified eye. For the visible object should be proportionate
to the sight. But a non-glorified eye is not proportionate to see the
clarity of glory, since this differs generically from the clarity of
nature. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will not be seen by a
non-glorified eye.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the clarity of the glorified body will be greater than
the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity of the sun also will
then be greater than it is now, according to Is. 30:26, and the clarity
of the glorified body will be much greater still, for which reason the
sun and the entire world will receive greater clarity. Now a
non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on account
of the greatness of its clarity. Therefore still less will it be able to
gaze on the clarity of a glorified body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a visible object that is opposite the eyes of the seer
must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion to the eye. But the
clarity of a glorified body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes is not
necessarily seen by them: which is evident in the case of the disciples
who saw our Lord's body after the resurrection, without witnessing its
clarity. Therefore this clarity will be invisible to a non-glorified eye.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A gloss on Phil. 3:21, "Made like to the body of His
glory," says: "It will be like the clarity which He had in the
Transfiguration." Now this clarity was seen by the non-glorified eyes of
the disciples. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will be
visible to non-glorified eyes also.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the wicked will be tortured in the judgment by seeing the glory
of the just, according to Wis. 5:2. But they would not fully see their
glory unless they gazed on their clarity. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some have asserted that the clarity of the glorified body
will not be visible to the non-glorified eye, except by a miracle. But
this is impossible, unless this clarity were so named equivocally,
because light by its essence has a natural tendency to move the sight,
and sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even
as the true is in relation to the intellect, and the good to the
appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether incapable of
perceiving a light, either this sight is so named equivocally, or else
this light is. This cannot be said in the point at issue, because then
nothing would be made known to us when we are told that the glorified
bodies will be lightsome: even so a person who says that a dog [*The dog
star] is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who knows no other
dog than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity of a glorified
body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The clarity of glory will differ generically from the
clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its species. Hence just
as the clarity of nature is, by reason of its species, proportionate to
the sight, so too will the clarity of glory be.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as a glorified body is not passible to a passion of
nature but only to a passion of the soul [*Cf. Q[82], A[1]], so in virtue
of its property of glory it acts only by the action of the soul. Now
intense clarity does not disturb the sight, in so far as it acts by the
action of the soul, for thus it rather gives delight, but it disturbs it
in so far as it acts by the action of nature by heating and destroying
the organ of sight, and by scattering the spirits* asunder. [*"Animalem,"
as though it were derived from "animus"---the mind. Cf. FS, Q[50], A[1]
,3m; FS, Q[52], A[1],3m.] Hence, though the clarity of a glorified body
surpasses the clarity of the sun, it does not by its nature disturb the
sight but soothes it: wherefore this clarity is compared to the
jasper-stone (Apoc. 21:11).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The clarity of the glorified body results from the merit of
the will and therefore will be subject to the will, so as to be seen or
not seen according to its command. Therefore it will be in the power of
the glorified body to show forth its clarity or to hide it: and this was
the opinion of Praepositivus.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a
non-glorified body. For the glorified bodies will be lightsome. Now a
lightsome body reveals itself and other things. Therefore the glorified
bodies will be seen of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every body which hides other bodies that are behind it
is necessarily perceived by the sight, from the very fact that the other
things behind it are hidden. Now the glorified body will hide other
bodies that are behind it from being seen, because it will be a colored
body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as quantity is something in a body, so is the
quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity will not be subject to the
will, so that the glorified body be able to be of greater or smaller
quantity. Therefore neither will the quality of visibility be subject to
the will, so that a body be able not to be seen.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, our body will be glorified in being made like to the
body of Christ after the resurrection. Now after the resurrection
Christ's body was not necessarily seen; in fact it vanished from the
sight of the disciples at Emmaus (Lk. 24:31). Therefore neither will the
glorified body be necessarily seen.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, there the body will be in complete obedience to the will.
Therefore as the soul lists the body will be visible or invisible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts on the
sight. Now there is no change in a thing through its acting or not acting
on an external object. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or not seen
without any property pertaining to its perfection being changed.
Consequently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for its body to
be seen or not seen, even as any other action of the body will be in the
soul's power; else the glorified body would not be a perfectly obedient
instrument of its principal agent.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This clarity will be obedient to the glorified body so that
this will be able to show it or hide it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A body's color does not prevent its being transparent
except in so far as it affects the sight, because the sight cannot be
affected by two colors at the same time, so as to perceive them both
perfectly. But the color of the glorified body will be completely in the
power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not act on the sight.
Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to hide a body that is
behind it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[85] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Quantity is inherent to the glorified body itself, nor
would it be possible for the quantity to be altered at the soul's bidding
without the glorified body suffering some alteration incompatible with
its impassibility. Hence there is no comparison between quantity and
visibility, because even this quality whereby it is visible cannot be
removed at the soul's bidding, but the action of that quality will be
suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at the soul's command.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN
(THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned
will rise again. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their
deformities?
(2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible?
(3) Whether they will be impassible?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise again with
their deformities. For that which was appointed as a punishment for sin
should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the lack of limbs that
results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily deformities, are
appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these deformities will not be
taken away from the damned, seeing that they will not have received the
forgiveness of their sins.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as the saints will rise again to final happiness,
so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when the saints
rise again nothing will be taken from them that can pertain to their
perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to the defect or unhappiness of
the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection. But such are
their deformities. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible body, so
is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not be taken from
the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their bodies will not
be agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will their deformity be
taken away.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "The dead shall rise
again incorruptible"; where a gloss says: "The dead, i.e. sinners, or all
the dead in general shall rise again incorruptible, i.e. without the loss
of any limbs." Therefore the wicked will rise again without their
deformities.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of
pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of
sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from
affecting the whole body. Therefore the damned will rise again without
these defects.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises
from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is deformed,
because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole. Deformities of
this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned,
since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. Another
deformity arises from the undue disposition of the parts, by reason of
undue quantity, quality, or place---which deformity is, moreover,
incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these
deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which
sometimes result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful
(Enchiridion xcii) as the Master remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern
masters, however, there are two opinions on this point. For some say that
such like deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the
damned, because they consider that those who are damned are sentenced to
utmost unhappiness wherefrom no affliction should be rebated. But this
would seem unreasonable. For in the restoration of the rising body we
look to its natural perfection rather than to its previous condition:
wherefore those who die under perfect age will rise again in the stature
of youth, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Consequently those who had
natural defects in the body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be
restored without those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless
the demerit of sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such
defects and deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of
punishment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is
about to be damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet have
deformities and defects which one who is about to be damned has not,
while burdened with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had
deformities in this life rise again with them, while the other who had
them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again
without them, though deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the
punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it would
seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he
suffered in this world; which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will
wholly restore the body's nature at the resurrection. Wherefore whatever
defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or weakness of
nature or of natural principles (for instance fever, purblindness, and so
forth) will be entirely done away at the resurrection: whereas those
defects in the human body which are the natural result of its natural
principles, such as heaviness, passibility, and the like, will be in the
bodies of the damned, while they will be removed from the bodies of the
elect by the glory of the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted according
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in this
temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves
temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence although the
damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there they
will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world: but the
Divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe
punishment for eternity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There is no parity between the good and the wicked, because
a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether evil. Hence the final
happiness of the saints requires that they should be altogether exempt
from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of the wicked will not
exclude all good, because "if a thing be wholly evil it destroys itself,"
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5). Hence it is necessary for the
good of their nature to underlie the unhappiness of the damned, which
good is the work of their perfect Creator, Who will restore that same
nature to the perfection of its species.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Slowness of movement is one of those defects which are the
natural result of the principles of the human body; but deformity is not,
and consequently the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be corruptible.
For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be corruptible.
Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the contraries whereof
they are composed even now, else they would not be the same, neither
specifically nor, in consequence, numerically. Therefore they will be
corruptible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if the bodies of the damned will not be corruptible,
this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to glory. But it will
not be by nature, since they will be of the same nature as now; nor will
it be by grace or glory, since they will lack these things altogether.
Therefore they will be corruptible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it would seem inconsistent to withdraw the greatest of
punishments from those who are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Now
death is the greatest of punishments, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
iii, 6). Therefore death should not be withdrawn from the damned, since
they are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Therefore their bodies
will be corruptible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men shall
seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to die, and
death shall fly from them."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment both
in soul and body (Mt. 25:46): "These shall go into everlasting
punishment." But this would not be possible if their bodies were
corruptible. Therefore their bodies will be incorruptible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since in every movement there must needs be a principle
of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a movable in two
ways: first through absence of a principle of movement, secondly through
an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now corruption is a kind of
change: and consequently a body which is corruptible on account of the
nature of its principles may be rendered incorruptible in two ways. First
by the total removal of the principle which leads to corruption, and in
this way the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible. For since the
heaven is the first principle of alteration in virtue of its local
movement, and all other secondary agents act in virtue thereof and as
though moved thereby, it follows that at the cessation of the heavenly
movement there is no longer any agent that can change the body by
altering it from its natural property. Wherefore after the resurrection,
and the cessation of the heavenly movement, there will be no quality
capable of altering the human body from its natural quality. Now
corruption, like generation, is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies
of the damned will be incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of
Divine justice, since living for ever they will be punished for ever.
This is in keeping with the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state
further on (A[3]), even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the
purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corruption of one
thing another is generated.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being
hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because the
conflicting qualities that exist in man's body were withheld by the grace
of innocence from conducing to the body's dissolution: and much more will
they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be wholly subject to
the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the two aforesaid modes
of incorruptibility will be united together in the bodies of the blessed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The contraries of which bodies are composed are conducive
to corruption as secondary principles. For the first active principle
thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the movement of the
heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be corrupted
unless some more powerful cause prevent it: whereas if the heavenly
movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which a body is composed do not
suffice to cause corruption, even in accordance with nature, as explained
above. But the philosophers were ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly
movement; and consequently they held that a body composed of contraries
is without fail corrupted in accordance with nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This incorruptibility will result from nature, not as
though there were some principle of incorruption in the bodies of the
damned, but on account of the cessation of the active principle of
corruption, as shown above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although death is simply the greatest of punishments, yet
nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain respect, to a cessation of
punishments; and consequently the removal of death may contribute to the
increase of punishment. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), "Life
is pleasant to all, for all desire to be . . . But we must not apply this
to a wicked or corrupt life, nor one passed in sorrow." Accordingly just
as life is simply pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows,
so too death, which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the
greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary good,
namely being, with which other things are withdrawn. But in so far as it
deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it is
a remedy for pains, since it puts an end to them. and consequently the
withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making them
everlasting. If however we say that death is penal by reason of the
bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will continue
to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in "everlasting
death," according to the Psalm (48:15): "Death shall feed upon them."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be impassible.
For, according to the Philosopher (Topic. vi), "increase of passion
results in loss of substance." Now "if a finite thing be continually
lessened, it must needs at length be done away" (Phys. i, 4). Therefore
if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be ever suffering,
they will at length be done away and corrupted: and this has been shown
to be false (A[2]). Therefore they will be impassible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every agent likens the patient to itself. If then the
bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the fire will liken them to
itself. Now fire does not consume bodies except in so far as in likening
them to itself it disintegrates them. Therefore if the bodies of the
damned will be passible they will at length be consumed by the fire, and
thus the same conclusion follows as before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those animals, for instance the salamander, which are
said to remain living in fire without being destroyed, are not distressed
by the fire: because an animal is not distressed by bodily pain, unless
the body in some way is hurt thereby. If therefore the bodies of the
damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the fire without being
corrupted, as Augustine asserts (De Civ. Dei xxi, 2,4), it would seem
that they will suffer no distress there: which would not be the case
unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if the bodies of the damned be passible, the pain
resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will surpass all present
bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints will surpass all present joy.
Now in this life it sometimes happens that the soul is severed from the
body through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those bodies will be
passible, the souls will be separate from the bodies through excess of
pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted: which is false. Therefore
those bodies will be impassible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "And we shall be
changed": and a gloss says: "We---the good alone---will be changed with
the unchangeableness and impassibility of glory."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, even as the body co-operates with the soul in merit, so does it
co-operate in sin. Now on account of the former co-operation not only the
soul but also the body will be rewarded after the resurrection. Therefore
in like manner the bodies of the damned will be punished; which would not
be the case were they impassible. Therefore they will be passible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The principal cause of the bodies of the damned not being
consumed by fire will be the Divine justice by which their bodies will be
consigned to everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is served
also by the natural disposition, whether on the part of the passive body
or on the part of the active causes; for since passiveness is a kind of
receptiveness, there are two kinds of passion, corresponding to two ways
in which one thing is receptive of another. For a form may be received
into a subject materially according to its natural being, just as the air
receives heat from fire materially; and corresponding to this manner of
reception there is a kind of passion which we call "passion of nature."
In another way one thing is received into another spiritually by way of
an "intention," just as the likeness of whiteness is received into the
air and in the pupil: this reception is like that whereby the soul
receives the likeness of things: wherefore corresponding to this mode of
reception is another mode of passion which we call "passion of the soul."
Since therefore after the resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly
movement it will be impossible for a body to be altered by its natural
quality, as stated above (A[2]), it will not be possible for any body to
be passive with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of
passion the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will be
incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will still
remain the passion which is after the manner of the soul, since the air
will both receive light from the sun, and will convey the variety of
colors to the sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of passion the
bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified bodies, albeit
they receive something, and are in a manner patient to sensation, will
nevertheless not be passive, since they will receive nothing to distress
or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned, which for this reason are
said to be passible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the passion whereby the
patient is changed from its natural disposition. But this kind of passion
will not be in the bodies of the damned, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The likeness of the agent is in the patient in two ways.
First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus it is in all univocal
agents, for instance a thing that is hot makes another thing hot, and
fire generates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the agent, and thus it
is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes that a form
which is in the agent spiritually is received into the patient
materially: thus the form of the house built by the craftsman is
materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the craftsman. On
the other hand, sometimes it is in the agent materially, but is received
into the patient spiritually: thus whiteness is materially on the wall
wherein it is received, whereas it is spiritually in the pupil and in the
transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue, because the
species which is in the fire materially is received spiritually into the
bodies of the damned; thus it is that the fire will assimilate the bodies
of the damned to itself, without consuming them withal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to the Philosopher (De Prop. Element.), "no
animal can live in fire." Galen also (De simp. medic.) says "that there
is no body which at length is not consumed by fire"; although sometimes
certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such as ebony. The
instance of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since it cannot
remain in the fire without being at last consumed, as do the bodies of
the damned in hell. Nor does it follow that because the bodies of the
damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore are not
tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a natural aptitude
to please or displease the senses, not only as regards its natural action
of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as regards its spiritual
action: since when the sensible object is duly proportionate to the
sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the result when it is in
excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and harmonious sounds are
pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease the hearing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[86] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Pain does not sever the soul from the body, in so far as it
is confined to a power of the soul which feels the pain, but in so far as
the passion of the soul leads to the body being changed from its natural
disposition. Thus it is that we see that through anger the body becomes
heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas after the resurrection it
will be impossible for the body to be changed from its natural
disposition, as stated above (A[2]). Consequently, however great the pain
will be, it will not sever the body from the soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] Out. Para. 1/2
TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS (QQ[86]-99)
OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN, MEN WILL HAVE AT THE JUDGMENT
CONCERNING MERITS AND DEMERITS (THREE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must treat of those things which follow the
resurrection. The first of these to be considered will be the knowledge,
which after rising again, men will have at the judgment, concerning
merits and demerits; the second will be the general judgment itself, as
also the time and place at which it will be; thirdly we shall consider
who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly we shall treat of the
form wherein the judge will come to judge; and fifthly we shall consider
what will be after the judgment, the state of the world and of those who
will have risen again.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether at the judgment every man will know all his sins?
(2) Whether every one will be able to read all that is on another's
conscience?
(3) Whether one will be able at one glance to see all merits and
demerits?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether after the resurrection every one will know what sins he has
committed?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that after the resurrection everyone will not be able to
know all the sins he has committed. For whatever we know, either we
receive it anew through the senses, or we draw it from the treasure house
of the memory. Now after the resurrection men will be unable to perceive
their sins by means of sense, because they will be things of the past,
while sense perceives only the present: and many sins will have escaped
the sinner's memory, and he will be unable to recall them from the
treasure house of his memory. Therefore after rising again one will not
be cognizant of all the sins one has committed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), that "there
are certain books of the conscience, wherein each one's merits are
inscribed." Now one cannot read a thing in a book, unless it be marked
down in the book: and sin leaves its mark upon the conscience according
to a gloss of Origen on Rm. 2:15, "Their conscience bearing witness,"
etc. which mark, seemingly, is nothing else than the guilt or stain.
Since then in many persons the guilt or stain of many sins is blotted out
by grace, it would seem that one cannot read in one's conscience all the
sins one has committed: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the greater the cause the greater the effect. Now the
cause which makes us grieve for the sins which we recall to memory is
charity. Since then charity is perfect in the saints after the
resurrection, they will grieve exceedingly for their sins, if they recall
them to memory: yet this is impossible, seeing that according to Apoc.
21:4, "Sorrow and mourning shall flee away from them." [*The quotation is
from Is. 35:10. The text of the Apocalypse has: "Nor mourning, nor
crying, nor sorrow shall be any more."] Therefore they will not recall
their own sins to memory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, at the resurrection the damned will be to the good they
once did as the blessed to the sins they once committed. Now seemingly
the damned after rising again will have no knowledge of the good they
once did, since this would alleviate their pain considerably. Neither
therefore will the blessed have any knowledge of the sins they had
committed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that "a kind of Divine
energy will come to our aid, so that we shall recall all of our sins to
mind."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, as human judgment is to external evidence, so is the Divine
judgment to the witness of the conscience, according to 1 Kgs. 16:7, "Man
seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Now
man cannot pass a perfect judgment on a matter unless evidence be taken
on all the points that need to be judged. Therefore, since the Divine
judgment is most perfect, it is necessary for the conscience to witness
to everything that has to be judged. But all works, both good and evil,
will have to be judged (2 Cor. 5:10): "We must all be manifested before
the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things
of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil."
Therefore each one's conscience must needs retain all the works he has
done, whether good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to Rm. 2:15,16, "In the day when God shall
judge" each one's conscience will bear witness to him and his thoughts
will accuse and defend him. And since in every judicial hearing, the
witness, the accuser, and the defendant need to be acquainted with the
matter on which judgment has to be pronounced, and since at the general
judgment all the works of men will be submitted to judgment, it will
behoove every man to be cognizant then of all his works. Wherefore each
man's conscience will be as a book containing his deeds on which judgment
will be pronounced, even as in the human court of law we make use of
records. Of these books it is written in the Apocalypse (20:12): "The
books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of
life; and the dead were judged by those things which were written in the
books [Vulg.: 'book'], according to their works." According to
Augustine's exposition (De Civ. Dei xx) the books which are here said to
be opened "denote the saints of the New and Old Testaments in whom God's
commandments are exemplified." Hence Richard of St. Victor (De judic.
potest.) says: "Their hearts will be like the code of law." But the book
of life, of which the text goes on to speak, signifies each one's
conscience, which is said to be one single book, because the one Divine
power will cause all to recall their deeds, and this energy, in so far as
it reminds a man of his deeds, is called the "book of life" [*Cf. FP,
Q[24], A[1], ad 1]. Or else we may refer the first books to the
conscience, and by the second book we may understand the Judge's sentence
as expressed in His providence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although many merits and demerits will have escaped our
memory, yet there will be none of them but will remain somewhat in its
effect, because those merits which are not deadened will remain in the
reward accorded to them, while those that are deadened remain in the
guilt of ingratitude, which is increased through the fact that a man
sinned after receiving grace. In like manner those demerits which are not
blotted out by repentance remain in the debt of punishment due to them,
while those which have been blotted out by repentance remain in the
remembrance of repentance, which they will recall together with their
other merits. Hence in each man there will be something whereby he will
be able to recollect his deeds. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xx), the Divine energy will especially conduce to this.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Each one's conscience will bear certain marks of the deeds
done by him; and it does not follow that these marks are the guilt alone,
as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although charity is now the cause of sorrow for sin, yet
the saints in heaven will be so full of joy, that they will have no room
for sorrow; and so they will not grieve for their sins, but rather will
they rejoice in the Divine mercy, whereby their sins are forgiven them.
Even so do the angels rejoice now in the Divine justice whereby those
whom they guard fall headlong into sin through being abandoned by grace.
and whose salvation none the less they eagerly watch over.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The wicked will know all the good they have done, and this
will not diminish their pain; indeed, it will increase it, because the
greatest sorrow is to have lost many goods: for which reason Boethius
says (De Consol. ii) that "the greatest misfortune is to have been happy."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every one will be able to read all that is in another's
conscience?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that it will be impossible for every one to read all
that is in another's conscience. For the knowledge of those who rise
again will not be clearer than that of the angels, equality with whom is
promised us after the resurrection (Mt. 22:30). Now angels cannot read
one another's thoughts in matters dependent on the free-will, wherefore
they need to speak in order to notify such things to one another [*Cf.
FP, Q[107]]. Therefore after rising again we shall be unable to read what
is contained in another's conscience.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is known is known either in itself, or in its
cause, or in its effect. Now the merits or demerits contained in a
person's conscience cannot be known by another in themselves, because God
alone enters the heart and reads its secrets. Neither will it be possible
for them to be known in their cause, since all will not see God Who alone
can act on the will, whence merits and demerits proceed. Nor again will
it be possible to know them from their effect, since there will be many
demerits, which through being wholly blotted out by repentance will leave
no effect remaining. Therefore it will not be possible for every one to
know all that is in another's conscience.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi in Ep. ad Hebr.), as we have
quoted before (Sent. iv, D, 17): "If thou remember thy sins now, and
frequently confess them before Cod and beg pardon for them, thou wilt
very soon blot them out; but if thou forget them, thou wilt then remember
them unwillingly, when they will be made public, and declared before all
thy friends and foes, and in the presence of the holy angels." Hence it
follows that this publication will be the punishment of man's neglect in
omitting to confess his sins. Therefore the sins which a man has
confessed will not be made known to others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is a relief to know that one has had many associates
in sin, so that one is less ashamed thereof. If therefore every one were
to know the sin of another, each sinner's shame would be much diminished,
which is unlikely. Therefore every one will not know the sins of all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5, "will . . . bring to light the
hidden things of darkness," says: "Deeds and thoughts both good and evil
will then be revealed and made known to all."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the past sins of all the good will be equally blotted out. Yet
we know the sins of some saints, for instance of Magdalen, Peter, and
David. Therefore in like manner the sins of the other elect will be
known, and much more those of the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, At the last and general judgment it behooves the Divine
justice, which now is in many ways hidden, to appear evidently to all.
Now the sentence of one who condemns or rewards cannot be just, unless it
be delivered according to merits and demerits. Therefore just as it
behooves both judge and jury to know the merits of a case, in order to
deliver a just verdict, so is it necessary, in order that the sentence
appear to be just, that all who know the sentence should be acquainted
with the merits. Hence, since every one will know of his reward or
condemnation, so will every one else know of it, and consequently as each
one will recall his own merits or demerits, so will he be cognizant of
those of others. This is the more probable and more common opinion,
although the Master (Sent. iv, D, 43) says the contrary, namely that a
man's sins blotted out by repentance will not be made known to others at
the judgment. But it would follow from this that neither would his
repentance for these sins be perfectly known, which would detract
considerably from the glory of the saints and the praise due to God for
having so mercifully delivered them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All the preceding merits or demerits will come to a certain
amount in the glory or unhappiness of each one rising again. Consequently
through eternal things being seen, all things in their consciences will
be visible, especially as the Divine power will conduce to this so that
the Judge's sentence may appear just to all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It will be possible for a man's merits or demerits to be
made known by their effects as stated above (A[1], ad 1), or by the power
of God, although the power of the created intellect is not sufficient for
this.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The manifestation of his sins to the confusion of the
sinner is a result of his neglect in omitting to confess them. But that
the sins of the saints be revealed cannot be to their confusion or shame,
as neither does it bring confusion to Mary Magdalen that her sins are
publicly recalled in the Church, because shame is "fear of disgrace," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), and this will be impossible in the
blessed. But this manifestation will bring them great glory on account of
the penance they did, even as the confessor hails a man who courageously
confesses great crimes. Sins are said to be blotted out because God sees
them not for the purpose of punishing them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The sinner's confusion will not be diminished, but on the
contrary increased, through his seeing the sins of others, for in seeing
that others are blameworthy he will all the more acknowledge himself to
be blamed. For that confusion be diminished by a cause of this kind is
owing to the fact that shame regards the esteem of men, who esteem more
lightly that which is customary. But then confusion will regard the
esteem of God, which weighs every sin according to the truth, whether it
be the sin of one man or of many.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others,
will be seen by anyone at a single glance?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all merits and demerits, one's own as well
as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance. For things
considered singly are not seen at one glance. Now the damned will
consider their sins singly and will bewail them, wherefore they say (Wis.
5:8): "What hath pride profited us?" Therefore they will not see them all
at a glance.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii) that "we do not arrive
at understanding several things at the same time." Now merits and
demerits, both our own and those of others, will not be visible save to
the intellect. Therefore it will be impossible for them all to be seen at
the same time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect of the damned after the resurrection will
not be clearer than the intellect of the blessed and of the angels is
now, as to the natural knowledge whereby they know things by innate
species. Now by such knowledge the angels do not see several things at
the same time. Therefore neither will the damned be able then to see all
their deeds at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A gloss on Job 8:22, "They . . . shall be clothed with
confusion," says: "As soon as they shall see the Judge, all their evil
deeds will stand before their eyes." Now they will see the Judge
suddenly. Therefore in like manner will they see the evil they have done,
and for the same reason all others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) considers it unfitting that at the
judgment a material book should be read containing the deeds of each
individual written therein, for the reason that it would be impossible to
measure the size of such a book, or the time it would take to read. But
in like manner it would be impossible to estimate the length of time one
would require in order to consider all one's merits and demerits and
those of others, if one saw these various things one after the other.
Therefore we must admit that each one sees them all at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[87] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that one will see all merits and demerits, both one's own and those of
others, at the same time in an instant. This is easily credible with
regard to the blessed, since they will see all things in the Word: and
consequently it is not unreasonable that they should see several things
at the same time. But with regard to the damned, a difficulty presents
itself, since their intellect is not raised so that they can see God and
all else in Him. Wherefore others say that the wicked will see all their
sins and those of others generically at the same time: and this suffices
for the accusation or absolution necessary for the judgment; but that
they will not see them all down to each single one at the same time. But
neither does this seem consonant with the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xx), who says that they will count them all with one glance of the mind;
and what is known generically is not counted. Hence we may choose a
middle way, by holding that they will consider each sin not
instantaneously, but in a very short time, the Divine power coming to
their aid. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) that
"they will be discerned with wondrous rapidity." Nor is this impossible,
since in a space of time, however short, is potentially an infinite
number of instants. This suffices for the replies to the objections on
either side of the question.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE
(FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the general judgment, as to the time and place at
which it will be. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there will be a general judgment?
(2) Whether as regards the debate it will be conducted by word of mouth?
(3) Whether it will take place at an unknown time?
(4) Whether it will take place in the valley of Josaphat?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there will be a general judgment?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there will not be a general judgment. For
according to Nahum 1:9, following the Septuagint version, "God will not
judge the same thing a second time." But God judges now of mans' every
work, by assigning punishments and rewards to each one after death, and
also by rewarding and punishing certain ones in this life for their good
or evil deeds. Therefore it would seem that there will be no other
judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in no judicial inquiry is the sentence carried cut
before judgment is pronounced. But the sentence of the Divine judgment on
man regards the acquisition of the kingdom or exclusion from the kingdom
(Mt. 25:34,41). Therefore since some obtain possession of the kingdom
now, and some are excluded from it for ever, it would seem that there
will be no other judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the reason why certain things are submitted to judgment
is that we may come to a decision about them. Now before the end of the
world each of the damned is awarded his damnation, and each of the
blessed his beatitude. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 12:41): "The men of Nineve shall
rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it." Therefore
there will be a judgment after the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Jn. 5:29): "They that have done good things
shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, but they that have done
evil, unto the resurrection of judgment." Therefore it would seem that
after the resurrection there will be a judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as operation refers to the beginning wherefrom
things receive their being, so judgment belongs to the term, wherein they
are brought to their end. Now we distinguish a twofold operation in God.
One is that whereby He first gave things their being, by fashioning their
nature and by establishing the distinctions which contribute to the
perfection thereof: from this work God is stated to have rested (Gn.
2:2). His other operation is that whereby He works in governing
creatures; and of this it is written (Jn. 5:17): "My Father worketh until
now; and I work." Hence we distinguish in Him a twofold judgment, but in
the reverse order. One corresponds to the work of governance which cannot
be without judgment: and by this judgment each one is judged individually
according to his works, not only as adapted to himself, but also as
adapted to the government of the universe. Hence one man's reward is
delayed for the good of others (Heb. 11:13,39,40), and the punishment of
one conduces to the profit of another. Consequently it is necessary that
there should be another, and that a general judgment corresponding on the
other hand with the first formation of things in being, in order that, to
wit, just as then all things proceeded immediately from God, so at length
the world will receive its ultimate complement, by each one receiving
finally his own personal due. Hence at this judgment the Divine justice
will be made manifest in all things, whereas now it remains hidden, for
as much as at times some persons are dealt with for the profit of others,
otherwise than their manifest works would seem to require. For this same
reason there will then be a general separation of the good from the
wicked, because there will be no further motive for the good to profit by
the wicked, or the wicked by the good: for the sake of which profit the
good are meanwhile mingled with the wicked, so long as this state of life
is governed by Divine providence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Each man is both an individual person and a part of the
whole human race: wherefore a twofold judgment is due to him. One, the
particular judgment, is that to which he will be subjected after death,
when he will receive according as he hath done in the body [*Cf. 2 Cor.
5:10], not indeed entirely but only in part since he will receive not in
the body but only in the soul. The other judgment will be passed on him
as a part of the human race: thus a man is said to be judged according to
human justice, even when judgment is pronounced on the community of which
he is a part. Hence at the general judgment of the whole human race by
the general separation of the good from the wicked, it follows that each
one will be judged. And yet God will not judge "the same thing a second
time," since He will not inflict two punishments for one sin, and the
punishment which before the judgment was not inflicted completely will be
completed at the last judgment, after which the wicked will be tormented
at the same time in body and soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The sentence proper to this general judgment is the general
separation of the good from the wicked, which will not precede this
judgment. Yet even now, as regards the particular sentence on each
individual, the judgment does not at once take full effect since even the
good will receive an increase of reward after the judgment, both from the
added glory of the body and from the completion of the number of the
saints. The wicked also will receive an increase of torment from the
added punishment of the body and from the completion of the number of
damned to be punished, because the more numerous those with whom they
will burn, the more will they themselves burn.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The general judgment will regard more directly the
generality of men than each individual to be judged, as stated above.
Wherefore although before that judgment each one will be certain of his
condemnation or reward, he will not be cognizant of the condemnation or
reward of everyone else. Hence the necessity of the general judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judgment will take place by word of mouth?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this judgment, as regards the inquiry and
sentence, will take place by word of mouth. For according to Augustine
(De Civ. Dei xx) "it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last."
But it would not be uncertain if the things we are told will take place
at the judgment were to be accomplished only in the mind. Therefore this
judgment will take place by word of mouth and not only in the mind.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxvi): "Those at least will hear
the words of the Judge, who have confessed their faith in Him by words."
Now this cannot be understood as referring to the inner word, because
thus all will hear the Judge's words, since all the deeds of other men
will be known to all both good and wicked. Therefore it seems that this
judgment will take place by word of mouth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Christ will judge according to His human form, so as to
be visible in the body to all. Therefore in like manner it seems that He
will speak with the voice of the body, so as to be heard by all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that the book of life
which is mentioned Apoc. 20:12,[15] "is a kind of Divine energy enabling
each one to remember all his good or evil works, and to discern them with
the gaze of the mind, with wondrous rapidity, his knowledge accusing or
defending his conscience, so that all and each will be judged at the same
moment." But if each one's merits were discussed by word of mouth, all
and each could not be judged at the same moment. Therefore it would seem
that this judgment will not take place by word of mouth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the sentence should correspond proportionately to the evidence.
Now the evidence both of accusation and of defense will be mental,
according to Rm. 2:15,16, "Their conscience bearing witness to them, and
their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another
in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men." Therefore seemingly,
this sentence and the entire judgment will take place mentally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is not possible to come to any certain conclusion
about the truth of this question. It is, however, the more probable
opinion that the whole of this judgment, whether as regards the inquiry,
or as regards the accusation of the wicked and the approval of the good
or again as regards the sentence on both, will take place mentally. For
if the deeds of each individual were to be related by word of mouth, this
would require an inconceivable length of time. Thus Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xx) that "if we suppose the book, from the pages of which all
will be judged according to Apoc. 20, to be a material book, who will be
able to conceive its size and length? or the length of time required for
the reading of a book that contains the entire life of every individual?"
Nor is less time requisite for telling by word of mouth the deeds of each
individual, than for reading them if they were written in a material
book. Hence, probably we should understand that the details set forth in
Mt. 25 will be fulfilled not by word of mouth but mentally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The reason why Augustine says that "it is uncertain how
many days this judgment will last" is precisely because it is not certain
whether it will take place mentally or by word of mouth. For if it were
to take place by word of mouth, a considerable time would be necessary.
but if mentally, it is possible for it to be accomplished in an instant.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even if the judgment is accomplished solely in the mind,
the saying of Gregory stands, since though all will be cognizant of their
own and of others' deeds, as a result of the Divine energy which the
Gospel describes as speech (Mt. 25:84-46), nevertheless those who have
had the faith which they received through God's words will be judged from
those very words, for it is written (Rm. 2:12): "Whosoever have sinned in
the Law shall be judged by the Law." Hence in a special way something
will be said to those who had been believers, which will not be said to
unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Christ will appear in body, so that the Judge may be
recognized in the body by all, and it is possible for this to take place
suddenly. But speech which is measured by time would require an immense
length of time, if the judgment took place by word of mouth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the time of the future judgment is unknown?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the time of the future judgment is not
unknown. For just as the holy Fathers looked forward to the first coming,
so do we look forward to the second. But the holy Fathers knew the time
of the first coming, as proved by the number of weeks mentioned in Daniel
9: wherefore the Jews are reproached for not knowing the time of Christ's
coming (Lk. 12:56): "You hypocrites, you know how to discern the face of
the heaven and of the earth, but how is it that you do not discern this
time?" Therefore it would seem that the time of the second coming when
God will come to judgment should also be certified to us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we arrive by means of signs at the knowledge of the
things signified. Now many signs of the coming judgment are declared to
us in Scripture (Mt. 24, Mk. 13, Lk. 21). Therefore we can arrive at the
knowledge of that time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:11): "It is on us [*'These
things . . . are written for our correction, upon whom the ends of the
world are come'] that the ends of the world are come," and (1 Jn. 2:18):
"Little children, it is the last hour," etc. Since then it is a long time
since these things were said, it would seem that now at least we can know
that the last judgment is nigh.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, there is no need for the time of the judgment to be
hidden, except that each one may be careful to prepare himself for
judgment, being in ignorance of the appointed time. Yet the same care
would still be necessary even were the time known for certain, because
each one is uncertain about the time of his death, of which Augustine
says (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix) that "as each one's last day finds him, so
will the world's last day find him." Therefore there is no necessity for
the time of the judgment to be uncertain.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 13:32): "Of that day or hour no man
knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father." The
Son, however, is said not to know in so far as He does not impart the
knowledge to us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (1 Thess. 5:2): "The day of the Lord shall so
come as a thief in the night." Therefore seemingly, as the coming of a
thief in the night is altogether uncertain, the day of the last judgment
is altogether uncertain.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God is the cause of things by His knowledge [*Cf. FP,
Q[14], A[8]]. Now He communicates both these things to His creatures,
since He both endows some with the power of action on others whereof they
are the cause, and bestows on some the knowledge of things. But in both
cases He reserves something to Himself, for He operates certain things
wherein no creature co-operates with Him, and again He knows certain
things which are unknown to any mere creature. Now this should apply to
none more than to those things which are subject to the Divine power
alone, and in which no creature co-operates with Him. Such is the end of
the world when the day of judgment will come. For the world will come to
an end by no created cause, even as it derived its existence immediately
from God. Wherefore the knowledge of the end of the world is fittingly
reserved to God. Indeed our Lord seems to assign this very reason when He
said (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the times or moments which
the Father hath put in His own power," as though He were to say, "which
are reserved to His power alone."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: At His first coming Christ came secretly according to Is.
45:15, "Verily Thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour."
Hence, that He might be recognized by believers, it was necessary for the
time to be fixed beforehand with certainty. On the other hand, at the
second coming, He will come openly, according to Ps. 49:3, "God shall
come manifestly." Consequently there can be no error affecting the
knowledge of His coming. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says, in his letter to Hesychius concerning
the day of judgment (Ep. cxcix), "the signs mentioned in the Gospels do
not all refer to the second advent which will happen at the end of the
world, but some of them belong to the time of the sack of Jerusalem,
which is now a thing of the past, while some, in fact many of them, refer
to the advent whereby He comes daily to the Church, whom He visits
spiritually when He dwells in us by faith and love." Moreover, the
details mentioned in the Gospels and Epistles in connection with the last
advent are not sufficient to enable us to determine the time of the
judgment, for the trials that are foretold as announcing the proximity of
Christ's coming occurred even at the time of the Early Church, in a
degree sometimes more sometimes less marked; so that even the days of the
apostles were called the last days (Acts 2:17) when Peter expounded the
saying of Joel 2:28, "It shall come to pass in the last days," etc., as
referring to that time. Yet it was already a long time since then: and
sometimes there were more and sometimes less afflictions in the Church.
Consequently it is impossible to decide after how long a time it will
take place, nor fix the month, year, century, or thousand years as
Augustine says in the same book (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix). And even if we
are to believe that at the end these calamities will be more frequent, it
is impossible to fix what amount of such calamities will immediately
precede the judgment day or the coming of Antichrist, since even at the
time of the Early Church persecutions were so bitter, and the corruptions
of error were so numerous, that some looked forward to the coming of
Antichrist as being near or imminent; as related in Eusebius' History of
the Church (vi, 7) and in Jerome's book De Viris Illustribus lii.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The statement, "It is the last hour" and similar
expressions that are to be found in Scripture do not enable us to know
the exact length of time. For they are not intended to indicate a short
length of time, but to signify the last state of the world, which is the
last age of all, and it is not stated definitely how long this will last.
Thus neither is fixed duration appointed to old age, which is the last
age of man, since sometimes it is seen to last as long as or even longer
than all the previous ages, as Augustine remarks (Qq. 83, qu. lviii).
Hence also the Apostle (2 Thess. 2:2) disclaims the false signification
which some had given to his words, by believing that the day of the Lord
was already at hand.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Notwithstanding the uncertainty of death, the uncertainty
of the judgment conduces to watchfulness in two ways. First, as regards
the thing ignored, since its delay is equal to the length of man's life,
so that on either side uncertainty provokes him to greater care.
Secondly, for the reason that a man is careful not only of his own
person, but also of his family, or of his city or kingdom, or of the
whole Church, the length of whose duration is not dependent on the length
of man's life. And yet it behooves each of these to be so ordered that
the day of the Lord find us not unprepared.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judgment will take place in the valley of Josaphat?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the judgment will not take place in the valley
of Josaphat or in the surrounding locality. For at least it will be
necessary for those to be judged to stand on the ground, and those alone
to be raised aloft whose business it will be to judge. But the whole land
of promise would not be able to contain the multitude of those who are to
be judged. Therefore it is impossible for the judgment to take place in
the neighborhood of that valley.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to Christ in His human form judgment is given that He
may judge justly, since He was judged unjustly in the court of Pilate,
and bore the sentence of an unjust judgment on Golgotha. Therefore these
places would be more suitably appointed for the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, clouds result from the exhalation of vapors. But then
there will be no evaporation or exhalation. Therefore it will be
impossible for the just to be "taken up . . . in the clouds to meet
Christ, into the air": and consequently it will be necessary for both
good and wicked to be on the earth, so that a much larger place than this
valley will be required.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Joel 3:2): "I will gather together all
nations and will bring them down into the valley of Josaphat, and I will
plead with them there."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Acts 1:11): "(This Jesus) . . . shall so come as
you have seen Him going into heaven." Now He ascended into heaven from
Mount Olivet which overlooks the valley of Josaphat. Therefore He will
come to judge in the neighborhood of that place.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We cannot know with any great certainty the manner in
which this judgment will take place, nor how men will gather together to
the place of judgment; but it may be gathered from Scripture that in all
probability He will descend in the neighborhood of Mount Olivet, even as
He ascended from there, so as to show that He who descends is the same as
He who ascended.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A great multitude can be enclosed in a small space. And all
that is required is that in the neighborhood of that locality there be a
space, however great, to contain the multitude of those who are to be
judged, provided that Christ can be seen thence since being raised in the
air, and shining with exceeding glory, He will be visible from a great
distance.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although through being sentenced unjustly Christ merited
His judiciary power, He will not judge with the appearance of infirmity
wherein He was judged unjustly, but under the appearance of glory wherein
He ascended to the Father. Hence the place of His ascension is more
suitable to the judgment than the place where He was condemned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: In the opinion of some the name of clouds is here given to
certain condensations of the light shining from the bodies of the saints,
and not to evaporations from earth and water. Or we may say that those
clouds will be produced by Divine power in order to show the parallel
between His coming to judge and His ascension; so that He Who ascended in
a cloud may come to judgment in a cloud.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[88] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Again the cloud on account of its refreshing influence indicates the
mercy of the Judge.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THOSE WHO WILL JUDGE AND OF THOSE WHO WILL BE JUDGED AT THE GENERAL
JUDGMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must next consider who will judge and who will be judged at the
general judgment. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any men will judge together with Christ?
(2) Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty?
(3) Whether the angels also will judge?
(4) Whether the demons will carry out the Judge's sentence on the damned?
(5) Whether all men will come up for judgment?
(6) Whether any of the good will be judged?
(7) Whether any of the wicked will be judged?
(8) Whether the angels also will be judged?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any men will judge together with Christ?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no men will judge with Christ. For it is
written (Jn. 5:22,23): "The Father . . . hath given all judgment to the
Son, that all men may honor the Son." Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever judges has authority over that which he judges.
Now those things about which the coming judgment will have to be, such as
human merits and demerits, are subject to Divine authority alone.
Therefore no one is competent to judge of those things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, this judgment will take place not vocally but mentally.
Now the publication of merits and demerits in the hearts of all men
(which is like an accusation or approval), or the repayment of punishment
and reward (which is like the pronouncement of the sentence) will be the
work of God alone. Therefore none but Christ Who is God will judge.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 19:28): "You also shall sit on
twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel." Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, "The Lord will enter into judgment with the ancients of His
people" (Is. 3:14). Therefore it would seem that others also will judge
together with Christ.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To judge has several significations. First it is used
causally as it were, when we say it of that which proves that some
person ought to be judged. In this sense the expression is used of
certain people in comparison, in so far as some are shown to be deserving
of judgment through being compared with others: for instance (Mt. 12:41):
"The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall
condemn it." To rise in judgment thus is common to the good and the
wicked. Secondly, the expression "to judge" is used equivalently, so to
say; for consent to an action is considered equivalent to doing it.
Wherefore those who will consent with Christ the Judge, by approving His
sentence, will be said to judge. In this sense it will belong to all the
elect to judge: wherefore it is written (Wis. 3:7,8): "The just . . .
shall judge nations." Thirdly, a person is said to judge assessorially
and by similitude, because he is like the judge in that his seat* is
raised above the others: and thus assessors are said to judge. [*An
"assessor" is one who "sits by" the judge.] Some say that the perfect to
whom judiciary power is promised (Mt. 19:28) will judge in this sense,
namely that they will be raised to the dignity of assessors, because they
will appear above others at the judgment, and go forth "to meet Christ,
into the air." But this apparently does not suffice for the fulfilment of
our Lord's promise (Mt. 19:28): "You shall sit . . . judging," for He
would seem to make "judging" something additional to "sitting." Hence
there is a fourth way of judging, which will be competent to perfect men
as containing the decrees of Divine justice according to which men will
be judged: thus a book containing the law might be said to judge:
wherefore it is written (Apoc. 20:12): "(Judgment took her seat*) and the
books were opened." [*The words in brackets are not in the Vulgate. Apoc.
20:4 we find: "I saw seats, and they sat upon them and judgment was given
to them."] Richard of St. Victor expounds this judging in this way (De
judic. potest.), wherefore he says: "Those who persevere in Divine
contemplation, who read every day the book of wisdom, transcribe, so to
speak, in their hearts whatever they grasp by their clear insight of the
truth"; and further on: "What else are the hearts of those who judge,
divinely instructed in all truth, but a codex of the law?" Since,
however, judging denotes an action exercised on another person, it
follows that, properly speaking, he is said to judge who pronounces
judgment on another. But this happens in two ways. First, by his own
authority: and this belongs to the one who has dominion and power over
others, and to whose ruling those who are judged are subject, wherefore
it belongs to him to pass judgment on them. In this sense to judge
belongs to God alone. Secondly, to judge is to acquaint others of the
sentence delivered by another's authority, that is to announce the
verdict already given. In this way perfect men will judge, because they
will lead others to the knowledge of Divine justice, that these may know
what is due to them on account of their merits: so that this very
revelation of justice is called judgment. Hence Richard of St. Victor
says (De judic. potest.) that for "the judges to open the books of their
decree in the presence of those who are to be judged signifies that they
open their hearts to the gaze of all those who are below them, and that
they reveal their knowledge in whatever pertains to the judgment."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection considers the judgment of authority which
belongs to Christ alone: and the same answer applies to the Second
Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is no reason why some of the saints should not reveal
certain things to others, either by way of enlightenment, as the higher
angels enlighten the lower [*Cf. FP, Q[106]],: or by way of speech as the
lower angels speak to the higher [*Cf. FP, Q[107], A[2]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the judicial power does not correspond to
voluntary poverty. For it was promised to none but the twelve apostles
(Mt. 19:28): "You shall sit on twelve seats, judging," etc. Since then
those who are voluntarily poor are not all apostles, it would seem that
the judicial power is not competent to all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to offer sacrifice to God of one's own body is more than
to do so of outward things. Now martyrs and also virgins offer sacrifice
to God of their own body. whereas the voluntarily poor offer sacrifice of
outward things. Therefore the sublimity of the judicial power is more in
keeping with martyrs and virgins than with those who are voluntarily poor.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 5:45): "There is one that accuseth
you, Moses in whom you trust---because you believe not his voice,"
according to a gloss, and (Jn. 12:48): "The word that I have spoken shall
judge him in the last day." Therefore the fact that a man propounds a
law, or exhorts men by word to lead a good life, gives him the right to
judge those who scorn his utterances. But this belongs to doctors.
Therefore it is more competent to doctors than to those who are poor
voluntarily.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Christ through being judged unjustly merited as man to
be judge of all in His human nature [*Cf. TP, Q[59], A[6]], according to
Jn. 5:27, "He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son
of man." Now those who suffer persecution for justice' sake are judged
unjustly. Therefore the judicial power is competent to them rather than
to the voluntarily poor.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a superior is not judged by his inferior. Now many who
will have made lawful use of riches will have greater merit than many of
the voluntarily poor. Therefore the voluntarily poor will not judge where
those are to be judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:6): "He saveth not the wicked,
and He giveth judgment to the poor."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, a gloss on Mt. 19:28, "You who have left all things' [*Vulg.:
'You who have followed Me']" says: "Those who left all things and
followed God will be the judges; those who made right use of what they
had lawfully will be judged," and thus the same conclusion follows as
before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The judicial power is due especially to poverty on three
counts. First, by reason of congruity, since voluntary poverty belongs to
those who despise all the things of the world and cleave to Christ alone.
Consequently there is nothing in them to turn away their judgment from
justice, so that they are rendered competent to be judges as loving the
truth of justice above all things. Secondly, by reason of merit, since
exaltation corresponds by way of merit to humility. Now of all the things
that make man contemptible in this world humility is the chief: and for
this reason the excellence of judicial power is promised to the poor, so
that he who humbles himself for Christ's sake shall be exalted. Thirdly,
because poverty disposes a man to the aforesaid manner of judging. For
the reason why one of the saints will be said to judge as stated above
[*Cf. A[1]], is that he will have the heart instructed in all Divine
truth which he will be thus able to make known to others. Now in the
advancement to perfection, the first thing that occurs to be renounced is
external wealth, because this is the last thing of all to be acquired.
And that which is last in the order of generation is the first in the
order of destruction: wherefore among the beatitudes whereby we advance
to perfection, the first place is given to poverty. Thus judicial power
corresponds to poverty, in so far as this is the disposition to the
aforesaid perfection. Hence also it is that this same power is not
promised to all who are voluntarily poor, but to those who leave all and
follow Christ in accordance with the perfection of life.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx), "we must not
imagine that because He says that they will sit on twelve seats only
twelve men will judge with Him. else since we read that Matthias was
appointed apostle in the place of the traitor Judas, Paul who worked more
than the rest will have nowhere to sit as judge." Hence "the number
twelve," as he states (De Civ. Dei xx), "signifies the whole multitude of
those who will judge, because the two parts of seven, namely three and
four, being multiplied together make twelve." Moreover twelve is a
perfect number, being the double of six, which is a perfect number.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Or, speaking literally, He spoke to the twelve apostles in whose person
he made this promise to all who follow them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Virginity and martyrdom do not dispose man to retain the
precepts of Divine justice in his heart in the same degree as poverty
does: even so, on the other hand, outward riches choke the word of God by
the cares which they entail (Lk. 8:14). Or we may reply that poverty does
not suffice alone to merit judicial power, but is the fundamental part of
that perfection to which the judicial power corresponds. Wherefore among
those things regarding perfection which follow after poverty we may
reckon both virginity and martyrdom and all the works of perfection: yet
they do not rank as high as poverty, since the beginning of a thing is
its chief part.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who propounded the law or urged men to good will judge,
in the causal (Cf. A[1]) sense, because others will be judged in
reference to the words he has uttered or propounded. Hence the judicial
power does not properly correspond to preaching or teaching. or we may
reply that, as some say, three things are requisite for the judicial
power; first, that one renounce temporal cares, lest the mind be hindered
from the contemplation of wisdom; secondly that one possess Divine
justice by way of habit both as to knowledge and as to observance;
thirdly that one should have taught others this same justice; and this
teaching will be the perfection whereby a man merits to have judicial
power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Christ humbled Himself in that He was judged unjustly; for
"He was offered because it was His own will" (Is. 53:7): and by His
humility He merited His exaltation to judicial power, since all things
are made subject to Him (Phil. 2:8,9). Hence, judicial power is more due
to them who humble themselves of their own will by renouncing temporal
goods, on account of which men are honored by worldlings, than to those
who are humbled by others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: An inferior cannot judge a superior by his own authority,
but he can do so by the authority of a superior, as in the case of a
judge-delegate. Hence it is not unfitting that it be granted to the poor
as an accidental reward to judge others, even those who have higher merit
in respect of the essential reward.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels will judge?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels will judge. For it is written (Mt.
25:31): "When the Son of man shall come in His majesty, and all the
angels with Him." Now He is speaking of His coming to judgment. Therefore
it would seem that also the angels will judge.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the orders of the angels take their names from the
offices which they fulfill. Now one of the angelic orders is that of the
Thrones, which would seem to pertain to the judicial power, since a
throne is the "judicial bench, a royal seat, a professor's chair" [*Cf.
St. Isidore, Etym. vii, 5]. Therefore some of the angels will judge.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, equality with the angels is promised the saints after
this life (Mt. 22:30). If then men will have this power of judging, much
more will the angels have it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 5:27): "He hath given Him power to
judgment, because He is the Son of man." But the angels have not the
human nature in common with Him. Neither therefore do they share with Him
in the judicial power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the same person is not judge and judge's minister. Now in this
judgment the angels will act as ministers of the Judge and, according to
Mt. 13:41: "The Son of man shall send His angels and they shall gather
out of His kingdom all scandals." Therefore the angels will not judge.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The judge's assessors must be conformed to the judge. Now
judgment is ascribed to the Son of man because He will appear to all,
both good and wicked, in His human nature, although the whole Trinity
will judge by authority. Consequently it behooves also the Judge's
assessors to have the human nature, so as to be visible to all, both good
and wicked. Hence it is not fitting for the angels to judge, although in
a certain sense we may say that the angels will judge, namely by
approving the sentence [*Cf. A[1]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As a gloss on this passage observes, the angels will come
with Christ, not to judge, but "as witnesses of men's deeds because it
was under their guardianship that men did well or ill."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The name of Thrones is given to angels in reference to the
judgment which God is ever pronouncing, by governing all things with
supreme justice: of which judgment angels are in a way the executors and
promulgators. On the other hand, the judgment of men by the man Christ
will require human assessors.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Equality with angels is promised to men as regards the
essential reward. But nothing hinders an accidental reward from being
bestowed on men to the exclusion of the angels, as in the case of the
virgins' and martyrs' crowns: and the same may be said of the judicial
power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the demons will carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the demons will not carry out the sentence of
the Judge on the damned after the day of judgment. For, according to the
Apostle (1 Cor. 15:24): "He will then bring to naught [*Vulg.: 'When He
shall have brought to naught', etc.] all principality, and power, and
virtue." Therefore all supremacy will cease then. But the carrying out of
the Judge's sentence implies some kind of supremacy. Therefore after the
judgment day the demons will not carry out the Judge's sentence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the demons sinned more grievously than men. Therefore it
is not just that men should be tortured by demons.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the demons suggest evil things to men, so good
angels suggest good things. Now it will not be the duty of the good
angels to reward the good, but this will be done by God, immediately by
Himself. Therefore neither will it be the duty of the demons to punish
the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Sinners have subjected themselves to the devil by
sinning. Therefore it is just that they should be subjected to him in
their punishments, and punished by him as it were.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The Master in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47 mentions two
opinions on this question, both of which seem consistent with Divine
justice, because it is just for man to be subjected to the devil for
having sinned, and yet it is unjust for the demon to be over him.
Accordingly the opinion which holds that after the judgment day the
demons will not be placed over men to punish them, regards the order of
Divine justice on the part of the demons punishing; while the contrary
opinion regards the order of Divine justice on the part of the men
punished.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Which of these opinions is nearer the truth we cannot know for certain.
Yet I think it truer to say that just as, among the saved, order will be
observed so that some will be enlightened and perfected by others
(because all the orders of the heavenly hierarchies will continue for
ever) [*Cf. FP, Q[108], AA[7],8], so, too, will order be observed in
punishments, men being punished by demons, lest the Divine order, whereby
the angels are placed between the human nature and the Divine, be
entirely set aside. Wherefore just as the Divine illuminations are
conveyed to men by the good angels, so too the demons execute the Divine
justice on the wicked. Nor does this in any way diminish the punishment
of the demons, since even in torturing others they are themselves
tortured, because then the fellowship of the unhappy will not lessen but
will increase unhappiness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The supremacy which, it is declared, will be brought to
nought by Christ in the time to come must be taken in the sense of the
supremacy which is in keeping with the state of this world: wherein men
are placed over men, angels over men, angels over angels, demons over
demons, and demons over men; in every case so as either to lead towards
the end or to lead astray from the end. But then when all things will
have attained to that end there will be no supremacy to lead astray from
the end or to lead to it, but only that which maintains in the end, good
or evil.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the demerit of the demons does not require that
they be placed over men, since they made men subject to them unjustly,
yet this is required by the order of their nature in relation to human
nature: since "natural goods remain in them unimpaired" as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The good angels are not the cause of the principal reward
in the elect, because all receive this immediately from God. Nevertheless
the angels are the cause of certain accidental rewards in men, in so far
as the higher angels enlighten those beneath them, both angels and men,
concerning certain hidden things of God, which do not belong to the
essence of beatitude. In like manner the damned will receive their
principal punishment immediately from God, namely the everlasting
banishment from the Divine vision: but there is no reason why the demons
should not torture men with other sensible punishments. There is,
however, this difference: that merit exalts, whereas sin debases.
Wherefore since the angelic nature is higher than the human, some on
account of the excellence of their merit will be so far exalted as to be
raised above the angels both in nature and rewards [*Cf. FP, Q[108], A[8]
], so that some angels will be enlightened by some men. On the other
hand, no human sinners will, on account of a certain degree of virtue,
attain to the eminence that attaches to the nature of the demons.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all men will be present at the judgment?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that men will not all be present at the judgment.
For it is written (Mt. 19:28): "You . . . shall sit on twelve seats,
judging the twelve tribes of Israel." But all men do not belong to those
twelve tribes. Therefore it would seem that men will not all be present
at the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the same apparently is to be gathered from Ps. 1:5, "The
wicked shall not rise again in judgment."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man is brought to judgment that his merits may be
discussed. But some there are who have acquired no merits, such as
children who died before reaching the perfect age. Therefore they need
not be present at the judgment. Now there are many such. Therefore it
would seem that not all will be present.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 10:42) that Christ "was appointed
by God to be judge of the living and of the dead." Now this division
comprises all men, no matter how the living be distinct from the dead.
Therefore all men will be present at the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Apoc. 1:7): "Behold He cometh with the clouds,
and every eye shall see Him." Now this would not be so unless all were
present at the judgment. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The judicial power was bestowed on Christ as man, in
reward for the humility which He showed forth in His passion. Now in His
passion He shed His blood for all in point of sufficiency, although
through meeting with an obstacle in some, it had not its effect in all.
Therefore it is fitting that all men should assemble at the judgment, to
see His exaltation in His human nature, in respect of which "He was
appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 5), "it does not follow
from the saying, 'Judging the twelve tribes of Israel,' that the tribe of
Levi, which is the thirteenth, is not to be judged, or that they will
judge that people alone, and not other nations." The reason why all other
nations are denoted by the twelve tribes is because they were called by
Christ to take the place of the twelve tribes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The words, "The wicked shall not rise in judgment," if
referred to all sinners, mean that they will not arise to judge. But if
the wicked denote unbelievers, the sense is that they will not arise to
be judged, because they are "already judged" (Jn. 3:18). All, however,
will rise again to assemble at the judgment and witness the glory of the
Judge.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even children who have died before reaching the perfect age
will be present at the judgment, not to be judged, but to see the Judge's
glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the good will be judged at the judgment?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that none of the good will be judged at the
judgment. For it is declared (Jn. 3:18) that "he that believeth in Him is
not judged." Now all the good believed in Him. Therefore they will not be
judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those who are uncertain of their bliss are not blessed:
whence Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi) that the demons were never
blessed. But the saints are now blessed. Therefore they are certain of
their bliss. Now what is certain is not submitted to judgment. Therefore
the good will not be judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fear is incompatible with bliss. But the last judgment,
which above all is described as terrible, cannot take place without
inspiring fear into those who are to be judged. Hence Gregory observes on
Job 41:16 "When he shall raise him up, the angels shall fear," etc.
(Moral. xxxiv): "Consider how the conscience of the wicked will then be
troubled when even the just are disturbed about their life." Therefore
the blessed will not be judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It would seem that all the good will be judged, since
it is written (2 Cor. 5:10): "We must all be manifested before the
judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of
the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil." Now
there is nothing else to be judged. Therefore all, even the good, will be
judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the "general" includes all. Now this is called the general
judgment. Therefore all will be judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The judgment comprises two things, namely the discussion
of merits and the payment of rewards. As regards the payment of rewards,
all will be judged, even the good, since the Divine sentence will appoint
to each one the reward corresponding to his merit. But there is no
discussion of merits save where good and evil merits are mingled
together. Now those who build on the foundation of faith, "gold, silver,
and precious stones" (1 Cor. 3:12), by devoting themselves wholly to the
Divine service, and who have no notable admixture of evil merit, are not
subjected to a discussion of their merits. Such are those who have
entirely renounced the things of the world and are solicitously
thoughtful of the things that are of God: wherefore they will be saved
but will not be judged. Others, however, build on the foundation of
faith, wood, hay, stubble [*Cf. FS, Q[89], A[2]]; they, in fact, love
worldly things and are busy about earthly concerns, yet so as to prefer
nothing to Christ, but strive to redeem their sins with alms, and these
have an admixture of good with evil merits. Hence they are subjected to a
discussion of their merits, and consequently in this account will be
judged, and yet they will be saved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since punishment is the effect of justice, while reward is
the effect of mercy, it follows that punishment is more especially
ascribed antonomastically to judgment which is the act of justice; so
that judgment is sometimes used to express condemnation. It is thus that
we are to understand the words quoted, as a gloss on the passage remarks.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The merits of the elect will be discussed, not to remove
the uncertainty of their beatitude from the hearts of those who are to be
judged, but that it may be made manifest to us that their good merits
outweigh their evil merits, and thus God's justice be proved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Gregory is speaking of the just who will still be in mortal
flesh, wherefore he had already said: "Those who will still be in the
body, although already brave and perfect, yet through being still in the
flesh must needs be troubled with fear in the midst of such a whirlwind
of terror." Hence it is clear that this fear refers to the time
immediately before the judgment, most terrible indeed to the wicked, but
not to the good, who will have no apprehension of evil.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
The arguments in the contrary sense consider judgment as regards the
payment of rewards.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the wicked will be judged?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that none of the wicked will be judged. For even as
damnation is certain in the case of unbelievers, so is it in the case of
those who die in mortal sin. Now it is declared because of the certainty
of damnation (Jn. 3:18): "He that believeth not is already judged."
Therefore in like manner neither will other sinners be judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the voice of the Judge is most terrible to those who are
condemned by His judgment. Now according to the text of Sentent. iv, D,
47 and in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxvi) "the Judge will not address
Himself to unbelievers." If therefore He were to address Himself to the
believers about to be condemned, the unbelievers would reap a benefit
from their unbelief, which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It would seem that all the wicked are to be judged,
because all the wicked will be sentenced to punishment according to the
degree of their guilt. But this cannot be done without a judicial
pronouncement. Therefore all the wicked will be judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The judgment as regards the sentencing to punishment for
sin concerns all the wicked. whereas the judgment as regards the
discussion of merits concerns only believers. Because in unbelievers the
foundation of faith is lacking, without which all subsequent works are
deprived of the perfection of a right intention, so that in them there is
no admixture of good and evil works or merits requiring discussion. But
believers in whom the foundation of faith remains, have at least a
praiseworthy act of faith, which though it is not meritorious without
charity, yet is in itself directed to merit, and consequently they will
be subjected to the discussion of merits. Consequently, believers who
were at least counted as citizens of the City of God will be judged as
citizens, and sentence of death will not be passed on them without a
discussion of their merits; whereas unbelievers will be condemned as
foes, who are wont among men to be exterminated without their merits
being discussed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although it is certain that those who die in mortal sin
will be damned, nevertheless since they have an admixture of certain
things connected with meriting well, it behooves, for the manifestation
of Divine justice, that their merits be subjected to discussion, in order
to make it clear that they are justly banished from the city of the
saints, of which they appeared outwardly to be citizens.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Considered under this special aspect the words addressed to
the believers about to be condemned will not be terrible, because they
will reveal in them certain things pleasing to them, which it will be
impossible to find in unbelievers, since "without faith it is impossible
to please God" (Heb. 11:6). But the sentence of condemnation which will
be passed on them all will be terrible to all of them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The argument in the contrary sense considered the judgment of
retribution.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether at the coming judgment the angels will be judged?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels will be judged at the coming
judgment. For it is written (1 Cor. 6:3): "Know you not that we shall
judge angels?" But this cannot refer to the state of the present time.
Therefore it should refer to the judgment to come.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written concerning Behemoth or Leviathan, whereby
the devil is signified (Job 40:28): "In the sight of all he shall be cast
down"; and (Mk. 1:24)* the demon cried out to Christ: "Why art Thou come
to destroy us before the time?" for, according to a gloss, "the demons
seeing our Lord on earth thought they were to be judged forthwith." [*The
reference should be Mt. 8:29: 'Art Thou come hither to torment us before
the time?' The text of Mark reads: 'Art Thou come to destroy us?']
Therefore it would seem that a final judgment is in store for them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (2 Pt. 2:4): "God spared not the angels
that sinned, but delivered them drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower
hell, unto torments, to be reserved unto judgment." Therefore it seems
that the angels will be judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Nahum 1:9) according to the Septuagint
version: "God will not judge the same thing a second time." But the
wicked angels are already judged, wherefore it is written (Jn. 16:11):
"The prince of this world is already judged." Therefore the angels will
not be judged in the time to come.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, goodness and wickedness are more perfect in the angels than in
men who are wayfarers. Now some men, good and wicked, will not be judged
as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47. Therefore neither will good
or wicked angels be judged.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The judgment of discussion nowise concerns either the
good or the wicked angels, since neither is any evil to be found in the
good angels, nor is any good liable to judgment to be found in the wicked
angels. But if we speak of the judgment of retribution, we must
distinguish a twofold retribution. One corresponds to the angels'
personal merits and was made to both from the beginning when some were
raised to bliss, and others plunged into the depths of woe. The other
corresponds to the merits, good or evil, procured through the angels, and
this retribution will be made in the judgment to come, because the good
angels will have an increased joy in the salvation of those whom they
have prompted to deeds of merit, while the wicked will have an increase
of torment through the manifold downfall of those whom they have incited
to evil deeds. Consequently the judgment will not regard the angels
directly, neither as judging nor as judged, but only men; but it will
regard the angels indirectly somewhat, in so far as they were concerned
in men's deeds.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of the Apostle refers to the judgment of
comparison, because certain men will be found to be placed higher than
the angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The demons will then be cast down in the sight of all
because they will be imprisoned for ever in the dungeon of hell, so that
they will no more be free to go out, since this was permitted to them
only in so far as they were directed by Divine providence to try the life
of man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[89] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The same answer applies to the Third Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE FORM OF THE JUDGE IN COMING TO THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the form of the Judge in coming to the judgment.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ will judge under the form or His humanity?
(2) Whether He will appear under the form of His glorified humanity?
(3) Whether His Godhead can be seen without joy?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Christ will judge under the form of His humanity?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ will not judge under the form of His
humanity. For judgment requires authority in the judge. Now Christ has
authority over the quick and the dead as God, for thus is He the Lord and
Creator of all. Therefore He will judge under the form of His Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, invincible power is requisite in a judge; wherefore it
is written (Eccles. 7:6): "Seek not to be made a judge, unless thou have
strength enough to extirpate iniquities." Now invincible power belongs to
Christ as God. Therefore He will judge under the form of the Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 5:22,23): "The Father . . . hath
given all judgment to the Son, that all men may honor the Son as they
honor the Father." Now equal honor to that of the Father is not due to
the Son in respect of His human nature. Therefore He will not judge under
His human form.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Dan. 7:9): "I beheld till thrones were
placed and the Ancient of days sat." Now the thrones signify judicial
power, and God is called the Ancient by reason of His eternity, according
to Dionysius (Div. Nom. x). Therefore it becomes the Son to judge as
being eternal; and consequently not as man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.) that "the
resurrection of the soul is the work of the Word the Son of God, and the
resurrection of the body is the work of the Word made the Son of man in
the flesh." Now that last judgment regards the soul rather than the body.
Therefore it becomes Christ to judge as God rather than as man.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 5:27): "He hath given Him power to
do judgment, because He is the Son of man."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, it is written (Job 36:17): "Thy cause hath been judged as that
of the wicked---by Pilate" according to a gloss---therefore, "cause and
judgment thou shalt recover---that thou mayest judge justly," according
to the gloss. Now Christ was judged by Pilate with regard to His human
nature. Therefore He will judge under the human nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, to Him it belongs to judge who made the law. Now Christ gave
us the law of the Gospel while appearing in the human nature. Therefore
He will judge under that same nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Judgment requires a certain authority in the judge.
Wherefore it is written (Rm. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest another
man's servant?" Hence it is becoming that Christ should judge in respect
of His having authority over men to whom chiefly the last judgment will
be directed. Now He is our Lord, not only by reason of the Creation,
since "the Lord He is God, He made us and not we ourselves" (Ps. 99:3),
but also by reason of the Redemption, which pertains to Him in respect of
His human nature. Wherefore "to this end Christ died and rose again, that
He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living" (Rm. 14:9). But the
goods of the Creation would not suffice us to obtain the reward of
eternal life, without the addition of the boon of the Redemption, on
account of the obstacle accruing to created nature through the sin of our
first parent. Hence, since the last judgment is directed to the admission
of some to the kingdom, and the exclusion of others therefrom, it is
becoming that Christ should preside at that judgment under the form of
His human nature, since it is by favor of that same nature's Redemption
that man is admitted to the kingdom. In this sense it is stated (Acts
10:42) that "He . . . was appointed by God to be Judge of the living and
of the dead." And forasmuch as by redeeming mankind He restored not only
man but all creatures without exception---inasmuch as all creatures are
bettered through man's restoration, according to Col. 1:20, "Making peace
through the blood of His cross, both as to things on earth, and the
things that are in heaven"---it follows that through His Passion Christ
merited lordship and judicial power not over man alone, but over all
creatures, according to Mt. 28:18, "All power is given to Me, in heaven
and in earth" [*Cf. TP, Q[59]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Christ, in respect of His Divine nature, has authority of
lordship over all creatures by right of creation; but in respect of His
human nature He has authority of lordship merited through His Passion.
The latter is secondary so to speak and acquired, while the former is
natural and eternal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although Christ as man has not of Himself invincible power
resulting from the natural power of the human species, nevertheless there
is also in His human nature an invincible power derived from His Godhead,
whereby all things are subjected under His feet (1 Cor. 15:25-28; Heb.
2:8,9). Hence He will judge in His human nature indeed, but by the power
of His Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Christ would not have sufficed for the redemption of
mankind, had He been a mere man. Wherefore from the very fact that He was
able as man to redeem mankind, and thereby obtained judicial power, it is
evident that He is God, and consequently is to be honored equally with
the Father, not as man but as God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In that vision of Daniel the whole order of the judicial
power is clearly expressed. This power is in God Himself as its first
origin, and more especially in the Father Who is the fount of the entire
Godhead; wherefore it is stated in the first place that the "Ancient of
days sat." But the judicial power was transmitted from the Father to the
Son, not only from eternity in respect of the Divine nature, but also in
time in respect of the human nature wherein He merited it. Hence in the
aforesaid vision it is further stated (Dan. 7:13,14): "Lo, one like the
Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and He came even to the
Ancient of days . . . And He gave Him power and glory, and a kingdom."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Augustine is speaking by a kind of appropriation, so as to
trace the effects which Christ wrought in the human nature to causes
somewhat similar to them. And since we are made to the image and likeness
of God in respect of our soul, and are of the same species as the man
Christ in respect of our body, he ascribes to the Godhead the effects
wrought by Christ in our souls, and those which He wrought or will work
in our bodies he ascribes to His flesh; although His flesh, as being the
instrument of His Godhead, has also its effect on our souls as Damascene
asserts (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), according to the saying of Heb. 9:14,
that His "blood" hath cleansed "our conscience from dead works." And thus
that "the Word was made flesh" is the cause of the resurrection of souls;
wherefore also according to His human nature He is becomingly the Judge
not only of bodily but also of spiritual goods [*Cf. TP, Q[56], A[2], ad
1].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether at the judgment Christ will appear in His glorified humanity?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that at the judgment Christ will not appear in His
glorified humanity. For a gloss [*St. Augustine, Tract. cxx in Joan.] on
Jn. 19:37, "They shall look on him whom they pierced," says: "Because He
will come in the flesh wherein He was crucified." Now He was crucified in
the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the form of weakness
and not in the form of glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is stated (Mt. 24:30) that "the sign of the Son of
man shall appear in heaven," namely, "the sign of the cross," as
Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxvii in Matth.), for "Christ when coming to the
judgment will show not only the scars of His wounds but even His most
shameful death." Therefore it seems that He will not appear in the form
of glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Christ will appear at the judgment under that form which
can be gazed upon by all. Now Christ will not be visible to all, good and
wicked, under the form of His glorified humanity: because the eye that is
not glorified is seemingly unproportionate to see the clarity of a
glorified body. Therefore He will not appear under a glorified form.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, that which is promised as a reward to the righteous is
not granted to the unrighteous. Now it is promised as a reward to the
righteous that they shall see the glory of His humanity (Jn. 10:9): "He
shall go in, and go out, and shall find pastures, i.e. refreshment in His
Godhead and humanity," according to the commentary of Augustine [*De
Spiritu et Anima, work of an unknown author. St. Thomas, De Anima,
ascribes it to Alcherus, a Cistercian monk; see above Q[70], A[2], ad 1]
and Is. 33:17: "His eyes shall see the King in his beauty." Therefore He
will not appear to all in His glorified form.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Christ will judge in the form wherein He was judged:
wherefore a gloss [*St. Augustine, Tract. xix, in Joan.] on Jn. 5:21, "So
the Son also giveth life to whom He will," says: "He will judge justly in
the form wherein He was judged unjustly, that He may be visible to the
wicked." Now He was judged in the form of weakness. Therefore He will
appear in the same form at the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:27): "Then they shall see the Son
of man coming in a cloud with great power and majesty." Now majesty and
power pertain to glory. Therefore He will appear in the form of glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, he who judges should be more conspicuous than those who are
judged. Now the elect who will be judged by Christ will have a glorified
body. Much more therefore will the Judge appear in a glorified form.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, as to be judged pertains to weakness, so to judge pertains to
authority and glory. Now at His first coming when Christ came to be
judged, He appeared in the form of weakness. Therefore at the second
coming, when He will come to judge, He will appear in the form of glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Christ is called the mediator of God and men (1 Tim. 2:5)
inasmuch as He satisfies for men and intercedes for them to the Father,
and confers on men things which belong to the Father, according to Jn.
17:22, "The glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to them."
Accordingly then both these things belong to Him in that He communicates
with both extremes: for in that He communicates with men, He takes their
part with the Father, and in that He communicates with the Father, He
bestows the Father's gifts on men. Since then at His first coming He came
in order to make satisfaction for us to the Father, He came in the form
of our weakness. But since at His second coming He will come in order to
execute the Father's justice on men, He will have to show forth His glory
which is in Him by reason of His communication with the Father: and
therefore He will appear in the form of glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He will appear in the same flesh, but not under the same
form.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The sign of the cross will appear at the judgment, to
denote not a present but a past weakness: so as to show how justly those
were condemned who scorned so great mercy, especially those who
persecuted Christ unjustly. The scars which will appear in His body will
not be due to weakness, but will indicate the exceeding power whereby
Christ overcame His enemies by His Passion and infirmity. He will also
show forth His most shameful death, not by bringing it sensibly before
the eye, as though He suffered it there; but by the things which will
appear then, namely the signs of His past Passion, He will recall men to
the thought of His past death.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A glorified body has it in its power to show itself or not
to show itself to an eye that is not glorified, as stated above (Q[85],
A[2], ad 3). Hence Christ will be visible to all in His glorified form.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Even as our friend's glory gives us pleasure, so the glory
and power of one we hate is most displeasing to us. Hence as the sight of
the glory of Christ's humanity will be a reward to the righteous, so will
it be a torment to Christ's enemies: wherefore it is written (Is. 26:11):
"Let the envious people see and be confounded and let fire" (i.e. envy)
"devour Thy enemies."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Form is taken there for human nature wherein He was judged
and likewise will judge; but not for a quality of nature, namely of
weakness, which will not be the same in Him when judging as when judged
(Cf. ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without
joy. For there can be no doubt that the wicked will know with the
greatest certainty that Christ is God. Therefore they will see His
Godhead, and yet they will not rejoice in seeing Christ. Therefore it
will be possible to see it without joy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the perverse will of the wicked is not more adverse to
Christ's humanity than to His Godhead. Now the fact that they will see
the glory of His humanity will conduce to their punishment, as stated
above (A[2], ad 4). Therefore if they were to see His Godhead, there
would be much more reason for them to grieve rather than rejoice.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the course of the affections is not a necessary sequel
to that which is in the intellect: wherefore Augustine says (In Ps. 118:
conc. 8): "The intellect precedes, the affections follow slowly or not at
all." Now vision regards the intellect, whereas joy regards the
affections. Therefore it will be possible to see the Godhead without joy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatever is received into "a thing is received according
to the mode of the receiver and not of the received." But whatever is
seen is, in a way, received into the seer. Therefore although the Godhead
is in itself supremely enjoyable, nevertheless when seen by those who are
plunged in grief, it will give no joy but rather displeasure.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible object, so is the intellect
to the intelligible object. Now in the senses, "to the unhealthy palate
bread is painful, to the healthy palate sweet," as Augustine says
(Confess. vii), and the same happens with the other senses. Therefore
since the damned have the intellect indisposed, it would seem that the
vision of the uncreated light will give them pain rather than joy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: That
they may know Thee, the . . . true God." Wherefore it is clear that the
essence of bliss consists in seeing God. Now joy is essential to bliss.
Therefore the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, the essence of the Godhead is the essence of truth. Now it is
delightful to every one to see the truth, wherefore "all naturally desire
to know," as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics. Therefore it is
impossible to see the Godhead without joy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, if a certain vision is not always delightful, it happens
sometimes to be painful. But intellective vision is never painful since
"the pleasure we take in objects of understanding has no grief opposed to
it," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii). Since then the Godhead
cannot be seen save by the intellect, it seems that the Godhead cannot be
seen without joy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In every object of appetite or of pleasure two things may
be considered, namely the thing which is desired or which gives pleasure,
and the aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness in that thing. Now
according to Boethius (De Hebdom.) that which is can have something
besides what it is, but 'being' itself has no admixture of aught else
beside itself. Hence that which is desirable or pleasant can have an
admixture of something rendering it undesirable or unpleasant; but the
very aspect of pleasurableness has not and cannot have anything mixed
with it rendering it unpleasant or undesirable. Now it is possible for
things that are pleasurable, by participation of goodness which is the
aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness, not to give pleasure when they
are apprehended, but it is impossible for that which is good by its
essence not to give pleasure when it is apprehended. Therefore since God
is essentially His own goodness, it is impossible for the Godhead to be
seen without joy.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The wicked will know most clearly that Christ is God, not
through seeing His Godhead, but on account of the most manifest signs of
His Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: No one can hate the Godhead considered in itself, as
neither can one hate goodness itself. But God is said to be hated by
certain persons in respect of some of the effects of the Godhead, in so
far as He does or commands something contrary to their will [*Cf. SS,
Q[34], A[1]]. Therefore the vision of the Godhead can be painful to no
one.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The saying of Augustine applies when the thing apprehended
previously by the intellect is good by participation and not essentially,
such as all creatures are; wherefore there may be something in them by
reason of which the affections are not moved. In like manner God is known
by wayfarers through His effects, and their intellect does not attain to
the very essence of His goodness. Hence it is not necessary that the
affections follow the intellect, as they would if the intellect saw God's
essence which is His goodness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Grief denotes not a disposition but a passion. Now every
passion is removed if a stronger contrary cause supervene, and does not
remove that cause. Accordingly the grief of the damned would be done away
if they saw God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[90] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The indisposition of an organ removes the natural
proportion of the organ to the object that has a natural aptitude to
please, wherefore the pleasure is hindered. But the indisposition which
is in the damned does not remove the natural proportion whereby they are
directed to the Divine goodness, since its image ever remains in them.
Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE QUALITY OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next discuss the quality which the world and those who rise
again will have after the judgment. Here a threefold matter offers itself
to our consideration: (1) The state and quality of the world; (2) The
state of the blessed; (3) The state of the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there will be a renewal of the world?
(2) Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease?
(3) Whether the heavenly bodies will be more brilliant?
(4) Whether the elements will receive an additional clarity?
(5) Whether the animals and plants will remain?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the world will be renewed?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the world will never be renewed. For nothing
will be but what was at some time as to its species: "What is it that
hath been? the same thing that shall be" (Eccles. 1:9). Now the world
never had any disposition other than it has now as to essential parts,
both genera and species. Therefore it will never be renewed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, renewal is a kind of alteration. But it is impossible
for the universe to be altered; because whatever is altered argues some
alterant that is not altered, which nevertheless is a subject of local
movement: and it is impossible to place such a thing outside the
universe. Therefore it is impossible for the world to be renewed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is stated (Gn. 2:2) that "God . . . rested on the
seventh day from all His work which He had done," and holy men explain
that "He rested from forming new creatures." Now when things were first
established, the mode imposed upon them was the same as they have now in
the natural order. Therefore they will never have any other.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the disposition which things have now is natural to
them. Therefore if they be altered to another disposition, this
disposition will be unnatural to them. Now whatever is unnatural and
accidental cannot last for ever (De Coelo et Mundo i). Therefore this
disposition acquired by being renewed will be taken away from them; and
thus there will be a cycle of changes in the world as Empedocles and
Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3) maintained, and after this world there will
be another, and after that again another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, newness of glory is given to the rational creature as a
reward. Now where there is no merit, there can be no reward. Since then
insensible creatures have merited nothing, it would seem that they will
not be renewed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 65:17): "Behold I create new heavens
and a new earth, and the former things shall not be in remembrance"; and
(Apoc. 21:1): "I saw a new heaven and a new earth. For the first heaven
and the first earth was gone."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, the dwelling should befit the dweller. But the world was made
to be man's dwelling. Therefore it should befit man. Now man will be
renewed. Therefore the world will be likewise.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, "Every beast loveth its like" (Ecclus. 13:19), wherefore it is
evident that likeness is the reason of love. Now man has some likeness to
the universe, wherefore he is called "a little world." Hence man loves
the whole world naturally and consequently desires its good. Therefore,
that man's desire be satisfied the universe must needs also be made
better.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We believe all corporeal things to have been made for
man's sake, wherefore all things are stated to be subject to him [*Ps.
8:5, seqq.]. Now they serve man in two ways, first, as sustenance to his
bodily life, secondly, as helping him to know God, inasmuch as man sees
the invisible things of God by the things that are made (Rm. 1:20).
Accordingly glorified man will nowise need creatures to render him the
first of these services, since his body will be altogether incorruptible,
the Divine power effecting this through the soul which it will glorify
immediately. Again man will not need the second service as to
intellective knowledge, since by that knowledge he will see God
immediately in His essence. The carnal eye, however, will be unable to
attain to this vision of the Essence; wherefore that it may be fittingly
comforted in the vision of God, it will see the Godhead in Its corporeal
effects, wherein manifest proofs of the Divine majesty will appear,
especially in Christ's flesh, and secondarily in the bodies of the
blessed, and afterwards in all other bodies. Hence those bodies also will
need to receive a greater inflow from the Divine goodness than now, not
indeed so as to change their species, but so as to add a certain
perfection of glory: and such will be the renewal of the world. Wherefore
at the one same time, the world will be renewed, and man will be
glorified.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Solomon is speaking there of the natural course: this is
evident from his adding: "Nothing under the sun is new." For since the
movement of the sun follows a circle, those things which are subject to
the sun's power must needs have some kind of circular movement. This
consists in the fact that things which were before return the same in
species but different in the individual (De Generat. i). But things
belonging to the state of glory are not "under the sun."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers natural alteration which proceeds
from a natural agent, which acts from natural necessity. For such an
agent cannot produce different dispositions, unless it be itself disposed
differently. But things done by God proceed from freedom of will,
wherefore it is possible, without any change in God Who wills it, for the
universe to have at one time one disposition, and another at another
time. Thus this renewal will not be reduced to a cause that is moved, but
to an immovable principle, namely God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God is stated to have ceased on the seventh day forming new
creatures, for as much as nothing was made afterwards that was not
previously in some likeness [*Cf. FP, Q[73], A[1]] either generically, or
specifically, or at least as in a seminal principle, or even as in an
obediential potentiality [*Cf. FP, Q[115], A[2], ad 4; TP, Q[11], A[1]].
I say then that the future renewal of the world preceded in the works of
the six days by way of a remote likeness, namely in the glory and grace
of the angels. Moreover it preceded in the obediential potentiality which
was then bestowed on the creature to the effect of its receiving this
same renewal by the Divine agency.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This disposition of newness will be neither natural nor
contrary to nature, but above nature (just as grace and glory are above
the nature of the soul): and it will proceed from an everlasting agent
which will preserve it for ever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although, properly speaking, insensible bodies will not
have merited this glory, yet man merited that this glory should be
bestowed on the whole universe, in so far as this conduces to man's
increase of glory. Thus a man merits to be clothed in more splendid
robes, which splendor the robes nowise merited themselves.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that when the world is thus renewed the movement of the
heavenly bodies will not cease. For it is written (Gn. 8:22): "All the
days of the earth . . . cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day
shall not cease." Now night and day, summer and winter result from the
movement of the sun. Therefore the movement of the sun will never cease.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 31:35,36): "Thus saith the Lord Who
giveth the sun for the light of the day, the order of the moon and of the
stars for the light of the night: Who stirreth up the sea, and the waves
thereof roar . . . If these ordinances shall fail before Me . . . then
also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before Me
for ever." Now the seed of Israel shall never fail, but will remain for
ever. Therefore the laws of day and of the sea waves, which result from
the heavenly movement, will remain for ever. Therefore the movement of
the heaven will never cease.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the substance of the heavenly bodies will remain for
ever. Now it is useless to admit the existence of a thing unless you
admit the purpose for which it was made: and the heavenly bodies were
made in order "to divide the day and the night"; and to be "for signs,
and for seasons, and for days and for years" (Gn. 1:14). But they cannot
do this except by movement. Therefore their movement will remain for
ever, else those bodies would remain without a purpose.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in this renewal of the world the whole world will be
bettered. Therefore no body will be deprived of what pertains to its
perfection. Now movement belongs to the perfection of a heavenly body,
because, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii, "those bodies participate of
the Divine goodness by their movement." Therefore the movement of the
heaven will not cease.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the sun successively gives light to the various parts of
the world, by reason of its circular movement. Therefore if the circular
movement of the heaven ceases, it follows that in some part of the
earth's surface there will be perpetual darkness, which is unbecoming to
the aforesaid renewal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, if the movement were to cease, this could only be
because movement causes some imperfection in the heaven, for instance
wear and tear, which is impossible, since this movement is natural, and
the heavenly bodies are impassible, wherefore they are not worn out by
movement (De Coelo et Mundo ii). Therefore the movement of the heaven
will never cease.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, a potentiality is useless if it be not reduced to act.
Now in whatever position the heavenly body is placed it is in
potentiality to another position. Therefore unless this potentiality be
reduced to act, it would remain useless, and would always be imperfect.
But it cannot be reduced to act save by local movement. Therefore it
will always be in motion.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, if a thing is indifferent in relation to more than one
alternation, either both are ascribed to it, or neither. Now the sun is
indifferent to being in the east or in the west, else its movement would
not be uniform throughout, since it would move more rapidly to the place
which is more natural to it. Therefore either neither position is
ascribed to the sun, or both. But neither both nor neither can be
ascribed to it, except successively by movement; for if it stand still,
it must needs stand in some position. Therefore the solar body will
always be in motion, and in like manner all other heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, the movement of the heaven is the cause of time.
Therefore if the movement of the heaven fail, time must needs fail: and
if this were to fail, it would fail in an instant. Now an instant is
defined (Phys. viii) "the beginning of the future and the end of the
past." Consequently there would be time after the last instant of time,
which is impossible. Therefore the movement of the heavens will never
cease.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, glory does not remove nature. But the movement of the
heaven is natural. Therefore it is not deprived thereof by glory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] OTC Para. 1/5
On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel who appeared,
"swore by him that liveth for ever and ever . . . that time shall be no
longer," namely after the seventh angel shall have sounded the trumpet,
at the sound of which "the dead shall rise again" (1 Cor. 15:52). Now if
time be not, there is no movement of the heaven. Therefore the movement
of the heaven will cease.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] OTC 10 Para. 2/5
Further: "Thy sun shall go down no more, and thy moon shall not
decrease" (Is. 60:20). Now the setting of the sun and the phases of the
moon are caused by the movement of the heavens. Therefore the heavenly
movement will cease at length.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] OTC 10 Para. 3/5
Further, it is shown in De Gener. ii that "the movement of the heaven is
for the sake of continual generation in this lower world." But generation
will cease when the number of the elect is complete. Therefore the
movement of the heaven will cease.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] OTC 10 Para. 4/5
Further, all movement is for some end (Metaph. ii). But all movement for
an end ceases when the end is obtained. Therefore either the movement of
the heaven will never obtain its end, and thus it would be useless, or it
will cease at length.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] OTC 10 Para. 5/5
Further, rest is more noble than movement, because things are more
likened to God, Who is supremely immovable, by being themselves unmoved.
Now the movement of lower bodies terminates naturally in rest. Therefore
since the heavenly bodies are far nobler, their movement terminates
naturally in rest.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are three opinions touching this question. The
first is of the philosophers who assert that the movement of the heaven
will last for ever. But this is not in keeping with our faith, which
holds that the elect are in a certain number preordained by God, so that
the begetting of men will not last for ever, and for the same reason,
neither will other things that are directed to the begetting of men, such
as the movement of the heaven and the variations of the elements. Others
say that the movement of the heaven will cease naturally. But this again
is false, since every body that is moved naturally has a place wherein it
rests naturally, whereto it is moved naturally, and whence it is not
moved except by violence. Now no such place can be assigned to the
heavenly body, since it is not more natural to the sun to move towards a
point in the east than to move away from it, wherefore either its
movement would not be altogether natural, or its movement would not
naturally terminate in rest. Hence we must agree with others who say that
the movement of the heaven will cease at this renewal of the world, not
indeed by any natural cause, but as a result of the will of God. For the
body in question, like other bodies, was made to serve man in the two
ways above mentioned (A[1]): and hereafter in the state of glory man will
no longer need one of these services, that namely in respect of which the
heavenly bodies serve man for the sustenance of his bodily life. Now in
this way the heavenly bodies serve man by their movement, in so far as by
the heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, plants and animals
needful for man's use generated, and the temperature of the atmosphere
rendered conducive to health. Therefore the movement of the heavenly body
will cease as soon as man is glorified.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: These words refer to the earth in its present state, when
it is able to be the principle of the generation and corruption of
plants. This is evident from its being said there: "All the days of the
earth, seed time and harvest," etc. And it is simply to be granted that
as long as the earth is fit for seed time and harvest, the movement of
the heaven will not cease.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
We reply in like manner to OBJ 2 that the Lord is speaking there of the
duration of the seed of Israel with regard to the present state. This is
evident from the words: "Then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as
not to be a nation before Me for ever." For after this state there will
be no succession of days: wherefore the laws also which He had mentioned
will cease after this state.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The end which is there assigned to the heavenly bodies is
their proximate end, because it is their proper act. But this act is
directed further to another end, namely the service of man, which is
shown by the words of Dt. 4:19: "Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to
heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and
being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God
created for the service of all the nations, that are under heaven."
Therefore we should form our judgment of the heavenly bodies from the
service of man, rather than from the end assigned to them in Genesis.
Moreover the heavenly bodies, as stated above, will serve glorified man
in another way; hence it does not follow that they will remain without a
purpose.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Movement does not belong to the perfection of a heavenly
body, except in so far as thereby it is the cause of generation and
corruption in this lower world: and in that respect also this movement
makes the heavenly body participate in the Divine goodness by way of a
certain likeness of causality. But movement does not belong to the
perfection of the substance of the heaven, which substance will remain.
Wherefore it does not follow that, when this movement ceases, the
substance of the heaven will lose something of its perfection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: All the elemental bodies will have in themselves a certain
clarity of glory. Hence though part of the surface of the earth be not
lit up by the sun, there will by no means be any darkness there.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: A gloss of Ambrose on Rm. 8:22, "Every creature groaneth,"
etc. says explicitly that "all the elements labor to fulfill their
offices: thus the sun and moon fill the places appointed to them not
without work: this is for our sake, wherefore they will rest when we are
taken up to heaven." This work, in my opinion, does not signify that any
stress or passion occurs to these bodies from their movement, since this
movement is natural to them and nowise violent, as is proved in De Coelo
et Mundo i. But work here denotes a defect in relation to the term to
which a thing tends. Hence since this movement is ordained by Divine
providence to the completion of the number of the elect, it follows that
as long as the latter is incomplete, this movement has not reached the
term whereto it was ordained: hence it is said metaphorically to labor,
as a man who has not what he intends to have. This defect will be removed
from the heaven when the number of the elect is complete. Or it may refer
to the desire of the future renewal which it awaits from the Divine
disposal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: In a heavenly body there is no potentiality that can be
perfected by place, or that is made for this end which is to be in such
and such a place. But potentiality to situation in a place is related to
a heavenly body, as the craftsman's potentiality to construct various
houses of one kind: for if he construct one of these he is not said to
have the potentiality uselessly, and in like manner in whatever situation
a heavenly body be placed, its potentiality to be in a place will not
remain incomplete or without a purpose.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: Although a heavenly body, so far as regards its nature, is
equally inclined to every situation that it can possibly occupy,
nevertheless in comparison with things outside it, it is not equally
inclined to every situation: but in respect of one situation it has a
more noble disposition in comparison with certain things than in respect
of another situation; thus in our regard the sun has a more noble
disposition at daytime than at night-time. Hence it is probable, since
the entire renewal of the world is directed to man, that the heaven will
have in this renewal the most noble situation possible in relation to
our dwelling there. Or, according to some, the heaven will rest in that
situation wherein it was made, else one of its revolutions would remain
incomplete. But this argument seems improbable, for since a revolution of
the heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to complete, it would follow
that the world must last that length of time, which does not seem
probable. Moreover according to this it would be possible to know when
the world will come to an end. For we may conclude with probability from
astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies were made, by taking
into consideration the number of years that have elapsed since the
beginning of the world: and in the same way it would be possible to know
the exact number of years it would take them to return to a like
position: whereas the time of the world's end is stated to be unknown.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: Time will at length cease, when the heavenly movement
ceases. Yet that last "now" will not be the beginning of the future. For
the definition quoted applies to the "now" only as continuous with the
parts of time, not as terminating the whole of time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 10 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 10: The movement of the heaven is said to be natural, not as
though it were part of nature in the same way as we speak of natural
principles; but because it has its principle in the nature of a body, not
indeed its active but its receptive principle. Its active principle is a
spiritual substance, as the Commentator says on De Coelo et Mundo; and
consequently it is not unreasonable for this movement to be done away by
the renewal of glory, since the nature of the heavenly body will not
alter through the cessation of that movement.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 10 Para. 2/3
We grant the other objections which argue in the contrary sense, namely
the first three, because they conclude in due manner. But since the
remaining two seem to conclude that the movement of heaven will cease
naturally, we must reply to them. To the first, then, we reply that
movement ceases when its purpose is attained, provided this is a sequel
to, and does not accompany the movement. Now the purpose of the heavenly
movement, according to philosophers, accompanies that movement, namely
the imitation of the Divine goodness in the causality of that movement
with respect to this lower world. Hence it does not follow that this
movement ceases naturally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[2] R.O. 10 Para. 3/3
To the second we reply that although immobility is simply nobler than
movement, yet movement in a subject which thereby can acquire a perfect
participation of the Divine goodness is nobler than rest in a subject
which is altogether unable to acquire that perfection by movement. For
this reason the earth which is the lowest of the elements is without
movement: although God Who is exalted above all things is without
movement, by Whom the more noble bodies are moved. Hence also it is that
the movements of the higher bodies might be held to be perpetual, so far
as their natural power is concerned, and never to terminate in rest,
although the movement of lower bodies terminates in rest.
�Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will be increased at this
renewal?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the brightness of the heavenly bodies will not
be increased at this renewal. For this renewal as regards the lower
bodies will be caused by the cleansing fire. But the cleansing fire will
not reach the heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies will not be
renewed by receiving an increase of brightness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as the heavenly bodies are the cause of generation
in this lower world by their movement, so are they by their light. But,
when generation ceases, movement will cease as stated above (A[2]).
Therefore in like manner the light of the heavenly bodies will cease
rather than increase.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the heavenly bodies will be renewed when man is
renewed, it follows that when man deteriorated they deteriorated
likewise. But this does not seem probable, since these bodies are
unalterable as to their substance. Therefore neither will they be renewed
when man is renewed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if they deteriorated then it follows that their
deterioration was on a par with the amelioration which, it is said, will
accrue to them at man's renewal. Now it is written (Is. 30:26) that "the
light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun." Therefore in the
original state before sin the moon shone as much as the sun does now.
Therefore whenever the moon was over the earth, it made it to be day as
the sun does now: which is proved manifestly to be false from the
statement of Gn. 1:16 that the moon was made "to rule the night."
Therefore when man sinned the heavenly bodies were not deprived of their
light; and so their light will not be increased, so it seems, when man is
glorified.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the brightness of the heavenly bodies, like other
creatures, is directed to the use of man. Now, after the resurrection,
the brightness of the sun will be of no use to man: for it is written
(Is. 60:19): "Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day,
neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee," and (Apoc.
21:23): "The city hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in
it." Therefore their brightness will not be increased.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, it were not a wise craftsman who would make very great
instruments for the making of a small work. Now man is a very small thing
in comparison with the heavenly bodies, which by their huge bulk surpass
the size of man almost beyond comparison: in fact the size of the whole
earth in comparison with the heaven is as a point compared with a sphere,
as astronomers say. Since then God is most wise it would seem that man is
not the end of the creation of the heavens, and so it is unseemly that
the heaven should deteriorate when he sinned, or that it should be
bettered when he is glorified.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 30:26): "The light of the moon shall
be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, the whole world will be renewed for the better. But the heaven
is the more noble part of the corporeal world. Therefore it will be
altered for the better. But this cannot be unless it shine out with
greater brightness. Therefore its brightness will be bettered and will
increase.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, "every creature that groaneth and travaileth in pain, awaiteth
the revelation of the glory of the children of God" [*'The creature also
itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into the
liberty of the children of God. For we know that every creature groaneth
and travaileth in pain,' etc.] (Rm. 8:21,22). Now such are the heavenly
bodies, as a gloss says on the same passage. Therefore they await the
glory of the saints. But they would not await it unless they were to gain
something by it. Therefore their brightness will increase thereby, since
it is their chief beauty.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The renewal of the world is directed to the end that,
after this renewal has taken place, God may become visible to man by
signs so manifest as to be perceived as it were by his senses. Now
creatures lead to the knowledge of God chiefly by their comeliness and
beauty, which show forth the wisdom of their Maker and Governor;
wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:5): "By the greatness of the beauty and
of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known
thereby." And the beauty of the heavenly bodies consists chiefly in
light; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 43:10): "The glory of the stars
is the beauty of heaven, the Lord enlighteneth the world on high." Hence
the heavenly bodies will be bettered, especially as regards their
brightness. But to what degree and in what way this betterment will take
place is known to Him alone Who will bring it about.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The cleansing fire will not cause the form of the renewal,
but will only dispose thereto, by cleansing from the vileness of sin and
the impurity resulting from the mingling of bodies, and this is not to be
found in the heavenly bodies. Hence although the heavenly bodies are not
to be cleansed by fire, they are nevertheless to be Divinely renewed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Movement does not denote perfection in the thing moved,
considered in itself, since movement is the act of that which is
imperfect: although it may pertain to the perfection of a body in so far
as the latter is the cause of something. But light belongs to the
perfection of a lightsome body, even considered in its substance: and
consequently after the heavenly body has ceased to be the cause of
generation, its brightness will remain, while its movement will cease.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A gloss on Is. 30:26, "The light of the moon shall be as
the light of the sun," says: "All things made for man's sake deteriorated
at his fall, and sun and moon diminished in light." This diminishment is
understood by some to mean a real lessening of light. Nor does it matter
that the heavenly bodies are by nature unalterable, because this
alteration was brought about by the Divine power. Others, however, with
greater probability, take this diminishment to mean, not a real lessening
of light, but a lessening in reference to man's use; because after sin
man did not receive as much benefit from the light of the heavenly bodies
as before. In the same sense we read (Gn. 3:17,18): "Cursed is the earth
in thy work . . . Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee";
although it would have brought forth thorns and thistles before sin, but
not as a punishment to man. Nor does it follow that, supposing the light
of the heavenly bodies not to have been lessened essentially through man
sinning, it will not really be increased at man's glorification, because
man's sin wrought no change upon the state of the universe, since both
before and after sin man had an animal life, which needs the movement and
generation of a corporeal creature; whereas man's glorification will
bring a change upon the state of all corporeal creatures, as stated above
(Q[76], A[7]). Hence there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This diminution, according to the more probable opinion,
refers not to the substance but to the effect. Hence it does not follow
that the moon while over the earth would have made it to be day, but that
man would have derived as much benefit from the light of the moon then as
now from the light of the sun. After the resurrection, however, when the
light of the moon will be increased in very truth, there will be night
nowhere on earth but only in the center of the earth, where hell will be,
because then, as stated, the moon will shine as brightly as the sun does
now; the sun seven times as much as now, and the bodies of the blessed
seven times more than the sun, although there be no authority or reason
to prove this.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A thing may be useful to man in two ways. First, by reason
of necessity, and thus no creature will be useful to man because he will
have complete sufficiency from God. This is signified (Apoc. 21:23) by
the words quoted, according to which that "city hath no need of the sun,"
nor "of the moon." Secondly, on account of a greater perfection, and thus
man will make use of other creatures, yet not as needful to him in order
to obtain his end, in which way he makes use of them now.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: This is the argument of Rabbi Moses who endeavors to prove
(Dux errantium iii) that the world was by no means made for man's use.
Wherefore he maintains that what we read in the Old Testament about the
renewal of the world, as instanced by the quotations from Isaias, is said
metaphorically: and that even as the sun is said to be darkened in
reference to a person when he encounters a great sorrow so as not to know
what to do (which way of speaking is customary to Scripture), so on the
other hand the sun is said to shine brighter for a person, and the whole
world to be renewed, when he is brought from a state of sorrow to one of
very great joy. But this is not in harmony with the authority and
commentaries of holy men. Consequently we must answer this argument by
saying that although the heavenly bodies far surpass the human body, yet
the rational soul surpasses the heavenly bodies far more than these
surpass the human body. Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the
heavenly bodies were made for man's sake; not, however as though this
were the principal end, since the principal end of all things is God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the elements will be renewed by an addition of brightness?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the elements will not be renewed by receiving
some kind of brightness. For just as light is a quality proper to a
heavenly body, so are hot and cold, wet and dry. qualities proper to the
elements. Therefore as the heaven is renewed by an increase of
brightness, so ought the elements to be renewed by an increase of active
and passive qualities.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, rarity, and density are qualities of the elements, and
the elements will not be deprived of them at this renewal. Now the rarity
and density of the elements would seem to be an obstacle to brightness,
since a bright body needs to be condensed, for which reason the rarity of
the air seems incompatible with brightness, and in like manner the
density of the earth which is an obstacle to transparency. Therefore it
is impossible for the elements to be renewed by the addition of
brightness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is agreed that the damned will be in the earth. Yet
they will be in darkness not only internal but also external. Therefore
the earth will not be endowed with brightness in this renewal, nor for
the same reason will the other elements.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, increase of brightness in the elements implies an
increase of heat. If therefore at this renewal the brightness of the
elements be greater than it is now, their heat will likewise be greater;
and thus it would seem that they will be changed from their natural
qualities, which are in them according to a fixed measure: and this is
absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the good of the universe which consists in the order and
harmony of the parts is more excellent than the good of any individual
creature. But if one creature be bettered, the good of the universe is
done away, since there will no longer be the same harmony. Therefore if
the elemental bodies, which according to their natural degree in the
universe should be devoid of brightness, were to be endowed with
brightness, the perfection of the universe would be diminished thereby
rather than increased.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 21:1): "I saw a new heaven and a
new earth." Now the heaven will be renewed by an increase of brightness.
Therefore the earth and likewise the other elements will also.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, the lower bodies, like the higher, are for man's use. Now the
corporeal creature will be rewarded for its services to man, as a gloss
of Ambrose seems to say on Rm. 8:22, "Every creature groaneth," and a
gloss of Jerome on Is. 30:26, "And the light of the moon shall be," etc.
Therefore the elements will be glorified as well as the heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, man's body is composed of the elements. Therefore the elemental
particles that are in man's body will be glorified by the addition of
brightness when man is glorified. Now it is fitting that whole and part
should have the same disposition. Therefore it is fitting that the
elements themselves should be endowed with brightness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as there is a certain order between the heavenly
spirits and the earthly or human spirits, so is there an order between
heavenly bodies and earthly bodies. Since then the corporeal creature was
made for the sake of the spiritual and is ruled thereby, it follows that
corporeal things are dealt with similarly to spiritual things. Now in
this final consummation of things the lower spirits will receive the
properties of the higher spirits, because men will be as the angels in
heaven (Mt. 22:30): and this will be accomplished by conferring the
highest degree of perfection on that in which the human spirit agrees
with the angelic. Wherefore, in like manner, since the lower bodies do
not agree with the heavenly bodies except in the nature of light and
transparency (De Anima ii), it follows that the lower bodies are to be
perfected chiefly as regards brightness. Hence all the elements will be
clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, however, but according to
their mode: for it is said that the earth on its outward surface will be
as transparent as glass, water as crystal, the air as heaven, fire as the
lights of heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[1]), the renewal of the world is
directed to the effect that man even by his senses may as it were see the
Godhead by manifest signs. Now the most spiritual and subtle of our
senses is the sight. Consequently all the lower bodies need to be
bettered, chiefly as regards the visible qualities the principle of which
is light. On the other hand, the elemental qualities regard the touch,
which is the most material of the senses, and the excess of their
contrariety is more displeasing than pleasant; whereas excess of light
will be pleasant, since it has no contrariety, except on account of a
weakness in the organ, such as will not be then.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The air will be bright, not as casting forth rays, but as
an enlightened transparency; while the earth, although it is opaque
through lack of light, yet by the Divine power its surface will be
clothed with the glory of brightness, without prejudice to its density.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The earth will not be glorified with brightness in the
infernal regions; but instead of this glory, that part of the earth will
have the rational spirits of men and demons who though weak by reason of
sin are nevertheless superior to any corporeal quality by the dignity of
their nature. or we may say that, though the whole earth be glorified,
the wicked will nevertheless be in exterior darkness, since even the fire
of hell, while shining for them in one respect, will be unable to
enlighten them in another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This brightness will be in these bodies even as it is in
the heavenly bodies, in which it causes no heat, because these bodies
will then be unalterable, as the heavenly bodies are now.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The order of the universe will not be done away by the
betterment of the elements, because all the other parts will also be
bettered, and so the same harmony will remain.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the plants and animals will remain in this renewal?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the plants and animals will remain in this
renewal. For the elements should be deprived of nothing that belongs to
their adornment. Now the elements are said to be adorned by the animals
and plants [*Cf. Gn. 1:11,12,20,21,24,25]. Therefore they will not be
removed in this renewal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as the elements served man, so also did animals,
plants and mineral bodies. But on account of this service the elements
will be glorified. Therefore both animals and plants and mineral bodies
will be glorified likewise.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the universe will remain imperfect if anything belonging
to its perfection be removed. Now the species of animals, plants, and
mineral bodies belong to the perfection of the universe. Since then we
must not say that the world will remain imperfect when it is renewed, it
seems that we should assert that the plants and animals will remain.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, animals and plants have a more noble form than the
elements. Now the world, at this final renewal, will be changed for the
better. Therefore animals and plants should remain rather than the
elements, since they are nobler.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is unseemly to assert that the natural appetite will
be frustrated. But by their natural appetite animals and plants desire to
be for ever, if indeed not as regards the individual, at least as regards
the species: and to this end their continual generation is directed (De
Generat. ii). Therefore it is unseemly to say that these species will at
length cease to be.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, If plants and animals are to remain, either all of them
will, or some of them. If all of them, then dumb animals, which had
previously died, will have to rise again just as men will rise again. But
this cannot be asserted for since their form comes to nothing, they
cannot resume the same identical form. On the other hand if not all but
some of them remain, since there is no more reason for one of them
remaining for ever rather than another, it would seem that none of them
will. But whatever remains after the world has been renewed will remain
for ever, generation and corruption being done away. Therefore plants and
animals will altogether cease after the renewal of the world.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, according to the Philosopher (De Generat. ii) the species of
animals, plants and such like corruptible things, are not perpetuated
except by the continuance of the heavenly movement. Now this will cease
then. Therefore it will be impossible for those species to be perpetuated.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, if the end cease, those things which are directed to the end
should cease. Now animals and plants were made for the upkeep of human
life; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:3): "Even as the green herbs have I
delivered all flesh to you [*Vulg.: 'have I delivered them all to you']."
Therefore when man's animal life ceases, animals and plants should cease.
But after this renewal animal life will cease in man. Therefore neither
plants nor animals ought to remain.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since the renewal of the world will be for man's sake it
follows that it should be conformed to the renewal of man. Now by being
renewed man will pass from the state of corruption to incorruptibility
and to a state of everlasting rest, wherefore it is written (1 Cor.
15:53): "This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must
put on immortality"; and consequently the world will be renewed in such a
way as to throw off all corruption and remain for ever at rest. Therefore
it will be impossible for anything to be the subject of that renewal,
unless it be a subject of incorruption. Now such are the heavenly bodies,
the elements, and man. For the heavenly bodies are by their very nature
incorruptible both as to their whole and as to their part: the elements
are corruptible as to their parts but incorruptible as a whole: while men
are corruptible both in whole and in part, but this is on the part of
their matter not on the part of their form, the rational soul to wit,
which will remain incorrupt after the corruption of man. on the other
hand, dumb animals, plants, and minerals, and all mixed bodies, are
corruptible both in their whole and in their parts, both on the part of
their matter which loses its form, and on the part of their form which
does not remain actually; and thus they are in no way subjects of
incorruption. Hence they will not remain in this renewal, but those
things alone which we have mentioned above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These bodies are said to adorn the elements, inasmuch as
the general active and passive forces which are in the elements are
applied to specific actions: hence they adorn the elements in their
active and passive state. But this state will not remain in the elements:
wherefore there is no need for animals or plants to remain.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Neither animals nor plants nor any other bodies merited
anything by their services to man, since they lack free-will. However,
certain bodies are said to be rewarded in so far as man merited that
those things should be renewed which are adapted to be renewed. But
plants and animals are not adapted to the renewal of incorruption, as
stated above. Wherefore for this very reason man did not merit that they
should be renewed, since no one can merit for another, or even for
himself that which another or himself is incapable of receiving. Hence,
granted even that dumb animals merited by serving man, it would not
follow that they are to be renewed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as several kinds of perfection are ascribed to man
(for there is the perfection of created nature and the perfection of
glorified nature), so also there is a twofold perfection of the universe,
one corresponding to this state of changeableness, the other
corresponding to the state of a future renewal. Now plants and animals
belong to its perfection according to the present state, and not
according to the state of this renewal, since they are not capable
thereof.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although animals and plants as to certain other respects
are more noble than the elements, the elements are more noble in relation
to incorruption, as explained above [*Cf. Q[74], A[1], ad 3].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[91] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The natural desire to be for ever that is in animals and
plants must be understood in reference to the movement of the heaven, so
that they may continue in being as long as the movement of the heaven
lasts: since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to last longer
than its cause. Wherefore if at the cessation of movement in the first
movable body, plants and animals cease as to their species, it does not
follow that the natural appetite is frustrated.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED* (THREE
ARTICLES) [*Cf. FP, Q[12]]
In the next place we must consider matters concerning the blessed after
the general judgment. We shall consider: (1) Their vision of the Divine
essence, wherein their bliss consists chiefly; (2) Their bliss and their
mansions; (3) Their relations with the damned; (4) Their gifts, which are
contained in their bliss; (5) The crowns which perfect and adorn their
happiness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints will see God in His essence?
(2) Whether they will see Him with the eyes of the body?
(3) Whether in seeing God they will see all that God sees?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His
essence?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to the
vision of God in His essence. For it is written (Jn. 1:18): "No man hath
seen God at any time"; and Chrysostom in his commentary says (Hom. xiv in
Joan.) that "not even the heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim and
Seraphim, have ever been able to see Him as He is." Now, only equality
with the angels is promised to men (Mt. 22:30): "They . . . shall be as
the angels of God in heaven." Therefore neither will the saints in heaven
see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius argues thus (Div. Nom. i): "Knowledge is only
of existing things." Now whatever exists is finite, since it is confined
to a certain genus: and therefore God, since He is infinite, is above all
existing things. Therefore there is no knowledge of Him, and He is above
all knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Dionysius (De Myst. Theol. i) shows that the most
perfect way in which our intellect can be united to God is when it is
united to Him as to something unknown. Now that which is seen in its
essence is not unknown. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to
see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach.) that "the
darkness"---for thus he calls the abundance of light---"which screens God
is impervious to all illuminations, and hidden from all knowledge: and if
anyone in seeing God understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but
one of those things that are His." Therefore no created intellect will be
able to see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad Hieroth.) "God is
invisible on account of His surpassing glory." Now His glory surpasses
the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is
invisible on the way, so will He be in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, since the intelligible object is the perfection of the
intellect, there must needs be proportion between intelligible and
intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there is no
possible proportion between our intellect and the Divine essence, since
an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intellect will be
unable to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the created
intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise attain to the
sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will our intellect be
able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, whenever the intellect understands something actually it
needs to be informed with the likeness of the object understood, which
likeness is the principle of the intellectual operation terminating in
that object, even as heat is the principle of heating. Accordingly if our
intellect understands God, this must be by means of some likeness
informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot be the very essence of
God, since form and thing informed must needs have one being, while the
Divine essence differs from our intellect in essence and being. Therefore
the form whereby our intellect is informed in understanding God must
needs be a likeness impressed by God on our intellect. But this likeness,
being something created, cannot lead to the knowledge of God except as an
effect leads to the knowledge of its cause. Therefore it is impossible
for our intellect to see God except through His effect. But to see God
through His effect is not to see Him in His essence. Therefore our
intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, the Divine essence is more distant from our intellect
than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna (Metaph. iii),
"the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does not imply that
its essence is in our intellect," because in that case our knowledge of
the intelligence would be a substance and not an accident, "but that its
likeness is impressed on our intellect." Therefore neither is God in our
intellect, to be understood by us, except in so far as an impression of
Him is in our intellect. But this impression cannot lead to the knowledge
of the Divine essence, for since it is infinitely distant from the Divine
essence, it degenerates to another image much more than if the image of a
white thing were to degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore,
just as a person in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to
the image of a black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ,
is not said to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able
to see God in His essence, since it understands God only by means of this
impression.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, "In things devoid of matter that which understands is
the same as that which is understood" (De Anima iii). Now God is
supremely devoid of matter. Since then our intellect, which is created,
cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible for our
intellect to see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 11 Para. 1/1
OBJ 11: Further, whatever is seen in its essence is known as to what it
is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but only what He is
not as Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. i)
declare. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 12 Para. 1/1
OBJ 12: Further, every infinite thing, as such, is unknown. But God is
in every way infinite. Therefore He is altogether unknown. Therefore it
will be impossible for Him to be seen in His essence by a created
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 13 Para. 1/1
OBJ 13: Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii): "God is by
nature invisible." Now that which is in God by nature cannot be
otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be seen in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 14 Para. 1/1
OBJ 14: Further, whatever is in one way and is seen in another way is
not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be seen in another way
by the saints in heaven: for He according to His own mode, but will be
seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He will not be seen
by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 15 Para. 1/1
OBJ 15: Further, that which is seen through a medium is not seen in its
essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium which is the
light of glory, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall see
light." Therefore He will not be seen in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Obj. 16 Para. 1/1
OBJ 16: Further, in heaven God will be seen face to face, according to 1
Cor. 13:12. Now when we see a man face to face, we see him through his
likeness. Therefore in heaven God will be seen through His likeness, and
consequently not in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] OTC Para. 1/6
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a
glass in a dark manner, but then face to face." Now that which is seen
face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His
essence by the saints in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] OTC 16 Para. 2/6
Further, it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear we shall be
like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore we shall see
Him in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] OTC 16 Para. 3/6
Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have delivered up the
kingdom to God and the Father," says: "Where," i.e. in heaven, "the
essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to
the clean of heart alone and is the highest bliss." Therefore the blessed
will see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] OTC 16 Para. 4/6
Further, it is written (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me shall be loved of
My Father; and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him." Now
that which is manifested is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be
seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] OTC 16 Para. 5/6
Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the words of Ex. 33:20,
"Man shall not see Me and live," disapproves of the opinion of those who
said that "in this abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but not in
His nature; for His glory differs not from His nature." But His nature is
His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] OTC 16 Para. 6/6
Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. Now
the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence, according
to Ex. 33:13, "Show me Thy glory"; Ps. 79:20, "Show Thy face and we shall
be saved"; and Jn. 14:8, "Show us the Father and it is enough for us."
Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man's life
is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man's ultimate
happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to their
being. Hence in reference to this question we find that philosophers and
theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same difference of
opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive intellect can never
come to understand separate substances. thus Alfarabius expresses himself
at the end of his Ethics, although he says the contrary in his book On
the Intelligence, as the Commentator attests (De Anima iii). In like
manner certain theologians held that the human intellect can never attain
to the vision of God in His essence. on either side they were moved by
the distance which separates our intellect from the Divine essence and
from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is somewhat one
with the intelligible object in act, it would seem difficult to
understand how the created intellect is made to be an uncreated essence.
Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Joan.): "How can the creature see
the uncreated?" Those who hold the passive intellect to be the subject of
generation and corruption, as being a power dependent on the body,
encounter a still greater difficulty not only as regards the vision of
God but also as regards the vision of any separate substances. But this
opinion is altogether untenable. First, because it is in contradiction to
the authority of canonical scripture, as Augustine declares (De Videndo
Deo: Ep. cxlvii). Secondly, because, since understanding is an operation
most proper to man, it follows that his happiness must be held to consist
in that operation when perfected in him. Now since the perfection of an
intelligent being as such is the intelligible object, if in the most
perfect operation of his intellect man does not attain to the vision of
the Divine essence, but to something else, we shall be forced to conclude
that something other than God is the object of man's happiness: and since
the ultimate perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its
principle, it follows that something other than God is the effective
principle of man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to
the philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate
substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these
substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our
intellect will at length attain to the vision of the Divine essence, and
according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of
separate substances.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like
Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our intellect
understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to the vision
of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two arguments. The
first is that just as the specific nature is not diversified in various
individuals, except as united to various individuating principles, so the
idea understood is not diversified in me and you, except in so far as it
is united to various imaginary forms: and consequently when the intellect
separates the idea understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a
quiddity understood, which is one and the same in the various persons
understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance.
Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any
intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the
separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that our
intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all
intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it
abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a
quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of
the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate
substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the quiddity
of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says (Met.
iii). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from this particular
sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that the intellect
has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and consequently since
we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some quiddity without a
quiddity, and this is what we understand by a separate quiddity [*Cf. FP,
Q[88], A[2]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the
quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is not
of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and
consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities of
material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows the
quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine essence, which
more than any other is of a different nature from any created quiddity.
Secondly, because granted that it be of the same nature, nevertheless the
knowledge of a composite thing would not lead to the knowledge of a
separate substance, except in the point of the most remote genus, namely
substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect unless it reach to the
properties of a thing. For to know a man only as an animal is to know him
only in a restricted sense and potentially: and much less is it to know
only the nature of substance in him. Hence to know God thus, or other
separate substances, is not to see the essence of God or the quiddity of
a separate substance, but to know Him in His effect and in a mirror as it
were. For this reason Avicenna in his Metaphysics. propounds another way
of understanding separate substances, to wit that separate substances are
understood by us by means of intentions of their quiddities, such
intentions being images of their substances, not indeed abstracted
therefrom, since they are immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls.
But this way also seems inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek.
For it is agreed that "whatever is received into any thing is therein
after the mode of the recipient": and consequently the likeness of the
Divine essence impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode
of our intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect
reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may
occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is a
deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the same
specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such is the
defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in comparison
with one that has much. In another way the likeness is yet more
defective, when it does not attain to the same specific nature but only
to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an orange-colored or
yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In another way, still
more defective is the likeness when it does not attain to the same
generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or proportion: such is the
likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a being: and in this way
every likeness received into a creature is defective in comparison with
the Divine essence. Now in order that the sight know whiteness, it is
necessary for it to receive the likeness of whiteness according to its
specific nature, although not according to the same manner of being
because the form has a manner of being in the sense other from that which
it has in the thing outside the soul: for if the form of yellowness were
received into the eye, the eye would not be said to see whiteness. In
like manner in order that the intellect understand a quiddity, it is
necessary for it to receive its likeness according to the same specific
nature, although there may possibly not be the same manner of being on
either side: for the form which is in the intellect or sense is not the
principle of knowledge according to its manner of being on both sides,
but according to its common ratio with the external object. Hence it is
clear that by no likeness received in the created intellect can God be
understood, so that His essence be seen immediately. And for this reason
those who held the Divine essence to be seen in this way alone, said that
the essence itself will not be seen, but a certain brightness, as it were
a radiance thereof. Consequently neither does this way suffice for the
Divine vision that we seek.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
Therefore we must take the other way, which also certain philosophers
held, namely Alexander and Averroes (De Anima iii.). For since in every
knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or seen, this
form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate substances
is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from composite things,
as the first opinion maintained, nor an impression left on our intellect
by the separate substance, as the second opinion affirmed; but the
separate substance itself united to our intellect as its form, so as to
be both that which is understood, and that whereby it is understood. And
whatever may be the case with other separate substances, we must
nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God in His essence,
because by whatever other form our intellect were informed, it could not
be led thereby to the Divine essence. This, however, must not be
understood as though the Divine essence were in reality the form of our
intellect, or as though from its conjunction with our intellect there
resulted one being simply, as in natural things from the natural form and
matter: but the meaning is that the proportion of the Divine essence to
our intellect is as the proportion of form to matter. For whenever two
things, one of which is the perfection of the other, are received into
the same recipient, the proportion of one to the other, namely of the
more perfect to the less perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter:
thus light and color are received into a transparent object, light being
to color as form to matter. When therefore intellectual light is received
into the soul, together with the indwelling Divine essence, though they
are not received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the
intellect as form to matter: and that this suffices for the intellect to
be able to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may be
shown as follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) and matter, there
results one thing simply, so from the form whereby the intellect
understands, and the intellect itself, there results one thing
intelligibly. Now in natural things a self-subsistent thing cannot be the
form of any matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts, since
it is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if this
self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it from being the
form of some matter and becoming that whereby the composite itself is
[*Literally,---and becoming the 'whereby-it-is' of the composite itself]
as instanced in the soul. Now in the intellect we must take the intellect
itself in potentiality as matter, and the intelligible species as form;
so that the intellect actually understanding will be the composite as it
were resulting from both. Hence if there be a self-subsistent thing, that
has nothing in itself besides that which is intelligible, such a thing
can by itself be the form whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing
is intelligible in respect of its actuality and not of its potentiality
(Met. ix): in proof of which an intelligible form needs to be abstracted
from matter and from all the properties of matter. Therefore, since the
Divine essence is pure act, it will be possible for it to be the form
whereby the intellect understands: and this will be the beatific vision.
Hence the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1) that the union of the body with
the soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the spirit with God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words quoted can be explained in three ways, according
to Augustine (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). In one way as excluding
corporeal vision, whereby no one ever saw or will see God in His essence;
secondly, as excluding intellectual vision of God in His essence from
those who dwell in this mortal flesh; thirdly, as excluding the vision of
comprehension from a created intellect. It is thus that Chrysostom
understands the saying wherefore he adds: "By seeing, the evangelist
means a most clear perception, and such a comprehension as the Father has
of the Son." This also is the meaning of the evangelist, since he adds:
"The Only-begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath
declared Him": his intention being to prove the Son to be God from His
comprehending God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as God, by His infinite essence, surpasses all
existing things which have a determinate being, so His knowledge, whereby
He knows, is above all knowledge. Wherefore as our knowledge is to our
created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to His infinite essence. Now
two things contribute to knowledge, to wit, the knower and the thing
known. Again, the vision whereby we shall see God in His essence is the
same whereby God sees Himself, as regards that whereby He is seen,
because as He sees Himself in His essence so shall we also see Him. But
as regards the knower there is the difference that is between the Divine
intellect and ours. Now in the order of knowledge the object known
follows the form by which we know, since by the form of a stone we see a
stone: whereas the efficacy of knowledge follows the power of the knower:
thus he who has stronger sight sees more clearly. Consequently in that
vision we shall see the same thing that God sees, namely His essence, but
not so effectively.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Dionysius is speaking there of the knowledge whereby
wayfarers know God by a created form, whereby our intellect is informed
so as to see God. But as Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii),
"God evades every form of our intellect," because whatever form our
intellect conceive, that form is out of proportion to the Divine essence.
Hence He cannot be fathomed by our intellect: but our most perfect
knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to know that He is above all that our
intellect can conceive, and thus we are united to Him as to something
unknown. In heaven, however, we shall see Him by a form which is His
essence, and we shall be united to Him as to something known.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: God is light (Jn. 1:9). Now illumination is the impression
of light on an illuminated object. And since the Divine essence is of a
different mode from any likeness thereof impressed on the intellect, he
(Dionysius) says that the "Divine darkness is impervious to all
illumination," because, to wit, the Divine essence, which he calls
"darkness" on account of its surpassing brightness, remains
undemonstrated by the impression on our intellect, and consequently is
"hidden from all knowledge." Therefore if anyone in seeing God conceives
something in his mind, this is not God but one of God's effects.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although the glory of God surpasses any form by which our
intellect is informed now, it does not surpass the Divine essence, which
will be the form of our intellect in heaven: and therefore although it is
invisible now, it will be visible then.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 6: Although there can be no proportion between finite and
infinite, since the excess of the infinite over the finite is
indeterminate, there can be proportionateness or a likeness to proportion
between them: for as a finite thing is equal to some finite thing, so is
an infinite thing equal to an infinite thing. Now in order that a thing
be known totally, it is sometimes necessary that there be proportion
between knower and known, because the power of the knower needs to be
adequate to the knowableness of the thing known, and equality is a kind
of proportion. Sometimes, however, the knowableness of the thing
surpasses the power of the knower, as when we know God, or conversely
when He knows creatures: and then there is no need for proportion between
knower and known, but only for proportionateness; so that, to wit, as the
knower is to the knowable object, so is the knowable object to the fact
of its being known: and this proportionateness suffices for the infinite
to be known by the finite, or conversely.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 2/2
We may also reply that proportion according to the strict sense in
which it is employed signifies a ratio of quantity to quantity based on a
certain fixed excess or equality; but is further transferred to denote
any ratio of any one thing to another; and in this sense we say that
matter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing hinders
our intellect, although finite, being described as proportionate to the
vision of the Divine essence; but not to the comprehension thereof, on
account of its immensity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: Likeness and distance are twofold. One is according to
agreement in nature; and thus God is more distant from the created
intellect than the created intelligible is from the sense. The other is
according to proportionateness; and thus it is the other way about, for
sense is not proportionate to the knowledge of the immaterial, as the
intellect is proportionate to the knowledge of any immaterial object
whatsoever. It is this likeness and not the former that is requisite for
knowledge, for it is clear that the intellect understanding a stone is
not like it in its natural being; thus also the sight apprehends red
honey and red gall, though it does not apprehend sweet honey, for the
redness of gall is more becoming to honey as visible, than the sweetness
of honey to honey.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: In the vision wherein God will be seen in His essence, the
Divine essence itself will be the form, as it were, of the intellect, by
which it will understand: nor is it necessary for them to become one in
being, but only to become one as regards the act of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: We do not uphold the saying of Avicenna as regards the
point at issue, for in this other philosophers also disagree with him.
Unless perhaps we might say that Avicenna refers to the knowledge of
separate substances, in so far as they are known by the habits of
speculative sciences and the likeness of other things. Hence he makes
this statement in order to prove that in us knowledge is not a substance
but an accident. Nevertheless, although the Divine essence is more
distant, as to the property of its nature, from our intellect, than is
the substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the point of
intelligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of
potentiality, which is not the case with other separate substances. Nor
will that knowledge whereby we shall see God in His essence be in the
genus of accident as regards that whereby He will be seen, but only as
regards the act of the one who understands Him, for this act will not be
the very substance either of the person understanding or of the thing
understood.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 10 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 10: A substance that is separate from matter understands both
itself and other things; and in both cases the authority quoted can be
verified. For since the very essence of a separate substance is of itself
intelligible and actual, through being separate from matter, it is clear
that when a separate substance understands itself, that which understands
and that which is understood are absolutely identical, for it does not
understand itself by an intention abstracted from itself, as we
understand material objects. And this is apparently the meaning of the
Philosopher (De Anima iii.) as indicated by the Commentator (De Anima
iii). But when it understands other things, the object actually
understood becomes one with the intellect in act, in so far as the form
of the object understood becomes the form of the intellect, for as much
as the intellect is in act; not that it becomes identified with the
essence of the intellect, as Avicenna proves (De Natural. vi.), because
the essence of the intellect remains one under two forms whereby it
understands two things in succession, in the same way as primary matter
remains one under various forms. Hence also the Commentator (De Anima
iii.) compares the passive intellect, in this respect, to primary matter.
Thus it by no means follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the
very essence of God, but that the latter is compared to it as its
perfection or form.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 11 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 11: These and all like authorities must be understood to refer
to the knowledge whereby we know God on the way, for the reason given
above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 12 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 12: The infinite is unknown if we take it in the privative
sense, as such, because it indicates removal of completion whence
knowledge of a thing is derived. Wherefore the infinite amounts to the
same as matter subject to privation, as stated in Phys. iii. But if we
take the infinite in the negative sense, it indicates the absence of
limiting matter, since even a form is somewhat limited by its matter.
Hence the infinite in this sense is of itself most knowable; and it is in
this way that God is infinite.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 13 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 13: Augustine is speaking of bodily vision, by which God will
never be seen. This is evident from what precedes: "For no man hath seen
God at any time, nor can any man see Him as these things which we call
visible are seen: in this way He is by nature invisible even as He is
incorruptible." As, however, He is by nature supremely being, so He is in
Himself supremely intelligible. But that He be for a time not understood
by us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be seen by us after being
unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 14 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 14: In heaven God will be seen by the saints as He is, if this
be referred to the mode of the object seen, for the saints will see that
God has the mode which He has. But if we refer the mode to the knower, He
will not be seen as He is, because the created intellect will not have so
great an efficacy in seeing, as the Divine essence has to the effect of
being seen.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 15 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 15: There is a threefold medium both in bodily and in
intellectual vision. The first is the medium "under which" the object is
seen, and this is something perfecting the sight so as to see in general,
without determining the sight to any particular object. Such is bodily
light in relation to bodily vision; and the light of the active intellect
in relation to the passive intellect, in so far as this light is a
medium. The second is the light "by which" the object is seen, and this
is the visible form whereby either sight is determined to a special
object, for instance by the form of a stone to know a stone. The third is
the medium "in which" it is seen; and this is something by gazing on
which the sight is led to something else: thus by looking in a mirror it
is led to see the things reflected in the mirror, and by looking at an
image it is led to the thing represented by the image. In this way, too,
the intellect from knowing an effect is led to the cause, or conversely.
Accordingly in the heavenly vision there will be no third medium, so
that, to wit, God be known by the images of other things, as He is known
now, for which reason we are said to see now in a glass: nor will there
be the second medium, because the essence itself of God will be that
whereby our intellect will see God. But there will only be the first
medium, which will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for
it to be united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner. Yet
this medium will not cause that knowledge to be mediate, because it does
not come in between the knower and the thing known, but is that which
gives the knower the power to know [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[5]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[1] R.O. 16 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 16: Corporeal creatures are not said to be seen immediately,
except when that which in them is capable of being brought into
conjunction with the sight is in conjunction therewith. Now they are not
capable of being in conjunction with the sight of their essence on
account of their materiality: hence they are seen immediately when their
image is in conjunction with the sight. But God is able to be united to
the intellect by His essence: wherefore He would not be seen immediately,
unless His essence were united to the intellect: and this vision, which
is effected immediately, is called "vision of face." Moreover the
likeness of the corporeal object is received into the sight according to
the same ratio as it is in the object, although not according to the same
mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads to the object directly:
whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in this way to God, as shown
above: and for this reason the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of
the body? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[3]]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that after the resurrection the saints will see God
with the eyes of the body. Because the glorified eye has greater power
than one that is not glorified. Now the blessed Job saw God with his eyes
(Job 42:5): "With the hearing of the ear, I have heard Thee, but now my
eye seeth Thee." Much more therefore will the glorified eye be able to
see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see God
my Saviour [Vulg.: 'my God']." Therefore in heaven God will be seen with
the eyes of the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further. Augustine, speaking of the sight of the glorified eyes,
expresses himself as follows (De Civ. Dei xxii): "A greater power will be
in those eyes, not to see more keenly, as certain serpents or eagles are
reported to see (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these
animals they can see only corporeal things), but to see even incorporeal
things." Now any power that is capable of knowing incorporeal things can
be upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified eyes will be able to see
God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the disparity of corporeal to incorporeal things is the
same as of incorporeal to corporeal. Now the incorporeal eye can see
corporeal things. Therefore the corporeal eye can see the incorporeal:
and consequently the same conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Gregory, commenting on Job 4:16, "There stood one whose
countenance I knew not," says (Moral. v): "Man who, had he been willing
to obey the command, would have been spiritual in the flesh, became, by
sinning, carnal even in mind." Now through becoming carnal in mind, "he
thinks only of those things which he draws to his soul by the images of
bodies" (Moral. v). Therefore when he will be spiritual in the flesh
(which is promised to the saints after the resurrection), he will be able
even in the flesh to see spiritual things. Therefore the same conclusion
follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, man can be beatified by God alone. Now he will be
beatified not only in soul but also in body. Therefore God will be
visible not only to his intellect but also to his flesh.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, even as God is present to the intellect by His essence,
so will He be to the senses, because He will be "all in all" (1 Cor.
15:28). Now He will be seen by the intellect through the union of His
essence therewith. Therefore He will also be visible to the sense.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 1/5
On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 1:2, "There appeared to him
an angel," says: "God is not sought with the eyes of the body, nor
surveyed by the sight, nor clasped by the touch." Therefore God will by
no means be visible to the bodily sense.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 2/5
Further, Jerome, commenting on Is. 6:1, "I saw the Lord sitting," says:
"The Godhead not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the Holy
Ghost is visible, not to carnal eyes, but only to the eyes of the mind,
of which it is said: Blessed are the pure in heart."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 3/5
Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine, Ep. cxlvii): "An
incorporeal thing is invisible to a corporeal eye." But God is supremely
incorporeal. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 4/5
Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii): "No man hath seen
God as He is at any time, neither in this life, nor in the angelic life,
in the same way as these visible things which are seen with the corporeal
sight." Now the angelic life is the life of the blessed, wherein they
will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 5/5
Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv.), "man is said to be made
to God's image inasmuch as he is able to see God." But man is in God's
image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh. Therefore he
will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two
ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceptible directly if it can
act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly either on
sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which acts directly
in this second way on a sense is called a proper sensible, for instance
color in relation to the sight, and sound in relation to the hearing. But
as sense as such makes use of a bodily organ, nothing can be received
therein except corporeally, since whatever is received into a thing is
therein after the mode of the recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the
sense as such, according to their magnitude: and consequently magnitude
and all its consequences, such as movement, rest, number, and the like,
are called common sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense,
neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is annexed to those
things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of
Diares; a friend and the like which are the direct object of the
intellect's knowledge in the universal, and in the particular are the
object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in
other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this
kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive power (whose province it
is to know directly this thing known), from that which is sensed
directly, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse
(thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks):
otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the body, or
perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither
here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be
removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that
which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no
sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and
sight as such a sense perceives color, it is impossible for the sight to
perceive that which is neither color nor magnitude, unless we call it a
sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically the
same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be
impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object of direct
vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on
the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in bodies,
especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body of Christ,
and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so clearly, that God
will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the body, even as life
is perceived in speech. For although our intellect will not then see God
from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in His creatures seen
corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally is indicated by
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii), as is clear if we take note of his words,
for he says: "It is very credible that we shall so see the mundane bodies
of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God
everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the
invisible things of God as understood by those that are made, but as when
we see men . . . we do not believe but see that they live."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye, of which
the Apostle says (Eph. 1:18): "The eyes of our [Vulg.: 'your'] heart
enlightened."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The passage quoted does not mean that we are to see God
with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall see God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring and
conditionally. This appears from what he had said before: "Therefore they
will have an altogether different power, if they shall see that
incorporeal nature": and then he goes on to say: "Accordingly a greater
power," etc., and afterwards he explains himself.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: All knowledge results from some kind of abstraction from
matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal form is abstracted from matter,
the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence it is that a form existing
in matter is in no way a principle of knowledge, while a form existing in
the senses is somewhat a principle of knowledge, in so far as it is
abstracted from matter, and a form existing in the intellect is still
better a principle of knowledge. Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the
obstacle to knowledge is removed, can see a corporeal object: but it does
not follow that the corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is
deficient as participating in matter, be able to know perfectly
incorporeal objects of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although the mind that has become carnal cannot think but
of things received from the senses, it thinks of them immaterially. In
like manner whatever the sight apprehends it must always apprehend it
corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which cannot be apprehended
corporeally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Beatitude is the perfection of man as man. And since man is
man not through his body but through his soul, and the body is essential
to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul: it follows that man's
beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in an act of the soul,
and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind of overflow, as
explained above (Q[85], A[1]). Yet our body will have a certain beatitude
from seeing God in sensible creatures: and especially in Christ's body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[2] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The intellect can perceive spiritual things, whereas the
eyes of the body cannot: wherefore the intellect will be able to know the
Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body will not.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees? [*Cf. FP, Q[12],
AA[7],8]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the saints, seeing God in His essence, see all
that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. 1.): "The
angels know all things in the World of God, before they happen." Now the
saints will be equal to the angels of God (Mt. 22:30). Therefore the
saints also in seeing God see all things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv.): "Since all see God there with
equal clearness, what do they not know, who know Him Who knows all
things?" and he refers to the blessed who see God in His essence.
Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is stated in De Anima (iii, text. 7), that "when an
intellect understands the greatest things, it is all the more able to
understand the least things." Now God is the greatest of intelligible
things. Therefore the power of the intellect is greatly increased by
understanding Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him understands all
things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the intellect is not hindered from understanding a thing
except by this surpassing it. Now no creature surpasses the intellect
that understands God, since, as Gregory says (Dial. ii.), "to the soul
which sees its Creator all creatures are small." Therefore those who see
God in His essence know all things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, every passive power that is not reduced to act is
imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul is a power that is
passive as it were to the knowledge of all things, since "the passive
intellect is in which all are in potentiality" (De Anima iii, text. 18).
If then in that beatitude it were not to understand all things, it would
remain imperfect, which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected in the
mirror. Now all things are reflected in the Word of God as in a mirror,
because He is the type and image of all. Therefore the saints who see the
Word in its essence see all created things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, according to Prov. 10:24, "to the just their desire
shall be given." Now the just desire to know all things, since "all men
desire naturally to know," and nature is not done away by glory.
Therefore God will grant them to know all things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, ignorance is one of the penalties of the present life
[*Cf. FS, Q[85], A[3]]. Now all penalty will be removed from the saints
by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed: and consequently they
will know all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, the beatitude of the saints is in their soul before
being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints will be reformed in
glory to the likeness of Christ's body (Phil. 3:21). Therefore their
souls will be perfected in likeness to the soul of Christ. Now Christ's
soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all the souls of the saints
will also see all things in the Word.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, the intellect, like the senses, knows all the things
with the image of which it is informed. Now the Divine essence shows a
thing forth more clearly than any other image thereof. Therefore since in
that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the form as it were of our
intellect, it would seem that the saints seeing God see all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 11 Para. 1/1
OBJ 11: Further, the Commentator says (De Anima iii), that "if the
active intellect were the form of the passive intellect, we should
understand all things." Now the Divine essence represents all things more
clearly than the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that sees God
in His essence knows all things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Obj. 12 Para. 1/1
OBJ 12: Further, the lower angels are enlightened by the higher about
the things they are ignorant of, for the reason that they know not all
things. Now after the day of judgment, one angel will not enlighten
another; for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss observes on 1
Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have brought to nought," etc. Therefore the
lower angels will then know all things, and for the same reason all the
other saints who will see God in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi): "The higher angels
cleanse the lower angels from ignorance." Now the lower angels see the
Divine essence. Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may be
ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God more perfectly
than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not necessarily see
all things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] OTC 12 Para. 2/3
Further, Christ alone has the spirit not "by measure" (Jn. 3:34). Now it
becomes Christ, as having the spirit without measure, to know all things
in the Word: wherefore it is stated in the same place (Jn. 3:35) that
"the Father . . . hath given all things into His hand." Therefore none
but Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] OTC 12 Para. 3/3
Further, the more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its
effects are known thereby. Now some of those who see God in His essence
will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore some will know more
things than others, and consequently every one will not know all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God by seeing his essence knows all things whatsoever
that are, shall be, or have been: and He is said to know these things by
His "knowledge of vision," because He knows them as though they were
present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this essence
He knows all that He can do, although He never did them, nor ever will:
else He would not know His power perfectly; since a power cannot be known
unless its objects be known: and this is called His "science" or
"knowledge of simple intelligence." Now it is impossible for a created
intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, to know all that God can do,
because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more things are
known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who is quick of
intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of intelligence.
Since then the extent of the Divine power is measured according to what
it can do, if an intellect were to see in the Divine essence all that God
can do, its perfection in understanding would equal in extent the Divine
power in producing its effects, and thus it would comprehend the Divine
power, which is impossible for any created intellect to do. Yet there is
a created intellect, namely the soul of Christ [*Cf. TP, Q[16], A[2]],
which knows in the Word all that God knows by the knowledge of vision.
But regarding others who see the Divine essence there are two opinions.
For some say that all who see God in His essence see all that God sees by
His knowledge of vision. This, however, is contrary to the sayings of
holy men, who hold that angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is
clear that according to faith all the angels see God in His essence.
Wherefore others say that others than Christ, although they see God in
His essence, do not see all that God sees because they do not comprehend
the Divine essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause
should know all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is
not in the competency of a created intellect. Consequently of those who
see God in His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the more
things according as he sees the Divine essence the more clearly: and
hence it is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things.
Thus the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on
increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining to
the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more, because
then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is possible
that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of Isidore, that "the angels know in the Word
all things before they happen," cannot refer to those things which God
knows only by the knowledge of simple intelligence, because those things
will never happen; but it must refer to those things which God knows only
by the knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not say that all the
angels know them all, but that perhaps some do; and that even those who
know do not know all perfectly. For in one and the same thing there are
many intelligible aspects to be considered, such as its various
properties and relations to other things: and it is possible that while
one thing is known in common by two persons, one of them perceives more
aspects, and that the one learns these aspects from the other. Hence
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the lower angels learn from the
higher angels the intelligible aspects of things." Wherefore it does not
follow that even the angels who know all creatures are able to see all
that can be understood in them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It follows from this saying of Gregory that this blessed
vision suffices for the seeing of all things on the part of the Divine
essence, which is the medium by which one sees, and whereby God sees all
things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing to the deficiency
of the created intellect which does not comprehend the Divine essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The created intellect sees the Divine essence not according
to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own mode which is
finite. Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be infinitely
increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know all things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Defective knowledge results not only from excess and
deficiency of the knowable object in relation to the intellect, but also
from the fact that the aspect of knowableness is not united to the
intellect: thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the image
of the stone not being united to it. And although the Divine essence
which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of one who
sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all things, but as the
type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the Divine
essence more fully.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: When a passive power is perceptible by several perfections
in order, if it be perfected with its ultimate perfection, it is not said
to be imperfect, even though it lack some of the preceding dispositions.
Now all knowledge by which the created intellect is perfected is directed
to the knowledge of God as its end. Wherefore he who sees God in His
essence, even though he know nothing else, would have a perfect
intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect through knowing something
else besides Him, except in so far as it sees Him more fully. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. v.): "Unhappy is he who knoweth all these"
(namely, creatures), "and knoweth not Thee: but happy whoso knoweth Thee,
though he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the
happier for them but for Thee only."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 6: This mirror has a will: and even as He will show Himself to
whom He will, so will He show in Himself whatsoever He will. Nor does the
comparison with a material mirror hold, for it is not in its power to be
seen or not to be seen.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 2/2
We may also reply that in a material mirror both object and mirror are
seen under their proper image; although the mirror be seen through an
image received from the thing itself, whereas the stone is seen through
its proper image reflected in some other thing, where the reason for
seeing the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the uncreated
mirror a thing is seen through the form of the mirror, just as an effect
is seen through the image of its cause and conversely. Consequently it
does not follow that whoever sees the eternal mirror sees all that is
reflected in that mirror: since he who sees the cause does not of
necessity see all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The desire of the saints to know all things will be
fulfilled by the mere fact of their seeing God: just as their desire to
possess all good things will be fulfilled by their possessing God. For as
God suffices the affections in that He has perfect goodness, and by
possessing Him we possess all goods as it were, so does the vision of Him
suffice the intellect: "Lord, show us the Father and it is enough for us"
(Jn. 14:8).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: Ignorance properly so called denotes a privation and thus
it is a punishment: for in this way ignorance is nescience of things, the
knowledge of which is a duty or a necessity. Now the saints in heaven
will not be ignorant of any of these things. Sometimes, however,
ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind of nescience: and thus
the angels and saints in heaven will be ignorant of certain things. Hence
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels will be cleansed from
their ignorance." In this sense ignorance is not a penalty but a defect.
Nor is it necessary for all such defects to be done away by glory: for
thus we might say that it was a defect in Pope Linus that he did not
attain to the glory of Peter.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: Our body will be conformed to the body of Christ in glory,
in likeness but not in equality, for it will be endowed with clarity even
as Christ's body, but not equally. In like manner our soul will have
glory in likeness to the soul of Christ, but not in equality thereto:
thus it will have knowledge even as Christ's soul, but not so great, so
as to know all as Christ's soul does.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 10 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 10: Although the Divine essence is the type of all things
knowable it will not be united to each created intellect according as it
is the type of all. Hence the objection proves nothing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 11 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 11: The active intellect is a form proportionate to the
passive intellect; even as the passive power of matter is proportionate
to the power of the natural agent, so that whatsoever is in the passive
power of matter or the passive intellect is in the active power of the
active intellect or of the natural agent. Consequently if the active
intellect become the form of the passive intellect, the latter must of
necessity know all those things to which the power of the active
intellect extends. But the Divine essence is not a form proportionate to
our intellect in this sense. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[92] A[3] R.O. 12 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 12: Nothing hinders us from saying that after the judgment
day, when the glory of men and angels will be consummated once for all,
all the blessed will know all that God knows by the knowledge of vision,
yet so that not all will see all in the Divine essence. Christ's soul,
however, will see clearly all things therein, even as it sees them now;
while others will see therein a greater or lesser number of things
according to the degree of clearness wherewith they will know God: and
thus Christ's soul will enlighten all other souls concerning those things
which it sees in the Word better than others. Hence it is written (Apoc.
21:23): "The glory of God shall enlighten the city of Jerusalem [*Vulg.:
'hath enlightened it'], and the Lamb is the lamp thereof." In like manner
the higher souls will enlighten the lower (not indeed with a new
enlightening, so as to increase the knowledge of the lower), but with a
kind of continued enlightenment; thus we might understand the sun to
enlighten the atmosphere while at a standstill. Wherefore it is written
(Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to justice" shall shine "as stars
for all eternity." The statement that the superiority of the orders will
cease refers to their present ordinate ministry in our regard, as is
clear from the same gloss.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS AND THEIR MANSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the happiness of the saints and their mansions.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the happiness of the saints will increase after the judgment?
(2) Whether the degrees of happiness should be called mansions?
(3) Whether the various mansions differ according to various degrees of
charity?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the happiness of the saints will be greater after the judgment
than before?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the happiness of the saints will not be
greater after the judgment than before. For the nearer a thing approaches
to the Divine likeness, the more perfectly does it participate happiness.
Now the soul is more like God when separated from the body than when
united to it. Therefore its happiness is greater before being reunited to
the body than after.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, power is more effective when it is united than when
divided. Now the soul is more united when separated from the body than
when it is joined to the body. Therefore it has then greater power for
operation, and consequently has a more perfect share of happiness, since
this consists in action [*Cf. FS, Q[3], A[2]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, beatitude consists in an act of the speculative
intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, makes no use of a bodily organ;
and consequently by being reunited to the body the soul does not become
capable of more perfect understanding. Therefore the soul's happiness is
not greater after than before the judgment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, nothing can be greater than the infinite, and so the
addition of the finite to the infinite does not result in something
greater than the infinite by itself. Now the beatified soul before its
reunion with the body is rendered happy by rejoicing in the infinite
good, namely God; and after the resurrection of the body it will rejoice
in nothing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and this is a
finite good. Therefore their joy after the resumption of the body will
not be greater than before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A gloss on Apoc. 6:9, "I saw under the altar the souls
of them that were slain," says: "At present the souls of the saints are
under the altar, i.e. less exalted than they will be." Therefore their
happiness will be greater after the resurrection than after their death.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a reward, so is
unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the unhappiness of the wicked
after reunion with their bodies will be greater than before, since they
will be punished not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore the
happiness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of the
body than before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is manifest that the happiness of the saints will
increase in extent after the resurrection, because their happiness will
then be not only in the soul but also in the body. Moreover, the soul's
happiness also will increase in extent, seeing that the soul will rejoice
not only in its own good, but also in that of the body. We may also say
that the soul's happiness will increase in intensity [*Cf. FS, Q[4], A[5]
, ad 5, where St. Thomas retracts this statement]. For man's body may be
considered in two ways: first, as being dependent on the soul for its
completion; secondly, as containing something that hampers the soul in
its operations, through the soul not perfectly completing the body. As
regards the first way of considering the body, its union with the soul
adds a certain perfection to the soul, since every part is imperfect, and
is completed in its whole; wherefore the whole is to the part as form to
matter. Consequently the soul is more perfect in its natural being, when
it is in the whole---namely, man who results from the union of soul and
body---than when it is a separate part. But as regards the second
consideration the union of the body hampers the perfection of the soul,
wherefore it is written (Wis. 9:15) that "the corruptible body is a load
upon the soul." If, then, there be removed from the body all those things
wherein it hampers the soul's action, the soul will be simply more
perfect while existing in such a body than when separated therefrom. Now
the more perfect a thing is in being, the more perfectly is it able to
operate: wherefore the operation of the soul united to such a body will
be more perfect than the operation of the separated soul. But the
glorified body will be a body of this description, being altogether
subject to the spirit. Therefore, since beatitude consists in an
operation [*Cf. FS, Q[3], A[2], seqq.], the soul's happiness after its
reunion with the body will be more perfect than before. For just as the
soul separated from a corruptible body is able to operate more perfectly
than when united thereto, so after it has been united to a glorified
body, its operation will be more perfect than while it was separated. Now
every imperfect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul
naturally desires reunion with the body and on account of this desire
which proceeds from the soul's imperfection its operation whereby it is
borne towards God is less intense. This agrees with the saying of
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) that "on account of the body's desire it
is held back from tending with all its might to that sovereign good."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The soul united to a glorified body is more like to God
than when separated therefrom, in so far as when united it has more
perfect being. For the more perfect a thing is the more it is like to
God: even so the heart, the perfection of whose life consists in
movement, is more like to God while in movement than while at rest,
although God is never moved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A power which by its own nature is capable of being in
matter is more effective when subjected in matter than when separated
from matter, although absolutely speaking a power separate from matter is
more effective.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although in the act of understanding the soul does not make
use of the body, the perfection of the body will somewhat conduce to the
perfection of the intellectual operation in so far as through being
united to a glorified body, the soul will be more perfect in its nature,
and consequently more effective in its operation, and accordingly the
good itself of the body will conduce instrumentally, as it were, to the
operation wherein happiness consists: thus the Philosopher asserts
(Ethic. i, 8,10) that external goods conduce instrumentally to the
happiness of life.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although finite added to infinite does not make a greater
thing, it makes more things, since finite and infinite are two things,
while infinite taken by itself is one. Now the greater extent of joy
regards not a greater thing but more things. Wherefore joy is increased
in extent, through referring to God and to the body's glory, in
comparison with the joy which referred to God. Moreover, the body's glory
will conduce to the intensity of the joy that refers to God, in so far as
it will conduce to the more perfect operation whereby the soul tends to
God: since the more perfect is a becoming operation, the greater the
delight [*Cf. FS, Q[32], A[1]], as stated in Ethic. x, 8.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the degrees of beatitude should be called mansions?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the degrees of beatitude should not be called
mansions. For beatitude implies the notion of a reward: whereas mansion
denotes nothing pertaining to a reward. Therefore the various degrees of
beatitude should not be called mansions.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, mansion seemingly denotes a place. Now the place where
the saint will be beatified is not corporeal but spiritual, namely God
Who is one. Therefore there is but one mansion: and consequently the
various degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as in heaven there will be men of various merits, so are
there now in purgatory, and were in the limbo of the fathers. But various
mansions are not distinguished in purgatory and limbo. Therefore in like
manner neither should they be distinguished in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions": and Augustine expounds this in reference to the
different degrees of rewards (Tract. lxvii in Joan.).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, in every well-ordered city there is a distinction of mansions.
Now the heavenly kingdom is compared to a city (Apoc. 21:2). Therefore we
should distinguish various mansions there according to the various
degrees of beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since local movement precedes all other movements, terms
of movement, distance and the like are derived from local movement to all
other movements according to the Philosopher (Phys., liber viii, 7). Now
the end of local movement is a place, and when a thing has arrived at
that place it remains there at rest and is maintained therein. Hence in
every movement this very rest at the end of the movement is called an
establishment [collocatio] or mansion. Wherefore since the term movement
is transferred to the actions of the appetite and will, the attainment of
the end of an appetitive movement is called a mansion or establishment:
so that the unity of a house corresponds to the unity of beatitude which
unity is on the part of the object, and the plurality of mansions
corresponds to the differences of beatitude on the part of the blessed:
even so we observe in natural things that there is one same place above
to which all light objects tend, whereas each one reaches it more
closely, according as it is lighter, so that they have various mansions
corresponding to their various lightness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Mansion implies the notion of end and consequently of
reward which is the end of merit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Though there is one spiritual place, there are different
degrees of approaching thereto: and the various mansions correspond to
these.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who were in limbo or are now in purgatory have not
yet attained to their end. Wherefore various mansions are not
distinguished in purgatory or limbo, but only in heaven and hell, wherein
is the end of the good and of the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the various mansions are distinguished according to the various
degrees of charity?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the various mansions are not distinguished
according to the various degrees of charity. For it is written (Mt.
25:15): "He gave to every one according to his proper virtue [Douay:
'ability']." Now the proper ability of a thing is its natural power.
Therefore the gifts also of grace and glory are distributed according to
the different degrees of natural power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to every
man according to his works." Now that which is rendered is the measure of
beatitude. Therefore the degrees of beatitude are distinguished according
to the diversity of works and not according to the diversity of charity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, reward is due to act and not to habit: hence "it is not
the strongest who are crowned but those who engage in the conflict"
(Ethic. i, 8) and "he . . . shall not be [Vulg.: 'is not'] crowned except
he strive lawfully." Now beatitude is a reward. Therefore the various
degrees of beatitude will be according to the various degrees of works
and not according to the various degrees of charity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The more one will be united to God the happier will one
be. Now the measure of charity is the measure of one's union with God.
Therefore the diversity of beatitude will be according to the difference
of charity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, "if one thing simply follows from another thing simply, the
increase of the former follows from the increase of the latter." Now to
have beatitude follows from having charity. Therefore to have greater
beatitude follows from having greater charity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The distinctive principle of the mansions or degrees of
beatitude is twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate
principle is the difference of disposition which will be in the blessed,
whence will result the difference of perfection in them in respect to the
beatific operation: while the remote principle is the merit by which they
have obtained that beatitude. In the first way the mansions are
distinguished according to the charity of heaven, which the more perfect
it will be in any one, the more will it render him capable of the Divine
clarity, on the increase of which will depend the increase in perfection
of the Divine vision. In the second way the mansions are distinguished
according to the charity of the way. For our actions are meritorious, not
by the very substance of the action, but only by the habit of virtue with
which they are informed. Now every virtue obtains its meritorious
efficacy from charity [*Cf. FS, Q[114], A[4]], which has the end itself
for its object [*Cf. SS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1]. Hence the diversity of merit
is all traced to the diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the
way will distinguish the mansions by way of merit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In this passage "virtue" denotes not the natural ability
alone, but the natural ability together with the endeavour to obtain
grace [*Cf. SS, Q[23], A[8]]. Consequently virtue in this sense will be a
kind of material disposition to the measure of grace and glory that one
will receive. But charity is the formal complement of merit in relation
to glory, and therefore the distinction of degrees in glory depends on
the degrees of charity rather than on the degrees of the aforesaid virtue.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Works in themselves do not demand the payment of a reward,
except as informed by charity: and therefore the various degrees of glory
will be according to the various degrees of charity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[93] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the habit of charity or of any virtue whatever is
not a merit to which a reward is due, it is none the less the principle
and reason of merit in the act: and consequently according to its
diversity is the diversity of rewards. This does not prevent our
observing a certain degree of merit in the act considered generically,
not indeed in relation to the essential reward which is joy in God, but
in relation to some accidental reward, which is joy in some created good.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARDS THE DAMNED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned?
(2) Whether they pity them?
(3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the blessed in heaven will not see the
sufferings of the damned. For the damned are more cut off from the
blessed than wayfarers. But the blessed do not see the deeds of
wayfarers: wherefore a gloss on Is. 63:16, "Abraham hath not known us,"
says: "The dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their
own children, are doing" [*St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis xiii, xv].
Much less therefore do they see the sufferings of the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, perfection of vision depends on the perfection of the
visible object: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "the
most perfect operation of the sense of sight is when the sense is most
disposed with reference to the most beautiful of the objects which fall
under the sight." Therefore, on the other hand, any deformity in the
visible object redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there will
be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore they will not see the
sufferings of the damned wherein there is extreme deformity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 66:24): "They shall go out and see
the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against Me"; and a gloss
says: "The elect will go out by understanding or seeing manifestly, so
that they may be urged the more to praise God."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the
perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for being
compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one
another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order that the
happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may
render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see
perfectly the sufferings of the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This gloss speaks of what the departed saints are able to
do by nature: for it is not necessary that they should know by natural
knowledge all that happens to the living. But the saints in heaven know
distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to the damned. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xii) that Job's words (14:21), "'Whether his
children come to honour or dishonour, he shall not understand,' do not
apply to the souls of the saints, because since they possess the glory of
God within them, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to
them." [*Concerning this Reply, Cf. FP, Q[89], A[8]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the beauty of the thing seen conduces to the
perfection of vision, there may be deformity of the thing seen without
imperfection of vision: because the images of things whereby the soul
knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore also God Who has
most perfect knowledge sees all things, beautiful and deformed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the
damned. For pity proceeds from charity [*Cf. SS, Q[30]]; and charity will
be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will most especially pity
the sufferings of the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking pity as God
is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions, wherefore He is
said to be merciful.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his
unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore
they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways: first
by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed there will
be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the reason's
choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except by the
choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason's choice
when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled: wherefore in those
things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be dispelled,
we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in this world they
are in such a state that without prejudice to the Divine justice they can
be taken away from a state of unhappiness and sin to a state of
happiness. Consequently it is possible to have compassion on them both by
the choice of the will---in which sense God, the angels and the blessed
are said to pity them by desiring their salvation---and by passion, in
which way they are pitied by the good men who are in the state of
wayfarers. But in the future state it will be impossible for them to be
taken away from their unhappiness: and consequently it will not be
possible to pity their sufferings according to right reason. Therefore
the blessed in glory will have no pity on the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity is the principle of pity when it is possible for us
out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's unhappiness. But the
saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it would be contrary to
Divine justice. Consequently the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is said to be merciful, in so far as He succors those
whom it is befitting to be released from their afflictions in accordance
with the order of wisdom and justice: not as though He pitied the damned
except perhaps in punishing them less than they deserve.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the punishment
of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's evil pertains to hatred. But
there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore they will not rejoice
in the unhappiness of the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the blessed in heaven will be in the highest degree
conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions. Therefore
neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no place
whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a wayfarer to
take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy to grieve for
them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the punishment of the
damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 57:11): "The just shall rejoice when
he shall see the revenge."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Is. 56:24): "They shall satiate [*Douay: 'They
shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh.'] the sight of all flesh." Now
satiety denotes refreshment of the mind. Therefore the blessed will
rejoice in the punishment of the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First
directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints will
not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by
reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will
rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein the order
of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill them with
joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the
direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the
damned will cause it indirectly.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs to hatred, but
not to rejoice in another's evil by reason of something annexed to it.
Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when we rejoice in
our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: "My brethren, count it
all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations" (James 1:2).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although God rejoices not in punishments as such, He
rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[94] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice in
another's afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice in
them as having something annexed. However it is not the same with a
wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions often
forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions are
praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of the mind, as in the
case of shame pity and repentance for evil: whereas in a comprehensor
there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment of reason.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFTS* OF THE BLESSED (FIVE ARTICLES) [*The Latin 'dos' signifies
a dowry.]
We must now consider the gifts of the blessed; under which head there
are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any gifts should be assigned to the blessed?
(2) Whether a gift differs from beatitude?
(3) Whether it is fitting for Christ to have gifts?
(4) Whether this is competent to the angels?
(5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly assigned?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no gifts should be assigned as dowry to the
blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v, 12, De jure dot. 20: Dig. xxiii, 3, De jure
dot.) is given to the bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens of
marriage. But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride, as
being members of the Church. Therefore they receive no dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the dowry is given not by the bridegroom's father, but
by the father of the bride (Cod. v, 11, De dot. promiss., 1: Dig. xxiii,
2, De rit. nup.). Now all the beatific gifts are bestowed on the blessed
by the father of the bridegroom, i.e. Christ: "Every best gift and every
perfect gift is from above coming down from the Father of lights."
Therefore these gifts which are bestowed on the blessed should not be
called a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in carnal marriage a dowry is given that the burdens of
marriage may be the more easily borne. But in spiritual marriage there
are no burdens, especially in the state of the Church triumphant.
Therefore no dowry should be assigned to that state.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a dowry is not given save on the occasion of marriage.
But a spiritual marriage is contracted with Christ by faith in the state
of the Church militant. Therefore if a dowry is befitting the blessed,
for the same reason it will be befitting the saints who are wayfarers.
But it is not befitting the latter: and therefore neither is it befitting
the blessed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a dowry pertains to external goods, which are styled
goods of fortune: whereas the reward of the blessed will consist of
internal goods. Therefore they should not be called a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 5:32): "This is a great sacrament:
but I speak in Christ and in the Church." Hence it follows that the
spiritual marriage is signified by the carnal marriage. But in a carnal
marriage the dowered bride is brought to the dwelling of the bridegroom.
Therefore since the saints are brought to Christ's dwelling when they are
beatified, it would seem that they are dowered with certain gifts.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, a dowry is appointed to carnal marriage for the ease of
marriage. But the spiritual marriage is more blissful than the carnal
marriage. Therefore a dowry should be especially assigned thereto.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, the adornment of the bride is part of the dowry. Now the saints
are adorned when they are taken into glory, according to Is. 61:10, "He
hath clothed me with the garments of salvation . . . as a bride adorned
with her jewels." Therefore the saints in heaven have a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Without doubt the blessed when they are brought into
glory are dowered by God with certain gifts for their adornment, and this
adornment is called their dowry by the masters. Hence the dower of which
we speak now is defined thus: "The dowry is the everlasting adornment of
soul and body adequate to life, lasting for ever in eternal bliss." This
description is taken from a likeness to the material dowry whereby the
bride is adorned and the husband provided with an adequate support for
his wife and children, and yet the dowry remains inalienable from the
bride, so that if the marriage union be severed it reverts to her. As to
the reason of the name there are various opinions. For some say that the
name "dowry" is taken not from a likeness to the corporeal marriage, but
according to the manner of speaking whereby any perfection or adornment
of any person whatever is called an endowment; thus a man who is
proficient in knowledge is said to be endowed with knowledge, and in this
sense ovid employed the word "endowment" (De Arte Amandi i, 538): "By
whatever endowment thou canst please, strive to please." But this does
not seem quite fitting, for whenever a term is employed to signify a
certain thing principally, it is not usually transferred to another save
by reason of some likeness. Wherefore since by its primary signification
a dowry refers to carnal marriage, it follows that in every other
application of the term we must observe some kind of likeness to its
principal signification. Consequently others say that the likeness
consists in the fact that in carnal marriage a dowry is properly a gift
bestowed by the bridegroom on the bride for her adornment when she is
taken to the bridegroom's dwelling: and that this is shown by the words
of Sichem to Jacob and his sons (Gn. 34:12): "Raise the dowry, and ask
gifts," and from Ex. 22:16: "If a man seduce a virgin . . . and lie with
her, he shall endow her, and have her to wife." Hence the adornment
bestowed by Christ on the saints, when they are brought into the abode of
glory, is called a dowry. But this is clearly contrary to what jurists
say, to whom it belongs to treat of these matters. For they say that a
dowry, properly speaking, is a donation on the part of the wife made to
those who are on the part of the husband, in view of the marriage burden
which the husband has to bear; while that which the bridegroom gives the
bride is called "a donation in view of marriage." In this sense dowry is
taken (3 Kgs. 9:16) where it is stated that "Pharoa, the king of Egypt,
took Gezer . . . and gave it for a dowry to his daughter, Solomon's
wife." Nor do the authorities quoted prove anything to the contrary. For
although it is customary for a dowry to be given by the maiden's parents,
it happens sometimes that the bridegroom or his father gives the dowry
instead of the bride's father; and this happens in two ways: either by
reason of his very great love for the bride as in the case of Sichem's
father Hemor, who on account of his son's great love for the maiden
wished to give the dowry which he had a right to receive; or as a
punishment on the bridegroom, that he should out of his own possessions
give a dowry to the virgin seduced by him, whereas he should have
received it from the girl's father. In this sense Moses speaks in the
passage quoted above. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should hold
that in carnal marriage a dowry, properly speaking, is that which is
given by those on the wife's side to those on the husband's side, for the
bearing of the marriage burden, as stated above. Yet the difficulty
remains how this signification can be adapted to the case in point, since
the heavenly adornments are given to the spiritual spouse by the Father
of the Bridegroom. This shall be made clear by replying to the objections.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although in carnal marriage the dowry is given to the
bridegroom for his use, yet the ownership and control belong to the
bride: which is evident by the fact that if the marriage be dissolved,
the dowry reverts to the bride according to law (Cap. 1,2,3, De donat.
inter virum et uxorem). Thus also in spiritual marriage, the very
adornments bestowed on the spiritual bride, namely the Church in her
members, belong indeed to the Bridegroom, in so far as they conduce to
His glory and honor, yet to the bride as adorned thereby.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Father of the Bridegroom, that is of Christ, is the
Person of the Father alone: while the Father of the bride is the whole
Trinity, since that which is effected in creatures belongs to the whole
Trinity. Hence in spiritual marriage these endowments, properly speaking,
are given by the Father of the bride rather than by the Father of the
Bridegroom. Nevertheless, although this endowment is made by all the
Persons, it may be in a manner appropriated to each Person. To the Person
of the Father, as endowing, since He possesses authority; and fatherhood
in relation to creatures is also appropriated to Him, so that He is
Father of both Bridegroom and bride. To the Son it is appropriated,
inasmuch as it is made for His sake and through Him: and to the Holy
Ghost, inasmuch as it is made in Him and according to Him, since love is
the reason of all giving [*Cf. FP, Q[38], A[2]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which is effected by the dowry belongs to the dowry by
its nature, and that is the ease of marriage: while that which the dowry
removes, namely the marriage burden which is lightened thereby, belongs
to it accidentally: thus it belongs to grace by its nature to make a man
righteous, but accidentally to make an ungodly man righteous.
Accordingly, though there are no burdens in the spiritual marriage, there
is the greatest gladness; and that this gladness may be perfected the
bride is dowered with gifts, so that by their means she may be happily
united with the bridegroom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The dowry is usually settled on the bride not when she is
espoused, but when she is taken to the bridegroom's dwelling, so as to be
in the presence of the bridegroom, since "while we are in the body we are
absent from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Hence the gifts bestowed on the
saints in this life are not called a dowry, but those which are bestowed
on them when they are received into glory, where the Bridegroom delights
them with His presence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: In spiritual marriage inward comeliness is required,
wherefore it is written (Ps. 44:14): "All the glory of the king's
daughter is within," etc. But in carnal marriage outward comeliness is
necessary. Hence there is no need for a dowry of this kind to be
appointed in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the dowry is the same as beatitude*? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[7], ad 1;
FS, Q[4], A[3]]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the dowry is the same as beatitude. For as
appears from the definition of dowry (A[1]), the dowry is "the
everlasting adornment of body and soul in eternal happiness." Now the
happiness of the soul is an adornment thereof. Therefore beatitude is a
dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a dowry signifies something whereby the union of bride
and bridegroom is rendered delightful. Now such is beatitude in the
spiritual marriage. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Augustine (In Ps. 92) vision is "the whole
essence of beatitude." Now vision is accounted one of the dowries.
Therefore beatitude is a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, fruition gives happiness. Now fruition is a dowry.
Therefore a dowry gives happiness and thus beatitude is a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), "beatitude is a
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." Now the state of
the blessed is perfected by the dowries. Therefore the dowries are part
of beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, The dowries are given without merits: whereas beatitude
is not given, but is awarded in return for merits. Therefore beatitude is
not a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, beatitude is one only, whereas the dowries are several.
Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, beatitude is in man according to that which is principal in him
(Ethic. x, 7): whereas a dowry is also appointed to the body. Therefore
dowry and beatitude are not the same.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that beatitude and dowry are the same in reality but differ in aspect:
because dowry regards the spiritual marriage between Christ and the soul,
whereas beatitude does not. But seemingly this will not stand, since
beatitude consists in an operation, whereas a dowry is not an operation,
but a quality or disposition. Wherefore according to others it must be
stated that beatitude and dowry differ even in reality, beatitude being
the perfect operation itself by which the soul is united to God, while
the dowries are habits or dispositions or any other qualities directed to
this same perfect operation, so that they are directed to beatitude
instead of being in it as parts thereof.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Beatitude, properly speaking, is not an adornment of the
soul, but something resulting from the soul's adornment; since it is an
operation, while its adornment is a certain comeliness of the blessed
themselves.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Beatitude is not directed to the union but is the union
itself of the soul with Christ. This union is by an operation, whereas
the dowries are gifts disposing to this same union.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Vision may be taken in two ways. First, actually, i.e. for
the act itself of vision; and thus vision is not a dowry, but beatitude
itself. Secondly, it may be taken habitually, i.e. for the habit whereby
this act is elicited, namely the clarity of glory, by which the soul is
enlightened from above to see God: and thus it is a dowry and the
principle of beatitude, but not beatitude itself. The same answer applies
to OBJ 4.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Beatitude is the sum of all goods not as though they were
essential parts of beatitude, but as being in a way directed to
beatitude, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is fitting that Christ should receive a dowry?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem fitting that Christ should receive a dowry. For the
saints will be conformed to Christ through glory, according to Phil.
3:21, "Who will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of
His glory." Therefore Christ also will have a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the spiritual marriage a dowry is given in likeness
to a carnal marriage. Now there is a spiritual marriage in Christ, which
is peculiar to Him, namely of the two natures in one Person, in regard to
which the human nature in Him is said to have been espoused by the Word,
as a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. i, 40] has it on Ps. 18:6,
"He hath set His tabernacle in the sun," etc., and Apoc. 21:3, "Behold
the tabernacle of God with men." Therefore it is fitting that Christ
should have a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii) that Christ,
according to the Rule [*Liber regularum] of Tyconius, on account of the
unity of the mystic body that exists between the head and its members,
calls Himself also the Bride and not only the Bridegroom, as may be
gathered from Is. 61:10, "As a bridegroom decked with a crown, and as a
bride adorned with her jewels." Since then a dowry is due to the bride,
it would seem that Christ ought to receive a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a dowry is due to all the members of the Church, since
the Church is the spouse. But Christ is a member of the Church according
to 1 Cor. 12:27, "You are the body of Christ, and members of member, i.e.
of Christ," according to a gloss. Therefore the dowry is due to Christ.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Christ has perfect vision, fruition, and joy. Now these
are the dowries. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A distinction of persons is requisite between the
bridegroom and the bride. But in Christ there is nothing personally
distinct from the Son of God Who is the Bridegroom, as stated in Jn.
3:29, "He that hath the bride is the bridegroom." Therefore since the
dowry is allotted to the bride or for the bride, it would seem unfitting
for Christ to have a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the same person does not both give and receive a dowry. But it
is Christ Who gives spiritual dowries. Therefore it is not fitting that
Christ should have a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that
there is a threefold union in Christ. One is the union of concord,
whereby He is united to God in the bond of love; another is the union of
condescension, whereby the human nature is united to the Divine; the
third is the union whereby Christ is united to the Church. They say,
then, that as regards the first two unions it is fitting for Christ to
have the dowries as such, but as regards the third, it is fitting for Him
to have the dowries in the most excellent degree, considered as to that
in which they consist, but not considered as dowries; because in this
union Christ is the bridegroom and the Church the bride, and a dowry is
given to the bride as regards property and control, although it is given
to the bridegroom as to use. But this does not seem congruous. For in the
union of Christ with the Father by the concord of love, even if we
consider Him as God, there is not said to be a marriage, since it implies
no subjection such as is required in the bride towards the bridegroom.
Nor again in the union of the human nature with the Divine, whether we
consider the Personal union or that which regards the conformity of will,
can there be a dowry, properly speaking, for three reasons. First,
because in a marriage where a dowry is given there should be likeness of
nature between bridegroom and bride, and this is lacking in the union of
the human nature with the Divine; secondly, because there is required a
distinction of persons, and the human nature is not personally distinct
from the Word; thirdly, because a dowry is given when the bride is first
taken to the dwelling of the bridegroom and thus would seem to belong to
the bride, who from being not united becomes united; whereas the human
nature, which was assumed into the unity of Person by the Word, never was
otherwise than perfectly united. Wherefore in the opinion of others we
should say that the notion of dowry is either altogether unbecoming to
Christ, or not so properly as to the saints; but that the things which we
call dowries befit Him in the highest degree.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This conformity must be understood to refer to the thing
which is a dowry and not to the notion of a dowry being in Christ: for it
is not requisite that the thing in which we are conformed to Christ
should be in the same way in Christ and in us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Human nature is not properly said to be a bride in its
union with the Word, since the distinction of persons, which is requisite
between bridegroom and bride, is not observed therein. That human nature
is sometimes described as being espoused in reference to its union with
the Word is because it has a certain act of the bride, in that it is
united to the Bridegroom inseparably, and in this union is subject to the
Word and ruled by the Word, as the bride by the bridegroom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If Christ is sometimes spoken of as the Bride, this is not
because He is the Bride in very truth, but in so far as He personifies
His spouse, namely the Church, who is united to Him spiritually. Hence
nothing hinders Him, in this way of speaking, from being said to have the
dowries, not that He Himself is dowered, but the Church.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The term Church is taken in two senses. For sometimes it
denotes the body only, which is united to Christ as its Head. In this way
alone has the Church the character of spouse: and in this way Christ is
not a member of the Church, but is the Head from which all the members
receive. In another sense the Church denotes the head and members united
together; and thus Christ is said to be a member of the Church, inasmuch
as He fulfills an office distinct from all others, by pouring forth life
into the other members: although He is not very properly called a member,
since a member implies a certain restriction, whereas in Christ spiritual
good is not restricted but is absolutely entire [*Cf. TP, Q[8], A[1]], so
that He is the entire good of the Church, nor is He together with others
anything greater than He is by Himself. Speaking of the Church in this
sense, the Church denotes not only the bride, but the bridegroom and
bride, in so far as one thing results from their spiritual union.
Consequently although Christ be called a member of the Church in a
certain sense, He can by no means be called a member of the bride; and
therefore the idea of a dowry is not becoming to Him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: There is here a fallacy of "accident"; for these things are
not befitting to Christ if we consider them under the aspect of dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels receive the dowries?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels receive dowries. For a gloss on
Canticle of Canticles 6:8, "One is my dove," says: "One is the Church
among men and angels." But the Church is the bride, wherefore it is
fitting for the members of the Church to have the dowries. Therefore the
angels have the dowries.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:36, "And you yourselves like to men
who wait for their lord, when he shall return from the wedding," says:
"Our Lord went to the wedding when after His resurrection the new Man
espoused to Himself the angelic host." Therefore the angelic hosts are
the spouse of Christ and consequently it is fitting that they should have
the dowries.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the spiritual marriage consists in a spiritual union.
Now the spiritual union between the angels and God is no less than
between beatified men and God. Since, then, the dowries of which we treat
now are assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would seem that
they are becoming to the angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a spiritual marriage demands a spiritual bridegroom and
a spiritual bride. Now the angels are by nature more conformed than men
to Christ as the supreme spirit. Therefore a spiritual marriage is more
possible between the angels and Christ than between men and Christ.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a greater conformity is required between the head and
members than between bridegroom and bride. Now the conformity between
Christ and the angels suffices for Christ to be called the Head of the
angels. Therefore for the same reason it suffices for Him to be called
their bridegroom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Origen at the beginning of the prologue to his
commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes four persons, namely "the
bridegroom with the bride, the young maidens, and the companions of the
bridegroom": and he says that "the angels are the companions of the
bridegroom." Since then the dowry is due only to the bride, it would seem
that the dowries are not becoming to the angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarnation and Passion:
wherefore this is foreshadowed in the words (Ex. 4:25), "A bloody spouse
thou art to me." Now by His Incarnation and Passion Christ was not
otherwise united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels do not
belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as spouse. Therefore the
dowries are not becoming to the angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Without any doubt, whatever pertains to the endowments of
the soul is befitting to the angels as it is to men. But considered under
the aspect of dowry they are not as becoming to the angels as to men,
because the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the angels
as to men. For there is required a conformity of nature between
bridegroom and bride, to wit that they should be of the same species. Now
men are in conformity with Christ in this way, since He took human
nature, and by so doing became conformed to all men in the specific
nature of man. on the other hand, He is not conformed to the angels in
unity of species, neither as to His Divine nor as to His human nature.
Consequently the notion of dowry is not so properly becoming to angels as
to men. Since, however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not necessary
to have a likeness in every respect, we must not argue that one thing is
not to be said of another metaphorically on account of some lack of
likeness; and consequently the argument we have adduced does not prove
that the dowries are simply unbecoming to the angels, but only that they
are not so properly befitting to angels as to men, on account of the
aforesaid lack of likeness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the angels are included in the unity of the
Church, they are not members of the Church according to conformity of
nature, if we consider the Church as bride: and thus it is not properly
fitting for them to have the dowries.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Espousal is taken there in a broad sense, for union without
conformity of specific nature: and in this sense nothing prevents our
saying that the angels have the dowries taking these in a broad sense.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the spiritual marriage although there is no other than a
spiritual union, those whose union answers to the idea of a perfect
marriage should agree in specific nature. Hence espousal does not
properly befit the angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The conformity between the angels and Christ as God is not
such as suffices for the notion of a perfect marriage, since so far are
they from agreeing in species that there is still an infinite distance
between them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Not even is Christ properly called the Head of the angels,
if we consider the head as requiring conformity of nature with the
members. We must observe, however, that although the head and the other
members are parts of an individual of one species, if we consider each
one by itself, it is not of the same species as another member, for a
hand is another specific part from the head. Hence, speaking of the
members in themselves, the only conformity required among them is one of
proportion, so that one receive from another, and one serve another.
Consequently the conformity between God and the angels suffices for the
notion of head rather than for that of bridegroom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether three dowries of the soul are suitably assigned?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unfitting to assign to the soul three dowries,
namely, "vision," "love" and "fruition." For the soul is united to God
according to the mind wherein is the image of the Trinity in respect of
the memory, understanding, and will. Now love regards the will, and
vision the understanding. Therefore there should be something
corresponding to the memory, since fruition regards not the memory but
the will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the beatific dowries are said to correspond to the
virtues of the way, which united us to God: and these are faith, hope,
and charity, whereby God Himself is the object. Now love corresponds to
charity, and vision to faith. Therefore there should be something
corresponding to hope, since fruition corresponds rather to charity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we enjoy God by love and vision only, since "we are said
to enjoy those things which we love for their own sake," as Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). Therefore fruition should not be reckoned
a distinct dowry from love.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, comprehension is required for the perfection of
beatitude: "So run that you may comprehend" (1 Cor. 9:24). Therefore we
should reckon a fourth dowry
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Anselm says (De Simil. xlviii) that the following
pertain to the soul's beatitude: "wisdom, friendship, concord, power,
honor, security, joy": and consequently the aforesaid dowries are
reckoned unsuitably.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) that "in that
beatitude God will be seen unendingly, loved without wearying, praised
untiringly." Therefore praise should be added to the aforesaid dowries.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, Boethius reckons five things pertaining to beatitude (De
Consol. iii) and these are: Sufficiency which wealth offers, joy which
pleasure offers, celebrity which fame offers, security which power
offers, reverence which dignity offers. Consequently it seems that these
should be reckoned as dowries rather than the aforesaid.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, All agree in reckoning three dowries of the soul, in
different ways however. For some say that the three dowries of the soul
are vision, love, and fruition. others reckon them to be vision,
comprehension, and fruition; others, vision, delight, and comprehension.
However, all these reckonings come to the same, and their number is
assigned in the same way. For it has been said (A[2]) that a dowry is
something inherent to the soul, and directing it to the operation in
which beatitude consists. Now two things are requisite in this operation:
its essence which is vision, and its perfection which is delight: since
beatitude must needs be a perfect operation. Again, a vision is
delightful in two ways: first, on the part of the object, by reason of
the thing seen being delightful; secondly, on the part of the vision, by
reason of the seeing itself being delightful, even as we delight in
knowing evil things, although the evil things themselves delight us not.
And since this operation wherein ultimate beatitude consists must needs
be most perfect, this vision must needs be delightful in both ways. Now
in order that this vision be delightful on the part of the vision, it
needs to be made connatural to the seer by means of a habit; while for it
to be delightful on the part of the visible object, two things are
necessary, namely that the visible object be suitable, and that it be
united to the seer. Accordingly for the vision to be delightful on its
own part a habit is required to elicit the vision, and thus we have one
dowry, which all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two
things are necessary. First, suitableness, which regards the
affections---and in this respect some reckon love as a dowry, others
fruition (in so far as fruition regards the affective part) since what we
love most we deem most suitable. Secondly, union is required on the part
of the visible object, and thus some reckon comprehension, which is
nothing else than to have God present and to hold Him within ourself
[*Cf. FS, Q[4], A[3]]; while others reckon fruition, not of hope, which
is ours while on the way, but of possession [*Literally "of the reality:
non spei . . . sed rei"] which is in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Thus the three dowries correspond to the three theological virtues,
namely vision to faith, comprehension (or fruition in one sense) to
hope, and fruition (or delight according to another reckoning to
charity). For perfect fruition such as will be had in heaven includes
delight and comprehension, for which reason some take it for the one, and
some for the other.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the three powers of the
soul, namely vision to the rational, delight to the concupiscible, and
fruition to the irascible, seeing that this fruition is acquired by a
victory. But this is not said properly, because the irascible and
concupiscible powers are not in the intellective but in the sensitive
part, whereas the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Memory and understanding have but one act: either because
understanding is itself an act of memory, or---if understanding denote a
power---because memory does not proceed to act save through the medium of
the understanding, since it belongs to the memory to retain knowledge.
Consequently there is only one habit, namely knowledge, corresponding to
memory and understanding: wherefore only one dowry, namely vision,
corresponds to both.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fruition corresponds to hope, in so far as it includes
comprehension which will take the place of hope: since we hope for that
which we have not yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on account of the
distance of the beloved: for which reason it will not remain in heaven
[Cf. SS, Q[18], A[2]] but will be succeeded by comprehension.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Fruition as including comprehension is distinct from vision
and love, but otherwise than love from vision. For love and vision denote
different habits, the one belonging to the intellect, the other to the
affective faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as denoting
comprehension, does not signify a habit distinct from those two, but the
removal of the obstacles which made it impossible for the mind to be
united to God by actual vision. This is brought about by the habit of
glory freeing the soul from all defects; for instance by making it
capable of knowledge without phantasms, of complete control over the
body, and so forth, thus removing the obstacles which result in our being
pilgrims from the Lord.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4 is clear from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Properly speaking, the dowries are the immediate principles
of the operation in which perfect beatitude consists and whereby the soul
is united to Christ. The things mentioned by Anselm do not answer to this
description; but they are such as in any way accompany or follow
beatitude, not only in relation to the Bridegroom, to Whom "wisdom" alone
of the things mentioned by him refers, but also in relation to others.
They may be either one's equals, to whom "friendship" refers as regards
the union of affections, and "concord" as regards consent in actions, or
one's inferiors, to whom "power" refers, so far as inferior things are
ordered by superior, and "honor" as regards that which inferiors offer
to their superiors. Or again (they may accompany or follow beatitude) in
relation to oneself: to this "security" refers as regards the removal of
evil, and "joy" as regards the attainment of good.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Praise, which Augustine mentions as the third of those
things which will obtain in heaven, is not a disposition to beatitude but
rather a sequel to beatitude: because from the very fact of the soul's
union with God, wherein beatitude consists, it follows that the soul
breaks forth into praise. Hence praise has not the necessary conditions
of a dowry.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[95] A[5] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The five things aforesaid mentioned by Boethius are certain
conditions of beatitude, but not dispositions to beatitude or to its act,
because beatitude by reason of its perfection has of itself alone and
undividedly all that men seek in various things, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. i, 7; x, 7,8). Accordingly Boethius shows that these
five things obtain in perfect beatitude, because they are what men seek
in temporal happiness. For they pertain either, as "security," to
immunity from evil, or to the attainment either of the suitable good, as
"joy," or of the perfect good, as "sufficiency," or to the manifestation
of good, as "celebrity," inasmuch as the good of one is made known to
others, or as "reverence," as indicating that good or the knowledge
thereof, for reverence is the showing of honor which bears witness to
virtue. Hence it is evident that these five should not be called dowries,
but conditions of beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE AUREOLES (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under this head there
are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the aureoles differ from the essential reward?
(2) Whether they differ from the fruit?
(3) Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence only?
(4) Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of
continence?
(5) Whether an aureole is due to virgins?
(6) Whether it is due to martyrs?
(7) Whether it is due to doctors?
(8) Whether it is due to Christ?
(9) Whether to the angels?
(10) Whether it is due to the human body?
(11) Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned?
(12) Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest?
(13) Whether one has the same aureole in a higher degree than another?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the aureole is the same as the essential reward which is called
the aurea?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the aureole is not distinct from the essential
reward which is called the "aurea." For the essential reward is
beatitude itself. Now according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), beatitude
is "a state rendered perfect by the aggregate of all goods." Therefore
the essential reward includes every good possessed in heaven; so that the
aureole is included in the "aurea."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "more" and "less" do not change a species. But those who
keep the counsels and commandments receive a greater reward than those
who keep the commandments only, nor seemingly does their reward differ,
except in one reward being greater than another. Since then the aureole
denotes the reward due to works of perfection it would seem that it does
not signify something distinct from the "aurea."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, reward corresponds to merit. Now charity is the root of
all merit. Since then the "aurea" corresponds to charity, it would seem
that there will be no reward in heaven other than the "aurea."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "All the blessed are taken into the angelic orders" as
Gregory declares (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Now as regards the angels,
"though some of them receive certain gifts in a higher degree, nothing is
possessed by any of them exclusively, for all gifts are in all of them,
though not equally, because some are endowed more highly than others with
gifts which, however, they all possess," as Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in
Evang.). Therefore as regards the blessed, there will be no reward other
than that which is common to all. Therefore the aureole is not a distinct
reward from the "aurea."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a higher reward is due to higher merit. If, then, the
"aurea" is due to works which are of obligation, and the aureole to works
of counsel, the aureole will be more perfect than the "aurea," and
consequently should not be expressed by a diminutive [*"Aureola," i.e. a
little "aurea"]. Therefore it would seem that the aureole is not a
distinct reward from the "aurea."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, A gloss [*Ven. Bede, De Tabernaculis i, 6] on Ex.
25:24,25, "Thou shalt make . . . another little golden crown [coronam
aureolam]," says: "This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins
alone sing in the presence of the Lamb." Wherefore apparently the aureole
is a crown awarded, not to all, but especially to some: whereas the aurea
is awarded to all the blessed. Therefore the aureole is distinct from the
"aurea."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, a crown is due to the fight which is followed by victory: "He .
. is not crowned except he strive lawfully" (2 Tim. 2:5). Hence where
there is a special kind of conflict, there should be a special crown. Now
in certain works there is a special kind of conflict. Therefore they
deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, the Church militant comes down from the Church triumphant: "I
saw the Holy City," etc. (Apoc. 21:2). Now in the Church militant
special rewards are given to those who perform special deeds, for
instance a crown to the conqueror, a prize to the runner. Therefore the
same should obtain in the Church triumphant.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man's essential reward, which is his beatitude, consists
in the perfect union of the soul with God, inasmuch as it enjoys God
perfectly as seen and loved perfectly. Now this reward is called a
"crown" or "aurea" metaphorically, both with reference to merit which is
gained by a kind of conflict---since "the life of man upon earth is a
warfare" (Job 7:1)---and with reference to the reward whereby in a way
man is made a participator of the Godhead, and consequently endowed with
regal power: "Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom," etc. (Apoc. 5:10);
for a crown is the proper sign of regal power.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
In like manner the accidental reward which is added to the essential has
the character of a crown. For a crown signifies some kind of perfection,
on account of its circular shape, so that for this very reason it is
becoming to the perfection of the blessed. Since, however, nothing can be
added to the essential, but what is less than it, the additional reward
is called an "aureole." Now something may be added in two ways to this
essential reward which we call the "aurea." First, in consequence of a
condition attaching to the nature of the one rewarded: thus the glory of
the body is added to the beatitude of the soul, wherefore this same glory
of the body is sometimes called an "aureole." Thus a gloss of Bede on Ex.
25:25, "Thou . . . shalt make another little golden crown," says that
"finally the aureole is added, when it is stated in the Scriptures that a
higher degree of glory is in store for us when our bodies are resumed."
But it is not in this sense that we speak of an aureole now. Secondly, in
consequence of the nature of the meritorious act. Now this has the
character of merit on two counts, whence also it has the character of
good. First, to wit, from its root which is charity, since it is referred
to the last end, and thus there is due to it the essential reward, namely
the attainment of the end, and this is the "aurea." Secondly, from the
very genus of the act which derives a certain praiseworthiness from its
due circumstances, from the habit eliciting it and from its proximate
end, and thus is due to it a kind of accidental reward which we call an
"aureole": and it is in this sense that we regard the aureole now.
Accordingly it must be said that an "aureole" denotes something added to
the "aurea," a kind of joy, to wit, in the works one has done, in that
they have the character of a signal victory: for this joy is distinct
from the joy in being united to God, which is called the "aurea." Some,
however, affirm that the common reward, which is the "aurea," receives
the name of "aureole," according as it is given to virgins, martyrs, or
doctors: even as money receives the name of debt through being due to
some one, though the money and the debt are altogether the same. And that
nevertheless this does not imply that the essential reward is any greater
when it is called an "aureole"; but that it corresponds to a more
excellent act, more excellent not in intensity of merit but in the manner
of meriting; so that although two persons may have the Divine vision
with equal clearness, it is called an "aureole" in one and not in the
other in so far as it corresponds to higher merit as regards the way of
meriting. But this would seem contrary to the meaning of the gloss quoted
above. For if "aurea" and "aureole" were the same, the "aureole" would
not be described as added to the "aurea." Moreover, since reward
corresponds to merit, a more excellent reward must needs correspond to
this more excellent way of meriting: and it is this excellence that we
call an "aureole." Hence it follows that an "aureole" differs from the
"aurea."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Beatitude includes all the goods necessary for man's
perfect life consisting in his perfect operation. Yet some things can be
added, not as being necessary for that perfect operation as though it
were impossible without them, but as adding to the glory of beatitude.
Hence they regard the well-being of beatitude and a certain fitness
thereto. Even so civic happiness is embellished by nobility and bodily
beauty and so forth, and yet it is possible without them as stated in
Ethic. i, 8: and thus is the aureole in comparison with the happiness of
heaven.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He who keeps the counsels and the commandments always
merits more than he who keeps the commandments only, if we gather the
notion of merit in works from the very genus of those works; but not
always if we gauge the merit from its root, charity: since sometimes a
man keeps the commandments alone out of greater charity than one who
keeps both commandments and counsels. For the most part, however, the
contrary happens, because the "proof of love is in the performance of
deeds," as Gregory says (Hom. xxx in Evang.). Wherefore it is not the
more excellent essential reward that is called an aureole, but that which
is added to the essential reward without reference to the essential
reward of the possessor of an aureole being greater, or less than, or
equal to the essential reward of one who has no aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity is the first principle of merit: but our actions
are the instruments, so to speak, whereby we merit. Now in order to
obtain an effect there is requisite not only a due disposition in the
first mover, but also a right disposition in the instrument. Hence
something principal results in the effect with reference to the first
mover, and something secondary with reference to the instrument.
Wherefore in the reward also there is something on the part of charity,
namely the "aurea," and something on the part of the kind of work, namely
the "aureole."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: All the angels merited their beatitude by the same kind of
act namely by turning to God: and consequently no particular reward is
found in anyone which another has not in some way. But men merit
beatitude by different kinds of acts: and so the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless among men what one seems to have specially, all have in
common in some way, in so far as each one, by charity, deems another's
good his own. Yet this joy whereby one shares another's joy cannot be
called an aureole, because it is not given him as a reward for his
victory, but regards more the victory of another: whereas a crown is
awarded the victors themselves and not to those who rejoice with them in
the victory.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The merit arising from charity is more excellent than that
which arises from the kind of action: just as the end to which charity
directs us is more excellent than the things directed to that end, and
with which our actions are concerned. Wherefore the reward corresponding
to merit by reason of charity, however little it may be, is greater than
any reward corresponding to an action by reason of its genus. Hence
"aureole" is used as a diminutive in comparison with "aurea."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the aureole differs from the fruit?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the aureole does not differ from the fruit.
For different rewards are not due to the same merit. Now the aureole and
the hundredfold fruit correspond to the same merit, according to a gloss
on Mt. 13:8, "Some a hundredfold." Therefore the aureole is the same as
the fruit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virgin xlv) that the "hundredfold
fruit is due to the martyrs, and also to virgins." Therefore the fruit is
a reward common to virgins and martyrs. But the aureole also is due to
them. Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there are only two rewards in beatitude, namely the
essential, and the accidental which is added to the essential. Now that
which is added to the essential reward is called an aureole, as evidenced
by the statement (Ex. 25:25) that the little crown [aureola] is added to
the crown. But the fruit is not the essential reward, for in that case it
would be due to all the blessed. Therefore it is the same as the aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Things which are not divided in the same way are not of
the same nature. Now fruit and aureole are not divided in the same way,
since aureole is divided into the aureole of virgins, of martyrs, and of
doctors: whereas fruit is divided into the fruit of the married, of
widows, and of virgins. Therefore fruit and aureole are not the same.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, if fruit and aureole were the same, the aureole would be due to
whomsoever the fruit is due. But this is manifestly untrue, since a fruit
is due to widowhood, while an aureole is not. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Metaphorical expressions can be taken in various ways,
according as we find resemblances to the various properties of the thing
from which the comparison is taken. Now since fruit, properly speaking,
is applied to material things born of the earth, we employ it variously
in a spiritual sense, with reference to the various conditions that
obtain in material fruits. For the material fruit has sweetness whereby
it refreshes so far as it is used by man: again it is the last thing to
which the operation of nature attains: moreover it is that to which
husbandry looks forward as the result of sowing or any other process.
Accordingly fruit is taken in a spiritual sense sometimes for that which
refreshes as being the last end: and according to this signification we
are said to enjoy [frui] God perfectly in heaven, and imperfectly on the
way. From this signification we have fruition which is a dowry: but we
are not speaking of fruit in this sense now. Sometimes fruit signifies
spiritually that which refreshes only, though it is not the last end; and
thus the virtues are called fruits, inasmuch as "they refresh the mind
with genuine sweetness," as Ambrose says [*De Parad. xiii]. In this sense
fruit is taken (Gal. 6:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy,"
etc. Nor again is this the sense in which we speak of fruit now; for we
have treated of this already [*Cf. FS, Q[70], A[1], ad 2].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
We may, however, take spiritual fruit in another sense, in likeness to
material fruit, inasmuch as material fruit is a profit expected from the
labor of husbandry: so that we call fruit that reward which man acquires
from his labor in this life: and thus every reward which by our labors we
shall acquire for the future life is called a "fruit." In this sense
fruit is taken (Rm. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and
the end life everlasting." Yet neither in this sense do we speak of fruit
now, but we are treating of fruit as being the product of seed: for it is
in this sense that our Lord speaks of fruit (Mt. 13:23), where He divides
fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold, and hundredfold. Now fruit is the
product of seed in so far as the seed power is capable of transforming
the humors of the soil into its own nature; and the more efficient this
power, and the better prepared the soil, the more plentiful fruit will
result. Now the spiritual seed which is sown in us is the Word of God:
wherefore the more a person is transformed into a spiritual nature by
withdrawing from carnal things, the greater is the fruit of the Word in
him. Accordingly the fruit of the Word of God differs from the aurea and
the aureole, in that the "aurea" consists in the joy one has in God, and
the "aureole" in the joy one has in the perfection of one's works,
whereas the "fruit" consists in the joy that the worker has in his own
disposition as to his degree of spirituality to which he has attained
through the seed of God's Word.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Some, however, distinguish between aureole and fruit, by saying that the
aureole is due to the fighter, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, "He . . . shall
not be crowned, except he strive lawfully"; whereas the fruit is due to
the laborer, according to the saying of Wis. 3:15, "The fruit of good
labors is glorious." Others again say that the "aurea" regards conversion
to God, while the "aureole" and the "fruit" regard things directed to the
end; yet so that the fruit regards the will rather, and the aureole the
body. Since, however, labor and strife are in the same subject and about
the same matter, and since the body's reward depends on the soul's, these
explanations of the difference between fruit, aurea and aureole would
only imply a logical difference: and this cannot be, since fruit is
assigned to some to whom no aureole is assigned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is nothing incongruous if various rewards correspond
to the same merit according to the various things contained therein.
Wherefore to virginity corresponds the aurea in so far as virginity is
kept for God's sake at the command of charity; the aureole, in so far as
virginity is a work of perfection having the character of a signal
victory; and the fruit, in so far as by virginity a person acquires a
certain spirituality by withdrawing from carnal things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fruit, according to the proper acceptation as we are
speaking of it now, does not denote the reward common to martyrdom and
virginity, by that which corresponds to the three degrees of continency.
This gloss which states that the hundredfold fruit corresponds to martyrs
takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any reward is called a fruit,
the hundredfold fruit thus denoting the reward due to any perfect works
whatever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the aureole is an accidental reward added to the
essential reward, nevertheless not every accidental reward is an aureole,
but only that which is assigned to works of perfection, whereby man is
most conformed to Christ in the achievement of a perfect victory. Hence
it is not unfitting that another accidental reward, which is called the
fruit, be due sometimes to the withdrawal from a carnal life.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence alone?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a fruit is not due to the virtue of continence
alone. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:41, "One is the glory of the sun," says
that "the worth of those who have the hundredfold fruit is compared to
the glory of the sun; to the glory of the moon those who have the
sixtyfold fruit; and to the stars those who have the thirtyfold fruit."
Now this difference of glory, in the meaning of the Apostle, regards any
difference whatever of beatitude. Therefore the various fruits should
correspond to none but the virtue of continence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fruits are so called from fruition. But fruition belongs
to the essential reward which corresponds to all the virtues. Therefore,
etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fruit is due to labor: "The fruit of good labors is
glorious" (Wis. 3:15). Now there is greater labor in fortitude than in
temperance or continence. Therefore fruit does not correspond to
continence alone.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is more difficult not to exceed the measure in food
which is necessary for life, than in sexual matters without which life
can be sustained: and thus the labor of frugality is greater than that of
continence. Therefore fruit corresponds to frugality rather than to
continence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, fruit implies delight, and delight regards especially
the end. Since then the theological virtues have the end for their
object, namely God Himself, it would seem that to them especially the
fruit should correspond.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, is the statement of the gloss on Mt. 13:23, "The one a
hundredfold," which assigns the fruits to virginity, widowhood, and
conjugal continence, which are parts of continence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A fruit is a reward due to a person in that he passes
from the carnal to the spiritual life. Consequently a fruit corresponds
especially to that virtue which more than any other frees man from
subjection to the flesh. Now this is the effect of continence, since it
is by sexual pleasures that the soul is especially subject to the flesh;
so much so that in the carnal act, according to Jerome (Ep. ad Ageruch.),
"not even the spirit of prophecy touches the heart of the prophet," nor
"is it possible to understand anything in the midst of that pleasure," as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11). Therefore fruit corresponds to
continence rather than to another virtue.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This gloss takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any
reward is called a fruit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fruition does not take its name from fruit by reason of any
comparison with fruit in the sense in which we speak of it now, as
evidenced by what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Fruit, as we speak of it now, corresponds to labor not as
resulting in fatigue, but as resulting in the production of fruit. Hence
a man calls his crops his labor, inasmuch as he labored for them, or
produced them by his labor. Now the comparison to fruit, as produced from
seed, is more adapted to continence than to fortitude, because man is not
subjected to the flesh by the passions of fortitude, as he is by the
passions with which continence is concerned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although the pleasures of the table are more necessary than
the pleasures of sex, they are not so strong: wherefore the soul is not
so much subjected to the flesh thereby.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Fruit is not taken here in the sense in which fruition
applies to delight in the end; but in another sense as stated above (A[2]
). Hence the argument proves nothing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of
continence?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the
three parts of continence: because twelve fruits of the Spirit are
assigned, "charity, joy, peace," etc. (Gal. 5:22). Therefore seemingly
we should reckon only three.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fruit denotes a special reward. Now the reward assigned
to virgins, widows, and married persons is not a special reward, because
all who are to be saved are comprised under one of these three, since no
one is saved who lacks continence, and continence is adequately divided
by these three. Therefore three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the
three aforesaid.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as widowhood surpasses conjugal continence, so does
virginity surpass widowhood. But the excess of sixtyfold over thirtyfold
is not as the excess of a hundredfold over sixtyfold; neither in
arithmetical proportion, since sixty exceeds thirty by thirty, and a
hundred exceeds sixty by forty; nor in geometrical proportion, since
sixty is twice thirty and a hundred surpasses sixty as containing the
whole and two-thirds thereof. Therefore the fruits are unfittingly
adapted to the degrees of continence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the statements contained in Holy Writ stand for all
time: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass
away" (Lk. 21:33): whereas human institutions are liable to change every
day. Therefore human institutions are not to be taken as a criterion of
the statements of Holy Writ: and it would seem in consequence that the
explanation of these fruits given by Bede is unfitting. For he says
(Expos. in Luc. iii, 8) that "the thirtyfold fruit is assigned to married
persons, because in the signs drawn on the 'abacus' the number 30 is
denoted by the thumb and index finger touching one another at the tips as
though kissing one another: so that the number 30 denotes the embraces of
married persons. The number 60 is denoted by the contact of the index
finger above the middle joint of the thumb, so that the index finger by
lying over the thumb and weighing on it, signifies the burden which
widows have to bear in this world. When, however, in the course of
enumeration we come to the number 100 we pass from the left to the right
hand, so that the number 100 denotes virginity, which has a share in the
angelic excellence; for the angels are on the right hand, i.e. in glory,
while we are on the left on account of the imperfection of the present
life."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, By continence, to which the fruit corresponds, man is
brought to a kind of spiritual nature, by withdrawing from carnal things.
Consequently various fruits are distinguished according to the various
manners of the spirituality resulting from continence. Now there is a
certain spirituality which is necessary, and one which is superabundant.
The spirituality that is necessary consists in the rectitude of the
spirit not being disturbed by the pleasures of the flesh: and this
obtains when one makes use of carnal pleasures according to the order of
right reason. This is the spirituality of married persons. Spirituality
is superabundant when a man withdraws himself entirely from those carnal
pleasures which stifle the spirit. This may be done in two ways: either
in respect of all time past, present, and future, and this is the
spirituality of virgins; or in respect of a particular time, and this is
the spirituality of widows. Accordingly to those who keep conjugal
continence, the thirtyfold fruit is awarded; to those who keep the
continence of widows, the sixtyfold fruit; and to those who keep virginal
continence, the hundredfold fruit: and this for the reason given by Bede
quoted above, although another motive may be found in the very nature of
the numbers. For 30 is the product of 3 multiplied by 10. Now 3 is the
number of everything, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo i, and contains a
certain perfection common to all, namely of beginning, middle, and end.
Wherefore the number 30 is fittingly assigned to married persons, in whom
no other perfection is added to the observance of the Decalogue,
signified by the number 10, than the common perfection without which
there is no salvation. The number six the multiplication of which by 10
amounts to 60 has perfection from its parts, being the aggregate of all
its parts taken together; wherefore it corresponds fittingly to
widowhood, wherein we find perfect withdrawal from carnal pleasures as to
all its circumstances (which are the parts so to speak of a virtuous
act), since widowhood uses no carnal pleasures in connection with any
person, place, or any other circumstance; which was not the case with
conjugal continence. The number 100 corresponds fittingly to virginity;
because the number 10 of which 100 is a multiple is the limit of numbers:
and in like manner virginity occupies the limit of spirituality, since no
further spirituality can be added to it. The number 100 also being a
square number has perfection from its figure: for a square figure is
prefect through being equal on all sides, since all its sides are equal:
wherefore it is adapted to virginity wherein incorruption is found
equally as to all times.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fruit is not taken there in the sense in which we are
taking it now.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing obliges us to hold that fruit is a reward that is
not common to all who will be saved. For not only the essential reward is
common to all, but also a certain accidental reward, such as joy in those
works without which one cannot be saved. Yet it may be said that the
fruits are not becoming to all who will be saved, as is evidently the
case with those who repent in the end after leading an incontinent life,
for to such no fruit is due but only the essential reward.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The distinction of the fruits is to be taken according to
the species and figures of the numbers rather than according to their
quantity. Nevertheless even if we regard the excess in point of quantity,
we may find an explanation. For the married man abstains only from one
that is not his, the widow from both hers and not hers, so that in the
latter case we find the notion of double, just as 60 is the double of 30.
Again 100 is 60 X 40, which latter number is the product of 4 X 10, and
the number 4 is the first solid and square number. Thus the addition of
this number is fitting to virginity, which adds perpetual incorruption to
the perfection of widowhood.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although these numerical signs are a human institution,
they are founded somewhat on the nature of things, in so far as the
numbers are denoted in gradation, according to the order of the aforesaid
joints and contacts.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an aureole is due on account of virginity?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due on account of virginity.
For where there is greater difficulty in the work, a greater reward is
due. Now widows have greater difficulty than virgins in abstaining from
the works of the flesh. For Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.) that the
greater difficulty certain persons experience in abstaining from the
allurements of pleasure, the greater their reward, and he is speaking in
praise of widows. Moreover, the Philosopher says (De Anim. Hist. vii)
that "young women who have been deflowered desire sexual intercourse the
more for the recollection of the pleasure." Therefore the aureole which
is the greatest reward is due to widows more than to virgins.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if an aureole were due to virginity, it would be
especially found where there is the most perfect virginity. Now the most
prefect virginity is in the Blessed Virgin, wherefore she is called the
Virgin of virgins: and yet no aureole is due to her because she
experienced no conflict in being continent, for she was not infected with
the corruption of the fomes [*Cf. TP, Q[27], A[3]]. Therefore an aureole
is not due to virginity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a special reward is not due to that which has not been
at all times praiseworthy. Now it would not have been praiseworthy to
observe virginity in the state of innocence, since then was it commanded:
"Increase and multiply and fill the earth" (Gn. 1:28): nor again during
the time of the Law, since the barren were accursed. Therefore an aureole
is not due to virginity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the same reward is not due to virginity observed, and
virginity lost. Yet an aureole is sometimes due to lost virginity; for
instance if a maiden be violated unwillingly at the order of a tyrant for
confessing Christ. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a special reward is not due to that which is in us by
nature. But virginity is inborn in every man both good and wicked.
Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, as widowhood is to the sixtyfold fruit, so is virginity
to the hundredfold fruit, and to the aureole. Now the sixtyfold fruit is
not due to every widow, but only, as some say, to one who vows to remain
a widow. Therefore it would seem that neither is the aureole due to any
kind of virginity, but only to that which is observed by vow.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, reward is not given to that which is done of necessity,
since all merit depends on the will. But some are virgins of necessity,
such as those who are naturally cold-blooded, and eunuchs. Therefore an
aureole is not always due to virginity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A gloss on Ex. 25:25: "Thou shalt also make a little
golden crown [coronam aureolam]" says: "This crown denotes the new hymn
which the virgins sing in the presence of the Lamb, those, to wit, who
follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth." Therefore the reward due to
virginity is called an aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, It is written (Is. 56:4): "Thus saith the Lord to the eunuchs":
and the text continues (Is. 56: 5): "I will give to them . . . a name
better than sons and daughters": and a gloss [*St. Augustine, De
Virginit. xxv] says: "This refers to their peculiar and transcendent
glory." Now the eunuchs "who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom
of heaven" (Mt. 19:12) denote virgins. Therefore it would seem that some
special reward is due to virginity, and this is called the aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Where there is a notable kind of victory, a special crown
is due. Wherefore since by virginity a person wins a signal victory over
the flesh, against which a continuous battle is waged: "The flesh lusteth
against the spirit," etc. (Gal. 5:17), a special crown called the aureole
is due to virginity. This indeed is the common opinion of all; but all
are not agreed as to the kind of virginity to which it is due. For some
say that the aureole is due to the act. So that she who actually remains
a virgin will have the aureole provided she be of the number of the
saved. But this would seem unreasonable, because in this case those who
have the will to marry and nevertheless die before marrying would have
the aureole. Hence others hold that the aureole is due to the state and
not to the act: so that those virgins alone merit the aureole who by vow
have placed themselves in the state of observing perpetual virginity. But
this also seems unreasonable, because it is possible to have the same
intention of observing virginity without a vow as with a vow. Hence it
may be said otherwise that merit is due to every virtuous act commanded
by charity. Now virginity comes under the genus of virtue in so far as
perpetual incorruption of mind and body is an object of choice, as
appears from what has been said above (Sent. iv, D, 33, Q[3], AA[1],2)
[*Cf. TP, Q[152], AA[1],3]. Consequently the aureole is due to those
virgins alone, who had the purpose of observing perpetual virginity,
whether or no they have confirmed this purpose by vow---and this I say
with reference to the aureole in its proper signification of a reward due
to merit---although this purpose may at some time have been interrupted,
integrity of the flesh remaining withal, provided it be found at the end
of life, because virginity of the mind may be restored, although
virginity of the flesh cannot. If, however, we take the aureole in its
broad sense for any joy added to the essential joy of heaven, the aureole
will be applicable even to those who are incorrupt in flesh, although
they had not the purpose of observing perpetual virginity. For without
doubt they will rejoice in the incorruption of their body, even as the
innocent will rejoice in having been free from sin, although they had no
opportunity of sinning, as in the case of baptized children. But this is
not the proper meaning of an aureole, although it is very commonly taken
in this sense.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In some respects virgins experience a greater conflict in
remaining continent; and in other respects, widows, other things being
equal. For virgins are inflamed by concupiscence, and by the desire of
experience, which arises from a certain curiosity as it were, which makes
man more willing to see what he has never seen. Sometimes, moreover, this
concupiscence is increased by their esteeming the pleasure to be greater
than it is in reality, and by their failing to consider the grievances
attaching to this pleasure. In these respects widows experience the
lesser conflict, yet theirs is the greater conflict by reason of their
recollection of the pleasure. Moreover, in different subjects one motive
is stronger than another, according to the various conditions and
dispositions of the subject, because some are more susceptible to one,
and others to another. However, whatever we may say of the degree of
conflict, this is certain---that the virgin's victory is more perfect
than the widow's, for the most perfect and most brilliant kind of victory
is never to have yielded to the foe: and the crown is due, not to the
battle but to the victory gained by the battle.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are two opinions about this. For some say that the
Blessed Virgin has not an aureole in reward of her virginity, if we take
aureole in the proper sense as referring to a conflict, but that she has
something more than an aureole, on account of her most perfect purpose of
observing virginity. Others say that she has an aureole even in its
proper signification, and that a most transcendent one: for though she
experienced no conflict, she had a certain conflict of the flesh, but
owing to the exceeding strength of her virtue, her flesh was so subdued
that she did not feel this conflict. This, however, would seem to be said
without reason, for since we believe the Blessed Virgin to have been
altogether immune from the inclination of the fomes on account of the
perfection of her sanctification, it is wicked to suppose that there was
in her any conflict with the flesh, since such like conflict is only from
the inclination of the fomes, nor can temptation from the flesh be
without sin, as declared by a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xix, 4]
on 2 Cor. 12:7, "There was given me a sting of my flesh." Hence we must
say that she has an aureole properly speaking, so as to be conformed in
this to those other members of the Church in whom virginity is found: and
although she had no conflict by reason of the temptation which is of the
flesh, she had the temptation which is of the enemy, who feared not even
Christ (Mt. 4).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: The aureole is not due to virginity except as adding some
excellence to the other degrees of continence. If Adam had not sinned,
virginity would have had no perfection over conjugal continence, since in
that case marriage would have been honorable, and the marriage-bed
unsullied, for it would not have been dishonored by lust: hence virginity
would not then have been observed, nor would an aureole have been due to
it. But the condition of human nature being changed, virginity has a
special beauty of its own, and consequently a special reward is assigned
to it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
During the time of the Mosaic law, when the worship of God was to be
continued by means of the carnal act, it was not altogether praiseworthy
to abstain from carnal intercourse: wherefore no special reward would be
given for such a purpose unless it came from a Divine inspiration, as is
believed to have been the case with Jeremias and Elias, of whose marriage
we do not read.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: If a virgin is violated, she does not forfeit the aureole,
provided she retain unfailingly the purpose of observing perpetual
virginity, and nowise consent to the act. Nor does she forfeit virginity
thereby; and be this said, whether she be violated for the faith, or for
any other cause whatever. But if she suffer this for the faith, this will
count to her for merit, and will be a kind of martyrdom: wherefore Lucy
said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity
will receive a double crown" [*Office of S. Lucy; lect. vi of Dominican
Breviary, December 13th]; not that she has two aureoles of virginity, but
that she will receive a double reward, one for observing virginity, the
other for the outrage she has suffered. Even supposing that one thus
violated should conceive, she would not for that reason forfeit her
virginity: nor would she be equal to Christ's mother, in whom there was
integrity of the flesh together with integrity of the mind [*Cf. SS,
Q[64], A[3], ad 3; SS, Q[124], A[4], ad 2; SS, Q[152], A[1]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Virginity is inborn in us as to that which is material in
virginity: but the purpose of observing perpetual incorruption, whence
virginity derives its merit, is not inborn, but comes from the gift of
grace.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The sixtyfold fruit is due, not to every widow, but only to
those who retain the purpose of remaining widows, even though they do not
make it the matter of a vow, even as we have said in regard to virginity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[5] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: If cold-blooded persons and eunuchs have the will to
observe perpetual incorruption even though they were capable of sexual
intercourse, they must be called virgins and merit the aureole: for they
make a virtue of necessity. If, on the other hand, they have the will to
marry if they could, they do not merit the aureole. Hence Augustine says
(De Sancta Virgin. xxiv): "For those like eunuchs whose bodies are so
formed that they are unable to beget, it suffices when they become
Christians and keep the commandments of God, that they have a mind to
have a wife if they could, in order to rank with the faithful who are
married."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an aureole is due to martyrs?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due to martyrs. For an
aureole is a reward given for works of supererogation, wherefore Bede
commenting on Ex. 25:25, "Thou shalt also make another . . . crown,"
says: "This may be rightly referred to the reward of those who by freely
choosing a more perfect life go beyond the general commandments." But to
die for confessing the faith is sometimes an obligation, and not a work
of supererogation as appears from the words of Rm. 10:10, "With the
heart, we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made
unto salvation." Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. ix [*Cf. St. Augustine, De
Adult. Conjug. i, 14]) "the freer the service, the more acceptable it
is." Now martyrdom has a minimum of freedom, since it is a punishment
inflicted by another person with force. Therefore an aureole is not due
to martyrdom, since it is accorded to surpassing merit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, martyrdom consists not only in suffering death
externally, but also in the interior act of the will: wherefore Bernard
in a sermon on the Holy Innocents distinguishes three kinds of
martyr---in will and not in death, as John; in both will and death, as
Stephen; in death and not in will, as the Innocents. Accordingly if an
aureole were due to martyrdom, it would be due to voluntary rather than
external martyrdom, since merit proceeds from will. Yet such is not the
case. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, bodily suffering is less than mental, which consists of
internal sorrow and affliction of soul. But internal suffering is also a
kind of martyrdom: wherefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption
[*Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch.]: "I should say rightly that the Mother of God
was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace,
wherefore: Thine own soul a sword hath pierced---namely for her Son's
death." Since then no aureole corresponds to interior sorrow, neither
should one correspond to outward suffering.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, penance itself is a kind of martyrdom, wherefore Gregory
says (Hom. iii in Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to offer the
opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom; since
even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we
slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit." But no
aureole is due to penance which consists in external works. Neither
therefore is an aureole due to every external martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, an aureole is not due to an unlawful work. Now it is
unlawful to lay hands on oneself, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei i),
and yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who laid hands upon
themselves in order to escape the fury of tyrants, as in the case of
certain women at Antioch (Eusebius, Eccles. Hist. viii, 24). Therefore an
aureole is not always due to martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, it happens at times that a person is wounded for the
faith, and survives for some time. Now it is clear that such a one is a
martyr, and yet seemingly an aureole is not due to him, since his
conflict did not last until death. Therefore an aureole is not always due
to martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, some suffer more from the loss of temporal goods than
from the affliction even of their own body and this is shown by their
bearing many afflictions for the sake of gain. Therefore if they be
despoiled of their temporal goods for Christ's sake they would seem to be
martyrs, and yet an aureole is not apparently due to them. Therefore the
same conclusion follows as before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, a martyr would seem to be no other than one who dies for
the faith, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vii): "They are called martyrs
in Greek, witnesses in Latin: because they suffered in order to bear
witness to Christ, and strove unto death for the truth." Now there are
virtues more excellent than faith, such as justice, charity, and so
forth, since these cannot be without grace, and yet no aureole is due to
them. Therefore seemingly neither is an aureole due to martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, even as the truth of faith is from God, so is all other
truth, as Ambrose [*Spurious work on 1 Cor. 12:3: "No man can say," etc.]
declares, since "every truth by whomsoever uttered is from the Holy
Ghost." Therefore if an aureole is due to one who suffers death for the
truth of faith, in like manner it is also due to those who suffer death
for any other virtue: and yet apparently this is not the case.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 11 Para. 1/1
OBJ 11: Further, the common good is greater than the good of the
individual. Now if a man die in a just war in order to save his country,
an aureole is not due to him. Therefore even though he be put to death in
order to keep the faith that is in himself, no aureole is due to him: and
consequently the same conclusion follows as above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Obj. 12 Para. 1/1
OBJ 12: Further, all merit proceeds from the free will. Yet the Church
celebrates the martyrdom of some who had not the use of the free will.
Therefore they did not merit an aureole: and consequently an aureole is
not due to all martyrs.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. xlvi): "No one,
methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom." Now an aureole is
due to virginity, and consequently also to martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] OTC 12 Para. 2/2
Further, the crown is due to one who has striven. But in martyrdom the
strife presents a special difficulty. Therefore a special aureole is due
thereto.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as in the spirit there is a conflict with the
internal concupiscences, so is there in man a conflict with the passion
that is inflicted from without. Wherefore, just as a special crown, which
we call an aureole, is due to the most perfect victory whereby we
triumph over the concupiscences of the flesh, in a word to virginity, so
too an aureole is due to the most perfect victory that is won against
external assaults. Now the most perfect victory over passion caused from
without is considered from two points of view. First from the greatness
of the passion. Now among all passions inflicted from without, death
holds the first place, just as sexual concupiscences are chief among
internal passions. Consequently, when a man conquers death and things
directed to death, his is a most perfect victory. Secondly, the
perfection of victory is considered from the point of view of the motive
of conflict, when, to wit, a man strives for the most honorable cause;
which is Christ Himself. Both these things are to be found in martyrdom,
which is death suffered for Christ's sake: for "it is not the pain but
the cause that makes the martyr," as Augustine says (Contra Crescon.
iii). Consequently an aureole is due to martyrdom as well as to virginity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To suffer death for Christ's sake, is absolutely speaking,
a work of supererogation; since every one is not bound to confess his
faith in the face of a persecutor: yet in certain cases it is necessary
for salvation, when, to wit, a person is seized by a persecutor and
interrogated as to his faith which he is then bound to confess. Nor does
it follow that he does not merit an aureole. For an aureole is due to a
work of supererogation, not as such, but as having a certain perfection.
Wherefore so long as this perfection remains, even though the
supererogation cease, one merits the aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A reward is due to martyrdom, not in respect of the
exterior infliction, but because it is suffered voluntarily: since we
merit only through that which is in us. And the more that which one
suffers voluntarily is difficult and naturally repugnant to the will the
more is the will that suffers it for Christ's sake shown to be firmly
established in Christ, and consequently a higher reward is due to him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are certain acts which, in their very selves, contain
intense pleasure or difficulty: and in such the act always adds to the
character of merit or demerit, for as much as in the performance of the
act the will, on account of the aforesaid intensity, must needs undergo
an alteration from the state in which it was before. Consequently, other
things being equal, one who performs an act of lust sins more than one
who merely consents in the act, because in the very act the will is
increased. In like manner since in the act of suffering martyrdom there
is a very great difficulty, the will to suffer martyrdom does not reach
the degree of merit due to actual martyrdom by reason of its difficulty:
although, indeed it may possibly attain to a higher reward, if we
consider the root of merit since the will of one man to suffer martyrdom
may possibly proceed from a greater charity than another man's act of
martyrdom. Hence one who is willing to be a martyr may by his will merit
an essential reward equal to or greater than that which is due to an
actual martyr. But the aureole is due to the difficulty inherent to the
conflict itself of martyrdom: wherefore it is not due to those who are
martyrs only in will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Just as pleasures of touch, which are the matter of
temperance, hold the chief place among all pleasures both internal and
external, so pains of touch surpass all other pains. Consequently an
aureole is due to the difficulty of suffering pains of touch, for
instance, from blows and so forth, rather than to the difficulty of
bearing internal sufferings, by reason of which, however, one is not
properly called a martyr, except by a kind of comparison. It is in this
sense that Jerome speaks.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The sufferings of penance are not a martyrdom properly
speaking, because they do not consist in things directed to the causing
of death, since they are directed merely to the taming of the flesh: and
if any one go beyond this measure, such afflictions will be deserving of
blame. However such afflictions are spoken of as a martyrdom by a kind of
comparison. and they surpass the sufferings of martyrdom in duration but
not in intensity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i) it is lawful to no
one to lay hands on himself for any reason whatever; unless perchance it
be done by Divine instinct as an example of fortitude that others may
despise death. Those to whom the objection refers are believed to have
brought death on themselves by Divine instinct, and for this reason the
Church celebrates their martyrdom [*Cf. SS, Q[64], A[5]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: If any one receive a mortal wound for the faith and
survive, without doubt he merits the aureole: as instanced in blessed
Cecilia who survived for three days, and many martyrs who died in prison.
But, even if the wound he receives be not mortal, yet be the occasion of
his dying, he is believed to merit the aureole: although some say that he
does not merit the aureole if he happen to die through his own
carelessness or neglect. For this neglect would not have occasioned his
death, except on the supposition of the wound which he received for the
faith: and consequently this wound previously received for the faith is
the original occasion of his death, so that he would not seem to lose.
the aureole for that reason, unless his neglect were such as to involve a
mortal sin, which would deprive him of both aurea and aureole. If,
however, by some chance or other he were not to die of the mortal wound
received, or again if the wounds received were not mortal, and he were to
die while in prison, he would still merit the aureole. Hence the
martyrdom of some saints is celebrated in the Church for that they died
in prison, having been wounded long before, as in the case of Pope
Marcellus. Accordingly in whatever way suffering for Christ's sake be
continued unto death, whether death ensue or not, a man becomes a martyr
and merits the aureole. If, however, it be not continued unto death, this
is not a reason for calling a person a martyr, as in the case of the
blessed Sylvester, whose feast the Church does not solemnize as a
martyr's, since he ended his days in peace, although previously he had
undergone certain sufferings.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: Even as temperance is not about pleasures of money, honors,
and the like, but only about pleasures of touch as being the principal of
all, so fortitude is about dangers of death as being the greatest of all
(Ethic. iii, 6). Consequently the aureole is due to such injuries only as
are inflicted on a person's own body and are of a nature to cause death.
Accordingly whether a person lose his temporalities, or his good name, or
anything else of the kind, for Christ's sake, he does not for that reason
become a martyr, nor merit the aureole. Nor is it possible to love
ordinately external things more than one's body; and inordinate love does
not help one to merit an aureole: nor again can sorrow for the loss of
corporeal things be equal to the sorrow for the slaying of the body and
other like things [*Cf. SS, Q[124], A[5]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: The sufficient motive for martyrdom is not only confession
of the faith, but any other virtue, not civic but infused, that has
Christ for its end. For one becomes a witness of Christ by any virtuous
act, inasmuch as the works which Christ perfects in us bear witness to
His goodness. Hence some virgins were slain for virginity which they
desired to keep, for instance blessed Agnes and others whose martyrdom is
celebrated by the Church.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 10 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 10: The truth of faith has Christ for end and object; and
therefore the confession thereof, if suffering be added thereto, merits
an aureole, not only on the part of the end but also on the part of the
matter. But the confession of any other truth is not a sufficient motive
for martyrdom by reason of its matter, but only on the part of the end;
for instance if a person were willing to be slain for Christ's sake
rather than sin against Him by telling any lie whatever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 11 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 11: The uncreated good surpasses all created good. Hence any
created end, whether it be the common or a private good, cannot confer so
great a goodness on an act as can the uncreated end, when, to wit, an act
is done for God's sake. Hence when a person dies for the common good
without referring it to Christ, he will not merit the aureole; but if he
refer it to Christ he will merit the aureole and he will be a martyr; for
instance, if he defend his country from the attack of an enemy who
designs to corrupt the faith of Christ, and suffer death in that defense.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[6] R.O. 12 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 12: Some say that the use of reason was by the Divine power
accelerated in the Innocents slain for Christ's sake, even as in John the
Baptist while yet in his mother's womb: and in that case they were truly
martyrs in both act and will, and have the aureole. others say, however,
that they were martyrs in act only and not in will: and this seems to be
the opinion of Bernard, who distinguishes three kinds of martyrs, as
stated above (OBJ 3). In this case the Innocents, even as they do not
fulfill all the conditions of martyrdom, and yet are martyrs in a sense,
in that they died for Christ, so too they have the aureole, not in all
its perfection, but by a kind of participation, in so far as they
rejoice in having. been slain in Christ's service; thus it was stated
above (A[5]) in reference to baptized children, that they will have a
certain joy in their innocence and carnal integrity [*Cf. SS, Q[124],
A[1], ad 1, where St. Thomas declares that the Holy Innocents were truly
martyrs.]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an aureole is due to doctors?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due to doctors. For every
reward to be had in the life to come will correspond to some act of
virtue. But preaching or teaching is not the act of a virtue. Therefore
an aureole is not due to teaching or preaching.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, teaching and preaching are the result of studying and
being taught. Now the things that are rewarded in the future life are not
acquired by a man's study, since we merit not by our natural and acquired
gifts. Therefore no aureole will be merited in the future life for
teaching and preaching.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, exaltation in the life to come corresponds to
humiliation in the present life, because "he that humbleth himself shall
be exalted" (Mt. 23:12). But there is no humiliation in teaching and
preaching, in fact they are occasions of pride; for a gloss on Mt. 4:5,
"Then the devil took Him up," says that "the devil deceives many who are
puffed up with the honor of the master's chair." Therefore it would seem
that an aureole is not due to preaching and teaching.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A gloss on Eph. 1:18,19, "That you may know . . . what
is the exceeding greatness," etc. says: "The holy doctors will have an
increase of glory above that which all have in common." Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, a gloss on Canticle of Canticles 8:12, "My vineyard is before
me," says: "He describes the peculiar reward which He has prepared for
His doctors." Therefore doctors will have a peculiar reward: and we call
this an aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as by virginity and martyrdom a person wins a most
perfect victory over the flesh and the world, so is a most perfect
victory gained over the devil, when a person not only refuses to yield to
the devil's assaults, but also drives him out, not from himself alone,
but from others also. Now this is done by preaching and teaching:
wherefore an aureole is due to preaching and teaching, even as to
virginity and martyrdom. Nor can we admit, as some affirm, that it is due
to prelates only, who are competent to preach and teach by virtue of
their office. but it is due to all whosoever exercise this act lawfully.
Nor is it due to prelates, although they have the office of preaching,
unless they actually preach, since a crown is due not to the habit, but
to the actual strife, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, "He . . . shall not be
[Vulg.: 'is not'] crowned, except he strive lawfully."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Preaching and teaching are acts of a virtue, namely mercy,
wherefore they are reckoned among the spiritual alms deeds [*Cf. SS,
Q[32], A[2]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although ability to preach and teach is sometimes the
outcome of study, the practice of teaching comes from the will, which is
informed with charity infused by God: and thus its act can be meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Exaltation in this life does not lessen the reward of the
other life, except for him who seeks his own glory from that exaltation:
whereas he who turns that exaltation to the profit of others acquires
thereby a reward for himself. Still, when it is stated that an aureole is
due to teaching, this is to be understood of the teaching of things
pertaining to salvation, by which teaching the devil is expelled from
men's hearts, as by a kind of spiritual weapon, of which it is said (2
Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of our warfare are not carnal but spiritual"
[Vulg.: 'but mighty to God'].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an aureole is due to Christ?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an aureole is due to Christ. For an aureole is
due to virginity, martyrdom, and teaching. Now these three were
pre-eminently in Christ. Therefore an aureole is especially due to Him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is most perfect in human things must ne
especially ascribed to Christ. Now an aureole is due as the reward of
most excellent merits. Therefore it is also due to Christ.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.) that "virginity bears a
likeness to God." Therefore the exemplar of virginity is in God.
Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due to Christ even as God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, An aureole is described as "joy in being conformed to
Christ." Now no one is conformed or likened to himself, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph., lib. ix, 3). Therefore an aureole is not due
to Christ.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Christ's reward was never increased. Now Christ had no aureole
from the moment of His conception, since then He had never fought.
Therefore He never had an aureole afterwards.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that
Christ has an aureole in its strict sense, seeing that in Him there is
both conflict and victory, and consequently a crown in its proper
acceptation. But if we consider the question carefully, although the
notion of aurea or crown is becoming to Christ, the notion of aureole is
not. For from the very fact that aureole is a diminutive term it follows
that it denotes something possessed by participation and not in its
fulness. Wherefore an aureole is becoming to those who participate in the
perfect victory by imitating Him in Whom the fulness of perfect victory
is realized. And therefore, since in Christ the notion of victory is
found chiefly and fully, for by His victory others are made victors---as
shown by the words of Jn. 16:33, "Have confidence, I have overcome the
world," and Apoc. 5:5, "Behold the lion of the tribe of Juda . . . hath
prevailed"---it is not becoming for Christ to have an aureole, but to
have something from which all aureoles are derived. Hence it is written
(Apoc. 3:21): "To him that shall overcome, I will give to sit with Me in
My throne, as I also have overcome, and am set down in My Father's throne
[Vulg.: 'With My Father in His throne']." Therefore we must say with
others that although there is nothing of the nature of an aureole in
Christ, there is nevertheless something more excellent than any aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Christ was most truly virgin, martyr, and doctor; yet the
corresponding accidental reward in Christ is a negligible quantity in
comparison with the greatness of His essential reward. Hence He has not
an aureole in its proper sense.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the aureole is due to a most perfect work, yet
with regard to us, so far as it is a diminutive term, it denotes the
participation of a perfection derived from one in whom that perfection is
found in its fulness. Accordingly it implies a certain inferiority, and
thus it is not found in Christ in Whom is the fulness of every perfection.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although in some way virginity has its exemplar in God,
that exemplar is not homogeneous. For the incorruption of God, which
virginity imitates is not in God in the same way as in a virgin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an aureole is due to the angels?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an aureole is due to the angels. For Jerome
(Serm. de Assump. [*Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch. ix]) speaking of virginity
says: "To live without the flesh while living in the flesh is to live as
an angel rather than as a man": and a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:26, "For the
present necessity," says that "virginity is the portion of the angels."
Since then an aureole corresponds to virginity, it would seem due to the
angels.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, incorruption of the spirit is more excellent than
incorruption of the flesh. Now there is incorruption of spirit in the
angels, since they never sinned. Therefore an aureole is due to them
rather than to men incorrupt in the flesh and who have sinned at some
time.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an aureole is due to teaching. Now angels teach us by
cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting [*Cf. FP, Q[111], A[1]] us, as
Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi). Therefore at least the aureole of
doctors is due to them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . shall not be
[Vulg.: 'is not'] crowned, except he strive lawfully." But there is no
conflict in the angels. Therefore an aureole is not due to them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, an aureole is not due to an act that is not performed through
the body: wherefore it is not due to lovers of virginity, martyrdom or
teaching, if they do not practice them outwardly. But angels are
incorporeal spirits. Therefore they have no aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, An aureole is not due to the angels. The reason of this
is that an aureole, properly speaking, corresponds to some perfection of
surpassing merit. Now those things which make for perfect merit in man
are connatural to angels, or belong to their state in general, or to
their essential reward. Wherefore the angels have not an aureole in the
same sense as an aureole is due to men.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virginity is said to be an angelic life, in so far as
virgins imitate by grace what angels have by nature. For it is not owing
to a virtue that angels abstain altogether from pleasures of the flesh,
since they are incapable of such pleasures.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Perpetual incorruption of the spirit in the angels merits
their essential reward: because it is necessary for their salvation,
since in them recovery is impossible after they have fallen [*Cf. FP,
Q[64], A[2]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The acts whereby the angels teach us belong to their glory
and their common state: wherefore they do not merit an aureole thereby.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an aureole is also due to the body?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an aureole is also due to the body. For the
essential reward is greater than the accidental. But the dowries which
belong to the essential reward are not only in the soul but also in the
body. Therefore there is also an aureole which pertains to the accidental
reward.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, punishment in soul and body corresponds to sin committed
through the body. Therefore a reward both in soul and in body is due to
merit gained through the body. But the aureole is merited through works
of the body. Therefore an aureole is also due to the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a certain fulness of virtue will shine forth in the
bodies of martyrs, and will be seen in their bodily scars: wherefore
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): "We feel an undescribable love for the
blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the
wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance
indeed we shall see them, for this will not make them less comely, but
more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty, though in
the body, yet not of the body but of virtue." Therefore it would seem
that the martyr's aureole is also in his body; and in like manner the
aureoles of others.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[10] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, The souls now in heaven have aureoles; and yet they
have no body. Therefore the proper subject of an aureole is the soul and
not the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[10] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, all merit is from the soul. Therefore the whole reward should
be in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Properly speaking the aureole is in the mind: since it is
joy in the works to which an aureole is due. But even as from the joy in
the essential reward, which is the aurea, there results a certain
comeliness in the body, which is the glory of the body, so from the joy
in the aureole there results a certain bodily comeliness: so that the
aureole is chiefly in the mind, but by a kind of overflow it shines forth
in the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. It must be observed,
however, that the beauty of the scars which will appear in the bodies of
the martyrs cannot be called an aureole, since some of the martyrs will
have an aureole in which such scars will not appear, for instance those
who were put to death by drowning, starvation, or the squalor of prison.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned, those of virgins, of
martyrs, and of doctors?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the three aureoles of virgins, martyrs, and
doctors are unfittingly assigned. For the aureole of martyrs corresponds
to their virtue of fortitude, the aureole of virgins to the virtue of
temperance, and the aureole of doctors to the virtue of prudence.
Therefore it seems that there should be a fourth aureole corresponding to
the virtue of justice.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Ex. 25:25: "A polished crown, etc. says that
a golden [aurea] crown is added, when the Gospel promises eternal life to
those who keep the commandments: 'If thou wilt enter into life, keep the
commandments' (Mt. 19:17). To this is added the little golden crown
[aureola] when it is said: 'If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that
thou hast, and give to the poor'" (Mt. 19:21). Therefore an aureole is
due to poverty.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man subjects himself wholly to God by the vow of
obedience: wherefore the greatest perfection consists in the vow of
obedience. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due thereto.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, there are also many other works of supererogation in
which one will rejoice in the life to come. Therefore there are many
aureoles besides the aforesaid three.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, just as a man spreads the faith by preaching and
teaching, so does he by publishing written works. Therefore a fourth
aureole is due to those who do this.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, An aureole is an exceptional reward corresponding to an
exceptional victory: wherefore the three aureoles are assigned in
accordance with the exceptional victories in the three conflicts which
beset every man. For in the conflict with the flesh, he above all wins
the victory who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures which are the
chief of this kind; and such is a virgin. Wherefore an aureole is due to
virginity. In the conflict with the world, the chief victory is to suffer
the world's persecution even until death: wherefore the second aureole is
due to martyrs who win the victory in this battle. In the conflict with
the devil, the chief victory is to expel the enemy not only from oneself
but also from the hearts of others: this is done by teaching and
preaching, and consequently the third aureole is due to doctors and
preachers.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] Body Para. 2/3
Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with the
three powers of the soul, by saying that the three aureoles correspond to
the three chief acts of the soul's three highest powers. For the act of
the rational power is to publish the truth of faith even to others, and
to this act the aureole of doctors is due: the highest act of the
irascible power is to overcome even death for Christ's sake, and to this
act the aureole of martyrs is due: and the highest act of the
concupiscible power is to abstain altogether from the greatest carnal
pleasures, and to this act the aureole of virgins is due.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] Body Para. 3/3
Others again, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with those
things whereby we are most signally conformed to Christ. For He was the
mediator between the Father and the world. Hence He was a doctor, by
manifesting to the world the truth which He had received from the Father;
He was a martyr, by suffering the persecution of the world; and He was a
virgin, by His personal purity. Wherefore doctors, martyrs and virgins
are most perfectly conformed to Him: and for this reason an aureole is
due to them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: There is no conflict to be observed in the act of justice
as in the acts of the other virtues. Nor is it true that to teach is an
act of prudence: in fact rather is it an act of charity or
mercy---inasmuch as it is by such like habits that we are inclined to the
practice of such an act---or again of wisdom, as directing it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
We may also reply, with others, that justice embraces all the virtues,
wherefore a special aureole is not due to it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Although poverty is a work of perfection, it does not take
the highest place in a spiritual conflict, because the love of
temporalities assails a man less than carnal concupiscence or persecution
whereby his own body is broken. Hence an aureole is not due to poverty;
but judicial power by reason of the humiliation consequent upon poverty.
The gloss quoted takes aureole in the broad sense for any reward given
for excellent merit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
We reply in the same way to the Third and Fourth Objections.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[11] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: An aureole is due to those who commit the sacred doctrine
to writing: but it is not distinct from the aureole of doctors, since the
compiling of writing is a way of teaching.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest of all?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the virgin's aureole is the greatest of all.
For it is said of virgins (Apoc. 14:4) that they "follow the Lamb
whithersoever He goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that "no" other "man could say
the canticle" which the virgins sang. Therefore virgins have the most
excellent aureole.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Cyprian (De Habit. Virg.) says of virgins that they are
"the more illustrious portion of Christ's flock." Therefore the greater
aureole is due to them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Again, it would seem that the martyr's aureole is the greatest.
For Aymo, commenting on Apoc. 14:3, "No man could say the hymn," says
that "virgins do not all take precedence of married folk; but only those
who in addition to the observance of virginity are by the tortures of
their passion on a par with married persons who have suffered martyrdom."
Therefore martyrdom gives virginity its precedence over other states: and
consequently a greater aureole is due to virginity.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[12] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Again, it would seem that the greatest aureole is due to doctors.
Because the Church militant is modelled after the Church triumphant. Now
in the Church militant the greatest honor is due to doctors (1 Tim.
5:17): "Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double
honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine." Therefore a
greater aureole is due to them in the Church triumphant.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[12] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Precedence of one aureole over another may be considered
from two standpoints. First, from the point of view of the conflicts,
that aureole being considered greater which is due to the more strenuous
battle. Looking at it thus the martyr's aureole takes precedence of the
others in one way, and the virgin's in another. For the martyr's battle
is more strenuous in itself, and more intensely painful; while the
conflict with the flesh is fraught with greater danger, inasmuch as it is
more lasting and threatens us at closer quarters. Secondly, from the
point of view of the things about which the battle is fought: and thus
the doctor's aureole takes precedence of all others, since this conflict
is about intelligible goods. while the other conflicts are about
sensible passions. Nevertheless, the precedence that is considered in
view of the conflict is more essential to the aureole; since the aureole,
according to its proper character, regards the victory and the battle,
and the difficulty of fighting which is viewed from the standpoint of the
battle is of greater importance than that which is considered from our
standpoint through the conflict being at closer quarters. Therefore the
martyr's aureole is simply the greatest of all: for which reason a gloss
on Mt. 5:10, says that "all the other beatitudes are perfected in the
eighth, which refers to the martyrs," namely, "Blessed are they that
suffer persecution." For this reason, too, the Church in enumerating the
saints together places the martyrs before the doctors and virgins. Yet
nothing hinders the other aureoles from being more excellent in some
particular way. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one person has an aureole more excellently than another person?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one person has not the aureole either of
virginity, or of martyrdom, or of doctrine more perfectly than another
person. For things which have reached their term are not subject to
intension or remission. Now the aureole is due to works which have
reached their term of perfection. Therefore an aureole is not subject to
intension or remission.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virginity is not subject to being more or less, since it
denotes a kind of privation; and privations are not subject to intension
or remission. Therefore neither does the reward of virginity, the
virgin's aureole to wit, receive intension or remission.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The aureole is added to the aurea. But the aurea is
more intense in one than in another. Therefore the aureole is also.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[13] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since merit is somewhat the cause of reward, rewards must
needs be diversified, according as merits are diversified: for the
intension or remission of a thing follows from the intension or remission
of its cause. Now the merit of the aureole may be greater or lesser:
wherefore the aureole may also be greater or lesser.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[13] Body Para. 2/2
We must observe, however, that the merit of an aureole may be
intensified in two ways: first, on the part of its cause, secondly on the
part of the work. For there may happen to be two persons, one of whom,
out of lesser charity, suffers greater torments of martyrdom, or is more
constant in preaching, or again withdraws himself more from carnal
pleasures. Accordingly, intension not of the aureole but of the aurea
corresponds to the intension of merit derived from its root; while
intension of the aureole corresponds to intension of merit derived from
the kind of act. Consequently it is possible for one who merits less in
martyrdom as to his essential reward, to receive a greater aureole for
his martyrdom.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The merits to which an aureole is due do not reach the term
of their perfection simply, but according to their species: even as fire
is specifically the most subtle of bodies. Hence nothing hinders one
aureole being more excellent than another, even as one fire is more
subtle than another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[96] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The virginity of one may be greater than the virginity of
another, by reason of a greater withdrawal from that which is contrary to
virginity: so that virginity is stated to be greater in one who avoids
more the occasions of corruption. For in this way privations may
increase, as when a man is said to be more blind, if he be removed
further from the possession of sight.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED (SEVEN ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider those things that concern the damned
after the judgment: (1) The punishment of the damned, and the fire by
which their bodies will be tormented; (2) matters relating to their will
and intellect; (3) God's justice and mercy in regard to the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in hell the damned are tormented with the sole punishment of
fire?
(2) Whether the worm by which they are tormented is corporeal?
(3) Whether their weeping is corporeal?
(4) Whether their darkness is material?
(5) Whether the fire whereby they are tormented is corporeal?
(6) Whether it is of the same species as our fire?
(7) Whether this fire is beneath the earth?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in hell the damned are tormented by the sole
punishment of fire; because Mt. 25:41, where their condemnation is
declared, mention is made of fire only, in the words: "Depart from Me,
you cursed, into everlasting fire."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, even as the punishment of purgatory is due to venial
sin, so is the punishment of hell due to mortal sin. Now no other
punishment but that of fire is stated to be in purgatory, as appears from
the words of 1 Cor. 3:13: "The fire shall try every man's work, of what
sort it is." Therefore neither in hell will there be a punishment other
than of fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, variety of punishment affords a respite, as when one
passes from heat to cold. But we can admit no respite in the damned.
Therefore there will not be various punishments, but that of fire alone.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:7): "Fire and brimstone and
storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Job 24:19): "Let him pass from the snow waters
to excessive heat."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to Basil (Homilia vi in Hexaemeron and Hom. i
in Ps. 38), at the final cleansing of the world, there will be a
separation of the elements, whatever is pure and noble remaining above
for the glory of the blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being
cast down for the punishment of the damned: so that just as every
creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so will all the elements
conduce to the torture of the damned, according to Wis. 5:21, "the whole
world will fight with Him against the unwise." This is also becoming to
Divine justice, that whereas they departed from one by sin, and placed
their end in material things which are many and various, so should they
be tormented in many ways and from many sources.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is because fire is most painful, through its abundance
of active force, that the name of fire is given to any torment if it be
intense.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The punishment of purgatory is not intended chiefly to
torment but to cleanse: wherefore it should be inflicted by fire alone
which is above all possessed of cleansing power. But the punishment of
the damned is not directed to their cleansing. Consequently the
comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The damned will pass from the most intense heat to the most
intense cold without this giving them any respite: because they will
suffer from external agencies, not by the transmutation of their body
from its original natural disposition, and the contrary passion affording
a respite by restoring an equable or moderate temperature, as happens
now, but by a spiritual action, in the same way as sensible objects act
on the senses being perceived by impressing the organ with their forms
according to their spiritual and not their material being.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the worm of the damned is corporeal?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the worm by which the damned are tormented is
corporeal. Because flesh cannot be tormented by a spiritual worm. Now the
flesh of the damned will be tormented by a worm: "He will give fire and
worms into their flesh" (Judith 16:21), and: "The vengeance on the flesh
of the ungodly is fire and worms" (Ecclus. 7:19). Therefore that worm
will be corporeal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 9): . . . "Both, namely
fire and worm, will be the punishment of the body." Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 22): "The unquenchable
fire and the restless worm in the punishment of the damned are explained
in various ways by different persons. Some refer both to the body, some,
both to the soul: others refer the fire, in the literal sense, to the
body, the worm to the soul metaphorically: and this seems the more
probable."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, After the day of judgment, no animal or mixed body will
remain in the renewed world except only the body of man, because the
former are not directed to incorruption [*Cf. Q[91], A[5]], nor after
that time will there be generation or corruption. Consequently the worm
ascribed to the damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but of
a spiritual nature: and this is the remorse of conscience, which is
called a worm because it originates from the corruption of sin, and
torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born of corruption torments by
gnawing.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The very souls of the damned are called their flesh for as
much as they were subject to the flesh. Or we may reply that the flesh
will be tormented by the spiritual worm, according as the afflictions of
the soul overflow into the body, both here and hereafter.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine speaks by way of comparison. For he does not wish
to assert absolutely that this worm is material, but that it is better to
say that both are to be understood materially, than that both should be
understood only in a spiritual sense: for then the damned would suffer no
bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that examines the context of his
words in this passage.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the weeping of the damned will be corporeal?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the weeping of the damned will be corporeal.
For a gloss on Lk. 13:28, "There will be weeping," says that "the weeping
with which our Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the resurrection
of the body." But this would not be the case if that weeping were merely
spiritual. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the pain of the punishment corresponds to the pleasure
of the sin, according to Apoc. 18:7: "As much as she hath glorified
herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to
her." Now sinners had internal and external pleasure in their sin.
Therefore they will also have external weeping.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Corporeal weeping results from dissolving into tears.
Now there cannot be a continual dissolution from the bodies of the
damned, since nothing is restored to them by food; for everything finite
is consumed if something be continually taken from it. Therefore the
weeping of the damned will not be corporeal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in corporeal weeping. One
is the resolution of tears: and as to this corporeal weeping cannot be in
the damned, since after the day of judgment, the movement of the first
movable being being at an end, there will be neither generation, nor
corruption, nor bodily alteration: and in the resolution of tears that
humor needs to be generated which is shed forth in the shape of tears.
Wherefore in this respect it will be impossible for corporeal weeping to
be in the damned. The other thing to be observed in corporeal weeping is
a certain commotion and disturbance of the head and eyes, and in this
respect weeping will be possible in the damned after the resurrection:
for the bodies of the damned will be tormented not only from without, but
also from within, according as the body is affected at the instance of
the soul's passion towards good or evil. In this sense weeping is a proof
of the body's resurrection, and corresponds to the pleasure of sin,
experienced by both soul and body.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned are in material darkness?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the damned are not in material darkness. For
commenting on Job 10:22, "But everlasting horror dwelleth," Gregory says
(Moral. ix): "Although that fire will give no light for comfort, yet,
that it may torment the more it does give light for a purpose, for by the
light of its flame the wicked will see their followers whom they have
drawn thither from the world." Therefore the darkness there is not
material.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the damned see their own punishment, for this increases
their punishment. But nothing is seen without light. Therefore there is
no material darkness there.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there the damned will have the power of sight after
being reunited to their bodies. But this power would be useless to them
unless they see something. Therefore, since nothing is seen unless it be
in the light, it would seem that they are not in absolute darkness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 22:13): "Bind his hands and his
feet, and cast him into the exterior darkness." Commenting on these words
Gregory says (Moral. ix): If this fire gave any light, "he would by no
means be described as cast into exterior darkness."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, Basil says (Hom. i in Ps. 28:7, "The voice of the Lord divideth
the flame of fire") that "by God's might the brightness of the fire will
be separated from its power of burning, so that its brightness will
conduce to the joy of the blessed, and the heat of the flame to the
torment of the damned." Therefore the damned will be in material darkness.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] OTC Para. 3/3
Other points relating to the punishment of the damned have been decided
above (Q[86]).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The disposition of hell will be such as to be adapted to
the utmost unhappiness of the damned. Wherefore accordingly both light
and darkness are there, in so far as they are most conducive to the
unhappiness of the damned. Now seeing is in itself pleasant for, as
stated in Metaph. i, "the sense of sight is most esteemed, because
thereby many things are known."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Yet it happens accidentally that seeing is painful, when we see things
that are hurtful to us, or displeasing to our will. Consequently in hell
the place must be so disposed for seeing as regards light and darkness,
that nothing be seen clearly, and that only such things be dimly seen as
are able to bring anguish to the heart. Wherefore, simply speaking, the
place is dark. Yet by Divine disposition, there is a certain amount of
light, as much as suffices for seeing those things which are capable of
tormenting the soul. The natural situation of the place is enough for
this, since in the centre of the earth, where hell is said to be, fire
cannot be otherwise than thick and cloudy, and reeky as it were.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
Some hold that this darkness is caused by the massing together of the
bodies of the damned, which will so fill the place of hell with their
numbers, that no air will remain, so that there will be no translucid
body that can be the subject of light and darkness, except the eyes of
the damned, which will be darkened utterly.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fire of hell will be corporeal?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fire of hell whereby the bodies of the
damned will be tormented will not be corporeal. For Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iv): The devil, and "demons, and his men" [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:3:
"And the man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition."], namely
Antichrist, "together with the ungodly and sinners will be cast into
everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that which we have, but such
as God knoweth." Now everything corporeal is material. Therefore the fire
of hell will not be corporeal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the souls of the damned when severed from their bodies
are cast into hell fire. But Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): "In
my opinion the place to which the soul is committed after death is
spiritual and not corporeal." Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, corporeal fire in the mode of its action does not follow
the mode of guilt in the person who is burned at the stake, rather does
it follow the mode of humid and dry: for in the same corporeal fire we
see both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of hell, in its mode of
torture or action, follows the mode of guilt in the person punished;
wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 63): "There is indeed but one hell
fire, but it does not torture all sinners equally. For each one will
suffer as much pain according as his guilt deserves." Therefore this fire
will not be corporeal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, He says (Dial. iv, 29): "I doubt not that the fire of
hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bodies are tortured there."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Wis. 5:21): "The . . . world shall fight . . .
against the unwise." But the whole world would not fight against the
unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and not a corporeal
punishment. Therefore they will be punished with a corporeal fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There have been many opinions about the fire of hell. For
some philosophers, as Avicenna, disbelieving in the resurrection, thought
that the soul alone would be punished after death. And as they considered
it impossible for the soul, being incorporeal, to be punished with a
corporeal fire, they denied that the fire whereby the wicked are punished
is corporeal, and pretended that all statements as to souls being
punished in future after death by any corporeal means are to be taken
metaphorically. For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will not
be about any corporeal object, but about something spiritual, namely the
attainment of their end, so will the torment of the wicked be merely
spiritual, in that they will be grieved at being separated from their
end, the desire whereof is in them by nature. Wherefore, just as all
descriptions of the soul's delight after death that seem to denote bodily
pleasure---for instance, that they are refreshed, that they smile, and so
forth---must be taken metaphorically, so also are all such descriptions
of the soul's suffering as seem to imply bodily punishment---for
instance, that they burn in fire, or suffer from the stench, and so
forth. For as spiritual pleasure and pain are unknown to the majority,
these things need to be declared under the figure of corporeal pleasures
and pains, in order that men may be moved the more to the desire or fear
thereof. Since, however, in the punishment of the damned there will be
not only pain of loss corresponding to the aversion that was in their
sin, but also pain of sense corresponding to the conversion, it follows
that it is not enough to hold the above manner of punishment. For this
reason Avicenna himself (Met. ix) added another explanation, by saying
that the souls of the wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but
by images of bodies; just as in a dream it seems to a man that he is
suffering various pains on account of such like images being in his
imagination. Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 32), as is clear from the text. But this would seem an
unreasonable statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use of
a bodily organ: so that it is impossible for such visions of the
imagination to occur in the soul separated from the body, as in the soul
of the dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna also that he might avoid this
difficulty, said that the soul separated from the body uses as an organ
some part of the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be
conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like
the movers of the heavenly body---thus following somewhat the opinion of
certain philosophers of old, who maintained that souls return to the
stars that are their compeers. But this is absolutely absurd according to
the Philosopher's teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ,
even as art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one
body to another, as Pythagoras is stated (De Anima i, text. 53) to have
maintained. As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it is
to be answered (ad 2). However, whatever we may say of the fire that
torments the separated souls, we must admit that the fire which will
torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal,
since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that
punishment itself be bodily. Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) proves the fire
of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will be cast
thither after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted in the text of
Sentent. iv, D, 44, clearly admits (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that the fire by
which the bodies are tormented is corporeal. And this is the point at
issue for the present. We have said elsewhere (Q[70], A[3]) how the souls
of the damned are punished by this corporeal fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Damascene does not absolutely deny that this fire is
material, but that it is material as our fire, since it differs from ours
in some of its properties. We may also reply that since that fire does
not alter bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their
punishment by a kind of spiritual action, it is for this reason that it
is stated not to be material, not as regards its substance, but as to its
punitive effect on bodies and, still more, on souls.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The assertion of Augustine may be taken in this way, that
the place whither souls are conveyed after death be described as
incorporeal, in so far as the soul is there, not corporeally, i.e. as
bodies are in a place, but in some other spiritual way, as angels are in
a place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion without
deciding the point, as he often does in those books.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That fire will be the instrument of Divine justice
inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its own power
and in its own way, but also by the power of the principal agent, and as
directed thereby. Wherefore although fire is not able, of its own power,
to torture certain persons more or less, according to the measure of sin,
it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as its action is regulated by
the ordering of Divine justice: even so the fire of the furnace is
regulated by the forethought of the smith, according as the effect of his
art requires.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fire of hell is of the same species as ours?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this fire is not of the same species as the
corporeal fire which we see. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): "In
my opinion no man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire, unless the
Spirit of God has revealed it to anyone." But all or nearly all know the
nature of this fire of ours. Therefore that fire is not of the same
species as this.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory commenting on Job 10:26, "A fire that is not
kindled shall devour him," says (Moral. xv): "Bodily fire needs bodily
fuel in order to become fire; neither can it be except by being kindled,
nor live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of hell, since
it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bodily way the wicked cast therein,
is neither kindled by human endeavor, nor kept alive with fuel, but once
created endures unquenchably; at one and the same time it needs no
kindling, and lacks not heat." Therefore it is not of the same nature as
the fire that we see.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the everlasting and the corruptible differ essentially,
since they agree not even in genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
x). But this fire of ours is corruptible, whereas the other is
everlasting: "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire" (Mt.
25:41). Therefore they are not of the same nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it belongs to the nature of this fire of ours to give
light. But the fire of hell gives no light, hence the saying of Job 18:5:
"Shall not the light of the wicked be extinguished?" Therefore . . . as
above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 6), "every
water is of the same species as every other water." Therefore in like
manner every fire is of the same species as every other fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (Wis. 11:17): "By what things a man sinneth by
the same also he is tormented." Now men sin by the sensible things of
this world. Therefore it is just that they should be punished by those
same things.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated in Meteor. iv, 1 fire has other bodies for its
matter, for the reason that of all the elements it has the greatest power
of action. Hence fire is found under two conditions: in its own matter,
as existing in its own sphere, and in a strange matter, whether of earth,
as in burning coal, or of air as in the flame. Under whatever conditions
however fire be found, it is always of the same species, so far as the
nature of fire is concerned, but there may be a difference of species as
to the bodies which are the matter of fire. Wherefore flame and burning
coal differ specifically, and likewise burning wood and red-hot iron; nor
does it signify, as to this particular point, whether they be kindled by
force, as in the case of iron, or by a natural intrinsic principle, as
happens with sulphur. Accordingly it is clear that the fire of hell is of
the same species as the fire we have, so far as the nature of fire is
concerned. But whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it
subsists in a strange matter, what that matter may be, we know not. And
in this way it may differ specifically from the fire we have, considered
materially. It has, however, certain properties differing from our fire,
for instance that it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But
the differences do not argue a difference of species as regards the
nature of the fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of that fire with regard to its
matter, and not with regard to its nature.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This fire of ours is kept alive with fuel, and is kindled
by man, because it is introduced into a foreign matter by art and force.
But that other fire needs no fuel to keep it alive, because either it
subsists in its own matter, or is in a foreign matter, not by force but
by nature from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore it is kindled not by man
but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is the meaning of the words of
Isaias (30:33): "The breath of the Lord is as a torrent of brimstone
kindling it."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even as the bodies of the damned will be of the same
species as now, although now they are corruptible, whereas then they will
be incorruptible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and on account
of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is it with the fire of hell
whereby those bodies will be punished.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To give light does not belong to fire according to any mode
of existence, since in its own matter it gives no light; wherefore it
does not shine in its own sphere according to the philosophers: and in
like manner in certain foreign matters it does not shine, as when it is
in an opaque earthly substance such as sulphur. The same happens also
when its brightness is obscured by thick smoke. Wherefore that the fire
of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof of its being of a
different species.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fire of hell is beneath the earth?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this fire is not beneath the earth. For it is
said of the damned (Job 18:18), "And God shall remove him out of the
globe [Douay: 'world']." Therefore the fire whereby the damned will be
punished is not beneath the earth but outside the globe.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing violent or accidental can be everlasting. But
this fire will be in hell for ever. Therefore it will be there, not by
force but naturally. Now fire cannot be under the earth save by violence.
Therefore the fire of hell is not beneath the earth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, after the day of judgment the bodies of all the damned
will be tormented in hell. Now those bodies will fill a place.
Consequently, since the multitude of the damned will be exceeding great,
for "the number of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), the space
containing that fire must also be exceeding great. But it would seem
unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth,
since all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the center. Therefore
that fire will not be beneath the earth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is
tormented" (Wis. 11:17). But the wicked have sinned on the earth.
Therefore the fire that punishes them should not be under the earth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 14:9): "Hell below was in an uproar
to meet Thee at Thy coming." Therefore the fire of hell is beneath us.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv): "I see not what hinders us from
believing that hell is beneath the earth."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, a gloss on Jonas 2:4, "Thou hast cast me forth . . . into the
heart of the sea," says, "i.e. into hell," and in the Gospel (Mt. 12:40)
the words "in the heart of the earth" have the same sense, for as the
heart is in the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be in the
middle of the earth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), "I am of opinion
that no one knows in what part of the world hell is situated, unless the
Spirit of God has revealed this to some one." Wherefore Gregory (Dial.
iv) having been questioned on this point answers: "About this matter I
dare not give a rash decision. For some have deemed hell to be in some
part of the earth's surface; others think it to be beneath the earth." He
shows the latter opinion to be the more probable for two reasons. First
from the very meaning of the word. These are his words: "If we call it
the nether regions (infernus [*The Latin for 'hell']), for the reason
that it is beneath us [inferius], what earth is in relation to heaven,
such should be hell in relation to earth." Secondly, from the words of
Apoc. 5:3: "No man was able, neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under
the earth, to open the book": where the words "in heaven" refer to the
angels, "on earth" to men living in the body, and "under the earth" to
souls in hell. Augustine too (Gen. ad lit. xii, 34) seems to indicate two
reasons for the congruity of hell being under the earth. One is that
"whereas the souls of the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they
should be treated as the dead flesh is wont to be treated, by being
buried beneath the earth." The other is that heaviness is to the body
what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) is as lightness (of
body). Wherefore "just as in reference to the body, all the heavier
things are beneath the others, if they be placed in order of gravity, so
in reference to the spirit, the lower place is occupied by whatever is
more sorrowful"; and thus even as the empyrean is a fitting place for the
joy of the elect, so the lowest part of the earth is a fitting place for
the sorrow of the damned. Nor does it signify that Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xv, 16) says that "hell is stated or believed to be under the earth,"
because he withdraws this (Retract. ii, 29) where he says: "Methinks I
should have said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than have given
the reason why it is stated or believed to be under the earth." However,
some philosophers have maintained that hell is situated beneath the
terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the earth, on that part which
is opposite to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore when he
asserted that "the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein they
were created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst of
their torments." But this is no argument, if we assert that hell is under
the earth. We have already stated how these words may be explained (Q[91]
, A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Pythagoras held the place of punishment to be in a fiery sphere
situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole world: and he
called it the prison-house of Jupiter as Aristotle relates (De Coelo et
Mundo ii). It is, however, more in keeping with Scripture to say that it
is beneath the earth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words of Job, "God shall remove him out of the globe,"
refer to the surface of the earth [*"De orbe terrarum," which might be
rendered "from the land of the living."], i.e. from this world. This is
how Gregory expounds it (Moral. xiv) where he says: "He is removed from
the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, he is taken away
from this world wherein he now prides himself in his wickedness." Nor
does globe here signify the universe, as though the place of punishment
were outside the whole universe.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fire continues in that place for all eternity by the
ordering of Divine justice although according to its nature an element
cannot last for ever outside its own place, especially if things were to
remain in this state of generation and corruption. The fire there will be
of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be all gathered together
from all parts, through being surrounded on all sides by the cold of the
earth.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the bodies of
the damned: since hell is accounted one of the three things that "never
are satisfied" (Prov. 30:15,16). Nor is it unreasonable that God's power
should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow great enough to
contain all the bodies of the damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[97] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It does not follow of necessity that "by what things a man
sinneth, by the same also he is tormented," except as regards the
principal instruments of sin: for as much as man having sinned in soul
and body will be punished in both. But it does not follow that a man will
be punished in the very place where he sinned, because the place due to
the damned is other from that due to wayfarers. We may also reply that
these words refer to the punishments inflicted on man on the way:
according as each sin has its corresponding punishment, since "inordinate
love is its own punishment," as Augustine states (Confess. i, 12).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED (NINE ARTICLES)
We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of
the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
(2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done?
(3) Whether they would rather not be than be?
(4) Whether they would wish others to be damned?
(5) Whether the wicked hate God?
(6) Whether they can demerit?
(7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life?
(8) Whether they ever think of God?
(9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not every act of will in the damned is evil.
For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the demons desire the good
and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand." Since, then, men who
are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem that they
also can have a good will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is altogether
involuntary." Therefore if the damned will anything, they will it as
something good or apparently good. Now a will that is directly ordered to
good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some will be damned who, while in this world, acquired
certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic virtues.
Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits.
Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the
damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to evil.
Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons [*Cf. FP,
Q[64], A[2]]. Further, as the will of the damned is in relation to evil,
so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But the blessed never
have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned any good will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely
the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs
not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this
inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature
remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good.
But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in
their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This will
is in them always evil: and this because they are completely turned away
from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good except it be
directed to that same end. Hence even though they will some good, they do
not will it well so that one be able to call their will good on that
account.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words of Dionysius must be understood of the natural
will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good. And yet this
natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in so far as this
good which they desire naturally is desired by them under certain evil
circumstances [*Cf. FP, Q[64], A[2], ad 5].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so far as it
is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that they esteem
that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will is evil.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the separated
soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life which will
not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they would never
come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the obstinacy of the
mind.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil they have
done. For Bernard says on the Canticle [*Cf. De Consideratione v, 12; De
Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that "the damned ever consent to the evil
they have done." Therefore they never repent of the sins they have
committed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But the
damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never wish
they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to
man what their fall was to the angels." But the angel's will is
irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice
whereby he previously sinned [*Cf. FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore the damned
also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater
than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent
not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as
heretics, or through obstinacy, as those "who are glad when they have
done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things" (Prov. 2:14). Therefore,
etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. 5:3): "Repenting within
themselves [Vulg.: 'Saying within themselves, repenting']."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "the wicked are full
of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in which previously
they took pleasure." Therefore the damned, being most wicked, repent all
the more.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way
directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who
hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of
something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of that
kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly,
because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but they will
repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the punishment
inflicted on them for sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment: and thus
indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To wish one had not sinned on account of the shamefulness
of vice is a good will: but this will not be in the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It will be possible for the damned to repent of their sins
without turning their will away from sin, because in their sins they will
shun, not what they heretofore desired, but something else, namely the
punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: However obstinate men may be in this world, they repent of
the sins indirectly, if they be punished for them. Thus Augustine says
(QQ[83], qu. 36): "We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the
greatest pleasures by fear of pain."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem impossible for the damned, by right and deliberate
reason, to wish not to be. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 7):
"Consider how great a good it is to be; since both the happy and the
unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater thing than
not to be at all."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine argues thus (De Lib. Arb. iii, 8): "Preference
supposes election." But "not to be" is not eligible; since it has not the
appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to be cannot be more
desirable to the damned than "to be."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the greater evil is the more to be shunned. Now "not to
be" is the greatest evil, since it removes good altogether, so as to
leave nothing. Therefore "not to be" is more to be shunned than to be
unhappy: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men . . .
shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the unhappiness of the damned surpasses all unhappiness of
this world. Now in order to escape the unhappiness of this world, it is
desirable to some to die, wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 41:3,4): "O
death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need and to him
whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care
about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom [Vulg.:
'patience']." Much more, therefore, is "not to be" desirable to the
damned according to their deliberate reason.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Not to be may be considered in two ways. First, in
itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of
good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, it may be considered as a
relief from a painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus "not to be"
takes on the aspect of good, since "to lack an evil is a kind of good" as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). In this way it is better for the
damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Mt. 26:24): "It
were better for him, if that man had not been born," and (Jer. 20:14):
"Cursed be the day wherein I was born," where a gloss of Jerome observes:
"It is better not to be than to be evilly." In this sense the damned can
prefer "not to be" according to their deliberate reason [*Cf. FP, Q[5],
A[2], ad 3].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood in the sense
that "not to be" is eligible, not in itself but accidentally, as putting
an end to unhappiness. For when it is stated that "to be" and "to live"
are desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as referable to an
evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ix, 4), but absolutely.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Non-existence is eligible, not in itself, but only
accidentally, as stated already.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although "not to be" is very evil, in so far as it removes
being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness, which is the
greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred "not to be."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in hell the damned would wish others were damned who are not
damned?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in hell the damned would not wish others were
damned who are not damned. For it is said (Lk. 16:27, 28) of the rich man
that he prayed for his brethren, lest they should come "into the place of
torments." Therefore in like manner the other damned would not wish, at
least their friends in the flesh to be damned in hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the damned are not deprived of their inordinate
affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not
damned. Therefore they would not desire their evil, i.e. that they should
be damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the damned do not desire the increase of their
punishment. Now if more were damned, their punishment would be greater,
even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their
number. Therefore the damned desire not the damnation of those who are
saved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 14:9, "are risen up from their thrones,"
says: "The wicked are comforted by having many companions in their
punishment."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore they grieve for
the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that Even as in the blessed in heaven there will be most
perfect charity, so in the damned there will be the most perfect hate.
Wherefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned
grieve for all goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the
saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (Is. 26:11):
"Let the envious people see and be confounded, and let fire devour Thy
enemies." Therefore they will wish all the good were damned.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: So great will be the envy of the damned that they will envy
the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are supremely
unhappy, for this happens even in this life, when envy increases.
Nevertheless they will envy their kindred less than others, and their
punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned, and others
saved, than if some of their kindred were saved. For this reason the rich
man prayed that his brethren might be warded from damnation: for he knew
that some are guarded therefrom. Yet he would rather that his brethren
were damned as well as all the rest.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Love that is not based on virtue is easily voided,
especially in evil men as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4). Hence the
damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom they loved
inordinately. Yet the will of them will remain perverse, because they
will continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although an increase in the number of the damned results in
an increase of each one's punishment, so much the more will their hatred
and envy increase that they will prefer to be more tormented with many
rather than less tormented alone.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned hate God?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the damned do not hate God. For, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the beautiful and good that is the cause of
all goodness and beauty is beloved of all." But this is God. Therefore
God cannot be the object of anyone's hate.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one can hate goodness itself, as neither can one will
badness itself since "evil is altogether involuntary," as Dionysius
asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is goodness itself. Therefore no one can
hate Him.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that hate
Thee ascendeth continually."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The appetite is moved by good or evil apprehended. Now
God is apprehended in two ways, namely in Himself, as by the blessed, who
see Him in His essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the damned.
Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in Himself be
displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees Him in His essence cannot
hate Him. On the other hand, some of His effects are displeasing to the
will in so far as they are opposed to any one: and accordingly a person
may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His effects. Therefore the
damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which is the effect of His
justice, hate Him, even as they hate the punishment inflicted on them
[*Cf. Q[90], A[3], ad 2; SS, Q[34], A[1]].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural appetite. and
even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that which is added
thereto by their deliberate will, as stated above (A[1]) [*Cf. SS, Q[34],
A[1], ad 1 where St. Thomas gives another answer].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument would prove if the damned saw God in Himself,
as being in His essence.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned demerit?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the damned demerit. For the damned have an
evil will, as stated in the last Distinction of Sentent. iv. But they
demerited by the evil will that they had here. Therefore if they demerit
not there, their damnation is to their advantage.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the damned are on the same footing as the demons. Now
the demons demerit after their fall, wherefore God inflicted a punishment
on the serpent, who induced man to sin (Gn. 3:14,15). Therefore the
damned also demerit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an inordinate act that proceeds from a deliberate will
is not excused from demerit, even though there be necessity of which one
is oneself the cause: for the "drunken man deserves a double punishment"
if he commit a crime through being drunk (Ethic. iii). Now the damned
were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing to which they are
under a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore since their act proceeds
from their free will, they are not excused from demerit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Punishment is contradistinguished from fault [*Cf. FP,
Q[48], A[5]]. Now the perverse will of the damned proceeds from their
obstinacy which is their punishment. Therefore the perverse will of the
damned is not a fault whereby they may demerit.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, after reaching the last term there is no further movement, or
advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the
judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation, since
then there "will cease to be two cities," according to Augustine
(Enchiridion cxi). Therefore after the judgment day the damned will not
demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would be
augmented.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We must draw a distinction between the damned before the
judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment day
there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because
merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or
evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil will have reached their
ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further addition to good
or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will not be a merit but a
reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit but a
punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to the state of
happiness and their contraries to the state of unhappiness (Ethic. i,
9,10).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment day, both the good
merit and the damned demerit. But this cannot apply to the essential
reward or to the principal punishment, since in this respect both have
reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the accidental
reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to increase until the
day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the demons, or to the good
angels, by whose activities some are drawn to salvation, whereby the joy
of the blessed angels is increased, and some to damnation, whereby the
punishment of the demons is augmented [*Cf. FP, Q[62], A[9], ad 3; SS,
Q[13], A[4], ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion
expressed here as to merit or demerit.].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is in the highest degree unprofitable to have reached
the highest degree of evil, the result being that the damned are
incapable of demerit. Hence it is clear that they gain no advantage from
their sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Men who are damned are not occupied in drawing others to
damnation, as the demons are, for which reason the latter demerit as
regards their secondary punishment [*Cf. FP, Q[62], A[9], ad 3; SS, Q[13]
, A[4], ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed
here as to merit or demerit].
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: The reason why they are not excused from demerit is not
because they are under the necessity of sinning, but because they have
reached the highest of evils.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are ourselves the cause, in
so far as it is a necessity, excuses from sin, because every sin needs to
be voluntary: but it does not excuse, in so far as it proceeds from a
previous act of the will: and consequently the whole demerit of the
subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned can make use of the knowledge they had in this world?
[*Cf. FP, Q[89]]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of the
knowledge they had in this world. For there is very great pleasure in the
consideration of knowledge. But we must not admit that they have any
pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had
heretofore, by applying their consideration thereto.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the damned suffer greater pains than any pains of this
world. Now in this world, when one is in very great pain, it is
impossible to consider any intelligible conclusions, through being
distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less therefore can one do
so in hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the damned are subject to time. But "length of time is
the cause of forgetfulness" (Phys. lib. iv, 13). Therefore the damned
will forget what they knew here.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is said to the rich man who was damned (Lk. 16:25):
"Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime," etc.
Therefore they will consider about the things they knew here.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as
stated above (Q[70], A[2], ad 3; FP, Q[89], AA[5],6). Therefore, if they
could not use them, these would remain in them to no purpose.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Even as in the saints on account of the perfection of
their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy so there
will be nothing in the damned but what is a matter and cause of sorrow;
nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their
unhappiness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain things known
brings us joy, in some respect, either on the part of the things known,
because we love them, or on the part of the knowledge, because it is
fitting and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both on the
part of the things known, because they are of a grievous nature, and on
the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imperfection; for instance
a person may consider his defective knowledge about a certain thing,
which he would desire to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the damned there
will be actual consideration of the things they knew heretofore as
matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For they will
consider both the evil they have done, and for which they were damned,
and the delightful goods they have lost, and on both counts they will
suffer torments. Likewise they will be tormented with the thought that
the knowledge they had of speculative matters was imperfect, and that
they missed its highest degree of perfection which they might have
acquired.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the consideration of knowledge is delightful in
itself, it may accidentally be the cause of sorrow, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In this world the soul is united to a corruptible body,
wherefore the soul's consideration is hindered by the suffering of the
body. On the other hand, in the future life the soul will not be so drawn
by the body, but however much the body may suffer, the soul will have a
most clear view of those things that can be a cause of anguish to it.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Time causes forgetfulness accidentally, in so far as the
movement whereof it is the measure is the cause of change. But after the
judgment day there will be no movement of the heavens; wherefore neither
will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from any lapse of time
however long. Before the judgment day, however, the separated soul is not
changed from its disposition by the heavenly movement.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned will ever think of God?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the damned will sometimes think of God. For
one cannot hate a thing actually, except one think about it. Now the
damned will hate God, as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, in the last
Distinction. Therefore they will think of God sometimes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the damned will have remorse of conscience. But the
conscience suffers remorse for deeds done against God. Therefore they
will sometimes think of God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man's most perfect thoughts are those which are about
God: whereas the damned will be in a state of the greatest imperfection.
Therefore they will not think of God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, one may think of God in two ways. First, in Himself and
according to that which is proper to Him, namely that He is the fount of
all goodness: and thus it is altogether impossible to think of Him
without delight, so that the damned will by no means think of Him in this
way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to Him in His
effects, such as His punishments, and so forth, and in this respect the
thought of God can bring sorrow, so that in this way the damned will
think of God.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The damned do not hate God except because He punishes and
forbids what is agreeable to their evil will: and consequently they will
think of Him only as punishing and forbidding. This suffices for the
Reply to the Second Objection, since conscience will not have remorse for
sin except as forbidden by the Divine commandment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned see the glory of the blessed?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the damned do not see the glory of the
blessed. For they are more distant from the glory of the blessed than
from the happenings of this world. But they do not see what happens in
regard to us: hence Gregory commenting on Job 14:21, "Whether his
children come to honor," etc. says (Moral. xii): "Even as those who still
live know not in what place are the souls of the dead; so the dead who
have lived in the body know not the things which regard the life of those
who are in the flesh." Much less, therefore, can they see the glory of
the blessed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is granted as a great favor to the saints in
this life is never granted to the damned. Now it was granted as a great
favor to Paul to see the life in which the saints live for ever with God
(2 Cor. 12). Therefore the damned will not see the glory of the saints.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated (Lk. 16:23) that the rich man in the midst
of his torments "saw Abraham . . . and Lazarus in his bosom."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The damned, before the judgment day, will see the blessed
in glory, in such a way as to know, not what that glory is like, but only
that they are in a state of glory that surpasses all thought. This will
trouble them, both because they will, through envy, grieve for their
happiness, and because they have forfeited that glory. Hence it is
written (Wis. 5:2) concerning the wicked: "Seeing it" they "shall be
troubled with terrible fear." After the judgment day, however, they will
be altogether deprived of seeing the blessed: nor will this lessen their
punishment, but will increase it; because they will bear in remembrance
the glory of the blessed which they saw at or before the judgment: and
this will torment them. Moreover they will be tormented by finding
themselves deemed unworthy even to see the glory which the saints merit
to have.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The happenings of this life would not, if seen, torment the
damned in hell as the sight of the glory of the saints; wherefore the
things which happen here are not shown to the damned in the same way as
the saints' glory; although also of the things that happen here those are
shown to them which are capable of causing them sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[98] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Paul looked upon that life wherein the saints live with God
[*Cf. SS, Q[185], A[3], ad 2], by actual experience thereof and by hoping
to have it more perfectly in the life to come. Not so the damned;
wherefore the comparison fails.
�Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] Out. Para. 1/1
OF GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider God's justice and mercy towards the damned: under
which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on
sinners?
(2) Whether by God's mercy all punishment both of men and of demons
comes to an end?
(3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end?
(4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end?
(5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have
performed works of mercy?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners?
[*Cf. FS, Q[87], AA[3],4]
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted on
sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not exceed the
fault: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the
stripes be" (Dt. 25:2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the punishment
should not be eternal.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, of two mortal sins one is greater than the other. and
therefore one should receive a greater punishment than the other. But no
punishment is greater than eternal punishment, since it is infinite.
Therefore eternal punishment is not due to every sin; and if it is not
due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely distant from
one another.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a just judge does not punish except in order to correct,
wherefore it is stated (Ethic. ii, 3) that "punishments are a kind of
medicine." Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to their
correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no one in
future who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal punishment is not
inflicted for sins according to Divine justice.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no one wishes that which is not desirable for its own
sake, except on account of some advantage. Now God does not wish
punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishments [*The
allusion is to Wis. 1:13: "Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of
the living," as may be gathered from FS, Q[87], A[3], OBJ[3]]. Since then
no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment, it would seem
that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, "nothing accidental lasts for ever" (De Coelo et Mundo
i). But punishment is one of those things that happen accidentally, since
it is contrary to nature. Therefore it cannot be everlasting.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the justice of God would seem to require that sinners
should be brought to naught: because on account of ingratitude a person
deserves to lose all benefits. and among other benefits of God there is
"being" itself. Therefore it would seem just that the sinner who has been
ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be brought to
naught, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it would seem
out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be punished for
ever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46): "These," namely the wicked,
"shall go into everlasting punishment."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, as reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now,
according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal merit:
"Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath [Vulg.: 'that
everyone . . . may have'] life everlasting." Therefore according to
Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), punishment is meted
according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a person
who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than one who
strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against God, Whose
commandments he breaks, and Whose honor he gives another, by placing his
end in some one other than God. But God's majesty is infinite. Therefore
whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it
seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished for ever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely
according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of
time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault, as
regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person sins
the more grievously is he punished: "As much as she hath glorified
herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to
her" (Apoc. 18:7). The duration of the punishment does not, however,
correspond with the duration of the fault, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xxi, 11), for adultery which is committed in a short space of time is not
punished with a momentary penalty even according to human laws [*Cf. FS,
Q[87], A[3], ad 1]. But the duration of punishment regards the
disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who commits an offense
in a city is rendered by his very offense worthy of being cut off
entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile
or even by death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered worthy of being
cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens. wherefore in order
that he may become a fitting member of the State, his punishment is
prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for his amendment, so
that he may live in the city in a becoming and peaceful manner. So too,
according to Divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be altogether
cut off from the fellowship of God's city, and this is the effect of
every sin committed against charity, which is the bond uniting this same
city together. Consequently, for mortal sin which is contrary to charity
a person is expelled for ever from the fellowship of the saints and
condemned to everlasting punishment, because as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xxi, 11), "as men are cut off from this perishable city by the
penalty of the first death, so are they excluded from that imperishable
city by the punishment of the second death." That the punishment
inflicted by the earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental,
either because man endures not for ever, or because the state itself
comes to an end. Wherefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile
or slavery, which is pronounced by human law, would remain in him for
ever. On the other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to
deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as
those who sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or
longer according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through sin
clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments of
this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly
condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because
they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is
mentioned by Augustine (De Civ. Dei. xii, 12): "He is become worthy of
eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal."
Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity [*Cf. FS, Q[87],
A[3], ad 1]; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv), it belongs to the great
justice of the judge that those should never cease to be punished, who in
this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it be objected that some who
sin mortally propose to amend their life at some time, and that these
accordingly are seemingly not deserving of eternal punishment, it must be
replied according to some that Gregory speaks of the will that is made
manifest by the deed. For he who falls into mortal sin of his own will
puts himself in a state whence he cannot be rescued, except God help him:
wherefore from the very fact that he is willing to sin, he is willing to
remain in sin for ever. For man is "a wind that goeth," namely to sin,
"and returneth not by his own power" (Ps. 77:39). Thus if a man were to
throw himself into a pit whence he could not get out without help, one
might say that he wished to remain there for ever, whatever else he may
have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very
fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and
since the whole of life is directed to its end, it follows that for this
very reason he directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing
to remain in sin forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what
Gregory says on Job 41:23, "He shall esteem the deep as growing old"
(Moral. xxxiv): "The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life
came to an end: they would indeed have wished to live for ever, that they
might continue in sin for ever for they desire rather to sin than to
live." Still another reason may be given why the punishment of mortal sin
is eternal: because thereby one offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore
since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature is
incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least in
duration. And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because guilt
remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and men
cannot receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so long as
guilt remains.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to the amount of
duration as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We may also
reply with Gregory (Dial. xliv) that although sin is temporal in act, it
is eternal in will.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The degree of intensity in the punishment corresponds to
the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins unequal in
gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity but equal in
duration.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The punishments inflicted on those who are not altogether
expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are intended for their
correction: whereas those punishments, whereby certain persons are wholly
banished from the society of their fellow-citizens, are not intended for
their correction; although they may be intended for the correction and
tranquillity of the others who remain in the state. Accordingly the
damnation of the wicked is for the correction of those who are now in the
Church; for punishments are intended for correction, not only when they
are being inflicted, but also when they are decreed.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The everlasting punishment of the wicked will not be
altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First, because
thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable to God for
its own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv): "Almighty God on account of
His loving kindness delights not in the torments of the unhappy, but on
account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by the punishment of
the wicked." Secondly, they are useful, because the elect rejoice
therein, when they see God's justice in them, and realize that they have
escaped them. Hence it is written (Ps. 57:12): "The just shall rejoice
when he shall see the revenge," etc., and (Is. 66:24): "They," namely the
wicked, "shall be a loathsome sight* to all flesh," namely to the saints,
as a gloss says. [*"Ad satietatem visionis," which St. Thomas takes to
signify being satiated with joy; Cf. Q[94], A[3]]. Gregory expresses
himself in the same sense (Dial. iv): "The wicked are all condemned to
eternal punishment, and are punished for their own wickedness. Yet they
will burn to some purpose, namely that the just may all both see in God
the joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they have
escaped: for which reason they will acknowledge themselves for ever the
debtors of Divine grace the more that they will see how the evils which
they overcame by its assistance are punished eternally."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although the punishment relates to the soul accidentally,
it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt. And since guilt
will remain in the soul for ever, its punishment also will be everlasting.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Punishment corresponds to fault, properly speaking, in
respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and not of the dignity in the
person offended: for if the latter were the case, a punishment of
infinite intensity would correspond to every sin. Accordingly, although
a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against
God the author of his being, yet, in view of the inordinateness of the
act itself, loss of being is not due to him, since being is presupposed
to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or corrupted by the
inordinateness of sin [*Cf. FS, Q[85], A[1]]: and consequently privation
of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons,
comes to an end?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of the damned,
both men and demons, comes to an end. For it is written (Wis. 11:24):
"Thou hast mercy upon all, O Lord, because Thou canst do all things." But
among all things the demons also are included, since they are God's
creatures. Therefore also their punishment will come to an end.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "God hath concluded all in sin [Vulg.: 'unbelief'], that
He may have mercy on all" (Rm. 11:32). Now God has concluded the demons
under sin, that is to say, He permitted them to be concluded. Therefore
it would seem that in time He has mercy even on the demons.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo ii), "it is not just that
God should permit the utter loss of a creature which He made for
happiness." Therefore, since every rational creature was created for
happiness, it would seem unjust for it to be allowed to perish altogether.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:41): "Depart from Me, you cursed,
into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels."
Therefore they will be punished eternally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, just as the good angels were made happy through turning to God,
so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God.
Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an
end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, which is
inadmissible.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi) Origen [*Cf. FP,
Q[64], A[2]] "erred in maintaining that the demons will at length,
through God's mercy, be delivered from their punishment." But this error
has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First because it is
clearly contrary to the authority of Holy Writ (Apoc. 20:9,10): "The
devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone,
where both the beasts and the false prophets [*Vulg.: 'the beast and
false prophet,' etc.] shall be tormented day and night for ever and
ever," which is the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secondly, because
this opinion exaggerated God's mercy in one direction and depreciated it
in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels to
remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked angels to be eternally
punished. Wherefore just as he maintained that the demons and the souls
of the damned are to be delivered at length from their sufferings, so he
maintained that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length
pass from their happy state to the unhappiness of this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since, however,
His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is that it does
not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that mercy,
as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness. And yet
we may say that even in them His mercy finds a place, in so far as they
are punished less than they deserve condignly, but not that they are
entirely delivered from punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the words quoted the distribution (of the predicate)
regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the statement applies
to men in the state of wayfarer, inasmuch as He had mercy both on Jews
and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Anselm means that it is not just in the sense of becoming
God's goodness, and is speaking of the creature generically. For it
becomes not the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature fail of
the end for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for all men or
all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men or some
angels should perish for ever, because the intention of the Divine will
is fulfilled in the others who are saved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God's mercy suffers at least men to be punished eternally?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God's mercy does not suffer at least men to be
punished eternally. For it is written (Gn. 6:3): "My spirit shall not
remain in man for ever because he is flesh"; where "spirit" denotes
indignation, as a gloss observes. Therefore, since God's indignation is
not distinct from His punishment, man will not be punished eternally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the charity of the saints in this life makes them pray
for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in that life.
Therefore they will pray then for their enemies who are damned. But the
prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most acceptable
to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy will in time
deliver the damned from their punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned
belongs to the prophecy of commination. Now the prophecy of commination
is not always fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the destruction
of Nineve (Jonas 3); and yet it was not destroyed as foretold by the
prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason (Jonas 4:1).
Therefore it would seem that much more will the threat of eternal
punishment be commuted by God's mercy for a more lenient punishment, when
this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to all.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the words of Ps. 76:8 are to the point, where it is
said: "Will God then be angry for ever? [*Vulg.: 'Will God then cast off
for ever?']" But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a gloss on Is. 14:19, "But thou art cast out," etc.
says: "Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never shalt":
and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all human souls
shall at length have rest from their pains.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46) of the elect conjointly with
the damned: "These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just,
into life everlasting." But it is inadmissible that the life of the just
will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the punishment
of the damned will ever come to an end.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) "death is to men what
their fall was to the angels." Now after their fall the angels could not
be restored [*Cf. FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore neither can man after
death: and thus the punishment of the damned will have no end.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 17,18), some evaded
the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished
everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at
length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether
unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and
therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls of men who
die without charity, since "death is to men what their fall was to the
angels," as Damascene says.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying refers to man generically, because God's
indignation was at length removed from the human race by the coming of
Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to remain in this
reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the Divine anger in
themselves, since no other way of reconciliation is given to us save that
which is through Christ.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 24) and Gregory (Moral.
xxxiv) say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies, that they may
be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them to be converted.
For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we should no more pray
for them than for the demons. And since for those who depart this life
without grace there will be no further time for conversion, no prayer
will be offered for them, neither by the Church militant, nor by the
Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray for them is, as the
Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:25,26), that "God may give them repentance to know
the truth, and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A punishment threatened prophetically is only then commuted
when there is a change in the merits of the person threatened. Hence: "I
will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out
and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation . . . shall repent of
their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to
them" (Jer. 18:7). Therefore, since the merits of the damned cannot be
changed, the threatened punishment will ever be fulfilled in them.
Nevertheless the prophecy of commination is always fulfilled in a certain
sense, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei. xxi, 24): "Nineve has been
overthrown, that was evil, and a good Nineve is built up, that was not:
for while the walls and the houses remained standing, the city was
overthrown in its wicked ways."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of mercy,
which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in this life
(which may be called God's anger on account of its unhappiness) He
changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence the Psalm continues
(Ps. 76:11): "This is the change of the right hand of the most High." We
may also reply that they refer to mercy as granting a relaxation but not
setting free altogether if it be referred also to the damned. Hence the
Psalm does not say: "Will He from His anger shut up His mercies?" but "in
His anger," because the punishment will not be done away entirely; but
His mercy will have effect by diminishing the punishment while it
continues.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: This gloss is speaking not absolutely but on an impossible
supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of the devil's
sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of
God?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians is
brought to an end by the mercy of God. "For he that believeth and is
baptized shall be saved" (Mk. 16:16). Now this applies to every
Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Jn. 6:55): "He that eateth My body and
drinketh My blood hath eternal life." Now this is the meat and drink
whereof Christians partake in common. Therefore all Christians will be
saved at length.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss: but he
himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15), where it is a
question of those who have the foundation of the Christian faith.
Therefore all such persons will be saved in the end.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9): "The unjust shall not
possess the kingdom of God." Now some Christians are unjust. Therefore
Christians will not all come to the kingdom of God, and consequently they
will be punished for ever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (2 Pt. 2:21): "It had been better for them not to
have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn
back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them." Now those
who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever. Therefore
Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be punished
for ever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 20,21), there
have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for
all men, but only for Christians. although they stated the matter in
different ways. For some said that whoever received the sacraments of
faith would be immune from eternal punishment. But this is contrary to
the truth, since some receive the sacraments of faith, and yet have not
faith, without which "it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11:6).
Wherefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal
punishment who have received the sacraments of faith, and professed the
Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time
some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and
these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since
according to 2 Pt. 2:21, "it had been better for them not to have known
the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back."
Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith and
invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have conformed to
some heresy from the first. And therefore some have maintained that those
alone are exempt from eternal punishment, who persevere to the end in the
Catholic faith, however guilty they may have been of other crimes. But
this is clearly contrary to Holy Writ, for it is written (James 2:20):
"Faith without works is dead," and (Mt. 7:21) "Not every one that saith
to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven: but he that
doth the will of My Father Who is in heaven": and in many other passages
Holy Scripture threatens sinners with eternal punishment. Consequently
those who persevere in the faith unto the end will not all be exempt from
eternal punishment, unless in the end they prove to be free from other
crimes.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord speaks there of formed faith [*Cf. SS, Q[4], A[3]]
"that worketh by love [Vulg.: 'charity'; Gal. 5:6]": wherein whosoever
dieth shall be saved. But to this faith not only is the error of unbelief
opposed, but also any mortal sin whatsoever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The saying of our Lord refers not to those who partake only
sacramentally, and who sometimes by receiving unworthily "eat and drink
judgment" to themselves (1 Cor. 11:29), but to those who eat spiritually
and are incorporated with Him by charity, which incorporation is the
effect of the sacramental eating, in those who approach worthily [*Cf.
TP, Q[80], AA[1],2,3]. Wherefore, so far as the power of the sacrament is
concerned, it brings us to eternal life, although sin may deprive us of
that fruit, even after we have received worthily.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In this passage of the Apostle the foundation denotes
formed faith, upon which whosoever shall build venial sins [*Cf. FS,
Q[89], A[2]] "shall suffer loss," because he will be punished for them by
God; yet "he himself shall be saved" in the end "by fire," either of
temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of purgatory which will be
after death.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all those who perform works of mercy will be punished eternally?
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not be
punished eternally, but only those who neglect those works. For it is
written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done
mercy"; and (Mt. 5:7): "Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain
mercy."
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, (Mt. 25:35-46) we find a description of our Lord's
discussion with the damned and the elect. But this discussion is only
about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded only
to such as have omitted to practice works of mercy: and consequently the
same conclusion follows as before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 6:12): "Forgive us our debts, as we
also forgive our debtors," and further on (Mt. 6:14): "For if you will
forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will forgive you also
your offenses." Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who forgive
others their offenses, will themselves obtain the forgiveness of their
sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Godliness is
profitable to all things," says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of
life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and though
he should suffer from the inconstancy of the flesh, without doubt he will
be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can boast of no other
exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting punishment."
Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though they be shackled
with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally: and thus the same
conclusion follows as before.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9,10): "Neither fornicators . .
nor adulterers," etc. "shall possess the kingdom of God." Yet many are
such who practice works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not all
come to the eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be
punished eternally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole
law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Therefore
whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other
works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be
punished eternally.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above (De Civ. Dei
xxi, 22), some have maintained that not all who have professed the
Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those who
persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes. But
this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be acceptable to
God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the absence of
charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in works of mercy
without having charity. Wherefore nothing profits them to the meriting of
eternal life, or to exemption from eternal punishment, as may be gathered
from 1 Cor. 13:3. Most evident is this in the case of those who lay hands
on other people's property, for after seizing on many things, they
nevertheless spend something in works of mercy. We must therefore
conclude that all whosoever die in mortal sin, neither faith nor works of
mercy will free them from eternal punishment, not even after any length
of time whatever.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an ordinate
manner. But those who while merciful to others are neglectful of
themselves do not show mercy ordinately, rather do they strike at
themselves by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not obtain
the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that mercy which
rebates somewhat their due punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason why the discussion refers only to the works of
mercy is not because eternal punishment will be inflicted on none but
those who omit those works, but because eternal punishment will be
remitted to those who after sinning have obtained forgiveness by their
works of mercy, making unto themselves "friends of the mammon of
iniquity" (Lk. 16:9).
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Our Lord said this to those who ask that their debt be
forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin. Wherefore the repentant
alone will obtain by their works of mercy the forgiveness that sets them
free altogether.
Aquin.: SMT XP Q[99] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 4: The gloss of Ambrose speaks of the inconstancy that
consists in venial sin, from which a man will be freed through the works
of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a scourging.
Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense is that
those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh through
frailty are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore such a
one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by those works
not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord, Who is blessed
for evermore. Amen.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Out. Para. 1/1
The following two questions were compiled by Nicolai from St. Thomas'
Commentary on the Sentences, and by him included in the supplement
between Questions 70 and 71.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY
(TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped
of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we shall
treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] Out. Para. 2/2
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted
with punishment by fire?
(2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within
themselves?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a
bodily fire, and are punished by fire?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that souls which depart with none but original sin,
suffer from a bodily fire and are punished by fire. For Augustine
[*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, xxvii] says: "Hold firmly and doubt not
that children who depart this life without the sacrament of Baptism will
be punished everlastingly." Now punishment denotes sensible pain.
Therefore souls which depart this life with original sin alone, suffer
from a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of fire.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a greater fault deserves a greater punishment. Now
original sin is greater than venial, because it contains more aversion,
since it deprives its subject of grace, whereas venial sin is compatible
with grace; and again because original sin is punished eternally, whereas
venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that venial sin is
deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is original sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sins are more severely punished after this life than
during lifetime, for in this life there is room for mercy. Now, sensible
punishment corresponds to original sin in this life, for children who
have only original sin are justly subject to many sensible punishments.
Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, even as in actual sin there is aversion and conversion,
so in original sin there is something corresponding to aversion, namely
the privation of original justice, and something corresponding to
conversion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment of fire is due to
actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it is also due to
original sin by reason of concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, after the resurrection the bodies of children will be
either passible or impassible. If they be impassible---and no human body
can be impassible except either on account of the gift of impassibility
(as in the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as in the state of
innocence)---it follows that the bodies of children will either have the
gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious, so that there will be
no difference between baptized and non-baptized children, which is
heretical, or else they will have original justice, and thus will be
without original sin, and will not be punished for original sin, which is
likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they be passible, since
everything passible suffers of necessity in the presence of the active,
it follows that in the presence of active sensible bodies they will
suffer sensible punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 1/3
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiii) that the mildest
punishment of all will be for those who are burdened with original sin
only. But this would not be so, if they were tormented with sensible
punishment, because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore
they will not suffer sensible punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 2/3
Further, the grief of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure of
sin (Apoc. 18:7): "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in
delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." But there is no
pleasure in original sin, as neither is there operation, for pleasure
follows operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Therefore punishment by fire
is not due to original sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 3/3
Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which is entitled on
Holy Baptism, distinguishes three classes of unbaptized persons: those
namely who refuse to be baptized, those who through neglect have put off
being baptized until the end of life and have been surprised by sudden
death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive it through no
fault of theirs. Of the first he says that they will be punished not only
for their other sins, but also for their contempt of Baptism; of the
second, that they will be punished, though less severely than the first,
for having neglected it; and of the last he says that "a just and eternal
Judge will consign them neither to heavenly glory nor to the eternal
pains of hell, for although they have not been signed with Baptism, they
are without wickedness and malice, and have suffered rather than caused
their loss of Baptism." He also gives the reason why, although they do
not reach the glory of heaven, they do not therefore suffer the eternal
punishment suffered by the damned: "Because there is a mean between the
two, since he who deserves not honor and glory is not for that reason
worthy of punishment, and on the other hand he who is not deserving of
punishment is not for that reason worthy of glory and honor."
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to fault, according to
the saying of Isaias (27:8), "In measure against measure, when it shall
be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now the defect transmitted to us
through our origin, and having the character of a sin does not result
from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon human nature
by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal or corruption of
something that had been superadded to nature. Nor does this sin belong to
this particular man, except in so far as he has such a nature, that is
deprived of this good, which in the ordinary course of things he would
have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore no further
punishment is due to him, besides the privation of that end to which the
gift withdrawn destined him, which gift human nature is unable of itself
to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and consequently the loss of
this vision is the proper and only punishment of original sin after
death: because, if any other sensible punishment were inflicted after
death for original sin, a man would be punished out of proportion to his
guilt, for sensible punishment is inflicted for that which is proper to
the person, since a man undergoes sensible punishment in so far as he
suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt did not result from an action
of his own, even so neither should he be punished by suffering himself,
but only by losing that which his nature was unable to obtain. On the
other hand, those who are under sentence for original sin will suffer no
loss whatever in other kinds of perfection and goodness which are
consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the authority quoted punishment denotes, not pain of
sense, but only pain of loss, which is the privation of the divine
vision, even as in Scripture the word "fire" is often wont to signify any
kind of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Of all sins original sin is the least, because it is the
least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will of the person, but
only by the will of the origin of our nature. But actual sin, even
venial, is voluntary by the will of the person in which it is; wherefore
a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial sin. Nor does it
matter that original sin is incompatible with grace; because privation of
grace has the character, not of sin, but of punishment, except in so far
as it is voluntary: for which reason that which is less voluntary is less
sinful. Again it matters not that actual venial sin is deserving of
temporal punishment, since this is accidental, for as much as he who
falls venially has sufficient grace to attenuate the punishment. For if
venial sin were in a person without grace, it would be punished eternally.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is no parity between pain of sense before and after
death, since before death the pain of sense results from the power of the
natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior as fever or the
like, or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after death nothing
will act by natural power, but only according to the order of divine
justice, whether the object of such action be the separate soul, on which
it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or the body after
resurrection, since then all natural action will cease, through the
cessation of the first movable which is the cause of all bodily movement
and alteration.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure, which is in
the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual concupiscence, which is in
original sin, has no pleasure. Hence, sensible pain does not correspond
thereto as punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The bodies of children will be impassible, not through
their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the lack of an
external agent to act upon them: because, after the resurrection, no body
will act on another, least of all so as to induce corruption by the
action of nature, but there will only be action to the effect of
punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore those bodies to
which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will not suffer
punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will be
impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering; hence
impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction on account of the
state in which they are?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the souls in question suffer spiritual
affliction on account of the state wherein they are, because as
Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Matth.), the punishment of God in that
they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their being
burned in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing God.
Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one wishes to
have. But these souls would wish to have the divine vision, else their
will would be actually perverse. Therefore since they are deprived of it,
seemingly they also suffer.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it be said that they do not suffer, because they know
that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on the
contrary: Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain of
punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is disinherited or
deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore these souls
likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through no fault of theirs,
suffer none the less.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit of
Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But baptized
children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of Christ's merit.
Therefore the unbaptized suffer pain through being deprived of eternal
life on account of Adam's demerit.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, separation from what we love cannot be without pain. But
these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for that very
reason will love Him naturally. Therefore since they are separated from
Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this separation without pain.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after
death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment. If
for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin, their
sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the damned
is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have the worm of
conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the mildest punishment,
as Augustine says it is [*See A[1], "On the contrary"]. If, on the other
hand, they grieve for their punishment, it follows, since their
punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their will opposes itself to
divine justice, and thus would be actually inordinate, which is not to be
granted. Therefore they will feel no sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of
what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv, and De ira
ii, 6) that "a wise man is not disturbed." Now in these children there is
right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will not be
disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which they could nowise
avoid.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, on this question there are three opinions. Some say that
these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so much
in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have lost.
It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily burden
should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to explore,
and many more besides. Hence others say that they have perfect knowledge
of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that they are
deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow on this
account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as it was not
by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are condemned.
Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow cannot be
little for the loss of so great a good, especially without the hope of
recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the mildest. Moreover
the very same reason that impugns their being punished with pain of
sense, as afflicting them from without, argues against their feeling
sorrow within, because the pain of punishment corresponds to the pleasure
of sin; wherefore, since original sin is void of pleasure, its punishment
is free of all pain. Consequently others say that they will know
perfectly things subject to natural knowledge, and both the fact of their
being deprived of eternal life and the reason for this privation, and
that nevertheless this knowledge will not cause any sorrow in them. How
this may be possible we must explore.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason
one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one's power
to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one is
capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to fly
like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since these
things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked that to
which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man who has the
use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because he can
prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life [*Cf. FS, Q[109],
AA[5],6]; so that if he fail in this, his grief will be very great, since
he has lost what he was able to possess. But children were never adapted
to possess eternal life, since neither was this due to them by virtue of
their natural principles, for it surpasses the entire faculty of nature,
nor could they perform acts of their own whereby to obtain so great a
good. Hence they will nowise grieve for being deprived of the divine
vision; nay, rather will they rejoice for that they will have a large
share of God's goodness and their own natural perfections. Nor can it be
said that they were adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their
own action, but by the actions of others around them, since they could be
baptized by others, like other children of the same condition who have
been baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant
grace that one should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Wherefore
the lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die
without Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others
of the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In those who, having the use of free-will, are damned for
actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but not in
children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity between the
two.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the will may be directed both to the possible and
to the impossible as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, an ordinate and complete
will is only of things which in some way are proportionate to our
capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but not if we
fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should be called
"velleity" [*Cf. FS, Q[13], A[5], ad 1; TP, Q[21], A[4]] rather than
"will"; for one does not will such things absolutely, but one would if
they were possible.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or bodily
members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at their loss,
whether this be through his own or another's fault: hence it is clear
that the argument is not based on a true comparison.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as stated in
Rm. 5:15, seqq. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized children have as
much of evil as the baptized have of good.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[1] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 5: Although unbaptized children are separated from God as
regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from Him: in
fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods, and so will
also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and love.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN
PURGATORY (SIX ARTICLES)
� We must next treat of the souls which after this life expiate the
punishment of their actual sins in the fire of Purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] Out. Para. 2/2
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the pain of Purgatory surpasses all the temporal pains of
this life?
(2) Whether that punishment is voluntary?
(3) Whether the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons?
(4) Whether venial sin as regards its guilt is expiated by the pains of
Purgatory?
(5) Whether the fire of Purgatory frees from the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether one is freed from that punishment sooner than another?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the pains of Purgatory surpass all the temporal pains of this
life?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the pains of Purgatory do not surpass all the
temporal pains of this life. Because the more passive a thing is the more
it suffers if it has the sense of being hurt. Now the body is more
passive than the separate soul, both because it has contrariety to a
fiery agent, and because it has matter which is susceptive of the agent's
quality: and this cannot be said of the soul. Therefore the pain which
the body suffers in this world is greater than the pain whereby the soul
is cleansed after this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the pains of Purgatory are directly ordained against
venial sins. Now since venial sins are the least grievous, the lightest
punishment is due to them, if the measure of the stripes is according to
the measure of the fault. Therefore the pain of Purgatory is the lightest
of all.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since the debt of punishment is an effect of sin, it
does not increase unless the sin increases. Now sin cannot increase in
one whose sin is already remitted. Therefore if a mortal sin has been
remitted in a man who has not fully paid the debt of punishment, this
debt does not increase when he dies. But while he lived he was not in
debt to the extent of the most grievous punishment. Therefore the pain
that he will suffer after this life will not be more grievous to him than
all other pains of this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (xli De Sanctis): "This fire
of Purgatory will be more severe than any pain that can be felt, seen or
conceived in this world."
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the more universal a pain is the greater it is. Now the whole
separate soul is punished, since it is simple: which is not the case with
the body. Therefore this, being the punishment of the separate soul, is
greater than any pain suffered by the body.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In Purgatory there will be a twofold pain; one will be
the pain of loss, namely the delay of the divine vision, and the pain of
sense, namely punishment by corporeal fire. With regard to both the least
pain of Purgatory surpasses the greatest pain of this life. For the more
a thing is desired the more painful is its absence. And since after this
life the holy souls desire the Sovereign Good with the most intense
longing---both because their longing is not held back by the weight of
the body, and because, had there been no obstacle, they would already
have gained the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Good---it follows that
they grieve exceedingly for their delay. Again, since pain is not hurt,
but the sense of hurt, the more sensitive a thing is, the greater the
pain caused by that which hurts it: wherefore hurts inflicted on the more
sensible parts cause the greatest pain. And, because all bodily sensation
is from the soul, it follows of necessity that the soul feels the
greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the soul itself. That the soul
suffers pain from the bodily fire is at present taken for granted, for we
shall treat of this matter further on [*Cf. XP, Q[70], A[3]]. Therefore
it follows that the pain of Purgatory, both of loss and of sense,
surpasses all the pains of this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Some, however, prove this from the fact that the whole soul is punished,
and not the body. But this is to no purpose, since in that case the
punishment of the damned would be milder after the resurrection than
before, which is false.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the soul is less passive than the body, it is more
cognizant of actual suffering [passionis]: and where the sense of
suffering is greater, there is the greater pain, though the suffering be
less.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The severity of that punishment is not so much a
consequence of the degree of sin, as of the disposition of the person
punished, because the same sin is more severely punished then than now.
Even so a person who has a better temperament is punished more severely
by the same sentence than another; and yet the judge acts justly in
condemning both for the same crimes to the same punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this punishment is voluntary?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this punishment is voluntary. For those who
are in Purgatory are upright in heart. Now uprightness in heart is to
conform one's will to God's, as Augustine says (Serm. i in Ps. 32).
Therefore, since it is God's will that they be punished, they will suffer
that punishment voluntarily.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every wise man wills that without which he cannot obtain
the end he has in view. Now those who are in Purgatory know that they
cannot obtain glory, unless they be punished first. Therefore they are
punished willingly.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No one asks to be freed from a punishment that he
suffers willingly. Now those who are in Purgatory ask to be set free, as
appears from many incidents related in the Dialogue of Gregory (iv,
40,65). Therefore they will not undergo that punishment voluntarily.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A thing is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, by an
absolute act of the will; and thus no punishment is voluntary, because
the very notion of punishment is that it be contrary to the will.
Secondly, a thing is said to be voluntary by a conditional act of the
will: thus cautery is voluntary for the sake of regaining health. Hence a
punishment may be voluntary in two ways. First, because by being punished
we obtain some good, and thus the will itself undertakes a punishment, as
instanced in satisfaction, or when a man accepts a punishment gladly, and
would not have it not to be, as in the case of martyrdom. Secondly, when,
although we gain no good by the punishment, we cannot obtain a good
without being punished, as in the case of natural death: and then the
will does not undertake the punishment, and would be delivered from it;
but it submits to it, and in this respect the punishment is said to be
voluntary. In this latter sense the punishment of Purgatory is said to be
voluntary.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Some, however, say that it is not voluntary in any way, because the
souls in Purgatory are so replete with suffering, that they know not that
they are being cleansed by their pains, and deem themselves damned. But
this is false, for did they not know that they will be set free, they
would not ask for prayers, as they often do.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul in Purgatory are punished by the demons?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the souls in Purgatory are punished by the
demons; for, according to the Master, "they will have for torturers in
their pains, those who were their tempters in sin." Now the demons tempt
us to sin, not only mortal, but also venial when they fail in the former.
Therefore in Purgatory also they will torture souls on account of venial
sins.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the just are competent to be cleansed from sin both in
this life and afterwards. Now, in this life, they are cleansed by pains
inflicted by the devil, as was the case with Job. Therefore after this
life also, those who have to be cleansed will be punished by the demons.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It were unjust that he who has triumphed over someone,
should be subjected to him after victory. Now those who are in Purgatory
have triumphed over the demons, since they died without mortal sin.
Therefore they will not be subjected to them through being punished by
them.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As after the Judgment day the Divine justice will kindle
the fire with which the damned will be punished for ever, even so now the
elect are cleansed after this life by the Divine justice alone, and
neither by the ministry of the demons whom they have vanquished, nor by
the ministry of the angels who would not inflict such tortures on their
fellow-citizens. It is, however, possible that they take them to the
place of punishment: also that even the demons, who rejoice in the
punishment of man, accompany them and stand by while they are being
cleansed, both that they may be sated with their pains, and that when
these leave their bodies, they may find something of their own in them.
But in this life, while there is yet time for the combat, men are
punished both by the wicked angels as foes, as instanced in Job, and by
the good angels, as instanced in Jacob, the sinew of whose thigh shrank
at the angel's touch [*Gn. 32:25]. Moreover, Dionysius says explicitly
that the good angels sometimes inflict punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether venial sin is expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the
guilt?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin is not expiated by the pains of
Purgatory as regards the guilt. For a gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xvi,
28] on 1 Jn. 5:16, "There is a sin unto death," etc. says: "It is vain to
ask pardon after death for what was not amended in this life." Therefore
no sin is remitted as to guilt after this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the same subject is freed from sin as falls into sin.
But after death the soul cannot sin venially. Therefore neither can it be
loosed from venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says [*Dial. iv, 39] that every man will be at
the judgment as he was when he left the body, because "the tree . . .
wheresoever it shall fall, there shall it be" [*Eccles. 11:3]. If, then,
a man go forth from this life with venial sin, he will be with venial sin
at the judgment: and consequently one does not atone for venial sin in
Purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it has been stated (XP, Q[2], A[3]) that actual sin is
not blotted out save by contrition. But there will be no contrition after
this life, because it is a meritorious act. For then there will be
neither merit nor demerit since, according to the Damascene [*De Fide
Orth. ii, 4], "death is to men what the fall was to the angels."
Therefore, after this life, venial sin is not remitted in Purgatory as to
its guilt.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, venial sin is not in us except on account of the fomes.
Wherefore in the original state Adam would not have sinned venially, as
was stated (Sent. ii, D, xxi, 2). Now after this life there will be no
sensuality; because the fomes will cease when the soul is separated,
since it is called the "law of the flesh" (Rm. 7). Hence there will be no
venial sin then, and consequently it cannot be expiated by the fire of
Purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Gregory [*Dial. iv, 39] and Augustine [*De vera et
falsa poenit. iv, xviii, by some other author] say that certain slight
sins will be remitted in the life to come. Nor can this be understood of
the punishment: because thus all sins, however grave they be, are
expiated by the fire of Purgatory, as regards the debt of punishment.
Therefore venial sins are cleansed by the fire of Purgatory as to their
guilt.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, wood, hay, stubble (1 Cor. 3:12) denote venial sins, as we have
said (FS, Q[89], A[2]). Now wood, hay, stubble are consumed in Purgatory.
Therefore venial sins are remitted after this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some have asserted that no sin is remitted after this
life, as regards the guilt: that if a man die with mortal sin, he is
damned and incapable of being forgiven; and that it is not possible for a
man to die with a venial sin and without mortal sin, since the final
grace washes the venial sin away. They assign as reason for this that
venial sin is excessive love of a temporal thing, in one who has his
foundation in Christ, which excess results from the corruption of
concupiscence. Wherefore if grace entirely overcome the corruption of
concupiscence, as in the Blessed Virgin, there is no room for venial sin.
Hence, since this concupiscence is altogether abated and removed, the
powers of the soul are wholly subject to grace, and venial sin is cast
out. But this opinion is nonsensical in itself and in its proof. In
itself, because it is opposed to the statements of holy men and of the
Gospel, which cannot be expounded as referring to the remission of venial
sins as to their punishment, as the Master says in the text [*Sentent.
iv, D, xxi] because in this way both light and grave sins are remitted in
the life to come: while Gregory [*Dial. iv, 39] declares that light sins
alone are remitted after this life. Nor does it suffice for them to say,
that this is said expressly of light sins, lest we should think that we
shall suffer nothing grievous on their account: because the remission of
sin diminishes punishment rather than aggravates it. As to the proof, it
is shown to be worthless, since bodily defect, such as obtains at the
last moment of life, does not remove the corruption of concupiscence; nor
does it diminish it in its root but in its act, as instanced in those who
lie dangerously ill; nor again does it calm the powers of the soul, so as
to subject them to grace, because tranquillity of the powers, and their
subjection to grace, is effected when the lower powers obey the higher
which delight together in God's law. But this cannot happen in that
state, since the acts of both kinds of powers are impeded; unless
tranquillity denote the absence of combat, as occurs even in those who
are asleep; and yet sleep is not said, for this reason, to diminish
concupiscence, or to calm the powers of the soul, or to subject them to
grace. Moreover, granted that the aforesaid defect diminish concupiscence
radically, and that it subject the powers to grace, it would still be
insufficient to wash away venial sin already committed, although it would
suffice in order to avoid it in the future. Because actual sin, even if
it be venial, is not remitted without an actual movement of contrition,
as stated above (XP, Q[2], A[3]), however much the latter be in the
habitual intention. Now it happens sometimes that a man dies in his
sleep, being in a state of grace and yet having a venial sin when he went
to sleep: and such a man cannot make an act of contrition for his venial
sin before he dies. Nor may we say, as they do, that if he repented
neither by act nor by intention, neither in general nor in particular,
his venial sin becomes mortal, for that "venial becomes mortal when it is
an object of complacency"; because not all complacency in venial sin
makes it mortal (else all venial sin would be mortal, since every venial
sin pleases for as much as it is voluntary), but only that complacency
which amounts to enjoyment, wherein all human wickedness consists, in
that "we enjoy what we should use," as Augustine says [*De Trin. x, 10].
Hence the complacency which makes a sin mortal is actual complacency, for
every mortal sin consists in an act. Now it may happen that a man, after
committing a venial sin, has no actual thought of being forgiven or of
remaining in that sin, but thinks perhaps about a triangle having its
three angles equal to two right angles, and while engaged in this thought
falls asleep, and dies.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
It is therefore clear that this opinion is utterly unreasonable: and
consequently we must say with others that venial sin in one who dies in a
state of grace, is remitted after this life by the fire of Purgatory:
because this punishment so far as it is voluntary, will have the power,
by virtue of grace, to expiate all such guilt as is compatible with
grace. [*St. Thomas expresses himself differently, De Malo, Q[7], A[2],
ad 9,17: "Guilt is not remitted by punishment, but venial sin as to its
guilt is remitted in Purgatory by virtue of grace, not only as existing
in the habit, but also as proceeding to the act of charity in detestation
of venial sin."]
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The gloss refers to mortal sin. Or it may be replied that
although, in this life, it is not amended in itself, it is amended in
merits, because a man merited here that his punishment should be
meritorious to him there.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Venial sin arises from the corruption of the fomes, which
will no longer be in the separate soul that is in Purgatory, wherefore
this soul cannot sin venially. On the other hand, the remission of venial
sin proceeds from the will informed by grace, which will be in the
separate soul in Purgatory. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Venial sins do not alter a man's state, for they neither
destroy nor diminish charity, according to which the amount of the soul's
gratuitous goodness is measured. Hence the soul remains such as it was
before, notwithstanding the remission or commission of venial sins.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: After this life there can be no merit in respect of the
essential reward, but there can be in respect of some accidental reward,
so long as man remains in the state of the way, in a sense. Consequently
in Purgatory there can be a meritorious act in respect of the remission
of venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although venial sin arises from the proneness of the fomes,
sin results in the mind; wherefore even when the fomes is no more, sin
can still remain.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fire of Purgatory delivers from the debt of punishment?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fire of Purgatory does not deliver from
the debt of punishment. For every cleansing is in respect of some
uncleanness. But punishment does not imply uncleanness. Therefore the
fire of Purgatory does not deliver from punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a contrary is not cleansed save by its contrary. But
punishment is not contrary to punishment. Therefore one is not cleansed
from the debt of punishment by the punishment of Purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 3:15, "He shall be saved, yet so,"
etc. says: "This fire is the trial of tribulation of which it is written
(Ecclus. 27:6): The furnace tries the potter's vessels," etc. Therefore
man expiates every punishment by the pains of this world, at least by
death, which is the greatest punishment of all, and not by the fire of
Purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The pains of Purgatory are more grievous than all the
pains of this world, as stated above (A[3]). Now the satisfactory
punishment which one undergoes in this life atones for the debt of
punishment. Much more therefore is this effected by the punishment of
Purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whosoever is another's debtor, is freed from his
indebtedness by paying the debt. And, since the obligation incurred by
guilt is nothing else than the debt of punishment, a person is freed from
that obligation by undergoing the punishment which he owed. Accordingly
the punishment of Purgatory cleanses from the debt of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the debt of punishment does not in itself imply
uncleanness, it bears a relation to uncleanness by reason of its cause.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although punishment is not contrary to punishment, it is
opposed to the debt of punishment, because the obligation to punishment
remains from the fact that one has not undergone the punishment that was
due.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Many meanings underlie the same words of Holy Writ. Hence
this fire may denote both the present tribulation and the punishment to
come, and venial sins can be cleansed from both of these. That natural
death is not sufficient for this, has been stated above (Sent. iv, D, 20).
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one person is delivered from this punishment sooner than another?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one person is not delivered from this
punishment sooner than another. For the more grievous the sin, and the
greater the debt, the more severely is it punished in Purgatory. Now
there is the same proportion between severer punishment and graver fault,
as between lighter punishment and less grievous fault. Therefore one is
delivered from this punishment as soon as another.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in point of duration unequal merits receive equal
retribution both in heaven and in hell. Therefore seemingly it is the
same in Purgatory.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, is the comparison of the Apostle, who denotes the
differences of venial sins by wood, hay, and stubble. Now it is clear
that wood remains longer in the fire than hay and stubble. Therefore one
venial sin is punished longer in Purgatory than another.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some venial sins cling more persistently than others,
according as the affections are more inclined to them, and more firmly
fixed in them. And since that which clings more persistently is more
slowly cleansed, it follows that some are tormented in Purgatory longer
than others, for as much as their affections were steeped in venial sins.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Severity of punishment corresponds properly speaking to the
amount of guilt: whereas the length corresponds to the firmness with
which sin has taken root in its subject. Hence it may happen that one may
be delayed longer who is tormented less, and "vice versa."
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 1 Q[2] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Mortal sin which deserves the punishment of hell, and
charity which deserves the reward of heaven, will, after this life, be
immovably rooted in their subject. Hence as to all there is the same
duration in either case. It is otherwise with venial sin which is
punished in Purgatory, as stated above (A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] Out. Para. 1/1
APPENDIX 2
TWO ARTICLES ON PURGATORY
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is a Purgatory after this life?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a Purgatory after this life. For
it is said (Apoc. 14:13): "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord. From
henceforth now, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors."
Therefore after this life no cleansing labor awaits those who die in the
Lord, nor those who do not die in the Lord, since they cannot be
cleansed. Therefore there is no Purgatory after this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as charity is to an eternal reward, so is mortal sin to
eternal punishment. Now those who die in mortal sin are forthwith
consigned to eternal punishment. Therefore those who die in charity go at
once to their reward; and consequently no Purgatory awaits them after
this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God Who is supremely merciful is more inclined to reward
good than to punish evil. Now just as those who are in the state of
charity, do certain evil things which are not deserving of eternal
punishment, so those who are in mortal sin, at times perform actions,
generically good, which are not deserving of an eternal reward. Therefore
since these good actions are not rewarded after this life in those who
will be damned, neither should those evil actions be punished after this
life. Hence the same conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is said (2 Macc. 12:46): "It is a holy and wholesome
thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins." Now
there is no need to pray for the dead who are in heaven, for they are in
no need; nor again for those who are in hell, because they cannot be
loosed from sins. Therefore after this life, there are some not yet
loosed from sins, who can be loosed therefrom; and the like have charity,
without which sins cannot be loosed, for "charity covereth all sins"
[*Prov. 10:12]. Hence they will not be consigned to everlasting death,
since "he that liveth and believeth in Me, shall not die for ever" [*Jn.
11:26]: nor will they obtain glory without being cleansed, because
nothing unclean shall obtain it, as stated in the last chapter of the
Apocalypse (verse 14). Therefore some kind of cleansing remains after
this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, Gregory of Nyssa [*De iis qui in fide dormiunt] says: "If one
who loves and believes in Christ," has failed to wash away his sins in
this life, "he is set free after death by the fire of Purgatory."
Therefore there remains some kind of cleansing after this life.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, From the conclusions we have drawn above (TP, Q[86],
AA[4],5; XP, Q[12], A[1]) it is sufficiently clear that there is a
Purgatory after this life. For if the debt of punishment is not paid in
full after the stain of sin has been washed away by contrition, nor again
are venial sins always removed when mortal sins are remitted, and if
justice demands that sin be set in order by due punishment, it follows
that one who after contrition for his fault and after being absolved,
dies before making due satisfaction, is punished after this life.
Wherefore those who deny Purgatory speak against the justice of God: for
which reason such a statement is erroneous and contrary to faith. Hence
Gregory of Nyssa, after the words quoted above, adds: "This we preach,
holding to the teaching of truth, and this is our belief; this the
universal Church holds, by praying for the dead that they may be loosed
from sins." This cannot be understood except as referring to Purgatory:
and whosoever resists the authority of the Church, incurs the note of
heresy.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The authority quoted is speaking of the labor of working
for merit, and not of the labor of suffering to be cleansed.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Evil has not a perfect cause, but results from each single
defect: whereas good arises from one perfect cause, as Dionysius asserts
[*Div. Nom. iv, 4]. Hence each defect is an obstacle to the perfection of
good; while not every good hinders some consummation of evil, since there
is never evil without some good. Consequently venial sin prevents one who
has charity from obtaining the perfect good, namely eternal life, until
he be cleansed; whereas mortal sin cannot be hindered by some conjoined
good from bringing a man forthwith to the extreme of evils.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that falls into mortal sin, deadens all the good he has
done before, and what he does, while in mortal sin, is dead: since by
offending God he deserves to lose all the good he has from God. Wherefore
no reward after this life awaits him who dies in mortal sin, whereas
sometimes punishment awaits him who dies in charity, which does not
always wash away the sin which it finds, but only that which is contrary
to it.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is the same place where souls are cleansed, and the damned
punished?
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not the same place where souls are
cleansed and the damned punished. For the punishment of the damned is
eternal, according to Mt. 25:46, "These shall go into everlasting
punishment [Vulg.: 'fire']." But the fire of Purgatory is temporary, as
the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 21). Therefore the former and the latter
are not punished together in the same place: and consequently these
places must needs be distinct.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: The punishment of hell is called by various names, as in Ps.
10:7, "Fire and brimstone, and storms of winds," etc., whereas the
punishment of Purgatory is called by one name only, namely fire.
Therefore they are not punished with the same fire and in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii, 16): "It is
probable that they are punished in the very places where they sinned."
And Gregory relates (Dial. iv, 40) that Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found
Paschasius being cleansed in the baths. Therefore they are not cleansed
in the same place as hell, but in this world.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Gregory says [*The quotation is from St. Augustine (De
Civ. Dei i, 8)]: "Even as in the same fire gold glistens and straw
smokes, so in the same fire the sinner burns and the elect is cleansed."
Therefore the fire of Purgatory is the same as the fire of hell: and
hence they are in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, the holy fathers; before the coming of Christ, were in a more
worthy place than that wherein souls are now cleansed after death, since
there was no pain of sense there. Yet that place was joined to hell, or
the same as hell: otherwise Christ when descending into Limbo would not
be said to have descended into hell. Therefore Purgatory is either close
to, or the same place as, hell.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Nothing is clearly stated in Scripture about the
situation of Purgatory, nor is it possible to offer convincing arguments
on this question. It is probable, however, and more in keeping with the
statements of holy men and the revelations made to many, that there is a
twofold place of Purgatory. one, according to the common law; and thus
the place of Purgatory is situated below and in proximity to hell, so
that it is the same fire which torments the damned in hell and cleanses
the just in Purgatory; although the damned being lower in merit, are to
be consigned to a lower place. Another place of Purgatory is according to
dispensation: and thus sometimes, as we read, some are punished in
various places, either that the living may learn, or that the dead may be
succored, seeing that their punishment being made known to the living may
be mitigated through the prayers of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Some say, however, that according to the common law the place of
Purgatory is where man sins. This does not seem probable, since a man may
be punished at the same time for sins committed in various places. And
others say that according to the common law they are punished above us,
because they are between us and God, as regards their state. But this is
of no account, for they are not punished for being above us, but for that
which is lowest in them, namely sin.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The fire of Purgatory is eternal in its substance, but
temporary in its cleansing effect.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The punishment of hell is for the purpose of affliction,
wherefore it is called by the names of things that are wont to afflict us
here. But the chief purpose of the punishment of Purgatory is to cleanse
us from the remains of sin; and consequently the pain of fire only is
ascribed to Purgatory, because fire cleanses and consumes.
Aquin.: SMT XP App. 2 Q[1] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the point of special dispensation
and not that of the common law.
