We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?
(2) Whether there should be one or two?
(3) Whether two suffice?
(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with
thy whole heart"?
(5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.?
(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?
(7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";
(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any precept should be given about charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about charity. For
charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it is the form of
the virtues as stated above (Q[23], A[8]), while the precepts are about
the virtues themselves. Now, according to the common saying, the mode is
not included in the precept. Therefore no precepts should be given about
charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Ghost" (Rm. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the Lord
is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that arises from
a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a necessity. Therefore
no precept should be given about charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to which
the precepts are directed, as shown above (FS, Q[90], A[2]; FS, Q[100],
A[9]). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, they should
have a place among the chief precepts which are those of the decalogue.
But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts should be given about
charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept.
Now God requires that man should love Him, according to Dt. 10:12.
Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity,
which is the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[16], A[1]; FS, Q[99], A[1]), a precept
implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter of
precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two
ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In every
affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, because it has the
character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to the
end is due for the sake of something else: thus for a physician, it is
due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the sake
of something else that he should give a medicine in order to heal. Now
the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and this
union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the
spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their end. Hence the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from a
pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the
virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed either to
the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the passions---such are the
virtues that regulate the passions---or at least to the possession of a
good conscience---such are the virtues that regulate operations---or to
the having of a right faith---such are those which pertain to the worship
of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love God.
For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of the
passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience gives man
a horror for God's justice, through fear of His punishments; and an
untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue representation of God,
and separates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is
for its own sake takes precedence of that which is for the sake of
another, wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in
Mt. 22:39.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FS, Q[100], A[10]) when we were treating
of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under those precepts
which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance, this precept,
"Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe that this should be
done out of charity. The act of love does, however, fall under special
precepts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty,
except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as may
be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the
precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will, wherefore it
is not opposed to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love
of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of charity had not
to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they are
included in all of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two precepts
of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to virtue, as stated
above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (Q[33],
A[5]). Therefore only one precept of charity should have been given.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27), charity
loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently directed to
love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God." Therefore
there was no need to add the precept about loving our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts. But it
is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we put not
aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Lk. 15:26): "If any man
come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot be My
disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is not distinct from
the precept of the love of our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 13:8): "He that loveth his
neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless all
its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in the
love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of our
neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have
from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[91], A[3]; FS, Q[94], A[2]) when
we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the Law what
propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these latter, the
conclusions are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence
whoever knows the principles as to their entire virtual extent has no
need to have the conclusions put separately before him. Since, however,
some who know the principles are unable to consider all that is virtually
contained therein, it is necessary, for their sake, that scientific
conclusions should be traced to their principles. Now in practical
matters wherein the precepts of the Law direct us, the end has the
character of principle, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; Q[26], A[1],
ad 1): and the love of God is the end to which the love of our neighbor
is directed. Therefore it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the
love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who
are less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these
precepts is included in the other.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one of
which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are given
about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in that
which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an explicit
precept about both, for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The means derive their goodness from their relation to the
end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice from the
same source and from no other
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end is
included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each precept
to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether two precepts of charity suffice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice. For
precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished by
their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of
charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown
above (Q[25], A[12]; Q[26]), it seems that there ought to be four
precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy, peace
and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of the
virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in
avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good, and by
the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been
not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity; and so two
precepts of charity are not sufficient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 22:40): "On these two commandments
dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Charity, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]), is a kind of
friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another, wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible between less
than two": and it has been explained how one may love oneself out of
charity (Q[25], A[4]). Now since good is the object of dilection and
love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is fitting that
there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we are induced to
love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor
for God's sake, as for the sake of our end
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though four
things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a precept as
regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and of one's own
body. "For however much a man may stray from the truth, the love of
himself and of his own body always remains in him." And yet the mode of
this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that he should love
himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his
loving God and his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[28], A[4]; Q[29], A[3]), the other acts
of charity result from the act of love as effects from their cause. Hence
the precepts of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts.
And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, special precepts were
given about each act---about joy (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord
always"---about peace (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men"---about
beneficence (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have time, let us work good to all
men"---and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of the parts of
beneficence, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter carefully.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore the
positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts. Nevertheless
we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for,
against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): "Thou shalt not hate thy
brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): "Be not grieved with
her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made desirous of
vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another"; against discord
(1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no
schisms among you"; and against scandal (Rm. 14:13): "That you put not a
stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother's way."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole
heart?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man should
love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act is not a
matter of precept, as shown above (A[1], ad 1; FS, Q[100], A[9]). Now the
words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the love of God.
Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his
whole heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing"
(Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be loved
with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to the love
of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins mortally. Now
a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. Therefore a venial sin
is a mortal sin, which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to
perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64), "to
be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection is not a
matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought not to be
commanded to love God with our whole heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is
a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is
requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own
matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances,
whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the last
end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind of
totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the love
of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does not
prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and higher
virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own proper
virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole heart."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold
signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always
actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in
the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so that
it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the
perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter
perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it
does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels are
directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding
reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal
things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and hinder
the actual movement of the heart towards God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart," it was fitting to add "and with thy whole soul, and with thy
whole strength"?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with thy whole
soul, and with thy whole strength" (Dt. 6:5). For heart does not mean
here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily action: and
therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense. Now the heart
understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part of the soul.
Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and soul.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal depends
on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with all thy
strength."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in Mt. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which words
do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly
worded in Dt. 6.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places:
for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. 6 three points are
mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with
thy whole strength." In Mt. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz. "with
thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole
strength" is omitted, but "with thy whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark 12
we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul,"
and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is the same
as "strength." Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10, where in
place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might." [*St. Thomas
is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota fortitudine tua" (Dt.),
"ex tota virtue tua" (Mk.), and "ex omnibus tuis" (Lk.), although the
Greek in all three cases has {ex holes tes ischyos}, which the Douay
renders "with thy whole strength."]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of
them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must
therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted
by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of all
the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards the
intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the
principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three
principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect
which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified
by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by "strength,"
"force" or "might." Accordingly we are commanded to direct our whole
intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with thy whole
heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed in the
words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according to God,
in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our external
actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength," "force" or
"might."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished work
(Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in Chrysostom's
works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the contrary
sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers "heart" to the
thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the intellect. Again
some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the intellect, "with thy
whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy mind" as pointing to the
memory. And again, according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii),
"heart" signifies the vegetative soul, "soul" the sensitive, and "mind"
the intellective soul, because our nourishment, sensation, and
understanding ought all to be referred by us to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of
God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil this
precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius, Exposit.
Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded anything
impossible." But God gave this commandment, as is clear from Dt. 6:5.
Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally, since
according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a
transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments." If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by
wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal sin,
and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): "(Who also)
will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim. 3:10): "Let
them minister, having no crime."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way of
salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord is
lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct anyone to
what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this
precept in this life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the
fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence
remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with
all his heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and
imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by
the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly
however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached,
nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the
commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be
perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the
commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those
who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing contrary
to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that man should
be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God
will be "all in all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will
be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though
imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil it
more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he approaches by
some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled
after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without
conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too he
that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing against
the love of God, does not sin mortally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), "why should
not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man attains it in
this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows whither to run.
And how would one know this if no precept pointed it out."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor is
unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men, even
to our enemies, as may be seen in Mt. 5:44. But the word "neighbor"
denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist towards all
men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly expressed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the origin
of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to ourselves,"
whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin of one's love
for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than that which results
from it. Therefore man ought not to love his neighbor as himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally.
Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his
neighbor as himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 22:39): "The second" commandment "is
like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates
both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving is
indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason why we ought to love
others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to the
natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it
matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" according to 1 Jn. 4:21,
or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18, because all these words express the
same affinity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does not
mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like
manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end,
namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as he loves
himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a "holy"
love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man should
not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good things, even as he
ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his
neighbor may be a "righteous" love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for
loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not for his own
profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his neighbor well, even
as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a
"true" love: since when a man loves his neighbor for his own profit or
pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but loves himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included in the
precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But if man
loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more, he
wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept. Therefore
the order of charity is not included in the precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently
delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was given
above (Q[26]) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is not
included in the precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love of
our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words, "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of charity is
not included in the precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us
first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My Law in
their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their
heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according to Cant
2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of charity
comes under the precept of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1), the mode which is essential
to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that
virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since
it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as shown
above (Q[25], A[12]; Q[26], AA[1],2). It is therefore evident that the
order of charity must come under the precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that if
he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to gratify
more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an injustice
to the one he ought to love more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The order of those four things we have to love out of
charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love God
with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must love Him
above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor "as
ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor. In like
manner where we are commanded (1 Jn. 3:16) "to lay down our souls," i.e.
the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given to understand
that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; and again
when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good . . . especially to those
who are of the household of the faith," and when a man is blamed (1 Tim.
5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and especially of those of his
house," it means that we ought to love most those of our neighbors who
are more virtuous or more closely united to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[44] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity;
and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the first
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?
(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?
(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among the
gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the virtues,
as stated above (FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now virtue is directed to the good
alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "no man makes
bad use of the virtues." Much more therefore are the gifts of the Holy
Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is directed to evil also,
for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain wisdom is "earthly,
sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the
gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom is the
knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine things which
man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom which is
an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural knowledge of Divine things
belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as explained above (Q[4],
A[5]; FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore wisdom should be called a virtue rather
than a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of the Lord,
that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is understanding." And in
this passage according to the rendering of the Septuagint which Augustine
follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read: "Behold piety, that is
wisdom." Now both fear and piety are gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore
wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as
though it were distinct from the others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall
rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs
to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are
able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according
thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be
understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus.
Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus, and
by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that belong
to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in medicine
or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: "As a wise architect, I have
laid a foundation." On the other hand, he who knows the cause that is
simply the highest, which is God, is said to be wise simply, because he
is able to judge and set in order all things according to Divine rules.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1
Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in
the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the
deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift of the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the
sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind of
likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or a
perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21). And
just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a
highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by
knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things
something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a
last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing,
according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they
have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs
fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if
he fixes his end in external earthly things, his "wisdom" is called
"earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is called "sensual wisdom," if
in some excellence, it is called "devilish wisdom" because it imitates
the devil's pride, of which it is written (Job 41:25): "He is king over
all the children of pride."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost,
differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the
latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is "descending
from above" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since
faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to the
gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the gift of
wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well what he knows"
(Ethic. i, 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a
manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by
worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is
stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, because if a
man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right judgment about
Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject.
For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of God." Now
charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as
stated above (Q[24], A[1]). Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as
its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of doctrine is
according to her name," for wisdom [sapientia] may be described as
"sweet-tasting science [sapida scientia]," and this would seem to regard
the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure or
sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather than in the
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by the
gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two things where
one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is contrary
to folly." But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), wisdom denotes a certain
rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of
judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason,
secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about
which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after
inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the
science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges of such
matters by a kind of connaturality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to
pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its
inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge
aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he
not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of
charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is
joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a gift,
has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence
in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above (FS,
Q[14], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence
also wisdom [sapientia] takes its name, in so far as it denotes a certain
sweetness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is evident,
that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted. For, apparently
this is not the case, because such an exposition of the text would only
fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and
perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would seem that in the text
quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised
by all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and
judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of
wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of
knowledge, according to human ideas.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely
speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue,
is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift,
speculative and not practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of operation
which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which are eternal
and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we
seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under a mighty
bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine things, in
which there is no toiling under a load, since according to Wis. 8:16,
"her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness."
Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not practical or active.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom towards
them that are without." Now this pertains to action. Therefore wisdom is
not merely speculative, but also practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of
the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the domain
of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same authority (De
Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of the
heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. FP, Q[79], A[9]; FS, Q[74], A[7]];
it considers them, in so far as it contemplates Divine things in
themselves, and it consults them, in so far as it judges of human acts by
Divine things, and directs human acts according to Divine rules.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also
practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of things to
which it extends, as stated in De Causis, prop. x, xvii. Wherefore from
the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent than wisdom as an
intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more intimately by a kind of
union of the soul with Him, it is able to direct us not only in
contemplation but also in action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in
themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are the
subject-matter of human actions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A thing is considered in itself before being compared with
something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all contemplation
which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the direction of
human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the direction of
wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in human acts; on the
contrary the result of wisdom is to make the bitter sweet, and labor a
rest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with mortal
sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are incompatible with
mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: "Our glory is this, the testimony
of our conscience." Now one ought not to glory in one's wisdom, according
to Jer. 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom." Therefore
wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as stated
above (A[1]). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of the Divine
truth, according to Rm. 1:18: "(Those men that) detain the truth of God
in injustice." Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of
charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal
perdition." But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it does not
divide the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition.
Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter into a
malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above (A[1]), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or of other
things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain connaturalness
or union with Divine things, which is the effect of charity, as stated
above (A[2]; Q[23], A[5]). Hence the wisdom of which we are speaking
presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible with mortal sin, as
shown above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore it follows that the wisdom of which
we are speaking cannot be together with mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These words are to be understood as referring to worldly
wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human reasons. In
such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov. 30:2: "The wisdom
of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine wisdom according to 1
Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us wisdom."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which we speak
but that which is acquired by the study and research of reason, and is
compatible with mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it presupposes
it, and for that very reason divides the children of perdition from the
children of the kingdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace. For it is
more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for the perfect
to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom among the
perfect." Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it seems that
much less all who have grace have wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the Philosopher
states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17) that the wise man
"judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is from above . .
is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']". Now it is not for
all that have grace, to judge, or put others in order, but only for those
in authority. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory says
(Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish, for
instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty of
mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have
grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God; since
he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that love Him
(Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that "God loveth none but him
that dwelleth with wisdom." Therefore wisdom is in all those who have
charity and are without mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above
(A[4]), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the contemplation and
consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these men obtain various
degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the measure of
right judgment attained by some, whether in the contemplation of Divine
things or in directing human affairs according to Divine rules, is no
more than suffices for their salvation. This measure is wanting to none
who is without mortal sin through having sanctifying grace, since if
nature does not fail in necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore
it is written (1 Jn. 2:27): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as to
the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted
mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to
the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being able
to direct not only themselves but also others according to those rules).
This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have sanctifying grace,
but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which the Holy Ghost
dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: "To one indeed by the
Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending to the
hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2 Cor.
1:7): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in authority to
direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to direct and
judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad Demophil.).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the habit of
wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not the act, on
account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of reason in them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond to the
gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Now both
these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps.
118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the Apostle
says (Rm. 5:5), "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and Who is "the Spirit of adoption of
sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (Rm. 8:15). Therefore the seventh
beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than to wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect rather than
by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom seems to be
charity, according to Wis. 7:27: "Through nations she conveyeth herself
into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets": whereas
peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote effects, since they
result from charity, as stated above (Q[29], A[3]). Therefore the
beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined in respect of the
love of charity rather than in respect of peace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): "The wisdom, that is from
above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to be
persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, judging
without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'without judging, without
dissimulation']." Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should
not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of heavenly wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that
"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of
rebellion, but only obedience to reason."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the gift
of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit is
denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Now a peacemaker is
one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others: and in both cases
this is the result of setting in due order those things in which peace is
established, for "peace is the tranquillity of order," according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it belongs to wisdom to set things
in order, as the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2), wherefore
peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to wisdom. The reward is expressed in
the words, "they shall be called the children of God." Now men are called
the children of God in so far as they participate in the likeness of the
only-begotten and natural Son of God, according to Rm. 8:29, "Whom He
foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son," Who is
Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of wisdom, man
attains to the sonship of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to
wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise the Holy Ghost
is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we receive from Him the
likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which in the
first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and consequently
reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is infused wisdom.
Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the cause but the
effect of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[45] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (A[3]) it belongs to wisdom, as a gift, not
only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human acts. Now
the first thing, to be effected in this direction of human acts is the
removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is said to be "the
beginning of wisdom," because it makes us shun evil, while the last thing
is like an end, whereby all things are reduced to their right order; and
it is this that constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that "the
wisdom that is from above" (and this is the gift of the Holy Ghost)
"first indeed is chaste," because it avoids the corruption of sin, and
"then peaceable," wherein lies the ultimate effect of wisdom, for which
reason peace is numbered among the beatitudes. As to the things that
follow, they declare in becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads to
peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin, the
first thing he has to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in all
things, and in this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in
those matters in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be
guided by the advice of others, and as to this we are told further that
wisdom is "easy to be persuaded." These two are conditions required that
man may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at peace
with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not be
opposed to their good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the good."
Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies, sympathy
in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted by the words
"full of mercy and good fruits." Thirdly, he should strive in all charity
to correct the sins of others, and this is indicated by the words
"judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is from above .
. is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']," lest he should
purpose to sate his hatred under cover of correction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] Out. Para. 1/1
OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
(2) Whether folly is a sin?
(3) To which capital sin is it reducible?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For seemingly
unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not seem to be the
same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about Divine things alone,
whereas folly is about both Divine and human things. Therefore folly is
not contrary to wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other. But
folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Cor. 3:18):
"If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a
fool, that he may be wise." Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But wisdom
is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer. 10:14): "Every man is
become a fool for knowledge," and wisdom is a kind of knowledge.
Moreover, it is written (Is. 47:10): "Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, this
hath deceived thee." Now it belongs to folly to be deceived. Therefore
folly is not contrary to wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that "a fool
is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when
he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to
Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of wisdom
is given as a remedy against folly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name from "stupor";
wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter of S): "A fool is one
who through dullness [stuporem] remains unmoved." And folly differs from
fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that folly implies
apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while fatuity denotes
entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore folly is fittingly
opposed to wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
For "sapiens" [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) "is so named from sapor
[savor], because just as the taste is quick to distinguish between savors
of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and causes." Wherefore it
is manifest that "folly" is opposed to "wisdom" as its contrary, while
"fatuity" is opposed to it as a pure negation: since the fatuous man
lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has the sense, though dulled,
whereas the wise man has the sense acute and penetrating.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Isidore (Etym. x), "unwisdom is contrary to
wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense"; so that
unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear to be a
fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that judgment,
which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails in judgment
about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason called a fool.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (Q[45],
A[1], ad 1), called "worldly wisdom," because it takes for the highest
cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good folly
opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly things: and it
is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes us
foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (1 Cor.
3:19).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due to
the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for heavenly
things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine wisdom, as
Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is the result of a
man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be seen in idiots, who
do not discern what is injurious to them, and this belongs to folly
simply.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether folly is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises in us
from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Every sin is voluntary," according to Augustine (De
Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary. Therefore it is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly is
not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 1:32): "The prosperity of fools
shall destroy them." But no man is destroyed save for sin. Therefore
folly is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Folly, as stated above (A[1]), denotes dullness of sense
in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is the last
end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect contract
dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural indisposition, as
in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no sin. Secondly, by
plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his sense is rendered
incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to 1 Cor. 2:14, "The
sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God,"
even as sweet things have no savor for a man whose taste is infected with
an evil humor: and such like folly is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those
things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense from
spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same thing
happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires pleasure,
without which there is no sin, although he does not desire sin simply,
for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Folly is opposed to the precepts about the contemplation of
truth, of which we have spoken above (Q[16]) when we were treating of
knowledge and understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether folly is a daughter of lust?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among which however
he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): "The wisdom of this
world is foolishness with God." Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 29)
"the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with crafty
devices;" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a daughter of
duplicity rather than of lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in
some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from
anger rather than from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 7:22): "Immediately he followeth
her," i.e. the harlot . . . "not knowing that he is drawn like a fool to
bonds."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As already stated (A[2]), folly, in so far as it is a
sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be incapable
of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged into earthly
things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of pleasures; and
these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which is
a sin, arises chiefly from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste for
God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust,
pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the life to
come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not
causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is folly
with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly
wisdom, is a cause of this folly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above (FS, Q[48]
, AA[2],3,4), produces a great change in the nature of the body,
wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which results from a bodily
impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused by a spiritual
impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into earthly things, arises
chiefly from lust, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] Out. Para. 1/2
TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ[47]-170)
ON PRUDENCE (QQ[47]-56)
OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)
After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence
consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider
prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding gift;
fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?
(2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in
the speculative reason?
(3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?
(4) Whether it is virtue?
(5) Whether it is a special virtue?
(6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?
(7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?
(8) Whether its proper act is command?
(9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?
(10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?
(11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same in
species as that which regards the common good?
(12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?
(13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?
(14) Whether prudence is in all good men?
(15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?
(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness ?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the
appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): "Prudence is
love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder."
Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty.
Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to
prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the appetitive
faculty, as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore prudence is not in
the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it is
better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case of
prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues, of
which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is
in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than in the
rational faculty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is the
knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who sees
as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of
uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the
cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs
directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by
the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself to
the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the
present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the
reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows
therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FP, Q[82], A[4]) the will moves all the
faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty is
love, as stated above (FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Accordingly prudence is said
to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the
act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that "prudence is
love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in
tending to God." Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason
to discern.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as
they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the
present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence
considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. Now
of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the
reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs more
properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9)
that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice presupposes
counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been already counselled"
(Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence
indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of
counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but
in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason.
Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence,
since, the end being of most import in everything, it follows that a
defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence the Philosopher
goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is "something more than a
merely rational habit," such as art is, since, as stated above (FS, Q[57]
, A[4]) it includes application to action, which application is an act of
the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the
speculative reason?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical,
but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Prov. 10:23):
"Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists chiefly in
contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is concerned
with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of fuller
knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason. Therefore
prudence resides also in the speculative reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same
part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical but
also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence
also is both practical and speculative.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is
right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the
practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent
man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now counsel is about
things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that
deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence it
is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[45], AA[1],3), wisdom considers the
absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest cause
in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in the genus
of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all human life, and
it is this end that prudence intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for the realization of a
particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely,
but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well with
regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely.
Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but
not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest
cause, for it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all.
And so it is stated significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but
not wisdom absolutely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the word
prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether speculative or
practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the
speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter of choice
and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes under the
direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its specification in
relation to its object which is the "necessary true," it comes under
neither counsel nor prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every application of right reason in the work of production
belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right
reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed
way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since then, the
speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the
like, wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules, consequently
in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art,
but not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a speculative art,
but not a speculative prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA[1],2). But
"reason deals with universals," according to Phys. i, 5. Therefore
prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot
comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence which is
right reason, is not about singulars.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is not
in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are devoid of
prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence
does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of
singulars also."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), to prudence belongs not
only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action,
which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently
apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied,
and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular
matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the
universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are
concerned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and
yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence the
conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular,
because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as
stated in De Anima iii.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be
comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain" (Wis.
9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a
certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of
these suffices for human prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not
reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, but in
the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to
judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean however that
prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is
chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this
sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says
(De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to desire and
what to avoid." Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the
Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue
of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art is not a
virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii,
14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of graving, and to
devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need of in the
work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate,
else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds to thy
prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence,
temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[55], A[3]; FS, Q[56], A[1]) when
we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its
possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may be understood
in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good,
secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of
good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify
the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the
appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man
to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but
without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those
virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the
nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but
also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the
aspect of good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]) to apply
right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite.
Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other
intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it,
among which virtues it is enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any
kind of right reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because
art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in order that a
man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will
rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to do with the matter
of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed
means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may
be said to act prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on
account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is
need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation,
as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence
itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other
things according to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For no
special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, since
virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows a mean
appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man
decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as
stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the effect of
moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of prudence,
right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue certain things
have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence is in every
virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence has
not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to action" (Ethic.
vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a
special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered among the other
virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and
prudence, justice and fortitude."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their
objects, as shown above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[2]; FS, Q[54], A[2]
), any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other
objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it
must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, not merely
according to the consideration of its matter, but rather according to its
formal aspect, as explained above (FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Because one
and the same thing is the subject matter of the acts of different habits,
and also of different powers, according to its different formal aspects.
Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite for a difference of
powers than for a difference of habits, since several habits are found in
the same power, as stated above (FS, Q[54], A[1]). Consequently any
difference in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of
powers, will "a fortiori" require a difference of habits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated
above (A[2]), it is differentiated from the other intellectual virtues by
a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and
"understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and "prudence"
are about contingent things, art being concerned with "things made," that
is, with things produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife and
so forth; and prudence, being concerned with "things done," that is, with
things that have their being in the doer himself, as stated above (FS,
Q[57], A[4]). On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral
virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the
intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power,
wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special
virtue, distinct from all other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of moral
virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an intellectual
virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in common with moral
virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue is something that
partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of virtue, in so far
as it partakes of intellectual virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the virtues,
and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove that it is
not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus from
containing a species which is operative in every other species of that
same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so far as
they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: but they are
the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the
appetitive power, that is, considered as good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral virtues.
Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the appetite,
it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to
the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive power.
Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but he
has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts of man
are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational
creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, according to
Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are directed to reason
as to their end. But prudence is "right reason applied to action," as
stated above (A[2]). Therefore all actions are directed to prudence as
their end. Therefore prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is
concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are
concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral
virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral virtue
ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while prudence ensures
the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not belong to prudence to
appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of
the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity
pre-exist in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things
naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of
which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is
"science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as
naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues,
since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative
matters, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; FS, Q[13], A[3]); while
certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and
such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these
is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular
conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to
prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the
means.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis" appoints
the end to moral virtues, as stated above (FP, Q[79], A[12]): but
prudence does not do this for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they
appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed by
natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the
way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that prudence is
more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet "synderesis"
moves prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find the
mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end of
moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as
shown above (A[6]). Therefore it does not find the mean in them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have no
cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to have
being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs to moral
virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above
(A[5], OBJ[1]). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean in moral
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral
virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as Tully
states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second nature
in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to
moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (A[5],
OBJ[1]) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . .
even as a wise man decides."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely
in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should
not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that
he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear or
daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural
reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act
according to reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by
what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For though
the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is
found by the right disposition of these things that are directed to the
end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet
does not make that which is essential to the form to belong to it, so
too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations, and yet does
not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain
the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in all matters
after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which
ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this purpose, and so
the ruling of prudence is required.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether command is the chief act of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of prudence. For
command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9)
states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes." Therefore
command is not the chief act of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the prudent
man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to command" seem to
be different acts, as appears from what has been said above (FS, Q[57],
A[6]). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to rule,
since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other powers of
the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore
command is not an act of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence
commands."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated
above (A[2]). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to
action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such
acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to discovery, for
counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (FS, Q[14], A[1]). The
second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act
of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to
action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," which act
consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And
since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it
follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and
consequently of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in
judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily against
his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so
involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, and
the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse
in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin
voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence,
viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good and
to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the avoidance
of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of prudence
that does not continue in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things
discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to
prudence which takes good counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes
motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the
reason, as stated above (FS, Q[17], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. For
solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a
solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion belongs chiefly to the
appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not in
the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above (A[1]).
Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude,
wherefore it is related (1 Kgs. 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: "As for
the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous, because they
are found." Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is
an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition to prudence
rather than belonging to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous man
is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary to solicitude. Since
then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not opposed to
good," as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it would seem that solicitude
does not belong to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and watch
in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore
solicitude belongs to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be
solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far as
a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever
has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a
command about what has been already counselled and judged in matters of
action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be
quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel."
Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this
reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that "prudence keeps most
careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil
counsel."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the
principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and
command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "equal
certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter
according to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is the
contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of
prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and leisurely" not
because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not
over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where he
ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for over-much
fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since fear makes us
take counsel, as stated above (FS, Q[44], A[2]) when we were treating of
the passion of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the governing of
many, but only to the government of oneself. For the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But
prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is not directed to the
common good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for
himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own.
Therefore they are not prudent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance and
fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only to a
man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a
faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath appointed
over his family?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have
held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the
good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not
bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to
charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5): wherefore the Apostle
says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking that which is profitable to
myself, but to many, that they may be saved." Moreover it is contrary to
right reason, which judges the common good to be better than the good of
the individual.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and
command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that
prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also
the common good of the multitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now just
as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is called
"legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the common good is
called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in the same relation
to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence
his own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good is
impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom.
Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv, 6] of the ancient
Romans that "they would rather be poor in a rich empire than rich in a
poor empire." Secondly, because, since man is a part of the home and
state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent about
the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their
relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any
part which does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common
good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic.
v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the
rational faculty which directly regards the universal, just as the
sensitive part regards singulars.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence about one's own good is specifically the same as that
which extends to the common good?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same
specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and prudence
are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is the
same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence is
chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since then
prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and political
prudence are the same habit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by
things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good,
which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the common
good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence and
political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "Political prudence," which is directed to the common
good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate
to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy"
which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are all
distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different kinds of
prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[5]; Q[54], A[2], ad 1), the species of
habits differ according to the difference of object considered in its
formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things directed to the end,
is taken from the end itself, as shown above (FS, Prolog.; FS, Q[102],
A[1]), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation to
different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the family, and
the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Wherefore there must
needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these different
ends, so that one is "prudence" simply so called, which is directed to
one's own good; another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the
common good of the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is
directed to the common good of the state or kingdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is
substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is the
same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This is called
"prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence, i.e. as being
right reason applied to action, while it is called "political," as being
directed to the common good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it belongs to
a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well," wherefore the
virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue
of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, even as the virtue
of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the
other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits
directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically
although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner,
though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the many,
that does not prevent this difference from making the habits differ
specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed to the last
end is above the other habits and commands them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in their
rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "prudence alone is
the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects
and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue but a true
opinion."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that "a slave is not
competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good counsel
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (A[8]). But
command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only of
rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two
kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs to
rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is about
"individual actions." Now it belongs also to subjects to perform these
individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but also in
subjects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing
belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to
reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and
governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave
as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled
and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave,
nor of a subject as subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] Body Para. 2/2
Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in
ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately
competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in
the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the
subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood strictly,
namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as he
is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he does
take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but also
himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence can be in sinners?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For our Lord
said (Lk. 16:8): "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay:
'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light." Now the
children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in
sinners.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But
there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, "we say that to be of good
counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners can take
good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is
impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no inner is a
good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which
takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent
man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a
good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil
end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is
good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good robber,"
and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of similarity,
because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the
prudence of which the Apostle says (Rm. 8:6): "The prudence [Douay:
'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places its ultimate
end in the pleasures of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Body Para. 2/3
The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting
ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold
source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the
common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a
man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he
is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because
he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes counsel
aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a
whole, but fails to make an effective command.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] Body Para. 3/3
The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel,
judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole
life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in
sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect
prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is
imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since that which is
imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the first
prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent absolutely, but
that they are prudent in "their generation."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the
appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the other
hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First because its
principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends one forms
a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the
appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there is no prudence, as
shown above (FS, Q[58], A[5]); secondly because prudence commands right
actions, which does not happen unless the appetite be right. Wherefore
though faith on account of its object is more excellent than prudence,
yet prudence, by its very nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises
from a disorder of the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some
particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for the end
of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect.
Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and yet in
them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) there is "cleverness,"
[*{deinotike}] i.e. natural diligence which may be directed to both good
and evil; or "cunning," [*{panourgia}] which is directed only to evil,
and which we have stated above, to be "false prudence" or "prudence of
the flesh."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence is in all who have grace?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace.
Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be
done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all
who have grace have prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as stated
above (A[8], OBJ[2]; A[13], OBJ[3]). Yet many have grace who do not take
good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore
not all who have grace, have prudence
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young people
are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. Therefore
prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can
be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that "the
other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what
they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have grace have prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected together, so that
whoever has one has all, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]). Now whoever
has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues,
and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (A[4]), he must, of
necessity, have prudence also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient with regard
to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is given to all who
have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things" (1 Jn. 2:27). There
is also another diligence which is more than sufficient, whereby a man is
able to make provision both for himself and for others, not only in
matters necessary for salvation, but also in all things relating to human
life; and such diligence as this is not in all who have grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others,
are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in this
point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern
good from evil counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[14] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts,
wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic. ii, 1),
hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the
other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion. Wherefore,
in children who have been baptized but have not come to the use of
reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even as in
idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it is also
as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by
practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the other
virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is for the
perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the
discerning of good and evil."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence is in us by nature?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher
says that things connected with prudence "seem to be natural," namely
"synesis, gnome" [*{synesis} and {gnome}, Cf. FS, Q[57], A[6]] and the
like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now
things belonging to the same genus have the same kind of origin.
Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence
results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is wisdom, and
in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is natural.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with
that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain natural
prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim.
viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual
virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands
experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated
above (A[4]). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching
and experience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As shown above (A[3]), prudence includes knowledge both
of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence
applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge
of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative
science, because the primary universal principles of either are known
naturally, as shown above (A[6]): except that the common principles of
prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks
(Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the speculative reason is
better than that which is according to man": whereas the secondary
universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical
reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery
through experience, or through teaching.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the
matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter
of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of
human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in
respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above (FS, Q[51], A[1];
FS, Q[63], A[1]) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain
virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they
also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] Body Para. 3/3
But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are
of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs.
Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the
knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason
of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another
in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of
speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but
about the means, as stated above (A[6]; FS, Q[57], A[5]), it follows that
prudence is not from nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to
prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had said
before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that "they are the principles of the {ou
heneka}" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)], namely,
the end; and so he does not mention {euboulia} among them, because it
takes counsel about the means.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their
natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but
also because of their long experience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[15] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an
end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in
like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason,
which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an
infinity of singulars.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.
For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain than
prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But science is lost
by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same things,
but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now the
engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of many
memories," as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, 1).
Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that
prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals.
But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore
prudence can also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "forgetfulness
is possible to art but not to prudence."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can
forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they
belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but
also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above (A[8]), its
principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he
has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not
taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasure and
sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written (Dan.
13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart,"
and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the
prudent [Douay: 'wise']."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the
latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails,
as stated above [*Cf. FS, Q[53], A[1]].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The experience required by prudence results not from memory
alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[47] A[16] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of
universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A[3]).
Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the
principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Which are the parts of prudence?
(2) Of its integral parts;
(3) Of its subjective parts;
(4) Of its potential parts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned
unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of
prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight." Macrobius
(In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence
six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding," "circumspection,"
"foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle says (Ethic. vi,
9,10,11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and "gnome" belong to prudence.
Again under the head of prudence he mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness,"
"sense" and "understanding." And another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus;
Cf. Q[80], OBJ[4]] says that ten things are connected with prudence,
namely, "good counsel," "shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative
[*Regnativa]," "military," "political" and "domestic prudence,"
"dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics." Therefore it seems that one or
the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But
politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore
they are not parts of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the intellective
memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, belong not only to
prudence but also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore they should not
be set down as parts of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts of
the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (FS, Q[16], A[1]
). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to counsel, is connected
with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which refer to judgment, so also
ought something to have been assigned corresponding to use.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Q[47],
A[9]). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among the
parts of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, "integral," as wall,
roof, and foundations are parts of a house; "subjective," as ox and lion
are parts of animal; and "potential," as the nutritive and sensitive
powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be assigned to a
virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the
things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue, are called
the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all the things mentioned
above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence, namely, the six assigned
by Macrobius; with the addition of a seventh, viz. "memory" mentioned by
Tully; and {eustochia} or "shrewdness" mentioned by Aristotle. For the
"sense" of prudence is also called "understanding": wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have the
sense, and this is understanding." Of these eight, five belong to
prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely, "memory," "reasoning,"
"understanding," "docility" and "shrewdness": while the three others
belong thereto, as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely,
"foresight," "circumspection" and "caution." The reason of their
difference is seen from the fact that three things may be observed in
reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if
it be of the past, is called "memory," if of the present, whether
contingent or necessary, is called "understanding" or "intelligence."
Secondly, the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching,
to which pertains "docility," or by "discovery," and to this belongs to
{eustochia}, i.e. "a happy conjecture," of which "shrewdness" is a part,
which is a "quick conjecture of the middle term," as stated in Poster. i,
9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things
known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to
"reasoning." And the reason, in order to command aright, requires to have
three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end, and
this belongs to "foresight"; secondly, to attend to the circumstances of
the matter in hand, and this belongs to "circumspection"; thirdly, to
avoid obstacles, and this belongs to "caution."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way
the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence whereby
a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude,
which differ specifically as stated above (Q[47], A[11]). Again, the
prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into various species
according to the various kinds of multitude. There is the multitude which
is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered
together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called
"military." There is also the multitude that is united together for the
whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and this is
ruled by "domestic prudence": and such again is the multitude of a city
or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is "regnative prudence" in the
ruler, and "political prudence," simply so called, in the subjects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also
speculative knowledge, as stated above (Q[47], A[2], ad 2) then its parts
include "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics," according to three
methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining
of science by demonstration, which belongs to "physics" (if physics be
understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The second method is
to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and this belongs to
"dialectics." The third method is to employ conjectures in order to
induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to
"rhetoric." It may be said, however, that these three belong also to
prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes from necessary
premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which
are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it
were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts of
prudence are "good counsel," which concerns counsel, "synesis," which
concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and "gnome," which
concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law: while "prudence" is
about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The various enumerations differ, either because different
kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is mentioned in one
enumeration includes several mentioned in another enumeration. Thus Tully
includes "caution" and "circumspection" under "foresight," and
"reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under "understanding."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as
sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply may
be gathered from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by
taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with things
pertaining to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Right command and right use always go together, because the
reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the lower
powers, which pertain to use.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] Out. Para. 1/1
OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Memory;
(2) Understanding or Intelligence;
(3) Docility;
(4) Shrewdness;
(5) Reason;
(6) Foresight;
(7) Circumspection;
(8) Caution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether memory is a part of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory,
as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive
part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience,
whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future
matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethic.
vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the
parts of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated
above (Q[47], A[5]). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not
by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which
occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate
to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded from like" (Ethic. vi
[*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need experience to discover what is true in
the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that
"intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time."
Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1,
and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory
is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[47], AA[3],6), prudence applies
universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence many
things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for prudence,
and memory is one of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its
perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says in his
Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24], memory not only arises
from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a
man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat
unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so
makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this
explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now
the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is
that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless
they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge
has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is
assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man
wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in
order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the
Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings
memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one
to the other." Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things
we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind,
the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his
Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the
figures of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the
things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i)
that "reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria
ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing
frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to
another by a kind of natural order.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from
the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good
counsel for the future.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether understanding* is a part of prudence? [*Otherwise intuition;
Aristotle's word is {nous}]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When
two things are members of a division, one is not part of the other. But
intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and prudence, according
to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not be reckoned a part of
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q[8], AA[1],8). But
prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been
said above (Q[4], A[8]; FS, Q[62], A[2]). Therefore understanding does
not pertain to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic. vi,
7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and immaterial
objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts
"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8]
mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power,
but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as
self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of
demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain
statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of
reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since
prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence
must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that
understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion,
in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated above (Q[47],
AA[3],6), it applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a
singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular
proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a
twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, and this
belongs to the understanding which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we
know naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical
universal principles, such as "One should do evil to no man," as shown
above (Q[47], A[6]). The other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11,
is cognizant of an extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent
practical matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in
the syllogism of prudence, as stated above (Q[47], AA[3],6). Now this
primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place.
Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right
estimate of some particular end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is a
quick insight into divine things, as shown above (Q[8], AA[1],2). It is
in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The right estimate about a particular end is called both
"understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and "sense," in
so far as its object is a particular. This is what the Philosopher means
when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we need to have the sense,
and this is understanding." But this is to be understood as referring,
not to the particular sense whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the
interior sense, whereby we judge of a particular.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part of
prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every intellectual
virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But docility is
requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not be
accounted a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our power,
since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised or
blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is befitting
to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is not a part of
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since it
makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also called
"preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the opinion
of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1; Q[47], A[3]) prudence is
concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are
of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently; nor
can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in
matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by
others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of
the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
11): "It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated
assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we
are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience
gives them an insight into principles." Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5):
"Lean not on thy own prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the
multitude of the ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join
thyself from thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to
be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a
part of prudence
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although docility is useful for every intellectual virtue,
yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other
things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much
towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully,
frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned,
neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through
pride.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but
also for himself, as stated above (Q[47], A[12], ad 3). Hence as stated
(Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which
docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be docile in some
respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of
prudence, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. For
shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for demonstrations,
as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a
demonstration since it deals with contingencies. Therefore shrewdness
does not pertain to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to Ethic.
vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness [*Ethic.
vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of {eustochia}, i.e. "a happy
conjecture": for the latter is "unreasoning and rapid," whereas counsel
needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should
not be accounted a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above (Q[48]) is a "happy
conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures.
Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who is
shrewd and alert [solers citus]." But solicitude belongs to prudence, as
stated above (Q[47], A[9]). Therefore shrewdness does also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of
action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both in
practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it oneself,
secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a
man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so
shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself,
yet so that shrewdness be taken for {eustochia}, of which it is a part.
For {eustochia} is a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness
is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term" (Poster. i,
34). Nevertheless the philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q[48], OBJ[1]] who
calls shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for {eustochia}, in
general, hence he says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are
discovered rapidly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the middle
term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical syllogisms, as, for
instance, when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to be
enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 34). In this
way shrewdness belongs to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to
prove that {euboulia}, i.e. good counsel, is not {eustochia}, which is
commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man may take
good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet this does
not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good counsel:
indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance, something has to
be done without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is
fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore
nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence.
Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it
is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all matters
whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of
prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But
prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason
should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned a
part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a
part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in
all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science, which
employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a
part of prudence
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from the
intelligence, as stated above (FP, Q[79], A[8]). If therefore
intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add
reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion of
Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated
in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things
to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for
prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things
required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or
quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be
numbered among these parts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its good
use.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet the
need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those things in
which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need for reason,
for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as do God and the
angels. On the other hand particular matters of action, wherein prudence
guides, are very far from the condition of things intelligible, and so
much the farther, as they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of
art, though they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain,
wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel on account of
their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence, although in certain
other intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet
prudence above all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may
rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and
uncertain.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although intelligence and reason are not different powers,
yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence takes its name
from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf. SS, Q[8], A[1]],
while reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence
each is accounted a part of reason as explained above (A[2]; Q[47], A[2]
,3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence?
[*"Providentia," which may be translated either "providence" or
"foresight."]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of
prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to be the
same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a prudent man
is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": and this is also the
derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De
Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be
also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word "to foresee,"
has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is
not a part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its
secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to
be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number
foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Q[48]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[1], ad 2, AA[6],13), prudence
is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them
in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an
end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to
human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be
done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity,
since what has been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present as
such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit,
so long as he sits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by
man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of
these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion
of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be
directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of
them must needs be the principal to which all the others are subordinate.
Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the
whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the principal of all the parts
of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary
precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end.
Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight
[providentia] as from its principal part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which,
in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and always,
though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence
foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but only to practical
matters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Right order to an end which is included in the notion of
foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, without
which no right order to the end is possible.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of prudence.
For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's surroundings. But
these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason
wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should not be reckoned a
part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues
rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote nothing but
attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently belongs
to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things
that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things.
Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of prudence
in addition to foresight.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Q[48]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), it belongs to prudence chiefly to
direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless
both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Q[47], A[3]) is about
singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of
circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to
the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by
reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love
to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse
love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his
heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need
of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the
circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be infinite,
the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment of reason in
matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence
has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues,
in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by
its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circumspection to
consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circumstances.
Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is
reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of
prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now no
man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii,
19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same
faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now it
belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid
evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence,
distinct from foresight.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man
can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution does
not belong to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk
cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true,
so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these
matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has
the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may
have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our
guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the
opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different in
idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both belong to
the one virtue of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[49] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of frequent
occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against them caution
is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they may
do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and by chance, and
these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be grasped by reason,
nor is man able to take precautions against them, although by exercising
prudence he is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as
to suffer less harm thereby.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence. And
since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules
himself (Q[47], seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of
prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?
(4) Whether military prudence is?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a species of
prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the preservation of
justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of
justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice rather than to
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom
[regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of prudence
is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are
"aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 10],
"tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy." Therefore neither should a
regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to certain
others placed in authority, and even to the people, according to Isidore
(Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence
to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to substitute regnative
prudence in its place.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence is
a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a special kind of
prudence is regnative.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], AA[8],10), it belongs to prudence
to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find a special
kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence.
Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance
in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community
of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according
as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher
end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a
king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which
reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence
as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with prudence" is
included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above (Q[47], A[5],
ad 1; FS, Q[58], A[2], ad 4). For this reason also the execution of
justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of
the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two
virtues---prudence and justice---belong most properly to a king,
according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall
execute justice and judgment in the earth." Since, however, direction
belongs rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative
prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is directive, rather
than to justice which is executive.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in
Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be denominated
rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative all other
rightful forms of government, but not perverse forms which are opposed to
virtue, and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the
principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this applies
to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as they have a
share of kingly government.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted
a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political prudence, as
stated above (A[1]). But a part should not be reckoned a species with the
whole. Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part of
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their various
objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what the
subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the
subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from
regnative prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each
individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so
called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called
political.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the
prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence
and is called legislative; another kind bears the common name political,
and deals with individuals."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings
are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings
are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since they
have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore
the rectitude of their government is not in their power but in the power
of their movers. On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any
sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move
themselves by their free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of
government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in
obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence
which is called political.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species of
prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of
regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, even
as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence of a
thing retains the name of "proper."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of
a habit, as stated above (Q[47], A[5]). Now the same actions are
considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as by his
subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various departments. Hence
regnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are
speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in
relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak,
he directs himself in relation to the common good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of
prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence is
directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is
directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1.
Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (Q[47], A[13]) prudence is only in good
people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many
sinners are provident in governing their household. Therefore domestic
prudence should not be reckoned a species of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, so
also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political is a
species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to
regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither
should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are
various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of which
is domestic, another legislative, and another political."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of
universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, diversify
arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is
principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a household is
a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since just as the
individual is part of the household, so is the household part of the city
or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence commonly so called which
governs the individual, is distinct from political prudence, so must
domestic prudence be distinct from both.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last
end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other hand,
the end of political prudence is "a good life in general" as regards the
conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher speaks of riches
as the end of political prudence, by way of example and in accordance
with the opinion of many.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail
concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard to "a
good life in general" as regards the conduct of the household, for which
above all a virtuous life is required.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The father has in his household an authority like that of a
king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full power of a
king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of
prudence, like regnative prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a
part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, according to Ethic.
vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore military prudence should not
be accounted a species of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as military business is contained under political
affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of tradesmen,
craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of prudence
corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any
be assigned to military business.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in
warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than to
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due
ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels." Now
it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need in
warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason,
should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature,
and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold
tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand
outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided
animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they are moved
to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with the
irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in
those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be
not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such
things as belong to the common good, but also a "military" prudence,
whereby hostile attacks are repelled.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has
certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as arms
and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it
belongs rather to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of
individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the
service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the entire
common good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but
the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the
commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with
prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?
(3) Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?
(4) Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?
[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of
deliberating well {euboulia}, of judging well according to common law
{synesis}, and of judging well according to general law {gnome},
respectively.]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man
makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil use of {euboulia}
(deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty
counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in
order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may
give alms. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii. But
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which implies
doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above
(FS, Q[65]). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not connected with the
other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men
are slow in taking counsel. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is
not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) {euboulia}
(deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of
virtue consists in right reason. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well)
is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[4]) the nature of a human
virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it
is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the
reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life
consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in Ethic. x.
But {euboulia} (deliberating well) signifies goodness of counsel, for it
is derived from the {eu}, good, and {boule}, counsel, being "a good
counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel." Hence it is
evident that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a human virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil
end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even as in
speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to a
false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from false premisses
through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both the aforesaid
processes are contrary to {euboulia} (deliberating well), as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not
follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. For
man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts, and this not only
as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as
regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more
imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to
the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with
certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which are
contingent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In no sinner as such is {euboulia} (deliberating well) to
be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good
counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the
end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be
neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking
counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due
circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the other
hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are
directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not take good
counsel in other particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, or
warfare, or the like.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from
prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now
this belongs to {euboulia} (deliberating well) as stated above. Therefore
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is not distinct from prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are
specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS,
Q[18], AA[4],6). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) and prudence are
directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not indeed to some
particular end, but to the common end of all life. Therefore {euboulia}
(deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision belong to
the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to the same
virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to {euboulia}
(deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence. There {euboulia}
(deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10. But
this does not apply to {euboulia} (deliberating well). Therefore
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), virtue is properly directed to
an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ
according to different acts, especially when there is a different kind of
goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of
goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of
love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong to
the same virtue of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have
they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different causes
that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command,
inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another. Consequently
{euboulia} (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must
needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well.
And since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal,
so {euboulia} (deliberating well) is directed to prudence as to a
principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all, even as
neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues
without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding
it, to {euboulia} (deliberating well) by eliciting it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees to the one
end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for counsel comes
first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last named has an
immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are
related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain proximate ends
of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of what has to be
done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this proves not that
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence,
but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science of
dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct from
demonstrative science, which decides the truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that {synesis} is not a virtue. Virtues are not in
us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common
law) is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of judging." But
judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is
only in the good, it seems that {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a
defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for it is
in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment,
it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good
command: and consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not
reasonable. Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is
not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But {euboulia},
or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is {synesis} (judging
well according to common law) a virtue, as being good judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, {synesis} (judging well according to common law)
signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but
about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence
in Greek some, in respect of {synesis} (judging well according to common
law) are said to be {synetoi}, i.e. "persons of sense," or {eusynetoi},
i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, those who lack this
virtue are called {asynetoi}, i.e. "senseless."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must
correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of
counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for
many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge
well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through
their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which
seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has
a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack
good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising
chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to
judge aright). Hence there is need, besides {euboulia} (deliberating
well), for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called
{synesis} (judging well according to common law).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending
a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right
disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed
the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it
be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now
that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things just as they
are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as to its consummation,
is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First
directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance,
because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct
ideas: this belongs to {synesis} (judging well according to common law)
which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, through
the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result being that one
judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment of
virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is
about the ends, whereas {synesis} (judging well according to common law)
is rather about the means.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal
principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular matter
of action, as stated above (Q[47], A[13]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or
execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges
aright there is a further need of a final and principal virtue, which
commands aright, and this is prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special
virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that {gnome} (judging well according to general
law) is not a special virtue distinct from {synesis} (judging well
according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of {synesis}
(judging well according to common law), to have good judgment. Now no man
can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things.
Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) extends to all
matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good
judgment called {gnome} (judging well according to general law).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now
there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. {euboulia} (deliberating
well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there
is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. {synesis} (judging well
according to common law).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from
the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and with such
things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the
intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is no
intellectual virtue about such matters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that {gnome}
(judging well according to general law) is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower
principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher
principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it;
and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what
is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible
to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of animals are
beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they come under the
order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still,
of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one
could not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this
is possible if we consider Divine Providence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not
covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the
enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his
deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of
such matters according to higher principles than the common laws,
according to which {synesis} (judging according to common law) judges:
and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a
higher virtue of judgment, which is called {gnome} (judging according to
general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: {Synesis} (judging well according to common law) judges
rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but
certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper
principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common
principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims
at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration which
tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence {euboulia}
(deliberating well) to which the research of counsel belongs is one for
all, but not so {synesis} (judging well according to common law) whose
act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good,
wherefore prudence also is only one.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[51] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all
things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, among
men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things
by his reason: this belongs to {gnome} (judging well according to general
law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost?
(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?
(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc.
corresponds to the gift of counsel?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts
of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the
virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the purpose of
taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue of prudence,
or even of {euboulia} (deliberating well), as is evident from what has
been said (Q[47], A[1], ad 2; Q[51], AA[1],2). Therefore counsel should
not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost
and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not given to
all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But counsel seems to be
one of those things which are given by the Holy Ghost specially to
certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65: "Behold . . . your brother
Simon is a man of counsel." Therefore counsel should be numbered among
the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Rm. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by the
Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." But counselling is not
consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received the
spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should not be
numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "(The Spirit of the Lord)
shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable to the
motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to the mode
of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature through time and
place, and the spiritual creature through time, but not through place, as
Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22). Again, it is proper to the
rational creature to be moved through the research of reason to perform
any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the
Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel,
wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Prudence or {euboulia} (deliberating well), whether
acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel according to
principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or {euboulia}
(deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either for himself or for
another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and
contingent things which may occur, the result is that "the thoughts of
mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Hence in
the research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who
comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel,
whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human
affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek
counsel from those who are wiser.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel others,
may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled by God as
to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is common to
all holy persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost according
to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is the "faculty
of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the gift of counsel
is befitting the children of God in so far as the reason is instructed by
the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly
correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that
which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes
(Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in
respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the gifts,
as stated above (FS, Q[68], A[8]). Since, then, counsel is the first and
lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act, and judgment
comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not
counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a
thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now prudence is
helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also
practical, as shown above (Q[9], A[3]). Therefore the gift of counsel
does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated
above (Q[47], A[8]). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man
should be directed by God, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore the gift of
counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for
the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore
they correspond to one another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is
perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a
body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the
rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower
motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme rule
of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes rectitude of
reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by
the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as stated above
(A[1]). Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping
and perfecting it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, but to
the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the position
of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, as stated above
(A[1]; FS, Q[68], A[1]), it follows that it would be unfitting to call
the gift corresponding to prudence by the name of command or judgment
rather than of counsel whereby it is possible to signify that the
counselled mind is moved by another counselling it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to
prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of
extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds
to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the same things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being moved. Hence
the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost,
is enabled to direct itself and others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in heaven.
For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of an end. But in
heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end, since there
man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel is not in
heaven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take counsel
in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 3).
Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is no counsel in
heaven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God,
according to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him."
But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rm. 11:34, "Who hath
been His counsellor?" Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is the
gift of counsel becoming.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the guilt
or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of the
heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the
conflict, or not to have won."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]; FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational creature by God.
Now we must observe two points concerning the motion of the human mind by
God. First, that the disposition of that which is moved, differs while it
is being moved from its disposition when it is in the term of movement.
Indeed if the mover is the principle of the movement alone, when the
movement ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regards the thing
moved, since it has already reached the term of movement, even as a
house, after it is built, ceases being built by the builder. On the other
hand, when the mover is cause not only of the movement, but also of the
form to which the movement tends, then the action of the mover does not
cease even after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the
air even after it is lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us
virtue and knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as
long as we persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the
blessed a knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were
ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge in them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men,
do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern
the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards
these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God moves the
mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in another.
For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing
the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple nescience in
the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know. From this
nescience the angel's mind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel.
Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any research of doubt, for
they simply turn to God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) "the angels take counsel of God about
things beneath them": wherefore the instruction which they receive from
God in such matters is called "counsel."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God
preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them in
their nescience of what has to be done.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end, or
resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as the acts
of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which they themselves
have attained, for example the ministrations of the angels, and the
prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of counsel finds a place
in them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state of
life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even so
neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on
the way thither.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it: and
the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the source
whence they receive.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the
gift of counsel?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy,
does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the beatitudes are
acts of virtue, as stated above (FS, Q[69], A[1]). Now we are directed by
counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude does not
correspond more than any other to counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for
salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary
for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to James
2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy." On the
other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the
life of perfection, according to Mt. 19:21. Therefore the beatitude of
poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel, rather than to the beatitude
of mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they denote a
certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of virtue. Now none
of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as appears from Gal.
5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond to the
gift of counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is
befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from
evils so great, to pardon, and to give."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end. Hence
such things as are of most use for an end, should above all correspond to
the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 Tim. 4:8,
"Godliness [*'Pietas,' which our English word 'pity,' which is the same
as mercy; see note on SS, Q[30], A[1]] is profitable to all things."
Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of
counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of virtue, it does
so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost guides us in
all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life whether they be
necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work of mercy is
necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[52] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the ultimate in
practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an action which is the
end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered among
the fruits, but only such things as pertain to action, in which practical
knowledge is the guide. Among these we find "goodness" and "benignity"
which correspond to mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] Out. Para. 1/3
OF IMPRUDENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says
(Contra Julian. iv, 3): "There are vices opposed to every virtue, not
only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is
opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of kinship and not
a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to prudence
we have craftiness."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] Out. Para. 2/3
Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in
evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect
either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence,
and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to prudence,
those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for prudence.
And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these
considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence
which is opposed to solicitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of precipitation or temerity;
(4) Of thoughtlessness;
(5) Of inconstancy;
(6) Concerning the origin of these vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether imprudence is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin is
voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas
imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent.
Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth. But
imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are
imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to original
justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But imprudence is
not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away save
by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Prov. 21:20,
"There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just,
and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend it." Therefore
imprudence is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a
privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken as
a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for this can
be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes lack of that
prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this sense imprudence
is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving to have prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act of
reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the right
reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises
counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which require
consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence is a sin in
respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect, since it is not
possible for a man to act against prudence, except by infringing the
rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if this
should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, it will be a mortal
sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and rejection of
the Divine teaching: whereas if he act beside the Law and without
contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it
will be a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the rash
man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act precipitately.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "he who sins willingly
against prudence is less to be commended."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense. It
must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other virtue is
included in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire soul.
Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed to original sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack of
this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to the
habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking
the sin of imprudence consists.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether imprudence is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For whoever
sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But imprudence
consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore
imprudence is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge is.
But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of the
general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned
among those causes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances of
virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results from
each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence; for
instance, reason, intelligence docility, and so on, as stated above
(QQ[48],49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence, so that it
is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above
(A[1]). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is one
special vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; first,
absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all sins;
secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are
its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two
counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and in
this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a
general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, namely the very
acts of reason: secondly, by participation; and in this way imprudence is
a general sin: for, just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in
so far as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of
imprudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect in an act of
the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in some
particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, then
imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three
ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of prudence,
for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual, from
other kinds that govern communities, as stated above (Q[48]; Q[50], A[7]
), so also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in
respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues
connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus, by
defect of "counsel" to which {euboulia} (deliberating well) corresponds,
"precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of imprudence; by defect of
"judgment," to which {synesis} (judging well according to common law) and
{gnome} (judging well according to general law) refer, there is
"thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy" and "negligence" correspond to the
"command" which is the proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken
by opposition to those things which are requisite for prudence, which are
the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Since however all these things are
intended for the direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it
follows that all the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts
mentioned above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in
"thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable to
"precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness,
belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers generality by participation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality than
prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows
that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on
account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent result,
and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. On
the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a moral vice; and
for this reason it can be called a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the same
motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same species
of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and when one
ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are various
species: for instance, if one man were to take another's property from
where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this would constitute
the species called sacrilege, while if another were to take another's
property when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, this
would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack of those things which
are requisite for prudence, does not constitute a diversity of species,
except in so far as they are directed to different acts of reason, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included in
imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; whereas
precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to Gregory,
who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel is given as a remedy
to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained under
imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now
rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore
precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now sin
happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also through
being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes by, and
through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9.
Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation as a sin
contained under imprudence, rather than slowness, or something else of
the kind pertaining to inordinate counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:19): "The way of the wicked is
darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of
ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to
fall or to be precipitate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the
soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said to be
precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down from
above by the impulse either of its own movement or of another's, and not
in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit of the soul is the reason,
and the base is reached in the action performed by the body; while the
steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion are
"memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the present, "shrewdness" in
considering the future outcome, "reasoning" which compares one thing with
another, "docility" in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes
counsel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed
into action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking
these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then inordinate
counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the vice of
precipitation is contained under imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and to
the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above (Q[52],
A[2]), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Things are said to be done rashly when they are not
directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through the
impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of the
directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly speaking,
wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride, which refuses to
submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers to both, so that
rashness is contained under precipitation, although precipitation refers
rather to the first.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Many things have to be considered in the research of
reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be
slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more directly opposed to
rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter bears a
certain likeness to right counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin included
in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any sin,
according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and yet it
incites us to be thoughtless, according to Mt. 10:19, "Take no thought
how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to many
things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and therefore to
a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained under
thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz.
"counsel," "judgment" about what has been counselled, and "command" [*Cf.
Q[47], A[8]]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also
to the speculative intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special
sin contained under imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:25): "Let thy eyes look straight
on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this pertains to
prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore
thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering
the truth about. something. Now just as research belongs to the reason,
so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a
demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it
judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back
to the first indemonstrable principles. Hence thought pertains chiefly
to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the
vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly
through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment
depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have
the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words
quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity
of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden
call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone, because "as we know
not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to God," according to 2 Paral
20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with
awaiting God's assistance, he would seem to tempt God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All thought about those things of which counsel takes
cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore
this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is
above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a
determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things
have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in
speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether inconstancy is a vice contained under prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained under
imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of perseverance
in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs
to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fortitude rather than
to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where jealousy [Douay:
'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil work."
But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to
imprudence but to envy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to persevere
in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of "incontinency" in
pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or "squeamishness" in unpleasant
matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1. Therefore inconstancy does not
pertain to imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to
the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence.
Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good
purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a man
does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of
something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal
completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in
rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist
the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its own
weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived; hence
inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now
just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to
prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to imprudence.
Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence.
And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and
thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises
from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant
because his reason fails in commanding what has been counselled and
judged.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues,
and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues,
chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the
contrary.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause
inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the origin of
inconstancy is due, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the
appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil
concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which
points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands firm, in
the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man,
against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance seem to be species of
constancy which pertains to reason; and to this power inconstancy
pertains also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the aforesaid vices arise from lust?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust.
For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A[5], ad 2). But envy
is a distinct vice from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A double-minded man is
inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain to
lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness,
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do
not arise from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect of
reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than carnal
vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather
than from carnal vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the aforesaid
vices arise from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure above
all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual pleasure which
absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight. Now the perfection of
prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from
sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect
of prudence and of the practical reason, as stated above (AA[2],5), it
follows that they arise chiefly from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason
to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the
judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6)
that "the man who is incontinent through anger listens to reason, yet not
perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through lust does not listen to
it at all."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just as
inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the mind
from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that
"love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[53] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the
more as they lead us away from reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] Out. Para. 1/1
OF NEGLIGENCE (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether negligence is a special sin?
(2) To which virtue is it opposed?
(3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether negligence is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For
negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in every
virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special sin.
Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins neglects that
which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects to be
contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every special sin had a determinate matter. But
negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither about
evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence if he
omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done negligently, they
are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is not a special
vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Sins committed through negligence, are distinguished
from those which are committed through contempt.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every lack
of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence is a sin,
and that it must needs have the character of a special sin according as
solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are special
through being about a special matter, as lust is about sexual matters,
while some vices are special on account of their having a special kind of
act which extends to all kinds of matter, and such are all vices
affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind
of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of reason, as
stated above (Q[47], A[9]), it follows that negligence, which denotes
lack of solicitude, is a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because the
more we love [diligimus] a thing the more solicitous are we about it.
Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for every virtue,
in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act
of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence just as
precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of reason
which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in any kind of
sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the lack of a special
act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is found more or less in
all sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good that
one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done negligently, but
because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a
due act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, or some due
circumstance be omitted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether negligence is opposed to prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to prudence. For
negligence seems to be the same as idleness or laziness, which belongs to
sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed
to prudence, but to charity, as stated above (Q[35], A[3]). Therefore
negligence is not opposed to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence. But
sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral
virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But negligence
does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is "precipitation," nor a
defect of judgment, since that is "thoughtlessness," nor a defect of
command, because that is "inconstancy." Therefore negligence does not
pertain to imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): "He that feareth God,
neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite virtue.
Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): "A babbler and a fool
[imprudens] will regard no time." Now this is due to negligence.
Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now
solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to
prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence.
This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x)
"a negligent man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]": and the right
choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore negligence pertains to
imprudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to which choice
also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of execution,
yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution,
while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself. Hence it is
becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, which is "an oppressive
sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from action [*Cf. Q[35], A[1]; FS,
Q[35], A[8]].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Omission regards the external act, for it consists in
failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is opposed to justice,
and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a just deed is
the effect of right reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which solicitude
also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this act otherwise
than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in commanding,
being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligent man fails
through lack of a prompt will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because
according to Prov. 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth
from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though
negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man to
acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (FS, Q[44], A[2])
when we were treating of the passions, that "fear makes us take counsel."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether negligence can be a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. For a gloss
of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on Job 9:28, "I feared all my works," etc.
says that "too little love of God aggravates the former," viz.
negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love of God is done
away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, "For thy negligences purify
thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it cleanses the
negligences of many sins." Now this would not be, if negligence were a
mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for
mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice was
prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:16): "He that neglecteth his
own life [Vulg.: 'way'] shall die."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 3), negligence arises out of a
certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude on
the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as it
should command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a mortal sin in
two ways. First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence.
If this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for salvation, it
will be a mortal sin. Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will
be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the
charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case
chiefly when negligence is due to contempt.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance
that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial sin,
provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some lack of
fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First through
lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence that is a
venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we
say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a merely natural
love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the same authority (gloss), a small offering
made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man not only from
venial but also from mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[54] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When negligence consists in the omission of that which is
necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest genus of
sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden,
wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them in the Law,
since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public confession of sin,
whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in public.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] Out. Para. 1/1
OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a
resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?
(4) Of guile;
(5) Of fraud;
(6) Of solicitude about temporal things;
(7) Of solicitude about the future;
(8) Of the origin of these vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For
prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it governs
them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is
any prudence a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is
lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man ever
hated his own flesh" (Eph. 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not
a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he
tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or of
the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of
the flesh be accounted among sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness according
to Wis. 14:9, "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike."
Now it is written (Rm. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.: 'wisdom'] of the flesh
is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[13]), prudence regards things
which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence of the
flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal
goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin,
because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which
does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above (FS, Q[2],
A[5]). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Justice and temperance include in their very nature that
which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of
concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the other
hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [providendo], as stated above
(Q[47], A[1]; Q[49], A[6]), which can extend to evil things also.
Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if
something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that
prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on
account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal
agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good
of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good
of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus
that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: The devil tempts us, not through the good of the appetible
object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies
direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence of the
devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the aspect
under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as worldly or
carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak of "carnal" and
again of "worldly" prudence, according to Lk. 16:8, "The children of this
world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation," etc. The
Apostle includes all in the "prudence of the flesh," because we covet the
external things of the world on account of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called
"wisdom," as stated above (Q[47], A[2], ad 1), we may distinguish a
threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. Hence
it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is "earthly,
sensual and devilish," as explained above (Q[45], A[1], ad 1), when we
were treating of wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it
is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this implies
contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh . . .
is not subject to the law of God" (Rm. 8:7). Therefore prudence of the
flesh is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. Now
prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for "it
cannot be subject to the law of God" (Rm. 8:7), and so it seems to be an
unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost.
Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as
stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed to that
prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of
the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the
nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining to
the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence,
diminishes sin [*Cf. Prov. 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not
of itself the nature of a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[2], ad 1; A[13]), a man is said
to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the end of
life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some
particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or something
else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as
corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man
place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a
mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing, since he cannot
have several last ends, as stated above (FS, Q[1], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding
to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it happens sometimes that
a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without
turning away from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place
the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain
this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But
if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one
is careful about one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no
longer prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh
as a means to an end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a
man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this
is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy
Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the law of
God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot be
converted and submit to the law of God, but that carnal prudence itself
cannot be subject to God's law, even as neither can injustice be just,
nor heat cold, although that which is hot may become cold.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is
shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed to
prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some
very grave matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether craftiness is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words
of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they induce us to be
crafty, according to Prov. 1:4, "To give craftiness [Douay: 'subtlety']
to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): "The crafty [Douay:
'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so
either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no sin
seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or
worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct from
prudence of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The simplicity
of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29): "The wisdom of
this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to conceal one's
meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to
be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is acquired by the
young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the above things seem to
belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or
worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): "We renounce the hidden
things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the
word of God." Therefore craftiness is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," just as
science is "right reason applied to knowledge." In speculative matters
one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when
the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in
another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to
be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so a sin may be
against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways.
First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good
not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the
flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or
evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit,
and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin
opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as
prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness
sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual
resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in a bad
sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an
evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false and
counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be
directed to a good end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything that
can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness.
For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. Yet a certain
guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Cor. 12:16, "Being crafty I
caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according
to Ps. 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues." Now craftiness
like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does not
pertain to craftiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): "Guile [Douay: 'Deceit'] is
in the heart of them that think evil things." But the thought of evil
things does not always pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not
seem to belong to craftiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to Eph.
4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive": and
guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), it belongs to craftiness to adopt
ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in order to
attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be
subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the process of
thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness, even as
thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence. Secondly the
adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard to their actual
execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a
certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and
improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the execution of
craftiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving,
is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief place among
those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, as
Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile is ascribed
chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to Ps.
104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his servants." Guile is also in the
heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23, "His interior is full of deceit," but
this is to devise deceits, according to Ps. 37:13: "They studied deceits
all the day long."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise
certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he devises
deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless
it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by violence without
craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, it is of less
frequent occurrence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fraud pertains to craftiness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. For a
man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived, which is
the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing
himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1, "Why do you not rather
suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore fraud does not belong to
craftiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving
external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a certain man named
Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept
back part of the price of the land." Now it pertains to injustice or
illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly.
Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness which is opposed to
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the
frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18)
concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against
their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job
13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay:
'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the same object.
Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as "guile" consists in the execution of craftiness,
so also does "fraud." But they seem to differ in the fact that "guile"
belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be
effected by words, or by deeds, whereas "fraud" belongs more properly to
the execution of craftiness by deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in
their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and
to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another
vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly
nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against
themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that
what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to Ps.
7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters.
Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, according to
Rm. 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now according to the Divine
ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to Ps. 8:8, "Thou
hast subjected all things under his feet," etc. Therefore man should be
solicitous about temporal things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works.
Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things whereby he
sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10): "If any man
will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is lawful to be
solicitous about temporal things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy,
according to 2 Tim. 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought
me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with
works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the
interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude about
temporal things is not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 6:31): "Be not solicitous . . .
saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we
be clothed?" And yet such things are very necessary.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain
something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there
is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is
assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in
three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we
seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach.
xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous,' etc. . . . He intended
to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of
these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the
Gospel." Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful,
through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things,
the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which
ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written (Mt.
13:22) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word." Thirdly,
through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary
things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for
laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors
bestowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body
and soul (Mt. 6:26); secondly, on account of the care with which God
watches over animals and plants without the assistance of man, according
to the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Divine
providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in
seeking temporal goods before all others. Consequently He concludes that
we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that
temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do
what we ought to do.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them
according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and be over
solicitous about them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor
is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on Mt. 6:31, "Be
not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but solicitude must be
banished," namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles the mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is
directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it
be superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we should be solicitous about the future?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we should be solicitous about the future. For
it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her
ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor master . .
provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in
the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore
solicitude about the future is praiseworthy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly
about the future, since its principal part is "foresight of future
things," as stated above (Q[49], A[6], ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to
be solicitous about the future.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the
morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (Jn. 12:6) that
Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts
4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been
laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about the
future.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 6:34): "Be not . . . solicitous for
tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as Jerome says in his
commentary on this passage.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due
circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to Eccles. 8:6,
"There is a time and opportunity for every business"; which applies not
only to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every time
has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude about the crops
belongs to the summer time, and solicitude about the vintage to the time
of autumn. Accordingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during
the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging
to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude,
saying: "Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for
the morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow
will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul.
This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is the evil
thereof," namely, the burden of solicitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this
that is proposed for our example.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it
would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a man
were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and "future"
apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs of the
present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), "when we
see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we
must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even Our Lord
deigned for our example to have a purse, and we read in the Acts of the
Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of
the future on account of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not
condemn those who according to human custom, provide themselves with such
things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these
things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether these vices arise from covetousness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As
stated above (Q[43], A[6]) lust is the chief cause of lack of rectitude
in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to
prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "Venus is full of guile and her
girdle is many colored" and that "he who is incontinent in desire acts
with cunning."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, as
stated above (Q[47], A[13]). Now, since prudence is in the reason, the
more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and
vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather
than from covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold of
other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of which
pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of
stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the
aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a
daughter of covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]; Q[47], A[13]), carnal prudence and
craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to
prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among all the moral
virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly,
for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of reason
appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the chief of which is
covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from
covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of
concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its
act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit
inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When the
Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is referring to a
certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away suddenly, just as
he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means of craftiness but
rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he adds
that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man" [*Cf. Iliad xiv,
214-217].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to
pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes
magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of fraud
and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from
covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[55] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with
precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid
vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in
plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, because
the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the Philosopher states
(Rhet. ii, 2,3) [*Cf. Ethic. vii, 6].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) The precepts of prudence;
(2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of
prudence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should have
included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should include a
precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are those of the
decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral virtues, it
seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept
of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law especially
with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the teaching of the
Gospel contains a precept of prudence (Mt. 10:16): "Be ye . . . prudent
[Douay: 'wise'] as serpents." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue
should have included a precept of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/2
OBJ 3: Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed to
the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written (Malach. 4:4):
"Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in Horeb."
Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts of prudence;
for instance (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not upon thy own prudence"; and further
on (Prov. 4:25): "Let thine eyelids go before thy steps." Therefore the
Law also should have contained a precept of prudence, especially among
the precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 2/2
The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts of
the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[100], A[3]; A[5], ad 1) when we
were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue being given
to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to all, as coming
under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost among the things
dictated by natural reason are the ends of human life, which are to the
practical order what naturally known principles are to the speculative
order, as shown above (Q[47], A[6]). Now prudence is not about the end,
but about the means, as stated above (Q[47], A[6]). Hence it was not
fitting that the precepts of the decalogue should include a precept
relating directly to prudence. And yet all the precepts of the decalogue
are related to prudence, in so far as it directs all virtuous acts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although prudence is simply foremost among all the moral
virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object
under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a
precept, as stated above (Q[44], A[1]; FS, Q[99], AA[1],5). Hence it
behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are those of the decalogue,
to refer to justice rather than to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection.
Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all matters relating to
right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore it behooved the Gospel
teaching to contain precepts also of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament is
directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it behooved man
to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament about the
act of prudence which is directed to the means.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to
prudence are fittingly propounded in the Old Law?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to the
vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old Law. For
such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly opposed to
prudence are not less opposed thereto, than those which bear a certain
resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices connected with it.
Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law: for it is written (Lev.
19:13): "Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor," and (Dt. 25:13): "Thou
shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less."
Therefore there should have also been prohibitive precepts about the
vices directly opposed to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in buying
and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud solely in buying
and selling.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/2
OBJ 3: Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of
virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of
prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any
contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 2/2
The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are
quoted in the first objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), justice, above all, regards the
aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept,
because justice tends to render that which is due to another, as we shall
state further on (Q[58], A[2]). Now craftiness, as to its execution, is
committed chiefly in matters of justice, as stated above (Q[55], A[8]):
and so it was fitting that the Law should contain precepts forbidding the
execution of craftiness, in so far as this pertains to injustice, as when
a man uses guile and fraud in calumniating another or in stealing his
goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence, do not
pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of craftiness, and
so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and guile are, which
latter pertain to injustice
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice, can
be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calumny (Lev. 19:13).
Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in buying and
selling, according to Ecclus. 26:28, "A huckster shall not be justified
from the sins of the lips": and it is for this reason that the Law
contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent buying and selling.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[56] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of justice
pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts prohibitive of
stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to the execution of
craftiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] Out. Para. 1/3
ON JUSTICE (QQ[57]-62)
OF RIGHT (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice, the
consideration of which will be fourfold:
(1) Of justice;
(2) Of its parts;
(3) Of the corresponding gift;
(4) Of the precepts relating to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] Out. Para. 2/3
Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2)
Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether right is the object of justice?
(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive right?
(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?
(4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether right is the object of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice. For the
jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that "right is the
art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the object of justice, but
is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore right is not the object of
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a kind of
right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence, wherefore
the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons "legislative" as one of the parts
of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for Augustine
says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving God alone, and
consequently governing aright all things subject to man." Now right [jus]
does not pertain to Divine things, but only to human affairs, for Isidore
says (Etym. v, 2) that "'fas' is the Divine law, and 'jus,' the human
law." Therefore right is not the object of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "'jus' [right] is so
called because it is just." Now the "just" is the object of justice, for
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are agreed in giving the
name of justice to the habit which makes men capable of doing just
actions."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is proper to justice, as compared with the other
virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes a
kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say
that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in
reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other virtues
perfect man in those matters only which befit him in relation to
himself. Accordingly that which is right in the works of the other
virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to its proper
object, depends on its relation to the agent only, whereas the right in a
work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its
relation to others. Because a man's work is said to be just when it is
related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for instance the
payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And so a thing is said to
be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an
act of justice, without taking into account the way in which it is done
by the agent: whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be
right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason
justice has its own special proper object over and above the other
virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as
"right." Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their original
signification so as to mean something else: thus the word "medicine" was
first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person, and
then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is done. In like
manner the word "jus" [right] was first of all used to denote the just
thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to designate the art
whereby it is known what is just, and further to denote the place where
justice is administered, thus a man is said to appear "in jure" [*In
English we speak of a court of law, a barrister at law, etc.], and yet
further, we say even that a man, who has the office of exercising
justice, administers the jus even if his sentence be unjust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman an
expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which
expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists in
the mind an expression of the particular just work which the reason
determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this rule be
expressed in writing it is called a "law," which according to Isidore
(Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and so law is not the same as right,
but an expression of right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot offer
God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a perfectly just
repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not properly called "jus"
but "fas," because, to wit, God is satisfied if we accomplish what we
can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man repay God as much as he can,
by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into natural
right and positive right. For that which is natural is unchangeable, and
is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to be found in human
affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in certain cases, nor do
they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there is no such thing as natural
right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing is called "positive" when it proceeds from the
human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it proceeds from the
human will, else a man's will could not be unjust. Since then the "just"
and the "right" are the same, it seems that there is no positive right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it transcends
human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive right, since it is
based not on human, but on Divine authority. Therefore right is
unfittingly divided into natural and positive.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "political
justice is partly natural and partly legal," i.e. established by law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]) the "right" or the "just" is a
work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of
equality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by its
very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal value
in return, and this is called "natural right." In another way a thing is
adjusted or commensurated to another person, by agreement, or by common
consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself satisfied, if he receive so
much. This can be done in two ways: first by private agreement, as that
which is confirmed by an agreement between private individuals; secondly,
by public agreement, as when the whole community agrees that something
should be deemed as though it were adjusted and commensurated to another
person, or when this is decreed by the prince who is placed over the
people, and acts in its stead, and this is called "positive right."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That which is natural to one whose nature is unchangeable,
must needs be such always and everywhere. But man's nature is changeable,
wherefore that which is natural to man may sometimes fail. Thus the
restitution of a deposit to the depositor is in accordance with natural
equality, and if human nature were always right, this would always have
to be observed; but since it happens sometimes that man's will is
unrighteous there are cases in which a deposit should not be restored,
lest a man of unrighteous will make evil use of the thing deposited: as
when a madman or an enemy of the common weal demands the return of his
weapons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing to be
just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural justice, and it
is in such matters that positive right has its place. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "in the case of the legal just, it
does not matter in the first instance whether it takes one form or
another, it only matters when once it is laid down." If, however, a thing
is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human will cannot make it
just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful to steal or to commit
adultery. Hence it is written (Is. 10:1): "Woe to them that make wicked
laws."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Divine right is that which is promulgated by God. Such
things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their justice is
hidden to man, and partly are made just by God's decree. Hence also
Divine right may be divided in respect of these two things, even as human
right is. For the Divine law commands certain things because they are
good, and forbids others, because they are evil, while others are good
because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as the
natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is natural to
them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the jurist
[*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] "the right of nations is that
which is in use among all nations." Therefore the right of nations is the
natural right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally
slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now "slavery belongs
to the right of nations," as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4). Therefore the
right of nations is a natural right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, right as stated above (A[2]) is divided into natural and
positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since all
nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement. Therefore
the right of nations is a natural right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that "right is either
natural, or civil, or right of nations," and consequently the right of
nations is distinct from natural right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the natural right or just is that
which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with another
person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as it is
considered absolutely: thus a male by its very nature is commensurate
with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent is commensurate
with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is naturally
commensurate with another person, not according as it is considered
absolutely, but according to something resultant from it, for instance
the possession of property. For if a particular piece of land be
considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should belong to one
man more than to another, but if it be considered in respect of its
adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of the land, it has a
certain commensuration to be the property of one and not of another man,
as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend a
thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is common to
us and other animals according to the first kind of commensuration. But
the right of nations falls short of natural right in this sense, as the
jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says because "the latter is
common to all animals, while the former is common to men only." On the
other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with what results from it,
is proper to reason, wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of
natural reason which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i,
1; De Just. et Jure i, 9): "whatever natural reason decrees among all
men, is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations."
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular man
should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on natural
reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man
to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be helped by the former,
as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). Wherefore slavery which belongs
to the right of nations is natural in the second way, but not in the
first.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which are according
to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality, it follows
that they need no special institution, for they are instituted by natural
reason itself, as stated by the authority quoted above
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as
special species?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "paternal right" and "right of dominion"
should not be distinguished as special species. For it belongs to justice
to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose states (De Offic. i, 24).
Now right is the object of justice, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore
right belongs to each one equally; and we ought not to distinguish the
rights of fathers and masters as distinct species.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated
above (A[1], ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city or
kingdom, as stated above (FS, Q[90], A[2]), but not to the private good
of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no need for
a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the master and the
father pertain to a household, as stated in Polit. i, 2.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees among men,
for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes.
Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right of
dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Right or just depends on commensuration with another
person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may denote
something that is other simply, as that which is altogether distinct; as,
for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the other, and both of
whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and between these according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the "just" simply. Secondly a
thing is said to be other from something else, not simply, but as
belonging in some way to that something else: and in this way, as regards
human affairs, a son belongs to his father, since he is part of him
somewhat, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12, and a slave belongs to his
master, because he is his instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 2 [*Cf.
Ethic. viii, 11]. Hence a father is not compared to his son as to another
simply, and so between them there is not the just simply, but a kind of
just, called "paternal." In like manner neither is there the just simply,
between master and servant, but that which is called "dominative." A
wife, though she is something belonging to the husband, since she stands
related to him as to her own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28),
is nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his
father, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind of
social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between husband and wife
than between father and son, or master and slave, because, as husband and
wife have an immediate relation to the community of the household, as
stated in Polit. i, 2,5, it follows that between them there is "domestic
justice" rather than "civic."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his right, the
distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man gives
himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." And since what
belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the slave is his
master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not justice of
father to son, or of master to slave.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as
such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is something
having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence in so far as
each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in a way: and for
this reason too there are certain laws regulating the relations of father
to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in so far as each is
something belonging to another, the perfect idea of "right" or "just" is
wanting to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[57] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All other differences between one person and another in a
state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and to
its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect sense of
justice. This "just" however is distinguished according to various
offices, hence when we speak of "military," or "magisterial," or
"priestly" right, it is not as though such rights fell short of the
simply right, as when we speak of "paternal" right, or right of
"dominion," but for the reason that something proper is due to each
class of person in respect of his particular office.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] Out. Para. 1/1
OF JUSTICE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points of
inquiry:
(1) What is justice?
(2) Whether justice is always towards another?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?
(5) Whether it is a general virtue?
(6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every
virtue?
(7) Whether there is a particular justice?
(8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?
(9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?
(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?
(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?
(12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant
will to render to each one his right?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined justice as
being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right"
[*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a man "capable of doing
what is just, and of being just in action and in intention." Now "will"
denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined
as being a will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the will
were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is unrighteous. Yet,
according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude. Therefore
justice is not the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore justice is
a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is
unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say that
it is both "perpetual" and "constant."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his right.
Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows that it is in
none but the sovereign: which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is
love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one his
right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if
understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the
principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the
good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper
matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse
with other men, as shall be shown further on (A[2]). Hence the act of
justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the
words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, as Isidore says (Etym.
x), "a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of
others."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous,
it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs
first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be done "by choice," and
"for a due end," thirdly to be done "immovably." Now the first of these
is included in the second, since "what is done through ignorance is
involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice mentions
first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice must be
voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its "constancy" and
"perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act
is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act,
because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to
the proper form of a definition, he might say that "justice is a habit
whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual
will": and this is about the same definition as that given by the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice is a habit whereby a man
is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his
choice."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is
customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus Augustine
says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what one sees not."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but
causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on the
part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's will alone
is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man
wills to do a certain thing always. and this is a necessary condition of
justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish
to observe justice in some particular matter for the time being, because
one could scarcely find a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and
it is requisite that one should have the will to observe justice at all
times and in all cases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act of
the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the
"perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always,
"constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of
command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of
justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the other
hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by way of
execution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as
stated above (Q[25], A[1]), so too the service of God includes rendering
to each one his due.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether justice is always towards one another?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards another. For the
Apostle says (Rm. 3:22) that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus
Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another.
Neither therefore does justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it
belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his
authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive
appetite is subject to man, according to Gn. 4:7, where it is written:
"The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and thou shalt
have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to have dominion
over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards oneself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is
co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no less
than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified by
justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the upright shall make
his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our dealings not only
with others, but also with ourselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of
justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." Now
this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is
concerned only about our dealings with others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[57], A[1]) since justice by its name
implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing
is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to
justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q[57], A[1]; FS, Q[113],
A[1]) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings
capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [*Cf. FP, Q[29], A[2]]
and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for
we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand,
nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such
expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly
speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in
one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may
speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the
reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many
agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to
be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and
concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each
part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the
ungodly is justified it consists in the due coordination of the parts of
the soul, as stated above (FS, Q[113], A[1]) where we were treating of
the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to metaphorical
justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all by himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal
will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice consists);
although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is
co-eternal with God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by
the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But his
dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation
to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are
directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this
is justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether justice is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written
(Lk. 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that are
commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which
we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for
Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a profit that is estimated
not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness." Therefore to
do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of
justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. But
to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of
necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions
that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those
things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior
but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix)
[*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce
externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a
moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure
of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence,
fortitude and justice
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man
himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice. For a
man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the
rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates
human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good,
and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly
from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the
luster of virtue appears above all in justice."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the
person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a
harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought,
spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously. Hence it is
written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth temperance, and prudence,
and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous
men) can have nothing more profitable in life."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from "constraint," and
this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises
from the obligation of a "command," or from the necessity of obtaining an
end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without
doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit,
when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does
however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Cor. 9:16,
"If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon
me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by making
them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other
men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether justice is in the will as its subject?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For
justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the will, but in
the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it
belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another.
Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not
directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue.
Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is "rational by
participation," viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will
as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rectitude
of the will observed for its own sake."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that
virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act
of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing
something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or
reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just
through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of
action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some appetitive
power as its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and
the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is
divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in the FP,
Q[81], A[2]. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot
proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does
not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to
another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in
the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will:
hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the
will, as may be seen above (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the rectitude
of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account
of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth;
and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on the
apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in
relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another,
and this belongs to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are
"rational by participation," but the entire "appetitive" faculty, as
stated in Ethic. i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason. Now
the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can be the
subject of moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether justice is a general virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice
is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7, "She teacheth
temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "general"
is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under
the same "general." Therefore justice is not a general virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are
temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is
reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any
way be reckoned a general virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above (A[2]
). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a general sin,
because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself. Therefore
neither is justice a general virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is
every virtue."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Justice, as stated above (A[2]) directs man in his
relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as
regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations
with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves
all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its
proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now
it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation
to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to
a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the
good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue,
whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to
certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to
which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice,
in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that
justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to
direct to the common good, as stated above (FS, Q[90], A[2]), it follows
that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal
justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs
the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues,
not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on
(AA[7],12).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite,
viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appetitive
of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of
particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as
its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge
whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence justice can be a general virtue
rather than temperance or fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to another,
especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in so
far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and
in like manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is written
(1 Jn. 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all
virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially
the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that
"virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their
mode of being." Now things that differ merely in their mode of being or
logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice is essentially the
same as every virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all
virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of virtue."
Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that
virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of
temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed
to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all
the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the
multitude, which transcends the good of one single individual. Therefore
it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of the
whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without use or
purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so.
Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that does not
belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; and so it
seems that general justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are able
to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be
virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) that "the
virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good
citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a
man Is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice is not the
same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the
other.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, by
"predication": thus "animal" is general in relation to man and horse and
the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be
essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general,
for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and
forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general
"virtually"; thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its
effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are
illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is no need
for that which is "general" to be essentially the same as those things in
relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not
essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to
what has been said (A[5]), legal justice is said to be a general virtue,
in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its
own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for
just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs
the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice,
in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper
object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal
justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it
regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the
sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is
secondarily and administratively in his subjects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so
far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal
justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually
general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as
all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that
the Philosopher speaks.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the virtue
commanded by legal justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that
virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a further
end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue considered
strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end.
Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from
every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good; and
this virtue is legal justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general
justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as neither is
there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his
relations with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to "one"
and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in matters
relating to the multitude, as shown above (AA[5],6). Therefore there is
not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters
relating to the individual.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands the
household community. Consequently, if in addition to general justice
there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the
same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the
common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore
neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on Mt. 5:6, "Blessed are
they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By
justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue
which is opposed to covetousness."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), legal justice is not essentially
the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man
immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to
direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these
virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person.
Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for
particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as
temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for
particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his
relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so
immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately.
Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man
immediately to the good of another individual.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of the
individual differ not only in respect of the "many" and the "few," but
also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the "common" good differs
from the aspect of the "individual" good, even as the aspect of "whole"
differs from that of "part." Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1)
that "they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the
like differ only as many and few and not specifically."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher
(Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely "of
husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of which one
person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between such persons
there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. "domestic"
justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether particular justice has a special matter?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special matter.
Because a gloss on Gn. 2:14, "The fourth river is Euphrates," says:
"Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated through what country it
flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul." Now this
would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every
special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice
has no special matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul has
four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz.
temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the
fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore particular
justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to
others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to
this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular
justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of
moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only
the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also
those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect
of external actions and external things by means of which men can
communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is
to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we
consider man's rectitude in himself. Consequently, since justice is
directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue,
but only about external actions and things, under a certain special
aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through
them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of
the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will which
moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly
justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind
of diffusion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), the cardinal virtues
may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a
determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. In this
latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he says that
"prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is
the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength of
mind in bearing with passing trials, justice is the love of God and our
neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common
principle of the entire order between one man and another."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A man's internal passions which are a part of moral matter,
are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs to the
specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are
capable of being directed to another man. Consequently it does not follow
that the matter of justice is general.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether justice is about the passions?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure and
pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above
[*FS, Q[23], A[4]; FS, Q[31], A[1]; FS, Q[35], A[1]] when we were
treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is
about the passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's operations in
relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified
unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the
passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sexual
lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft.
Therefore justice must needs be about the passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so
is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it would
not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the
passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
about operations.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The true answer to this question may be gathered from a
twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will,
whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above (FS, Q[22],
A[3]; FS, Q[59], A[4]), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose
movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about the passions,
as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and
concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice
is about man's relations with another, and we are not directed
immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not
about the passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its
proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but every moral
virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure and pain are the
principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a
good": and in this way too they belong to justice, since "a man is not
just unless he rejoice in just actions" (Ethic. i, 8).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: External operations are as it were between external things,
which are their matter, and internal passions, which are their origin.
Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without
there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal another's
property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will
to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet another's property
without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the directing of operations in
so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in
so far as they arise from the passions, it belongs to the other moral
virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice hinders theft of
another's property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the, equality
that should be maintained in external things, while liberality hinders it
as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however,
external operations take their species, not from the internal passions
but from external things as being their objects, it follows that,
external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of
the other moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The common good is the end of each individual member of a
community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. On the
other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another
individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the common good,
is more capable of extending to the internal passions whereby man is
disposed in some way or other in himself, than particular justice which
is directed to the good of another individual: although legal justice
extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external
operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law commands us to perform the
actions of a courageous person . . . the actions of a temperate person .
. and the actions of a gentle person" (Ethic. v, 5).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean. For
the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral virtue is
defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which observes the mean
fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice observes the rational
and not the real mean.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither excess
nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is clearly the
case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about
things that are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v. Therefore justice
does not observe the real mean.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the
rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean varies
according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too
little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in justice:
for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one
who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice also observes, not
the real, but the rational mean.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean
of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" proportion, so that
it is the real mean.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[9]; FS, Q[59], A[4]), the other moral
virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which
is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject
of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with
their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is
measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by
comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is
only that which is fixed by reason in our regard.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so
far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly
proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists
in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the
external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less,
as stated in Metaph. x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4]: wherefore
justice observes the real mean.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice
satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways.
First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; and
there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this
sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through being good
absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil through being
abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it is possible to
find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who can use them well or
ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good
simply.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a
prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each
injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this
implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render to each
one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice the act
of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is
not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in
rendering to each one his own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which we
may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it pertains to
liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what is his. Therefore
the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things
duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery and
so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to belong
solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of justice is not
sufficiently described by saying that it consists in rendering to each
one his own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice that
renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's property; it
disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[8],10), the matter of justice is an
external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is
made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by
justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him according to
equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing
else than to render to each one his own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary
virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with it, as
we shall state further on (Q[80], A[1]). Wherefore to succor the needy,
which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, which
pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as
to their principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of
justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive, and
whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is that
justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary
interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those
expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to all
other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to each one
of what is his own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the
moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each one what
is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one's own, and this
is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than
itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the
virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more
excellent than justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and "good," as
stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more difficult things than
justice is, since it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii,
6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most
resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it
stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common
good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of the
virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the
evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of particular
justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first
reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more
excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas
the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto
appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues.
The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are
commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself,
whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being
well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of
another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most
profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to
others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and
the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is
useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so
in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue,
while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of
the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, whereas
liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man's
own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the
latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[58] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult things, it
is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas justice
is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] Out. Para. 1/1
OF INJUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?
(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?
(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?
(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether injustice is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is
written (1 Jn. 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever committeth
sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now iniquity would
seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a kind of equality,
so that injustice is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity.
Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But
injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it is
opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, and in
like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a
special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will.
But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus Anim. x).
Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a
special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice
which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special
vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good
which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as regards the
intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of
sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have the
character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, in accord
with what has been said above about justice (Q[58], AA[5],6). Secondly we
speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and
another, when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or
honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a
special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human common good, so
Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which all sin is
repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to all the
virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both to justice
and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways as stated
above (Q[58], A[9], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters,
i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to another
person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in the point
of its extending to operations that relate to another: and the same
applies to injustice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an unjust
thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated above (FS,
Q[54], A[2]). Now the proper object of justice is the just, and the
proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be
called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through doing an
unjust thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they hold a
false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do suddenly an
unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of doing what is
unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false unless it
were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. Therefore a man is to
be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper act,
and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does what is
intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust
thing, is said to be unjust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do
an unjust thing without being unjust."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Even as the object of justice is something equal in
external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,
through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him. To
this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its proper act
which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two ways that
a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on account of a
lack of correspondence between the operation and its proper object. For
the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its
indirect object: and in things directed to an end the direct is that
which is intended, and the indirect is what is beside the intention.
Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust
thing, for instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it
is unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but
only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is unjust:
hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may
happen on account of a lack of proportion between the operation and the
habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance,
anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the
injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency. In the latter
case properly speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has
a habit, whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him.
Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper
to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit
of injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through
passion, without having the habit of injustice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and formal
acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from
choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the sake
of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The object of temperance is not something established
externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance, i.e.
the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man himself.
Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be said to be
temperate either materially or formally. In like manner neither can it be
called intemperate: and in this respect there is dissimilarity between
justice and the other moral virtues; but as regards the proportion
between operation and habit, there is similarity in all respects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For
injustice is inequality, as stated above (A[2]). Now a man by injuring
himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another. Therefore a
man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But whoever does
himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a man can
voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for having
committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished according
to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can do himself an
injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man suffers injustice
voluntarily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers that
injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one who
wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth.
Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are
contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on
the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent, whereas
passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in the same
respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1;
viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will, wherefore
man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily, and on the
other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against his will, since
in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in himself, and so,
considered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly we must
conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man can do an injustice
except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save involuntarily; but that
accidentally and materially so to speak, it is possible for that which is
unjust in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man does
anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man
voluntarily gives to another more than he owes him).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he
does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a man's
ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he forfeit
something of his own free-will, either by his own or by another's action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An individual person may be considered in two ways. First,
with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it
may come under the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for
instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice no less than
justice, is always referred to another person. Secondly, this or that man
may be considered as belonging to the State as part thereof, or as
belonging to God, as His creature and image; and thus a man who kills
himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and to
God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both Divine and human
law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor.
3:17): "If any man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the
point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that
which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above (A[2]),
and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent
and patient, as stated above (A[2]). Accordingly we must reply that
injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always
accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the
formal sense a man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an
injustice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, because
he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an
injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who
does the injury unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only
materially.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins
mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a
venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in
reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they do not merely in
ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter." Therefore not
everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs but
slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and should be
accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues" [*Peter
Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto that
a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the other
virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to do an
injustice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal sin.
Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the law of
God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or
to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q[64], seqq.).
Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[12], A[5]), when we were treating
of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is contrary to
charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury inflicted on
another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will
the good of another. And so since injustice always consists in an injury
inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do an injustice is a
mortal sin according to its genus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as
referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls "ignorance of particular
circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves pardon, and not to
ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice
through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, as stated above
(A[2])
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of
the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed
not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom:
for instance, if a man take an apple or some such thing from another
man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or
displeased.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[59] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not
always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder affecting human
passions; hence there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] Out. Para. 1/1
OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?
(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?
(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?
(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?
(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written law?
(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether judgment is an act of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what he
knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty.
Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. Therefore judgment
belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as
stated above (Q[58], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man
judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue of
charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is
given to us" (Rm. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather than
to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its proper
matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in everything,"
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore judgment does not
belong to justice any more than to the other moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But the
act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges are
not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act of
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be turned
into judgment."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such. Now
a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus dicens]
and right is the object of justice, as stated above (Q[57], A[1]).
Consequently the original meaning of the word "judgment" is a statement
or decision of the just or right. Now to decide rightly about virtuous
deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from the virtuous habit; thus a chaste
person decides rightly about matters relating to chastity. Therefore
judgment, which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs
properly to justice. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4)
that "men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification
of justice."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of a right
decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a right
decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a right
judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the virtue
itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an act of
reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define. The
other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends his
aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judgment
proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fortitude, it proceeds from
fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in so far as justice
inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence
pronounces judgment: wherefore {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) which belongs to prudence is said to "judge rightly," as
stated above (Q[51], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, has
an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the Divine
rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces judgment
through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces judgment
through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas justice
regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above (Q[58], A[2]).
Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in matters
relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are in question,
there is no need for judgment other than that of a virtuous man, taking
judgment in its broader sense, as explained above (ad 1). But in matters
of justice, there is further need for the judgment of a superior, who is
"able to reprove both, and to put his hand between both" [*Job 9:33].
Hence judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any other
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q[58],
A[6]], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in the
subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence judgment, which
denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as
existing chiefly in one who has authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to judge?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished except
what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with punishment,
which those who judge not will escape, according to Mt. 7:1, "Judge not,
and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is unlawful to judge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Rm. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest
another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth." Now God
is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 Jn. 1:8, "If we say
that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful for a
sinner to judge, according to Rm. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, O man,
whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou
condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest."
Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint judges
and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people
with just judgment."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice.
Now it follows from what has been stated above (A[1], ad 1,3) that three
conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice: first,
that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come
from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced according to
the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be lacking, the
judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is contrary to the
rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted" or "unjust":
secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has no authority,
and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly, when the reason
lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid motive, forms a
judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it is called
judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is
about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine
states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about
Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe, since
they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on Mt. 5. Or
again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], He forbids the
judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is
written (Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on (Dt.
1:17), "because it is the judgment of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not judge
those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom [*Hom.
xxiv] says on the words of Mt. 7:1, "Judge not." Above all does this hold
when such sins are public, because there would be an occasion of scandal
arising in the hearts of others. If however they are not public but
hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the judge to pronounce
judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility
and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "If we
find that we are guilty of the same sin as another man, we should groan
together with him, and invite him to strive against it together with us."
And yet it is not through acting thus that a man condemns himself so as
to deserve to be condemned once again, but when, in condemning another,
he shows himself to be equally deserving of condemnation on account of
another or a like sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment from
suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about an
evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion is
about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any but
an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human
judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent
matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not lawful
to judge from suspicions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him
unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man's
opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of
another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an
injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (A[1]).
Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus, as stated
above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would always
be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this is false, because "we
cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss of Augustine (Tract. xc in
Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time." Therefore a judgment
based on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on the
words of Mt. 7:1, "Judge not," etc., says: "By this commandment our Lord
does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly motives, but
that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his own
righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on mere
suspicion."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes
evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three
causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very fact,
as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think evil of
others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he walketh in the way,
whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools." Secondly, this is
due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for when a man hates or
despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight
indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what
he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long experience: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "old people are very suspicious, for
they have often experienced the faults of others." The first two causes
of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the
third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads
to certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently
suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the
more vicious it is.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man
begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications. This is a
venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation without which
no man can go through this life," according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5,
"Judge not before the time." The second degree is when a man, from slight
indications, esteems another man's wickedness as certain. This is a
mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without
contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes on to say: "If then
we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human, we must nevertheless
restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a definite and fixed
opinion." The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a
man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, and consequently
is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not indeed
the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the matter in
point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable witnesses.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another
without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does him
an injury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since justice and injustice are about external operations,
as stated above (Q[58], AA[8],10,11; Q[59], A[1], ad 3), the judgment of
suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it is betrayed by external
action, and then it is a mortal sin, as stated above. The internal
judgment pertains to justice, in so far as it is related to the external
judgment, even as the internal to the external act, for instance as
desire is related to fornication, or anger to murder.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best.
Because we should judge from what happens for the most part. But it
happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number of fools
is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and thought of man's
heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gn. 8:21). Therefore doubts
should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he leads
a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and turns
neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a doubtful point
for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not be done.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with regard
to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the worst,
according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it seems that
doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be interpreted for the
worst.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not
judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best
sense."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), things from the very fact
that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures and
despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another
man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have evident
indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by
interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen
to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently
through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently
through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case
an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of
men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good or
evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm
no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question
of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil
if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of the intellect, and
the false is its evil," as stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone
should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the
other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is
considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being
formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is
judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil.
For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a
man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we
may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to
our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither
does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of
contingent singulars in themselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the best
in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to
apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in order for
the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is
expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious
against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil.
Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst, by
deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we
should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and when judging
of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we should always judge according to the written law?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge according to the
written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But written
laws sometimes contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, "Woe to them
that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice." Therefore
we ought not always to judge according to the written law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual happenings.
But no written law can cover each and every individual happening, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it seems that we are not
always bound to judge according to the written law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's intention
may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if the lawgiver
himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore we ought not
always to judge according to the written law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these earthly
laws, though men judge about them when they are making them, when once
they are established and passed, the judges may judge no longer of them,
but according to them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), judgment is nothing else but a
decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just in
two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is called
"natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and this is
called "positive right," as stated above (Q[57], A[2]). Now laws are
written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but in
different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural right,
but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force, not from
the law but from nature: whereas the written law both contains positive
right, and establishes it by giving it force of authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else
judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the written law does not give force to the natural
right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because neither
can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law contains anything
contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has no binding force. For
positive right has no place except where "it matters not," according to
the natural right, "whether a thing be done in one way or in another"; as
stated above (Q[57], A[2], ad 2). Wherefore such documents are to be
called, not laws, but rather corruptions of law, as stated above (FS,
Q[95], A[2]): and consequently judgment should not be delivered according
to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either always
or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too laws that are
rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they were observed they
would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in such cases judgment
should be delivered, not according to the letter of the law, but
according to equity which the lawgiver has in view. Hence the jurist says
[*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25]: "By no reason of law, or
favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render
burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare
of man." In such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise;
and if he had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by being
usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now truth is not
impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from the person who
ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing, no matter who
declares what is just, and this is what is meant by judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is related
to the praise of some that they punished sins without having authority
over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the Egyptian (Ex.
2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri the son of Salu
(Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto justice" (Ps. 105:31).
Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to injustice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now prelates
having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters concerning the
secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to judge
aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown above (A[1],
ad 1,3; A[2]). But a judgment is not described as unjust, if he who
judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the law. Neither
therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, i.e. without
authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest
another man's servant?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced according to the
written law, as stated above (A[5]), he that pronounces judgment,
interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some
particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to interpret
and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by public authority,
so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by public authority, which
extends over those who are subject to the community. Wherefore even as it
would be unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that was
not approved by public authority, so too it is unjust, if a man compels
another to submit to a judgment that is pronounced by other than the
public authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation to accept
it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes. On the other
hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is unjust for anyone to
be judged by one who has no public authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority
received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from
Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian . . . he
thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save
Israel [Vulg.: 'them']." Or it may be replied that Moses slew the
Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked, without
himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. Wherefore Ambrose
says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward off a blow from a
fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker"; and he
quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with Augustine (QQ. Exod.
qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just as "the soil gives proof
of its fertility by producing useless herbs before the useful seeds have
grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a sign of great
fertility," in so far, to wit, as it was a sign of the power whereby he
was to deliver his people.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for God
by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest, he was
nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his concern as
of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex. 22:20; Lev. 20; Dt.
13,17].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as the
body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not usurped if
the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal matters that are
subject to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to the
spiritual by the temporal authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[60] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of the
individual, and consequently their absence does not make a judgment to be
usurped, as in the absence of public authority which gives a judgment its
coercive force.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts,
which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative
justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts,
i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will be
twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And since
restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we must
consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive
justice; (2) restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and
commutative?
(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?
(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?
(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as
counter-passion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative
and distributive?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably
assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is hurtful to the
many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the
common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of the many, if the
goods of the community are distributed among many, both because the goods
of the community would be exhausted, and because the morals of men would
be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes
worse, and the more ready to expect that he will receive again."
Therefore distribution does not belong to any species of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is his
own, as stated above (Q[58], A[2]). But when things are distributed, a
man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed of something
which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not pertain to
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in the
subject, as stated above (Q[58], A[6]). But it belongs exclusively to the
sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic. v,
4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice.
Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a
virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one
person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to many.
Therefore they are not different species of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says
(Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other, commutations."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[58], AA[7],8), particular justice is
directed to the private individual, who is compared to the community as a
part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered in relation to a
part. In the first place there is the order of one part to another, to
which corresponds the order of one private individual to another. This
order is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the
mutual dealings between two persons. In the second place there is the
order of the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order of
that which belongs to the community in relation to each single person.
This order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes common
goods proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice,
distributive and commutative.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation in
his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation to be
observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein distributive
justice directs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that
which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that
when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of
individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community, belongs
to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and yet
distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are
distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution.
Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state
but to the members of a family, and such distribution can be made by
authority of a private individual.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Movement takes its species from the term "whereunto." Hence
it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common good those matters
which concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it belongs to
particular justice to direct the common good to particular individuals by
way of distribution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not only in
respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of different kinds of
due: because common property is due to an individual in one way, and his
personal property in another way.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in
commutative justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to be
observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of these is
a kind of particular justice, as stated above (A[1]). Now the mean is
taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude.
Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way in both
distributive and commutative justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the
mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one
virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the same.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice we
have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person's deserts
are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in punishments;
thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one who strikes a
private individual. Therefore the mean is observed in the same way in
both kinds of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in
distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical proportion,"
whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical proportion."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), in distributive justice something
is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs to the whole
is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the
importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole.
Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of
the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position in the
community. This prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged
according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy
according to liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of
community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not
according to equality between thing and thing, but according to
proportion between things and persons: in such a way that even as one
person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses
that which is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows "geometrical proportion,"
wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example
we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion
equals 1-1/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its
half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6
exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on
account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen
chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found
primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that
the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become
richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will
be equality according to the "arithmetical mean" which is gauged
according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and
4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former, by 1.
Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and one of them
receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one that is the receiver,
will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so there will be
justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that
has 6, and given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which is
the mean.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real mean,
is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore the mean,
in justice, depends on the diversity of things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein
distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find equality
of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find equality of
arithmetical proportion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In actions and passions a person's station affects the
quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince than a
private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's station is
considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is considered in
so far as it causes a diversity of things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for both kinds
of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue, as in the
case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if distributive and
commutative justice have different matters, it would seem that they are
not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive
justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be distributed
among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which very things are
the subject matter of commutations between one person and another, and
this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the matters of
distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from that
of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ specifically,
where there is no specific difference, there ought to be no diversity of
matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons commutative justice as
one species, and yet this has many kinds of matter. Therefore the matter
of these species of justice is, seemingly, not of many kinds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that "one kind of justice
directs distributions, and another commutations."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[51], AA[8],10), justice is about
certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation. These
consist in the use of certain externals, whether things, persons or even
works: of things, as when one man takes from or restores to another that
which is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury to the very person
of another, for instance by striking or insulting him, or even by showing
respect for him; and of works, as when a man justly exacts a work of
another, or does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the matter
of each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are
the use, the matter of distributive and commutative justice is the same,
since things can be distributed out of the common property to
individuals, and be the subject of commutation between one person and
another; and again there is a certain distribution and payment of
laborious works.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the
principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things, and
works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For
distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice
directs commutations that can take place between two persons. of these
some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when anyone
uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will, and this
may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In either case the
offence may be committed against the other man's chattel or person, or
against a person connected with him. If the offence is against his
chattel and this be taken secretly, it is called "theft," if openly, it
is called "robbery." If it be against another man's person, it may affect
either the very substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against
the substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is
treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly
slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be against his personal
dignity, a man is injured secretly by false witness, detractions and so
forth, whereby he is deprived of his good name, and openly, by being
accused in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a
personal connection, a man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly
(for the most part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the
latter be induced to leave his master: which things can also be done
openly. The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever
injury may be committed against the principal, may be committed against
them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master
are properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave
is his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations are
when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. And if he
transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as in the case
of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality. A voluntary
transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the notion of debt,
and this may occur in many ways. First when one man simply transfers his
thing to another in exchange for another thing, as happens in selling and
buying. Secondly when a man transfers his thing to another, that the
latter may have the use of it with the obligation of returning it to its
owner. If he grant the use of a thing gratuitously, it is called
"usufruct" in things that bear fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in
things that bear no fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even
the use is granted gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a
man transfers his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the
purpose of its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or
under some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one
man stands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary
or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the
equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same
species of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the judgment
of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his deeds,
according to Mt. 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you shall be judged:
and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again."
Therefore the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to someone
according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this equality
regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly on what a
person has done for the good of the community; while in commutative
justice it regards the thing in which a person has suffered loss. Now in
respect of either equality there is retaliation in respect of the deed
committed. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same
as retaliation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on the
difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who does an
injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary and
involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the mean of
justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on us. Therefore
it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just is
not always the same as retaliation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes equal passion repaid
for previous action; and the expression applies most properly to
injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of his
neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back. This
kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23,24): "He shall render
life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away what
belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that secondly
retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes loss to another,
should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss is also found in the
Law (Ex. 22:1): "If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and kill or sell it,
he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four sheep for one sheep."
Thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary commutations, where
action and passion are on both sides, although voluntariness detracts
from the nature of passion, as stated above (Q[59], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of
equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely
that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not
always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action.
Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one who
is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species that he
might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not only struck
back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner when a man
despoils another of his property against the latter's will, the action
surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing, because the
man who caused another's loss, himself would lose nothing, and so he is
punished by making restitution several times over, because not only did
he injure a private individual, but also the common weal, the security of
whose protection he has infringed. Nor again would there be equality of
passion in voluntary commutations, were one always to exchange one's
chattel for another man's, because it might happen that the other man's
chattel is much greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to
equalize passion and action in commutations according to a certain
proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented. Hence
retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is no
place for it in distributive justice, because in distributive justice we
do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between passion
and action (whence the expression 'contrapassum'), but according to
proportion between things and persons, as stated above (A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with the
conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are apportioned
to merits, and punishments to sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his
services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive,
justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not between
the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing received by
one person and the thing received by another according to the respective
conditions of those persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[61] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is
aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence it
requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference,
not on part, but on the part of the thing.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] Out. Para. 1/1
OF RESTITUTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight
points of inquiry:
(1) of what is it an act?
(2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what one
has taken away?
(3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?
(4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?
(5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from whom
something has been taken?
(6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to restore
it?
(7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?
(8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether restitution is an act of commutative justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of commutative
justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. Now one may
restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. Therefore
restitution is not the act of any part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be
restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and
passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution
would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away. Now
something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, but also
in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less than his
due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of commutative than of
distributive justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an act
of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another. Therefore
to restore it is an act of that justice which directs commutations.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person
in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in restitution we
consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one thing for
another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Hence restitution is an
act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person having what belongs
to another, either with his consent, for instance on loan or deposit, or
against his will, as in robbery or theft.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly
speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is a
mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another what
is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution, since the
thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same in respect of
the formal aspect of justice, which considers that thing as belonging to
this particular man: and so it is not restitution properly so called.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes something done
over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem originally
to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass from one
person to another, since they remain the same both substantially and in
respect of the right of dominion. But, even as the term "commutation" has
passed from such like things to those actions and passions which confer
reverence or injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term
"restitution" is applied, to things which though they be transitory in
reality, yet remain in their effect; whether this touch his body, as when
the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man
remains defamed or dishonored by injurious words.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to whom
less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the
latter receives so much the more according as he received less than his
due: and consequently it pertains to commutative justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for
salvation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has been
taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for salvation.
But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when a
man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem necessary for
salvation to restore what one has taken from another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for salvation,
for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible,
without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away
another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it is not necessary
for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man loses
his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that which has
been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not
necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is
seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack little is
almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a benefice
or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice, since
this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is not necessary for
salvation to restore what one has taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a man
restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Restitution as stated above (A[1]) is an act of
commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore
restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it is
by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it be
taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need
for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since therefore the
safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is
necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices
to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and our
parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore when that
which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, compensation
should be made as far as possible: for instance if one man has deprived
another of a limb, he must make compensation either in money or in honor,
the condition of either party being duly considered according to the
judgment of a good man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are three ways in which one may take away another's
good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as when a man
reveals another's sin, while observing the right order of so doing, and
then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by saying what is untrue
and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man's good name, by
confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but
unjustly, as when a man reveals another's sin contrarily to the right
order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far
as he can, and yet without telling an untruth; for instance by saying
that he spoke ill, or that he defamed him unjustly; or if he be unable to
restore his good name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in
other cases, as stated above (ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be
undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its effect,
viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the opinion of
other men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from obtaining a
benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view the honor of God
or the good of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more
worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever to make
restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if the intention is to
injure the person whom one hinders, through hatred, revenge or the like.
In this case, if before the benefice has been definitely assigned to
anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by
counseling that it be not conferred on him, one is bound to make some
compensation, after taking account of the circumstances of persons and
things according to the judgment of a prudent person: but one is not
bound in equivalent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and
might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining it. If, on the
other hand, the benefice had already been assigned to a certain person,
and someone, for some undue cause procures its revocation, it is the same
as though he had deprived a man of what he already possessed, and
consequently he would be bound to compensation in equivalent, in
proportion, however, to his means.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the exact
amount taken. For it is written (Ex. 22:1): "If a man shall steal an ox
or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox,
and four sheep for one sheep." Now everyone is bound to keep the
commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is bound to restore
four- or fivefold.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "What things soever were written, were written for our
learning" (Rm. 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Lk. 19:8) to our Lord: "If I
have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold." Therefore a
man is bound to restore several times over the amount he has taken
unjustly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not bound
to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the amount of
his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is bound to pay it,
and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Restitution re-establishes equality where an unjust
taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by repaying the
exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to restore more than
the exact amount taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two things
must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the thing, which
inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the case in loans. The
other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent with equality on the
part of the thing, as when a person intends to use violence but fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution, since
thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough that a man
restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But as regards the
sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the infliction of which belongs
to the judge: and so, until a man is condemned by the judge, he is not
bound to restore more than he took, but when once he is condemned, he is
bound to pay the penalty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law
fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this
commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man is
bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above (FS, Q[104], A[3]).
Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law, and then the same
answer would apply.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was
bound to do; hence he had said already: "Behold . . . the half of my
goods I give to the poor."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more by
way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has not
taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to remove that
loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater than
the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man's seeds, you inflict
on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and thus you would seem
to be bound to make restitution accordingly. Therefore a man is bound to
restore what he has not taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the stated
time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible profits from
that money, and yet he does not really take them. Therefore it seems that
a man is bound to restore what he did not take.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a man
is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him, according
to Mt. 25:26, "Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, and gather where
I have not strewed." Therefore it is just that one should restore to a
man also, something that one has not taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, because it
re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not
take, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make such
a restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Whoever brings a loss upon another person, seemingly,
takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having "less"*
than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English than in Latin,
where 'damnum' stands for 'loss,' and 'minus' for 'less.' Aristotle
merely says that to have more than your own is called 'gain,' and to
have less than you started with is called 'loss.'] Therefore a man is
bound to make restitution according to the loss he has brought upon
another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of what
he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made good by
repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies another by
destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of the house.
Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from obtaining what
he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need not be made good in
equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is less than to have it
actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely
virtually or potentially, and so were he to be indemnified by receiving
the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value taken from him,
but more, and this is not necessary for salvation, as stated above.
However he is bound to make some compensation, according to the condition
of persons and things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections: because
the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not actually but
only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the profit not yet
actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered in many ways.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has sown
in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing either the
shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had received
nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects from us the fruit of
His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us, although the gifts
themselves are from God without us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing
has been taken?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that restitution need not always be made to the
person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful to injure
anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man himself, or to
others, were one to restore to him what has been taken from him; if, for
instance, one were to return a madman his sword. Therefore restitution
need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not
deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that which
another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who
are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always necessary to make
restitution to the person from whom one has taken something.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is
sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a thing
has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too far
away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need not
always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have
received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from others
(our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor. Therefore
sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than make
restitution to one from whom we have taken something.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to the
restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken something
from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it reverts into his
hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's property. Therefore he
ought not to restore to the Church from whom he has taken: and so
restitution should not always be made to the person from whom something
has been taken away
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 13:7): "Render . . . to all men
their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Restitution re-establishes the equality of commutative
justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing to thing, as
stated above (A[2]; Q[58], A[10]). Now this equalizing of things is
impossible, unless he that has less than his due receive what is lacking
to him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to the person
from whom a thing has been taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously
injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other,
it should not be restored to him there and then, because restitution is
directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, since all
possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who retains
another's property must not appropriate it, but must either reserve it,
that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over to another to
keep it more securely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First
through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is the
case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves to lose
what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him: and, since
the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he must not retain the
price, but must use it for some pious object. Secondly a man gives
unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful purpose, albeit the giving
itself is not unlawful, as when a woman receives payment for fornication:
wherefore she may keep what she has received. If, however, she has
extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown
altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance by
giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living):
but not without previously making a careful inquiry about his person. If
the person to whom restitution is due be dead, restitution should be made
to his heir, who is looked upon as one with him. If he be very far away,
what is due to him should be sent to him, especially if it be of great
value and can easily be sent: else it should be deposited in a safe place
to be kept for him, and the owner should be advised of the fact.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his
parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he
ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others; and
he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is due to
another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for then he
could and should even take what belongs to another in order to succor a
parent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the Church
of her property. First by laying hands on Church property which is
committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a bishop
appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is clear that
he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who are its
lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person (for instance a
relative or a friend) Church property committed to himself: in which case
he must make restitution to the Church, and have it under his own care,
so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands
on Church property, merely in intention, when, to wit, he begins to have
a mind to hold it as his own and not in the name of the Church: in which
case he must make restitution by renouncing his intention.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not always bound
to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality of justice, by
taking away from him that has more and giving to him that has less. Now
it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which belongs to another,
no longer has it, through its having passed into another's hands.
Therefore it should be restored, not by the person that took it, but by
the one that has it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by making
restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the case of
theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always bound to
restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several times. Now
sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one of them
restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not
always bound to restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now
restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a thing
is bound to restore it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, With regard to a man who has taken another's property,
two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the taking. By reason
of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his
possession, since the thing that he has in addition to what is his,
should be taken away from him, and given to him who lacks it according to
the form of commutative justice. On the other hand, the taking of the
thing that is another's property, may be threefold. For sometimes it is
injurious, i.e. against the will of the owner, as in theft and robbery:
in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by reason of the
thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even though the thing
is no longer in his possession. For just as a man who strikes another,
though he gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured
person, so too he that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make
compensation for the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in
addition he must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man
takes another's property for his own profit but without committing an
injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan: and
then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of the thing,
but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the thing: for he
is bound to compensate the person who has done him a favor, and he would
not be doing so if the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, a man takes
another's property without injury to the latter or profit to himself, as
in the case of a deposit; wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no
obligation on account of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor;
but he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken.
Consequently if this thing be taken from him without any fault on his
part, he is not bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to
lose the thing through a grievous fault on his part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has more
than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than his due
may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those
things which one man may receive from another without loss to the latter,
as when a person takes a light from another's candle. Consequently
although he that has taken something from another, may have ceased to
have what he took, through having transferred it to another, yet since
that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to restitution, he
that took the thing, on account of the injurious taking, and he that has
it, on account of the thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to other
men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so he may
make restitution of another's property through the priest to whom he
confesses.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the compensation
for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing has been taken
unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received sufficient
compensation from one, the others are not bound to any further
restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the person who has
made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse them from so doing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who have
not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now none should
be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to
restitution save the one who has taken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's
property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who takes a
thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way whatever,
the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both
because he would receive restitution many times over, and because
sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away from
someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the others are
not bound to restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in order to
safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would expose himself to
the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him.
Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not betraying or
withstanding a thief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 1:32): "They who do such things are
worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that
consent to them that do them." Therefore in like manner they that consent
are bound to restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), a person is bound to restitution
not only on account of someone else's property which he has taken, but
also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an
unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly
and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to take, and this in
three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by moving a man to take,
either by express command, counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for
his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving
him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the
thing taken, by taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow
evil-doer. Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from
evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by
omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or
robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by
sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Body Para. 2/4
"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by
participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Body Para. 3/4
It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator
is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of command: because he
that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution
principally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one without
whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in the case of
receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives them
assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation; when a man takes part
in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the
theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority
who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if
by their neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them
in payment of their preserving justice here below.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] Body Para. 4/4
In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to
restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the efficacious
cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is bound to
restitution, only when it may be judged with probability that the unjust
taking resulted from such causes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the sin,
but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counselling,
or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the principal in
the deed; first of all, the "commander"; secondly, the "executor," and in
due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution,
another is not bound to make restitution to the same person. Yet those
who are principals in the deed, and who took possession of the thing, are
bound to compensate those who have already made restitution. When a man
commands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution has to be
made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who
has been unjustly injured.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or
reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he is
obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly
princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they are invested
with public authority, in order that they may maintain justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution, or may he put it off?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate restitution,
and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative precepts do not bind
for always. Now the necessity of making restitution is binding through an
affirmative precept. Therefore a man is not bound to immediate
restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is
sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is
bound to immediate restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice. Now
time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts. Since then
the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are
determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems that neither
in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a man be bound to restore
at once.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All matters of restitution seem to come under one head.
Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not delay
compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, "The wages of him that hath
been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning."
Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of restitution, to delay,
and restitution should be made at once.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Even as it is a sin against justice to take another's
property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold the property
of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him of the use of what
belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it is wrong
to remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to renounce
one's sin at once, according to Ecclus. 21:2, "Flee from sin as from the
face of a serpent." Consequently one is bound to immediate restitution,
if possible, or to ask for a respite from the person who is empowered to
grant the use of the thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the precept about the making of restitution is
affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to
withhold another's property.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this very inability
excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is altogether
excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it. He
is, however, bound either himself or through another to ask the person to
whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission or a respite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[62] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to
virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we are
bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a sin of
unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands to reason
that the time is determinate in the point of restitution being immediate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] Out. Para. 1/2
VICES OPPOSED TO DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (Q[63])
OF RESPECT OF PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of
justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed to
distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed to
commutative justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether respect of persons is a sin?
(2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities?
(3) Whether it takes place in showing honor?
(4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether respect of persons is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For the word
"person" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf. FP, Q[29], A[3],
ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to consider personal
dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than
things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not conversely.
But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore, is respect of
persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to
respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes
upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to Mt.
24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field' [*'Bed' is the reading of
Lk. 17:34]], one shall be taken, and one shall be left." Therefore
respect of persons is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law. Now
respect of persons is forbidden, Dt. 1:17: "Neither shall you respect any
man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice.
For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various
things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity.
Accordingly, if one considers that personal property by reason of which
the thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is respect
not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss on Eph. 6:9, "There is
no respect of persons with God [Vulg.: 'Him']," says that "a just judge
regards causes, not persons." For instance if you promote a man to a
professorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider
the due cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on
someone, you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is
proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular man
(e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person, since you
give him something not for some cause that renders him worthy of it, but
simply because he is this person. And any circumstance that does not
amount to a reason why this man be worthy of this gift, is to be referred
to his person: for instance if a man promote someone to a prelacy or a
professorship, because he is rich or because he is a relative of his, it
is respect of persons. It may happen, however, that a circumstance of
person makes a man worthy as regards one thing, but not as regards
another: thus consanguinity makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an
estate, but not to be chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority:
wherefore consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to
respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows,
accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice
in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but sin is
opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In distributive justice we consider those circumstances of
a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of persons
we consider circumstances that do not so result.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of things
which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things pertaining
to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to be
considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the persons
themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though it were;
and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy, absolutely
speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is a twofold giving. one belongs to justice, and
occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of
persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one
gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of the
gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a giving there
is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may, without
injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he will,
according to Mt. 20:14,15, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? .
. Take what is thine, and go thy way."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether respect of persons takes place in the dispensation of spiritual
goods?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in the
dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to savor of respect of
persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice on account of
consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby a man is
rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet this apparently is not
a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are wont to do so. Therefore the sin
of respect of persons does not take place in the conferring of spiritual
goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a poor
man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James 2:2,3.
Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees are more
readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others. Therefore the
sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the dispensation of
spiritual goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it suffices
to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one choose the better
man. But it would seem to savor of respect of persons to choose one who
is less good for a higher position. Therefore respect of persons is not a
sin in spiritual matters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum dilectus.)
the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock." Now this would
seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more competent persons
would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in
spiritual matters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:1): "Have not the faith of our
Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." On these words a gloss
of Augustine says: "Who is there that would tolerate the promotion of a
rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the exclusion of a poor
man more learned and holier?" [*Augustine, Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), respect of persons is a sin, in
so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in which
justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that, spiritual
things being of greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a
more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispensing
temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when something is
allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts, it must be
observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in two ways. First,
simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who abounds the more in
the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly, in relation to
the common good; for it happens at times that the less holy and less
learned man may conduce more to the common good, on account of worldly
authority or activity, or something of the kind. And since the
dispensation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the common good,
according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to
every man unto profit," it follows that in the dispensation of
spiritualities the simply less good are sometimes preferred to the
better, without respect of persons, just as God sometimes bestows
gratuitous graces on the less worthy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's
kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely speaking,
and in relation to the common good: and then if they are preferred to the
more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in the dispensation of
spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical superior is not the owner,
with power to give them away as he will, but the dispenser, according to
1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ,
and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Sometimes however the
prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then without respect of
persons he can lawfully give preference to his kindred since there is at
least this advantage, that he can trust the more in their being of one
mind with him in conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have
to forego so doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example
from him and give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard
to their deserts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use for
the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more
necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so that
there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more readily to
such persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of
law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect the
better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw. But as
regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect one who is
better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the common good.
For if it is possible to have one who is more competent for a post, and
yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have some cause for this. If
this cause have anything to do with the matter in point, he who is
elected will, in this respect, be more competent; and if that which is
taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it will clearly be
respect of persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The man who is taken from among the members of a particular
Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the common good,
since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up. For this reason
it was commanded (Dt. 17:15): "Thou mayest not make a man of another
nation king, who is not thy brother."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether respect of persons takes place in showing honor and respect?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in
showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing else than
"reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes should be
honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of whom it is
written (Ex. 20:12): "Honor thy father and thy mother." Again masters,
though they be wicked, should be honored by their servants, according to
1 Tim. 6:1: "Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their
masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to
respect persons in showing honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): "Rise up before the hoary
head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to savor of
respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous; according
to Dan. 13:5: "Iniquity came out from the ancients of the people [*Vulg.:
'Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges, that seemed to
govern the people.']." Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in
showing honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, on the words of James 2:1, "Have not the faith . . .
with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.]
says: "If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into your assembly a
man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily meetings, who sins
not here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is respect of persons to
honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory says in a homily (xxviii in
Evang.): "Our pride is blunted, since in men we honor, not the nature
wherein they are made to God's image, but wealth," so that, wealth not
being a due cause of honor, this will savor of respect of persons.
Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on James 2:1, says: "Whoever honors the rich
for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored for
other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this savors of
respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing
honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, To honor a person is to recognize him as having virtue,
wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored. Now it
is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own
virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and prelates, although they
be wicked, are honored as standing in God's place, and as representing
the community over which they are placed, according to Prov. 26:8, "As he
that casteth a stone into the heap of Mercury, so is he that giveth honor
to a fool." For, since the gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to
Mercury, "the heap of Mercury" signifies the casting up of an account,
when a merchant sometimes substitutes a pebble [*'Lapillus' or 'calculus'
whence the English word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a
fool honored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community:
and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account of
their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and Lord of
all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of virtue,
though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis. 4:8,9,
"venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of
years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs, and a spotless life
is old age." The rich ought to be honored by reason of their occupying a
higher position in the community: but if they be honored merely for their
wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin of respect of persons takes place in judicial sentences?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not take
place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is opposed to
distributive justice, as stated above (A[1]): whereas judicial sentences
seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore respect of
persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now it
is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a heavier
punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on
one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect of persons does
not take place in judicial sentences.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In judging be merciful to
the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the person of the
needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of persons is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not good to accept
the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the person of
the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[60], A[1]), judgment is an act of
justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice,
those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of
persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted
to a person out of that proportion to him in which the equality of
justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment is rendered
corrupt by respect of persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view of
the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to commutative and
distributive justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some
common good is to be distributed among many, and how one person is to
restore to another what he has taken from him. Secondly, it may be
considered in view of the form of judgment, in as much as, even in
commutative justice, the judge takes from one and gives to another, and
this belongs to distributive justice. In this way respect of persons may
take place in any judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a
crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of persons,
because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, a diversity
of things, as stated above (Q[58], A[10], ad 3; Q[61], A[2], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[63] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy as
far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying of Ex.
23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] Out. Para. 1/2
VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE (QQ[64]-81)
(A) BY DEEDS (QQ[64]-66)
�OF MURDER (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative
justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation
to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to
voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary
commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor against his will: and
this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when
one's neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person
connected with him, or in his possessions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] Out. Para. 2/2
We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first
place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury
on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?(2) Whether
it is lawful to kill a sinner?
(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public
person only?
(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?
(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?
(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?
(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the Apostle
says (Rm. 13:2): "They that resist the ordinance of God purchase to
themselves damnation [*Vulg.: 'He that resisteth the power, resisteth the
ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase themselves
damnation.']." Now Divine providence has ordained that all living things
should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8,9, "Who maketh grass to grow
on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts their food." Therefore it
seems unlawful to take the life of any living thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life. Now
life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same reason it is
apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not appointed
save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted, according
to the Divine law, on one who killed another man's ox or sheep (Ex.
22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "When we hear it
said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to trees, for
they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no
fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, 'Thou shalt not
kill' refer to the killing of a man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for
which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for
the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from
imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation of
a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so
too things, like the plants, which merely have life, are all alike for
animals, and all animals are for man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if man
use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as
the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that
animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be
done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to
take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the
use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God
Himself: for it is written (Gn. 1:29,30): "Behold I have given you every
herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all beasts of the
earth": and again (Gn. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be
meat to you."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and
plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both
their life and their death are subject to our use."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason
whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were by
another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are
naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing the
ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is
not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For our Lord
in the parable (Mt. 13) forbade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes
wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by God is a
sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now
according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance,
according to Ezech. 33:11, "I desire not the death of the wicked, but
that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore it seems
altogether unjust to kill sinners.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do that
which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii) and
the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself,
since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and "we wish our
friends to live and to exist," according to Ethic. ix, 4. Therefore it is
nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not
suffer to live"; and (Ps. 100:8): "In the morning I put to death all the
wicked of the land."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), it is lawful to kill dumb
animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as the
imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed to the
whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the
sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the
whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or
infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and
advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared
to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous
and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is
praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the
common good, since "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump" (1 Cor.
5:6).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the
cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the
wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either
because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many
followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as
Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that
we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be
delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to
death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger,
but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the
latter may be lawfully put to death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes slays
sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He
allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for
His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers;
for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows
time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and
consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he
is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish
state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to
others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did
not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like
to them," and Prov. 11:29: "The fool shall serve the wise." Hence,
although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his
dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is
to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more
harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii, 6).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has
sinned?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a man who
has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine law. Yet, on
account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded (Ex. 32:27): "Let
every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor." Therefore it is
lawful for private individuals to kill a sinner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), man, on account of sin, is
compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private individual to
kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. Therefore for the same
reason, it is lawful for any private individual to kill a man who has
sinned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise for
doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of evildoers is
useful for the common good, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore it is
deserving of praise if even private individuals kill evil-doers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque
percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: "A man who, without exercising public
authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all
the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not given
him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), it is lawful to kill an evildoer
in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so
that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community's welfare.
Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has
been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body. Now the
care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public
authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can
lawfully put evildoers to death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done really does
the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "He slays not who owes his service to one
who commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument to him that
wields it." Wherefore those who, at the Lord's command, slew their
neighbors and friends, would seem not to have done this themselves, but
rather He by whose authority they acted thus: just as a soldier slays the
foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays the
robber by the authority of the judge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the
case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill it;
whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not
for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On the other hand a
man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men; hence a
public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to death for the
common good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do anything for
the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some
other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person
to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts for the
welfare of the whole.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For clerics
especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye
followers of me as I also am of Christ," whereby we are called upon to
imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we worship puts
evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their
firstborn." Again Moses made the Levites slay twenty-three thousand men
on account of the worship of the calf (Ex. 32), the priest Phinees slew
the Israelite who went in to the woman of Madian (Num. 25), Samuel killed
Agag king of Amalec (1 Kgs. 15), Elias slew the priests of Baal (3 Kgs.
18), Mathathias killed the man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1
Mach. 2); and, in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira
(Acts 5). Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is more
united to God. Now the secular power as "God's minister" lawfully puts
evil-doers to death, according to Rm. 13:4. Much more therefore may
clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual power, put evil-doers
to death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully
exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely
office to slay evildoers, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore those clerics
who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3): "It behooveth . . . a
bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is the
reading in Tit. 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons.
First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon is
represented the Passion of Christ slain "Who, when He was struck did not
strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']" (1 Pt. 2:23).
Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for ministers should
imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, "As the judge of the
people is himself, so also are his ministers." The other reason is
because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein
no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore they
should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting
ministers of the New Testament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God works in all things without exception whatever is
right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone should
imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence, though God
slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that all should
imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put Ananias and Saphira
to death by his own authority or with his own hand, but published their
death sentence pronounced by God. The Priests or Levites of the Old
Testament were the ministers of the Old Law, which appointed corporal
penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay with their own hands.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things
than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual
welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor matters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly
princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but
that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their
authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder is a
sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an
injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man sins
by killing himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public authority, to
kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes an
evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser
danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a man to cut
off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his whole body.
Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil, for
example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill
himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and yet
he is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful for a
man to kill himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is related (2 Mach. 14:42) that a certain Razias
killed himself, "choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands
of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble birth." Now
nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide is
not unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "Hence it follows
that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man---not
another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills himself, kills
nothing else than a man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three
reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result
being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists
corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the
inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love
himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the
natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as such,
belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as
such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he injures
the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Thirdly,
because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His power, Who kills
and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against God,
even as he who kills another's slave, sins against that slave's master,
and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to
him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life,
according to Dt. 32:39, "I will kill and I will make to live."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to
justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should
have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to
oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by reason
also of its opposition to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to
death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is
judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises public
authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever: although he may
lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will:
wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which
pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the passage
from this life to another and happier one is subject not to man's
free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take
his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that he may escape
any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because the ultimate and
most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon oneself in order to
escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt a greater evil in
order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is unlawful to take one's own
life on account of one's having committed a sin, both because by so doing
one does oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the time
needful for repentance, and because it is not lawful to slay an evildoer
except by the sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for
a woman to kill herself lest she be violated, because she ought not to
commit on herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sir;
of another. For she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided
she does not consent, since "without consent of the mind there is no
stain on the body," as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that
fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's,
especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous, because
one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is
most dangerous since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance.
Again it is not lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should
consent to sin, because "evil must not be done that good may come" (Rm.
3:8) or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small
account and an uncertain event, for it is uncertain whether one will at
some future time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from
sin under any temptation whatever.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "not even Samson is
to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies under the
ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought many wonders
through him, had secretly commanded him to do this." He assigns the same
reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the time of persecution
took their own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from
being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that he
may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal
evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason some, among
whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act from fortitude),
yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness of soul unable to
bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De
Civ. Dei 22,23) declare.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the
innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on the
contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus. 1:27). Now
Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing to
slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, kill an innocent
person.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one's
neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous
injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a
greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the
latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to
the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to kill a
sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous
person.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not
a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice,
to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound to
judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom he knows to
be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; and again the
executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to death the man who has
been unjustly sentenced.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:7): "The innocent and just person
thou shalt not put to death."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, An individual man may be considered in two ways: first,
in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man
in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he
be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is
destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above (A[2]) the
slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which
is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of righteous men
preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of
the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both the
sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills an
innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he executes:
indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he fears Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the
essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just man,
sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he
injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to
charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less
deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice: thirdly,
because he deprives the community of a greater good: fourthly, because he
despises God more, according to Lk. 10:16, "He that despiseth you
despiseth Me." On the other hand it is accidental to the slaying that the
just man whose life is taken be received by God into glory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false
witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with
great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he
cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If
even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in
accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent
man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out
the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the
sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there
would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it
contain no manifest injustice, he does not has no right to discuss the
judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but
the judge whose minister he is.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in
self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not
agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him;
unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it
not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be
in keeping with one's person." Now he who kills a man in self-defense,
kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be
unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from sin
in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's life for
the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among contemptible things he
reckons "those which men may forfeit unwillingly," as appears from the
context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief of these is the life of the
body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another's life for the
sake of the life of his own body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis]
says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom you have
consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as
to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their
former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it
lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever." Now
clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts.
Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or
adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery
or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the
spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no
man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in order to save his
own life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Mt.
7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to Rm.
12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my dearly
beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also
unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found
breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he
that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more lawful
to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty
of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one
of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral
acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according
to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained
above (Q[43], A[3]; FS, Q[12], A[1]). Accordingly the act of self-defense
may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the
slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to
save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to
everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though
proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it
be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense,
uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he
repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according
to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it
is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the
limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a
man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the
other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of
another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the
public authority acting for the common good, as stated above (A[3]), it
is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except
for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in
self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier
fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling
with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private
animosity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one
man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage
quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense.
Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things," whereby he
indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second
Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking
a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man
to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense,
is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily
directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence
sometimes results the taking of a man's life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which comes
from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending
yourselves---that is, not striking your enemy back."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Out. Para. 1/1
Whether one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing
someone by chance. For we read (Gn. 4:23,24) that Lamech slew a man in
mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does not say so, but
this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gn. 4:23], and that he was
accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder
through killing a man by chance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a woman
with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue thereupon,
he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen without any intention
of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder through killing
someone by chance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons
prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not due
save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt
of murder.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we do a
thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause
harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us." Now it sometimes
happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done
for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted
guilty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance is a
cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance happenings,
strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And since every
sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it follows
that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary
and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally, according as that
which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who
does not remove something whence homicide results whereas he ought to
remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in
two ways: first when a man causes another's death through occupying
himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid: secondly, when he
does not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists, if a man
pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a
person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person's death: whereas
if he be occupied with something unlawful, or even with something lawful,
but without due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his
action results in someone's death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man's
life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful:
wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of the
animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing
that death is the natural result of such a blow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[64] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to the canons a penalty, is inflicted on those
who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or
failing to take sufficient care.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] Out. Para. 1/1
OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The mutilation of members;
(2) Blows;
(3) Imprisonment;
(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are
aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone.
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists in departing
from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to
nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God that a man's body
should be entire in its members, and it is contrary to nature that it
should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems that it is always a
sin to maim a person.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the parts
of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it is unlawful
to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by public authority.
Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps by public
authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the
welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself for
the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P. I, sect.
4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they might
preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to
maim a person.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for
the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member
of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for
the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself useful to the good
of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen to be hurtful, as when
a decayed member is a source of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly
so long as a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it
cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But as the whole of
man is directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he
is a part, as stated above (Q[61], A[1]; Q[64], AA[2],5), it may happen
that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole
body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so
far as it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of
restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully
deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so
is he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is
not lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner
of the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, to
whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed
and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful
with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the member for
the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care
of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of
the person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who
has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim anyone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular
nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and
corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular nature
of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with universal
nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to the particular
nature of the body of the person maimed, is nevertheless in keeping with
natural reason in relation to the common good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to something
belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed to
his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone's
life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted the procuring
of the common good. But the removal of a member can be directed to the
good of one man, and consequently in certain cases can pertain to him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily
health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to further the
good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further one's spiritual
welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is always
subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it allowable to maim
oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever. Hence Chrysostom, in his
exposition on Mt. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth.), "There are eunuchs who
have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," says: "Not by
maiming themselves, but by destroying evil thoughts, for a man is
accursed who maims himself, since they are murderers who do such things."
And further on he says: "Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it
becomes more importunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources,
and chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and
temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing
one's thoughts."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters
their slaves?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their children, or
masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4): "You, fathers,
provoke not your children to anger"; and further on (Eph. 9:6): "And you,
masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing
threatenings." Now some are provoked to anger by blows, and become more
troublesome when threatened. Therefore neither should parents strike
their children, nor masters their slaves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's
words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind of coercion.
Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their children.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this
belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q[32], A[2]). If,
therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake
of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to
strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion
follows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod
hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not correction
from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou
shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell." Again it is
written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters are for a malicious slave."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when it
is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while a blow
merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm
than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm,
except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. Again, no man justly
punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction.
Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have
some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject
to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a
parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that
instruction may be enforced by correction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused
chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher
states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their
children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their children
for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on them without
moderation. The command that masters should forbear from threatening
their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that they should be
slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correction;
secondly, that they should not always carry out their threats, that is
that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness temper the judgment
whereby they threatened punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion. Now
just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city has
perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable punishments
such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father and the master
who preside over the family household, which is an imperfect community,
have imperfect coercive power, which is exercised by inflicting lesser
punishments, for instance by blows, which do not inflict irreparable harm.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing
subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only
who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which deals with
undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above (FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now
man, having a free-will, is undue matter for imprisonment which is
inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is unlawful to imprison a man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now
according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God left man in the hand of his own
counsel." Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains
or prisons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from doing an
evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from doing this. If,
therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to restrain him
from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a man in prison;
and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for the
sin of blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In the goods three things may be considered in due order.
First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is injured by
death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this
striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the
movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by binding or
imprisoning or any kind of detention.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless
it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or as
a measure of precaution against some evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to
lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of his
members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the order of His wisdom God sometimes
restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to Job 5:12: "Who
bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hand
cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes He allows them to
do what they will." In like manner, according to human justice, men are
imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain ones.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from
doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another
from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. But to
him alone who has the right of disposing in general of the actions and of
the life of another does it belong primarily to imprison or fetter,
because by so doing he hinders him from doing not only evil but also good
deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are
perpetrated on those who are connected with others?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact that the
aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with
others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from inflicting an
injury on another against his will. Now the evil inflicted on a man's own
person is more against his will than that which is inflicted on a person
connected with him. Therefore an injury inflicted on a person connected
with another is less grievous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries to
orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): "He will not
despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out
her complaint." Now the widow and the orphan are not connected with other
persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated through an injury being
inflicted on one who is connected with others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own just
as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary for him
and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the case of
adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these injuries
are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary commutation.
Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 28:32) as though indicating an
aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to
another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons and thy
daughters be given,' etc.]."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous
sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it is a
more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a
private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole
community, as stated above (FS, Q[73], A[9]). Now when an injury is
inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that injury
affects two persons, so that, other things being equal, the sin is
aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view of
certain circumstances, a sin committed against one who is not connected
with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either the dignity
of the person, or the greatness of the injury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with others is
less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it were
perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a less
grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the person with whom
he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is guilty through
injuring the other one in himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted upon
both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same injury
done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have no one to
turn to for relief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[65] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the
adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is concerned,
for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed her by
violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her husband,
since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the husband" (1 Cor.
7:4). The same applies to similar cases. of adultery, however, as it is
opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, we shall speak in the
treatise on Temperance (Q[154], A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures
his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] Out. Para. 2/2
Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?
(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?
(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?
(5) Whether every theft is a sin?
(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?
(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?
(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?
(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess external
things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is God's. Now the
dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according to Ps. 23:1, "The
earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it is not natural for man to possess
external things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Lk.
12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my goods,"
says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine? where did you
take them from and bring them into being?" Now whatever man possesses
naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not
naturally possess external things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad
Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power." But man has no power over
external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore
the possession of external things is not natural to man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all
things under his feet."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as
regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but
only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as
regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over
external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them
for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the imperfect
is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above (Q[64], A[1]). It
is by this argument that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the
possession of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural
dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent to man in
respect of his reason wherein God's image resides, is shown forth in
man's creation (Gn. 1:26) by the words: "Let us make man to our image and
likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and He,
according to His providence, directed certain things to the sustenance of
man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as
regards the power to make use of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external things to
belong to him principally, as though he had not received them from
another, namely from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the dominion over external things
as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God alone, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his own.
For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now according to
the natural law all things are common property: and the possession of
property is contrary to this community of goods. Therefore it is unlawful
for any man to appropriate any external thing to himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted
above (A[1], OBJ[2]), says: "The rich who deem as their own property the
common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by going
beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and appropriate to
themselves what is intended for common use." Now it would be unlawful to
prevent others from obtaining possession of common goods. Therefore it is
unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words are
quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: "Let no man call
his own that which is common property": and by "common" he means external
things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems unlawful for a
man to appropriate an external thing to himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): "The
'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves
that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who are
married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and clerics
who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic Church." Now
the reason why these people are heretics was because severing themselves
from the Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the above
things, which they themselves lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore
it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess
property.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior
things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard
it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary to
human life for three reasons. First because every man is more careful to
procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to
all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which
concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of
servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly
fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing
himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after
any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is
ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be
observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division
of the things possessed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things
is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things, not
as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate
them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18):
"Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to
others," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that
the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common
and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because the
division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather
arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as stated above
(Q[57], AA[2],3). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to
the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand to
the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if by so
doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does not
act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking possession of
something which at first was common property, and gives others a share:
but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from using it. Hence
Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you rich while another is
poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and
he the reward of patience?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that which is
common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds:
"He who spends too much is a robber."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another's thing secretly?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take another's
thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not, apparently,
belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends to diminish a
sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as indicating an aggravating
circumstance of the sin of some (Is. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad
their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it." Therefore it is not
essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's thing
secretly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A[2], OBJ[3], Can.
Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii]:
"It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to refuse to
succor the needy when you can and are well off." Therefore just as theft
consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist in keeping it
back.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that which
is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with another, or
that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it is not essential
to theft that it should consist in taking another's thing secretly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Fur' [thief] is derived from
'furvus' and so from 'fuscus' [dark], because he takes advantage of the
night."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Three things combine together to constitute theft. The
first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to each
one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of
what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from
those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and
adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be about a thing
possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as a possession but
as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person
connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his daughter or his
wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference
is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in a thing
being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly to theft
that it consists in "taking another's thing secretly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man employs
secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and guile. In
this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a species of sin: and
thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a circumstance of
sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a sign of shame, and
because it removes scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same kind
of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention is
included in an unjust taking.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person simply,
from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit belongs simply
to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is the depositary's,
and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply, but as regards its
custody.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of different
species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and "manifest": because
theft is taking something secretly, while robbery is to take something
violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of sins, the secret and the
manifest do not differ specifically. Therefore theft and robbery are not
different species of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as stated
above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; Q[18], A[6]). Now theft and robbery are directed
to the same end, viz. the possession of another's property. Therefore
they do not differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of
possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore Isidore
says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the
victim of the rape is said to be corrupted." Now it is a case of rape
whether the woman be carried off publicly or secretly. Therefore the
thing appropriated is said to be taken by force, whether it be done
secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and robbery do not differ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft from
robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that robbery is
done openly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in as
much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an
injustice willingly," as stated in Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and
robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being involuntary
on the part of the person from whom something is taken. Now the
involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through ignorance,
as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect of robbery
differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not derived
from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to justice: and so
where there is a different kind of involuntary, there is a different
species of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But this
is not enough for identity of species, because there is a difference of
proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing by his own power,
but the thief, by cunning.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of the
woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards the others
from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the part of the
woman to whom violence is done.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether theft is always a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin is
commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath commanded
no man to do wickedly." Yet we find that God commanded theft, for it is
written (Ex. 12:35,36): "And the children of Israel did as the Lord had
commanded Moses [Vulg.: 'as Moses had commanded']. . . and they stripped
the Egyptians." Therefore theft is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it, he
seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. Yet this seems
lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See loc. cit.
in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin,
because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy its
equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his own
property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another. Therefore
it seems that theft is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:15): "Thou shalt not steal."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will find
that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its opposition to
justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for this reason
theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking of what belongs to
another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the thief,
by laying hands on another's property secretly and cunningly. Wherefore
it is evident that every theft is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is no theft for a man to take another's property either
secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him to do so,
because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is adjudicated to him
by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was it a theft for the
Israelites to take away the spoils of the Egyptians at the command of the
Lord, Who ordered this to be done on account of the ill-treatment
accorded to them by the Egyptians without any cause: wherefore it is
written significantly (Wis. 10:19): "The just took the spoils of the
wicked."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be made.
For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for instance
precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such the finder is
allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst. II, i, De rerum
divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden underground long since and
belonging to no man, except that according to civil law the finder is
bound to give half to the owner of the land, if the treasure trove be in
the land of another person [*Inst. II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris].
Hence in the parable of the Gospel (Mt. 13:44) it is said of the finder
of the treasure hidden in a field that he bought the field, as though he
purposed thus to acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On
the other Land the treasure-trove may be nearly in someone's possession:
and then if anyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of
returning it to the owner who does not look upon such things as
unappropriated, he is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing
found appears to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be
so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47].
In any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De
acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48]: wherefore Augustine says
in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): "If thou hast found a
thing and not returned it, thou hast stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si
quid invenisti).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is deposited
with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound either to
restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly guilty of
sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On the other hand
he who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be unjustly detained
by another, he sins indeed; yet not because he burdens the retainer, and
so he is not bound to restitution or compensation: but he sins against
general justice by disregarding the order of justice and usurping
judgment concerning his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to
God and endeavor to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor
by acting this way.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[6] Out. Para. 1/1
Whether theft is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is written
(Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath stolen." But
every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But in
the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according to Ex.
22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he shall restore have oxen
for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Therefore theft is not a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great things.
But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with eternal death for
the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a quill. Therefore theft
is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for a
mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to Zach. 5:3,
"This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the earth; for every
thief shall be judged as is there written." Therefore theft is a mortal
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[59], A[4]; FS, Q[72], A[5]), a mortal
sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of the soul.
Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and secondarily in
the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing and doing him
well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his
belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human society
would be undone. Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity, is a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is in view of
two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through necessity. This
necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we shall show further on
(A[7]). Hence the text continues: "For he stealeth to fill his hungry
soul." Secondly, theft is stated not to be a great fault in comparison
with the guilt of adultery, which is punished with death. Hence the text
goes on to say of the thief that "if he be taken, he shall restore
sevenfold . . . but he that is an adulterer . . . shall destroy his own
soul."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than
retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which is
pronounced against sinners "according to truth" (Rm. 2:2). Wherefore,
according to the judgment of the present life the death punishment is
inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as inflict an
irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible deformity.
Hence according to the present judgment the pain of death is not
inflicted for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm, except
when it is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in the case of
sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of peculation, which is
theft of common property, as Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.),
and of kidnaping which is stealing a man, for which the pain of death is
inflicted (Ex. 21:16).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so that a
man does not consider himself injured in very little matters: and the
person who takes such things can presume that this is not against the
will of the owner. And if a person take such like very little things, he
may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet if his intention is
to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a mortal sin even in these
very little things, even as there may be through consent in a mere
thought.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need. For
penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is stated
(Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress of hunger or
nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance for three
weeks." Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there are some
actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among these he reckons
theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for a good end.
Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy a need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now,
according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in
order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither
is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In cases of need all things are common property, so
that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, for need
has made it common.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Things which are of human right cannot derogate from
natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order
established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the
purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the division
and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not preclude
the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means of these very
things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by
natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this reason
Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A[2], OBJ[3]] says, and his words are embodied in
the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): "It is the hungry man's bread
that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you store away, the money
that you bury in the earth is the price of the poor man's ransom and
freedom."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible
for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted
with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come
to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so
manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be
remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in
some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is
lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another's property,
by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking
theft or robbery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and
use another's property in a case of extreme need: because that which he
takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of
that need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly
another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether robbery may be committed without sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin. For
spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the essence of
robbery, according to what has been said (A[4]). Now it is lawful to take
spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch. 4 [*De Abraham i,
3]): "When the conqueror has taken possession of the spoils, military
discipline demands that all should be reserved for the sovereign," in
order, to wit, that he may distribute them. Therefore in certain cases
robbery is lawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now the
things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine says (Ep. ad
Vincent. Donat. xciii.): "You falsely call things your own, for you do
not possess them justly, and according to the laws of earthly kings you
are commanded to forfeit them." Therefore it seems that one may lawfully
rob unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from their
subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem a
grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that case
nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases robbery is
lawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God in
sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds of
robbery, according to Is. 61:8, "I am the Lord that love judgment, and
hate robbery in a holocaust." Therefore it is not lawful to take anything
by robbery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion employed
in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in human society no
man can exercise coercion except through public authority: and,
consequently, if a private individual not having public authority takes
another's property by violence, he acts unlawfully and commits a robbery,
as burglars do. As regards princes, the public power is entrusted to them
that they may be the guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them
to use violence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice---either
by fighting against the enemy, or against the citizens, by punishing
evil-doers: and whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the
spoils of robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand
to take other people's property violently and against justice, in the
exercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty of
robbery; and whoever does so is bound to restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For if
they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such things
as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no robbery,
so that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even they who are
engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through cupidity arising
from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight chiefly not for justice
but for spoil. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that
"it is a sin to fight for booty." If, however, those who take the spoil,
are waging an unjust war, they are guilty of robbery, and are bound to
restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as they
are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those goods. Hence
these may be taken violently from them, not by private but by public
authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects that
which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good, even if
they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something unduly by
means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): "If justice be disregarded, what is a king but
a mighty robber? since what is a robber but a little king?" And it is
written (Ezech. 22:27): "Her princes in the midst of her, are like wolves
ravening the prey." Wherefore they are bound to restitution, just as
robbers are, and by so much do they sin more grievously than robbers, as
their actions are fraught with greater and more universal danger to
public justice whose wardens they are.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether theft is a more grievous sin than robbery?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than robbery. For
theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another's property: and these
things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and guile are sinful in
themselves, as stated above (Q[55], AA[4],5). Therefore theft is a more
grievous sin than robbery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, shame is fear about a wicked deed, as stated in Ethic.
iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery. Therefore theft
is more wicked than robbery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous it
would seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured by theft:
whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is possible to
use violence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft seems to be more
grievous than the sin of robbery.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to the laws robbery is more severely punished
than theft.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above (AA[4],6),
on account of the involuntariness on the part of the person from whom
something is taken: yet so that in theft the involuntariness is due to
ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to violence. Now a thing is more
involuntary through violence than through ignorance, because violence is
more directly opposed to the will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a
more grievous sin than theft. There is also another reason, since robbery
not only inflicts a loss on a person in his things, but also conduces to
the ignominy and injury of his person, and this is of graver import than
fraud or guile which belong to theft. Hence the Reply to the First
Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Men who adhere to sensible things think more of external
strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal virtue which is
forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed of robbery than of
theft.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[66] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although more persons may be injured by theft than by
robbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery than by
theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] Out. Para. 1/3
(B) BY WORDS UTILIZED IN A COURT OF LAW (QQ[67]-71)
OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice, that
consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider (1) those
which are connected with judicial proceedings, and (2) injurious words
uttered extra-judicially.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] Out. Para. 2/3
Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The
injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor in
accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself; (4)
The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The injustice of
the advocate in defending.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to
deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him?
(3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?
(4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not subject
to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel sentenced the
ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness. But these ancients
were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were judges of the people.
Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject to his
jurisdiction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was "King of
kings and Lord of lords" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the judgment
of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge one that is
not subject to his jurisdiction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro
Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind of
offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man whose
business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance when the
defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore it seems
that a man may judge one that is not his subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on Dt.
23:25, "If thou go into thy friend's corn," etc. says: "Thou mayest not
put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted to another."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A judge's sentence is like a particular law regarding
some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law should have
coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9), so too the
sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby either party is
compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else the judgment would be
of no effect. Now coercive power is not exercised in human affairs, save
by those who hold public authority: and those who have this authority are
accounted the superiors of those over whom they preside whether by
ordinary or by delegated authority. Hence it is evident that no man can
judge others than his subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or
of ordinary authority.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an authority
delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where it is said
(Dan. 13:45) that "the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a young boy."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to the
judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an example of
which is when parties agree to a settlement by arbitrators. Wherefore it
is necessary that the arbitrator should be upheld by a penalty, since the
arbitrators through not exercising authority in the case, have not of
themselves full power of coercion. Accordingly in this way did Christ of
his own accord submit to human judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo
IV] submit to the judgment of the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter,
caus. ii, qu. 7].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes the latter's
superior as regards the fault committed, even though he be exempt: unless
perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt from the bishop's
authority, for instance in administering the property of an exempt
monastery. But if an exempt person commits a theft, or a murder or the
like, he may be justly condemned by the ordinary.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth
that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against
the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary. For it
is written (Dt. 17:9): "Thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical
race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and thou shalt ask of
them, and they shall show thee the truth of the judgment." Now sometimes
certain things are alleged against the truth, as when something is proved
by means of false witnesses. Therefore it is unlawful for a judge to
pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and proved in opposition
to the truth which he knows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to the
Divine judgment, since "it is the judgment of God" (Dt. 1:17). Now "the
judgment of God is according to the truth" (Rm. 2:2), and it was foretold
of Christ (Is. 11:3,4): "He shall not judge according to the sight of the
eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the ears. But He shall
judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove with equity for the meek
of the earth." Therefore the judge ought not to pronounce judgment
according to the evidence before him if it be contrary to what he knows
himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of law,
is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth of the matter,
wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of judicial
procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, "Some men's sins are manifest, going
before to judgment." Consequently, if the judge by his personal knowledge
is aware of the truth, he should pay no heed to the evidence, but should
pronounce sentence according to the truth which he knows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the word "conscience" denotes application of knowledge
to a matter of action as stated in the FP, Q[79], A[13]. Now it is a sin
to act contrary to one's knowledge. Therefore a judge sins if he
pronounces sentence according to the evidence but against his conscience
of the truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine [*Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20] says in
his commentary on the Psalter: "A good judge does nothing according to
his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to the law and the
right." Now this is to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged
and proved in court. Therefore a judge ought to pronounce judgment in
accordance with these things, and not according to his private opinion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]; Q[60], AA[2],6) it is the duty of
a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises public
authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on information acquired
by him, not from his knowledge as a private individual, but from what he
knows as a public person. Now the latter knowledge comes to him both in
general and in particular ---in general through the public laws, whether
Divine or human, and he should admit no evidence that conflicts
therewith---in some particular matter, through documents and witnesses,
and other legal means of information, which in pronouncing his sentence,
he ought to follow rather than the information he has acquired as a
private individual. And yet this same information may be of use to him,
so that he can more rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and
discover its weak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that
evidence juridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing
sentence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is stated that
the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is to make it
clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance with the
evidence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power:
wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself knows, and
not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said of Christ,
Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do not judge in virtue
of their own power, so that there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Apostle refers to the case where something is well
known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so that the
guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of notorious
criminals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of the fact. If,
on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but not to others, or
to others, but not to the judge, then it is necessary for the judge to
sift the evidence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In matters touching his own person, a man must form his
conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the public
authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with the knowledge
attainable in the public judicial procedure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a judge may condemn a man who is not accused?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man who is not
accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now God judges
the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore it seems that a man
may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even though there be no
accuser.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in order
that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the crime may
come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation; for instance,
by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the judge himself being an
eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a man without there being an
accuser.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ, as
models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the accuser and
the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it is not contrary
to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while being at the same
time his accuser.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2, expounding the
Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a judge should not
condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not banish Judas, who was
a thief, yet was not accused."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to one
who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above (Q[58], A[2]
), justice is not between a man and himself but between one man and
another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two parties, which is the
case when one is the prosecutor, and the other the defendant. Therefore
in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence a man unless the latter has
an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: "It is not the custom of the Romans
to condemn any man, before that he who is accused have his accusers
present, and have liberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the
crimes" of which he is accused.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's conscience as his
accuser, according to Rm. 2:15, "Their thoughts between themselves
accusing, or also defending one another"; or again, He takes the evidence
of the fact as regards the deed itself, according to Gn. 4:10, "The voice
of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the earth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a
gloss on Gn. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood," etc. says: "There
is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is notorious." In a
case of denunciation, as stated above (Q[33], A[7]), the amendment, not
the punishment, of the sinner is intended: wherefore when a man is
denounced for a sin, nothing is done against him, but for him, so that no
accuser is required. The punishment that is inflicted is on account of
his rebellion against the Church, and since this rebellion is manifest,
it stands instead of an accuser. The fact that the judge himself was an
eye-witness, does not authorize him to proceed to pass sentence, except
according to the order of judicial procedure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of the
truth, whereas man does not, as stated above (A[2]). Hence a man cannot
be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is. Daniel was at
once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of the sentence of
God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judge can lawfully remit the punishment?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the punishment.
For it is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy" shall be done
"to him that hath not done mercy." Now no man is punished for not doing
what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any judge can lawfully do mercy by
remitting the punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine judgment. Now
God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires not the death of
the sinner, according to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human judge also may
lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable to
some one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment profits
the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can lawfully loose a
guilty man from his punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 13:8,9) concerning anyone who would
persuade a man to serve strange gods: "Neither let thy eye spare him to
pity and conceal him, but thou shalt presently put him to death": and of
the murderer it is written (Dt. 19:12,13): "He shall die. Thou shalt not
pity him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said (AA[2],3),
with regard to the question in point, two things may be observed in
connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge between accuser and
defendant, while the other is that he pronounces the judicial sentence,
in virtue of his power, not as a private individual but as a public
person. Accordingly on two counts a judge is hindered from loosing a
guilty person from his punishment. First on the part of the accuser,
whose right it sometimes is that the guilty party should be
punished---for instance on account of some injury committed against the
accuser---because it is not in the power of a judge to remit such
punishment, since every judge is bound to give each man his right.
Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part of the commonwealth, whose
power he exercises, and to whose good it belongs that evil-doers should
be punished.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of
lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, to whom the
entire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no power
to exempt a guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed on him by
his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on John 19:11, "Thou
shouldst not have any power against Me," says (Tract. cxvi in Joan.):
"The power which God gave Pilate was such that he was under the power of
Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit the person accused." On
the other hand the sovereign who has full authority in the commonwealth,
can lawfully remit the punishment to a guilty person, provided the
injured party consent to the remission, and that this do not seem
detrimental to the public good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is a place for the judge's mercy in matters that are
left to the judge's discretion, because in like matters a good man is
slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But in matters
that are determined in accordance with Divine or human laws, it is not
left to him to show mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns Him
whatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to remit
the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin chiefly because
it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit the punishment,
except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is the source of all
laws.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[67] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the judge were to remit punishment inordinately, he
would inflict an injury on the community, for whose good it behooves
ill-deeds to be punished, in order that. men may avoid sin. Hence the
text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds (Dt. 13:11):
"That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more anything like
this." He would also inflict harm on the injured person; who is
compensated by having his honor restored in the punishment of the man who
has injured him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] Out. Para. 1/1
OF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man is bound to accuse?
(2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing?
(3) How is an accusation vitiated?
(4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man is bound to accuse?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no man is
excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept, since he
would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are disqualified
from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of evil fame, or
who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet proved to be innocent
[*1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by a Divine precept to accuse.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the end of the
precept" [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1]: wherefore
it is written (Rm. 13:8): "Owe no man anything, but to love one another."
Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that man owes to all both of
high and of low degree, both superiors and inferiors. Since therefore
subjects should not accuse their superiors, nor persons of lower degree,
those of a higher degree, as shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu.
vii), it seems that it is no man's duty to accuse.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he
owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would not
have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary to the
fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov. 11:13): "He
that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that is faithful,
concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend." Therefore a man is
not bound to accuse.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 5:1): "If any one sin, and hear the
voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he himself hath
seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his
iniquity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[33], AA[6],7; Q[67], A[3], ad 2), the
difference between denunciation and accusation is that in denunciation
we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation we intend the
punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought, not
for their own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution,
but in their character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of
the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by
the punishment of evil-doers. The former of these is intended in
denunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards properly accusation.
Hence in the case of a crime that conduces to the injury of the
commonwealth, a man is bound to accusation, provided he can offer
sufficient proof, since it is the accuser's duty to prove: as, for
example, when anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption
of the community. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the
community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not bound to
attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly
accomplish.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing
what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting
eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor does a
man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to fail to do what
one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors, "if it
is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that leads them
to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors" [*Append. Grat.
ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7] ---or again if the subject who
wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of crime [*Decret. II,
qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided they be in other respects
qualified to accuse, it is lawful for subjects to accuse their superiors
out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets to the
injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of the
community, which should always be preferred to a private good. Hence it
is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common good: and
yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient witnesses to
prove it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for the accusation to be made in writing?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made in
writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of the
past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the accusation
needs not to be made in writing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per scripta)
that "no man may accuse or be accused in his absence." Now writing seems
to be useful in the fact that it is a means of notifying something to one
who is absent, as Augustine declares (De Trin. x, 1). Therefore the
accusation need not be in writing: and all the more that the canon
declares that "no accusation in writing should be accepted."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even as by
accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore it is
seemingly unnecessary in accusation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can.
Accusatorum) that "the role of accuser must never be sanctioned without
the accusation be in writing."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[67], A[3]), when the process in a
criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the position
of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and the accused
for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it behooves one to
proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since however verbal
utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge would be unable to
know for certain what had been said and with what qualifications, when he
comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were drawn up in writing. Hence it
has with reason been established that the accusation, as well as other
parts of the judicial procedure, should be put into writing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Words are so many and so various that it is difficult to
remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number of people
who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they will not agree
in repeating them, even after a short time. And since a slight difference
of words changes the sense, even though the judge's sentence may have to
be pronounced soon afterwards, the certainty of judgment requires that
the accusation be drawn up in writing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of the
person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom something is
notified, but also on account of the delay of time as stated above (ad
1). Hence when the canon says, "Let no accusation be accepted in writing"
it refers to the sending of an accusation by one who is absent: but it
does not exclude the necessity of writing when the accuser is present.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs:
wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this reason
writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that the
denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in virtue
of her office, to the correction of the brother.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an accusation is rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust by
calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu. iii
[*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists in
falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes one man falsely
accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which excuses him.
Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always rendered unjust
through being slanderous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "collusion
consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly this is not
unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as stated
above (A[1]; Q[33], A[7]). Therefore it seems that an accusation is not
rendered unjust by collusion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion
consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this can be
done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man repent of
having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a matter which he
cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the innocent party whom
he has accused, let them acquit one another." [*The accuser was bound by
Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect
of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if
he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the
accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does
not render an accusation unjust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness of
accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of
calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), accusation is ordered for the
common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of the
crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to promote
the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when making an
accusation: first through acting unjustly against the accused, by
charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e. by calumniating
him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose good is intended
chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked intent hinders a sin
being punished. This again happens in two ways: first by having recourse
to fraud in making the accusation. This belongs to collusion
[prevaricatio] for "he that is guilty of collusion is like one who rides
astraddle [varicator], because he helps the other party, and betrays his
own side" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by
withdrawing altogether from the accusation. This is evasion
[tergiversatio] for by desisting from what he had begun he seems to turn
his back [tergum vertere].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he is
quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet he who
falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator unless he gives
utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it happens sometimes
that a man through levity of mind proceeds to accuse someone, because he
believes too readily what he hears, and this pertains to rashness; while,
on the other hand sometimes a man is led to make an accusation on account
of an error for which he is not to blame. All these things must be
weighed according to the judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man
to have been guilty of calumny, who through levity of mind or an error
for which he is not to be blamed has uttered a false accusation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is guilty of
collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter about which he
makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant, dissembling his
proofs, and admitting false excuses.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the
accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but
inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly
desist from accusing without committing a sin ---in one way, in the very
process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the matter of his
accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the accuser and the
defendant acquit one another---in another way, if the accusation be
quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of the common good,
which it is intended to procure by the accusation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an accuser who fails to prove his indictment is bound to the
punishment of retaliation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his indictment
is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For sometimes a man is led
by a just error to make an accusation, in which case the judge acquit the
accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. iii. [*Append. Grat., ad can. Si
quem poenituerit.] Therefore the accuser who fails to prove his
indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be inflicted
on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of the injury he
has done to someone---but not on account of any injury done to the person
of the accused, for in that case the sovereign could not remit this
punishment, nor on account of an injury to the commonwealth, because then
the accused could not acquit him. Therefore the punishment of retaliation
is not due to one who has failed to prove his accusation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold punishment,
according to Nahum 1:9 [*Septuagint version]: "God shall not judge the
same thing a second time." But he who fails to prove his accusation,
incurs the punishment due to defamation [*Can. Infames, caus. vi, qu. 1],
which punishment even the Pope seemingly cannot remit, according to a
statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]:
"Although we are able to save souls by Penance, we are unable to remove
the defamation." Therefore he is not bound to suffer the punishment of
retaliation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): "He that fails to prove
his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his accusation
inferred."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), in a case, where the procedure is
by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of a party aiming at
the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the judge is to establish
the equality of justice between them: and the equality of justice
requires that a man should himself suffer whatever harm he has intended
to be inflicted on another, according to Ex. 21:24, "Eye for eye, tooth
for tooth." Consequently it is just that he who by accusing a man has put
him in danger of being punished severely, should himself suffer a like
punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not
always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably whether a
man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury deserves
punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the judge
becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with a mind to
do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just error, he does not
impose the punishment of retaliation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person of
the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished on
both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Dt. 19:18-20): "And
when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find that the false
witness hath told a lie against his brother: then shall render to him as
he meant to do to his brother," and this refers to the injury done to the
person: and afterwards, referring to the injury done to the commonwealth,
the text continues: "And thou shalt take away the evil out of the midst
of thee, that others hearing may fear, and may not dare to do such
things." Specially, however, does he injure the person of the accused, if
he accuse him falsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone
the injury done to himself, particularly if the accusation were made not
calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist from
accusing an innocent man, through collusion with the latter's adversary,
he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot be condoned by
the accused, although it can be remitted by the sovereign, who has charge
of the commonwealth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[68] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in
compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but the
punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in accusing
another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the punishment,
and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the disgrace also:
wherefore the Pope also can remove this disgrace. When Pope Gelasius
says: "We cannot remove the disgrace," he may mean either the disgrace
attaching to the deed [infamia facti], or that sometimes it is not
expedient to remove it, or again he may be referring to the disgrace
inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian states (Callist. I, Epist. ad
omn. Gall. episc.).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] Out. Para. 1/1
OF SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice on
the part of the defendant. Under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to
one's condemnation?
(2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies?
(3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing?
(4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend
himself by violence if he be able to do so?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to
one's condemnation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which
would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi super
Ep. ad Heb.): "I do not say that you should lay bare your guilt publicly,
nor accuse yourself before others." Now if the accused were to confess
the truth in court, he would lay bare his guilt and be his own accuser.
Therefore he is not bound to tell the truth: and so he does not sin
mortally if he tell a lie in court.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie in
order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious lie when
one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one is more
bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious lie is
considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the accused denies
the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does not sin mortally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above
(Q[24], A[12]). But that the accused lie by denying himself to be guilty
of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity, neither as
regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our neighbor.
Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a mortal
sin, because we are bound by precept to "do all to the glory of God" (1
Cor. 10:31). Now it is to the glory of God that the accused confess that
which is alleged against him, as appears from the words of Josue to
Achan, "My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, and confess and
tell me what thou hast done, hide it not" (Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is
a mortal sin to lie in order to cover one's guilt.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins
mortally, as stated above (Q[59], A[4]). Now it belongs to the order of
justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to which the
rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated above (Q[67]
, A[1]), is the superior in relation to the person whom he judges.
Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge the truth which
the latter exacts from him according to the form of law. Hence if he
refuse to tell the truth which he is under obligation to tell, or if he
mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally. If, on the other hand, the judge
asks of him that which he cannot ask in accordance with the order of
justice, the accused is not bound to satisfy him, and he may lawfully
escape by appealing or otherwise: but it is not lawful for him to lie.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When a man is examined by the judge according to the order
of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt is unmasked
by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed on him by one
whom he is bound to obey.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To lie, with injury to another person, in order to rescue a
man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an admixture of
the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in order to exculpate
himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound to obey, since he
refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts both
against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the love of
his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom he refuses
his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished if he fail to
prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Ps. 140:4): "Incline not my
heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins": on which words a gloss
says: "Shameless men are wont by lying to deny their guilt when they have
been found out." And Gregory in expounding Job 31:33, "If as a man I have
hid my sin," says (Moral. xxii, 15): "It is a common vice of mankind to
sin in secret, by lying to hide the sin that has been committed, and when
convicted to aggravate the sin by defending oneself."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with
calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De transact.
18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for him to bribe
his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending oneself with
calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his life does not
sin if he defend himself with calumnies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the accused,
is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Yet no
punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion with the accuser.
Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with
calumnies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and
declineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident." Now what
is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines from
evil, he does not sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against
calumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap. Inhaerentes):
and this would not be the case if it were lawful to defend oneself with
calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the accused to defend himself
with calumnies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another to
utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is not bound
to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and must require of
him according to the order of justice; as, for instance, when the accused
is already disgraced through the commission of some crime, or certain
indications of his guilt have already been discovered, or again when his
guilt is already more or less proven. On the other hand it is never
lawful to make a false declaration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful
means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to
prudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed end,
and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and guile, as
shown above (Q[55], AA[3], seqq.). His conduct in the former case is
praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is lawful for the
accused to defend himself by withholding the truth that he is not bound
to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not answering such questions
as he is not bound to answer. This is not to defend himself with
calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is unlawful for him, either to
utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth that he is bound to avow, or to
employ guile or fraud, because fraud and guile have the force of a lie,
and so to use them would be to defend oneself with calumnies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Human laws leave many things unpunished, which according to
the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple fornication;
because human law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue
belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a number of people as
human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes unwilling to commit a
sin in order to escape from the death of the body, the danger of which
threatens the accused who is on trial for his life, is an act of perfect
virtue, since "death is the most fearful of all temporal things" (Ethic.
iii, 6). Wherefore if the accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes
his adversary, he sins indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet
the civil law does not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to
be lawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused and
the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident that he
sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or to take
part in a sin in any way---for the Apostle says (Rm. 1:32), that "they .
. are worthy of death . . . that consent" to those who sin---it is
evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty of collusion with his
adversary. Nevertheless according to human laws no punishment is
inflicted on him, for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The wise man hides himself not by slandering others but by
exercising prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape judgment by
appealing. The Apostle says (Rm. 13:1): "Let every soul be subject to the
higher powers." Now the accused by appealing refuses to be subject to a
higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he commits a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that which we
choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, qu. vi, cap. A
judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by common
consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from ordinary judges.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is not
lawful to appeal after the tenth day [*Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii, qu. 6],
nor a third time on the same point [*Can. Si autem, caus. ii, qu. 6].
Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two motives for which a man appeals. First
through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is
unjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to appeal,
because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid down (Decret.
II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): "All those who are oppressed are free,
if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the priests, and no man may
stand in their way." Secondly, a man appeals in order to cause a delay,
lest a just sentence be pronounced against him. This is to defend oneself
calumniously, and is unlawful as stated above (A[2]). For he inflicts an
injury both on the judge, whom he hinders in the exercise of his office,
and on his adversary, whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able.
Hence it is laid down (II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): "Without doubt
a man should be punished if his appeal be declared unjust."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as the
latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower authority
departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to submit to it, for
instance "if the proconsul order one thing and the emperor another,"
according to a gloss on Rm. 13:2. Now when a judge oppresses anyone
unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order of the higher
authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence it is lawful for
a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to the authority of the
higher power, by appealing either before or after sentence has been
pronounced. And since it is to be presumed that there is no rectitude
where true faith is lacking, it is unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to
an unbelieving judge, according to Decretals II, qu. vi, can. Catholicus:
"The Catholic who appeals to the decision of a judge of another faith
shall be excommunicated, whether his case be just or unjust." Hence the
Apostle also rebuked those who went to law before unbelievers (1 Cor.
6:6).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that, of his own
accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he has no
confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind for a man
not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is with reason
that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the decision of
judges of our own choice, who have no power save by virtue of the consent
of the litigants. On the other hand the authority of an ordinary judge
depends, not on the consent of those who are subject to his judgment, but
on the authority of the king or prince who appointed him. Hence, as a
remedy against his unjust oppression, the law allows one to have recourse
to appeal, so that even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and
chosen by the litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his decision, since
seemingly his ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as
arbitrator. Nor is it to be imputed as a fault to the man who consented
to his being arbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was
appointed ordinary judge by the prince.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The equity of the law so guards the interests of the one
party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days for appeal
to be made, this being considered sufficient time for deliberating on the
expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand there were no fixed time
limit for appealing, the certainty of judgment would ever be in suspense,
so that the other party would suffer an injury. The reason why it is not
allowed to appeal a third time on the same point, is that it is not
probable that the judges would fail to judge justly so many times.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he
can?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may lawfully
defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that to which
nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak. Now, to
resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men and animals
but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can do so, the
accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put to death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death to which
he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is lawful seemingly
to escape death by flight, according to Ecclus. 9:18, "Keep thee far
from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]" [*The words in
the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. Therefore it is also lawful for the
accused to resist.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that are led
to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to deliver." Now
a man is under greater obligation to himself than to another. Therefore
it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself from being put to
death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 13:2): "He that resisteth the
power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase to
themselves damnation." Now a condemned man, by defending himself, resists
the power in the point of its being ordained by God "for the punishment
of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good" [*1 Pt. 2:14]. Therefore
he sins in defending himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First
justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend himself,
because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance by force, so
that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently without any doubt
he sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the
violence of robbers, according to Ezech. 22:21, "Her princes in the midst
of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood." Wherefore even
as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in a like case, to
resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to avoid scandal, whence
some grave disturbance might be feared to arise.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reason was given to man that he might ensue those things to
which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in accordance with the
order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is lawful, but only such as
is accomplished with due moderation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill
himself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do anything
from which death would result, such as to stay in the place whence he
would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who lead him to
death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for him to suffer.
Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he does not sin if he
partakes of food brought to him secretly, because to refrain from taking
it would be to kill himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[69] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This saying of the wise man does not direct that one should
deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of justice: wherefore
neither should a man deliver himself from death by resisting against
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] Out. Para. 1/1
OF INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the witness.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence?
(2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices?
(3) Whether a man's evidence may be rejected without any fault on his
part?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man is bound to give evidence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to give evidence. Augustine
say (QQ. Gn. 1:26) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33,34], that when Abraham
said of his wife (Gn. 20:2), "She is my sister," he wished the truth to
be concealed and not a lie be told. Now, by hiding the truth a man
abstains from giving evidence. Therefore a man is not bound to give
evidence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it is written
(Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully revealeth secrets, but he
that is faithful concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend."
Therefore a man is not always bound to give evidence, especially on
matters committed to him as a secret by a friend.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, clerics and priests, more than others, are bound to
those things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics and priests
are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his life.
Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give evidence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine [*Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap.
Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says: "Both he who conceals
the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the former because he is
unwilling to do good, the latter because he desires to hurt."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We must make a distinction in the matter of giving
evidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary, and
sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject to a
superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to obey,
without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points which are
required of him in accordance with the order of justice, for instance on
manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If however he is
required to give evidence on other points, for instance secret matters,
and those of which no ill-report has preceded, he is not bound to give
evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be required by authority of
a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must make a distinction: because
if his evidence is required in order to deliver a man from an unjust
death or any other penalty, or from false defamation, or some loss, in
such cases he is bound to give evidence. Even if his evidence is not
demanded, he is bound to do what he can to declare the truth to someone
who may profit thereby. For it is written (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor,
and deliver the needy from the hand of the sinner"; and (Prov. 24:11):
"Deliver them that are led to death"; and (Rm. 1:32): "They are worthy of
death, not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them
that do them," on which words a gloss says: "To be silent when one can
disprove is to consent." In matters pertaining to a man's condemnation,
one is not bound to give evidence, except when one is constrained by a
superior in accordance with the order of justice; since if the truth of
such a matter be concealed, no particular injury is inflicted on anyone.
Or, if some danger threatens the accuser, it matters not since he risked
the danger of his own accord: whereas it is different with the accused,
who incurs the danger against his will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth in a case
when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to declare the
truth, and when such concealment is not specially injurious to any person.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man should by no means give evidence on matters secretly
committed to him in confession, because he knows such things, not as man
but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more binding than any human
precept. But as regards matters committed to man in some other way under
secrecy, we must make a distinction. Sometimes they are of such a nature
that one is bound to make them known as soon as they come to our
knowledge, for instance if they conduce to the spiritual or corporal
corruption of the community, or to some grave personal injury, in short
any like matter that a man is bound to make known either by giving
evidence or by denouncing it. Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged
to act on the plea that the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for
he would break the faith he owes to another. On the other hand sometimes
they are such as one is not bound to make known, so that one may be under
obligation not to do so on account of their being committed to one under
secrecy. In such a case one is by no means bound to make them known, even
if the superior should command; because to keep faith is of natural
right, and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural
right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to slay a man
or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above (Q[64], A[4]); hence
according to the order of justice they cannot be compelled to give
evidence when a man is on trial for his life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the evidence of two or three persons suffices?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons is not
sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude of the truth
is not obtained by the assertions of two or three witnesses, for we read
that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the evidence of two witnesses (3
Kgs. 21). Therefore the evidence of two or three witnesses does not
suffice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must agree. But
frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some point.
Therefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can. Praesul.): "A
bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two
witnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be
sixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church, unless
there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, an acolyte, an
exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without seven witnesses." Now the sin
of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and consequently should
be treated more severely. Therefore neither is the evidence of two or
three witnesses sufficient for the condemnation of other persons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 17:6): "By the mouth of two or three
witnesses shall he die that is to be slain," and further on (Dt. 19:15):
"In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "we must not
expect to find certitude equally in every matter." For in human acts, on
which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is impossible to
have demonstrative certitude, because they a about things contingent and
variable. Hence the certitude of probability suffices, such as may reach
the truth in the greater number, cases, although it fail in the minority.
No it is probable that the assertion of sever witnesses contains the
truth rather than the assertion of one: and since the accused is the only
one who denies, while several witness affirm the same as the prosecutor,
it is reasonably established both by Divine and by human law, that the
assertion of several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude is
comprised of three elements, the beginning, the middle and the end.
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 1), "we reckon 'all'
and 'whole' to consist of three parts." Now we have a triple voucher when
two agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are required; or for
the sake of greater certitude three, which is the perfect number.
Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12): "A threefold cord is not easily
broken": and Augustine, commenting on Jn. 8:17, "The testimony of two men
is true," says (Tract. xxxvi) that "there is here a mystery by which we
are given to understand that Trinity wherein is perpetual stability of
truth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: No matter how great a number of witnesses may be
determined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since is written (Ex.
23:2): "Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil." And yet the fact
that in so many it is not possible to have certitude without fear of
error, is no reason why we should reject the certitude which can probably
be had through two or three witnesses, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 2: If the witnesses disagree certain principal circumstances
which change the substance of the fact, for instance in time, place, or
persons, which are chiefly in question, their evidence is of no weight,
because if they disagree in such things, each one would seem to be giving
distinct evidence and to be speaking of different facts. For instance,
one say that a certain thing happened at such and such a time or place,
while another says it happened at another time or place, they seem not to
be speaking of the same event. The evidence is not weakened if one
witness says that he does not remember, while the other attests to a
determinate time or place And if on such points as these the witness for
prosecution and defense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in
number on either side, and of equal standing, the accused should have the
benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to be more inclined to
acquit than to condemn, except perhaps in favorable suits, such as a
pleading for liberty and the like. If, however, the witnesses for the
same side disagree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in
discerning which side to favor, by considering either the number of
witnesses, or their standing, or the favorableness of the suit, or the
nature of the business and of the evidence
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/3
Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he
contradict himself when questioned about what he has seen and about what
he knows; not, however, if he contradict himself when questioned about
matters of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer
differently according to the different things he has seen and heard.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 3/3
On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence in circumstances
not touching the substance of the fact, for instance, whether the weather
were cloudy or fine, whether the house were painted or not, or such like
matters, such discrepancy does not weaken the evidence, because men are
not wont to take much notice of such things, wherefore they easily forget
them. Indeed, a discrepancy of this kind renders the evidence more
credible, as Chrysostom states (Hom. i in Matth.), because if the
witnesses agreed in every point, even in the minutest of details, they
would seem to have conspired together to say the same thing: but this
must be left to the prudent discernment of the judge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This passage refers specially to the bishops, priests,
deacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of its dignity: and
this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men ought to
be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more weight than that
of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have to judge other men,
often have many opponents on account of their justice, wherefore those
who give evidence against them should not be believed indiscriminately,
unless they be very numerous. Thirdly, because the condemnation of any
one of them would detract in public opinion from the dignity and
authority of that Church, a result which would be more fraught with
danger than if one were to tolerate a sinner in that same Church, unless
he were very notorious and manifest, so that a grave scandal would arise
if he were tolerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man's evidence can be rejected without any fault of his?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man's evidence ought not to be rejected
except on account of some fault. For it a penalty on some that their
evidence is inadmissible, as in the case of those who are branded with
infamy. Now a penalty must not be inflicted save for a fault. Therefore
it would seem that no man's evidence ought to be rejected save on account
of a fault.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Good is to be presumed of every one, unless the
contrary appear" [*Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.]. Now it pertains to a man's
goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore there can be
no proof of the contrary, unless there be some fault of his, it would
seem that no man's evidence should be rejected save for some fault.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for
salvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation to give
true evidence, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore no man should be
excluded from giving evidence save for some fault.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): "As to the bishop who
is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know that they
should by no means have been heard": which words are embodied in the
Decretals II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the authority of evidence is not
infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one side is
weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the other. Now the
reliability of a person's evidence is weakened, sometimes indeed on
account of some fault of his, as in the case of unbelievers and persons
of evil repute, as well as those who are guilty of a public crime and who
are not allowed even to accuse; sometimes, without any fault on his part,
and this owing either to a defect in the reason, as in the case of
children, imbeciles and women, or to personal feeling, as in the case of
enemies, or persons united by family or household ties, or again owing to
some external condition, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those
who are under authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed that they
might easily be induced to give evidence against the truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Thus it is manifest that a person's evidence may be rejected either with
or without some fault of his.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If a person is disqualified from giving evidence this is
done as a precaution against false evidence rather than as a punishment.
Hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary
appear, provided this does not threaten injury to another: because, in
that case, one ought to be careful not to believe everyone readily,
according to 1 Jn. 4:1: "Believe not every spirit."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To give evidence is necessary for salvation, provided the
witness be competent, and the order of justice observed. Hence nothing
hinders certain persons being excused from giving evidence, if they be
considered unfit according to law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is always a mortal sin to give false evidence?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not always a mortal sin to give false
evidence. For a person may happen to give false evidence, through
ignorance of fact. Now such ignorance excuses from mortal sin. Therefore
the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a lie that benefits someone and hurts no man is
officious, and this is not a mortal sin. Now sometimes a lie of this kind
occurs in false evidence, as when a person gives false evidence in order
to save a man from death, or from an unjust sentence which threatens him
through other false witnesses or a perverse judge. Therefore in such
cases it is not a mortal sin to give false evidence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a witness is required to take an oath in order that he
may fear to commit a mortal sin of perjury. But this would not be
necessary, if it were already a mortal sin to give false evidence.
Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:5): "A false witness shall not
be unpunished."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, False evidence has a threefold deformity. The first is
owing to perjury, since witnesses are admitted only on oath and on this
count it is always a mortal sin. Secondly, owing to the violation of
justice, and on this account it is a mortal sin generically, even as any
kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of false evidence by the precept
of the decalogue is expressed in this form when it is said (Ex. 20:16),
"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." For one does
nothing against a man by preventing him from doing someone an injury, but
only by taking away his justice. Thirdly, owing to the falsehood itself,
by reason of which every lie is a sin: on this account, the giving of
false evidence is not always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In giving evidence a man ought not to affirm as certain, as
though he knew it, that about which he is not certain and he should
confess his doubt in doubtful terms, and that which he is certain about,
in terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty of the human memory,
a man sometimes thinks he is certain about something that is not true;
and then if after thinking over the matter with due care he deems
himself certain about that false thing, he does not sin mortally if he
asserts it, because the evidence which he gives is not directly an
intentionally, but accidentally contrary to what he intends.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An unjust judgment is not a judgment, wherefore the false
evidence given in an unjust judgment, in order to prevent injustice is
not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only by reason of the
oath violated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[70] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Men abhor chiefly those sin that are against God, as being
most grievous and among them is perjury: whereas they do not abhor so
much sins against their neighbor. Consequently, for the greater certitude
of evidence, the witness is required to take a oath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] Out. Para. 1/1
OF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on the
part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?
(2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the
office of advocate?
(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the suits of
the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): "If thou see the ass of him that
hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shall
lift him up with him." Now no less a danger threatens the poor man whose
suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than if his ass were to lie underneath
its burden. Therefore an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the
poor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): "Let him that
hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that
hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let
him who is a servant to art share his skill with his neighbor; let him
who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy plead the cause of
the poor: for the slightest gift you have received will be reputed a
talent." Now every man is bound, not to hide but faithfully to dispense
the talent committed to him; as evidenced by the punishment inflicted on
the servant who hid his talent (Mt. 25:30). Therefore an advocate is
bound to plead for the poor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being
affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is chiefly
in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the suit of a
poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in such a case an
advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, He that lacks food is no less in need than he that
lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always bound
to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always bound to
defend the suits of the poor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the works
of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one given above
with regard to the other works of mercy (Q[32], AA[5],9). Now no man is
sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those who need it. Wherefore,
as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "since one cannot do good to
all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time, or
any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to
us." He says "by reason of place," because one is not bound to search
throughout the world for the needy that one may succor them; and it
suffices to do works of mercy to those one meets with. Hence it is
written (Ex. 23:4): "If thou meet thy enemy's ass going astray, bring it
back to him." He says also "by reason of time," because one is not bound
to provide for the future needs of others, and it suffices to succor
present needs. Hence it is written (1 Jn. 3:17): "He that . . . shall see
his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the
charity of God abide in him?" Lastly he says, "or any other
circumstance," because one ought to show kindness to those especially who
are by any tie whatever united to us, according to 1 Tim. 5:8, "If any
man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he
hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
It may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we have
to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need that it is
not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then one is bound
to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is easy to see how he
can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or by some other person
still more closely united to him, or in a better position to help him,
one is not bound so strictly to help the one in need that it would be a
sin not to do so: although it would be praiseworthy to do so where one is
not bound to. Therefore an advocate is not always bound to defend the
suits of the poor, but only when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else
he would have to put aside all other business, and occupy himself
entirely in defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a
physician with regard to attendance on the sick.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: So long as the ass lies under the burden, there is no means
of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come to the
man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they would not be so
bound if help were possible from another quarter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed on
him, according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and other
circumstances, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not every need is such that it is one's duty to remedy it,
but only such as we have stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is fitting that the law should debar certain persons from the
office of advocate?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain persons from
the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred from doing works of
mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to defend a man's suit, as
stated above (A[1]). Therefore no man should be debarred from this office.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same effect.
Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin are contrary
to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some should be debarred
from the office of advocate, on account of religion, as monks and
clerics, while others are debarred on account of sin, as persons of
ill-repute and heretics.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it is a
duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore it is
unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading the cause
of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to Decretals III, qu. vii, can. Infames, many
persons are debarred from the office of advocate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In two ways a person is debarred from performing a
certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because it
is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act is
impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom an act
is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may do away
with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from the office of
advocate because it is impossible to them through lack of sense---either
interior, as in the case of madmen and minors---or exterior, as in the
case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs to have both interior
skill so that he may be able to prove the justice of the cause he
defends, and also speech and hearing, that he may speak and hear what is
said to him. Consequently those who are defective in these points, are
altogether debarred from being advocates either in their own or in
another's cause. The becomingness of exercising this office is removed in
two ways. First, through a man being engaged in higher things. Wherefore
it is unfitting that monks or priests should be advocates in any cause
whatever, or that clerics should plead in a secular court, because such
persons are engaged in Divine things. Secondly, on account of some
personal defect, either of body (for instance a blind man whose
attendance in a court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it
ill becomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the
justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill
repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous crimes
should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is outweighed by
necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead either their own
cause or that of persons closely connected with them. Moreover, clerics
can be advocates in the cause of their own church, and monks in the cause
of their own monastery, if the abbot direct them to do so.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by unbecomingness,
and others by inability from performing works of mercy: for not all the
works of mercy are becoming to all persons: thus it ill becomes a fool to
give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much" and "too little,"
so does a person become incompetent by "more" and "less." For this reason
some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from pleading in causes,
because they are above such an office; and others because they are less
than competent to exercise it, such as persons of ill-repute and
unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not so
pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because others are
able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an
unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing a
desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can defend
an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a desperate
malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but ought to be
praised, if he defends an unjust cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin. Yet
an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II, qu. iii,
can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by defending an
unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to use
unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false
witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause, since
the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the matter of
justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make use of such
underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to lay ambushes in a
battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate does not sin by
defending an unjust cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): "Thou helpest the
ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the
Lord." Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the ungodly.
Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by
counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or
assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Rm. 1:32)
that "they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do" a sin, "but
they also that consent to them that do" it. Hence it was stated above
(Q[62], A[7]), that all such are bound to restitution. Now it is evident
that an advocate provides both assistance and counsel to the party for
whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he defends an unjust cause,
without doubt he sins grievously, and is bound to restitution of the loss
unjustly incurred by the other party by reason of the assistance he has
provided. If, however, he defends an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking
it just, he is to be excused according to the measure in which ignorance
is excusable.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a
desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an unjust
cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads unjustly. Hence
the comparison fails. For though he may seem to deserve praise for
showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by reason of injustice in
his will, since he abuses his art for an evil end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause is
just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that it is
unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the
other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to the other
party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his client to give
way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the opposing party.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[40], A[3]), it is lawful for a soldier,
or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently concealing what
he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we
should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says (De offic. iii, 29).
Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending his case, prudently to
conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue, but it is unlawful for him
to employ any kind of falsehood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for
pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human
remuneration, according to Lk. 14:12, "When thou makest a dinner or a
supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest
perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to thee."
Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated above (A[1]
). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take payment in money
for pleading.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with temporal
things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a spiritual good since
it consists in using one's knowledge of law. Therefore it is not lawful
for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards the
pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge and of the
witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.), "the judge
should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true evidence."
Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "an
advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A man may justly receive payment for granting what he is
not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always
bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's causes.
Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against
justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a sick person
to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however, they take a
moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the matter in hand,
for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the country. If, however,
they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against justice. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "it is customary to demand
from them restitution of what they have extorted by a wicked excess, but
not what has been given to them in accordance with a commendable custom."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he can do from
motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell anything, since
anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does give a
thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but a Divine reward. In
like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor
man, should have in view not a human but a Divine meed; and yet he is not
always bound to give his services gratuitously.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use of
that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body: hence it is
lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsman would be
allowed to make profit by his art.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[71] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either party, since
the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the witness to give
true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to one side rather
than to the other: and consequently judges receive out of the public
funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive their expenses
(not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for their labor)
either from both parties or from the party by whom they are adduced,
because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge
[*Vulg.: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the other hand an
advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully accept fee from
the party he assists.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] Out. Para. 1/2
(C) BY WORDS UTTERED EXTRAJUDICIALLY (QQ[72]-76)
OF REVILING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered
extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, (3) tale
bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is reviling?
(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?
(4) Of the origin of reviling.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether reviling consists in words?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words. Reviling
implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is a kind of
injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's neighbor, either
in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore reviling does not consist
in words.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be
dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it seems
that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or a
taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt. Therefore
reviling does not consist in words.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now
reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, "I heard
reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side." Therefore reviling
consists in words.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this
happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, one person
dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the excellence for which he
is honored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have spoken above
(Q[64], seqq.). Secondly, when a man publishes something against
another's honor, thus bringing it to the knowledge of the latter and of
other men. This reviling properly so called, and is done I some kind of
signs. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "compared
with words all other signs are very few, for words have obtained the
chief place among men for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind
conceives." Hence reviling, properly speaking consists in words:
wherefore, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler [contumeliosus] "is
hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words." Since, however, things
are also signified by deeds, which on this account have the same
significance as words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends
also to deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rm. 1:30, "contumelious, proud,"
says: "The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame
others."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e. as
audible sound injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the ear, as
when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs conveying
something to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds of harm.
Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor, or of the
respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling is greater if one man
reproach another in the presence of many: and yet there may still be
reviling if he reproach him by himself. in so far as the speaker acts
unjustly against the respect due to the hearer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as such deeds
cause or signify that which is against that other man's honor. In the
former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other kind of
injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ[64],65,66): where as in the
latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have the significant
force of words.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling,
because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the detriment of his
honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of
guilt, which is exposed by "reviling" words. Secondly, there is the fault
of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by "taunts" [convicium],
because "vice" is commonly spoken of in connection with not only the soul
but also the body. Hence if one man says spitefully to another that he is
blind, he taunts but does not revile him: whereas if one man calls
another a thief, he not only taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man
reproaches another for his inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the
honor due to him for any kind of excellence. This is done by "upbraiding"
words, and properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man
that one has succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written
(Ecclus. 20:15): "He will give a few things and upbraid much."
Nevertheless these terms are sometimes employed one for the other.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal sin. For
no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of a virtue,
viz. of wittiness {eutrapelia} [*Cf. FS, Q[60], A[5]] to which it
pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8).
Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and yet
these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the Apostle
says (Gal. 3:1): "O senseless Galatians!," and our Lord said (Lk. 24:25):
"O foolish and slow of heart to believe!" Therefore railing or reviling
is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its
genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus
cannot become venial, as stated above (FS, Q[88], AA[4],6). Hence if by
reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to railing or
reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin. But this is
apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who utters a
reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger. Therefore reviling
or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment
of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell,
according to Mt. 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother . . . Thou
fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Therefore railing or reviling is
a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), words are injurious to other
persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends on
the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we
ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered. Since then
railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if the intention
of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is properly and
essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling: and this is a
mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man loves his honor no
less than his possessions. If, on the other hand, a man says to another a
railing or reviling word, yet with the intention, not of dishonoring him,
but rather perhaps of correcting him or with some like purpose, he utters
a railing or reviling not formally and essentially, but accidentally and
materially, in so far to wit as he says that which might be a railing or
reviling. Hence this may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without
any sin at all. Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters,
and one should use such words with moderation, because the railing might
be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the
person against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit a
mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other man: just
as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him
in fun, he would not be without blame.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery, not
with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of the
mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may be
without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. on the other hand if a
man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of his witty
mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful, as stated in
the passage quoted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him in
his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the purpose of
correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom one has to
correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples "foolish," and the
Apostle called the Galatians "senseless." Yet, as Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when it is very necessary
should we have recourse to invectives, and then so as to urge God's
service, not our own."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the
intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be a
slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be
uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the
fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such a
word to give but little pain.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled.
For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the reviler. But
one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to suffer oneself to be
reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one
ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written (Prov.
26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger." Therefore
neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is said:
"Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now by
submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to Chrysostom
(Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): "If thou wilt be revenged, be silent; thou
hast dealt him a fatal blow." Therefore one ought not by silence to
submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 37:13): "They that sought evils to
me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: "But I as a
deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as we need patience in things done against us, so do
we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience in
those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind,
according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on our
Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also
the other" [*The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending of Mt. 5:39
and Lk. 6:29]: that is to say, a man ought to be prepared to do so if
necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually: since not even
did our Lord do so, for when He received a blow, He said: "Why strikest
thou Me?" (Jn. 18:23). Consequently the same applies to the reviling
words that are said against us. For we are bound to hold our minds
prepared to submit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless
it sometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this
chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely, that
his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the attempt,
according to Prov. 26:5, "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he
imagine himself to be wise." Secondly, for the good of many who would be
prevented from progressing in virtue on account of our being reviled.
Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): "Those who are so placed that
their life should be an example to others, ought, if possible, to silence
their detractors, lest their preaching be not heard by those who could
have heard it, and they continue their evil conduct through contempt of a
good life."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be checked with
moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for one's own
honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): "Answer not a fool according to
his folly, lest thou be like him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled there is
not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a man defends
himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to proceed from a
sense of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the
intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be praiseworthy
to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it is written
(Ecclus. 8:4): "Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap
not wood upon his fire."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether reviling arises from anger?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. For it is
written (Prov. 11:2): "Where pride is, there shall also be reviling
[Douay: 'reproach']." But anger is a vice distinct from pride. Therefore
reviling does not arise from anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): "All fools are meddling with
revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']." Now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom,
as stated above (Q[46], A[1]); whereas anger is opposed to meekness.
Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of
reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it is a
more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger. Therefore
reviling does not arise from anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives rise
to revilings."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, While one sin may arise from various causes, it is
nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it is
wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected with its
end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end, which is
revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on
another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises chiefly from anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is
excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride.
Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who think
themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict
injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming
it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6) "anger listens
imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers a defect of
reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence reviling arises
from folly on account of the latter's kinship with anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[72] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an angry man
seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about this." Hence
reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather than to
hatred.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] Out. Para. 1/1
OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction] (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) What is backbiting?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Of its comparison with other sins;
(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another's
character by secret words?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some [*Albert
the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], "the blackening of another's good
name by words uttered in secret." For "secretly" and "openly" are
circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin, because it is
accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few. Now that which
does not constitute the species of a sin, does not belong to its essence,
and should not be included in its definition. Therefore it does not
belong to the essence of backbiting that it should be done by secret
words.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to the
public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by backbiting,
this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered openly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something
already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened, even
without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals the
crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every blackening
of a good name is backbiting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite in
silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as one man injures another by deed in two
ways---openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence---and
secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures
another by words in two ways---in one way, openly, and this is done by
reviling him, as stated above (Q[72], A[1])---and in another way
secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one man
openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think little
of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that reviling is
detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the other hand, he
that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect rather than slight
him, so that he injures directly, not his honor but his good name, in so
far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for his own part, causes his
hearers to have a bad opinion of the person against whom he speaks. For
the backbiter apparently intends and aims at being believed. It is
therefore evident that backbiting differs from reviling in two points:
first, in the way in which the words are uttered, the reviler speaking
openly against someone, and the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the
end in view, i.e. as regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a
man's honor, the backbiter injuring his good name.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all
injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the kind
of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and "openly,"
because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and by
ignorance, as stated above (Q[65], A[4]; FS, Q[6], AA[5],8).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not
altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said, because
they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On the other
hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore if a man
speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case of
backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he alone be present:
although if a man speak ill of an absent person to one man alone, he
destroys his good name not altogether but partly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another, not because
he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good name. This is
done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly, in four ways:
first, by saying that which is false about him; secondly, by stating his
sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing something unknown
about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a bad intention.
Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good, or by maliciously
concealing it, or by diminishing it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no act of
virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which pertains to
backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), is an act of the virtue of
charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin in order that he may
amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man accuses his
brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with
detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice." But
no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many refrain
from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in all.
Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm.
civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a slight sin "to
speak ill without hesitation or forethought." But this pertains to
backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to God,"
which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be deemed a
slight sin because it consists in words."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should be
judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by its
very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore, properly
speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to
blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to blacken a man's
good name, because of all temporal things a man's good name seems the
most precious, since for lack of it he is hindered from doing many things
well. For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15): "Take care of a good
name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand treasures
precious and great." Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal
sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby
someone's good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this, but
something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally speaking,
but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if such defamatory
words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good, and with attention
to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and cannot be called
backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness of heart or for some
unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin, unless perchance the spoken
word be of such a grave nature, as to cause a notable injury to a man's
good name, especially in matters pertaining to his moral character,
because from the very nature of the words this would be a mortal sin. And
one is bound to restore a man his good name, no less than any other
thing one has taken from him, in the manner stated above (Q[62], A[2])
when we were treating of restitution.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man's
hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or accuse
him for the good of public justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to be found
throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because "the number
of fools is infinite," [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they that walk in the
way of salvation, [*Cf. Mt. 7:14] and because there are few or none at
all who do not at times speak from lightness of heart, so as to injure
someone's good name at least slightly, for it is written (James 3:2): "If
any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man utters a
slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but through
lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's
neighbor?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins
committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4, "Instead
of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss says: "Those
who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of future believers
are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that was soon to rise
again." From this it seems to follow that backbiting is by so much a
graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to kill the soul than to
kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the other sins that are
committed against one's neighbor. Therefore backbiting is absolutely the
gravest of all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling,
because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting. Now
backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because adultery
unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs utterly those
who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous than adultery: and
yet of all other sins a man commits against his neighbor, adultery is
most grave.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises from
envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a graver sin
than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than reviling; and so
the same conclusion follows as before.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of the
defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous defect, viz.
blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2): "What else do
backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into their eyes, so
that the more they breathe of detraction, the less they see of the
truth?" Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin committed against
one's neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But
backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins
of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins committed
against one's neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The essential gravity of sins committed against one's
neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is
thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good
taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's good is threefold,
namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of
external things; the good of the soul, which is the greatest of all,
cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause, for
instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the
other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external things,
can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the body
excel the goods of external things, those sins which injure a man's body
are more grievous than those which injure his external things.
Consequently, among other sins committed against one's neighbor, murder
is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the life which he already
possesses: after this comes adultery, which is contrary to the right
order of human generation, whereby man enters upon life. In the last
place come external goods, among which a man's good name takes precedence
of wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is
written (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is better than great riches."
Therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin than
theft, but is less grievous than murder or adultery. Nevertheless the
order may differ by reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the
sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if he sins
through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word have a
certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a slip of the
tongue, and without much forethought.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His
members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith.
Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as much
as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as robbery is a
graver sin than theft, as stated above (Q[66], A[9]). Yet reviling is not
a more grievous sin than adultery. For the gravity of adultery is
measured, not from its being a union of bodies, but from being a disorder
in human generation. Moreover the reviler is not the sufficient cause of
unfriendliness in another man, but is only the occasional cause of
division among those who were united, in so far, to wit, as by declaring
the evils of another, he for his own part severs that man from the
friendship of other men, though they are not forced by his words to do
so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer "occasionally," since by his
words he gives another man an occasion for hating or despising his
neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [*Ad
Jacob. Ep. i], that "backbiters are murderers," i.e. occasionally;
because "he that hateth his brother is a murderer" (1 Jn. 3:15).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher states
(Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in secret, is not
the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of envy, which strives
by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory. Nor does it follow from
this that backbiting is more grievous than reviling: since a lesser vice
can give rise to a greater sin, just as anger gives birth to murder and
blasphemy. For the origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end,
i.e. on the thing to which the sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin
depends on what it turns away from.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth" (Prov.
15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and believes what
he says, and consequently more and more hates his neighbor, and thus his
knowledge of the truth becomes less and less. This effect however may
also result from other sins pertaining to hate of one's neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter does not
sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to others than
to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his own
backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as we ought
not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so ought we to
suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by their own
wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater." Therefore a man
does not sin if he does not withstand those who backbite others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): "In no wise speak against
the truth." Now sometimes a person tells the truth while backbiting, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore it seems that one is not always
bound to withstand a backbiter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others. Now
backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: for Pope Pius
[*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi, qu. 1]: "Not
unfrequently backbiting is directed against good persons, with the result
that those who have been unduly exalted through the flattery of their
kindred, or the favor of others, are humbled by backbiting." Therefore
one ought not to withstand backbiters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to have
an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract others
nor listen to backbiters."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the Apostle (Rm. 1:32), they "are worthy of
death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also that consent
to them that do them." Now this happens in two ways. First, directly,
when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin is pleasing
to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not withstand him when
he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not because the sin is
pleasing to him, but on account of some human fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without
resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he becomes a
participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at least
if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of the
person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes more.
Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It is difficult to say which
is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens to
backbiting." If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails to
withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he sins
indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially.
Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his official
duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger;
or on account of the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be
a mortal sin, as stated above (Q[19], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is
spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly speaking,
but reviling, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Yet it is possible for the
detractions uttered against a person to come to his knowledge through
others telling him, and then it is left to his discretion whether he will
suffer their detriment to his good name, unless this endanger the good of
others, as stated above (Q[72], A[3]). Wherefore his patience may deserve
commendation for as much as he suffers patiently being detracted himself.
But it is not left to his discretion to permit an injury to be done to
another's good name, hence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist
when he can, for the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another
man's ass lying "underneath his burden," as commanded in Dt. 21:4 [*Ex.
23:5].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by
endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that he
is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words, for
that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained
demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because
according to Prov. 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a
sad countenance a backbiting tongue."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[73] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is due, not to
the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God Who produces
good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less withstand
backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even though the
oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] Out. Para. 1/1
OF TALE-BEARING [*'Susurratio,' i.e. whispering] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from
backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The susurro [tale-bearer] takes his
name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks disparagingly not to the
face but into the ear." But to speak of another disparagingly belongs to
backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from backbiting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): "Thou shalt not be an
informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']
among the people." But an informer is apparently the same as a backbiter.
Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed." But a double-tongued
man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a backbiter speaks
with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with another in your
presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a backbiter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 1:29,30, "Tale-bearers, backbiters
[Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow discord among
friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good points."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, and
also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil secretly of
their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are sometimes used one
for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, "Be not called a
tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i.e. a backbiter." They differ
however in end, because the backbiter intends to blacken his neighbor's
good name, wherefore he brings forward those evils especially about his
neighbor which are likely to defame him, or at least to depreciate his
good name: whereas a tale-bearer intends to sever friendship, as appears
from the gloss quoted above and from the saying of Prov. 26:20, "Where
the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease." Hence it is that
a tale-bearer speaks such ill about his neighbors as may stir his
hearer's mind against them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, "A sinful man
will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that
are at peace."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as he speaks
ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he intends not to
speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir one man against
another, though it be good simply, and yet has a semblance of evil
through being unpleasant to the hearer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a backbiter, for
an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes, either by
accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to a backbiter or
tale-bearer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a tale-bearer.
For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer strives to sever
friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double tongue towards two
persons, by speaking ill of one to the other: wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer'] and the
double-tongued is accursed," and then it is added, "for he hath troubled
many that were peace."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.
For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a backbiter speaks of his
neighbor things that are evil simply, for such things lead to the loss or
depreciation of his good name: whereas a tale-bearer is only intent on
saying what is apparently evil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the
hearer. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name, deprives him
not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is minded to
scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is reproached
against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip 19:2): "Thou art
joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord." But tale-bearing
deprives one of only one friend. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin
than tale-bearing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth
[Douay:,'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and
consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting
seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above
(Q[20], A[3]; FS, Q[73], A[3]). On the other hand the sin of tale-bearing
is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting is graver than
the sin of tale-bearing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of disgrace
is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']
hatred, and enmity, and reproach."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[73], A[3]; FS, Q[73], A[8]), sins
against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they inflict
a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the greater, according
to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all one's
external goods a friend takes the first place, since "no man can live
without friends," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it
is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be compared to a faithful
friend." Again, a man's good name whereof backbiting deprives him, is
most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship. Therefore
tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even reviling, because a
friend is better than honor, and to be loved is better than to be
honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end rather
than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end,
tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the backbiter
says worse things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad name
is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of the thing
for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a disposition
for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what conduces directly to
enmity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[74] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the law, in
so far as he despises the precept of love for one's neighbor: while he
that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly against this
precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against God, because "God
is charity" (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this reason it is written (Prov. 6:16):
"Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul
detesteth," and the seventh is "he (Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among
brethren."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] Out. Para. 1/1
OF DERISION [*Or mockery] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins
whereby one's neighbor is injured by words?
(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct from
those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the same as
derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision
would seem not to differ from reviling.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible
which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to a
person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts to
backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct from the
foregoing vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury they
inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by derision
affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental to his
friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the foregoing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as
"making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest.
Therefore derision differs from all of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should be
weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these sins are
differentiated according to the various intentions of those who speak
against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor of
the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name, and the
tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends to shame
the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the others, it
follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but
differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by words
and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as a
gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them":
and such a distinction does not differentiate the species. Yet they both
differ from reviling, as being shamed differs from being dishonored: for
to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as Damascene states (De Fide Orth.
ii, 15).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect and a
good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory of a good
conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is this, the testimony
of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing a reprehensible,
i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and good name in the eyes
of others---and for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of
another person---while in his own eyes, he loses the glory of his
conscience through being confused and ashamed at reprehensible deeds
being imputed to him---and for this purpose the derider speaks ill of
him. It is accordingly evident that derision agrees with the foregoing
vices as to the matter but differs as to the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according to
Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore he that
disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a special
injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether derision can be a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every mortal
sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary to
charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends, wherefore it
is known as "making fun." Therefore derision cannot be a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which is
done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal sin when it
tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into
a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says (De Sum. Bon.
ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has repented of, is a
derider and not a penitent." It would likewise follow that all hypocrisy
is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) "the
ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the horse, i.e. the just
man, and his rider, i.e. God." Therefore derision is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than
derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest. But
not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore is
derision a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg.: 'shall
scorn'] the scorners." But God's derision is eternal punishment for
mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in
heaven shall laugh at them." Therefore derision is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The object of derision is always some evil or defect. Now
when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously:
consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the
terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is considered to be
slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first, in
itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone makes game or
fun of another's evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in itself,
this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand this
defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the person, just
as we are wont to think little of the defects of children and imbeciles:
and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and
to think him so despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit,
but is held as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal
sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because
the reviler would seem to take another's evil seriously; whereas the
derider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and
dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a grievous
sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater respect is due to
the person derided.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the
things of God, according to Is. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached, and
whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice?"
and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel." In the second place
comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written (Prov. 30:17):
"The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the labor of his
mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the
young eagles eat it." Further, the derision of good persons is grievous,
because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is written
(Job 12:4): "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn." Such
like derision does very much harm: because it turns men away from good
deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14), "Who when they perceive any
good points appearing in the acts of others, directly pluck them up with
the hand of a mischievous reviling."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation to
the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against
charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on
account of contempt, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has
repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in so
far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that to
commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but only
dispositively and imperfectly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[75] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous than
backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest.
Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as
stated above, and then it is a grave sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] Out. Para. 1/1
OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?
(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?
(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
(4) Of its comparison with other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful to
disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according to 2
Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rm. 12:14), "Bless and curse not." Therefore
it is not lawful to curse anyone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan. 3:82, "O
ye sons of men, bless the Lord." Now the same mouth cannot both bless God
and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James. Therefore no man
may lawfully curse another man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some evil
either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a kind of
imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, indeed we are
bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil. Therefore it is
unlawful for any man to curse.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his
obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it
lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While the
ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul." Much less therefore
is it lawful to curse a man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God hath
not cursed?" says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if
one be ignorant of his sentiments." Now one man cannot know another man's
sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no man may
lawfully curse another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth
not in the words of this law." Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys
who mocked him (4 Kgs. 2:24).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum
dicere]. Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the thing spoken.
First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the
indicative mood: in this way "maledicere" signifies simply to tell
someone of another's evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore
tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly,
speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this
belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His word,
according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and they were made"; while secondarily
it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and thus moves them
to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ verbs in the
imperative mood. Thirdly, "speaking" is related to the thing spoken by
expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in
words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way
of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. And here
we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on one
another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above (FS,
Q[20], A[3]). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by way of command
and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of lawfulness and
unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another's evil, as evil,
being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will be unlawful in
both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the other hand if a
man commands or desires another's evil under the aspect of good, it is
lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly speaking, but
accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker is directed not
to evil but to good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect
of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge
lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the
Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in
the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though conforming
their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation may be taken
by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the aspect of
useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of
some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least that he may
cease from harming others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an evil
intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is not
opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in fact
rather is it in conformity therewith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered. His
nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse it. On
the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed, according to Job
3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day." Yet when a sinner curses the
devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he judges himself
worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to curse his own
soul.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in
themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which has to
be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom God curses
in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know who is accursed
of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational
creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to
punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either of
guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the
nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the
devil, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an
irrational creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies, or
transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. iv, 2), "it
is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse what
exists." Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Mt. 21:19;
and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard
things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: while
good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to
the rational creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related to
the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in
so far as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man. In this
sense the Lord said to man (Gn. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy work,"
so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David
cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding (Moral.
iv, 3). Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature
by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in
signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related to
rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of time or
place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of the
original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of the
consequent penalties. In this sense also we may understand David to have
cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kgs. 1:21, namely on
account of the people slaughtered there.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a sin
of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is idle and
vain and consequently unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For Augustine in
a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix of St.
Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins. But such sins are
venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a venial Sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the mind
does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing sometimes
arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil deeds are
not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom
of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, according to 1 Cor.
6:10, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor extortioners shall possess the
kingdom of God." Therefore cursing is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The evil words of which we are speaking now are those
whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire. Now
to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil by commanding
it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we love our
neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mortal sin, according
to its genus, and so much the graver, as the person whom we curse has a
greater claim on our love and respect. Hence it is written (Lev. 20:9):
"He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin
either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing
him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the curse;
because he may say such words through some slight movement, or in jest,
or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed chiefly with
regard to the speaker's intention, as stated above (Q[72], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than backbiting.
Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied in the canonical
epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that "when Michael the
archangel, disputing with the devil, contended about the body of Moses,
he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy [Douay: 'railing
speech']," where blasphemy stands for cursing, according to a gloss. Now
blasphemy is a graver sin than backbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver
sin than backbiting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as stated above
(Q[73], A[3]). But cursing is on a par with the sin of murder; for
Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): "When thou sayest: 'Curse him
down with his house, away with everything,' you are no better than a
murderer." Therefore cursing is graver than backbiting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But the
curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely
signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more
grievously than the backbiter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas
cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what has
been said (A[1]). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q[48], A[5], evil is twofold, evil
of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil of fault is the
worse (FP, Q[48], A[6]). Hence to speak evil of fault is worse than to
speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of speaking be the same.
Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer, the backbiter and
the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas it belongs to the
evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to speak evil of punishment, and
not evil of fault except under the aspect of punishment. But the mode of
speaking is not the same, for in the case of the four vices mentioned
above, evil of fault is spoken by way of assertion, whereas in the case
of cursing evil of punishment is spoken, either by causing it in the form
of a command, or by wishing it. Now the utterance itself of a person's
fault is a sin, in as much as it inflicts an injury on one's neighbor,
and it is more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it,
other things being equal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin than
the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing which is
expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a cause, will be
more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it inflicts an injury
more or less grave than the blackening of a man's good name. Moreover
this must be taken as applying to these vices considered in their
essential aspects: for other accidental points might be taken into
consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God, and thus
accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one curse a
creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to backbiting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (A[3]), cursing, in one way, includes the
desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil of another's violent
death, he does not differ, in desire, from a murderer, but he differs
from him in so far as the external act adds something to the act of the
will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[76] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers cursing by way of command.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] Out. Para. 1/2
(D) BY SINS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (Q[77])
OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations.
First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed in buying and
selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which occurs in loans. In
connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin
is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is lawful
to sell a thing for more than its worth?
(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;
(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?
(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price
than was paid for it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its
worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws determine that which
is just. Now according to these laws it is just for buyer and seller to
deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 8,15): and this
occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than its worth, and the
buyer buying a thing for less than its worth. Therefore it is lawful to
sell a thing for more than its worth
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural and
not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain jester was
accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to sell at a premium,"
which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is naught, it is naught,
saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, then he will boast."
Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty demands
be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on utility, the amount of the
recompense for a favor received should depend on the utility accruing to
the receiver: and this utility sometimes is worth more than the thing
given, for instance if the receiver be in great need of that thing,
whether for the purpose of avoiding a danger, or of deriving some
particular benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and selling, it is
lawful to give a thing in return for more than its worth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 7:12): "All things . . . whatsoever
you would that men should do to you, do you also to them." But no man
wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore no man should
sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit in
order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this is to
deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says (De Offic.
iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from double-dealing: the
seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one that bids
against him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two ways.
First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of view, buying
and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both
parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and vice
versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now whatever is
established for the common advantage, should not be more of a burden to
one party than to another, and consequently all contracts between them
should observe equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a
thing that comes into human use is measured by the price given for it,
for which purpose money was invented, as stated in Ethic. v, 5. Therefore
if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing's worth, or,
conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the equality
of justice: and consequently, to sell a thing for more than its worth, or
to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as accidentally
tending to the advantage of one party, and to the disadvantage of the
other: for instance, when a man has great need of a certain thing, while
an other man will suffer if he be without it. In such a case the just
price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the loss which the
sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be lawful to sell a thing for
more than it is worth in itself, though the price paid be not more than
it is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive a great advantage by
becoming possessed of the other man's property, and the seller be not at
a loss through being without that thing, the latter ought not to raise
the price, because the advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the
seller, but to a circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell
what is not his, though he may charge for the loss he suffers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from
something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller
something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FS, Q[96], A[2]) human law is given to the
people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not given to
the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all that is
contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit whatever is
destructive of human intercourse, while it treats other matters as though
they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by not punishing them.
Accordingly, if without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods
for more than their worth, or the buyer obtain them for less than their
worth, the law looks upon this as licit, and provides no punishment for
so doing, unless the excess be too great, because then even human law
demands restitution to be made, for instance if a man be deceived in
regard to more than half the amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod.
IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 2,8].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is
contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is reckoned
unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and
selling: and he who has received more than he ought must make
compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be considerable.
I add this condition, because the just price of things is not fixed with
mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that a
slight addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking into
himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are inclined
to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in reality
this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that justice
whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination." And then he gives
the example of a man who gave the just price for a book to a man who
through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is evident that this
common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it is common to
many who walk along the broad road of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real equality.
On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we consider equality of
usefulness, so that the recompense should depend on the usefulness
accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing bought.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and unlawful
through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should be taken of
the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its substance. Yet the
sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered unlawful through a fault in
its substance: for instance, if a man sell instead of the real metal,
silver or gold produced by some chemical process, which is adapted to all
the human uses for which silver and gold are necessary, for instance in
the making of vessels and the like. Much less therefore will it be an
unlawful sale if the thing be defective in other ways.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity, would
seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in equality. Now
quantity is known by being measured: and the measures of things that come
into human use are not fixed, but in some places are greater, in others
less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7). Therefore just as it is
impossible to avoid defects on the part of the thing sold, it seems that
a sale is not rendered unlawful through the thing sold being defective.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a
fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much
knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a sale is
not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): "It is manifestly a
rule of justice that a good man should not depart from the truth, nor
inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any connection with fraud."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the thing
which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if the
seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is guilty of a
fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful. Hence we find it
written against certain people (Is. 1:22), "Thy silver is turned into
dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because that which is mixed is
defective in its substance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being
measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure in
selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it is
written (Dt. 25:13,14): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a
greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a greater bushel
and a less," and further on (Dt. 25:16): "For the Lord . . . abhorreth
him that doth these things, and He hateth all injustice."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man
sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do this
knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in
consequence, is illicit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale, but
he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing defects be
in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the seller does not
sin, because he does that which is unjust materially, nor is his deed
unjust, as shown above (Q[59], A[2]). Nevertheless he is bound to
compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his knowledge. Moreover
what has been said of the seller applies equally to the buyer. For
sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his goods to be specifically
of lower value, as when a man sells gold instead of copper, and then if
the buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and is bound to
restitution: and the same applies to a defect in quantity as to a defect
in quality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of the
usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but also
on account of the excellence and purity of their substance. Hence if the
gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true specific nature of
gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent and unjust, especially as
real gold and silver can produce certain results by their natural action,
which the counterfeit gold and silver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus
the true metal has the property of making people joyful, and is helpful
medicinally against certain maladies. Moreover real gold can be employed
more frequently, and lasts longer in its condition of purity than
counterfeit gold. If however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it
would not be unlawful to sell it for the genuine article, for nothing
prevents art from employing certain natural causes for the production of
natural and true effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things
produced by the art of the demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The measures of salable commodities must needs be different
in different places, on account of the difference of supply: because
where there is greater abundance, the measures are wont to be larger.
However in each place those who govern the state must determine the just
measures of things salable, with due consideration for the conditions of
place and time. Hence it is not lawful to disregard such measures as are
established by public authority or custom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price of things
salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at times a horse
fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on their usefulness
to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or buyer to be cognizant
of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but only of such as render the
thing adapted to man's use, for instance, that the horse be strong, run
well and so forth. Such qualities the seller and buyer can easily
discover.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the defects
of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer to buy, he
would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods offered for sale. Now
judgment about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to the same
person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the seller if the buyer
be deceived in his judgment, and be hurried into buying a thing without
carefully inquiring into its condition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him
carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods he
has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic. iii, 13)
pictures a man as saying: "Could anything be more absurd than for a
public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer this unhealthy
horse for sale?'" Therefore the seller is not bound to state the defects
of the thing sold.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to know
the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to offer
advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters pertaining to
virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is false. Much less
therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for
sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one offers
for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now sometimes
the price would be lowered for some other reason, without any defect in
the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat to a place where
wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will come after him
carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they would give a lower
price. But apparently the seller need not give the buyer this
information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him the
faults of the goods he is selling.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): "In all contracts the
defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and unless the seller
make them known, although the buyer has already acquired a right to them,
the contract is voided on account of the fraudulent action."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of
danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help or
counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in certain
fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or when he is
the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers goods for
sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the very fact
that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may occasion loss or
danger to the buyer---loss, if, by reason of this defect, the goods are
of less value, and he takes nothing off the price on that
account---danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the goods or
render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a lame for a fleet horse,
a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or poisonous food for wholesome.
Wherefore if such like defects be hidden, and the seller does not make
them known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and the seller will
be bound to compensation for the loss incurred.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse
have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be useful
to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought from the
price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods, since perhaps on
account of that defect the buyer might want him to allow a greater rebate
than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to his own indemnity, by
withholding the defect of the goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest: for
"a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the defects of
the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is not
sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made known to
him. The case would be different if the defects were manifest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the public crier
the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because if he were to
begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be frightened to buy,
through ignorance of other qualities that might render the thing good and
serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated to each individual that
offers to buy: and then he will be able to compare the various points one
with the other, the good with the bad: for nothing prevents that which is
defective in one respect being useful in many others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell
everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so bound
in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would endanger
another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this case.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now than it
seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to be of less
value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other merchants,
which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the seller, since he
sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not seem to act
contrary to justice through not stating what is going to happen. If
however he were to do so, or if he lowered his price, it would be
exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does not seem to be bound
to do this as a debt of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether, in trading, it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than
what was paid for it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell a thing
for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxviii in
the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on
Mt. 21:12: "He that buys a thing in order that he may sell it, entire and
unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who is cast out of God's temple."
Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his commentary on Ps. 70:15,
"Because I have not known learning, or trading" according to another
version [*The Septuagint]: "What is trade," says he, "but buying at a
cheap price with the purpose of retailing at a higher price?" and he
adds: "Such were the tradesmen whom Our Lord cast out of the temple." Now
no man is cast out of the temple except for a sin. Therefore such like
trading is sinful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a higher
price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their value, as
shown above (A[1]). Now if you sell a thing for a higher price than you
paid for it, you must either have bought it for less than its value, or
sell it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be done without
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Shun, as you would the
plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or who, from
being a nobody has become a celebrity." Now trading would net seem to be
forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness. Therefore it is
a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell at a higher price.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not
known learning," [*Cf. OBJ 1] says: "The greedy tradesman blasphemes over
his losses; he lies and perjures himself over the price of his wares. But
these are vices of the man, not of the craft, which can be exercised
without these vices." Therefore trading is not in itself unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A tradesman is one whose business consists in the
exchange of things. According to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), exchange
of things is twofold; one, natural as it were, and necessary, whereby
one commodity is exchanged for another, or money taken in exchange for a
commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of life. Such like trading,
properly speaking, does not belong to tradesmen, but rather to
housekeepers or civil servants who have to provide the household or the
state with the necessaries of life. The other kind of exchange is either
that of money for money, or of any commodity for money, not on account of
the necessities of life, but for profit, and this kind of exchange,
properly speaking, regards tradesmen, according to the Philosopher
(Polit. i, 3). The former kind of exchange is commendable because it
supplies a natural need: but the latter is justly deserving of blame,
because, considered in itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which
knows no limit and tends to infinity. Hence trading, considered in
itself, has a certain debasement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its
very nature, it does not imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless
gain which is the end of trading, though not implying, by its nature,
anything virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything
sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being
directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes
lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he
seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household, or for the
assistance of the needy: or again, a man may take to trade for some
public advantage, for instance, lest his country lack the necessaries of
life, and seek gain, not as an end, but as payment for his labor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading which seeks
gain as a last end. This is especially the case where a man sells
something at a higher price without its undergoing any change. For if he
sells at a higher price something that has changed for the better, he
would seem to receive the reward of his labor. Nevertheless the gain
itself may be lawfully intended, not as a last end, but for the sake of
some other end which is necessary or virtuous, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he bought is
a tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a profit. If, on
the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession, and afterwards,
for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade transaction even if he
sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this, either because he has
bettered the thing, or because the value of the thing has changed with
the change of place or time, or on account of the danger he incurs in
transferring the thing from one place to another, or again in having it
carried by another. In this sense neither buying nor selling is unjust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[77] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Clerics should abstain not only from things that are evil
in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of evil. This
happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly gain, which
clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so many vices,
since "a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips" [*'A merchant is
hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall not be justified from
the sins of the lips'] (Ecclus. 26:28). There is also another reason,
because trading engages the mind too much with worldly cares, and
consequently withdraws it from spiritual cares; wherefore the Apostle
says (2 Tim. 2:4): "No man being a soldier to God entangleth himself with
secular businesses." Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in
the first mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the
necessaries of life, either by buying or by selling.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] Out. Para. 1/1
(E) BY SINS COMMITTED IN LOANS (Q[78])
OF THE SIN OF USURY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which
is to receive usury?
(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of
consideration, by way of payment for the loan?
(3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money
taken in usury?
(4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for money lent.
For no man sins through following the example of Christ. But Our Lord
said of Himself (Lk. 19:23): "At My coming I might have exacted it," i.e.
the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury for
lending money.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is
unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is
allowed in the Divine law, according to Dt. 23:19,20: "Thou shalt not
fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the
stranger": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the observance
of the Law, according to Dt. 28:12: "Thou shalt fenerate* to many
nations, and shalt not borrow of any one." [*'Faeneraberis'---'Thou shalt
lend upon usury.' The Douay version has simply 'lend.' The objection lays
stress on the word 'faeneraberis': hence the necessity of rendering it by
'fenerate.'] Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil laws.
Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to be lawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among other
counsels we find (Lk. 6:35): "Lend, hoping for nothing thereby."
Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a
price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is not
bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful
for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically from
silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price for the
loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price
for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not in itself a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner
freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the usury.
Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any
of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be
hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because
this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to
inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this evident,
we must observe that there are certain things the use of which consists
in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and
we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore in such like things
the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself,
and whoever is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself
and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to transfer the
ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the
use of the wine, he would be selling the same thing twice, or he would be
selling what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of
injustice. In like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or
wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in
equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist in
their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to destroy
it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for instance, one man
may hand over to another the ownership of his house while reserving to
himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may grant the use of
the house, while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may
lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and, besides this,
revendicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as
happens in renting and letting a house.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3) was
invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently the proper
and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is
sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment
for the use of money lent, which payment is known as usury: and just as a
man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore
the money which he has taken in usury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for the
increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He wishes us
ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and this is for
our own profit not for His.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their brethren,
i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand that to take
usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to treat every man as
our neighbor and brother, especially in the state of the Gospel, whereto
all are called. Hence it is said without any distinction in Ps. 14:5: "He
that hath not put out his money to usury," and (Ezech. 18:8): "Who hath
not taken usury [*Vulg.: 'If a man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor
taken any increase . . . he is just.']." They were permitted, however, to
take usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to
avoid a greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were
prone according to Is. 56:11, they should take usury from the Jews who
were worshippers of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Where we find it promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate to
many nations," etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense for
lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, where we read: "Many have refused to
fenerate, not out of wickedness," i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly
the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth, so that they
would be able to lend to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account of
the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of
many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments
appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted usury, not that it
looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but lest the advantage of
many should be hindered. Hence it is that in civil law [*Inst. II, iv, de
Usufructu] it is stated that "those things according to natural reason
and civil law which are consumed by being used, do not admit of
usufruct," and that "the senate did not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct
to such things, but established a quasi-usufruct," namely by permitting
usury. Moreover the Philosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i,
3) that "to make money by usury is exceedingly unnatural."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason it
is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not to seek
profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel in
comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some kinds of
usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter of counsel.
Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain, but of the
hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do any good deed
through hope in man, but only through hope in God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for
what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid according
to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if
he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other use but the
consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of something
non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The principal use of a silver vessel is not its
consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining one's
ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver money is
sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its use and at
the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. It must be
observed, however, that the secondary use of silver vessels may be an
exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In like manner there may
be some secondary use of silver money; for instance, a man might lend
coins for show, or to be used as security.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply, but
under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money which
the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to ask for any other kind of consideration for money
lent?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of
consideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to indemnify
himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending money.
Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something else besides
the money lent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. v, 5, one is in duty bound by a
point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now to lend
money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he should
be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a natural
debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to bind oneself to
an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not unlawful, in
lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of compensation as condition
of the loan.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there verbal
remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says on Is. 33:15,
"Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes [*Vulg.: 'Which of
you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . . He that shaketh his
hands from all bribes.']." Now it is lawful to accept service or praise
from one to whom one has lent money. Therefore in like manner it is
lawful to accept any other kind of remuneration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same as of
loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given. Therefore
it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a loan granted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum of
money removes the money further from himself than he who entrusts it to a
merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest for money
entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also lawful to
receive interest for money lent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of
which pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages his land
or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to receive
interest for money lent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price of his
goods under guise of loan, or buys another's goods at a low figure; or
raises his price through delay in being paid, and lowers his price that
he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases there seems to be
payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to be manifestly illicit.
Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or exact some consideration for
money lent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Among other conditions requisite in a just man it is
stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he "hath not taken usury and increase."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing is
reckoned as money "if its value can be measured by money." Consequently,
just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by tacit or express
agreement, in return for lending money or anything else that is consumed
by being used, so also is it a like sin, by tacit or express agreement to
receive anything whose price can be measured by money. Yet there would be
no sin in receiving something of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as
though it were due on account of some agreement tacit or expressed, but
as a gratuity: since, even before lending the money, one could accept a
gratuity, nor is one in a worse condition through lending.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in
respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money, for
instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the
borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he ought to
have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. It
may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss than the lender
incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender with what he has
gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for compensation,
through the fact that he makes no profit out of his money: because he
must not sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in many ways
from having.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one way,
as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by a fixed
contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor received.
Wherefore the borrower of money or any such thing the use of which is its
consumption is not bound to repay more than he received in loan: and
consequently it is against justice if he be obliged to pay back more. In
another way a man's obligation to repayment for favor received is based
on a debt of friendship, and the nature of this debt depends more on the
feeling with which the favor was conferred than on the greatness of the
favor itself. This debt does not carry with it a civil obligation,
involving a kind of necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature
of such a repayment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If a man were, in return for money lent, as though there
had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or exact repayment in
the shape of some remuneration of service or words, it would be the same
as if he expected or exacted some real remuneration, because both can be
priced at a money value, as may be seen in the case of those who offer
for hire the labor which they exercise by work or by tongue. If on the
other hand the remuneration by service or words be given not as an
obligation, but as a favor, which is not to be appreciated at a money
value, it is lawful to take, exact, and expect it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount
lent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made with a
demand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence which
cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which can be the basis of a
spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at some future
time is repugnant to such a feeling, because again an obligation of this
kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is lawful for the lender to
borrow something else at the same time, but it is unlawful for him to
bind the borrower to grant him a loan at some future time.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money to
the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk and is
bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact more. On
the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant or craftsman so
as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the ownership of his
money to them, for it remains his, so that at his risk the merchant
speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for his craft, and
consequently he may lawfully demand as something belonging to him, part
of the profits derived from his money.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: If a man in return for money lent to him pledges something
that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for the use of that
thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he wishes the gratuitous
use of that thing in addition to repayment, it is the same as if he took
money for lending, and that is usury, unless perhaps it were such a thing
as friends are wont to lend to one another gratis, as in the case of the
loan of a book.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than that
which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is
manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of the
price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands beyond the
just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price for a loan,
which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes to buy goods at
a lower price than what is just, for the reason that he pays for the
goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of usury; because again
this anticipated payment of money has the character of a loan, the price
of which is the rebate on the just price of the goods sold. On the other
hand if a man wishes to allow a rebate on the just price in order that he
may have his money sooner, he is not guilty of the sin of usury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of
money gotten by usury?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever profits he
has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle says (Rm. 11:16):
"If the root be holy, so are the branches." Therefore likewise if the
root be rotten so are the branches. But the root was infected with usury.
Therefore whatever profit is made therefrom is infected with usury.
Therefore he is bound to restore it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal: 'Cum
tu sicut asseris'): "Property accruing from usury must be sold, and the
price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was extorted." Therefore,
likewise, whatever else is acquired from usurious money must be restored.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is due
to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has no more
right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he was bound
to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is also bound to
restore what he acquired with it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully acquired.
Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully
acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), there are certain things whose
use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct, according
to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be extorted by means
of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so forth, the lender is not
bound to restore more than he received (since what is acquired by such
things is the fruit not of the thing but of human industry), unless
indeed the other party by losing some of his own goods be injured through
the lender retaining them: for then he is bound to make good the loss.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their
consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or land
property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted from
another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the house or
land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since they are the
fruits of things owned by another man and consequently are due to him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The root has not only the character of matter, as money
made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active
cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison
fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong to
the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he that
paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the
other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that such property
should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since the property is
perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but it is commanded that
the property be sold, and the price be restored, of course according to
the amount taken in usury.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the person
who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as instrumental
cause, but on account of his own industry as principal cause. Wherefore
he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious money than to the
usurious money itself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money under a
condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rm. 1:32) that they "are worthy
of death . . . not only they that do" these sins, "but they also that
consent to them that do them." Now he that borrows money under a
condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer, and gives him an
occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another an
occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active scandal, which
is always sinful, as stated above (Q[43], A[2]). Now he that seeks to
borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he is not to
be excused on account of any temporal advantage.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit one's
money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems altogether
unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it would be
unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, a maiden with a libertine,
or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful to borrow from a
usurer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, He that suffers injury does not sin, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean between two
vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by doing an
injury to the person who borrows from him under a condition of usury.
Therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury does not sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet it
is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even God
uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every evil as
stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked whether it
were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing by false gods
(which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to them) Augustine
(Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad but for a good
purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods, is a party, not to
his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good compact whereby he kept
his word. If however he were to induce him to swear by false gods, he
would sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is by
no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of usury: yet
it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so and is
a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a good end in view,
such as the relief of his own or another's need. Thus too it is lawful
for a man who has fallen among thieves to point out his property to them
(which they sin in taking) in order to save his life, after the example
of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer. 41:8): "Kill us not: for we have
stores in the field."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the usurer's
sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance of usury that
pleases him, but his lending, which is good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion, not
for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an occasion
of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive scandal on his
part, while there is no active scandal on the part of the person who
seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a reason why the other
person should desist from borrowing if he is in need, since this passive
scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but from malice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[78] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking
other means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a
greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be giving
a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator in his
guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts one's money
has other means of practising usury, there is no sin in entrusting it to
him that it may be in safer keeping, since this is to use a sinner for a
good purpose.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (QQ[79]-81)
OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are "to
do good," and "to decline from evil," and the opposite vices. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether these two are parts of justice?
(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?
(3) Whether omission is a special sin?
(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good are not
parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a good deed
and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the whole. Therefore to
decline from evil and to do good should not be reckoned parts of justice,
which is a special kind of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, "Turn away from evil and do good,"
says: "The former," i.e. to turn away from evil, "avoids sin, the
latter," i.e. to do good, "deserves the life and the palm." But any part
of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to decline from
evil is not a part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies the other,
are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining from evil is
implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good at the same time.
Therefore declining from evil and doing good are not parts of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that
"declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to
every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they cannot
be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of
"all virtue" [*Cf. Q[58], A[5]]. And yet even if justice be taken in this
sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; namely, the good as
due in respect of Divine or human law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as
due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special justice to
do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid the opposite
evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor; while it belongs
to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation
to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of
special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of justice.
For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with
others, as shown above (Q[58], A[2]): and it pertains to the same cause
to establish and to preserve that which it has established. Now a person
establishes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to
another his due: and he preserves the already established equality of
justice by declining from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his
neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Good and evil are here considered under a special aspect,
by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why these two are
reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and evil, while
they are not reckoned parts of any other moral virtue, is that the other
moral virtues are concerned with the passions wherein to do good is to
observe the mean, which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so
that doing good and avoiding evil come to the same, with regard to the
other virtues. On the other hand justice is concerned with operations and
external things, wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to
disturb the equality established is another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice, does
not denote a pure negation, viz."not to do evil"; for this does not
deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies a
movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term "decline"
shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person resists against an
instigation to do evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the
principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more
imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a.
material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the
formal and completive part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether transgression is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin. For no
species is included in the definition of its genus. Now transgression is
included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii)
that sin is "a transgression of the Divine law." Therefore transgression
is not a species of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But
transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a "word,
deed or desire against the law of God," according to Augustine (Contra
Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature, or custom.
Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no species contains all the parts into which its genus
is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the capital
vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed. Therefore
transgression is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The term transgression is derived from bodily movement
and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to transgress in
bodily movement, when he steps [graditur] beyond [trans] a fixed
boundary---and it is a negative precept that fixes the boundary that man
must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore to transgress, properly
speaking, is to act against a negative precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of sin,
because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of mortal sin.
But if we consider it formally, namely under its special aspect of an act
against a negative precept, it is a special sin in two ways. First, in so
far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that are opposed to the other
virtues: for just as it belongs properly to legal justice to consider a
precept as binding, so it belongs properly to a transgression to consider
a precept as an object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct
from omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even as legal justice is "all virtue" (Q[58], A[5]) as
regards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially "all
sin." It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, considering it from the
point of view of legal injustice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the
natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept; since
as Augustine says in an epistle On the Fast of the Sabbath (Ep. xxxvi),
"a custom of God's people should be looked upon as law." Hence both sin
and transgression may be against a laudable custom and against a natural
inclination.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All these species of sin may include transgression, if we
consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special aspect,
as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether distinct
from the sin of transgression.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether omission is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For every sin
is either original or actual. Now omission is not original sin, for it is
not contracted through origin nor is it actual sin, for it may be
altogether without act, as stated above (FS, Q[71], A[5]) when we were
treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission sometimes is not
voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated after taking a vow
of virginity, or when one lose that which one is under an obligation to
restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is prevented from
doing so. Therefore omission is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time when any special sin
begins. But this is not possible in the case of omission, since one is
not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the omission occurs, and
yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission is not a
special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But it
is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission is
opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and because
justice to which it would seem more particularly opposed, always requires
an act, even in declining from evil, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), while
omission may be altogether without act. Therefore omission is not a
special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who knoweth
to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not
indeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the aspect
of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the thing due
depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the due is
something in relation to one's neighbor. Wherefore, in the same way as
justice is a special virtue, as stated above (Q[58], AA[6],7), omission
is a special sin distinct from the sins which are opposed to the other
virtues; and just as doing good, which is the opposite of omitting it, is
a special part of justice, distinct from avoiding evil, to which
transgression is opposed, so too is omission distinct from transgression.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Omission is not original but actual sin, not as though it
had some act essential to it, but for as much as the negation of an act
is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action is a kind of
action, as stated above (FS, Q[71], A[6], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Omission, as stated above, is only of such good as is due
and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the impossible:
wherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot.
Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is guilty of an
omission, not through not having virginity, but through not repenting of
her past sin, or through not doing what she can to fulfil her vow by
observing continence. Again a priest is not bound to say Mass, except he
have a suitable opportunity, and if this be lacking, there is no
omission. And in like manner, a person is bound to restitution, supposing
he has the wherewithal; if he has not and cannot have it, he is not
guilty of an omission, provided he does what he can. The same applies to
other similar cases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to negative
precepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of omission is
opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of good. Now
affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed time, and at
that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen that then one is
unable to do what one ought, and if this inability is without any fault
on his part, he does not omit his duty, as stated above (ad 2; FS, Q[71],
A[5]). On the other hand if this inability is due to some previous fault
of his (for instance, if a man gets drunk at night, and cannot get up for
matins, as he ought to), some say that the sin of omission begins when he
engages in an action that is illicit and incompatible with the act to
which he is bound. But this does not seem to be true, for supposing one
were to rouse him by violence and that he went to matins, he would not
omit to go, so that, evidently, the previous drunkenness was not an
omission, but the cause of an omission. Consequently, we must say that
the omission begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time comes
for the action; and yet this is on account of a preceding cause by reason
of which the subsequent omission becomes voluntary.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Omission is directly opposed to justice, as stated above;
because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but only under the
aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is required for an act
to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be sinful and
demeritorious, because "good results from an entire cause, whereas evil
arises from each single defect" [*Dionysius, De Div. Nom. iv]. Wherefore
the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an omission does not.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin
of transgression. For "delictum" would seem to signify the same as
"derelictum" [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and therefore is
seemingly the same as an omission. But "delictum" denotes a more grievous
offence than transgression, because it deserves more expiation as appears
from Lev. 5. Therefore the sin of omission is more grievous than the sin
of transgression.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more
excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which
transgression is opposed, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore
omission is a graver sin than transgression.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or mortal.
But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are opposed to
an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to be a graver sin
than transgression.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of
seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater
punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of
transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now
punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission is
graver than the sin of transgression.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to
accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain from
an evil deed, i.e. "to transgress," than not to accomplish a good deed,
which is "to omit."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from
virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to Metaph.
x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed from its
contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is further removed
from white than not-white is, since every black is not-white, but not
conversely. Now it is evident that transgression is contrary to an act of
virtue, while omission denotes the negation thereof: for instance it is a
sin of omission, if one fail to give one's parents due reverence, while
it is a sin of transgression to revile them or injure them in any way.
Hence it is evident that, simply and absolutely speaking, transgression
is a graver sin than omission, although a particular omission may be
graver than a particular transgression.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Delictum" in its widest sense denotes any kind of
omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of
something concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it were
contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity, for
which reason it demands a greater expiation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The opposite of "doing good" is both "not doing good,"
which is an omission, and "doing evil," which is a transgression: but the
first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety, which
implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more grievous
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so is
transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both, strictly
speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression and omission,
however, may be taken broadly for any infringement of an affirmative or
negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such precept: and so
taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[79] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To the sin of transgression there correspond both the pain
of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of sense, on
account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In like manner
omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the pain of sense,
according to Mt. 7:19, "Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit
shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire"; and this on account
of the root from which it grows, although it does not necessarily imply
conversion to any mutable good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the virtues
annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of consideration:
(1) What virtues are annexed to justice?
(2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are unsuitably
enumerated Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz. "religion, piety,
gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge is seemingly a
species of commutative justice whereby revenge is taken for injuries
inflicted, as stated above (Q[61], A[4]). Therefore it should not be
reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven, viz.
"innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity,"
several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to
justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz. "obedience" in
respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard to inferiors,
"equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and "truthfulness" towards all;
and of these "truthfulness" alone is mentioned by Tully. Therefore he
would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues annexed to
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons nine
parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness, revenge,
commonsense, [*{eugnomosyne}] piety, gratitude, holiness, just exchange"
and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it is evident that Tully mentions
none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have made an incomplete
enumeration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions {epieikeia} as being
annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the
foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are
insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to
a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in
common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some respect
they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly since
justice is of one man to another as stated above (Q[58], A[2]), all the
virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common
aspect be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice
consists in rendering to another his due according to equality, as stated
above (Q[58], A[11]). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to
another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling
short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect
of due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but
are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man
renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to
God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I render
to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?" In this
respect "religion" is annexed to justice since, according to Tully (De
invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or
worship to "some superior nature that men call divine." Secondly, it is
not possible to make to one's parents an equal return of what one owes to
them, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus "piety" is
annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man
"renders service and constant deference to his kindred and the
well-wishers of his country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus
"observance" is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De
invent. ii, 53) in the "deference and honor rendered to those who excel
in worth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13)
assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which one is
bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is chiefly
the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the other hand,
the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude
of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two
degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude
cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of due. Moreover
this due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and in
this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man represent himself to
others just as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is
annexed "truth," whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present,
past and future things are told without perversion. It may also be
considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by
comparing the reward he receives with what he has done---sometimes in
good things; and then annexed to justice we have "gratitude" which
"consists in recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others,
and in desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii,
53)---and sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed
"revenge," whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist
force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by
self-defense." [*St. Thomas read 'obscurum,' and explains it as meaning
'derogatory,' infra Q[108], A[2]. Cicero, however, wrote 'obfuturum,'
i.e. 'hurtful.']
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to
greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This due
is the concern of "liberality," "affability" or "friendship," or the
like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there
is little of the nature of anything due in them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in
accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice:
whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not
against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs to
the virtue annexed to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral
parts of justice, namely, "declining from evil," to which "innocence"
belongs, and "doing good," to which the six others belong. Of these, two
would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, "friendship" in
the external conduct and "concord" internally; two regard our relations
toward superiors, namely, "piety" to parents, and "religion" to God;
while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely,
"condescension," in so far as their good pleases us, and "humanity,"
whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says (Etym. x) that a
man is said to be "humane, through having a feeling of love and pity
towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one
another." In this sense "friendship" is understood as directing our
external conduct towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher
treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. "Friendship" may also be taken as regarding
properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in Ethic.
viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to friendship, namely,
"benevolence" which is here called "affection"; "concord," and
"beneficence" which is here called "humanity." These three, however, are
omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they have little of the
nature of a due.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: "Obedience" is included in observance, which Tully
mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to persons
who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his words"
[*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in "truthfulness"
as to the observance of one's promises: yet "truthfulness" covers a wider
ground, as we shall state further on (Q[109], AA[1],3). "Discipline" is
not due as a necessary duty, because one is under no obligation to an
inferior as such, although a superior may be under an obligation to watch
over his inferiors, according to Mt. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant,
whom his lord hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is
omitted by Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by
Macrobius; and equity under {epieikeia} or under "friendship."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice.
To particular justice belongs "justice of exchange," which he describes
as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To legal justice,
as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes "legislative
justice," which he describes as "the science of political commutations
relating to the community." As regards things which have to be done in
particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions "common sense" or
"good judgment*," which is our guide in such like matters, as stated
above (Q[51], A[4]) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that
it is a "voluntary justification," because by his own free will man
observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the
written law. [*St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: {eugnomosyne}
quasi 'bona {gnome}.'] These two are ascribed to prudence as their
director, and to justice as their executor. {Eusebeia} [piety] means
"good worship" and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he
says that it is the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the
manner of Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences')
[*Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and "holiness" comes to the same, as we
shall state further on (Q[81], A[8]). {Eucharistia} (gratitude) means
"good thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore
says (Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to
do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that
"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." "Liberality" would seem
to pertain to "humanity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[80] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: {Epieikeia} is annexed, not to particular but to legal
justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of
{eugnomosyne} [common sense].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] Out. Para. 1/3
OF RELIGION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our
present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3)
observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8)
liberality, (9) {epieikeia}. Of the other virtues that have been
mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of
concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for
instance, of right commutations and of innocence. of legislative justice
we spoke in the treatise on prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] Out. Para. 2/3
Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in
itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?
(2) Whether religion is a virtue?
(3) Whether religion is one virtue?
(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?
(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?
(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
(7) Whether religion has any external actions?
(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether religion directs man to God alone?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It
is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the
Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation,
and to keep oneself unspotted from this world." Now "to visit the
fatherless and widows" indicates an order between oneself and one's
neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" belongs to the
order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to
God alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in
speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere
wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and
relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie,
that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine
worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is
nothing else but the worship of God." Therefore religion signifies a
relation not only to God but also to our kindred.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, seemingly "latria" pertains to religion. Now "latria
signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). And we are
bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor, according to Gal.
5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another." Therefore religion
includes a relation to one's neighbor also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship
not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of Cato
[*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents." Therefore
religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to
God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but
only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to
obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not denote a
relation of subjection of man to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists in
offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call
divine."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a man is
said to be religious from 'religio,' because he often ponders over, and,
as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the
worship of God," so that religion would seem to take its name from
reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought
frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Prov.
3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him." According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that "we ought to seek God
again, whom we had lost by our neglect" [*St. Augustine plays on the
words 'reeligere,' i.e. to choose over again, and 'negligere,' to neglect
or despise.]. Or again, religion may be derived from "religare" [to bind
together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): "May religion
bind us to the one Almighty God." However, whether religion take its name
from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost
through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation
to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing
principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to
our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should
recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and
immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God
alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other
acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it
commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue which is
concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are concerned with the
means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and widows in their
tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as
eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" is an act of
religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as
eliciting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one's
human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, but not if
we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted,
Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems to denote, not any
kind of worship, but the worship of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is
a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service.
Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular
way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all.
Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as
"latria" in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to
cultivate [*In the Latin the same word 'colere' stands for 'worship' and
'cultivate']: a man's memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating
things that are beneath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one who
cultivates the land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who cultivates the
place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is due to God as the
first principle of all things, to Him also is due a special kind of
worship, which in Greek is {Eusebeia} or {Theosebeia}, as Augustine
states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all in
general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who
consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from
human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied, not to
those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to
contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man's sake but
for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. 4:14), "You .
. received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether religion is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it belongs
to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of fear
which is a gift, as stated above (Q[19], A[9]). Therefore religion is not
a virtue but a gift
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will, wherefore
it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit" [*Ethic. ii, 6].
Now, as stated above (A[1], ad 3) "latria" belongs to religion, and
"latria" denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is in us
by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the dictate of
natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer ceremonial worship
to the Godhead" [*Cf. A[1]], and ceremonial matters, as stated above (FS,
Q[99], A[3], ad 2; FS, Q[101]), do not belong to the dictate of natural
reason. Therefore religion is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears
from what has been said above (Q[80]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[58], A[3]; FS, Q[55], AA[3],4) "a
virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good
likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a
virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of
good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably
proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner.
But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species,
according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to
religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that
religion is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now
it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for God.
Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but
that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the gifts
are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above (Q[9], A[1],
ad 3; FS, Q[68], A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master, and
so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam.], by
doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due service to God
may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so voluntarily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should
do something through reverence for God. But that he should do this or
that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason,
but is established by Divine or human law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether religion is one virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion directs
us to God, as stated above (A[1]). Now in God there are three Persons;
and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one
another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a difference
of virtue, as stated above (Q[50], A[2], ad 2). Therefore religion is
not one virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since habits
are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of religion, for
instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many
such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid to
images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself. Since,
then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that
religion is not one virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): "One God [Vulg.: 'Lord'], one
faith." Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore religion
is one virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are
differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now it
belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect,
namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of things.
Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): "If . . . I be a father, where
is My honor?" For it belongs to a father to beget and to govern.
Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the
creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one
religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect
of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs them by
the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion is one
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships God, for
worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due: while
service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under an
obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong all acts
ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the
Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, either by offering
something to God, or by assuming something Divine.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as
considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to God
incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the image,
but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither "latria" nor the
virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship
is paid to the images of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue distinct from
the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any action whereby we
are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice." But sacrifice
belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed belongs to religion;
and consequently religion is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of
God." Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence of God, as
stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2]). Therefore religion is not a special
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the
charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to Ethic. viii, 8 "to
be honored is almost to be loved." Therefore the religion whereby we
honor God is not a special virtue distinct from observance, or "dulia,"
or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion is not a
special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the
other parts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is a
special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the good to
which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God. Again, honor is
due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a singular
excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all things and
exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor due: even as
in human affairs we see that different honor is due to different personal
excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another to the king, and so
on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so far as
it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove that
religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as
stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honor, belongs
to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong to religion
as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their
specific character.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of honor and
reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is communicated to
the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence the
charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the charity whereby our
neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby God is honored, is
distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether religion is a theological virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. Augustine
says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith, hope and
charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to
pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its object.
Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God alone, as
stated above (A[1]). Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or
moral, as is clear from what has been said (FS, QQ[57],58,62). Now it is
evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its
perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor is it a
moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too
much and too little. for one cannot worship God too much, according to
Ecclus. 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He
is above all praise." Therefore it remains that it is a theological
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[4]) religion pays due worship to God.
Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it
offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and object in
religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to Whom
worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped do not reach
out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to Him by
believing; for which reason it was stated (Q[1], AA[1],2,4) that God is
the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because we
believe God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is
worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out
of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion
not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a
theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which
is properly about things referred to the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves
by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters
directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and
charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object:
wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which
performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is
worshiped by faith, hope and charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but as its
end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but
a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a mean, not
in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by establishing a kind
of equality in them. And when I say "equality," I do not mean absolute
equality, because it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him,
but equality in consideration of man's ability and God's acceptance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine
worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards
other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not
due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other
circumstance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other
moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its observing
the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the
mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal to God.
Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more
praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater
need: wherefore it is written (Is. 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the hungry."
But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps. 15:2, "I
have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods." Therefore
religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby
man's needs are relieved.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing, the less
praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the
Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the more a
thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what
is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it would seem
that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion are given
precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of
precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts of
the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the
moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from
being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the better
it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (A[5]; Q[4], A[7]), are about
matters that are ordered to God as their end. And religion approaches
nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are
directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion
excels among the moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the
ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean
of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise,
provided there be no failing on the part of his will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness
to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering,
because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account
of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on account
of its usefulness to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the
luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be
done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether religion has an external act?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is
written (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore
Him in spirit and in truth." Now external acts pertain, not to the spirit
but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs, has acts
that are not external but internal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and honor.
Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one were to
offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since then
whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed properly to
the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior creatures, it
would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for
finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are wont
to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals is
unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to the
true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore it would
seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore religion has no
bodily actions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God." Now just as internal actions belong to the
heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh.
Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal
but also by external actions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because
He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything),
but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honor
God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since
a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the
body is perfected by being quickened by the soul, and the air by being
enlightened by the sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to God,
needs to be guided by the sensible world, since "invisible things . . .
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," as the
Apostle says (Rm. 1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary
to make use of corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby,
as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God.
Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and
belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary,
and subordinate to the internal acts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and
directly intended in the worship of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These external things are offered to God, not as though He
stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, "Shall I eat the flesh of
bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?" but as signs of the
internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to God.
Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The visible sacrifice is the
sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things
pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual
things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols;
and still more because they were foolish and wicked.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether religion is the same as sanctity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity. Religion
is a special virtue, as stated above (A[4]): whereas sanctity is a
general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil our just
obligations to God, according to Andronicus [*De Affectibus]. Therefore
sanctity is not the same as religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all uncleanness, and is
perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now purity would seem above all
to pertain to temperance which repels bodily uncleanness. Since then
religion belongs to justice, it would seem that sanctity is not the same
as religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division are not
identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above (Q[80], ad
4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from
religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:74,75): "That . . . we may serve
Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs to
religion, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3], ad 2). Therefore religion is
the same as sanctity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The word "sanctity" seems to have two significations. In
one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the Greek,
for {hagios} means "unsoiled." In another way it denotes firmness,
wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied to such things as
were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a thing is said to
be sacred [sancitum] when it is ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this
word "sanctus" may be connected with purity, if it be resolved into
"sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified
were sprinkled with the victim's blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x).
In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to
those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only
men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be
sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is
necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human mind
is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things depreciate
by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with
lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must
be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it is that without purity
the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Heb. 12:14):
"Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see
God." Again, firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for
it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things
must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rm. 8:38,39): "I am
sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg.: 'shall
be able to separate us'] from the love of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and
its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but
only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives
God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship,
such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanctity,
according as man refers to God not only these but also the works of the
other virtues, or according as man by means of certain good works
disposes himself to the worship of God
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; and
in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it has a
certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the acts of
all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to be a
general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to
the common good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the
character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of virginity
itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored not for what
it is, but for being consecrated to God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[81] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not
really but logically.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] Out. Para. 1/2
INTERIOR ACTS OF RELIGION (QQ[82]-83)
OF DEVOTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the
interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts; secondly,
we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior
acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer. Accordingly we shall
treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether devotion is a special act?
(2) Whether it is an act of religion?
(3) Of the cause of devotion?
(4) Of its effect?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether devotion is a special act?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That which
qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion seems
to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip 29:31): "All the
multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout
mind." Therefore devotion is not a special act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera of
acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely, corporal
and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to
genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive or to
a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as may be
seen by going through the various species of acts of either faculty, as
enumerated above (FP, QQ[78], seqq.; FS, Q[23], A[4]). Therefore devotion
is not a special act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (FS, Q[21],
AA[34]). But devotion has a special reason for merit. Therefore devotion
is a special act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin 'devovere'
means 'to vow']; wherefore those persons are said to be "devout" who, in
a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject themselves wholly to
Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who vowed
to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy relates
of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is apparently
nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things concerning
the service of God. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 35:20,21) that "the
multitude of the children of Israel . . . offered first-fruits to the
Lord with a most ready and devout mind." Now it is evident that the will
to do readily what concerns the service of God is a special kind of act.
Therefore devotion is a special act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing
moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, and
the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both itself and whatever
is directed to the end, as stated above (FS, Q[9], A[3]). Wherefore,
since devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the
service of God Who is the last end, it follows that devotion prescribes
the mode to human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about
things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that are moved by
the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not as a
species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found
virtually in the movements of the things moved.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul, and
is a movement of the will, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether devotion is an act of religion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion. Devotion,
as stated above (A[1]), consists in giving oneself up to God. But this is
done chiefly by charity, since according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the
Divine love produces ecstasy, for it takes the lover away from himself
and gives him to the beloved." Therefore devotion is an act of charity
rather than of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to precede
charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by fire, while
devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of fire [*Cant.
8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as stated
above (Q[81], A[1]). But devotion is directed also to men; for we speak
of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects are said to be
devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm. viii, De Pass. Dom.]
that the Jews "out of devotion to the Roman laws," said: "We have no king
but Caesar." Therefore devotion is not an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Devotion is derived from "devovere," as stated (A[1]).
But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is also an act of
religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do something,
and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts have the same
object. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1): "It is
justice whereby men both will end do just actions." Now it is evident
that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God, belongs
properly to religion, as stated above (Q[81]). Wherefore it belongs to
that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and this is to be
devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs immediately to charity that man should give
himself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it belongs
immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion, to charity
which is the principle of religion, that man should give himself to God
for certain works of Divine worship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the
process of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat thrives, as
it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both causes devotion
(inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's friend) and feeds on
devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and increased by the
practice and consideration of friendly deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Devotion to God's holy ones, dead or living, does not
terminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honor God in His
servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters is of
another kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from the
service of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not the cause
of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle considerations about
abstract matters are often a hindrance to devotion. Therefore
contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential cause of
devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater
devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged to
greater devotion by considering Christ's Passion and other mysteries of
His humanity than by considering the greatness of His Godhead. Therefore
contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion, it
would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, are also most
apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for devotion is
frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the female sex, who
are defective in contemplation. Therefore contemplation is not the proper
cause of devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire
shall flame out." But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore
meditation is the cause of devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of Whom
Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:55, says that "God calls whom He deigns to
call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane Samaritans, had
He so willed, He would have made devout." But the intrinsic cause on our
part must needs be meditation or contemplation. For it was stated above
(A[1]) that devotion is an act of the will to the effect that man
surrenders himself readily to the service of God. Now every act of the
will proceeds from some consideration, since the object of the will is a
good understood. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that
"the will arises from the intelligence." Consequently meditation must
needs be the cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man
conceives the thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a
twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration of
God's goodness and loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, "It is good
for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and this
consideration wakens love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf.
Q[27]] which is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration
is that of man's own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean
on God, according to Ps. 120:1,2, "I have lifted up my eyes to the
mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord,
Who made heaven and earth"; and this consideration shuts out presumption
whereby man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His
strength.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The consideration of such things as are of a nature to
awaken our love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. Q[27]] of
God, causes devotion; whereas the consideration of foreign matters that
distract the mind from such things is a hindrance to devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the
strongest incentive to love ['dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf.
Q[27]] and consequently to devotion, because God is supremely lovable.
Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs a guiding hand,
not only to the knowledge, but also to the love of Divine things by means
of certain sensible objects known to us. Chief among these is the
humanity of Christ, according to the words of the Preface [*Preface for
Christmastide], "that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to
the love of things invisible." Wherefore matters relating to Christ's
humanity are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a
guiding hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters
concerning the Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to man
an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender
himself to God. The result is that such like things sometimes occasion a
hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women devotion abounds
by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his
science or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is
increased.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether joy is an effect of devotion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As stated
above (A[3], ad 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive to devotion.
But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the soul, according
to Lam. 3:19, "Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood and the gall,"
which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam. 3:20) it is said: "I
will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall languish within me."
Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice of
the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): "A sacrifice to God is an
afflicted spirit." Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion rather
than gladness or joy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat. funebr. de
Placilla Imp.] that "just as laughter proceeds from joy, so tears and
groans are signs of sorrow." But devotion makes some people shed tears.
Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth Sunday of
Lent]: "That we who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a holy
devotion."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The direct and principal effect of devotion is the
spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and indirect
effect. For it has been stated (A[3]) that devotion is caused by a
twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of God's goodness,
because this consideration belongs to the term, as it were, of the
movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and the direct result
of this consideration is joy, according to Ps. 76:4, "I remembered God,
and was delighted"; but accidentally this consideration causes a certain
sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy God fully, according to Ps. 41:3,
"My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God," and afterwards it is
said (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my bread," etc. Secondarily devotion
is caused as stated (A[3]), by the consideration of one's own failings;
for this consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the
movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in himself, but
subjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency to
the first: for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly (when one
thinks over one's own failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through
hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident that the first
and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary and accidental
effect is that "sorrow which is according to God" [*2 Cor. 7:10].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is something
that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal of which made
it necessary for Christ to suffer [*Lk. 24:25]; and there is something
that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to us in giving us such a
deliverance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on account of
the defects of the present life, on the other hand is rejoiced, by the
consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of the Divine help.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[82] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also through
a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one considers
something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont to shed tears
through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their children or dear
friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way tears arise from
devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PRAYER (SEVENTEEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power?
(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?
(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?
(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?
(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?
(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?
(7) Whether we ought to pray for others?
(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?
(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer;
(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?
(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?
(12) Whether prayer should be vocal?
(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?
(14) Whether prayer should last a long time?
(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]
(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art. 15]
(17) of the different kinds of prayer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive power. It
belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is heard by God,
according to Ps. 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor."
Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the appetitive power:
and therefore prayer is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to begin
everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves to God and
unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by love which
belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs to the
appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there are
two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is "the
understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend what a
thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis," whereby we
apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be added,
namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown.
Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations. Therefore it is
an operation, not of the intellective, but of the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak." Now
speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not of the
appetitive, but of the intellective power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13] "prayer
[oratio] is spoken reason [oris ratio]." Now the speculative and
practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends
its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes.
Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when
it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly
subject to the power of the cause; secondly imperfectly, by merely
disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly
subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is
cause of certain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in
this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the lower powers and
the members of the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by
commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way,
disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be
done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its
superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech,
imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something to be
effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the reason to which
it belongs to set in order. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do what is best."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last
paragraph refers to the Latin word 'oratio' [prayer] which originally
signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from 'os,' 'oris'
(the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which sense
Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.) that "prayer
is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "to
pray is to ask becoming things of God." Accordingly it is evident that
prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either
because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is like
the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily they are
heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God hears them
before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Is. 65:24, "And
it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will hear."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (FP, Q[82], A[4]; FS, Q[9], A[1], ad 3),
the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders the act
of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an end such as
charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God through being
moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in two ways. First, on
the part of the object of our petition, because when we pray we ought
principally to ask to be united to God, according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing
I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the
house of the Lord all the days of my life." Secondly, on the part of the
petitioner, who ought to approach the person whom he petitions, either
locally, as when he petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions
God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God in
our prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up of
the mind to God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but to
the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by way of
command or of petition, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is becoming to pray?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems to be
necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the person to whom
we pray. But according to Mt. 6:32, "Your Father knoweth that you have
need of all these things." Therefore it is not becoming to pray to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we
pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is
unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kgs. 15:29, "But the
Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance."
Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not, than to
one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1), "nothing
is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers." But God is
supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:1): "We ought always to pray, and
not to faint."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Among the ancients there was a threefold error concerning
prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine providence;
whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to worship God at
all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): "You have said: He laboreth
in vain that serveth God." Another opinion held that all things, even in
human affairs, happen of necessity, whether by reason of the
unchangeableness of Divine providence, or through the compelling
influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and
this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was a third
opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine
providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the
disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed
by prayers and other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these
opinions were disproved in the FP, Q[19], AA[7],8; FP, Q[22], AA[2],4;
FP, Q[115], A[6]; FP, Q[116]. Wherefore it behooves us so to account for
the utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs
subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part of
the Divine disposition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine
providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also from
what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among
other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects. Wherefore it
must be that men do certain actions. not that thereby they may change the
Divine disposition, but that by those actions they may achieve certain
effects according to the order of the Divine disposition: and the same is
to be said of natural causes. And so is it with regard to prayer. For we
pray not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that we may
impetrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers in
other words "that by asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God
from eternity has disposed to give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8)
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to Him
our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the
necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not Divine
disposition, we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our
prayers, we may obtain what God has appointed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God bestows many things on us out of His liberality, even
without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow certain things
on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good, namely, that we may
acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and that we may recognize
in Him the Author of our goods. Hence Chrysostom says [*Implicitly [Hom.
ii, de Orat.: Hom. xxx in Genes. ]; Cf. Caten. Aur. on Lk. 18]: "Think
what happiness is granted thee, what honor bestowed on thee, when thou
conversest with God in prayer, when thou talkest with Christ, when thou
askest what thou wilt, whatever thou desirest."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prayer is an act of religion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion. Since
religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its subject.
But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above (A[1]).
Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of the gift of
understanding whereby the mind ascends to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the act of "latria" falls under a necessity of precept.
But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept, but to
come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a petition for
what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers worship
end ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53]. But prayer
seems not to offer anything to God, but to. ask to obtain something from
Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 140:2): "Let my prayer be directed
as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the passage says that "it was to
signify this that under the old Law incense was said to be offered for a
sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to religion. Therefore prayer
is an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], AA[2],4), it belongs properly to
religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things through which
reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man shows reverence to
God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects himself to Him, and by
praying confesses that he needs Him as the Author of his goods. Hence it
is evident that prayer is properly an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, as
stated above (Q[82], A[1], ad 1), and therefore religion, which is in the
will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of God. Now
among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest, and the
nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion which belongs to the
will, prayer which belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the
acts of religion, since by it religion directs man's intellect to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask for
what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to desire
comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of
religion, which precept is expressed in Mt. 7:7, where it is said: "Ask
and ye shall receive" [*Vulg.: 'Ask and it shall be given you.'].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he
subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to Him,
as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A[1], OBJ[2]).
Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether bodily
members, or those external things that are employed for God's service, so
too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to pray to God alone?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer is an
act of religion, as stated above (A[3]). But God alone is to be worshiped
by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the
prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both because
frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God alone knows,
rather than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor.
14:15), "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the
understanding": and again because, as Augustine says (De Cura pro mortuis
xiii) the "dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their
own children, are doing." Therefore we ought to pray to God alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only because
they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or even some
who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace, and yet we do
not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the saints who are
in Paradise.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1), "Call . . . if there be any
that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as to
be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In the
first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers ought to be
directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone gives,
according to Ps. 83:12, "The Lord will give grace and glory." But in the
second way we pray to the saints, whether angels or men, not that God may
through them know our petitions, but that our prayers may be effective
through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written (Apoc. 8:4) that
"the smoke of the incense," namely "the prayers of the saints ascended up
before God." This is also clear from the very style employed by the
Church in praying: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity "to have mercy on
us," while we ask any of the saints "to pray for us."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To Him alone do we offer religious worship when praying,
from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so doing we
confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those whom we call
upon as our advocates in God's presence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do not
know what takes place in this world, especially the interior movements of
the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. xii, 21), whatever
it is fitting the blessed should know about what happens to us, even as
regards the interior movements of the heart, is made known to them in the
Word: and it is most becoming to their exalted position that they should
know the petitions we make to them by word or thought; and consequently
the petitions which we raise to them are known to them through Divine
manifestation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet
enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think or
say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them, but
ask it of the living by speaking to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything definite when
we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "to pray
is to ask becoming things of God"; wherefore it is useless to pray for
what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, "You ask, and receive not:
because you ask amiss." Now according to Rm. 8:26, "we know not what we
should pray for as we ought." Therefore we ought not to ask for anything
definite when we pray.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those who ask another person for something definite
strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we ought
not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the contrary, we ought
to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps. 32:1,
"Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just." Therefore we ought not to ask God for
anything definite when we pray.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to
good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless to
ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we ought
not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, our Lord (Mt. 6 and Lk. 11) taught His disciples to ask
definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of the
Lord's Prayer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus [*Fact. et Dict. Memor.
vii, 2], "Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods for
nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because they at
any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray we
frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain." This
opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which may have an
evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as "riches, by
which," as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2),
"many have come to an evil end; honors, which have ruined many; power, of
which we frequently witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages,
which sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family." Nevertheless
there are certain goods which man cannot ill use, because they cannot
have an evil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude and
whereby we merit it: and these the saints seek absolutely when they pray,
as in Ps. 79:4, "Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved," and again in
Ps. 118:35, "Lead me into the path of Thy commandments."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to pray
for, "the Spirit," as stated in the same passage, "helpeth our
infirmity," since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask for
what is right. Hence our Lord said (Jn. 4:24) that true adorers "must
adore . . . in spirit and in truth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our
salvation, we conform our will to God's, of Whom it is written (1 Tim.
2:4) that "He will have all men to be saved."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God so invites us to take good things, that we may approach
to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires and devout
prayers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal things
when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we should not seek
for temporal things, for it is written (Mt. 6:33): "Seek ye . . . first
the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things shall be added
unto you," that is to say, temporal things, which, says He, we are not to
seek, but they will be added to what we seek. Therefore temporal things
are not to be asked of God in prayer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous about.
Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things, according to the
saying of Mt. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall
eat." Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when we pray.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But by
asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it, against the
saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18), "While we look not at the things
which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things
which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are
eternal." Therefore man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he
prays.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and useful
things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are harmful,
not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense. Therefore we
should not ask God for them in our prayers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 30:8): "Give me only the
necessaries of life."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx,
12): "It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire." Now it is
lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally, by placing our
end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending towards
beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means of supporting the
life of the body, and are of service to us as instruments in performing
acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine
too says the same to Proba (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6,7)
when he states that "it is not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for
a livelihood, and no more; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its
own sake, but for the welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be
clothed in a way befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping
with those among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that
we may keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not, that
we may gain possession of them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We should seek temporal things not in the first but in the
second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 16): "When
He says that this" (i.e. the kingdom of God) "is to be sought first, He
implies that the other" (i.e. temporal goods) "is to be sought
afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being our good, the
other as our need."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden, but
that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above (Q[55], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When our mind is intent on temporal things in order that it
may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is intent on
them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not lowered by
them, but raises them to a higher level.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not as
the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to something
else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be granted to us in
so far as they are expedient for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to pray for others?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In praying we
ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now in the Lord's
Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus we say:
"Give us this day our daily bread," etc. Therefore we should not pray for
others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of the
conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one pray for
oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on Jn. 16:23, "If you ask the
Father anything in My name He will give it you," says (Tract. cii):
"Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when he prays for all;
wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,' but 'He will give it
you. '" Therefore it would seem that we ought not to pray for others, but
only for ourselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are wicked,
according to Jer. 7:16, "Therefore do not then pray for this people . .
and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee." On the other hand
we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are heard when they
pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we ought not to pray
for others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (James 5:16): "Pray one for another, that
you may be saved."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), when we pray we ought to ask for
what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not only for
ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the love which
we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (Q[25], AA[1],12; Q[27], A[2];
Q[31], A[1]). Therefore charity requires us to pray for others. Hence
Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [*Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
to St. John Chrysostom]: "Necessity binds us to pray for ourselves,
fraternal charity urges us to pray for others: and the prayer that
fraternal charity proffers is sweeter to God than that which is the
outcome of necessity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom.), "We say 'Our Father' and
not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the Master of unity
did not wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves alone, for He
wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself bore all in one."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is a condition of prayer that one pray for oneself: not
as though it were necessary in order that prayer be meritorious, but as
being necessary in order that prayer may not fail in its effect of
impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for another with piety
and perseverance, and ask for things relating to his salvation, and yet
it is not granted on account of some obstacle on the part of the person
we are praying for, according to Jer. 15:1, "If Moses and Samuel shall
stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people." And yet the prayer
will be meritorious for the person who prays thus out of charity,
according to Ps. 34:13, "My prayer shall be turned into my bosom, i.e.
though it profit them not, I am not deprived of my reward," as the gloss
expounds it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may be
converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in
holiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for some:
since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who are
foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the
brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate,
according to Eccles. 7:14, "No man can correct whom God hath despised."
Hence it is written (1 Jn. 5:16): "He that knoweth his brother to sin a
sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him,
who sinneth not to death." Now just as the benefit of correction must not
be refused to any man so long as he lives here below, because we cannot
distinguish the predestined from the reprobate, as Augustine says (De
Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no man should be denied the help of prayer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because the
prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss on Rm.
15:30, "Help me in your prayers," says: "The Apostle rightly tells the
lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if they be united
together in one mind, become great, and it is impossible for the prayers
of a multitude not to obtain" that which is possible to be obtained by
prayer. Secondly, that many may thank God for the graces conferred on the
just, which graces conduce to the profit of many, according to the
Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that the more perfect may not wax proud,
seeing that they find that they need the prayers of the less perfect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies.
According to Rm. 15:4, "what things soever were written, were written for
our learning." Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations against enemies;
thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): "Let all my enemies be ashamed and be . .
troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled very speedily [*Vulg.:
'Let them be turned back and be ashamed.']." Therefore we too should pray
against rather than for our enemies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to them. But
holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apoc. 6:10, "How
long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that dwell on
earth?" Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their enemies,
according to Ps. 57:11, "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the
revenge." Therefore we should not pray for our enemies, but against them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer. Now
sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be
unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above (Q[40], A[1]).
Therefore we should not pray for our enemies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 5:44): "Pray for them that persecute
and calumniate you."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated above
(A[7]). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in the same manner
as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above in the treatise
on charity (Q[25], AA[8],9), how we are bound to love our enemies,
namely, that we must love in them their nature, not their sin. and that
to love our enemies in general is a matter of precept, while to love them
in the individual is not a matter of precept, except in the preparedness
of the mind, so that a man must be prepared to love his enemy even in the
individual and to help him in a case of necessity, or if his enemy should
beg his forgiveness. But to love one's enemies absolutely in the
individual, and to assist them, is an act of perfection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not exclude
our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for others: but it
is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to pray for them
individually, except in certain special cases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be understood
in four ways. First, according to the custom of the prophets "to foretell
the future under the veil of an imprecation," as Augustine states [*De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21]. Secondly, in the sense that certain temporal
evils are sometimes inflicted by God on the wicked for their correction.
Thirdly, because they are understood to be pronounced, not against the
men themselves, but against the kingdom of sin, with the purpose, to wit,
of destroying sin by the correction of men. Fourthly, by way of
conformity of our will to the Divine justice with regard to the damnation
of those who are obstinate in sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 22), "the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom of
sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned": or as he says again
(QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), "their prayer for vengeance is expressed
not in words but in their minds, even as the blood of Abel cried from the
earth." They rejoice in vengeance not for its own sake, but for the sake
of Divine justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be
restrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the good of
others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that temporal
evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may mend their ways.
Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer are fittingly assigned?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer are
not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to be hallowed
which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy, according to
Lk. 1:49, "Holy is His name." Again, His kingdom is everlasting,
according to Ps. 144:13, "Thy kingdom is a kingdom of all ages." Again,
God's will is always fulfilled, according to Isa 46:10, "All My will
shall be done." Therefore it is useless to ask for "the name of God to be
hallowed," for "His kingdom to come," and for "His will to be done."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one must withdraw from evil before attaining good.
Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the attainment
of good to be set forth before those relating to the removal of evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one. Now
the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we receive
through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly assigned,
since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned in
the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter. Therefore it was
superfluous for Matthew to mention seven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of one
who forestalls us by his benevolence. Now God forestalls us by His
benevolence, since "He first hath loved us" ( 1 Jn. 4:19). Therefore it
is useless to preface the petitions with the words our "Father Who art in
heaven," which seem to indicate a desire to win God's benevolence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer,
suffices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as Augustine
says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), "if we pray rightly and fittingly, we can
say nothing else but what is contained in this prayer of our Lord." For
since prayer interprets our desires, as it were, before God, then alone
is it right to ask for something in our prayers when it is right that we
should desire it. Now in the Lord's Prayer not only do we ask for all
that we may rightly desire, but also in the order wherein we ought to
desire them, so that this prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also
directs all our affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be
the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed
to the end. Now our end is God towards Whom our affections tend in two
ways: first, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to
enjoy His glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in
Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love ourselves
in God. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus: "Hallowed be Thy
name," and the second thus: "Thy kingdom come," by which we ask to come
to the glory of His kingdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] Body Para. 2/3
To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its very
nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very nature the good which
is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing is useful in two
ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way, directly and
principally, according to the merit whereby we merit beatitude by obeying
God, and in this respect we ask: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in
heaven"; in another way instrumentally, and as it were helping us to
merit, and in this respect we say: "Give us this day our daily bread,"
whether we understand this of the sacramental Bread, the daily use of
which is profitable to man, and in which all the other sacraments are
contained, or of the bread of the body, so that it denotes all
sufficiency of food, as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since
the Eucharist is the chief sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus
in the Gospel of Matthew we read, "supersubstantial," i.e. "principal,"
as Jerome expounds it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] Body Para. 3/3
We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of obstacles.
Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of beatitude. First,
there is sin, which directly excludes a man from the kingdom, according
to 1 Cor. 6:9,10, "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, etc., shall
possess the kingdom of God"; and to this refer the words, "Forgive us our
trespasses." Secondly, there is temptation which hinders us from keeping
God's will, and to this we refer when we say: "And lead us not into
temptation," whereby we do not ask not to be tempted, but not to be
conquered by temptation, which is to be led into temptation. Thirdly,
there is the present penal state which is a kind of obstacle to a
sufficiency of life, and to this we refer in the words, "Deliver us from
evil."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when we
say, "Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God's name is not holy,
but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing," and this pertains to
the diffusion of God's glory among men. When we say, "Thy kingdom come,
we do not imply that God is not reigning now," but "we excite in
ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to us, and that
we may reign therein," as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11). The
words, "Thy will be done rightly signify, 'May Thy commandments be
obeyed' on earth as in heaven, i.e. by men as well as by angels" (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three petitions will be perfectly
fulfilled in the life to come; while the other four, according to
Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the needs of the present life
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of the
petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of desire or
intention, where the end precedes the things that are directed to the
end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts the seven
petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: "If it is fear God
whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's name be
hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby blessed are
the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that we become meek
and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby blessed are they
that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for thus we shall mourn no
more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere they that hunger, let us
pray that our daily bread be given to us. If it is counsel whereby
blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the trespasses of others that
our own may be forgiven. If it is understanding whereby blessed are the
pure in heart, let us pray lest we have a double heart by seeking after
worldly things which ere the occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom
whereby blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children
of God, let us pray to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we
shall by that very fact become the free children of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke included
not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by omitting it,
he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition of the two that
precede, and thus helps us to understand it"; because, to wit, the will
of God tends chiefly to this---that we come to the knowledge of His
holiness and to reign together with Him. Again the last petition
mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us from evil," is omitted by Luke, so that
each one may know himself to be delivered from evil if he be not led into
temptation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[9] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him, but
that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which confidence
is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity in our
regard, whereby he wills our good---wherefore we say: "Our Father"; and
of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil it---wherefore we say:
"Who art in heaven."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational creature.
Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject. But receiving
is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and Holy Ghost.
Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son said (Jn. 14:16):
"I will ask My [Vulg.: 'the'] Father," and the Apostle says of the Holy
Ghost (Rm. 8:26): "The Spirit . . . asketh for us."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Angels are above rational creatures, since they are intellectual
substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels, wherefore we read in
the Ps. 96:7: "Adore Him, all you His angels." Therefore prayer is not
proper to the rational creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted to call
upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb animals are
fitted to call upon God, according to Ps. 146:9, "Who giveth to beasts
their food and to the young ravens that call upon Him." Therefore prayer
is not proper to the rational creatures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above (A[1]). But
the rational creature is so called from his reason. Therefore prayer is
proper to the rational creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]) prayer is an act of reason, and
consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of reason,
whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly prayer is
properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have reason, and a
superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the Divine Persons;
and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore prayer is unbecoming
both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it is proper to the
rational creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of their
nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives through grace. The Son
is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e. His human, nature
and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy Ghost is said to ask,
because He makes us ask.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated in the FP, Q[79], A[8], intellect and reason are
not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the perfect from the
imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are the angels are distinct
from rational creatures, and sometimes are included under them. In this
sense prayer is said to be proper to the rational creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The young ravens are said to call upon God, on account of
the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire to
attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey God,
on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for us. A
man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others. But the
saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they pray for
themselves, since they are already established in the term. Neither
therefore do they pray for us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly, so that
they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always fulfilled.
Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are those in
Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory do not pray
for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither do the saints
in heaven pray for us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers of the
higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to implore
the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of the higher
saints.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the souls
of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from their
bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul, to pray
for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints therefore do not
pray for us, at least before the resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is . . . he that
prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the
prophet of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of
Vigilantius consisted in saying that "while we live, we can pray one for
another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for others can
be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers are granted when they
pray for their blood to be avenged." But this is absolutely false,
because, since prayers offered for others proceed from charity, as stated
above (AA[7],8), the greater the charity of the saints in heaven, the
more they pray for wayfarers, since the latter can be helped by prayers:
and the more closely they are united to God, the more are their prayers
efficacious: for the Divine order is such that lower beings receive an
overflow of the excellence of the higher, even as the air receives the
brightness of the sun. Wherefore it is said of Christ (Heb. 7:25): "Going
to God by His own power . . . to make intercession for us" [*Vulg.: 'He
is able to save for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to
make intercession for us.']. Hence Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): "If
the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body and having to be
solicitous for themselves, can pray for others, how much more now that
they have the crown of victory and triumph."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saints in heaven, since they are blessed, have no lack
of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they pray. But they
pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and their prayers
are efficacious in impetrating through their previous merits and through
God's acceptance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take place
through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem will be
granted through their prayers according to God's will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who are in Purgatory though they are above us on
account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains
which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a condition to
pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It is God's will that inferior beings should be helped by
all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not only to the
higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to implore the
mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime that prayers
addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious, either because
he is implored with greater devotion, or because God wishes to make known
his sanctity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[11] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: It is because the saints while living merited to pray for
us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known in this
life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in order to
indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the saying of Ex.
3:6, "I am the God of Abraham," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prayer should be vocal?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As stated above
(A[4]), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God knows the language of
the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ vocal prayer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated above
(A[1], ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent man from
ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not use words in
our prayers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret, according to
Mt. 6:6, "But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and
having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret." But prayer loses its
secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer should not be vocal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 141:2): "I cried to the Lord with my
voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common prayer
is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church
representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer should
come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is offered: and
this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer. Therefore it is
reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church should say these
prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come to the knowledge of
all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any
single person, whether he pray for himself or for others; and it is not
essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice is
employed in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in order to
excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is
raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether of words or of
deeds, the human mind is moved as regards apprehension, and consequently
also as regards the affections. Hence Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep.
cxxx, 9) that "by means of words and other signs we arouse ourselves more
effectively to an increase of holy desires." Hence then alone should we
use words and such like signs when they help to excite the mind
internally. But if they distract or in any way impede the mind we should
abstain from them; and this happens chiefly to those whose mind is
sufficiently prepared for devotion without having recourse to those
signs. Wherefore the Psalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: "My heart hath said to
Thee: 'My face hath sought Thee,'" and we read of Anna (1 Kgs. 1:13) that
"she spoke in her heart." Secondly, the voice is used in praying as
though to pay a debt, so that man may serve God with all that he has from
God, that is to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and
this applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is
written (Osee 14:3): "Take away all iniquity, and receive the good: and
we will render the calves of our lips." Thirdly, we have recourse to
vocal prayer, through a certain overflow from the soul into the body,
through excess of feeling, according to Ps. 15:9, "My heart hath been
glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell God
something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the
person praying or of other persons to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Words about other matters distract the mind and hinder the
devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object of devotion
lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "Our Lord forbids one to pray
in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others. Hence when
you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's attention, either by shouting
so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking the heart, or
extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. And yet, "according to
Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), "it is not wrong to be seen by
men, but to do this or that in order to be seen by men."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether attention is a necessary condition of prayer?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of prayer.
It is written (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him must
adore Him in spirit and in truth." But prayer is not in spirit unless it
be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prayer is "the ascent of the mind to God" [*Damascene,
De Fide Orth. iii, 24]. But the mind does not ascend to God if the prayer
is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it should be
altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander while praying
he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God; even as if he
were to speak to another man without attending to what he was saying.
Hence Basil says [*De Constit. Monach. i] that the "Divine assistance is
to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind wandering hither and
thither: because he that prays thus not only will not obtain what he
asks, nay rather will he provoke God to anger." Therefore it would seem a
necessary condition of prayer that it should be attentive.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of the
mind when they pray, according to Ps. 39:13, "My heart hath forsaken me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer.
Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways. First,
a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better obtained: and thus
attention is absolutely necessary for prayer. Secondly, a thing is said
to be necessary when without it something cannot obtain its effect. Now
the effect of prayer is threefold. The first is an effect which is common
to all acts quickened by charity, and this is merit. In order to realize
this effect, it is not necessary that prayer should be attentive
throughout; because the force of the original intention with which one
sets about praying renders the whole prayer meritorious, as is the case
with other meritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper
thereto, and consists in impetration: and again the original intention,
to which God looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the
original intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and impetration:
because, as Gregory [*Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. Aug. iii] says,
"God hears not the prayer of those who pay no attention to their prayer."
The third effect of prayer is that which it produces at once; this is the
spiritual refreshment of the mind, and for this effect attention is a
necessary condition: wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 14:14): "If I pray
in a tongue . . . my understanding is without fruit."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] Body Para. 2/2
It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention
that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words, lest
we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the words, and a
third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God, and to the thing
we are praying for. That last kind of attention is most necessary, and
even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this attention, whereby the mind
is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong that the mind forgets all other
things, as Hugh of St. Victor states [*De Modo Orandi ii].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about praying
through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards the mind
wander through weakness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long on
account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs down the
soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when, while
praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a sudden it wanders
off through weakness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is sinful
and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this that
Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When you pray God with psalms and
hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips pronounce." But to
wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive prayer of its fruit.
Hence Basil says (De Constit. Monach. i): "If you are so truly weakened
by sin that you are unable to pray attentively, strive as much as you can
to curb yourself, and God will pardon you, seeing that you are unable to
stand in His presence in a becoming manner, not through negligence but
through frailty."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prayer should last a long time?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is written
(Mt. 6:7): "When you are praying, speak not much." Now one who prays a
long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal prayer.
Therefore prayer should not last a long time.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all the
holier according as it is centered on one thing, according to Ps. 26:4,
"One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after." Therefore
the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed by
God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according to Ex.
19:21: "Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the
limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should
perish." But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by instituting the
Lord's Prayer (Mt. 6). Therefore it is not right to prolong our prayer
beyond its limits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, It would seem that we ought to pray continually.
For our Lord said (Lk. 18:1): "We ought always to pray, and not to
faint": and it is written (1 Thess. 5:17): "Pray without ceasing."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by
considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause. The
not cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought to
arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either actually or
virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in whatever we do out of
charity; and we ought to "do all things to the glory of God" (1 Cor.
10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to be continual: wherefore
Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9): "Faith, hope and charity are by
themselves a prayer of continual longing." But prayer, considered in
itself, cannot be continual, because we have to be busy about other
works, and, as Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God
with our lips at certain intervals and seasons, in order to admonish
ourselves by means of such like signs, to take note of the amount of our
progress in that desire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an
increase thereof." Now the quantity of a thing should be commensurate
with its end, for instance the quantity of the dose should be
commensurate with health. And so it is becoming that prayer should last
long enough to arouse the fervor of the interior desire: and when it
exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be continued any longer without
causing weariness, it should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says
(ad Probam. Ep. cxxx): "It is said that the brethren in Egypt make
frequent but very short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest
that vigilant and erect attention which is so necessary in prayer slacken
and languish, through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make
it sufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if
we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to continue, it
should not be broken off too soon." And just as we must judge of this in
private prayers by considering the attention of the person praying, so
too, in public prayers we must judge of it by considering the devotion of
the people.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray with many
words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one thing, to be
devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord passed the whole
night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in order to set us an
example." Further on he says: "When praying say little, yet pray much so
long as your attention is fervent. For to say much in prayer is to
discuss your need in too many words: whereas to pray much is to knock at
the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and devout clamor of the
heart. Indeed this business is frequently done with groans rather than
with words, with tears rather than with speech."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Length of prayer consists, not in praying for many things,
but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we might use no
other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might have none but
these things in view, no matter how we express them or think of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[14] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: One may pray continually, either through having a continual
desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain fixed times,
though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the person
who prays---because he remains more devout even after praying, or in some
other person---as when by his kindness a man incites another to pray for
him, even after he himself has ceased praying.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prayer is meritorious?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit proceeds
from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is obtained by
means of prayer according to Lk. 11:13, "(How much more) will your Father
from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask Him!" Therefore prayer
is not a meritorious act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be chiefly
that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always merit this,
because even the saints' prayers are frequently not heard; thus Paul was
not heard when he besought the sting of the flesh to be removed from him.
Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to James
1:6, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering." Now faith is not
sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless faith.
Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13, "My prayer shall be
turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if my prayer does not
profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my reward." Now reward is not
due save to merit. Therefore prayer is meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[13]) prayer, besides causing spiritual
consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy in respect of
a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and efficacy in
impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is efficacious in
meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its root, the proper object
of which is the eternal good that we merit to enjoy. Yet prayer proceeds
from charity through the medium of religion, of which prayer is an act,
as stated above (A[3]), and with the concurrence of other virtues
requisite for the goodness of prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the
offering of prayer itself to God belongs to religion, while the desire
for the thing. that we pray to be accomplished belongs to charity. Faith
is necessary in reference to God to Whom we pray; that is, we need to
believe that we can obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary
on the part of the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness.
Devotion too is necessary: but this belongs to religion, for it is its
first act and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts, as stated
above (Q[82], AA[1],2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] Body Para. 2/2
As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace of
God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore Augustine
says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): "He would not urge us to ask, unless
He were willing to give"; and Chrysostom [*Cf. Catena Aurea of St. Thomas
on Lk. 18. The words as quoted are not to be found in the words of
Chrysostom] says: "He never refuses to grant our prayers, since in His
loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in praying."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is meritorious
without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which impetrates
sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift,
since the very act of praying is "a gift of God," as Augustine states (De
Persever. xxiii).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something
distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object of merit
is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of prayer extends
sometimes to certain other things, as stated above (AA[6],7). Accordingly
if this other thing that we ask for ourselves be not useful for our
beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes by asking for and desiring
such things we lose merit for instance if we ask of God the
accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious prayer. And
sometimes it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet manifestly contrary
thereto; and then although he who prays may merit eternal life by
praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks for. Hence
Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): "He who faithfully
prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both mercifully heard, and
mercifully not heard. For the physician knows better than the sick man
what is good for the disease." For this reason, too, Paul was not heard
when he prayed for the removal of the sting in his flesh, because this
was not expedient. If, however, we pray for something that is useful for
our beatitude, through being conducive to salvation, we merit it not only
by praying, but also by doing other good deeds: therefore without any
doubt we receive what we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since
certain things are not denied us, but are deferred that they may be
granted at a suitable time," according to Augustine (Tract. cii in
Joan.): and again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for
it. Wherefore Basil says (De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason why
sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast asked
amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast asked for
what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased asking." Since,
however, a man cannot condignly merit eternal life for another, as stated
above (FS, Q[114], A[6]), it follows that sometimes one cannot condignly
merit for another things that pertain to eternal life. For this reason we
are not always heard when we pray for others, as stated above (A[7], ad
2,3). Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; namely, to
ask---"for ourselves---things necessary for
salvation---piously---perseveringly"; when all these four concur, we
always obtain what we ask for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[15] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its efficacy in
meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but for its
efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man comes to
know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source whence prayer
impetrates what it asks for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[16] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by their prayers?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[16] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by their
prayers. It is written (Jn. 9:31): "We know that God doth not hear
sinners"; and this agrees with the saying of Prov. 28:9, "He that turneth
away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination."
Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from God. Therefore sinners
impetrate nothing from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[16] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as stated
above (A[15], ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since they lack
grace and charity which is the "power of godliness," according to a gloss
on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of godliness, but denying the
power thereof." and so their prayer is impious, and yet piety it required
in order that prayer may be impetrative, as stated above (A[15], ad 2).
Therefore sinners impetrate nothing by their prayers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[16] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "The Father is unwilling to hear
the prayer which the Son has not inspired." Now in the prayer inspired by
Christ we say: "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that
trespass against us": and sinners do not fulfil this. Therefore either
they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy to be heard, or, if they do
not say it, they are not heard, because they do not observe the form of
prayer instituted by Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[16] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): "If God were
not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord, be
merciful to me a sinner"; and Chrysostom [*Hom. xviii of the same Opus
Imperfectum] says: "Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is to say
whether he be righteous or sinful."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[16] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his
nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when a
sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a sinful
desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through vengeance
when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For "God refuses
in mercy what He grants in anger," as Augustine declares (Tract. lxxiii
in Joan.). On the other hand God hears the sinner's prayer if it proceed
from a good natural desire, not out of justice, because the sinner does
not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy [*Cf. A[15], ad 1], provided
however he fulfil the four conditions given above, namely, that he
beseech for himself things necessary for salvation, piously and
perseveringly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[16] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.), these words
were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e. perfectly
enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there is truth in
the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which sense also the
sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[16] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer as though
his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his prayer may be
godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to godliness. Even so
a man who has not the habit of justice is able to will something just, as
stated above (Q[59], A[2]). And though his prayer is not meritorious, it
can be impetrative, because merit depends on justice, whereas impetration
rests on grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[16] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (A[7], ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is
pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone say
the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's trespasses,
he lies not, although his words do not apply to him personally: for they
are true as referred to the person of the Church, from which he is
excluded by merit, and consequently he is deprived of the fruit of his
prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is prepared to forgive those who
have trespassed against him, wherefore his prayers are heard, according
to Ecclus. 28:2, "Forgive thy neighbor if he hath hurt thee, and then
shall thy sins be forgiven to thee when thou prayest."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the parts of prayer are fittingly described as supplications,
prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly described
as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings.
Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according to
Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who wishes to live according to
the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful to swear, it is
also unlawful to adjure." Therefore supplication is unfittingly reckoned
a part of prayer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "to pray
is to ask becoming things of God." Therefore it is unfitting to
distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others regard
the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore thanksgivings are
unfittingly placed after the others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, that
the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is signified
in the word "prayer," because prayer is "the raising up of one's mind to
God." The second is that there should be a petition, and this is
signified in the word "intercession." In this case sometimes one asks for
something definite, and then some say it is "intercession" properly so
called, or we may ask for some thing indefinitely, for instance to be
helped by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in Jn. 11:3, "Behold,
he whom Thou lovest is sick," and then they call it "insinuation." The
third condition is the reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this
either on the part of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The
reason of impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account of
which we ask to be heard, according to Dan. 9:17,18, "For Thy own sake,
incline, O God, Thy ear"; and to this pertains "supplication"
[obsecratio] which means a pleading through sacred things, as when we
say, "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord." The reason for
impetration on the part of the person who asks is "thanksgiving"; since
"through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to receive yet
greater benefits," as we say in the collect [*Ember Friday in September
and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor Bishop]. Hence a gloss on
1 Tim. 2:1 says that "in the Mass, the consecration is preceded by
supplication," in which certain sacred things are called to mind; that
"prayers are in the consecration itself," in which especially the mind
should be raised up to God; and that "intercessions are in the petitions
that follow, and thanksgivings at the end."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] Body Para. 2/3
We may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects.
Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, "Almighty eternal God"
belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, "Who hast given to
Thy servants," etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, "grant, we beseech
Thee," belong to intercession; and the words at the end, "Through Our
Lord," etc. belong to supplication.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] Body Para. 3/3
In the "Conferences of the Fathers" (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read:
"Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing something to God;
intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by the mind
to God in ineffable ecstasy." The first explanation, however, is the
better.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Supplication" is an adjuration not for the purpose of
compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "Prayer" in the general sense includes all the things
mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes
properly the ascent to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[83] A[17] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Among things that are diverse the past precedes the future;
but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence
thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and the
same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been received, we
give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer whereby we
approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by supplication,
whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we dare approach Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] Out. Para. 1/2
EXTERIOR ACTS OF RELIGION (QQ[84]-91)
THE SERVICE OF THE BODY (Q[84])
OF ADORATION (THREE ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in the
first place, adoration whereby one uses one's body to reverence God;
secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to God;
thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is assumed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether adoration is an act of latria?
(2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act?
(3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether adoration is an act of latria or religion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or religion.
The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration is not due to
God alone: since we read (Gn. 18:2) that Abraham adored the angels; and
(3 Kgs. 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when he was come in to king David,
"worshiped him bowing down to the ground." Therefore adoration is not an
act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the worship of religion is due to God as the object of
beatitude, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas adoration
is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on Ps. 28:2, "Adore
ye the Lord in His holy court," says: "We pass from these courts into
the court where we adore His majesty." Therefore adoration is not an act
of latria.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the worship of one same religion is due to the three
Persons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one adoration, for we
genuflect at each separate invocation of Them [*At the adoration of the
Cross, on Good Friday]. Therefore adoration is nol an act of latria.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, are the words quoted Mt. 4:10: "The Lord thy God shalt
thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person
adored. Now it is evident from what we have said (Q[81], AA[2],4) that it
is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the adoration
whereby we adore God is an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Reverence is due to God on account of His excellence, which
is communicated to certain creatures not in equal measure, but according
to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence which we pay to God, and
which belongs to latria, differs from the reverence which we pay to
certain excellent creatures; this belongs to dulia, and we shall speak of
it further on (Q[103]). And since external actions are signs of internal
reverence, certain external tokens significative of reverence are offered
to creatures of excellence, and among these tokens the chief is
adoration: yet there is one thing which is offered to God alone, and that
is sacrifice. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 4): "Many tokens of
Divine worship are employed in doing honor to men, either through
excessive humility, or through pernicious flattery; yet so that those to
whom these honors are given are recognized as being men to whom we owe
esteem and reverence and even adoration if they be far above us. But who
ever thought it his duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he
either knew or deemed or pretended to be a God?" Accordingly it was with
the reverence due to an excellent creature that Nathan adored David;
while it was the reverence due to God with which Mardochai refused to
adore Aman fearing "lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a
man" (Esther 13:14).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature Abraham adored the
angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15): though we may understand them to
have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared and spoke to
them in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence due to God that
John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc. 22:9), both to indicate the
dignity which he had acquired through Christ, whereby man is made equal
to an angel: wherefore the same text goes on: "I am thy fellow-servant
and of thy brethren"; as also to exclude any occasion of idolatry,
wherefore the text continues: "Adore God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every Divine excellency is included in His majesty: to
which it pertains that we should be made happy in Him as in the sovereign
good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since there is one excellence of the three Divine Persons,
one honor and reverence is due to them and consequently one adoration. It
is to represent this that where it is related (Gn. 18:2) that three men
appeared to Abraham, we are told that he addressed one, saying: "Lord, if
I have found favor in thy sight," etc. The triple genuflection represents
the Trinity of Persons, not a difference of adoration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether adoration denotes an action of the body?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that adoration does not denote an act of the body.
It is written (Jn. 4:23): "The true adorers shall adore the Father in
spirit and in truth." Now what is done in spirit has nothing to do with
an act of the body. Therefore adoration does not denote an act of the
body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the word adoration is taken from "oratio" [prayer]. But
prayer consists chiefly in an interior act, according to 1 Cor. 14:15, "I
will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding."
Therefore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, acts of the body pertain to sensible knowledge: whereas
we approach God not by bodily but by spiritual sense. Therefore adoration
does not denote an act of the body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Ex. 20:5, "Thou shalt not adore them, nor
serve them," says: "Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor adore
them outwardly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 12), since we are
composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer God a
twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the
internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which consists in
an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts of latria that
which is without is referred to that which is within as being of greater
import, it follows that exterior adoration is offered on account of
interior adoration, in other words we exhibit signs of humility in our
bodies in order to incite our affections to submit to God, since it is
connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the intelligible.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so far as it
proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and secondarily
expressed in words, as stated above (Q[83], A[12]), so too adoration
consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but secondarily in
certain bodily signs of humility; thus when we genuflect we signify our
weakness in comparison with God, and when we prostrate ourselves we
profess that we are nothing of ourselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Though we cannot reach God with the senses, our mind is
urged by sensible signs to approach God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether adoration requires a definite place?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that adoration does not require a definite place.
It is written (Jn. 4:21): "The hour cometh, when you shall neither on
this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father"; and the same reason
seems to apply to other places. Therefore a definite place is not
necessary for adoration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, exterior adoration is directed to interior adoration.
But interior adoration is shown to God as existing everywhere. Therefore
exterior adoration does not require a definite place.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same God is adored in the New as in the Old
Testament. Now in the Old Testament they adored towards the west, because
the door of the Tabernacle looked to the east (Ex. 26:18 seqq.).
Therefore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards the west, if
any definite place be requisite for adoration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 56:7): "My house shall be called the
house of prayer," which words are also quoted (Jn. 2:16).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the chief part of adoration is
the internal devotion of the mind, while the secondary part is something
external pertaining to bodily signs. Now the mind internally apprehends
God as not comprised in a place; while bodily signs must of necessity be
in some definite place and position. Hence a definite place is required
for adoration, not chiefly, as though it were essential thereto, but by
reason of a certain fittingness, like other bodily signs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By these words our Lord foretold the cessation of
adoration, both according to the rite of the Jews who adored in
Jerusalem, and according to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on
Mount Garizim. For both these rites ceased with the advent of the
spiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which "a sacrifice is offered
to God in every place," as stated in Malach. 1:11.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A definite place is chosen for adoration, not on account of
God Who is adored, as though He were enclosed in a place, but on account
of the adorers; and this for three reasons. First, because the place is
consecrated, so that those who pray there conceive a greater devotion and
are more likely to be heard, as may be seen in the prayer of Solomon (3
Kgs. 8). Secondly, on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of
holiness contained therein. Thirdly, on account of the concourse of many
adorers, by reason of which their prayer is more likely to be heard,
according to Mt. 18:20, "Where there are two or three gathered together
in My name, there am I in the midst of them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[84] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is a certain fittingness in adoring towards the east.
First, because the Divine majesty is indicated in the movement of the
heavens which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was situated
in the east according to the Septuagint version of Gn. 2:8, and so we
signify our desire to return to Paradise. Thirdly, on account of Christ
Who is "the light of the world" [*Jn. 8:12; 9:5], and is called "the
Orient" (Zach. 6:12). Who mounteth above the heaven of heavens to the
east (Ps. 67:34), and is expected to come from the east, according to Mt.
24:27, "As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the
west; so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] Out. Para. 1/2
SERVICE BY GIFT (QQ[85]-87)
OF SACRIFICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things are
offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration: (1) Of things
given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby something is promised
to Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations,
first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?
(2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?
(3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue?
(4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of the
natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among all men.
Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of some, e.g.
Melchisedech (Gn. 14:18), offering bread and wine in sacrifice, and of
certain animals being offered by some, and others by others. Therefore
the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by all
just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor that Adam
did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that wisdom
"brought him out of his sin." Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not
of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5,19) that sacrifices are
offered in signification of something. Now words which are chief among
signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "signify, not by
nature but by convention," according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i,
2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, At all times and among all nations there has always
been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by all is
seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of the natural
law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a higher
being, on account of the defects which he perceives in himself, and in
which he needs help and direction from someone above him: and whatever
this superior being may be, it is known to all under the name of God. Now
just as in natural things the lower are naturally subject to the higher,
so too it is a dictate of natural reason in accordance with man's natural
inclination that he should tender submission and honor, according to his
mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that
he should employ sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he
derives his knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural
reason that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in
sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make certain
offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now this is what
we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of
the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FS, Q[95], A[2]), certain things belong
generically to the natural law, while their determination belongs to the
positive law; thus the natural law requires that evildoers should be
punished; but that this or that punishment should be inflicted on them is
a matter determined by God or by man. In like manner the offering of
sacrifice belongs generically to the natural law, and consequently all
are agreed on this point, but the determination of sacrifices is
established by God or by man, and this is the reason for their difference.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God in
a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to Gregory,
who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was remitted
through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture mention all the
sacrifices of the just, but only those that have something special
connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read of no sacrifice being
offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of sin is ascribed to him, the
origin of sanctification ought not to be represented as typified in him.
Isaac was a type of Christ, being himself offered in sacrifice; and so
there was no need that he should be represented as offering a sacrifice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but the
determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to the most
high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God, it would seem
that it ought to be offered to all such as are partakers of the Godhead.
Now holy men are made "partakers of the Divine nature," according to 2
Pt. 1:4; wherefore of them is it written (Ps. 81:6): "I have said, You
are gods": and angels too are called "sons of God," according to Job 1:6.
Thus sacrifice should be offered to all these.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due to him
from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any earthly
princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much greater honor,
by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts, than is implied by
offering an animal or any other thing in sacrifice. Much more therefore
may one offer sacrifice to the angels and saints.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of
sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints.
Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:20): "He that sacrificeth to gods
shall be put to death, save only to the Lord."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), a sacrifice is offered in order
that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is offered
outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby the soul
offers itself to God according to Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to God is an
afflicted spirit," since, as stated above (Q[81], A[7]; Q[84], A[2]), the
outward acts of religion are directed to the inward acts. Again the soul
offers itself in sacrifice to God as its beginning by creation, and its
end by beatification: and according to the true faith God alone is the
creator of our souls, as stated in the FP, Q[90], A[3]; FS, Q[118], A[2],
while in Him alone the beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above
(FS, Q[1], A[8]; FS, Q[2], A[8]; FS, Q[3], AA[1],7,8). Wherefore just as
to God alone ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to
offer outward sacrifices to Him alone: even so "in our prayers and
praises we proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we
offer the things which we designate thereby," as Augustine states (De
Civ. Dei x, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are
wont to show the sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if
this be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore,
in the Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer
Divine honor to another than God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain ones,
not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is equal honor
due to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the value of
the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done in honor of
the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei x, 19), "the demons rejoice, not in the stench of corpses,
but in receiving divine honors."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), "we do not raise
temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but their God is
our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice to thee, Peter
or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their triumphs, and urge ourselves
to imitate them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the offering of sacrifice is a special act of virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a special act
of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "A true sacrifice is any
work done that we may cleave to God in holy fellowship." But not every
good work is a special act of some definite virtue. Therefore the
offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to
abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs to
fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the offering of
sacrifice, according to Rm. 12:1, "Present your bodies a living
sacrifice." Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16): "Do not forget to do
good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Now
it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do good and to impart.
Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God. Now
many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes,
first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not
appear to be a special act of a definite virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The law contains special precepts about sacrifices, as
appears from the beginning of Leviticus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[18], AA[6],7), where an act of one
virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it partakes somewhat of
its species; thus when a man thieves in order to commit fornication, his
theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of fornication, so that even
though it were not a sin otherwise, it would be a sin from the very fact
that it was directed to fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special
act deserving of praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and
for this reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it
happens that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence
of God, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God's sake, or
when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence for
God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called
sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving of
praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts are
properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a spiritual
fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently the act of any
virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through being done in order
that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good
which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion, prayer
and other like interior acts: and this is the principal sacrifice. The
second is his body's good, which is, so to speak, offered to God in
martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third is the good which
consists of external things: and of these we offer a sacrifice to God,
directly when we offer our possession to God immediately, and indirectly
when we share them with our neighbor for God's sake.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A "sacrifice," properly speaking, requires that something
be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance animals were
slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The very word
signifies this, since "sacrifice" is so called because a man does
something sacred [facit sacrum]. On the other hand an "oblation" is
properly the offering of something to God even if nothing be done
thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at the altar, and yet
nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not
conversely. "First-fruits" are oblations, because they were offered to
God, according to Dt. 26, but they are not a sacrifice, because nothing
sacred was done to them. "Tithes," however, are neither a sacrifice nor
an oblation, properly speaking, because they are not offered immediately
to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all are bound to offer sacrifices?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all are not bound to offer sacrifices. The
Apostle says (Rm. 3:19): "What things soever the Law speaketh, it
speaketh to them that are in the Law." Now the law of sacrifices was not
given to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are not bound
to offer sacrifices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify
something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these
significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, priests [*'Sacerdotes': Those who give or administer
sacred things (sacra dantes): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1] are so called because they
offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not all are
bound to offer sacrifices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural law, as
stated above (A[1]). Now all are bound to do that which is of the natural
law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above (A[2]). The first
and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to offer,
since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other is the
outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a sacrifice which
is deserving of praise merely through being offered to God in
protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation of offering
this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New or the Old Law,
as for those who were not under the Law. For those who are under the Law
are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices according to the precepts
of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law were bound to
perform certain outward actions in God's honor, as became those among
whom they dwelt, but not definitely to this or that action. The other
outward sacrifice is when the outward actions of the other virtues are
performed out of reverence for God; some of which are a matter of
precept; and to these all are bound, while others are works of
supererogation, and to these all are not bound.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All were not bound to offer those particular sacrifices
which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to some sacrifices
inward or outward, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Though all do not know explicitly the power of the
sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit faith, as
stated above (Q[2], AA 6,7).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[85] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The priests offer those sacrifices which are specially
directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but also for
others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can offer to God for
himself as explained above (AA[2],3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] Out. Para. 1/1
OF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept?
(2) To whom are oblations due?
(3) of what things they should be made?
(4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer
them?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men are under a necessity of precept to make oblations?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make
oblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe the
ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (FS, Q[103], AA[3]
,4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the ceremonial precepts of
the Old Law, since it is written (Ex. 23:14): "Three times every year you
shall celebrate feasts with Me," and further on (Ex. 23:15): "Thou shalt
not appear empty before Me." Therefore men are not now under a necessity
of precept to make oblations.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, before they are made, oblations depend on man's will, as
appears from our Lord's saying (Mt. 5:23), "If . . . thou offer thy gift
at the altar," as though this were left to the choice of the offerer: and
when once oblations have been made, there is no way of offering them
again. Therefore in no way is a man under a necessity of precept to make
oblations.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the
Church, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being
deprived of the Church's sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to refuse
the sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make oblations
according to a decree of the sixth council [*Can. Trullan, xxiii], quoted
I, qu. i, can. Nullus: "Let none who dispense Holy Communion exact
anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything let them be
deposed." Therefore it is not necessary that men should make oblations.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says [*Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can.
xii]: "Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God at
the celebration of Mass."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[85], A[3], ad 3), the term "oblation"
is common to all things offered for the Divine worship, so that if a
thing be offered to be destroyed in worship of God, as though it were
being made into something holy, it is both an oblation and a sacrifice.
Wherefore it is written (Ex. 29:18): "Thou shalt offer the whole ram for
a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an oblation to the Lord, a most
sweet savor of the victim of the Lord"; and (Lev. 2:1): "When anyone
shall offer an oblation of sacrifice to the Lord, his offering shall be
of fine flour." If, on the other hand, it be offered with a view to its
remaining entire and being deputed to the worship of God or to the use of
His ministers, it will be an oblation and not a sacrifice. Accordingly it
is essential to oblations of this kind that they be offered voluntarily,
according to Ex. 25:2, of "every man that offereth of his own accord you
shall take them." Nevertheless it may happen in four ways that one is
bound to make oblations. First, on account of a previous agreement: as
when a person is granted a portion of Church land, that he may make
certain oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of
rent. Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise; as when a
man offers a gift among the living, or by will bequeaths to the Church
something whether movable or immovable to be delivered at some future
time. Thirdly, on account of the need of the Church, for instance if her
ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on account of custom;
for the faithful are bound at certain solemn feasts to make certain
customary oblations. In the last two cases, however, the oblation remains
voluntary, as regards, to wit, the quantity or kind of the thing offered.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Under the New Law men are not bound to make oblations on
account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on account of
certain other reasons, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Some are bound to make oblations, both before making them,
as in the first, third, and. fourth cases, and after they have made them
by assignment or promise: for they are bound to offer in reality that
which has been already offered to the Church by way of assignment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who do not make the oblations they are bound to make
may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not by the priest
himself to whom the oblations should be made, lest he seem to exact,
something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone superior to him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether oblations are due to priests alone?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that oblations are not due to priests alone. For
chief among oblations would seem to be those that are deputed to the
sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the poor is called a
"victim in Scripture according to Heb. 13:16, "Do not forget to do good
and to impart, for by such victims [Douay: 'sacrifices'] God's favor is
obtained. Much more therefore are oblations due to the poor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in many parishes monks have a share in the oblations.
Now "the case of clerics is distinct from the case of monks," as Jerome
states [*Ep. xiv, ad Heliod.]. Therefore oblations art not due to priests
alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, lay people with the consent of the Church buy oblations
such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other reason than that
they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore oblations may have
reference to the laity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A canon of Pope Damasus [*Damasus I] quoted X, qu. i
[*Can. Hanc consuetudinem], says: "None but the priests whom day by day
we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the oblations which are
offered within the precincts of the Holy Church: because in the Old
Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the sacred
loaves, with the exception of Aaron and his sons" (Lev. 24:8,9).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The priest is appointed mediator and stands, so to speak,
"between" the people and God, as we read of Moses (Dt. 5:5), wherefore it
belongs to him to set forth the Divine teachings and sacraments before
the people; and besides to offer to the Lord things appertaining to the
people, their prayers, for instance, their sacrifices and oblations. Thus
the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): "Every high priest taken from among men is
ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer
up gifts and sacrifices for sins." Hence the oblations which the people
offer to God concern the priests, not only as regards their turning them
to their own use, but also as regards the faithful dispensation thereof,
by spending them partly on things appertaining to the Divine worship,
partly on things touching their own livelihood (since they that serve the
altar partake with the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13), and partly for
the good of the poor, who, as far as possible, should be supported from
the possessions of the Church: for our Lord had a purse for the use of
the poor, as Jerome observes on Mt. 17:26, "That we may not scandalize
them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice properly
speaking; yet it is called a sacrifice in so far as it is given to them
for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same reason, it can be called
an oblation, though not properly speaking, since it is not given
immediately to God. Oblations properly so called fall to the use of the
poor, not by the dispensation of the offerers, but by the dispensation of
the priests.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Monks or other religious may receive oblations under three
counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the priests, or by
ordination of the Church; secondly, through being ministers of the altar,
and then they can accept oblations that are freely offered; thirdly, if
the parishes belong to them, and they can accept oblations, having a
right to them as rectors of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Oblations when once they are consecrated, such as sacred
vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the laity: and
this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those which are
unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by permission of the
priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man may make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man may not make oblations of whatever he
lawfully possesses. According to human law [*Dig. xii, v, de Condict. ob.
turp. vel iniust. caus. 4] "the whore's is a shameful trade in what she
does but not in what she takes," and consequently what she takes she
possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her to make an oblation with
her gains, according to Dt. 23:18, "Thou shalt not offer the hire of a
strumpet . . . in the house of the Lord thy God." Therefore it is not
lawful to make an oblation of whatever one possesses lawfully.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the same passage it is forbidden to offer "the price
of a dog" in the house of God. But it is evident that a man possesses
lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore it is not
lawful to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Malachi 1:8): "If you offer the lame and
the sick, is it not evil?" Yet an animal though lame or sick is a lawful
possession. Therefore it would seem that not of every lawful possession
may one make an oblation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:9): "Honor the Lord with thy
substance." Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his
substance. Therefore he may make oblations of whatever he possesses
lawfully.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. cxiii), "shouldst
thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the spoil to the
judge, if he should pronounce in thy favor, such is the force of justice
that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and if this should not
please thee, neither does it please thy God." Hence it is written
(Ecclus. 34:21): "The offering of him that sacrificeth of a thing
wrongfully gotten is stained." Therefore it is evident that an oblation
must not be made of things unjustly acquired or possessed. In the Old
Law, however, wherein the figure was predominant, certain things were
reckoned unclean on account of their signification, and it was forbidden
to offer them. But in the New Law all God's creatures are looked upon as
clean, as stated in Titus 1:15: and consequently anything that is
lawfully possessed, considered in itself, may be offered in oblation. But
it may happen accidentally that one may not make an oblation of what one
possesses lawfully; for instance if it be detrimental to another person,
as in the case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting his
father (which our Lord condemns, Mt. 15:5), or if it give rise to scandal
or contempt, or the like.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the Old Law it was forbidden to make an offering of the
hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and in the New Law, on
account of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor sin if she accept
oblations from the profits of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Law, a dog was deemed an unclean animal.
Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could be offered,
according to Lev. 27:27, "If it be an unclean animal, he that offereth it
shall redeem it." But a dog was neither offered nor redeemed, both
because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices to their idols, and because
they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot be offered in
oblation. However, this prohibition ceased under the New Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The oblation of a blind or lame animal was declared
unlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose for which it
was offered, wherefore it is written (Malach. 1:8): "If you offer the
blind in sacrifice, is it not evil?" and it behooved sacrifices to be
without blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt, wherefore the same
text goes on (Malach. 1:12): "You have profaned" My name, "in that you
say: The table of the Lord is defiled and that which is laid thereupon is
contemptible." Thirdly, on account of a previous vow, whereby a man has
bound himself to offer without blemish whatever he has vowed: hence the
same text says further on (Malach. 1:14): "Cursed is the deceitful man
that hath in his flock a male, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice
that which is feeble to the Lord." The same reasons avail still in the
New Law, but when they do not apply the unlawfulness ceases.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men are bound to pay first-fruits?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that men are not bound to pay first-fruits. After
giving the law of the first-born the text continues (Ex. 13:9): "It shall
be as a sign in thy hand," so that, apparently, it is a ceremonial
precept. But ceremonial precepts are not to be observed in the New Law.
Neither therefore ought first-fruits to be paid.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, first-fruits were offered to the Lord for a special
favor conferred on that people, wherefore it is written (Dt. 26:2,3):
"Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits . . . and thou shalt go to
the priest that shall be in those days, and say to him: I profess this
day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the land, for which He
swore to our fathers, that He would give it us." Therefore other nations
are not bound to pay first-fruits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: That which one is bound to do should be something definite. But
neither in the New Law nor in the Old do we find mention of a definite
amount of first-fruits. Therefore one is not bound of necessity to pay
them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can. Decimas): "We
confirm the right of priests to tithes and first-fruits, and everybody
must pay them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, First-fruits are a kind of oblation, because they are
offered to God with a certain profession (Dt. 26); where the same passage
continues: "The priest taking the basket containing the first-fruits from
the hand of him that bringeth the first-fruits, shall set it before the
altar of the Lord thy God," and further on (Dt. 26:10) he is commanded to
say: "Therefore now I offer the first-fruits of the land, which the Lord
hath given me." Now the first-fruits were offered for a special reason,
namely, in recognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowledged
that he had received the fruits of the earth from God, and that he ought
to offer something to God in return, according to 1 Paral 29:14, "We have
given Thee what we received of Thy hand." And since what we offer God
ought to be something special, hence it is that man was commanded to
offer God his first-fruits, as being a special part of the fruits of the
earth: and since a priest is "ordained for the people "in the things that
appertain to God" (Heb. 5:1), the first-fruits offered by the people were
granted to the priest's use." Wherefore it is written (Num. 18:8): "The
Lord said to Aaron: Behold I have given thee the charge of My
first-fruits." Now it is a point of natural law that man should make an
offering in God's honor out of the things he has received from God, but
that the offering should be made to any particular person, or out of his
first-fruits, or in such or such a quantity, was indeed determined in the
Old Law by divine command; but in the New Law it is fixed by the
declaration of the Church, in virtue of which men are bound to pay
first-fruits according to the custom of their country and the needs of
the Church's ministers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The ceremonial observances were properly speaking signs of
the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed truth was
actually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for a sign of a
past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowledgment in accordance with
the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a general sense this
obligation remains.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: First-fruits were offered in the Old Law, not only on
account of the favor of the promised land given by God, but also on
account of the favor of the fruits of the earth, which were given by God.
Hence it is written (Dt. 26:10): "I offer the first-fruits of the land
which the Lord hath given me," which second motive is common among all
people. We may also reply that just as God granted the land of promise to
the Jews by a special favor, so by a general favor He bestowed the
lordship of the earth on the whole of mankind, according to Ps. 113:24,
"The earth He has given to the children of men."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[86] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezech. 45:13,14; cf. Cap.
Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.]: "According to the tradition of the
ancients the custom arose for those who had most to give the priests a
fortieth part, and those who had least, one sixtieth, in lieu of
first-fruits." Hence it would seem that first-fruits should vary between
these limits according to the custom of one's country. And it was
reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not be fixed by law,
since, as stated above, first-fruits are offered by way of oblation, a
condition of which is that it should be voluntary.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] Out. Para. 1/1
OF TITHES (FOUR ARTICLES)
Next we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes?
(2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid?
(3) To whom ought they to be paid?
(4) Who ought to pay tithes?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men are bound to pay tithes under a necessity of precept?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay tithes.
The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the Old Law (Lev. 27:30),
"All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the fruits of trees, are
the Lord's," and further on (Lev. 27:32): "Of all the tithes of oxen and
sheep and goats, that pass under the shepherd's rod, every tenth that
cometh shall be sanctified to the Lord." This cannot be reckoned among
the moral precepts, because natural reason does not dictate that one
ought to give a tenth part, rather than a ninth or eleventh. Therefore it
is either a judicial or a ceremonial precept. Now, as stated above (FS,
Q[103], A[3]; FS, Q[104], A[3]), during the time of grace men are hound
neither to the ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law.
Therefore men are not bound now to pay tithes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, during the time of grace men are bound only to those
things which were commanded by Christ through the Apostles, according to
Mt. 28:20, "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have
commanded you"; and Paul says (Acts 20:27): "I have not spared to declare
unto you all the counsel of God." Now neither in the teaching of Christ
nor in that of the apostles is there any mention of the paying of tithes:
for the saying of our Lord about tithes (Mt. 23:23), "These things you
ought to have done" seems to refer to the past time of legal observance:
thus Hilary says (Super Matth. can. xxiv): "The tithing of herbs, which
was useful in foreshadowing the future, was not to be omitted." Therefore
during the time of grace men are not bound to pay tithes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, during the time of grace, men are not more bound to the
legal observances than before the Law. But before the Law tithes were
given, by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read (Gn.
28:20,22) that Jacob "made a vow" saying: "If God shall be with me, and
shall keep me in the way by which I walk . . . of all the things that
Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee." Neither, therefore,
during the time of grace are men bound to pay tithes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in the Old Law men were bound to pay three kinds of
tithe. For it is written (Num. 18:23,24): "The sons of Levi . . . shall .
. be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have separated for
their uses and necessities." Again, there were other tithes of which we
read (Dt. 14:22,23): "Every year thou shalt set aside the tithes of all
thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth year by year; and thou shalt
eat before the Lord thy God in the place which He shall choose." And
there were yet other tithes, of which it is written (Dt. 14:28): "The
third year thou shalt separate another tithe of all things that grow to
thee at that time, and shalt lay it up within thy gates. And the Levite
that hath no other part nor possession with thee, and the stranger, and
the fatherless, and the widow, that are within thy gates, shall . . . eat
and be filled." Now during the time of grace men are not bound to pay the
second and third tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to pay the
first.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a debt that is due without any time being fixed for its
payment, must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly if during
the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept, to pay
tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they would all be in
a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the ministers of the Church
for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable. Therefore during the time
of grace men are not bound under necessity of precept to pay tithes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words are
quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: "It is a duty to pay tithes, and
whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to another."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance of the
ministers of God. Hence it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all the
tithes into My [Vulg.: 'the'] store-house that there may be meat in My
house." Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was partly moral and
instilled in the natural reason; and partly judicial, deriving its force
from its divine institution. Because natural reason dictates that the
people should administer the necessaries of life to those who minister
the divine worship for the welfare of the whole people even as it is the
people's duty to provide a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers and
so forth. Hence the Apostle proves this from human custom, saying (1 Cor.
9:7): "Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge? Who
planteth a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof?" But the fixing
of the proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does
not belong to the natural law, but was determined by divine institution,
in accordance with the condition of that people to whom the law was being
given. For they were divided into twelve tribes, and the twelfth tribe,
namely that of Levi, was engaged exclusively in the divine ministry and
had no possessions whence to derive a livelihood: and so it was
becomingly ordained that the remaining eleven tribes should give
one-tenth part of their revenues to the Levites [*Num. 18:21] that the
latter might live respectably; and also because some, through negligence,
would disregard this precept. Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed,
the precept was judicial, since all institutions established among this
people for the special purpose of preserving equality among men, in
accordance with this people's condition, are called "judicial precepts."
Nevertheless by way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed
something in the future, even as everything else connected with them,
according to 1 Cor. 12, "All these things happened to them in figure." In
this respect they had something in common with the "ceremonial precepts,"
which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of the future.
Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed something in the
future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first
numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond ten but begin over
again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth, which is the sign of
perfection, reserving the nine other parts for himself, acknowledged by a
sign that imperfection was his part, and that the perfection which was to
come through Christ was to be hoped for from God. Yet this proves it to
be, not a ceremonial but a judicial precept, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts of
the Law, as we stated above (FS, Q[104], A[3]), that it is unlawful to
observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New Law, whereas there
is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during the time of grace
although they are not binding. Indeed they are bound to be observed by
some, if they be ordained by the authority of those who have power to
make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of the Old Law that he who
stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex. 22:1), and if any king were
to order this to be done his subjects would be bound to obey. In like
manner during the time of the New Law the authority of the Church has
established the payment of tithe; thus showing a certain kindliness, lest
the people of the New Law should give less to the ministers of the New
Testament than did the people of the Old Law to the ministers of the Old
Testament; for the people of the New Law are under greater obligations,
according to Mt. 5:20, "Unless your justice abound more than that of the
Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven,"
and, moreover, the ministers of the New Testament are of greater dignity
than the ministers of the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor.
3:7,8).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
Accordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises
partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church; who,
nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and persons
might ordain the payment of some other proportion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it was a
moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said (Mt.
10:10) [*The words as quoted are from Lk. 10:7: Matthew has 'meat'
instead of 'hire']: "The workman is worthy of his hire," and the Apostle
says the same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq.). But the fixing of the particular
proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of the divine
worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although it is stated
that the first-born were priests, and that they received a double
portion. For this very reason no particular portion was directed to be
given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when they met with one,
each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed right. Thus Abraham by
a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to Melchisedech, the priest of
the Most High God, according to Gn. 14:20, and again Jacob made a vow to
give tithes [*Gn. 28:20], although he appears to have vowed to do so, not
by paying them to ministers, but for the purpose of the divine worship,
for instance for the fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said
significantly: "I will offer tithes to Thee."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for the
offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the legal
victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to eat
with the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us to
give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms." Moreover the
tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be dispensed
by them for the use of the poor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The ministers of the Church ought to be more solicitous for
the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for the amassing of
temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to make use of the
right given him by the Lord of receiving his livelihood from those to
whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should occasion a hindrance to the
Gospel of Christ [*1 Cor. 9:12]. Nor did they sin who did not contribute
to his upkeep, else the Apostle would not have omitted to reprove them.
In like manner the ministers of the Church rightly refrain from demanding
the Church's tithes, when they could not demand them without scandal, on
account of their having fallen into desuetude, or for some other reason.
Nevertheless those who do not give tithes in places where the Church does
not demand them are not in a state of damnation, unless they be
obstinate, and unwilling to pay even if tithes were demanded of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of all
things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the Old Law.
Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes, viz. those
that are payable on property acquired by one's own act, for instance by
commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to pay tithes on such
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which is
ill-gotten, as stated above (Q[86], A[3]). Now oblations, being offered
to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected with the divine
worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers. Therefore neither
should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30,32) the precept of
paying tithes refers only to "corn, fruits of trees" and animals "that
pass under the shepherd's rod." But man derives a revenue from other
smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his garden and so forth.
Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to pay tithes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a man
does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land and
stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery; sometimes they
are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes they are due to some
other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and wages due to workmen.
Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such like things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 28:22): "Of all things that Thou
shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In judging about a thing we should look to its principle.
Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt whereby carnal
things are due to those who sow spiritual things, according to the saying
of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), "If we have sown unto you spiritual things,
is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?" [thus implying that
on the contrary "it is no great matter if we reap your carnal things"]
[*The phrase in the brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition]. For
this debt is the principle on which is based the commandment of the
Church about the payment of tithes. Now whatever man possesses comes
under the designation of carnal things. Therefore tithes must be paid on
whatever one possesses.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In accordance with the condition of that people there was a
special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept about personal
tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had certain possessions
wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient livelihood for the
Levites who had no possessions, but were not forbidden to make a profit
out of other lawful occupations as the other Jews did. On the other hand
the people of the New Law are spread abroad throughout the world, and
many of them have no possessions, but live by trade, and these would
contribute nothing to the support of God's ministers if they did not pay
tithes on their trade profits. Moreover the ministers of the New Law are
more strictly forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades,
according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth
himself with secular business." Wherefore in the New Law men are bound to
pay personal tithes, according to the custom of their country and the
needs of the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words are quoted 16, qu.
1, cap. Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]: "Tithes must be paid on
the profits of soldiering, trade or craft."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because the
getting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by
robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not to
pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the profits of
usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce, because the
latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the other hand
certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are gotten of a
shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or stage-playing, and the like.
Such things a man is not bound to restore, and consequently he is bound
to pay tithes on them in the same way as other personal tithes.
Nevertheless the Church must not accept the tithe so long as those
persons remain in sin, lest she appear to have a share in their sins: but
when they have done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Things directed to an end must be judged according to their
fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is due not for its own
sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity it is
unbecoming that they should demand minute things with careful exactitude,
for this is reckoned sinful according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2).
Hence the Old Law did not order the payment of tithes on such like minute
things, but left it to the judgment of those who are willing to pay,
because minute things are counted as nothing. Wherefore the Pharisees who
claimed for themselves the perfect justice of the Law, paid tithes even
on these minute things: nor are they reproved by our Lord on that
account, but only because they despised greater, i.e. spiritual,
precepts; and rather did He show them to be deserving of praise in this
particular, when He said (Mt. 23:23): "These things you ought to have
done," i.e. during the time of the Law, according to Chrysostom's [*Hom.
xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
commentary. This also seems to denote fittingness rather than obligation.
Therefore now too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things,
except perhaps by reason of the custom of one's country.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has lost by
theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he has incurred
the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the Church ought not
to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat that has not been
tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to her, both from the buyer
who has a thing due to the Church, and from the seller, because so far as
he is concerned he has defrauded the Church: yet if one pays, the other
is not bound. Tithes are due on the fruits of the earth, in so far as
these fruits are the gift of God. Wherefore tithes do not come under a
tax, nor are they subject to workmen's wages. Hence it is not right to
deduct one's taxes and the wages paid to workmen, before paying tithes:
but tithes must be paid before anything else on one's entire produce.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether tithes should be paid to the clergy?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the clergy.
Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because they had no
portion in the people's possessions, according to Num. 18:23,24. But in
the New Testament the clergy have possessions not only ecclesiastical,
but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they receive first-fruits, and
oblations for the living and the dead. Therefore it is unnecessary to pay
tithes to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one parish,
and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within the bounds
of one parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds of one
parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds of another
parish during the other part of the year; or he may have his sheepfold in
one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now in all these and similar
cases it seems impossible to decide to which clergy the tithes ought to
be paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed tithe ought to be paid to
the clergy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for the
soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain religious
receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only to those of
the clergy who have care of souls.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 18:21): "I have given to the sons
of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the ministry
wherewith they serve Me in the Tabernacle." Now the clergy are the
successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes are
due to the clergy alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two things have to be considered with regard to tithes:
namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in the name of
tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing, for it arises
from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the altar have a right
to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are due to those
who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns none but the clergy who have
care of souls, and so they alone are competent to have this right.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are material,
wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it is that they
fall into the hands of the laity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the Old Law, as stated above (A[1], ad 4), special
tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New Law
the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own support, but
also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor. Hence they are
not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and first-fruits as
well as tithes are all necessary for this same purpose.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Personal tithes are due to the church in whose parish a man
dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to belong to the church
within whose bounds the land is situated. The law, however, prescribes
that in this matter a custom that has obtained for a long time must be
observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad apostolicae, de Decimis, etc.]. The
shepherd who grazes his flock at different seasons in two parishes,
should pay tithe proportionately to both churches. And since the fruit of
the flock is derived from the pasture, the tithe of the flock is due to
the church in whose lands the flock grazes, rather than to the church on
whose land the fold is situated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the things she
receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him to receive
tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being reserved to
the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the need of the
Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers through being granted
to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the succoring of the poor;
thus certain tithes have been granted by way of alms to certain lay
religious, or to those that have no care of souls. Some religious,
however, are competent to receive tithes, because they have care of souls.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes. By
common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc.] the parish church should
receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. Now it
happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their own on the
territory of some parish church, or that one church has ecclesiastical
property on the territory of another. Therefore it would seem that the
clergy are bound to pay predial tithes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are bound to
pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they cultivate even
with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap. Nuper.]. Therefore it
would seem that the clergy are not immune from the payment of tithes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26,28), it is
prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the
people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the
high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the
Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to the
clergy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of the
clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the clergy
are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the latter is not
true. Therefore the former is false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: "It is a
new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the clergy"
[*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as
neither can the cause of action be the cause of passion; yet it happens
that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and
patient, on account of different causes and from different points of
view. Now tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar
and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Wherefore those members
of the clergy as such, i.e. as having ecclesiastical property, are not
bound to pay tithes; whereas from some other cause through holding
property in their own right, either by inheriting it from their kindred,
or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they are bound to the
payment of tithes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy like
anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the parish
church, even though they be the clergy of that same church, because to
possess a thing as one's private property is not the same as possessing
it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even though they be
within the boundaries of another parish.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls, and
dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay tithes, but
they may receive them. Another reason applies to other religious, who
though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the people; for
according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay tithes, but they are
somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions granted by the Apostolic
See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad audientiam, de Decimis, etc.].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests, and
tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the priests, the
Lord commanded that the former should pay the high-priest "the tenth part
of the tenth" [*Num. 18:26] instead of first-fruits: wherefore for the
same reason the clergy are bound now to pay tithes to the Sovereign
Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural reason dictates that he who has
charge of the common estate of a multitude should be provided with all
goods, so that he may be able to carry out whatever is necessary for the
common welfare.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Tithes should be employed for the assistance of the poor,
through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no reason for
accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] Out. Para. 1/1
SERVICE BY PROMISE (Q[88])
OF VOWS (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under
this head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) What is a vow?
(2) What is the matter of a vow?
(3) Of the obligation of vows;
(4) Of the use of taking vows;
(5) Of what virtue is it an act?
(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than
without a vow?
(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;
(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?
(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?
(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?
(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of continence?
(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation
from a vow?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the
will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, xxviii, qu.
1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is a conception of a good
purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind, whereby a man binds
himself before God to do or not to do a certain thing." But the
conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere movement
of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from "voluntas"
[will], for one is said to do a thing "proprio voto" [by one's own vow]
when one does it voluntarily. Now to "purpose" is an act of the will,
while to "promise" is an act of the reason. Therefore a vow consists in a
mere act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 9:62): "No man putting his hand to
the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Now from
the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to
the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from his good
purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore by a mere good
purpose a man is bound before God, even without making a promise; and
consequently it would seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the
will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow is a
promise.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular
thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which
is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just
as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are
to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for
another. Now a promise between man and man can only be expressed in words
or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be made to God by the
mere inward thought, since according to 1 Kgs. 16:7, "Man seeth those
things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express
words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated
above with regard to prayer (Q[83], A[12]), or to call others to witness,
so that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of
God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a
purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since
it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are
essential to a vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of
the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of
a vow. Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of
confirmation of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth,
according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have
uttered"; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv,
D, 38) that a vow is "the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought
to be made to God and about things relating to God": although the
"witnessing" may strictly refer to the inward protestation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by the
deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a promise.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something relating
to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from the will
forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does something already;
while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing so far. When,
however, he promises, he already sets about doing, although he does not
yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts his hand to the plough does
not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches out his hand for the purpose of
ploughing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a vow should always be about a better good?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better good.
A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation. But vows are not
only about matters of supererogation, but also about matters of
salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and his pomps,
and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and pay
to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed (Gn. 28:21) that the Lord should
be his God. Now this above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore vows
are not only about a better good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32). Yet he
killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges 11). Since,
then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good, but is in
itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only about a better
good, but also about something unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or that
are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good. Yet
sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to
injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters and
such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always about a
better good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:22): "If thou wilt not promise
thou shalt be without sin."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), a vow is a promise made to God.
Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for someone
else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say that one would
do something against someone. In like manner it would be futile to
promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as every sin is
against God, and since no work is acceptable to God unless it be
virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but only some
act of virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes a
voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness, whatever is
absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can nowise be the
matter of a vow. For it would be foolish to vow that one would die or
that one would not fly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not absolutely but on the
supposition of an end---for instance if salvation be unattainable without
it---it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done voluntarily,
but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it. But that which is
not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an end, is
altogether voluntary, and therefore is most properly the matter of a vow.
And this is said to be a greater good in comparison with that which is
universally necessary for salvation. Therefore, properly speaking, a vow
is said to be about a better good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of
Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things are
done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The same
answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained that
Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving Him a
special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance by
offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same passage.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such are
acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter of a
vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which
are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the matter of a vow:
while some, considered in themselves, are good, and as such may be the
matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, in which case the vow
must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of Jephte, who as related in
Judges 11:30,31, "made a vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt deliver
the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever shall first come forth out
of the doors of my house, and shall meet me when I return in peace . . .
the same will I offer a holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an
evil result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal
which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being.
Hence Jerome says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi,
viii: Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist.
Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in
keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised (Judges 11:29) that
"the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith and devotion,
which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy Ghost; and for this
reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason of the victory
which he obtained, and because it is probable that he repented of his
sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance by vigils
and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it is an act of
virtue; and this depends on its being done with due discretion, namely,
that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening nature. on this
condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence the Apostle after
saying (Rm. 12:1), "Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy,
pleasing to God," adds, "your reasonable service." Since, however, man
is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as
these are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of
a superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is
seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to
appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about vain
and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all vows are binding?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs things
that are done by another, more than God does, since He has no need for
our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the prescription of human laws
[*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple promise made to a man is not
binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness
of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a simple promise made
to God, which we call a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now sometimes
that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either because it
depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man vows to enter
a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him: or on account of
some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows virginity, and
afterwards is deflowered; or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and
afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always binding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at
once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it be
taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is
not always binding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3,4): "Whatsoever thou hast
vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to
perform the things promised."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's
promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac.
xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his word"
[*'Fides . . . fiunt dicta' Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic. i,
7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, both on account of
God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from God.
Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to God,
since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. On the other hand, the
breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the
reason why vows should be paid to God, because "an unfaithful . . .
promise displeaseth Him" [*Eccles. 5:3].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he makes
to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural law. But for
a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has made, other
conditions are requisite. And although God needs not our goods, we are
under a very great obligation to Him: so that a vow made to Him is most
binding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him
through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he have at
least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to enter a
monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be received
there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to enter the
religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this particular form of
religious life, or this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is
bound, should he be unable to be received there, to enter the religious
life elsewhere. But if his principal intention is to bind himself to this
particular kind of religious life, or to this particular place, because
the one or the other pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to
enter another religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into
this particular one. on the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of
fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above to
do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is
afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her
power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has
lost by sinning.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will and
intention, wherefore it is written (Dt. 23:23): "That which is once gone
out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised
to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and with thy own
mouth." Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's intention and will to
bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound to fulfil it immediately.
But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain
condition, one is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought
not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for it is written
(Dt. 23:21): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God thou shalt
not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it; and if
thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is expedient to take vows?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is not
expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God has given
him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is liberty
whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a vow.
Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever
takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before taking a
vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if
he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep.
cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound
thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast
vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed.
For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good: whereas now if
thou breakest faith with God (which God forbid) thou art the more
unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow."
Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me,
as I also am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ or the
Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the Lord
your God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God under
another. Because we promise something to a man for his own profit; since
it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should at
first assure him of the future fulfilment of that service: whereas we
make promises to God not for His but for our own profit. Hence Augustine
says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "He is a kind and not a needy
exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who
pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as what we give God is useful not to
Him but to us, since "what is given Him is added to the giver," as
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.), so also a promise
whereby we vow something to God, does not conduce to His profit, nor does
He need to be assured by us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as
by vowing we fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to do.
Hence it is expedient to take vows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable
to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed to good
does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and the blessed. Such is
the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a certain resemblance to the
confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad
Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy is the necessity that compels us to do
the better things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is not
expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge: but
if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, the latter does
not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horseback,
though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: else it would
behoove one to desist from all good things, that may become dangerous
accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 11:4): "He that observeth
the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never
reap." Now a man incurs danger, not from the vow itself, but from his
fault, when he changes his mind by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine
says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou
shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest
lawfully have done to thy detriment."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to take
a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will was firmly
fixed on the good, since He was a "comprehensor." By a kind of
similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26): "I will pay
my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is speaking of His
body, which is the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state
of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or religion.
Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem to pertain to
the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a vow pertains
to any virtue and not to religion especially.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to
religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes a
vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it. Therefore,
a vow is not an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, religious worship should be offered to none but God. But
a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to one's
superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their
profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall
worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to the
Lord, and perform them." Now, the worship of God is properly the act of
religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[1], ad 1), every act of virtue
belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it is
directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of latria. Now
the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding
virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the direction of the
acts of any virtue to the service of God is the proper act of latria.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now, it is evident from what has been said above (AA[1],2) that a vow is
a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than a
directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is
made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or
service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an
act of latria or religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another virtue,
as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency; while
sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or praying.
But promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for the reason
given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to religion by
reason only of the promise made to God, which is the essence of a vow,
while others belong thereto by reason also of the thing promised, which
is the matter of the vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He who promises something gives it already in as far as he
binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when its
cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its cause.
This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises to give.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be made
to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is fore made to a
man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous act.
This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something to the
saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the saints or
to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to God
to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or one's superiors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in
fulfilment of a vow, than without a vow?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do
a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow. Prosper says (De Vita
Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves under
the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free to do be done
without devotion and unwillingly." Now he who vows to fast puts himself
under the necessity of fasting. Therefore it would be better for him to
fast without taking the vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): "Everyone as he hath
determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for God
loveth a cheerful giver." Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have
vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow,
for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to Metaph. v [*Ed. Did. iv,
5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow, than in
fulfilment of a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the will on
that which is vowed, as stated above (A[4]). But the will cannot be more
fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is
no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye and pay,"
says: "Vows are counseled to the will." But a counsel is about none but
a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in fulfilment of a vow
than without a vow: since he that does it without a vow fulfils only one
counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it with a vow,
fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow and the counsel to do it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to do
one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because to vow, as
stated above (A[5]) is an act of religion which is the chief of the moral
virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the better and more
meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is the
better the more meritorious for being commanded by a superior virtue,
whose act it becomes through being commanded by it, just as the act of
faith or hope is better if it be commanded by charity. Hence the works of
the other moral virtues (for instance, fasting, which is an act of
abstinence; and being continent, which is an act of chastity) are better
and more meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus
they belong to the divine worship, being like sacrifices to God.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that "not even is virginity
honorable as such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cherished
by godly continence."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects himself
to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects himself to God not
only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he cannot
do something else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with its
fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm [*Eadmer] observes
(De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank even those who promise, as
stated above (A[5], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do
anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection of
virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to sin with
an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against the
Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q[14], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted should be understood as referring to
necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and excludes
devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we are free to do be
done without devotion and unwillingly." On the other hand the necessity
resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility of the will, wherefore
it strengthens the will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does
not conclude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in so
far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity
resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it
strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine says
(Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst
rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully
have done to thy detriment." If, however, the very deed, considered in
itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary after one has taken
the vow, the will to fulfil it remaining withal, it is still more
meritorious than if it were done without the vow, since the fulfilment of
a vow is an act of religion which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of
which fasting is an act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who does something without having vowed it has an
immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at the
time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed for
the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow: for the latter
has bound his will to do something, both before he did that particular
deed, and perchance to do it many times.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a vow is solemnized by the reception of holy orders, and by the
profession of a certain rule?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the reception of
holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As stated above
(A[1]), a vow is a promise made to God. Now external actions pertaining
to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but to men. Therefore they
are related to vows accidentally: and consequently a solemnization of
this kind is not a proper circumstance of a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would seem
to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many things may
be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either with holy
orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows a pilgrimage, or
something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization that takes place in
the reception of holy orders or in the profession of a certain rule does
not belong to the condition of a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow. Now
many other vows may be made in public besides that which is pronounced in
receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule; which latter,
moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only these vows are
solemn.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, These vows alone are an impediment to the contract of
marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the effect of
a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third Part of this work
[*XP, Q[53], A[2]].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its
nature [conditio]: thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes the fact
in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and arms and a
concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way,
namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of their
kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God: wherefore, the solemnization
of a vow consists in something spiritual pertaining to God; i.e. in some
spiritual blessing or consecration which, in accordance with the
institution of the apostles, is given when a man makes profession of
observing a certain rule, in the second degree after the reception of
holy orders, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is
that solemnization is not wont to be employed, save when a man gives
himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nuptial
solemnization takes place only when the marriage is celebrated, and when
the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the power over their bodies to
one another. In like manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes
himself to the divine ministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the
state of perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the
profession of a certain rule.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This kind of solemnization regards not only men but also
God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration or
blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister,
according to Num. 6:27, "They shall invoke My name upon the children of
Israel, and I will bless them." Hence a solemn vow is more binding with
God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more
grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than a
solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either
commits a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but the
embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man vows
particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast, such a vow
is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the vow whereby a man
entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or service: and yet many
particular works are included under this vow as under a universal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Through being pronounced in public vows may have a certain
human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as the
aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few persons.
Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those who are subject to another's power are hindered from taking
vows?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's power are
not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed by the
greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a lesser
bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. Therefore
those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking
vows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet children
may make religious profession even without the consent of their parents.
Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through being subject to
another's power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are
under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to say
some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore
seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But
subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this
forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow any
thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age," she
is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is said
there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in like
manner other persons that are subject to another's power cannot bind
themselves by vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), a vow is a promise made to God.
Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in
another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power. Now
whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject to
him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the
will of the other. And therefore without the consent of his superior he
cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters wherein he is
subject to another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a
promise made to God, as stated above (A[2]). Now it is contrary to virtue
for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above
(Q[86], A[3]). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow are not
altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power vows that
which is in that other's power, except under the condition that he whose
power it concerns does not gainsay it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is in
his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance with
regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to
contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as regards the
arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot vow
anything that shall be valid without the consent of his father.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his
personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since this
would withdraw him from his master's service.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions
connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may
be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with
other things by one's superior, yet since there is no time when his
superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands
without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl
while in (her father's) house without his consent; nor of a wife,
without the consent of her husband.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to another's power
does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, he
does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to contain the
requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior approve or do
not gainsay it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow to
enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, it is
fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. But this
is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore just as
imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow, so
neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves by vow to enter religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be annulled
by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or girl before the
age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian (20, qu. ii,
cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl cannot validly make a
vow before the age of fourteen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch. 58] and
a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to those who
enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of the vow.
Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation, for children
to be bound by vow to enter religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That which is not done aright is invalid without being
annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even before
attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her
parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before
attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a vow
to enter religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said above (A[7]),
vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in the
same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual blessing
and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the Church, it follows
that it comes under the Church's dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its
efficacy from the deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put
oneself under an obligation. That such an obligation be of no force may
happen in two ways. First, through defect of reason, as in madmen and
imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a
state of madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow
being subject to another's power, as stated above (A[8]). Now these two
circumstances concur in children before the age of puberty, because in
most instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally
under the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents:
wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens,
however, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human
laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on
this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for
this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this
care is subject to human law, which takes into account that which is of
most frequent occurrence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the
years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise bind
themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of
reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own
part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by their
parents, under whose care they are still subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] Body Para. 3/3
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of
puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account of
the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad
Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But after the years of
puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious vows,
simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument avails in the case of children who have not
yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power contain an
implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the superior.
This condition renders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which are
taken in profession.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vows admit of dispensation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation. It is
less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it. But a
vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9,10, "A beast that may be
sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and cannot be
changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a better." Much
less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters concerning
the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those of the First
Table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which is the last end
of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a matter of the natural
law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as shown above (A[3]), and
belongs to the precepts of the First Table since it is an act of
religion. Therefore vows do not admit of dispensation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity which a
man owes to God, as stated above (A[3]). But no man can dispense in such
a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one grant a dispensation
from a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That which proceeds from the common will of many has
apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the individual
will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force from the
common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it seems that vows
also admit of dispensation by a man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same
sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, as
stated above (FS, Q[96], A[6]; FS, Q[97], A[4]), a law is made with an
eye to that which is good in the majority of instances. But since, in
certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone to decide that
in that particular case the law is not to be observed. This is properly
speaking to dispense in the law: for a dispensation would seem to denote
a commensurate distribution or application of some common thing to those
that are contained under it, in the same way as a person is said to
dispense food to a household.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it
were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the
majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular
case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good:
and this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow, as
is clear from what has been said above (A[2]). Therefore it is necessary,
in such a case, to decide that the vow is not to be observed. And if it
be decided absolutely that a particular vow is not to be observed, this
is called a "dispensation" from that vow; but if some other obligation be
imposed in lieu of that which was to have been observed, the vow is said
to be "commuted." Hence it is less to commute a vow than to dispense from
a vow: both, however, are in the power of the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed holy
from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being, as it were,
dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason it could not be
changed: even so neither may one now exchange for something better, or
worse, that which one has vowed, if it be already consecrated, e.g. a
chalice or a house. On the other hand, an animal that could not be
sacrificed, through not being the lawful matter of a sacrifice, could and
had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even so, vows can be commuted
now, if no consecration has intervened.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine precept to
fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey the
law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed from
keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that human
law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the Divine
command; but it amounts to this---that what was law is not law in this
particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that
which was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so
contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and such a
thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently when an
ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a vow, he does not
dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the Divine law,
but he pronounces a decision on a matter to which a man had bound himself
of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every
circumstance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we fulfil
that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would be an
obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from that vow
would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not contrary to the
fidelity due to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn
vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a
dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But a
vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle to a
greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the good of an
individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to the good of
the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if certain persons
who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of their country might
be procured. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be dispensed even
from a solemn vow of continency.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity. Now
if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice to God he can
be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he be dispensed
from the vow of continency which is about an act of chastity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be a
source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a vow of
continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be dispensed from
that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body. Therefore for the
same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of continency.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the religious
profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the vows of
poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed from the vows
of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who are appointed
bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems that it is possible
to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a
continent soul."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the Decretal, Cum ad
Monasterium it is stated that the "renouncing of property, like the
keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that not even
the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of
continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency; secondly,
the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds himself by vow to
the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the solemnity of the vow.
Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5] say
that the solemn vow cannot be a matter of dispensation, on account of the
continency itself for which no worthy price can be found, as is stated by
the authority quoted above. The reason for this is assigned by some to
the fact that by continency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the
fact that by continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect
of purity of both body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be
cogent since the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, far
surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and yet
one may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation. Therefore,
continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason why the solemn
vow thereof cannot be a matter of dispensation; especially seeing that
the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:34) exhorts us to be continent on account of
contemplation, when he says that the unmarried woman . . . "thinketh on
the things of God [Vulg.: 'the Lord']," and since the end is of more
account than the means.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] Body Para. 2/4
Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the reason
for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For they assert
that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by something
altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any vow. But this
is evidently false, because just as the practice of carnal intercourse is
contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary to
abstinence from such things, and yet these latter vows may be a matter
for dispensation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] Body Para. 3/4
For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain
that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for the
sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the example
given above (OBJ[1]), of a country being restored to peace through a
certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal quoted says
explicitly that "not even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a monk from
keeping chastity," it follows seemingly, that we must maintain that, as
stated above (A[10], ad 1; cf. Lev. 27:9,10,28), whatsoever has once been
sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to any other use. For no
ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose its
consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, for instance a
consecrated chalice to be not consecrated, so long as it remains entire.
Much less, therefore, can a prelate make a man that is consecrated to God
cease to be consecrated, so long as he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow
consists in a kind of consecration or blessing of the person who takes
the vow, as stated above (A[7]). Hence no prelate of the Church can make
a man, who has pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he
was consecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest no more,
although a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from
exercising his order. In like manner the Pope cannot make a man who has
made his religious profession cease to be a religious, although certain
jurists have ignorantly held the contrary.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] Body Para. 4/4
We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up
with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. because if not, the
solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of
continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that for
which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing continency
is connected with Holy orders, not essentially but by the institution of
the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can grant a dispensation
from the vow of continency solemnized by the reception of Holy Orders. on
the other hand the obligation of observing; continency is an essential
condition of the religious state, whereby a man renounces the world and
binds himself wholly to God's service, for this is incompatible with
matrimony, in which state a man is under the obligation of taking to
himself a wife, of begetting children, of looking after his household,
and of procuring whatever is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:33) that "he that is with a wife, is solicitous
for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is
divided." Hence the "monk" takes his name from "unity" [*The Greek
{monos}] in contrast with this division. For this reason the Church
cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession; and
the reason assigned by the Decretal is because "chastity is bound up with
the monastic rule."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated by
human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a professed
religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he must not be
called back to the human life on the pretext of any human contingency.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of
dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal abstinence.
But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a vow of continency
solemnized by profession is due, not to its being an act of chastity, but
because through the religious profession it is already an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person,
therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to the
person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of
dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly ordered to
the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to abstain
from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the person. And if
indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the person, this
danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance by abstinence,
or other corporal remedies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more absolved from
his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since he must have
nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the dispenser of the
common goods of the Church. In like manner neither is he dispensed from
his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he is not bound to obey if
he have no superior; just as the abbot of a monastery, who nevertheless
is not dispensed from his vow of obedience.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[11] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary
sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of the
flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency, which is
reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares (De Sanct.
Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a continent soul," not
"of a continent body."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the
dispensation of a vow?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not required for
the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may enter religion
without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by entering religion one
is absolved from the vows he made in the world, even from the vow of
making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti
redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or dispensation of a vow is possible
without the authority of a superior prelate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in
deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the
prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does not
seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a
dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows, as
stated above (A[10], ad 2; A[11]). Likewise, when anyone rightly
determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be kept,
he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it have an
evil result (A[2], ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a prelate is not
required that one may be dispensed from a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant
dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all
prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow.
Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense from
vows.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A vow binds one to do something, even as a law does.
Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation from a
precept of the law, as stated above (FS, Q[96], A[6]; FS, Q[97], A[4]).
Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made to God
about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise something to anyone
it depends on his decision whether he accept what you promise. Again in
the Church a prelate stands in God's place. Therefore a commutation or
dispensation of vows requires the authority of a prelate who in God's
stead declares what is acceptable to God, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For
. . have pardoned . . . for your sakes . . . in the person of Christ."
And he says significantly "for your sakes," since whenever we ask a
prelate for a dispensation we should do so to honor Christ in Whose
person he dispenses, or to promote the interests of the Church which is
His Body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All other vows are about some particular works, whereas by
the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's service. Now
the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a Decretal [*Cap.
Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that "a man is not deemed a
vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the perpetual service
of religion." And yet a man who enters religion is not bound to fulfil
the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the like, which he made
when in the world, because by entering religion he dies to his former
life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life that each one should
have his own observances, and because the burden of religion is onerous
enough without requiring the addition of other burdens.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at
their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition that
the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above (A[8]) that the
vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this condition, if
"the father or master consent," or "does not dissent." And thus a subject
might break his vow without any remorse of conscience, whenever his
superior tells him to.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual
prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given "unto
edification, not for destruction" (2 Cor. 10:8), and consequently, just
as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to God, namely,
sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleasing to God, namely,
works of virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking man can vow them. But it
does belong to a prelate to decide what is the more virtuous and the more
acceptable to God. Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the
prelate's dispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a
prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious life,
without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his vow. But
if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to doubt, he could
hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation or of dispensation.
He could not, however, follow his own judgment in the matter, because he
does not stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case when the
thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse
to the prelate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[88] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ
throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of dispensing
from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and inferior prelates
is the power committed of dispensing from those vows that are commonly
made and frequently require dispensation, in order that men may easily
have recourse to someone; such are the vows of pilgrimage (Cap. de
Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting and the like, and of
pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap.
Ex multa].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] Out. Para. 1/1
BY TAKING THE NAME OF GOD (QQ[89]-91)
OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something
Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or the Name of
God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the
Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name we shall treat now.
The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of oath in
order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly, by way of adjuration as
an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of invocation for the purpose of
prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of oaths: and under
this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is an oath?
(2) Whether it is lawful?
(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?
(4) Of what virtue is it an act?
(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as
something useful and good?
(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?
(7) Whether an oath is binding?
(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?
(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?
(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to swear is to call God to witness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness.
Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to witness, since it
is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to call
God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would swear.
But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him to
witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it is written
(Mt. 5:33): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to the Lord";
and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear [jurare] is "to pay the
right [jus reddere] of truth to God." Therefore to swear is not to call
God to witness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a
witness, as shown above (QQ[67],70). Now sometimes a man, by swearing,
implores the Divine judgment, according to Ps. 7:5, "If I have rendered
to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my
enemies." Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm. clxxx):
"When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that God is his
witness?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths are taken for the
purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive
confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known naturally
and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts regarding man cannot
be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore propositions regarding such
things are wont to be confirmed by witnesses. Now a human witness does
not suffice to confirm such matters for two reasons. First, on account of
man's lack of truth, for many give way to lying, according to Ps. 16:10,
"Their mouth hath spoken lies [Vulg.: 'proudly']." Secondly, on account
of this lack of knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor
secret thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things,
and our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about
them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither
can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness
is named "jurare" [to swear] because it is established as though it were
a principle of law [jure] that what a man asserts under the invocation of
God as His witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is
called to witness when we assert present or past events, and this is
termed a "declaratory oath"; while sometimes God is called to witness in
confirmation of something future, and this is termed a "promissory oath."
But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary matters,
and such as come under the investigation of reason; for it would seem
absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already given,
as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and another to
implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he performs
what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he calls upon
God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal knowledge and
unerring truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A person is called to give witness, in order that he may
make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two ways in
which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not. In one
way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward inspiration, or by
unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what was hitherto secret:
in another way by punishing the lying witness, and then He is at once
judge and witness, since by punishing the liar He makes known his lie.
Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple contestation of God, as
when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I speak before God," or, "By
God," which has the same meaning, as Augustine states [*See argument On
the contrary]; the other is by cursing, and consists in a man binding
himself or something of his to punishment if what is alleged be not true.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to swear?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing forbidden
in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden (Mt. 5:34), "But I
say to you not to swear at all"; and (James 5:12), "Above all things, my
brethren, swear not." Therefore swearing is unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful,
because according to Mt. 7:18, "neither can an evil tree bring forth good
fruit." Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Mt. 5:37):
"But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which is over and
above these is of evil." Therefore swearing is apparently unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God, and
this is altogether unlawful, according to Dt. 6:16, "Thou shalt not tempt
the Lord thy God." Now he that swears seems to seek a sign of Divine
Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this must be by some
evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is altogether unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy
God . . . and shalt swear by His name."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet
becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly: thus
to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it
"unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" (1 Cor. 11:29).
Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that an
oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is proved from its origin
and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes its introduction
to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses unerring truth and
universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and from its end, since
oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to put an end to
controversy (Heb. 6:16).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it,
that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if a man
calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would seemingly prove
him to have but little reverence for God, since he would not treat even a
good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of committing perjury,
because man easily offends in words, according to James 3:2, "If any man
offend not in word, the same is a perfect man." Wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. 23:9): "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it
there are many falls."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Jerome, commenting on Mt. 5:34, says: "Observe that our
Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth. For it
is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing by the
elements." Yet this answer does not suffice, because James adds, "nor by
any other oath." Wherefore we must reply that, as Augustine states (De
Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath in his epistles, he shows
how we are to understand the saying, 'I say to you, not to swear at all';
lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear easily and from swearing easily,
we contract the habit, and, from swearing habitually, we fall into
perjury. Hence we find that he swore only when writing, because thought
brings caution and avoids hasty words."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17): "If
you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the infirmity of
those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an evil. Accordingly
He did not say: 'That which is over and above is evil,' but 'is of evil.'
For you do no evil; since you make good use of swearing, by persuading
another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes of the evil' of the person by
whose infirmity you are forced to swear."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without
usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance.
Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling to
bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness at some
future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden things of darkness,
and will make manifest the counsels of hearts" (1 Cor. 4:5). And this
witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither for nor against him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned,
namely, justice, judgment, and truth?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are unsuitably
assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things should not be
enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other. Now of these
three, one includes another, since truth is a part of justice, according
to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment is an act of justice, as
stated above (Q[60], A[1]). Therefore the three accompanying conditions
of an oath are unsuitably assigned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, many other things are required for an oath, namely,
devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things and
cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are
insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed: since he
ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without judgment,
according to 1 Tim. 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice," i.e. without
previous judgment [*Vulg.: 'Observe these things without prejudice, doing
nothing by declining to either side.']. Therefore these three should not
be associated with an oath any more than with other human actions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As the
Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which words
Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be accompanied by
these conditions, truth, judgment and justice."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), an oath is not good except for
one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for the
good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous, but for
urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires judgment or
discretion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards the
point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor unlawful,
and this requires both truth, so that one employ an oath in order to
confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm what is lawful. A
rash oath lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or
unlawful oath lacks justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Judgment does not signify here the execution of justice,
but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is truth here to be
taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of speech.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the right
manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two regard the
things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that justice regards
the reason for swearing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is great danger in swearing, both on account of the
greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on account of
the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are confirmed by
oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an oath than for
other human actions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or latria.
Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths are employed
in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:16).
Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as Tully
says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers nothing to God,
but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of
religion or latria.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the end of religion or latria is to show reverence to
God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the confirmation of
some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy
God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His name." Now he
speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is an act
of religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (A[1]), he that
swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now nothing
is confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful. Therefore in
the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges God to be more
powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and His universal knowledge;
and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For this reason the Apostle
says (Heb. 6:16) that "men swear by one greater than themselves," and
Jerome commenting on Mt. 5:34, says that "he who swears either reveres or
loves the person by whom he swears." The Philosopher, too, states
(Metaph. i, 3) that "to swear is to give very great honor." Now to show
reverence to God belongs to religion or latria. wherefore it is evident
that an oath is an act of religion or latria.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness adduced,
and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that which makes it
necessary to call the witness, and this is human. Accordingly an oath
belongs to religion by reason of the former, and not of the latter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way of
an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to the
reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God, namely,
reverence and honor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of God:
wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we show
reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in God's honor
that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God also works for
His own glory and for our good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful
and good?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used frequently
as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of religion, so is
an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by vow,
because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above (Q[88], A[5]).
Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a thing with an oath is more
commendable, and consequently oaths are desirable as being good
essentially.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Mt. 5:34, says that "he who swears
either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." Now reverence and
love of God are desirable as something good essentially. Therefore
swearing is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or
assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion.
Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): "A man that sweareth
much shall be filled with iniquity": and Augustine says (De Mendacio xv)
that "the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your own part you
might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of
swearing, as though it were a good thing."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity
or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are desirable for
their own sake, but among those that are necessary: this is clear in the
case of medicine which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now an oath
is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man's lack of belief in
another man. Wherefore an oath is not to be reckoned among those things
that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary
for this life; and such things are used unduly whenever they are used
outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 17): "He who understands that swearing is not to be held
as a good thing," i.e. desirable for its own sake, "restrains himself as
far as he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because by a
vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this very reason
a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath reverence for
the name of God is taken in confirmation of a promise. Hence what is
confirmed by oath does not, for this reason, become an act of religion,
since moral acts take their species from the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or love
for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct his oath
to the reverence or love of that person, but to something else that is
necessary for the present life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the
stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so too an
oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the
reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it be employed
aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), "if he make it void,"
i.e. if he deceive his brother, "his sin shall be upon him: and if he
dissemble it," by swearing falsely, and with dissimulation, "he offendeth
double," [because, to wit, "pretended equity is a twofold iniquity," as
Augustine [*Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7] declares]: "and if he swear in vain,"
i.e. without due cause and necessity, "he shall not be justified."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by creatures. It is
written (Mt. 5:34-36): "I say to you not to swear at all, neither by
heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by Jerusalem . . . nor by thy
head": and Jerome, expounding these words, says: "Observe that the
Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven and earth," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a punishment
is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is written (22, qu.
i, can. Clericum): "If a cleric swears by creatures he must be very
severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this vicious habit we wish
that he be excommunicated." Therefore it is unlawful to swear by
creatures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above (A[4]).
But religious worship is not due to any creature, according to Rm.
1:23,25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Joseph swore "by the health of Pharaoh" (Gn. 42:16).
Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics, and by the
saints.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), there are two kinds of
oath. One is uttered a simple contestation or calling God as witness: and
this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth. Now faith is
essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very truth, and secondarily
about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as stated above (Q[1],
A[1]). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred to God Whose testimony
is invoked; and secondarily an appeal by oath is made to certain
creatures considered, not in themselves, but as reflecting the Divine
truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God Whose truth is made known
in the Gospel; and by the saints who believed this truth and kept it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a
creature is adduced that the judgment of God may be wrought therein. Thus
a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some other thing
that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23), saying: "I call
God to witness upon my soul."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood in
both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's health
to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to the truth of
God's justice which the princes of the earth are appointed to execute.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give
them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that "the Jews, through
swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures with a Divine
honor."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22, qu.
i, can. Clericum, OBJ[2]), for swearing by a creature, for this savors of
the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is said: "If any
one swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter blasphemy against
God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be degraded."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is
invoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Ex. 23:13): "By the name of
strange gods you shall not swear." But religious worship is not given to
creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an oath has a binding force?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath is
employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a person
makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true, though it may
not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15, seqq.) though he went
not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Cor. 16:5). Therefore it seems
that an oath is not binding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22). Now
an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above (A[4]). But it would
sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were to
fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were to swear to
commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action. Therefore an oath
is not always binding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to promise
something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by the Roman Pontiffs
from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum in ea quaest.,
etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet
sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears have
opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 5:33): "Thou shalt perform thy oaths
to the Lord."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, An obligation implies something to be done or omitted; so
that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath (which is about
something present or past), nor such oaths as are about something to be
effected by some other cause (as, for example, if one were to swear that
it would rain tomorrow), but only such as are about things to be done by
the person who swears.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] Body Para. 2/4
Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the
present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is about
something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a difference:
since, in the oath that is about the past or present, this obligation
affects, not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of the
swearer, in the point of his swearing to what is or was already true;
whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is made about something to be
done by us, the obligation falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a
man is bound to make true what he has sworn, else his oath lacks truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] Body Para. 3/4
Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is lacking
in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible when he
swore become impossible to him through some mishap. as when a man swore
to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him by force or
theft. For then he would seem to be excused from fulfilling his oath,
although he is bound to do what he can, as, in fact, we have already
stated with regard to the obligation of a vow (Q[88], A[3], ad 2). If, on
the other hand, it be something that he can do, but ought not to, either
because it is essentially evil, or because it is a hindrance to a good,
then his oath is lacking in justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept
when it involves a sin or a hindrance to good. For in either case "its
result is evil" [*Cf. Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] Body Para. 4/4
Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is
bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always that
the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, judgment and
justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an
oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the truth
of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do, since it is
already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the doer. But an oath
should not be employed, save in a matter about which one is firmly
certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an oath, he is bound, as far
as he can, to make true what he has sworn, through reverence of the
Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil result, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First,
because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through being
evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit adultery),
or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a man were to swear
not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric, or that he would not
accept a prelacy, supposing it would be expedient for him to accept, or
in similar cases. For oaths of this kind are unlawful from the outset:
yet with a difference: because if a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned
in swearing, and sins in keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to
perform a greater good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins
indeed in swearing (through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is
the inspirer of good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath,
though he does much better if he does not keep it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and
unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to the
damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she would ask
of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset, supposing it to
have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel asked what it was
right to grant. but the fulfilment of the oath was unlawful. Hence
Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): "Sometimes it is wrong to fulfil a
promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who granted the slaying of John,
rather than refuse what he had promised."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is a twofold obligation in the oath which a man takes
under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the person to whom he
promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by the compulsion,
because he that used force deserves that the promise made to him should
not be kept. The other is an obligation whereby a man is beholden to God,
in virtue of which he is bound to fulfil what he has promised in His
name. This obligation is not removed in the tribunal of conscience,
because that man ought rather to suffer temporal loss, than violate his
oath. He can, however, seek in a court of justice to recover what he has
paid, or denounce the matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the
contrary, because such an oath would lead to evil results since it would
be contrary to public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from
oaths of this kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but
relaxed the obligation for some just cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When the intention of the swearer is not the same as the
intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due to the
swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound
understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence Isidore says
(De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in wording his oath,
God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as understood by the
person to whom it is made." And that this refers to the deceitful oath is
clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty who both takes God's name
in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile." If, however, the swearer uses
no guile, he is bound in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human ear takes such like words in
their natural outward sense, but the Divine judgment interprets them
according to our inward intention."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an oath is more binding than a vow?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A vow is a
simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise, an appeal to
God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger. Now
a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is stronger
than a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation of
the mind, a stated above (Q[88], A[1]); while the obligation of an oath
results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since therefore
God's truth is something greater than human deliberation, it seems that
the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes binds
one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore a vow is
more binding than an oath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises from
something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a vow
arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our
promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises from
the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we promise in
His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an irreverence, but not
conversely, because the infidelity of a subject to his lord would seem to
be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by its very nature is more
binding than an oath.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to
God; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An oath is added to a vow not because it is more stable,
but because greater stability results from "two immutable things" [*Heb.
6:18].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on the
part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause of
stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anyone can dispense from an oath?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath. Just as
truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the past or the
present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, which is about the
future. Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth about
present or past things. Therefore neither can anyone dispense a man from
making truth that which he has promised by oath to do in the future.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the person
to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot release the other
from his oath, since it would be contrary to the reverence of God. Much
less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted by anyone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow, except
certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (Q[88], A[12],
ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any
bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly this is to be against
the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de
Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an oath does not admit of
dispensation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated above
(A[8]). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath does also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[88], A[10]), the necessity of a
dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that
something which is useful and morally good in itself and considered in
general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular
emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor vow. Now anything
morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an oath: for
if it be morally evil it is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it
is contrary to judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits of
dispensation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission to
do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the keeping
of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of
dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath no
longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just as we
have said with regard to vows (Q[88], A[10], ad 2). Now the matter of a
declaratory oath, which is about something past or present, has already
acquired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable, wherefore the
dispensation will regard not the matter but the act itself of the oath:
so that such a dispensation would be directly contrary to the Divine
precept. On the other hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something
future, which admits of change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies,
it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath.
Therefore a promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such
dispensation regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the
Divine precept about the keeping of oaths.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One man may promise something under oath to another in two
ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for instance, if
he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from such a promise he
can be released by the person to whom he made it: for he is understood to
have already kept his promise to him when he acts towards him according
to his will. Secondly, one man promises another something pertaining to
God's honor or to the benefit of others: for instance, if a man promise
another under oath that he will enter religion, or perform some act of
kindness. In this case the person to whom the promise is made cannot
release him that made the promise, because it was made principally not to
him but to God: unless perchance it included some condition, for
instance, "provided he give his consent" or some such like condition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory
oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as
when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a
greater good, as when a man swears not to enter a religion: and such an
oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is bound not
to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for him to keep or
not to keep the oath, as stated above (A[7], ad 2). Sometimes what is
promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, either
in itself or under the circumstance. In this case any bishop can
dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is promised under oath is
manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of this kind seemingly admits
not of dispensation but of commutation, when there occurs something
better to be done for the common good, in which case the matter would
seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, who has charge over the
whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation, for this too belongs in
general to the Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things
ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by
one of his subjects in matters that come under his authority: for
instance, a father may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his
wife's (Num. 30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (Q[88],
AA[8],9).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an oath is voided by a condition of person or time?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person
or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is employed for
the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to anyone to confirm his
assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that an oath is not
voided by a condition of person or time.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the Gospels:
wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed
to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason for swearing, it
seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great thing to swear by the
Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be said: Nonsense! the
Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for the sake of the
Scriptures." Now men of all conditions and at all times are wont to swear
by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to swear by the Gospels.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary causes,
since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are debarred
from swearing on account of some personal defect; children, for
instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already
committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person ought not to be
debarred from swearing either on account of his dignity, as clerics, or
on account of the solemnity of the time.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to an
angel: for it is written (Mt. 11:11) that "he that is the lesser in the
kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the Baptist,
while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it is written
(Apoc. 10:6) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for ever and ever."
Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, on account of his
dignity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter): "Let
a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of being put
on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in ecclesiastical
orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is on the
part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect we should
hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason children before
the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths [*Caus. XXII, qu. 5,
can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear, because they have not
yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to take a oath
with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from taking an oath,
because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will not treat an
oath with the reverence due to it. For this same reason, in order that
oaths might be treated with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can.
Honestum): "It is becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things
should do so fasting, with all propriety and fear of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose
assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no
confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates
from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what he
says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear." For
this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter) that
"priests should not swear for trifling reasons." Nevertheless it is
lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, or if great good may
result therefrom. Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs, when
moreover it is becoming that they should take oath on days of solemnity,
since they ought then to devote themselves to spiritual matters. Nor
should they on such occasions take oaths temporal matters, except perhaps
in cases grave necessity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on account
of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be so certain
that they need no confirmation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more
binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad
Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly is a graver matter to swear by God
than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account of the
manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might be taken
with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God frivolously and
without deliberation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of
contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this way
that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great authority
that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are of such little
authority that their oaths have no standing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[89] A[10] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any defect in
the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word, but in order
to show that the statement made issues from God's infallible disposition.
Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by Scripture as swearing, in order to
express the immutability of His word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17).
