We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear causes contraction?
(2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?
(3) Whether it makes one tremble?
(4) Whether it hinders action?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear causes contraction?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when
contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn
inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior
parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring, as may be
seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who
are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause contraction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and
heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, as may be seen
in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the
contrary they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not cause
contraction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q[41], A[4]).
But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8),
and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is an
indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction
is not an effect of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a
power according to {systole}," i.e. contraction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[28], A[5]), in the passions of the
soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while
the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are
mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes
a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as
to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain
contraction: the reason of which is that fear arises from the imagination
of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above
(Q[41], A[2]). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of
power, as stated above (Q[43], A[2]): and the weaker a power is, the
fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination
that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus
we observe in one who is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account
of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when
seized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for
the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which
pertains to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction
of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place in regard
to the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in
those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner parts of
the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who
are angry and those who are afraid. For in those who are angry, by reason
of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the
craving for vengeance, the inward movement has an upward direction:
wherefore the vital spirits and heat concentrate around the heart: the
result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in
those who are afraid, on account of the condensation caused by cold, the
vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the
imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon
the heart instead of concentrating around it: the result being that a man
who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is
natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing that
causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain,
attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now the greatest help for all
purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are
in pain, their nature stores up the heat and vital spirits within them,
in order to make use thereof in repelling the harmful object. Hence the
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat
are concentrated together within, they require to find a vent in the
voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from
crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal
heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, as stated above (ad
1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the
vital spirits in an upward direction through the mouth: the result being
that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes
its subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1,6,7).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the
soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there is
contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature:
for when an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it experiences a
contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it
were threatened by a natural death. Hence it is that "those who are in
fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). But the evil that shame fears,
is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul.
Consequently there results a contraction in this appetite, but not in the
corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is
free to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread
to the outward parts of the body: the result being that those who are
ashamed blush.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel.
For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a hindrance
thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose,
which is requisite for the good use of reason. Therefore fear does not
make a man suitable for counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and
deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all
thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc.
iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid
evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas fear is of
evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore
fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men
of counsel."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from
his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes men of
counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take
counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves." Now
things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain
magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, and because they
are apprehended as near to us, as stated above (Q[42], A[2]). Wherefore
men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel:
and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of counsel.
Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater
or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems
better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful.
Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every passion,
considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it
to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man
does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that
he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a
man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may
even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his
ensuing carefulness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he
despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3.
But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope is of good
things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things,
as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of
difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty,
especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear makes one tremble?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. Because
trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold person
trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a
parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are thirsty,
especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are
being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause trembling.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative
medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are often caused by
fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not
cause trembling.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the
inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward
parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should
cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is not the
case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is
followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), in fear there takes place a
certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the
result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this reason
trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power
in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to the want of
heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, as
stated in De Anima ii, 4.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts,
the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive parts.
Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes
indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and urinary or even
seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction
of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii,
11).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward
movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, as
also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart
resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in their speech, on
account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too,
and the lower jaw tremble, through their connection with the heart; which
explains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason the arms and
hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For
which reason the knees tremble in those who are afraid, according to Is.
35:3: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.:
'weak'] knees."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear hinders action?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered
chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. But fear
disturbs reason, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore fear hinders action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to
fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls through
fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would
not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness
hinders action. Therefore fear does too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): "With fear and trembling
work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a
hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first
mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be
hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal
mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself,
is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward
members being deprived, through fear, of their heat. But on the part of
the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the
reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain
solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention.
If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders
action even on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does
not speak.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a
disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured
to his imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore,
since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it hinders
work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces
to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that whereby a man
escapes from what he fears.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] Out. Para. 1/1
OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?
(2) How is daring related to hope?
(3) Of the cause of daring;
(4) Of its effect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether daring is contrary to fear?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine
says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice is contrary to
virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems
that daring is not contrary to fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary
to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes
safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes forethought
for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is
not contrary to fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is
contrary to fear."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest
removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is
farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the
future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas
daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that
same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be
taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the
sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they
are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this movement, a
straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It
is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of
it in the first sense.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several
contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having
several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (Q[23], A[2];
Q[40], A[4]) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety:
one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is
contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of approach and
withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to
hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but
merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears not.
Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is
opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation, so
daring implies safety.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether daring ensues from hope?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because
daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But
hope regards good things, as stated above (Q[40], A[1]). Therefore they
have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring
does not ensue from hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair
contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, despair
excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring
does not result from hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it
belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. Therefore
daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are
hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from
hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As we have often stated (Q[22], A[2]; Q[35], A[1]; Q[41],
A[1]), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every
movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or
of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by
reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason of itself,
good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of avoidance: but by
reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some
good attaching to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through
some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else,
follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil
follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil.
Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good
belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful
evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows,
therefore, that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of
overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly.
But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is
because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were not
co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good,
since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently
daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet
avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good
precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring,
so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not always lead to
despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to
daring, save only when it is strong.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the
estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; yet
daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like
manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while
fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not
a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair is an effect, not a part,
of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether some defect is a cause of daring?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine are strong
and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore
daring is caused by a defect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have
no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience is a defect.
Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring;
"like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But the
suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a
defect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of
daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of
safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent
or far off." But anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal
of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared.
Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2) daring results from hope and is
contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or
banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and
also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, and
in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause
of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope, or by banishing fear; in
one way, in the part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the
part of the bodily transmutation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope
that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon
victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily
strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or
they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of
friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the
Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it is well
in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear
is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes of fear;
for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having
harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger; since
those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed
others.
On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the
incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which
raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De
Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose heart is small in size, are more
daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural
heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a
small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large house as well as it
does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those
whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring, through the heat in the
heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that
"lovers of wine are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine":
hence it has been said above (Q[40], A[6]) that drunkenness conduces to
hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by
reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the heart.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but
through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think greatly
of himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring,
not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as through
being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers
that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear gives
rise to daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been
wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the
assistance of those who suffer unjustly."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally,
i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary,
either in oneself or in another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in
the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which is
contrary to daring, as stated above (A[1]; Q[44], A[3]). But the daring
sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii,
3). Therefore they are not more eager at first than in the midst of
danger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object:
thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. But the
object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the
difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous and
difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger
causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "anger makes
man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is
being beaten, then is he most daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are
precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of
dangers they stand aloof."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite,
follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive
faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances;
its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is
impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties
of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face
the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the
difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation.
Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment
of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from
passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of
danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty
turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more
persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account
of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however
great the danger may prove: whereas men of daring face the danger on
account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as
stated above (A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the
heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, as
occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat
withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it withdraws to
the inferior parts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be
increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a
compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil
presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much
difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of
daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does
ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind
of hope, as we shall see later on (Q[46], A[1]). Consequently if the
danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not
ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does ensue, there will be
greater daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] Out. Para. 1/2
OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of
anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger is a special passion?
(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?
(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?
(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of
justice?
(8) Of the species of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger is a special passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the
irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are several
passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as
is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion is contrary
to anger, as stated above (Q[23], A[3]). Therefore anger is not a special
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger
includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and
hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a
special passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special
passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by
predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals.
Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things
generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because just
as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness
of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its
active power. Now it happens that an effect is produced by the
concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in
its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due
to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch
as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is
condivided with the other passions, as stated above (Q[23], A[4]). In
like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of
the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a general
passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is
the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]
). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch
as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the
movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted,
and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for
revenge as being possible." Consequently if the person, who inflicted the
injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as
Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not
because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its
movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger
is the most patent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary
passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of
evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no
contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no
contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus
includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of cause
and effect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of
Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the sword-bearer
of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in
the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore
anger regards evil as its object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each
seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its object,
as stated above (Q[29], A[1]). Therefore anger does also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the object of
sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for
revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good:
since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes
pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope
and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of
the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in
two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand
what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when we
understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways
the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple
and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and adheres to
good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope,
pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as when the
appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to,
another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the
case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some
good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to
be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes
to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold
tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as
being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on
whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which
bears the character of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between
anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first
difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and
hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love
wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is,
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to
someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of
hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to
someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger regards one
object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it
seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of
contrary passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For
Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of "desire."
But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into
hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is
inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion.
Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up of sorrow and
desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger
is a concupiscible passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible
faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the
irascible would not take its name from it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the
irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, in
that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil
absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are
good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been
stated (A[2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it
seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both,
anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not
arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we
make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the
Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is
not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for
a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous and
that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire,
inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense, however, desire
is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same
passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming
inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long
time engenders hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as
though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and it has
been said above (Q[25], A[2]) that the concupiscible passions are the
causes of the irascible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger requires an act of reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For,
since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite. But the
sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the
sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen
to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive
to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger
listens to reason somewhat."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), anger is a desire for vengeance.
Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted
and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with
such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and
to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore anger, in a fashion,
requires an act of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of
reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in so far as
the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is
called the rational appetite. In another way, it follows reason in so far
as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not
in obedience to reason's command, but as a result of reason's denouncing
the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not
immediately but through the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by
the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements,
both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above
(Q[40], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to
reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens
not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the
measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and
yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De
Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk, so as to be incapable
of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those who are slightly drunk,
do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a
judgment of reason.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger is more natural than desire?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because
it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But "gentleness is
contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore
anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to be altogether
unnatural to man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things
that act according to reason, are not said to act according to nature.
Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in
Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a
craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch, viz.
for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are
more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more natural than
anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is
more natural than desire."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as
stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a
particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without
reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as
stated above (Q[36], A[2]), may be considered in two ways: first, on the
part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we
consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the object,
thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual
pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these pleasures are
more natural to man than vengeance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject,
thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is
more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered
either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to
the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the
generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus
desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very generic
nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve
in him the life both of the species and of the individual. If, however,
we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a
rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far
as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more
natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything to rise up
against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the
individual, in respect of his particular temperament, thus anger is more
natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from
the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is
to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies result from
a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a
bilious temperament; and of all the humors, the bile moves quickest; for
it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to
anger is sooner incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally
disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more
liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a disposition to
desire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the
part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament,
a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in
anger or in any other passion, on account of the moderation of his
temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes
from this moderation and approaches to an extreme disposition, are
naturally disposed to some excess of passion, such as the lion in daring,
the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of
reason, however, it is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle:
in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which
causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man
"does not listen perfectly to the command of reason," as stated above
(A[4], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from
the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows that it
is, in a manner, natural to man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the
object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is
written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh
forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous
than hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than
merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the object
of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless
the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than
hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as
more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the more settled
through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the
concurrence of several passions, as stated above (A[1]): whereas hatred
is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam,"
but anger to "a mote."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its
object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object of
hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so
does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there is a
difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil,
whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not as
evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he
reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it
has been said above (A[2]) that hatred implies application of evil to
evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is
evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil,
than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone
under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice,
if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in
this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.
Consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely,
the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing
desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires
another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no particular
measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own
sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i,
3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is written
(Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be
satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only under
the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil
inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of
the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the
hater is never appeased."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred
does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through the
heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear
the violence of one provoked?"
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so
far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is wrought
by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists
in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault.
Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is
hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know that this has befallen him
on account of the harm he has done the other. The hater, on the other
hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It
is not true, however, that an evil is worse through giving pain: because
"injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not
grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled
when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause prevails
over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger
does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong
inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason
of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to
him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or
habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a
passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of
justice?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one
has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between man and
irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings;
thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider strikes his
horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an
obligation of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there
justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man is angry
with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it
is written (Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore anger is not
only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an
entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state injures
an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an
individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore properly
speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of
justice or injustice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii,
2,3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), anger desires evil as being a
means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we
are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing
is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. the
harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the
angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or
unjust.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it follows an
act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid of
reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by
their imagination to something like rational action. Since then in man
there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be
aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination denounces
the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of anger even
against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that
which occurs in animals against anything that injures them. Secondly, by
the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher
(Rhet. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or
with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above all, what
the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is
no question of vengeance on them, since they can do us no harm.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically
speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and
himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible
parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to be avenged on
himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in
accordance with the nature of things, a man is never angry with himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference
between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, as we
hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards
an individual." The reason is that hatred arises from our considering a
quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a
thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the other hand, ensues from
someone having injured us by his action. Now all actions are the deeds of
individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual.
When the whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one
individual [*Cf. Q[29], A[6]].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably
assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor." For no
genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three
are diversified in respect of an accident: because "the beginning of the
movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is
called ill-will {menis}; while rancor {kotos} is anger waiting for an
opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these are not different species of
anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that
"excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and is
a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according
to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek {kotos} [rancor].
Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in
course of time spends itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger,
namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and anger with
perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by
Our Lord (Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" [thus implying
"anger without utterance"], and then, "whosoever shall say to his
brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with utterance yet without full
expression"], and lastly, "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" [where we
have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore Damascene's division is
imperfect, since it takes no account of utterance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of
Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This
happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he
calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because it quickly aroused.
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells
some time in the memory; this belongs to {menis} [ill-will] which is
derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part of that which the
angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor]
which never rests until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all bitterness
and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons {akrocholoi}
[choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi}
[bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he
calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have
retaliated [*Cf. SS, Q[158], A[5]].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All those things which give anger some kind of perfection
are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing prevents
them from causing a certain specific difference thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to
the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness of
temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the
Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor," should not
signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various
effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the very
movement of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR
ARTICLES) [*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text,
except in A[4].]
We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one
who is angry?
(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?
(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is
angry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who
is angry?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something
done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, can do
nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy iniquities
be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of
as being angry with man on account of sin, according to Ps. 105:40: "The
Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore it is not always
on account of something done against him, that a man is angry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire
vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not always
angry on account of something done against us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry
especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest in;
thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise
philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the
philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us
angry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him,
provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in Ep.
ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore
a man is not always provoked to anger by something done against him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without
anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him
such."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[46], A[6]), anger is the desire to
hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury
has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any injury
provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who
seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so
does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not
affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him.
Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against
him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul
but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on
sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but
so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways.
First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so
far as he harms himself or another; which injury redounds to God,
inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's providence and
protection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be
avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way
to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the
nature we have in common.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon
it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we
ourselves were despised and injured.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is
due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight is an
action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of
anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are angry "when
we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But one may suffer
an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore a slight is not
the only motive of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the
same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they are
not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger, when
wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a slight is
not the sole motive of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of
anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others should
rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being
hindered from doing as we like." Therefore being slighted is not the only
motive for being angry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a
desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done
unbecomingly."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight
is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful
treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence":
and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two reasons may be
assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a
means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance in so far as it
seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that which is done
unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered
in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
3) that "men are not angry---if they think they have wronged some one and
are suffering justly on that account; because there is no anger at what
is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through
ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man
does an injustice, when he does an injury from choice, on purpose, or
from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most
of all angry with those who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For
if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or
through passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much
less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion takes
away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy
and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose,
seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all.
Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at
all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because
they do not seem to have acted slightingly."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence:
because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (Rhet.
ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods.
Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is
derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man
suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt or
slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself
the cause of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it
naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything
derogatory thereto.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus
forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we think of
a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not
hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this seems to show that
he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when
another is in misfortune, seem to care little about his good or evil.
Again he that hinders another from carrying out his will, without
deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his
friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far as they are signs of
contempt, provoke anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his
being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that
"some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick,
the poor, and those who are disappointed." But these things seem to
pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one
prone to anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are very
much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing or
weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but
if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble." But a
suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather
than excellence is a cause of a man being angry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and
hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry
when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are
prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and well-founded
hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence
makes men prone to anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken
in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus excellence
is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger
is an unjust slight, as stated above (A[2]). Now it is evident that the
more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the
matter in which he excels. Consequently those who excel in any matter,
are most of all angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance,
a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered
on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive aforesaid.
Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that
grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of
grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And
this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more
easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently
excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and
therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in
another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly despised, he has
more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied
or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or some other
like cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder
sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger,
because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with
him?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being
more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that
"we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble
themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs bite
not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and defect.
Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less angry with
him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases
at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not provoke
anger against him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly
towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they offend us or
refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): "If my enemy had
reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore a person's
defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man
is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner
the prince is angry with his subject."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],3) unmerited contempt more than
anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or
littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase our
anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For
just as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is
despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising. Thus
a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a
fool; a master, if by a servant.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited
contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way those
who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who
humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Prov.
15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to
despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble
themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of
death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; and
this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered.
Another reason is because the dead seem to have attained to the limit of
evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, in
so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of just retaliation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[47] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater
indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing to
help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry
with those who are beneath us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?
(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?
(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger causes pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow
excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as stated in
Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain." Therefore
anger does not cause pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance
makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain": whence
we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and
that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent of pleasure,
anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with
pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to
its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, 3. Therefore
pleasure is not an effect of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that
anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109
[trl. Pope]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures,
chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: and
therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to
the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst which
increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said
(Q[47], AA[1],3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done
that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy.
Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so
much the greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if
vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding
sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is
really present, it becomes present to the angry man in two ways: in one
way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as
stated above (Q[46], A[1]); in another way, by thinking of it
continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell
on the thought of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are
pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about
vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow
and consequently anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same
thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the
thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its
beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the
real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and
consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking
vengeance follows from anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger. For
fervor, as stated above (Q[28], A[5]; Q[37], A[2]), belongs to love. But
love, as above stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions.
Since then the cause is more powerful than its effect, it seems that
anger is not the chief cause of fervor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor,
increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it lasts.
But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger." Therefore fervor is not the
proper effect of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But "the
addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger," as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that "anger is
fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of the
bile."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[44], A[1]), the bodily transmutation
that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement
of the appetite. Now it is evident that every appetite, even the natural
appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to it,
if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as though
the cold acted with greater force on the hot object. Since then the
appetitive movement of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a
contrary that is present; it follows that the appetite tends with great
force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues
great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of anger. And because the
movement of anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action
of cold, but one of prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat,
the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and
vital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's
passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being so
disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in
their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) "the heart that
is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body
trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow
fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth
indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the
beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently when a man
suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he feels his
love thereof the more: the result being that his heart is moved with
greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love; so that
anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to be felt more.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to
be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor of love has a certain
sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence
it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood. For this reason
sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying
that "love springs from the liver," because of the blood being formed
there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness
with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary
evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and for
this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from
an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its name {chole}."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of
which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is weakened by
time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory. But
anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done. Consequently the cause of
anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it
vanishes altogether. Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first
felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually lessened the further the
sense of present wrong recedes into the past. The same applies to love,
so long as the cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a friend's absence lasts long,
it seems to make men forget their friendship." But in the presence of a
friend, the cause of friendship is continually being multiplied by time:
wherefore the friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger,
were its cause continually multiplied.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the
strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent having burnt
up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every power that is divided in itself is weakened.
Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with
another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened.
Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be greater: because
the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with
the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem to be of little or no
account.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason.
Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem to hinder
the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated in Ethic.
vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man
show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "an
angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore anger does not seem to
hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, as he
also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by
juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more clearly
when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are more angry if they receive
unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored":
and so forth. Therefore the same cause increases anger, and facilitates
the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does not hinder the judgment of
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the
light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily
organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers for
the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the
body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the
body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of
drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated (A[2]) that anger, above
all, causes a bodily disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as
to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions,
anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according
to Ps. 30:10: "My eye is troubled with wrath."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the
appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the
passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it
listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of the
heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of
anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to
him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of
hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as
not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise
the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which
pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the
Philosopher says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open
in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly."
Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because,
in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame
and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those
things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of
vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in the
reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another
facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases
anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth, suffers a loss
therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account of the contrast,
and because it was unforeseen. Consequently it causes greater grief: just
as a great good, through being received unexpectedly, causes greater
delight. And in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes,
anger is increased also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity. Because
taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger conduces to
speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord
(Mt. 5:22): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother"; and " .
. whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and " . . . whosoever
shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'" Therefore anger does not cause
taciturnity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks out
into unbecoming words: hence it is written (Prov. 25:28): "As a city that
lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot
refrain his own spirit in speaking." But anger, above all, hinders the
judgment of reason, as stated above (A[3]). Consequently above all it
makes one break out into unbecoming words. Therefore it does not cause
taciturnity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 12:34): "Out of the abundance of the
heart the mouth speaketh." But anger, above all, causes a disturbance in
the heart, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore above all it conduces to
speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not
vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]; Q[46], A[4]), anger both follows
an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects it may
cause taciturnity. On the part of the reason, when the judgment of reason
prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite in its
inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled
speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes when the mind
is disturbed, anger, as if in judgment, commands silence." On the part of
the impediment to reason because, as stated above (A[2]), the disturbance
of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members
which reflect more distinctly the emotions of the heart, such as the
eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as observed above (A[2]), "the tongue
stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce." Consequently
anger may cause such a disturbance, that the tongue is altogether
deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from
curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze
the tongue and other outward members.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[48] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to
the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered by the
inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility
of the outward members; and sometimes even death. If, however, the
disturbance be not so great, then "out of the abundance of the heart"
thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds to speak.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] Out. Para. 1/3
TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)
OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the
consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic
principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is
power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the FP, Q[77],
seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place
we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which are the
principles of human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] Out. Para. 2/3
Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First,
the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of their
generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished
from one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habit is a quality?
(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?
(3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?
(4) Of the necessity of habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether habit is a quality?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the verb 'to
have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other
categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having" quantity and money and
other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be
clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). But one
predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a
quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book
of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the order of that
which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to
the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to
have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way,
inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in
another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet]
either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard
to anything that is "had," is common to the various predicaments. And so
the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called
because they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance,
opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which
are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which
there is no medium between the "haver" and that which is had: as, for
instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity.
Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as,
for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And,
further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action
or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus,
for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned
or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a
habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and
that which is had"; as is the case in those things which we have about
ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things,
which are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between
clothing and the man who is clothed."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard
to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since
this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition
whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either
in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And
in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say that habit is
a quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for
thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which we
understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had:
and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that
which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes
on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or
as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as Simplicius observes
in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions:
bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the
predicament "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he
says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in
course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as
inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he
includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as
perfected science and virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality.
Because, as we have said (A[1]), habit, in so far as it is a quality, is
"a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill."
But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well
or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, in regard to
heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a
distinct species of quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments
(Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits, just as
sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from
the other species of quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to
the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion. Now, no
genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus;
but "differences should be proper to a genus," as the Philosopher says in
Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to
change," it seems not to be a distinct species of quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi)
reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. Now
Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the
difference of these species as follows. He says "that some qualities are
natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always
there: but some are adventitious, being caused from without, and these
can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are adventitious, "are
habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or
difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the
point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the
second species of quality: while others regard a thing which is in act;
and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply
rooted, we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have
the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of
an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems
unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like qualities, which
are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions
which are not adventitious but natural, as health, beauty, and the like.
Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is
the more natural is always first.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 2/5
Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and
habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a
certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv,
3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore it implies a certain
determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in
accordance with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is
determined to its substantial being, is called quality, which is a
difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the
potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental being, is
called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is
clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 3/5
Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be
taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to
action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are
matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or
determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have
the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered in
itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or
evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a
thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 4/5
But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or
passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. And
therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease
or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them, we do
not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because
movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and
evil are said in respect of an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 5/5
On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard
to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality,
which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii,
text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that they
are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that
which is disposed in accordance with its nature." And since the form
itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why a thing is
made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider
both evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult;
inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And
so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition
whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says
that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the
passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has
the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil.
And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything, for
this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1],
ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality except
in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs
to the essential notion of habit, we must consider the quality's relation
to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold,
a man is not said to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a
relation to the nature of a thing, with regard to its suitability or
unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so
far as they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of
a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and color, according
to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat
and cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a thing,
concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the
Philosopher, in the first species of quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some
give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the
Predicaments.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: This difference, "difficult to change," does not
distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from
disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the
genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of habit
(Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against
habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can be divided against
habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect within the same
species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the
genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily lost: whereas we
call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily.
And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man.
Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one
subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the
first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily lost,
because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we
call habits those qualities which, by reason of their very nature, are
not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences
and virtues. And in this sense, disposition does not become habit. The
latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle:
for in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of
speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature,
easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly
changeable, then it is called a habit: while the contrary happens in
regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable:
for supposing a man to have a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to
lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than
that he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit"
implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition" does not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are
specific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion and
movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though
apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate differences
which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus
of substance we often take accidental instead of substantial differences,
in so far as by the former, essential principles are designated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether habit implies order to an act?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For
everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is
still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than before learning."
Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs
to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put in the
definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be
the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that which is
essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a
principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power. And so habit
and disposition will not be the first species of quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and
beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore it is not
essential to habit to be a principle of act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is
that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says
(De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in
regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which the
habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to
have relation to an act. For it is essential to habit to imply some
relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable
thereto. But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further
ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of
an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit
implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also,
consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or
conducive to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in
the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is
disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to
its nature, or in regard to something else, that is to the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in
which they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act. For,
as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the
thing's nature. If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit
is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit
principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature
and the notion of power is that it should be a principle of act.
Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally
relation to an act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this
respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of
potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first
act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text.
5.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but
to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is
related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in
relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature is a
principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore
the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that man, or one of his
members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a
healthy man." And the same applies to other habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether habits are necessary?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are
well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated above. But a
thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a
thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity for
habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies
sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, without any
habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for
habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit:
and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. Given,
therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But
perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the
nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As we have said above (AA[2],3), habit implies a
disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end,
by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto.
Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three
conditions are necessary. The first condition is that which is disposed
should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it
should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a
being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose
substance is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can
find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case in God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality
in regard to something else, be capable of determination in several ways
and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality
in regard to something else, but in regard to that only, there we find no
room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature
has the due relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be
composed of matter and form, since that matter is not in a state of
potentiality to another form, as we said in the FP, Q[56], A[2], there is
no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in
respect of operation, since the nature of the heavenly body is not in a
state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those
things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur,
capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject
well or ill to its form or to its operation. Wherefore the simple
qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one
single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, but "simple
qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as health,
beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which
may vary in their relative adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher
says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and
disposition is "the order of that which has parts either as to place, or
as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad
3). Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and
operations several things must concur which may vary in their relative
adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the
subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition.
But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the
end, or the means to the end. And if the form is limited to one fixed
operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for
the operation. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse
ways, as the soul; it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of
habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it
needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not a
relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we
have said. For this reason the natural forces do not perform their
operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined
to one mode of operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[49] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will
be made clear further on (Q[54], A[3]): whereas the same power has a
relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the
powers be determined to good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)
We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is a habit in the body?
(2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or
in respect of its power?
(3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?
(4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?
(5) Whether there is a habit in the will?
(6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is a habit in the body?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the
Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby we act when we
will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are
natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is
a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition can be a
habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But
change can only be in the third species of quality, which is divided
against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De
Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called
habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As we have said above (Q[49], AA[2] seqq.), habit is a
disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to
form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies disposition to
operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every
operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body
or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those operations
which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit:
because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and
we have already said (Q[49], A[4]) that it is when the subject is in
potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As
to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they
belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits
are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits
are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such
operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in
the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with
promptitude to help in the operations of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a
habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as
a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like
are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit
perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily
changeable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the
Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of
the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of
quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle mentions
health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they
belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of example: so that
he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult
to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are
called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly contrary to the
intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health
and sickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in Phys.
vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition
to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from nature: but
not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the
principle of which is the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on
account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may be
difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as
long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or because they
are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But
qualities of the soul are simply difficult to change, on account of the
unchangeableness of the subject. And therefore he does not say that
health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as
a habit," as we read in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the
other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of
quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species,
in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some
"becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called passions
or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection
(specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed into the first
species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary disapproves of this;
for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the
first species of quality; whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that
passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in bodies
by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in
this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to give heat,
then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it
is permanent. But when it has been brought to the point that it is able
to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and if it goes so far
as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be
a habit: so that disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or
passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But
Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and remissness do not
imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the
diverse participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no
diversity among the species of quality. And therefore we must say
otherwise that, as was explained above (Q[49], A[2], ad 1), the
adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their
suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and so, when a
change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat
and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and
health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and
dispositions, primarily and of themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in
respect of its power?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence
rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions and
habits in relation to nature, as stated above (Q[49], A[2]). But nature
regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in
respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the
form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence
and not in respect of its powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an
accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of accident, as we
have said in the FP, Q[77], A[1], ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the
soul in respect of its powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject.
But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it is prior to
power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a
power of the soul as its subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in
the various powers of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As we have said above (Q[49], AA[2],3), habit implies a
certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore
we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the
soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the
form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or
disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation
to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body. But
if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker,
according to 2 Pt. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature":
thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in
respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (Q[110], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is
chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the soul is
not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a
condition for a habit, as we have said above (Q[49], A[4]). And since the
soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore,
regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a
subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and
nature to which someone is disposed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But
since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject,
according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a
further accident. In this way we say that one accident is the subject of
another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is
the subject of habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a
disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation to
operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of
operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does not imply
relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power.
Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of power, as the complete
takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes precedence of
potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though
potentiality is prior in order of generation and time, as stated in
Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of
the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so
is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the
nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of
the sensitive part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But
there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is no will, which
is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above (Q[49], A[3]).
Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and
just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it virtue
related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no
sciences: since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers
cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the
sensitive part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some
virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational
part."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways:
first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according
as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural
instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is; but
according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to
various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by which they are
well or ill disposed in regard to something.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn
aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits
in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the
command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for in so far as
they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as
stated in Ethic. i, 13.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the
command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals act
from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to
operations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions in relation
to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are
disposed by a sort of custom to do things in this or that way, so in this
sense, to a certain extent, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb
animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the
most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they
took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we
say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to
the use of the will, for they have not that power of using or of
refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore,
properly speaking, there can be no habits in them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved
by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the
rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from
the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits
should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of
sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits
do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason.
And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may
admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or
imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii)
that "custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that
these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing
and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their
fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the
members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the
powers which command their movements.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is any habit in the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For
habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above (A[1]). But the
operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i,
text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the intellect is not an act of
the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the
subject of a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode
of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is act
only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and
act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential and
actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is
composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter.
Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the same time as act, being a
sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in
the "conjunction," which is composed of soul and body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill
disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is
due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (De
Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick
witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect,
which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of the
body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science,
wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the
intellective part of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, concerning intellective habits there have been various
opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [*FP, Q[79],
A[2], ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of
knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior sensitive
powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was
impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being
only one, would be common to all men. Wherefore if there were but one
single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which
men differ from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as
their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, which
differ in various men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of
Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational, not
by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the
Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science and
understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they
are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he
says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when the "possible"
intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is
reduced to act in respect of singulars by the intelligible species, "then
it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this
happens when the intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and
even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way as
before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect
itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect,
even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the
second place, this supposition is contrary to the truth. For as to whom
belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also
the habit. But to understand and to consider is the proper act of the
intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in
the intellect itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the
Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain extent
an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i,
text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in the
"conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect,
for the intellect is separate, as ran the argument, given above. But the
argument is no cogent. For habit is not a disposition of the object to
the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore
the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the act, and
not in that which is compared to the power as its object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body,
except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66.
But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive
intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the
intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and
not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And
therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the subject of
habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to
the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the "possible" intellect is the
subject of intellectual habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal
matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible"
intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible"
intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their
proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the good
disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body
cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary
way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is
in the "possible" intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any habit is in the will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the
habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by means of
which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by
means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there
is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an active power.
But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the
powers to their acts, as stated above (Q[9], A[1]). Therefore there is no
habit in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by
reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the will,
by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason
directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it
is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, 1).
Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs
a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a
rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the
will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to
its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is
principally related to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one
uses when one wills," as stated above (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the
likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive power
there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for
the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as
we have said above (Q[6], A[4]; Q[22], A[2]). And therefore in respect of
those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the nature of the
power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is
necessary, for the end of human life, that the appetitive power be
inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of
the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it
is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there
be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive.
But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved (De
Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not
hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in
potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the
good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the
will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the
reason, in order that action may follow more promptly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are habits in the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For
Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is not
proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in
the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of
accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for
accident of any kind is foreign to them." But every habit is an accident.
Therefore there are no habits in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy
dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other
things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior
to and more power than that which is by another [per aliud]. Therefore
the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with
God, and therefore not by means of habits. And this seems to have been
the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: "For if this were
the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it
have been as far as possible deified of itself."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which has
parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that
there are no dispositions and habits in them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of
the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring
of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels,
and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence Maximus,
after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the
powers which are in them, are essential, through the absence of matter in
them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the
Predicaments: "Wisdom which is in the soul is its habit: but that which
is in the intellect, is its substance. For everything divine is
sufficient of itself, and exists in itself."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] Body Para. 2/5
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest
from what we have said (Q[49], A[4]) that only a being in potentiality is
the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that
angels are immaterial substances, and that there is no material
potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and
any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality
in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act
belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be
in them, so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality
of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the
same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments
that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits
here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which
it contains in itself."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] Body Para. 3/5
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with
regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the
intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible
things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and
therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But
the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of
intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this
belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and
the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said
in the FP, Q[55], A[1], so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in
need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to
its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence
it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things
according to the mode of its substance, as stated in De Causis: and the
more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] Body Para. 4/5
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are
infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God
Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being
as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is
to say, that by them they are made like to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] Body Para. 5/5
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in
angels, since they are immaterial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of material
habits and accidents.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they
do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as
not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they
need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have
habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[50] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but there are
potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several
species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their
formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their
diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether any habit is from nature?
(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?
(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?
(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any habit is from nature?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those
things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But habit "is
that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii.
Therefore habit is not from nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But
the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the habits of the
powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are
necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above (Q[49], A[4]). If
therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not
fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is clearly false. Therefore
habits are not from nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to
understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore
also first principles are said to be known naturally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 1/7
I answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in
respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural to
man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in
respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato
to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their
respective temperaments. Again, in respect of both natures, something may
be called natural in two ways: first, because it entirely is from the
nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an
extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his
health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of
medicine, health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic
principle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 2/7
Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in
relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing
ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human
species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is
natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition
has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this
disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual
nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or
partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle, as we have
said of those who are healed by means of art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 3/7
But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is
a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), may be natural
whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual
nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul
itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific
principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the
body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it happen
that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from
nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have
intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of
the human soul, as we have said in the FP, Q[55], A[2]; FP, Q[84], A[3].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 4/7
There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their
existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in
one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the
appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural
habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and
in respect of the individual nature. This happens with regard to the
specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the understanding
of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the
very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what
is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole
is larger than its part: and in like manner with regard to other such
principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part---this he cannot know
except through the intelligible species which he has received from
phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the
Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from
the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 5/7
But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural
as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition of his
organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we
need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 6/7
In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning,
on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit; but
only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles
of common law are called the "nurseries of virtue." The reason of this is
because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the
beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the
very nature of the powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 7/7
But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there
are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are
disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or
such like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection takes nature as divided against reason and
will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a
power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, with
regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself
capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of
all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something
is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known: whence it
would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that
it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be
added to the angels' intellective power, some intelligible species, which
are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the
Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be
actually those things which they understand. And so it is clear that not
everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various
kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, as we
have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are
natural, therefore all are natural.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any habit is caused by acts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a
quality, as we have said above (Q[49], A[1]). Now every quality is caused
in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the
agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather gives: it seems
impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that
quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled:
whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as
may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were caused
in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover
and moved, active and passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics
iii, 8.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But
habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is clear
from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit
cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of
virtue and vice are caused by acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle
of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle of
heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act:
for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed,
as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in
which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as
we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from
that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power
presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, according as
it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a
self-evident proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in
their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but
with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover
moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed
by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain
quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality
is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the
appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the
habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved
by first propositions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so
far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something
from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover
and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to
different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes
from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle than
is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent
principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power
by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more
excellent principle than the science of conclusions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a habit can be caused by one act?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For
demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of one
conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused
by one act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they
happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by multiplication
of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the
generating cause of a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a
man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can cause a
habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one
swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short time
make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect
of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a habit of
virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As we have said already (A[2]), habit is caused by act,
because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order
that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active principle
must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire
cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once;
but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming it
entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the
active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive
power in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and
to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be
willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the
appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined
like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which
inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue
cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two
passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See FP, Q[79], A[2] ad 2]
intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima
iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason," that is
the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to
the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active
principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive
principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so
that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition
cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many
acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas
a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as
the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower
apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for
anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher
says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily
habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of
great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores
health at once.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God
treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He would
infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is
suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence to
preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are
naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above (A[2]). Therefore
God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that
habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit is caused"
(Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same
species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this seems
impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same
subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): "God filled him with the
spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are
habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is
disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely,
the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (Q[5], A[5]).
And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is
disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those habits, which
dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore
such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case
with all gratuitous virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second
causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the FP, Q[105],
A[6]. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He
causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have
caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses
into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus
He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues,
which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in
respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives certain
things to some, which He does not give to others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That God works in all according to their mode, does not
hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from this
that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[51] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit,
but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies of
medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of
health, but give new strength to the health he had before.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habits increase?
(2) Whether they increase by addition?
(3) Whether each act increases the habit?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether habits increase?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns
quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus quantity,
but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But
since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it
cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to
alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more hot, is said
to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in
Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the
disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith."
Therefore habits increase.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 1/11
I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is
transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on
account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things,
which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is
said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due
to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in man, which is not
reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms, we say a thing is
great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection,
therefore "in things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater
is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 2/11
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation of
the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a
form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be "little"
or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far
as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the participation
thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or "less": for instance
more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be
understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or
subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its
specific nature, and another to consider it in respect of its
participation by a subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 3/11
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers
concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius
relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other
Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of
more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain
want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on
the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves were not
susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them
[qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of the participation of
the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the
just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between
the two preceding opinions. For they held that some habits are of
themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that
some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who
said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or
less, but that material forms are.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 4/11
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe
that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be something
fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to
that thing, is contained under the species, and whatever recedes from it
more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect.
Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of
things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction changes the
species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific
nature in respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to it,
it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite
nature, which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or
other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation to
something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But
those things which receive their species from something to which they are
related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more
or less: and nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of
the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they
receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or
more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the
oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same
thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according as
it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various
dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as
regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for
the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one
individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain
health."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 5/11
Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of
excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the most
perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less.
Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or decrease
of itself, and how it cannot.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 6/11
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by
the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are
susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the
cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be
susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore
every form which is participated substantially by its subject, cannot
vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of substance
nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to
substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore is it that
neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the
Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing receives form
and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other
qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are connected with
passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect of
their participation by the subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 7/11
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity.
For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must
remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore
in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated more or
less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that
form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated more or
less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, "as a
number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the
species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation of the
specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in
respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in substance."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 8/11
Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially
indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs
participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do
not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or less;
because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The
same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are
denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of
relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity,
as triangle and tetragon.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 9/11
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of
more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle
or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because
indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever
participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 10/11
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in
respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two
ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions.
First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of
greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or
fewer things. Secondly, in respect of participation by the subject: in so
far as equal science or health is participated more in one than in
another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or
from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the
subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 11/11
We shall say further on (Q[66], A[1]) how it is with the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and
applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the word
"growth," the term of which is something great.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is
the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject its
specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion
of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore there is nothing to
hinder it from being susceptible of more or less.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the
third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first
species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows
in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, if
an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or
the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to science
and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether habits increases by addition?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition.
For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to forms, from
corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase
without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is said that
"increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in
habits also there is no increase without addition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent.
But every agent does something in the passive subject: for instance, that
which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no
increase without addition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be
white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more white.
But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of
whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made more white,
except by an added whiteness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which
is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot, that
was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner,
neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have
said above (A[1]). For we said that increase and decrease in forms which
are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on the
part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse
participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase of habits
and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the
subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form. And
just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot,
beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form
itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by an
intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were
participating the form more perfectly, not as though something were added
to the form.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 2/5
For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition,
this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it be
understood of the form itself, it has already been stated (A[1]) that
such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the
species of color is changed when a thing from being pale becomes white.
If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the
subject, this could only be either because one part of the subject
receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold
increases in a man who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold
in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in the
same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to
another). But in either of these two ways we have not a more white or a
more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 3/5
Since, however, as stated above (A[1]), certain accidents are of
themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find
increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to the
time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains
the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases
the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. in so far as the
same movement can be executed more or less speedily or readily. In like
manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone
learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific habit of
science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the
subject's participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is
quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 4/5
As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive
increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply
healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be
brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in the
simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity
on the part of the subject partaking of them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 5/5
How this question affects virtues we shall state further on (Q[66], A[1]
).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition
of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things.
Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the
case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys. iv, text.
63.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects something
in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject to partake
more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend
further.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet
possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new form in
the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality
to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it is in
potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives
through the agent's action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every act increases its habit?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the
cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of
habits, as stated above (Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit increases when
its acts are multiplied.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all
the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike (Ethic. ii,
1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase
it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit
whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But
according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not
every act that increases a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now
things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode
of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white, but
also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less
white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as stated in
Phys. v, text. 52.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (Q[50],
A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary
to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not
in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the
intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the
habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or
disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak of the increase of
habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of
food actually increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of
water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results at
last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to
grow. If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit,
such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to
a lessening thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] Out. Para. 1/1
HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
(2) Whether it can be diminished?
(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a habit can be corrupted?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is
within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to act
from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted.
Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to
corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases
through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now
science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its
subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance
that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither
can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible
species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52).
Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit
of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a direct
movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is,
however, moved indirectly through the movement of the body: and yet no
bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species
residing in the intellect: since the intellect independently of the body
is the proper abode of the species; for which reason it is held that
habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore
science cannot be corrupted. For the same reason neither can habits of
virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than
learning."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover, by
sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered
and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary;
indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit
has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be
corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits---for
instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an
incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are,
however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible
subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such
is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the "possible"
intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as
stated above (Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of science
cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect,
but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted
directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the part
of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but
if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly. Now it is evident
that an intelligible species residing in the "possible" intellect, has no
contrary; nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that
species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the "possible" intellect there
be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is
incorruptible both directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of the
first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be
corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the
Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by
being forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit
caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called
science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways.
First, on the part of those very propositions which are the starting
point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to
the assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of
the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is
contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear
that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of
science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is
the corruption of science." As to virtues, some of them are intellectual,
residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these
applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the
moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the same may
be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are
caused therein because it is natural to it to be moved by the reason.
Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a
judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or
virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second
nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature
of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is
removed, though with difficulty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet
there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we
consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an
obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act,
has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal
transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt
the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit. In like
manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said
that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must be understood in
respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of
virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning
does not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a habit can diminish?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a
simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed either wholly or
not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason
either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not become
more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a
species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And if it
can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would
follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not
common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has something
proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in
De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form;
which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any
accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined
with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more
or less intense in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its
subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the
same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a
habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as
we have already explained (Q[52], A[1]). And since they increase through
the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the
same cause as that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit
is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other hand,
the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not
thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different ways
in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the
subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to
participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a
smaller number of things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit
were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that a certain
decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but
in its subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies
dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take an
accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which
relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject: for
"whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an
accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as though it were the
first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but we give it the second
place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a
curvature of the nose." But if we take accidents in the concrete, the
relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the
relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a
white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining
this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the
first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum" is a "snub-nose."
Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject,
but is not of the very essence of the accident, is ascribed to that
accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and
decrease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not
ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies to habits
and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save
that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we
have already clearly explained (Q[52], A[2]).
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from
act?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through
mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than passion-like
qualities, as we have explained above (Q[49], A[2], ad 3; Q[50], A[1]).
But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by
cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through not affecting
the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot. Therefore
neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is
changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation from act does
not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be
diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual
soul which is above time. Now those things that are above time are
neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore,
are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of time, if one
fails for long to exercise them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of
science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has
dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other habits of virtue are
diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of
movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement
by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly,
indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this
latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through
cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act
which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit. For it
has been stated (A[1]) that habits are destroyed or diminished directly
through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually
undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts
proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether
by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of
science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue
makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a
man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own
passions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds
fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the
sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is
destroyed or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to the
intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those
things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to
make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in
opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those
fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes
is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the intellectual habit
is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat,
if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were to
increase.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of
corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as
explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[53] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is
above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in
course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive
part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher
says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether many habits can be in one power?
(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether many habits can be in one power?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For
when several things are distinguished in respect of the same thing, if
one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are
distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts and objects.
Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be
many habits in one power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject
there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the cause of
its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed
from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power
informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the same time by
various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same
time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at the same time
in one power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are
the habits of various sciences.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[49], A[4]), habits are dispositions of
a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to
operation, which is the end of nature. As to those habits which are
dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same
subject: since in one subject we may take parts in various ways,
according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various
habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts of the human body,
according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the
habit or disposition of health: while, if we take like parts, such as
nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature
is strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands,
feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion to nature, is
beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same
subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to
operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may be
several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a
habit is a passive power, as stated above (Q[51], A[2]): for it is only
an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly
shown above (Q[51], A[2]). Now a passive power is compared to the
determinate act of any species, as matter to form: because, just as
matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive
power determined by the nature of one active object to an act
specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move one passive
power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or
perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or forms
adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate
species. Consequently several habits, even as several specifically
different acts, can belong to one power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species is
according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as
stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong
to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects entails a
difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1,
that "those objects that differ generically belong to different
departments of the soul"); while specific difference of objects entails a
specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things
that differ in genus differ in species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the
acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not
follow that different habits are in different powers, for several can be
in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one genus,
and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that
there are several species of habits and powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is
multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different
acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially
different habits from being in one power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal
boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, but
the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term.
Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same time,
except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as
neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one shape
enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure. For the
intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually";
and yet it can know several things at the same time "habitually."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects.
For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of science regards
contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy.
Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically distinct.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same
scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the physicist
and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii,
text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by their objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same.
But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it be
directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done
for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in order to
pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also
belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does not follow
diversity of objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of
their objects, as stated above (Q[18], A[5]). But habits are dispositions
to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the
diversity of objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific
distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms
differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is
proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another in
reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent
produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to something:
and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according
to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit
is a disposition implying a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an
operation consequent to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things.
First, in respect of the active principles of such dispositions;
secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically
different objects, as will appear from what follows.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider
the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ
in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific
contraries is a real distinction yet they are both known under one
aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far
as they concur in the one aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one
cognitive habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means,
the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of
mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort;
while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the movement of
heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a
demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing science," as stated in
Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And consequently various means
are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of
science are distinguished.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii,
8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in
speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity
of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover the
ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues
are concerned, as is evident from what has been said (Q[18], A[6]; Q[19],
A[2], ad 1; Q[34], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For
good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards contraries, as
was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into
good and bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is
common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the
Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation
and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot
be specifically divided into good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same
object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of
concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for
instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher
clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into
good and bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to
vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), habits are specifically distinct
not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in
their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason
of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way a good
habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is
one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an
evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus,
acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to
reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they
are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished
specifically by the difference of good and bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact
that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature,
while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And
thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is
distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act
befitting some higher nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far as
contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen
that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits
follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided into good
and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not
by reason of one habit being something good, and another about something
bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not the good which is common to every being, that is
a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate
good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human,
nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference of habits
is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a
determinate nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing are
distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated
above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in
reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with
nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one habit is made up of many habits?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For
whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to be
made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but
little by little out of several acts, as stated above (Q[51], A[3]).
Therefore one habit is made up of several.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are
assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,
temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit
of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one science,
to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made
up of many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But
nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made up of
many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly
concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every
perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence,
just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so far as
they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so
also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they are related to
one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to one nature,
or to one principle, as was clearly stated above (AA[2],3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall
find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this multiplicity is
directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is
that a habit is a simple quality, not composed to several habits, even
though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many
things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to
one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that the subject
does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable
disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being imperfectly in
the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other
qualities.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are
not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective or
potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4; SS,
Q[48]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[54] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration,
scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet
imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific
knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in
him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as
it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and demonstrations of
one science are coordinate, and one flows from another.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] Out. Para. 1/2
TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES
(QQ[55]-70)
OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since
habits, as we have said (Q[54], A[3]), are divided into good and bad, we
must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of
other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and
Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. Now
five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue;
(2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5)
certain properties of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?
(2) Whether it is an operative habit?
(3) Whether it is a good habit?
(4) Of the definition of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human virtue is a habit?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is
"the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit of anything
is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is
reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the
genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De
Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." But use of
free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions:
otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do
merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is the
order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering which is
called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what
we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, denominates either an action or
a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural
virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither
therefore are human virtues habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and
virtue are habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a
thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the
end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as
it is determinate to its act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their
acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these
natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers,
which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action,
but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts
by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above (Q[49], A[4]
). Therefore human virtues are habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the
virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for
instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act
of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When therefore we
say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object
of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can reach, is said to
be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not
more, his virtue [*In English we should say 'strength,' which is the
original signification of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine
being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a
hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being
essentially the limit of power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same
sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which virtue
is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else
than the good use of free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by
merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus we merit by
acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle
whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive power; and thus are
we said to merit by virtues and habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love,
we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love is set
in order by virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act:
not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we have
said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human virtue is an operative habit?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an
operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health and beauty
belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty
are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference
to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the Philosopher
(De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a
virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. Now as natural virtue
is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore
also human virtue is referred not only to act, but also to being.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue
"is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." Now the
best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as
Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3,6, 14) to Whom the soul is disposed
by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of
the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in
reference to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a
thing is that which makes its work good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some
perfection of power, as we have said above (A[1]). Wherefore, since power
[*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality' in the first
case, and 'power' in the second] is of two kinds, namely, power in
reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each
of these is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part
of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act,
is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since
everything acts in so far as it is in act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the
soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other
animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the
soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul,
namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human
virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but
belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue
does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is
essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for
such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the
principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the
operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue
causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered
disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are
in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside. Hence
virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like
health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this
does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but
only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper
to man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man
to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above
(Q[3], A[2]), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly
conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an
operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human virtue is a good habit?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should
be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But there is a
virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. 15:56: "The virtue [Douay:
'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a good
habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only
referred to good, but also to evil: according to Is. 5: "Woe to you that
are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." Therefore virtue
also is referred to good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue [Douay:
'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an evil.
Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt
that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his
work good likewise."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As we have said above (A[1]), virtue implies a perfection
of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its
power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must needs be good: for
all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that
every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must
be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue which is an
operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect,
so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or robber;
and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v,
text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to evil things: so
that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin
is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to the limit of its
possibility.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a
falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together with
this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference
to that which belongs to its own kind, even in direct opposition to
reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that
power, since it is compatible with a falling away from reason, cannot be
called a human virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according
as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of the body
and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed
to reason, is said to be "made perfect in infirmity," not of the reason
indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether virtue is suitably defined?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is
not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we
live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in
us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, since virtue it is that
makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither
is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a
"good quality."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is
that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since
it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the
definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come
across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it
is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the
irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue,
therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the
righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is
therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when
we say that virtue is that "by which we live righteously."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But
many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that "pride
lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue,
therefore, "that no one can make bad use of virtue."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on
Jn. 15:11: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. xxvii
in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11]: "He who created thee without thee,
will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore unsuitable to say
that "God works virtue in us, without us."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine from whose words
this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential
notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is
gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the
causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is
gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good
quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference,
"good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we
substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any
other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and
matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which
virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the
above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain
species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And
so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say
that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it
must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil,
as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to
evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the
untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and
so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred
to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously": and
its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good,
sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this
definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works
in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the
definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or
infused.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is being:
wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and
consequently as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being.
Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that
oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this
is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for
everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white
and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and
non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had
being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or
one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them
something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it
something is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good
in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further
than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in
accord with reason."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except
in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And
therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts
those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper
matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2]; SS, Q[58],
A[8]). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the
Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above (Q[19],
A[4]), is common to all virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance
by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being
proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of
action, so that an act of virtue be evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[55] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on
our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words,
"which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by
us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He
works in every will and in every nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?
(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?
(3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?
(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject
of virtue?
(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of
virtue?
(6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the
soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue is that by
which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul, and
not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a power, but in the
essence of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is that
which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." But as work
is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of
the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to
the essence of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is
a quality, as we have said above (Q[55], A[4]): and quality is not the
subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But the
limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a power
of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a
power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of virtue,
which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it
perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as
we have said above (Q[55], A[2]): for all operation proceeds from the
soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that
which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing's
operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the
thing's power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken
for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs to the
essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living
thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for the operation of the living
thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by
virtue we perform righteous actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good is either the end, or something referred to the end.
And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, this
fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work,
and consequently, to the power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as
though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident
inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means
of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of color. In
this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one virtue can be in several powers?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For
habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various way from
several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from
the will as moving, and from the motive power as executing. Therefore
also one habit can be in several powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things
are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to work
steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will"
belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason
of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in the will: for it
cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one
virtue can be in two powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the
same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot
be in several powers of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in
two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way it is
impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers
follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits
follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is
diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In
another way one thing can be subjected in two or more, not on an equal
footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to
several powers, so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others
by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one
power is moved by another, and one power receives from another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the
same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various
degrees.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue,
inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral
virtue is essentially in the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes
as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further on
(A[3]; Q[57], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue.
For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is love. But the
subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone.
Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has
been said above (Q[55], A[3]). Now good is not the object of the
intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue
is not the intellect, but the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects the
intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be
a good man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the intellect
is not the subject of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the
subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above
given, of virtue (Q[55], A[4]). Therefore the intellect is the subject of
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As we have said above (Q[55], A[3]), a virtue is a habit
by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two
ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a
good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to
speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly:
for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: and the
case is the same with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may
confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness:
for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just
actions, but also makes him act justly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply,
in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is actually:
therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do
good, and to be good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and
in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that
"which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these
latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they make the work to
be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of
habits are not called virtues simply: because they do not make the work
good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their
possessor good simply. For through being gifted in science or art, a man
is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good
grammarian or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often
divided against virtue; while at other times they are called virtues
(Ethic. vi, 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative
sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, but
also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the
Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that science, wisdom and understanding,
and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which
is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far
as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, that the will
moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational,
as we have said above (Q[9], A[1]; Q[17], AA[1],5; FP, Q[82], A[4]): and
therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will.
Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do well actually, and not
merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will
itself; or in some power as moved by the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the
other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he wills to
do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the
will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this way
the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for
the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of
faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will" [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in
Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since
prudence is the right reason of things to be done, it is a condition
thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this
reason of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which
man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the
principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural
light of the active intellect. And therefore as the subject of science,
which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative
intellect in its relation to the active intellect, so the subject of
prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue
simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it
depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose
first movement consists in love, as we have said above (Q[25], AA[1],2,3;
Q[27], A[4]; FP, Q[20], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth
is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act of the
intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to
the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection considers virtue simply so called.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot
be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to us and dumb
animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for
this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impossible for
human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are
parts of the sensitive appetite, as we have said in the FP, Q[81], A[2].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a
corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's body: for the
Apostle says (Rm. 7): "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh."
Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not
in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is ruled by the
soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use
of his body: "For instance, if my coachman, through obedience to my
orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to
me." But just as the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule
the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the irascible and concupiscible
powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now
"virtue is that by which we live rightly," as we have said above (Q[55],
A[4]). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers,
but only in the rational powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic.
viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible
powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above (Q[13], A[2]).
Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers,
but in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and
temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic.
iii, 10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of the
soul."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered
in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the
sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the
subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered as participating in
the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey
reason. And thus the irascible or concupiscible power can be the subject
of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in the reason, it is
the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and
concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from one power
according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both
powers be well disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a craftsman
cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well
disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the operations of the
irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved by
reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting
well, not only the reason, but also the irascible and concupiscible
powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through
being moved, depends on its conformity with the power that moves it:
therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers
is nothing else but a certain habitual conformity of these powers to
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in
themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and dumb
animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are
obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this way they can
be the subject of human virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue,
but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being moved by
reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so also, the irascible
and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not the good of
virtue, but rather the infection of the "fomes": whereas, inasmuch as
they are in conformity with reason, the good of reason is begotten in
them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and
concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body
obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in
which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: whence the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the body with a
despotic command" as the master rules his slave: wherefore the entire
movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this reason virtue is
not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible
powers do not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have their
own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence
the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the irascible
and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that by which
free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And
for this reason also must there be some virtues in the irascible and
concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of
the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential
choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence
(Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible powers have a
right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due
to the good disposition of these powers. And therefore those moral
virtues which are concerned with the passions are in the irascible and
concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the
interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite can
be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior
sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: for the powers of
imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. FP, Q[78], A[4]] act at
the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be
hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so also can the
intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above.
As, therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of appetite,
so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent.
Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the power of
memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior
sensitive powers of apprehension.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic.
ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the
intellectual virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from
Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive
powers of apprehension.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there
are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the
Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after
another, we become used to it; and use is a second nature." Now a habit
of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto
nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it is a
habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet, in man, that
which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of
apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, but something annexed to
the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above (Q[50],
A[4], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be
virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that
anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power
which consummates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is not
consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers
prepare the way to the intellective knowledge. And therefore in these
powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these are
rather in the intellect or reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the
rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the act of
the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for
this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. Whereas the
sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather
through moving it; for the reason that the phantasms are related to the
intellective soul, as colors to sight (De Anima iii, text. 18). And
therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for
this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in the intellect itself, or the
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus,
as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of the
conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion,
it is after the manner of an integral part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because
no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by reason of its
very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very
essence of the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text.
42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good
every virtue is ordered, since everything naturally desires its own
proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his Rhetoric, is a "habit like
a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the
subject of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i,
13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect and
reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the
irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by participation.
Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are
voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of some
human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect
of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue in any
other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which
seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the subject of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the
moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. Much
more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible
and concupiscible powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act,
then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which
habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice
for the purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object.
Since, therefore, as we have said above (Q[19], A[3]), the object of the
will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this
the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But if man's will is
confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the
whole human species, such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of
human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one's
neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as
those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are
subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained
to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which are
concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what
we have said (Q[35], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are
rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e. in
its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive
power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral
virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on (Q[62], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[56] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion,
which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases there is
no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for
the purpose, as we have said. This need exists only in the case of
virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the
intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological virtues.
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?
(2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?
(3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?
(4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?
(5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?
(6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to
prudence?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are
not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above
(Q[55], A[2]). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative
matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore the
habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy
or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. i, 9). Now
intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by
which man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining to nature or
to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue
are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, as
the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The speculative habits alone consider necessary things
which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which
considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they are.
Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated
above (Q[55], A[3]), a habit, as we have already observed (Q[56], A[3]),
may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness
in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right
use of it. The latter condition, as above stated (Q[55], A[3]), belongs
to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul: since
it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to
their respective uses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the
appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective
part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness
for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good
work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second
way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a
man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is
inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in
those matters of which he has scientific knowledge: that he make use of
the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will.
Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice,
confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too
there can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of
charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the "contemplative life has
greater merit than the active life."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly
the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative
faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit
is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior act of the intellect
which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first
place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues
are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in
so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient cause or object of
complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation.
Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its acts: and in this sense the
intellectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy;
both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated
above, and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which
consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated (Q[3],
A[7]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second
sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz.
wisdom, science and understanding?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the
speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. Because a
species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom
should not be condivided with science among the intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of
their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of these objects, as
we have already explained (FP, Q[77], A[3]). Therefore diversity of
habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal
aspect of those objects. Now the principle of a demonstration is the
formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the
understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit or virtue
distinct from the knowledge of conclusions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the
essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason employs the
dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the
demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the result of a
demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also
should opinion be.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three
alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and
understanding.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As already stated (A[1]), the virtues of the speculative
intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the
consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject
to a twofold consideration---as known in itself, and as known through
another. What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once
understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects the
intellect for the consideration of such truth is called "understanding,"
which is the habit of principles.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood
by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and
is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the
last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term
of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from
our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i,
text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with respect to all human
knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And
about these is "wisdom," which considers the highest causes, as stated in
Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in
order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not
based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in this
or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which perfects the
intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter,
there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but
one wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which
is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from
principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other
sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their
conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a
more perfect virtue than science.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power
or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in
respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs
to the same power of sight to see both color, and light, which is the
formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as
the color. On the other hand, the principles of a demonstration can be
considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Again
they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the
conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the
principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the
conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs
to understanding.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are
distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order.
The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more
perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect
than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is
thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher
degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest
place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by
judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on
which they are based.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[55], AA[3],4), a virtuous habit has a
fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of
the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits
alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and
never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth
and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they are not
intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad use of
virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly
according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue
of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore art is
not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as
the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative.
Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be
reckoned among the speculative virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a
virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues,
which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain
works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not on man's
appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the
goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable, not
for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work.
Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has
something in common with the speculative habits: since the quality of the
object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but
not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object. For as
long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his
appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even
as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And so
art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits,
in so far, to wit, as neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work
as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that
perfects the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship,
this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the art: even
as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord
with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore, just as science has
always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so it is with
art: and it is for this reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it
falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it does not make its
possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is
requisite: although there cannot be a good use without the art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he
needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this
reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a
moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue.
For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which
rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even in speculative matters there is something by way of
work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work
of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like
works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called
arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those
arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a
fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the
soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand,
those sciences which are not ordained to any such like work, are called
sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more
excellent, does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to
them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art.
For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity of works
does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts
about works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also right
reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prudence has more in common with art than the
speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters that
may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative
habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be called
an art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic.
vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of
medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic.
vi, 5).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different
kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above (A[1]; Q[56], A[3]) that
some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness
for a good work: while some habits are virtues, not only through
conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use.
But art confers the mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard
the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work,
but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the
rectitude thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of
things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason of things to be
done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text.
16, in that "making" is an action passing into outward matter, e.g. "to
build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action abiding in
the agent, e.g. "to see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence
stands in the same relation to such like human actions, consisting in
the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each
is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. But
perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the
principles from which reason argues; just as we have said above (A[2], ad
2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the
habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are
in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 8. Consequently, it is
requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done,
that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on
the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a
moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good
things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of
those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of
the appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman
who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is
more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since
rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art.
Accordingly it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The various kinds of things made by art are all external to
man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But prudence is
right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of
virtue, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative
habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are both in
the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise
than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has more in
common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's
entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel
about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men,
in so far as they are good counselors in matters of warfare, or
seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply
prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all
the concerns of life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a
good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is the
right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which
we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right reason about these
things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things
that are made, save in order that they be made, but not after they have
been made. Neither, therefore is prudence necessary to man in order to
lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order
that he may become virtuous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as
stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, but also
from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in
order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the counsels
of prudent men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells
the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be the case
with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about
what is to be done; since human actions are about things that may be
otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): "The thoughts
of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it
seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human
life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth
temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things
as men can have nothing more profitable in life."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a
good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it
matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that
he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And,
since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice
requires two things: namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained
to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue
which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is
the good and the end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due
end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because
counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts
of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the
reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards
things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently
prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman,
but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things to
be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it
is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing made, even as movement
is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of
things. On the other hand, the good of prudence is in the active
principle, whose activity is its perfection: for prudence is right reason
about things to be done, as stated above (A[4]). Consequently art does
not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his
work be good. Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well
(e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if
it were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on,
because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the
craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a
good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence is
necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he
may be a good man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but
moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards
his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if
he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet this is required
in order that he may lead a good life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the
practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of the
speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the
thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with
things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no
speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but
only such as is about necessary things. On the other hand, the truth of
the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This
conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by
the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected by
us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of
external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an
intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as
regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?
[*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}" are
unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "{euboulia}" is
"a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to
prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. vi, 9). Therefore
"{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence
itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest
virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is judgment. Now
"{synesis}" enables us to judge well. Therefore "{synesis}" is not a
virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on,
so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. But there
is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to
judge well of what has to be done, there is no need, besides "{synesis}"
of the virtue of "{gnome}."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other
parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the
present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn.
Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," and the like.
Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another,
that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there
are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of
these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The first two
correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry
and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper
to the practical intellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation;
for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it
is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command,
to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which
perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has
other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. "{eustochia}," which perfects
counsel; and "{synesis}" and "{gnome}," which are parts of prudence in
relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall speak further on
(ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its
immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects
the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "{euboulia}."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something
further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's judgment
is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its
final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of
what has to be done.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper
principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because,
if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the
truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to
being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment:
because difference is based not on common but on proper principles.
Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one science of
dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative
sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different
objects. "{Synesis}" and "{gnome}" differ in respect of the different
rules on which judgment is based: for "{synesis}" judges of actions
according to the common law; while "{gnome}" bases its judgment on the
natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we
shall explain further on (SS, Q[51], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[57] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and
docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are,
as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite
for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective parts or species of
prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the
three first names are, in a fashion, potential parts of prudence; because
they are subordinate thereto, as secondary virtues to a principal virtue:
and we shall speak of them later (SS, Q[48], seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference
between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from
another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between
the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?
(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?
(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual
virtue?
(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?
(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral
virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral
virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now, we can
accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue
is a moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is
"a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue is a habit of
choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And,
moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some
way, as we shall explain further on (Q[64], AA[1],2,3). Therefore every
virtue is a moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a
habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since every human
virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since
man's good "consists in that which agrees with his reason," as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a
man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he
is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not
moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above (Q[57], A[2]).
Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, we must
consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able
to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning.
For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1):
"Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot
be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to
do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb
animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) that "rushing violently upon the
enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of
doing], they slew them": and the word is used in the same sense in Ps.
67:7, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a
house." For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but
in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is
written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short "e".
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or
quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other
meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes
a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one.
But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the
appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their
acts, as explained above (Q[9], A[1]). Therefore not every virtue is a
moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes "mos" in the sense of "custom."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue
makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the
soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the
appetitive faculty (Q[13], A[1]). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a
habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which
perfects the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also
may be a matter of choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. 3).
Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the appetitive
power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the
reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the appetitive faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual
virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue is the art
of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral
and intellectual virtue do not differ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues:
thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding those
things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science
which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God." Now science is
an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be
distinguished from intellectual virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the
rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the intellectual
virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not
differ from intellectual.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in
its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the definition of
moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue
is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man
would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral
virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13.
Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are two kinds
of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and
whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason
somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without
any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they
be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or
the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3)
that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. as a master rules his
slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the
active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this
were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be
perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of
his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so
that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion
of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated in
Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession
of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so through
ignorance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty
obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition;
wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the
appetitive faculty by a politic power," whereby a man rules over subjects
that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says
on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while
desire is slow, or follows not at all," in so far as the habits or
passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded
in some particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the
saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he
does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include
the use of reason in this individual act of choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that
his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue;
but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral
virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the
appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the
principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral
habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of
right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right
reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about
things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue is the art of
right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other
virtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by prudence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on
the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we have
said about art (ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The same applies to the Third Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included
in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as
something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in
so far as they are all under the direction of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral
and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral and
intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues
(Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal
virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on (Q[61],
A[1]). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and
moral, as though there were no mean between them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned
to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; since
they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an
abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into
intellectual and moral.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not
intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. science,
wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above (Q[57], AA[2]
,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the
passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. Therefore virtue
is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is
twofold, intellectual and moral."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his
doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human
actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the
two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48.
Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of
these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or
practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an
intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a
moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either
intellectual or moral.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But
considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the
moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated
above (Q[57], A[4]). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the
moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the
sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound in
the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his
sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it conformable to
reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the
rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest reason be led astray.
But they fall short of being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which
makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes
a right appetite of the end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect
of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this
is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action
proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be
perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however
perfect be the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce
an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence
if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not
perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting
action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action
will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting from
pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but
something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii,
1,9).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they
are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue.
Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is "a habit
like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in
accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no need for
that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of
natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a
moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to his
reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use
of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and acceptable
to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems
that moral virtue can be without intellectual.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But
some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural
inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without
intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues,
unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues." But
prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Q[57], A[5]).
Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual
virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and
prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit
of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be
good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a
due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive
faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end.
Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the
end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command
aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it,
as stated above (Q[57], AA[5],6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue
without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without
understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know
self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters.
Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it
proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding
of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason
about things to be done.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is
without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity
require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and
consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be
perfected by intellectual virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as
to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things which have
to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of
reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly
cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Mt. 10:16: "Be ye
therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple as doves."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of
beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this
inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be
accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means
towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs
the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt.
And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates
held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it
inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the
Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be
"joined with right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral
virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the
perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive
appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the
reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the
appetitive faculty; and can be without it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things
makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper matter,
as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral
virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin to
the moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel"
(Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having the moral
virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue;
and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue.
Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be
without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right
reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also
in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason demands
principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues
about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular
principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed
by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that
he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not
enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it
happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means
of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a
passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome
thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to
the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of
natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed
in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be
rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz.
the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes
connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done
by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue,
because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5).
Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence,
requires man to have moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for
the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing about
the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in
speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on
which the syllogism of the reason is based.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite
whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when
we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the
former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not
require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[58] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also
to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of
the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be
removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] Out. Para. 1/1
OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.
And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ
accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the
relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in
relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?
(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?
(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether moral virtue is a passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is
of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two
passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in
the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such as envy
and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's
ills, as stated above (Q[35], A[8]). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did
not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei
ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither
virtues nor vices."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three
reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]): whereas moral virtue is not a
movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a
kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or
evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason:
wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable both to
good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason.
Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to
good alone, as stated above (Q[55], A[3]). Thirdly, because, granted that
some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only;
even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite,
and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with
reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it
begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is
moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6)
states that it is "a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a
prudent man would appoint it."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its
essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes
the mean between passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is
evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which
is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the
other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so far as a passion
is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so
far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz. "when pity
is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or
the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by
pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity
reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The
same applies to similar passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the
Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who is not
passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give
way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral
virtues are without passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to
the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue is a kind of
health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's
passions are "the soul's diseases," as he says in the same book. Now
health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion
compatible with virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in
particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment of
prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that "when they," i.e. the soul's
passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth."
Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is
perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but if
it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But
nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral
virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the
soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the
Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral
virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of
words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not
discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the
sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible,
did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other
affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of
the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which
are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but
only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions
in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or
virtuous man if they arose deliberately: while it would be possible for
them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words
of Aulus Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei
ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known
as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs
disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear,
or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use
of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they
cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; as
the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of
the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they
are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some
describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance;
this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified": they
should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as
they should be as to manner and time."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples
in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, but that
of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul
were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher rejects this opinion
(Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It
may be said, however, that when he says "a gentle man is not passionate,"
we are to understand this of inordinate passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward
in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's
command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to
prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the
judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being
commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because
the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7: "She," i.e.
Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and
fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom "hath no bitterness," as we
read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue
also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is incompatible
with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc.
Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, which
is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue
and is incompatible with it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in
Him, for He said (Mt. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death."
Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held
that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e.
"three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead
of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; instead of fear,
"caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be
in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they
held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just
as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so
man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is
unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever
conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not
his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is
contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate
sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave sin, yet no
man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to 1
Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third
reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin,
may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for
that sin, according to 2 Cor. 7:10: "The sorrow that is according to God
worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may
praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible
with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when
moderated by reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about
evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is about
a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a
good possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses not, may be
consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow
for a present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is
incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil
which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which
evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows
reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according
as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive
appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Wherefore
moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a
mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover,
this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily
sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on
account of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is
incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other
hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter
how.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made
sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom.
Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there
can be no hindrance to wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it
helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate
sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the present
state of life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about
objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as
stated above (Q[23], A[4]; Q[31], A[1]; Q[35], AA[1], 2). Therefore all
the moral virtues are about the passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is
rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But
the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]).
Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and
so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are about the
passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10.
Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the
passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by
directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by reason
is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are
moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction
and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the
sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective
appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated
above (Q[22], A[3]). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about
passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows,
as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting from their
proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and
sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the words quoted,
adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and
passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is
about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as about something that results from
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the
passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there
are no passions, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some
virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the
more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the passions.
Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its
contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the passions
incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rm. 7:5) they are
called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as
Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all
things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is
without any passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as
stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot be
without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as
the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is
without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of
the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about
the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.
The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue
makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the
function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their
proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by
exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily
limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive
appetite to its proper regulated movements.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but
about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice:
because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion.
Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will,
in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through
the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite;
in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as
stated above (Q[17], A[7]; Q[24], A[3]). Wherefore by reason of this kind
of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.
Reply OBJ 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[59] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of its
nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as
there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is
altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good
operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's
help.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] Out. Para. 1/1
HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another:
under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?
(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct
from those which are about passions?
(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?
(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of
the passions?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is only one moral virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just
as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject
of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the
appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one
intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore
there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their
respective inclinations.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects,
but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the formal
aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz.
the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end,
as stated above (Q[1], A[3]). Now there is but one common end of all
moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are
infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in
number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above
(Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive
part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the
FP, Q[80], A[2]; FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore there cannot be only one
moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[58], AA[1],2,3), the moral virtues are
habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically
according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above
(Q[54], A[2]). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any
thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But
we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold
relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent,
in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with
all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter
must of necessity receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal
effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire.
Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not
in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with
non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the
sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species,
but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the
influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the one action of
the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction
according to the various adaptability of matter.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of
commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved.
But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so
to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation
(Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of
reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to
reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and
are not one only.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral
matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of
truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters,
viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is
the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various
relations to reason, the directing power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This formal element is one generically, on account of the
unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the various
relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from the last
end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be infinite
in number, are not infinite in species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are
about passions?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which
are about operations and those which are about passions. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit
whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow." Now
pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (Q[31], A[1]; Q[35],
A[1]). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about
operations, since it is an operative habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action. If
therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a
consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues
are about both passions and operations.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards
every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite are
passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also
about passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations;
and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7;
v, 1, seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to
virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has
some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow
which are passions, as stated above (Q[59], A[4], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about
which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which
are about operations must needs differ from those which are about
passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain
operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter
how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in
them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In operations
of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in
themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which
there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason
justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper
matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only
on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these
operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for
this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about
internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is
evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that
the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion of
the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure
of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed in
so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when
through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue
blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may
be clearly applied to other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers
operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two consider
operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases
virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions, for the
reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about
operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to
belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but
one virtue about operations.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed
on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the other to the
good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the
moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice,
which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save
logically, from the virtue which directs a man's actions to one man only.
Therefore diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various
operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of
operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice
to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and again in
distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not
different virtues about different operations.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both
of which are about operations.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in
one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to
another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The
reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is
established, as we have stated (A[2]), not according as how man is
affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of
the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of
something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it
pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such
virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of
justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues:
for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another
way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs
according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already
conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are
various virtues: e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety,"
whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude,"
whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose
object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But the
name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is
rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue
from that which is directed to the private good of an individual:
wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii)
reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good of his
country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a
general virtue through its act of command: since it directs all the acts
of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in
so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of
justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from legal
justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that
is active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of
another virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is the same kind of due in all the operations
belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue of
justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that
distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; but
about this we shall inquire later on (SS, Q[61], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about
different passions. For there is but one habit about things that concur
in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of
sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and they
all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above
(Q[25], AA[1],2,4; Q[27], A[4]). Therefore there is but one moral virtue
about all the passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about different
passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as
passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral
virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear and daring;
temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for
different moral virtues about different passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different
species, as stated above (Q[23], A[4]). Now there is but one virtue about
all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral
virtues about different passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about
desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue
about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power as
other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the
concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily
suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions
are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear
and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to
one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral
virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands
in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but one
mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because
there are different passions contradicting reason in the same manner,
e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing
from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different
passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral
virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order,
as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some good
or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from
desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite
passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to
sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one
order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are
about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good;
while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm.
Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g.
temperance, about the concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and
daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All the passions concur in one common principle and end;
but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice for
the unity of moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle causes
movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in the
intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between
contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a second
nature, consents to reason's dictates.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those three passions are directed to the same object in a
certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the
passions?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to
the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects of passions,
so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are
about operations, do not differ according to the objects of those
operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse
belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore neither do those
moral virtues that are about passions differ according to the objects of
those passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive
appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than
acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of
passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is
but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies
to the other passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various
objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of
virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same
applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to
the objects of the passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there
are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus temperance is
about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}]
about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be different virtues
about fears of evils.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about
pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas
the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.
Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their
relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the
appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are
variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species
of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause
the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the
same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a
difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing
diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several passions, as
stated above (A[4]); and again, a difference of objects from causing
different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since
several virtues are directed about one passion, e.g. pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 2/6
And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong
to diverse virtues, as stated above (A[4]); therefore a difference of
objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a
specific difference of virtues---for instance the difference between that
which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult
to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man's lower powers in a
certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence, one single
object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense,
imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the soul,
body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and
consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues.
Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure,
may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner
apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to man's
good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in
relation to other men. And every such difference, being differently
related to reason, differentiates virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 3/6
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the
sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life
either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the
table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of
"temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not
intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence there
is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is about
difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 4/6
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner
power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the
former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body,
while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods
again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the
concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which way they
belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has no place in
pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are
becoming to man in so far as he has something in common with irrational
animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good
absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is
"liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as
being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence" [*{megaloprepeia}].
With regard to that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the
object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [*{philotimia}],
i.e. "love of honor": while if we consider it as hard to attain, and as
an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity." Wherefore liberality and
"philotimia" seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and
magnanimity are in the irascible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 5/6
As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to
obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the concupiscible
passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards
another either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are
directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are
done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the same relation to
reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards another in serious
matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming
speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic.
ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may be rendered "affability."
Secondly, one man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in
words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he
calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For frankness is more akin to the
reason than pleasure, and serious matters than play. Hence there is
another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher
"eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. iv, 8).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 6/6
It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten
moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality,
magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship,
truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in respect of their
diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which
is about operations, there will be eleven in all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All objects of the same specific operation have the same
relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion;
because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues
are, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless
they bear different relations to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[60] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does
not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require
virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seemingly, one such evil
corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue,
meekness, for every form of anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude,
for all forms of daring. On the other hand, good involves difficulty,
which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular
kind of passion. Consequently there are various moral virtues about
desires, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal
virtues?
(2) Of their number;
(3) Which are they?
(4) Whether they differ from one another?
(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect,
and exemplar virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or
principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division are by nature
simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than
another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the
genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called principal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the
theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues are about
the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral
virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison
with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual virtues
belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues
belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated above (Q[58]
, A[3]). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than
the moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor
in spirit" (Lk. 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal
virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these
are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to
speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (Q[56], A[3]),
is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires
rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the
faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other
hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers imperfectly to the
idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of the appetite: because
it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed
to be done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared
to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the
appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and
prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of
a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (Q[57], A[4]). Consequently,
those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed
among the moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the
members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea;
although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass
another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals. But
when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but
to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking
before another, even in the point of the generic idea; as the notion of
being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such
is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good
defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated above
(Q[58], A[3], ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but
"super-human" or godlike virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank
before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do not rank
before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the
object of the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are four cardinal virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For
prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is
clear from what has been said above (Q[58], A[4]). But that which directs
other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now
we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a
right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two
cardinal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than
another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to rank
above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are
many more principal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of
good works is built on four virtues."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either
way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as
defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as
existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal
virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according as the reason puts its
order into something else; either into operations, and then we have
"Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need
of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions
inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a curb,
which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from
following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of danger or toil: and
then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he
turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of
virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz.
the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by
"Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is
threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty,
subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of
"Fortitude."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The
others are principal, each in its own genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That part of the soul which is rational by participation is
threefold, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks before another,
are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the
formal principle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called principal
rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal in any
genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic.
iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a principal
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above
all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for Gregory says
(Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues without humility
is as one who carries straw against the wind." Therefore humility seems
above all to be a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But
this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath a
perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), these four are reckoned as
cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as
we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain acts
and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found
chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as
stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by reason and put into
our operations as something right and due, is found chiefly in
commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a
basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in
those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the pleasures of
touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason,
against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in perils of death,
which are most difficult to withstand.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First,
in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they are called
principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues:
so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason's act of
consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good
of right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs
and represses the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that
strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude.
Many, both holy doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues
in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under
them. Wherefore all the objections fail.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,
each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus
they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are
called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the
importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which
commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals;
temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of
touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of
death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other virtues may
be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason
of their matter, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and
distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1): "There is
no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect
temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound fortitude, that
is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence,
fortitude and temperance." But this would not be so, if the above virtues
were distinct from one another: since the different species of one genus
do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not
distinct from one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the function of
one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance is
attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): "Rightly do
we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is not weakened
and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii,
xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in all things that we
decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that these virtues are not
distinct from one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary
conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have knowledge;
secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly,
that he should possess the habit and act with firmness and
steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which
is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i.e. choice,
belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on the curb,
acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act
for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly
belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness,
belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in
comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from one
another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are
four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four
virtues are distinct from one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), these four virtues are understood
differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain
general conditions of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so
that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in any
actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind,
whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; temperance, a
disposition of the mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to
keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is
strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any
assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. To
distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice,
temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because it is
fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a "habit,"
should be accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its
contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover,
inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is directed to good which involves the
notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice.
Again, owing to the fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason,
it observes the mode of reason in all things, and does not exceed its
bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the
point of having discretion, which we ascribed to prudence, that there
seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion
belongs essentially to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain
share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions
or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would
be distinct from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct
from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both
habit, and virtue, and moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according
as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter, in
which special commendation is given to that general condition from which
the virtue's name is taken as stated above (A[3]). In this way it is
clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in
respect of their diverse objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first
sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify
one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow
on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed by prudence. And
each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever
can do what is harder, can do what is less difficult. Wherefore whoever
can curb his desires for the pleasures of touch, so that they keep within
bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more
able to check his daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far,
which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be
temperate. Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude
overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is
strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of
very great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught
of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent
for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that
he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered
by toil."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by
the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken
to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that they
overflow on to one another, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down by the
Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however,
be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues,
perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided
into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and social
virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar
virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." Now the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude,
temperance, and prudence to God." Therefore these virtues cannot be
exemplar.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any
passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul that is
cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has
forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the passions; it
does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above (Q[59], A[5])
that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is
no such thing as "perfect" virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs
and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong
to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is not only
unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what
most men admire, viz. power and office." Therefore there are no
"perfecting" virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their
country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice
that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,
1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus,
together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The
four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social*
virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae:
literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect
[*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul] virtues;
and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf. Chrysostom's fifteenth
homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the
merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself . .
He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the
sake of the truth, lives for the common weal."]
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs
to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is
God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of
human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the
types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing
originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in
God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is
the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which
conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness;
His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as
Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on
Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according
to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is
by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human
affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues
until now.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to
Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as
Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as
your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mt. 5:48), we must needs place some
virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues
which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of
movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way
and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called
"perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God,
counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts
of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects
the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of
neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists
in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus
proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already
attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the "perfect
virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God;
temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of
passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by
an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed,
or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as
they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying and
selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this
sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living
together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those
who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus
says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social virtues check
the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second
kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz.
the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is impious to mention them in
connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues.
It may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting
inordinate emotions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked;
otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: "Perhaps
one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional
talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have
retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other
yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and
renown of authority." This agrees with what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity
necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote
ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is
laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[61] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but
by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the
common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take
note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to
do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the
community, viz. towards the household, or even towards one individual.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual
and moral virtues?
(3) How many, and which are they?
(4) Of their order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are any theological virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For
according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect
thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is
disposed according to nature." But that which is Divine is above man's
nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the
Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Q[61], A[5]), which are
not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues
of man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they
direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things.
But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his
first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits
of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now
the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and
charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord
believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore
faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they
are theological virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he
is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Q[5], A[7]). Now man's
happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Q[5], A[5]). One is
proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain
by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing
man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a
kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pt.
1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the Divine nature." And
because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's
natural principles which enable him to act well according to his
capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it
is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles,
whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is
directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles,
albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called
"theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as
they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by
God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save
by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two
ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the
nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of
the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of
the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are
proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a
partaker.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were
virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous,
and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch
as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature.
But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently
directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and
moral virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from
the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they
be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective,
or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect the
intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect
the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues
are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to
God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to
God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the
highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from
the intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four
cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, which is a
theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the
theological.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that
which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above
man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion
to his nature, as clearly shown above (Q[58], A[3]). Therefore they are
distinct from one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are
specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal
difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is
God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of
our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral
virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the
theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect
and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological
virtues, supernaturally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons
as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are
open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other
hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity.
When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can
be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of
charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each
virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal
virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of
every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; Q[28], A[6], ad 2; Q[41],
A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it
does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that
all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further
on (Q[65], AA[2],5; SS, Q[23], A[7]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological
virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly
reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in
relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation
to the connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural
end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of
principles. Therefore there should be but one theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the
intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the
intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is
imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral
virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much
less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now
man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective part,
wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two
theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the theological virtues direct
man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural
inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens
in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect,
in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known
to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's
starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly,
through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as
defined by reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness,
according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither
hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for
them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man
needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a
supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain
supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light:
these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will
is directed to this end, both as to that end as something
attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain spiritual
union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end---and
this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and tends
towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a
certain conformity of the thing with its end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to
understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to
the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed
naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its
conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in
either of these respects, for the will to be directed to things that are
above its nature. Consequently there was need for an additional
supernatural habit in both respects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is
of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith and
hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion
of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of
human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according
to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is stronger than men."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the
end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must needs
be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and
charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not
that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes that
which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues,
according to Eph. 3:17: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore
charity precedes the others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot love
what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, by doing
good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith precedes
charity, and charity hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated
above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a passion,
as stated above (Q[25], A[2]). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes
hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now
there remain faith, hope, charity."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of
perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes
form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith
precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are all
infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to
anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that thing be apprehended by
the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect
apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation,
faith precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves a thing
because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man
hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man
in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason that a
man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of
generation, hope precedes charity as regards their respective acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because
both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from charity
their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the
root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we
shall state further on (SS, Q[23], A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to
obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs to
hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man
before having charity, to hope through merits not already possessed, but
which he hopes to possess.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[62] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[40], A[7]), in treating of the passions,
hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped
for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never
hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person
from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to
this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards hope is increased by
love. Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good
through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact that he loves
him, he then hopes all the more in him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?
(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as
infused virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether virtue is in us by nature?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and are equally in
all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will
contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it is virtuous."
Moreover, a gloss on Mt. 4:23, "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught
them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man
possesses naturally."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was
clearly shown above (Q[55], A[4], ad 2). But that which accords with
reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore
virtue is in man by nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to
us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written (Job 31:18):
"From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my
mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and
is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain,
as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is
cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by
some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, who upheld
the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. FP, Q[45], A[8]; Q[65],
A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for
instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from some separate
cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so
far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in
so far as they are brought into act by the agent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 2/6
In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they
are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would pre-exist
in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue,
which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are removed by
study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This
was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from
without, being due to the inflow of the active intellect, as Avicenna
maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by
nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but not in their perfection:
this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the
truth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 3/6
To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which
something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his
specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since
each thing derives its species from its form, and its individuation from
matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his
matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational
soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific nature; while whatever
belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is
natural to him in respect of his individual nature. For whatever is
natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species,
is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular
body is adapted to this particular soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 4/6
In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in
respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be
found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both
knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral
virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for
good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the
individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body,
some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit,
certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body, according
to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the
exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the rational powers also,
which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a
natural aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for
temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in
us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since
nature is determined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does
not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in
respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's
action, and according to various circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 5/6
It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according
to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the
theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 6/6
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue
about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch as we
are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that,
owing to the natural disposition which the body has from birth, one has
an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some
other virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by
habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi
cvi.] commenting on Rm. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says:
"The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without
the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a
mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired by
means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By
grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be
in us by habituation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are
incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God,
according to Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent,
except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by
habituation, but only by the gift of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of
virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. Therefore a
virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more
efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much
more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We have spoken above (Q[51], AA[2],3) in a general way
about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special
way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note that, as
stated above (Q[55], AA[3],4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to
good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and
order," as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight,
and measure," as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man's good must needs be
appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated
above (Q[19], AA[3],4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since
Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that
whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but
the converse does not hold.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined
according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts:
inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the
aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs
man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot
be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is
produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in giving
the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which God works
in us without us" (Super Ps. 118, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these
virtues that the First Objection holds good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue,
especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual sin,
even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use
of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated above (Q[49], A[3]):
and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it
is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit.
Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never
to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue,
whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in
matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain mortal sins which
man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly
opposed to the theological virtues, which are in us through the gift of
grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later (Q[109], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (A[1]; Q[51], A[1]), certain seeds or
principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles
are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them: thus the
understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the
science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more
excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results through
the appetite partaking of reason, which rectification belongs to moral
virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher
principles, can cause acquired human virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are
infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, save perhaps
sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes;
for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), "it is God's rule to bring about
extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be
caused in us by our acts, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore it is not
reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in
the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to
supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues
needing to be caused in us by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices:
much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls,
according to a gloss on Heb. 1 [*Cf. Jerome on Gal. 1: 15,16]. Therefore
it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and
prudence and justice and fortitude."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and
principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by
our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as
above stated (A[1]; Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural principles,
God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a
supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we need to receive
from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the
theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what
the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused
in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological
virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God
immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our
supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But the
soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other
things, yet in relation to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The power of those naturally instilled principles does not
extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition
to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused
virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from
acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what
has been said (A[3]), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the
last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but
by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual
virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused
and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires of touch.
Therefore they do not differ in species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is
wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature. But
the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten
naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one
produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and
infused virtue belong to the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Any change introduced into the difference expressed in
a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of
infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us," as
stated above (Q[55], A[4]). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these
words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The
first, as stated above (Q[54], A[2]; Q[56], A[2]; Q[60], A[1]), is taken
from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of
every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus
the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected
with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from
reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material
element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident
that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to
the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean
which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption
of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the
health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to
the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into
subjection" (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It
is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in
species; and the same applies to the other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to
which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not of the
same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which
their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher
says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they
are well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too,
those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their
being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay:
'domestics'] of God" (Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues,
whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to
the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for
pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their
respective acts are not identical.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[63] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the
act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it was of the
same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man
miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. But the
case is not so in the question before us, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of
virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, (4)
the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?
(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational
mean?
(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?
(4) Whether the theological virtues do?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether moral virtues observe the mean?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For
the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the
nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo
i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore moral virtue does not
observe the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend
to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, and
magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3.
Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the
mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the contrary
corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues
are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus virginity, which
abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most
perfect chastity: and to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy
or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral
virtue that it should observe the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue
is a habit of choosing the mean."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As already explained (Q[55], A[3]), the nature of virtue
is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a
perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some
determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in
respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which is
measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the good
things made by art is that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in
things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or
measure. Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by
their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things ruled or
measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in
conformity with the rule of reason. Now it is clear that between excess
and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is
evident that moral virtue observes the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason,
while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore we
compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of
reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; while
excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity.
But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds
the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion conform to the
rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue,
as to its essence, is a mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is
imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the
'best' and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on
various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being extreme
in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a
mean in respect of other circumstances, through being in conformity with
reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we
look at the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues,
we shall call it an extreme and a maximum: but if we consider the
quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of
a mean: since these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the
rule of reason, i.e. "where" it is right, "when" it is right, and for an
"end" that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum
"when" it is not right, or "where" it is not right, or for an undue
"end"; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where"
one ought, and "when" one aught. This agrees with the saying of the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme
in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of
magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty
from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according
to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this be done in
an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for
vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it ought to
be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by deficiency: for
instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational
mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists in its
observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in
things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue
does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean between
operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the
rational, but the real mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or
geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of justice,
as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the
rational, but the real mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue
observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First,
according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as though
the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense,
since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act of the
appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean.
Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that which the reason
puts into some particular matter. In this sense every mean of moral
virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated (A[1]), moral virtue is
said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean:
in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for instance, in
justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real
mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such is the mean in all
the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about
operations, which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be
established simply and absolutely, as stated above (Q[60], A[2]):
wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in
so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his due, neither more nor
less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the
right cannot be established in the same way, since men are variously
situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has
to be established in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved
in respect of the passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two
arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason,
while the third argues from the mean of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the
mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming to the rule of
reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they
seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not
observe the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual
virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue observes the mean
appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If therefore
intellectual virtue also observe the mean, this mean will have to be
appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an
indefinite series of virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the
Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there seems to be no
contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in
the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, but are understood
together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no
mean in the intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean
in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes the
mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The good of anything consists in its observing the mean,
by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may happen to
be excessive or deficient, as stated above (A[1]). Now intellectual
virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above
(Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue consists in
observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good
of intellectual virtue is the true; in the case of contemplative virtue,
it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical
virtue, it is the true in conformity with a right appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is
measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect, as
stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or
say, according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the good of
speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of
conformity with things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses
them as being what they are, or as not being what they are not: and it is
in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if
something false is affirmed, as though something were, which in reality
it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied,
and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in
relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; so that both in
practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in
conformity with things. But if we consider it in relation to the
appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the
rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of
prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as ruled
and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess
and deficiency is to be applied in both cases.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated,
and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues:
because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another kind
of virtue, but things themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety
in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other:
nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and
negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end of Peri Hermenias.
For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary, but in
contradictory opposition to one another, so long as we consider their
signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we have "being"
and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer them to the
act of the mind, there is something positive in both cases. Hence "to be"
and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion stating that "good is
good" is contrary to the opinion stating that "good is not good": and
between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the
good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. Now the
theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more
does theological virtue observe the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being
ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists in the
intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both
intellect and appetite, as stated above (Q[62], A[3]). Therefore
theological virtue also observes the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between
despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course between
contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by
confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe the mean
between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two
persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to one
person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue observes the mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin
by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess
against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written
(Ecclus. 43:33): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He
is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue does not observe the
mean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the mean of virtue depends on
conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or
fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be
twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the
measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith
is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to His goodness;
hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness.
This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as
much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we
should. Much less therefore can there be excess in such things.
Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but
increases the more we approach to the summit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with
us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought, yet
we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to
the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible to find a mean
and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a
mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: whereas
this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself,
as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and
appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the
theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and
measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[64] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in
relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous,
through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or
to despair through failing to hope for that which according to his
condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in
comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In like manner faith
holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not by comparison with
its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so
far as human opinion itself takes a middle position between contrary
opinions, as was explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there
are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?
(2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?
(3) Whether charity can be without them?
(4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?
(5) Whether charity can be without them?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one
another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of
acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the
acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other
virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a
man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or
magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man
cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other virtues; and (Ethic.
iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is
modest, but not magnanimous." Therefore the moral virtues are not
connected with one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the
soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part. But
the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have
one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, are the moral
virtues connected with one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can
only be because they are united together in prudence. But this does not
suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be
prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue, without being
prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the
art of making certain things, without the art of making certain others.
Now prudence is right reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral
virtues are not necessarily connected with one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20: "The virtues are connected
and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several":
and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the
human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says
(Moral. xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no
account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. ii):
"If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be
that you have none at all."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as
imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or
fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good
deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If
we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we
find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt
in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of
chastity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good
deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that
they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two
reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning the
distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above (Q[61],
AA[3],4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties
of the virtues: for instance, by saying that discretion belongs to
prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of
mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties to be.
In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength of
mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or
rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned
for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue
cannot be perfect" as a virtue, "if isolated from the others: for there
can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and
he continues to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. Q[61],
A[4], OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their
matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for
their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above (Q[58], A[4]),
no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral
virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right
choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination
is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct choice of things
conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels,
judges, and commands in those things that are directed to the end. In
like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues:
since prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the
starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end
man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have
speculative science unless we have the understanding of the principles,
so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this
it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general
state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be done
in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the
same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he exercise
himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits
of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good deeds in
regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for instance, by
behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence;
he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger; but this
habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence,
which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural
inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, if prudence
be lacking.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some
eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does
not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such
virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues,
without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak
of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those
other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because when,
by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and
expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would
acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a
geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge
about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before.
Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of having it,
according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That
which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no
relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various sciences
and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be
found among the moral virtues, which are about passions and operations,
that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their
rise in certain initial passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in
certain others, viz. pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the
operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one
another, and to the passions. Hence the whole matter of moral virtues
falls under the one rule of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles.
And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding
of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated.
On the other hand, the universal principles which are the object of the
virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions,
which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral
virtues depend on prudence, because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the
reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above (Q[9], A[1]; Q[58],
A[5], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the
principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the
principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason
may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet in no way
can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle
whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, "A whole is
greater than its part," he cannot acquire the science of geometry,
because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion.
Moreover, things "done" are related to one another, but not things
"made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one
department of things to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting
other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether moral virtues can be without charity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it
is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every virtue save
charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none
except the good," as stated in the same book. Therefore the other virtues
can be had without charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by
infusion, according to Rm. 5:5: "The charity of God is poured forth in
our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is
possible to have the other virtues without charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through
depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed,
it surpasses prudence, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ,
which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not
connected with charity, and can be without it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:14): "He that loveth not,
abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues,
since it is "by them" that "we lead a good life," as Augustine states (De
Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of
charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means of
human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good
works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of
man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even
as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good
works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the
character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human
acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without
charity. For it has been stated above (A[1]; Q[58], AA[4],5) that the
other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot
be without the moral virtues, because these latter make man well disposed
to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of
prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary
that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect
of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which
is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right
reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, that
"contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is therefore
evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity; nor,
consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without
prudence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused
virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since they
direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those,
namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not
simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some
particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply.
Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on the
words, "All that is not of faith is sin" (Rm. 14:23), says: "He that
fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct
be good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else
if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor
good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence
depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the infused
moral virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity can be without moral virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues.
For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is superfluous to
employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the
works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. 13:4, seqq.: "Charity is
patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other
virtues are superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works
of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own sake:
hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now
many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it
difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for
their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have
charity without the other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are
some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says (on Lk. 17:10)
that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain
virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. Therefore, if a man has
charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is
written (Rm. 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the
Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all
the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of
virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity, has
all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis.
clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp.] that charity contains all
the cardinal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity.
The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of
grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that
whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has also
whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with
organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls empower them to
do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his
last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to
his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused
together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each
different kind of good work.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not
only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that
whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only
must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower power: for
if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not
follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed. Consequently, in
order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only
a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which
dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which
regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those
things that are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have
the moral virtues together with charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it
difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no
pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment
supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it
difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner
sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their
works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from previous
acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue:
because the repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the
contrary dispositions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so
far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the
reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith and hope can be without charity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity.
Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more
excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral
virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope
be without charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says (Tract.
xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as
stated above (Q[62], A[3]). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be no
hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this love that he
speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Mt. 1:2 says that "faith begets hope, and
hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be
without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without
charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered
in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues.
For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue
is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this
consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else,
if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly
good; wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an
act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what
is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect
virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the
result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue
without prudence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without
charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without
charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to
believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will not as
one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is
the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right
movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a
perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence.
The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to
God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on the merits
which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future
bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to
acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is
possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without
charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so-called;
because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do
what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused
prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves
the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end.
On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on
prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they
are not virtues without charity, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to
gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this is not
without charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity can be without faith and hope?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For
charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God
naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss.
Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to
Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes
without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and
hope, and the other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had
neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we
shall explain further on (TP, Q[7], AA[3],4). Therefore charity can be
without faith and hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity,
according to Prov. 8:17: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope
that we are brought to charity, as stated above (Q[62], A[4]). Therefore
it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a
certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain
mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in
Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 Jn. 4:16:
"He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and from 1
Cor. 1:9, where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are called
unto the fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with God,
which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in
this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory;
each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore just as
friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or
despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy;
so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without
faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to
hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible
without faith and hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of
God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are
directed by faith and hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it
gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the
precursors of charity, as stated above (Q[62], A[4]), and so charity is
impossible without them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[65] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of
their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest
vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above, Q[4], A[3]]:
so that in Him was perfect charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] Out. Para. 1/1
OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?
(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?
(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;
(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;
(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;
(6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than
another. For it is written (Apoc. 21:16) that the sides of the city of
Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues.
Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater
than another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum,
cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a maximum,
for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states (De Coelo
i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are
very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it
seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of
the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God Whose power is
uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be
greater than another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance,
there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and
increase: for it is written (Mt. 5:20): "Unless your justice abound more
than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the
kingdom of heaven": and (Prov. 15:5): "In abundant justice there is the
greatest strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be
greater or less than another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than
another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to
virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue
is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than its
effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most
excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said (Q[18], A[5]; Q[61],
A[2]) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence
which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues
which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason.
And among these, one is better than another, according as it approaches
nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels
the remaining moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible
part, stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has
a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the
same species. In this way, according to what was said above (Q[52], A[1]
), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said
to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; secondly with regard
to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall
call it greater or little, according to the things to which it extends.
Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of
whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and
art: for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar.
And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his
Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as
science and art can; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then
be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in
different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain
to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and this, on
account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition,
or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of
grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of the giving
of Christ," as stated in Eph. 4:9. And here the Stoics erred, for they
held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the
highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not
require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were
an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he
should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same
indivisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by one than by
another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of
proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we
shall see further on (A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the
character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained
above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to
the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures of
virtue, according to Eph. 4:7: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is
given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all
equally intense. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:7): "Everyone hath his
proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that." Now
one gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if God infused
all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the
virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the
same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one virtue,
would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case:
since various saints are specially praised for different virtues; e.g.
Abraham for faith (Rm. 4), Moses for his meekness (Num. 7:3), Job for his
patience (Tob. 2:12). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings:
"There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [*See
Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)], since each one was
remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all
equal in one and the same man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure
and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that a man is
more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another.
Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are
equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on. Now
it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal.
Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As explained above (A[1]), the comparative greatness of
virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their
specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt that in a man one
virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and
hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of
participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or
remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues in one man are equal
with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is
equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but equal in proportion,
since they grow in proportion to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as
the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their connection
as to greatness. Now it has been stated above (Q[65], A[1]) that a
twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to
the opinion of those who understood these four virtues to be four general
properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in
any matter. In this way virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter
unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this
kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men
are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than the other; it
follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently
they are not really equal in fortitude, since the former's fortitude is
more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you
run over them all in the same way."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those
who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters (Q[65]
, AA[1],2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from
prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not from the
inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above (Q[65],
A[1]). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can also be
considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in
all the moral virtues: for in one and the same man, so long as his reason
has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately
defined according to right reason in each matter of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the
inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the act of
one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature,
or from habituation, or again by the grace of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the
gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all of
them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to
the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has all the
virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater
abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused
virtues are connected.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint
for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness for the
act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the
intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, is
better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences"
(Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, they are more
necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the
intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor
good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art in
respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence
alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according
to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of the end; whereas
prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more
excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards
moral matters.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is
rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the
essentially rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by
essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore
intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways:
first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from
being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better
relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle, Topic. iii.]. Now
to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific
nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as
explained above (Q[54], A[2]; Q[60], A[1]). Hence, speaking simply, that
virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is
evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object
of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal,
while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted
to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual
virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral
virtues, which perfect the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue,
which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other
powers to act, as stated above (Q[9], A[1]), is more excellent. And since
virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the
perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees
more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual
virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual
virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the life of
the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which
are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of moral
virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral
virtues are more necessary for human life, proves that they are more
excellent, not simply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative
intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to
something else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more
excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of
beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as
stated above (Q[3], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of
moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because the
appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above (Q[56],
A[3]). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is
better relatively.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice
of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each moral
virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which
mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence, as stated in
Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues.
For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is due. Now the
former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality
is apparently a greater virtue than justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in
which it is most perfect. Now, according to Jm. 1:4, "Patience hath a
perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than
justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," as
stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. Therefore it
is greater than justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the
most excellent of the virtues."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A virtue considered in its species may be greater or
less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply,
whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above (A[1]). In
this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being
most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and
its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the
rational appetite, as stated above (Q[8], A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object
or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order
not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the
most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues,
which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the
appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the
rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief
of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude
which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and
death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the
passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the
most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man
and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e.
fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war
and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance, which subjects the
appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one
individual, or in the one species, viz. in matters of food and of sex.
And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal
virtues, in excellence also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or
adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is more excellent simply
than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more
excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some
accidental mode of being.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of
justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own"
(Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice,
which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas justice can be without
liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being
more universal, and as being its foundation: while liberality is greater
relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring
evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also
excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by
charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also
inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is
more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter.
It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply.
Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but
also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient;
but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as
stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament,
so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual
virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now
prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that
political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that
sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each
individual should devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then,
wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than
wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to
happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing to that
which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right
reason about things to be done," whereby man is brought to happiness:
whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains
happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to
be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are
the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of
wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14):
because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job 26:26:
"Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a
greater virtue than wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge
of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable
principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as
other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than
wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the
head" among "the intellectual virtues."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), the greatness of a virtue, as to
its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses
the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the
Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the
Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and
by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that
wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues,
directs them all, and is the architect of them all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the
Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than
wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing
in the world." Wherefore we must say, as stated in the same book (Ethic.
vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the
spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" (1
Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are
the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to wisdom,
viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political
science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom,
preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but
wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme
Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in
respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of
wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect
of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the act of wisdom
is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so that wisdom is
nearer than prudence to happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one
knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher
object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally
good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more
certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and
better object, is preferable to that which is more certain about an
object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii,
text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about
celestial beings, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and
again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about
sublime things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to
which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man,
especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to
God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge about God which
we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles
depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a
whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater
than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole
and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms
whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of
wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause,
which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which
are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from
them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and
by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that
wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological
virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity
are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and
charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is
greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above (Q[62], A[3]).
Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, when two things are added together, the result is
greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to
charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii),
and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved.
Therefore hope is greater than charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and
hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Mt. 1:3 says that "faith
begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater
than charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), the greatness of a virtue, as to
its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological
virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any
one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater
object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to
that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because
the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the
object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not
possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed:
since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is
drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written (1 Jn.
4:16): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way
as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the
theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas
prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man. Now in
things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know
them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower:
whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. Now
that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a
thing is contained according to the mode of the container. But it is the
other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence
moderates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues,
whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God,
which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the
object. And this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses human
knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which
surpasseth all knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain;
and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good,
loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity
implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as stated above
(Q[62], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[66] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a
disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more noble than
the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that
faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, that one is a
disposition to the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under
which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?
(2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?
(3) Whether faith remains?
(4) Whether hope remains?
(5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?
(6) Whether charity remains?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this
life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, according
to Mt. 22:30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels
[*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods"
(Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will
there be moral virtues after this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the
active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says (Moral. iv,
18): "The works of the active life pass away from the body." Therefore
moral virtues do not remain after this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are
in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the
body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily organs. Therefore it
seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:15) that "justice is perpetual
and immortal."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the
cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made happy by the mere
knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is better or more lovable,
that Nature, to wit, which created all others." Afterwards he concludes
that these four virtues remain in the future life, but after a different
manner.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there
is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material element
in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the
passions and operations according to a certain mode: and since this mode
is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the
future life, as regards their material element. For in the future life
there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex;
nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions and
commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards
the formal element, they will remain most perfect, after this life, in
the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most perfect
rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of
life: and his appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the
order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine
says (De Trin. xiv, 9) that "prudence will be there without any danger of
error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance,
without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither
prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most
steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no
imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be its act
in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in this life
subjection to a superior is part of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues,
as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards
"commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror
and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern
the active life, belong to the material element of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is a twofold state after this life; one before the
resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; the
other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their
bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational powers will be in
the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for
fortitude to be in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible
part, in so far as each power will be perfectly disposed to obey the
reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts
will not be in the soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as
stated in the FP, Q[77], A[8]. Wherefore neither will these virtues be
actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein
are certain nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]).
Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice
it is specially said that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason
of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because its act will
not change, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after
this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8,9) that "knowledge shall be
destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now
just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is
the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life
lasts. Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is
a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is not easily lost,
except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change
is so great as that of death. Therefore science and the other
intellectual virtues do not remain after death.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that
it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act of the
intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a
phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, the phantasms
do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body.
Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is
more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the
knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for
instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to
Lk. 16:25: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy
life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore, does
the knowledge of universal and necessary things remain, which belong to
science and the other intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q[79], A[6] some have held that the
intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when
it actually understands; and that so long as actual consideration ceases,
the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts
of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these
powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, according to
this opinion, neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will
remain after this life when once the body is corrupted.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De
Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is in act when it is
identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in
potentiality to consider it actually." It is also contrary to reason,
because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect
immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible"
intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima iii) because it
preserves the intelligible species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life,
by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the FP, Q[84],
A[7]; FP, Q[85], A[1], ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted.
Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the
quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease
when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species,
which are in the "possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain.
Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual
virtues. Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal
element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring
to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding;
because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is
destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the phantasms.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material
element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species,
which are in the "possible" intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in the FP, Q[89], A[1] the separated soul has a
mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms.
Consequently science remains, yet not as to the same mode of operation;
as we have stated concerning the moral virtues (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith remains after this life?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith
is more excellent than science. Now science remains after this life, as
stated above (A[2]). Therefore faith remains also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 3:11): "Other foundation no man
can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in
Jesus Christ. Now if the foundation is removed, that which is built upon
it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no
other virtue remains.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ
as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible with
perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be "evening" and "morning"
knowledge [*Cf. FP, Q[58], A[6]]; and a man can have science through a
demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable
syllogism, about one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith
also is compatible with the knowledge of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6,7): "While we are in the
body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by
sight." But those who are in glory are not absent from the Lord, but
present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the
life of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing
being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things
are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and
negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect of contrary
forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find
opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: wherefore in
alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when a
thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since
perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, it is impossible for
perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 2/5
Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's
very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack of reason belongs
to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so
long as it remains the same identically, cannot pass from one species to
another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species
of that thing is changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse,
were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the imperfection does not
belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by
reason of something else; even as sometimes lack of reason is accidental
to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like
reason; and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the
thing remains substantially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 3/5
Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of
faith: for it is included in its definition; faith being defined as "the
substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear
not" (Heb. 11:1). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Where
is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an imperfect knowledge
that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge
belongs to the very nature of faith: therefore it is clear that the
knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 4/5
But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect
knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect
knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we
must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on the
part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium;
thirdly, on the part of the subject. The difference of perfect and
imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the
"morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning"
knowledge is about things according to the being which they have in the
Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they
have being in their own natures, which being is imperfect in comparison
with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect
knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion through a
demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the
subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to
opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion that we
assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that
our adhesion is not firm: to science it is essential to have firm
adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which
results from the understanding of principles: while faith holds a middle
place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but
falls short of science in so far as it lacks vision.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 5/5
Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the
same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect and imperfect can be
together in the same respect in one and the same other thing.
Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is
quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but
they are compatible with one another in respect of the same medium or the
same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and the same
time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge
about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, e.g. about health and
sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the
part of the medium is incompatible with imperfect knowledge through one
and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same
subject or in the same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions
through a probable and through a demonstrative medium. Again, knowledge
that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect
knowledge in the same subject. Now faith, of its very nature, contains an
imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not
what he believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection
on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that which makes
them happy, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]). Hence it is manifest that faith
and bliss are incompatible in one and the same subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the
object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a more
perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision
which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of faith is
incompatible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge:
consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be
perfected also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of
glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent
manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this
life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much more then does
hope remain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this
life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in the lost,
the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in
the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of the
body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul, according to Ecclus.
24:29: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall
yet thirst," and 1 Pt. 1:12: "On Whom the angels desire to look."
Therefore it seems that there can be hope in the Blessed after this life
is past.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope,
viz. God. Therefore they do not hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), that which, in its very nature,
implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite
perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very
nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is "the act of that
which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this
potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases; for a thing does
not continue to become white, when once it is made white. Now hope
denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from
what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q[40], AA[1],2).
Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. the enjoyment of
God, it will no longer be possible to have hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is
God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the
perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as
regards their matter, in respect of which they do not remain. For moral
virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet
possessed, but also as regards something which is in our actual
possession.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state
further on (SS, Q[19], A[2]). Servile fear regards punishment, and will
be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be
possibility of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of
reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the other is
an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it
does not remain. Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil:
and no evil will be feared there, according to Prov. 1:33: "He . . .
shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope
by opposition of good and evil, as stated above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1]
), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to
hope. In the lost there can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of
glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a succession of
punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which
is the object of fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by
reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is
neither past nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly
speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42],
A[2]), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no
such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except
speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is
called fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the
Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the reason
already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them
because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said to be in
the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in
the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a
theological virtue, for thus its object is God, and not a created good;
nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something
difficult, as stated above (Q[40], A[1]): while a good whose unerring
cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult.
Hence he that has money is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what
he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul
are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but
only to desire it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory.
For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there remains what
is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you take away
rational, there remains living, and when you remove living, there remains
being." Now in faith there is something that it has in common with
beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is something proper to it, viz.
darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. Therefore, the
darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to
Eph. 1:17,18: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge
of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light of
glory, of which it is written (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see
light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes:
for a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it
seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the
withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of liberality,
though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the
object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore when this ceases
through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either
withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does not
remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above (A[3]), it seems that
it is withdrawn entirely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but
that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains
in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be
understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically but
generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus,
viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not of
the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to the enjoyment
of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith
remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. Because when
you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not
remain identically the same: thus if you remove the difference
constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain
identically the same, as though the identical color were at one time
whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not
related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the
genus remains identically the same, when the difference is removed, as
the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is
changed: for genus and difference are not the parts of a species, else
they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species
denotes the whole, i.e. the compound of matter and form in material
things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes
the whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by
signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying both. Thus,
in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and
animal is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational of
that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So
that the one same whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same
aspect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference
is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, the substance of
the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not
remain, if another kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is
impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to
become clear vision. It is therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing
remains of faith, either identically or specifically the same, but only
generically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" thing is
the same, not identically, but generically, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the
perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject:
whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed
to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently they are
incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that loses his money does not therefore lose the
possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the
habit of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the
object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even its
possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so
such a habit would remain to no purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in
glory. Because according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that which is perfect is
come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be
done away." Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it
will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But
the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore the apprehension
of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it
seems that charity is not the same in both cases.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to
perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the wayfarer can
never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be
increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of the wayfarer does not
remain in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8): "Charity never falleth
away."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), when the imperfection of a thing
does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the
identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is
perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, the
nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an
object either possessed or not possessed, either seen or not seen.
Therefore charity is not done away by the perfection of glory, but
remains identically the same.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because
imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although that
which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence
the imperfection of charity being done away, charity itself is not done
away.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were,
the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity of
heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God
Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[67] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the
perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part of the
cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the
more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we love Him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?
(2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?
(3) Whether the Gifts are habits?
(4) Which, and how many are they?
(5) Whether the Gifts are connected?
(6) Whether they remain in heaven?
(7) Of their comparison with one another;
(8) Of their comparison with the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For
Gregory commenting on Job 1:2, "There were born to him seven sons," says
(Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception
of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in
us": and he quotes the words of Is. 11:2,3: "And the Spirit . . . of
understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of
the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost are virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine commenting on Mt. 12:45, "Then he goeth and
taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i,
qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the Holy
Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the
seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from
the virtues commonly so called.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves
the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; for each
gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc.
[*Cf. Q[55], A[4]]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the
infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to the
Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ
from one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues:
for, as stated above (Q[57], A[2]), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge
are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind
of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the
gifts do not differ from the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which
he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three
theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three
daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts
from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four
corners of the house.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion
conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between them.
Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in
relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers to the cause from
which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from
one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing: especially as we
have already stated (Q[63], A[3]) that some virtues are infused into us
by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from
virtues. Consequently some have held that the gifts are not to be
distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty
for them to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called
gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, for
instance, that are not reckoned virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 2/6
Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being
distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a suitable reason
for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all
the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of
the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge,
understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude,
piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the free-will according
as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a
faculty of the will: since they observed only two virtues in the reason
or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive
power or the affections. If this distinction were true, all the virtues
would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 3/6
Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the
Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence, temperance,
justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every
kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are
given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist
temptation. But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the
virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the sins that are
contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary:
which is especially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written
(Cant 8:7): "Many waters cannot quench charity."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 4/6
Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as
having been in Christ, according to Is. 11:2,3, said that the virtues are
given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to
conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then
that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this
appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished
us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in humility and meekness, according to
Mt. 11:29: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in
charity, according to Jn. 15:12: "Love one another, as I have loved you."
Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 5/6
Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we
must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we
find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For
thus it is written (Is. 11:2,3): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of
understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are
clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being
in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from without.
For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of
movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him,
viz. God, as stated above (Q[9], AA[4],6): moreover the Philosopher says
this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 6/6
Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its
mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a
disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence
the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition
whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a
disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a higher
teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect
man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his
interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher
perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections
are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also
because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine
inspiration, according to Is. 50:5: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear,
and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the Philosopher says in
the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who
are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according
to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they
are moved by a principle higher than human reason. This then is what some
say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts
of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad
sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above the
virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine
virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or
"divine virtue [*{arete heroike kai theia}]," in respect of which some
men are called "divine."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are
opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed to the
gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the
same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose light flows from
God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its general
sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished
from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life"
as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of
reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be
defined as something given by God in relation to His motion; something,
to wit, that makes man to follow well the promptings of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it
proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according
as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the
other virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for
salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing the
ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's
salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary
standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept,
but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for
salvation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well
in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's behavior
to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his
behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts are not
necessary to man for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives
wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel against
rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety
against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride." But a sufficient
remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the
gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and
fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of
wisdom it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth
with wisdom"; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot
be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these
are also necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the gifts are perfections of man,
whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God.
Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not
sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there
is, in consequence, need for a gift.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its
natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with
a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated
above (Q[62], A[1]). And, though this latter perfection is greater than
the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner
than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession,
whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God
imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form
or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not,
however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every
nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or
form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless it be moved by
another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by
itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds
only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art
perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully
instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions
from him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's
connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If,
however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special
promptings from God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness:
hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired
moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters
directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves him,
according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the
theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it
receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according
to Rm. 8:14,17: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of
God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and Ps. 142:10: "Thy good Spirit
shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the
inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led
thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it
is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues,
not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the
commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man
being moved by a higher principle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so
perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need
of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the
reason already given.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its
natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does
not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable
to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. God,
however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His
motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and
hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as
remedies to these defects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as "a quality
difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it
is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as
stated in Is. 11:2,3: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending
and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory
comments as follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the
faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator."
Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he
is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above (AA[1],2). But in so far
as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument
in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not an
instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are not habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine
inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit: for
"the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as
Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts of
the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His
disciples (Jn. 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you."
Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts
abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding
habits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the gifts are perfections of man,
whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it
is evident from what has been already said (Q[56], A[4]; Q[58], A[2]),
that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it
partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural
aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly the gifts of
the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to
man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are
related to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits,
whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly.
Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected
to obey readily the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying
that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy Ghost
ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven
gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore,
with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has
no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is not an
instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that
he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will. Therefore he needs
a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the
manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence
the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably
enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding to
the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and
counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing is set down
corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover,
something is included corresponding to justice, viz. piety, and something
corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of fortitude; while there is
nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated
insufficiently.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is
assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore justice
itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to
God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by God,
it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues,
should have been included.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of
hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided with
fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding;
counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, some
gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ (Is. 11:2,3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), the gifts are habits perfecting
man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even
as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the
reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved
by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to
be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior power. Therefore
whatever powers in man can be the principles of human actions, can also
be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are
the reason and appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the
apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and
judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of
truth, the speculative reason is perfected by "understanding"; the
practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative
reason is perfected by "wisdom"; the practical reason by "knowledge." The
appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to another, is
perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by
"fortitude" against the fear of dangers; and against inordinate lust for
pleasures, by "fear," according to Prov. 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord
every one declineth from evil," and Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh
with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that
these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both
intellectual and moral, extend.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters
concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but
to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not
about things to be done, but about things to be made (Ethic. vi, 4).
However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art
is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the principal mover, and not on
the part of men, who are His organs when He moves them. The gift of fear
corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to
temperance, properly speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for
the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift
of fear, to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and
so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name of piety
denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And
since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is also called piety,
as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man,
through reverence for God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in
some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved by the
craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between
them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope and charity:
and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being
their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues,
as being derived therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is
the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are
transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the
other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to God:
hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain
things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its name to a
theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from evil, for
higher motives than moral virtue does.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of
man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their
directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of
understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. Because
the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the
Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of
wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same
Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to divers
men, and are not connected together in the same man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the
faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some of the
gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems
that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the same
man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account
if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless if it be
not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of
fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very weak if it be
not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use
of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack the discernment of
knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these virtues with it, fear
itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that
it is possible to have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are not connected.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the
following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons, that
by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is
speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from
what has been already set down. For it has been stated (A[3]) that as the
powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the
governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed by the
gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells
in us by charity, according to Rm. 5:5: "The charity of God is poured
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our
reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as the moral virtues are
united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected
together in charity: so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the
Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as
gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the
knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct
the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the
Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he
mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge. They
may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and thus
wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind,
rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the
knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these
gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding
the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring to
knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is
clear from the context which follows: "For it is one thing to know only
what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no
other than eternal life; and another, to know how to impart this to godly
souls, and to defend it against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle
seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in
one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by another, as
stated above (Q[65], A[1]); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of
the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect
without the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular
virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend its
support to another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can
be without another; but that if understanding were without wisdom, it
would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in
heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His sevenfold
gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now
there will be no temptations in heaven, according to Is. 11:9: "They
shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore
there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above
(A[3]). But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now
the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory says
(Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . .
counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . . fortitude . . . has no
fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of
mercy," all of which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore
these gifts will not remain in the state of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life,
e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, e.g. piety
and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states
(Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be in the
state of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of
God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly
river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who,
proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in those
celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their
essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may be
gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is
that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable to the
motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven,
where God will be "all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28), and man entirely subject
unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the matter about
which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an
operation about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation
in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not remain in
the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to
the cardinal virtues (Q[67], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they
are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they afford us
protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all
evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts of the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that
passes away with the present state, and something that remains in the
future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope
and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes, and
certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the
truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness," of
which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every man . .
his brother" (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind remains.
Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is
necessary in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of
reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude he
says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present
life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands of confidence,"
which remains also in the future life. With regard to knowledge he
mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance,"
which refers to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of
the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, which
belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the
inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words taken literally refer only
to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified
by "the inmost heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will
achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that
"it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which
refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens it with the meat of
hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards
hope, but may also refer to the future state, as regards being
"strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For
the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; but all
the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the
contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly bliss.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their
order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that which, more
than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more
than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel,
what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord
thy God?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a master, where is My fear?"
Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest
but the greatest of the gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to
all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods.
Therefore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the
most excellent gift.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel
pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.
Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is
set down as being below it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while
science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than the
appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude;
and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the gifts are not
set down in their order of dignity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It
seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which
Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we
read in Mt. 5:3]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in
Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, with
the lower gifts."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways:
first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding from
their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their
matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they follow
the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another;
because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's powers, even
as the virtues do, as stated above (A[4]). Hence, as the intellectual
virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the
intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the active,
viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that
wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before science, and
prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom,
understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety,
fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and
fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude
temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede
knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are concerned with
difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters.
Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds with the order in
which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are
given the preference to the others, their excellence is considered
simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to
knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their matter.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to
speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the Lord is
the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as though it
were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation,
man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. 16:16), before doing good
works, and which result from the other gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared
with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which he had
said it "is profitable to little."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its
judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: for
counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3),
whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more
excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation to
their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the
appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on the part of the
matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the
executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because counsel and
fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while knowledge and
piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with
fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the preference to
knowledge and piety.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity: "No gift
of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the
children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal damnation.
Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they
avail nothing." But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more
excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more
excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for
Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind
it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance
. . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz.
the gifts], so "as against folly to bestow wisdom; against dullness,
understanding; against rashness, counsel; against fear, fortitude;
against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against
piety, fear." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues
cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make evil use of
the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of
prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding, while it runs
nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies
itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives confidence,
may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and yet loves not,
may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may
become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge
us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent
than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to
remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so
that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the
gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As was shown above (Q[58], A[3]; Q[62], A[1]), there are
three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and
some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby man's mind is
united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself
is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of
appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of the
Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the
Divine motion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by
which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as the
moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the
reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the
intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and
control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the
gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says (Moral. i,
12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the
perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in faith, hope,
and charity."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and
moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the
gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their
Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the
other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more
exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing
moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect than
the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be
more perfect than the gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One
is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes love of
our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and
moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The other is the order
of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love
of God, as regards the act: and in this way moral and intellectual
virtues precede the gifts, since man, through being well subordinate to
his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[68] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy
Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth not
perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the
like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the
Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they
assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?
(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?
(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;
(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues
and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns the
beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy
Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq., ascribes the
beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason
and the eternal law, as stated above (Q[19], A[3]; Q[21], A[1]). Now the
virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in
relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, as is clear from what has
been said (Q[68], AA[1],3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything
else pertaining to the rectitude of the human will, besides the virtues
and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and
mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not
differ from the virtues and gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that
are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace.
Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[3], A[1]), happiness is
the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already,
when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope";
and the Apostle says (Rm. 8:24): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope
to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved towards that end, and
approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved
towards, and approaches the happy end by works of virtue, and above all
by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which
our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy
Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow
him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not
as habit, but as act from habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts
and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more
excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above (Q[68], A[8]).
Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng,
assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, who is
explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and
so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy
Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument proves that no other habits, besides the
virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness:
and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might seem to
be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts
perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him, as stated
above (Q[68], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not
refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because they hope
for a reward, as stated above (A[1]). Now the object of hope is future
happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the
beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you
shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep."
Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men
are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13: "They spend their
days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes refer
to this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of
poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix)
[*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be
had save in the life to come, according to Ps. 16:15: "I shall be filled
[Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in
the future life that we shall see God, and that our Divine sonship will
be made manifest, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We are now the sons of God;
and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He
shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He
is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These
promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been
fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change
into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us after this
life."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of
these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all
these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom in
his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some
to the present life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future
happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having a
preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way
of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness
in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree
will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we
see the first signs of the fruit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the
beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness,
either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may
be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or some
beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained
perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. Because when a
man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and gifts, it is
to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as
a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may
also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that end,
according to Ps. 27:7: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been
helped."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal
punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so,
Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment." The
Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is
divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another that"; and
afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a man so miserable,
he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner, although, on
the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive material rewards in
this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life,
according to Mt. 19:29, and Mk. 10:30: "Ye shall receive a hundred times
as much" even "in this time."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to
come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this life.
Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv; *Cf.
De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote the beginning of perfect
wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men. The
"possession" of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the soul
that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal
inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this life,
by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the "Paraclete," i.e. the
Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food of
which Our Lord said (Jn. 4:34): "My meat is to do the will of Him that
sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye
being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see
God." Likewise, in this life, those who are the "peacemakers" of their
own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children
of God." Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in
heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For
the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the
contemplative life: yet no beatitude is assigned to the act of
contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active
life. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active
life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge and counsel:
yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts
of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently
indicated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active
life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety seems to
correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly
connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently
enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus,
it is written (Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God correcteth"; and
(Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the
ungodly"; and (Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom."
Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For
there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are
indicated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter
of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5 are too many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make
this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist
in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life,
some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [*See Q[3]].
Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future
beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy. Because sensual
happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an obstacle to future
beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future
beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if perfect, is the very essence
of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as
removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure
consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods,
whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn---by a virtue so
that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent way,
so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is:
"Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the contempt
of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility.
Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of one's
passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the
irascible passions man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that they are kept
within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a gift, in a
more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will, is
altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "Blessed
are the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man is
withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in
moderation---and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside
altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice
of sorrow [*Cf. Q[35], A[3]]; hence the third beatitude is: "Blessed are
they that mourn."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor,
either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former we
are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to
our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and by a gift, so that we do
the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an
ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with
eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we
are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we
should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains
to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift, so that, through reverence
for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our
gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): "When thou makest
a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc . . .
"but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have
mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final
beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are included
in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the
active life, which dispose man for the contemplative life, are included
in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those
virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing
of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the passions: hence the
sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of heart." But as regards the
virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in relation to his neighbor,
the effect of the active life is peace, according to Is. 32:17: "The work
of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are
the peacemakers."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are
indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to the
contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given
above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of understanding; and
to be like God by being adoptive "children of God," corresponds to the
gift of wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not
sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies
something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts of those gifts
which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited
by those gifts, as, e.g. to counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge,
the act of knowledge: but, on the other hand, they include those
operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning
in respect of knowledge, and mercy in respect of counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two
things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first five
beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing
principles: whereas they must be distributed among the executive gifts:
so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond
to piety, which perfects man in his relations to others; meekness to
fortitude, for Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: "It is the business of fortitude
to conquer anger, and to curb indignation," fortitude being about the
irascible passions: poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man
withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this
way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the
principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to
piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows his
failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18: "He that
addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The principal motive
for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude of the soul: and
the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to Dan.
4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]:
and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of
mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte i, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced
to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because they must
all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life.
Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom the Lord correcteth,"
we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, "Blessed
is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly," we must
refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read, "Blessed is the man
that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the reward of the seventh
beatitude. The same applies to all others that can be adduced.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of
all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is
confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that
no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the eighth
beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the
multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the
capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure,
temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord
excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The first of
these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying:
"Blessed are ye poor." The second is that man be well off as to his body,
in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second
place: "Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it should be well
with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside by saying:
"Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the outward favor of man;
and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: "Blessed shall you be, when men
shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20, "poverty corresponds to
temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who
hungers is compassionate and, through compassion gives; mourning, to
prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred
belongs to fortitude."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably
enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal life,
contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no
other rewards should be mentioned.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of
the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same ground it
should have been assigned to all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as
Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the rewards seem
to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less
than to possess "the kingdom of heaven." Therefore these rewards are
unsuitably enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these
rewards.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the
nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness
indicated above (A[3]). For the first three beatitudes concerned the
withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists:
which happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire,
not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal and perishable
things. Wherefore the rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to
these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men
seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and
abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom of heaven, whereby
man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our
Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel
and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies
so as to gain security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a
secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby the
solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation
for the toils of the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the
world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are
the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor: from
which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own
good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in
correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there
are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what
is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may abound in temporal
goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that
they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede from works of mercy, lest
they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the
merciful that they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude:
hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions
included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see
clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God.
Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be
a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward,
he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in perfect
union with God through consummate wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards
are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect
cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various
boons known to us, while observing due proportion to the merits to which
those rewards are assigned.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the
beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence it
returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be
attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to Ambrose (Super
Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as
regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer persecution in
their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[69] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is
more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to have it:
since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully.
Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to have and possess
it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by
sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted,
because fulness implies abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses
satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to
desire. And yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who
not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. Lastly,
the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?
(2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?
(3) Of their number?
(4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal.
5) are acts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by
the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23), are not acts. For that which bears fruit,
should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely.
But our actions bear fruit: for it is written (Wis. 3:15): "The fruit of
good labor is glorious," and (Jn. 4:36): "He that reapeth receiveth
wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." Therefore our actions
are not to be called fruits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy
[*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English
'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them."
But our will should not rest in our actions for their own sake. Therefore
our actions should not be called fruits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers
certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. Now virtues
are not actions but habits, as stated above (Q[55], A[1]). Therefore the
fruits are not actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 12:33): "By the fruit the tree is
known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain
the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material
to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the product
of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This
fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that produces it, and to the
man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual
matters, we may take the word "fruit" in two ways: first, so that the
fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he produces;
secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and
gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these are
not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man
intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense man's
fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human
actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the
operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's
operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be the
fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher
power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said
to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine seed, for it is written
(1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed
abideth in him."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders
one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate to
another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy
Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are referred to
the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers:
hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): "My flowers are the fruits of honor
and riches."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own
sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression
"for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way,
man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last end. Secondly,
so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight
in anything that is delightful by reason of its form. Thus it is clear
that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake, as in an end; in a
nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a
nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of
something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for
His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being
his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness which is delightful
to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds
are called fruits because "they refresh those that have them, with a holy
and genuine delight."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their
actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to believe
what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the
movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor." It is thus that the
names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes.
For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above (Q[69],
A[1], ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the
Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the Holy
Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude
which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the present life
to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the
fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude. Therefore the
fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful.
Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above (Q[3], A[1];
Q[4], A[1]). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and
consequently should not be distinguished from one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Things divided into different species, differ from one
another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as
is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits
differ from the beatitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit.
Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and
delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and
excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice
versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights:
whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason
of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the
virtues, as already stated (Q[69], A[1], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not
that all the fruits are beatitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply:
hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand the
fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore
not all the fruits are beatitudes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as
stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the
Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only
one fruit of the present life; according to Rm. 6:22: "You have your
fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written (Is. 27:9): "This is
all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away." Therefore we
should not reckon twelve fruits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A[1]
). But Our Lord mentions (Mt. 13:23) a threefold fruit as growing from a
spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, sixtyfold," and
"thirtyfold." Therefore one should not reckon twelve fruits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and
delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned by the
Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object,
while faith is not something ultimate, but rather something primary and
fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated
insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated (A[2]) that all
the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor
is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of many other
virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle
is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve
fruits of which it is written (Apoc. 22:2): "On both sides of the river
was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit is something
that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the difference
between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the
Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process consists in this, that the mind
of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in
regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are
below it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has
a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the
first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love,
which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as stated
above (Q[27], A[4]). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we
reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, as
in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence it is written (Rm.
5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of the love of charity
is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now
charity has always actual presence in God Whom it loves, according to 1
Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him":
wherefore the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection of joy is
peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward
disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved
good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's
heart is perfectly set at peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by
any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written
(Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there
is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external things do not disturb
them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the
restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied
with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely,
that we be not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest
altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, "peace" is
given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in
respect of two things. First, by not being disturbed whenever evil
threatens: which pertains to "patience"; secondly, by not being
disturbed, whenever good things are delayed; which belongs to "long
suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his
neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs
"goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this
belongs "benignity," for the benign are those in whom the salutary flame
[bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their
neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils his
neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs anger.
Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor
not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit. To this
pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it
for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed thereby to
that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and,
consequently, all that is his, to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards
external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe the "mode" in all our
words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and
"chastity": whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man from
unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the
continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas
the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which
also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in the
singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into
many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not
differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees of
perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married
state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the contingency of
widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold
fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy men distinguish
three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees of virtue: and
they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is
considered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and its end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is
something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the
foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as
much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith, which
is certainly about the unseen."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Augustine says on Gal. 5:22,23, "the Apostle had no
intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits
of the Spirit] there are; but to show how the former should be avoided,
and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer fruits might
have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues
can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in so far as
all the virtues and gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the
above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts
directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why
he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either
enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to
belong to the notion of fruit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the
flesh?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary
to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5:19,
seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the
flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not
contrary to them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more
works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore the fruits of the
Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given
to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, and
immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed.
Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the works of the
flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may
be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits of
the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the
flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in
accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the
fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws man to sensible goods which
are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and downward are contrary
movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the
flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered
singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this they are not
of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad
4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether
spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine,
commenting on Gal. 5:22,23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works,
each to each. Thus "to fornication, which is the love of satisfying lust
outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is
wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must
understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the
joy of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was
waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against
witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels,
there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on us
by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those
evils; and goodness, to forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is
faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature,
is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since works of
virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to
nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called fruits, but not
so works of vice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices are
contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh
are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[70] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] Out. Para. 1/2
EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)
OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)
We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six
points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in themselves;
(2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the
subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?
(3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?
(4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?
(5) Whether every sin includes action?
(6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii):
"Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing
has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and malice
are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice
applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of any things
whatever.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice
does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not
contrary to virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is the
soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is opposed to
health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is a
quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality
which makes its subject good," as was shown above (Q[55], AA[3],4).
Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of
virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue we
may consider something directly, and we may consider something
consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby the subject
is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is a disposition of a
perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is
disposed according to its nature." That which virtue implies
"consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: because the goodness of
a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its
nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown
above (Q[56], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of
these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which
virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate
act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of
that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of
goodness, the contrary of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that
which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is "vice":
because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in
a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii):
"Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a
vice."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the
same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter is
productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of
goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle
of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason for
this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a
thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. It is
in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and sickness
are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he calls it" disease
"when the whole body is infected," for instance, with fever or the like;
he calls it sickness "when the disease is attended with weakness"; and
vice "when the parts of the body are not well compacted together." And
although at times there may be disease in the body without sickness, for
instance, when a man has a hidden complaint without being hindered
outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says,
"these two things are indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever
a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is
rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is known
by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according to Mt. 12:33. But "vice
of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or
affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through
life": and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g.
when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider
extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue extends to more things
than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii,
text. 17). Consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more
fittingly than sickness or disease.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vice is contrary to nature?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice
is contrary to virtue, as stated above (A[1]). Now virtue is in us, not
by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q[63], AA[1]
,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is
contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to upward
movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice.
Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the
greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is found
in the greater number of men; for it is written (Mt. 7:13): "Broad is the
way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat."
Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated
above (A[1]). Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to
the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). But the Law
of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to
the Law, rather than to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice,
simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), vice is contrary to virtue. Now
the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner
befitting its nature, as stated above (A[1]). Hence the vice of any thing
consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and
for this reason is that thing "vituperated," which word is derived from
"vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form
from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species
from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the
order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as
man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the
nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason,
and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good,
is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his
reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is
contrary to the order of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards
their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords with
reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii)
that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second nature": and
it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and
on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against
nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being from
nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to
"being in accord with nature," in which latter sense virtues are said to
be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is
suitable to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the
sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his senses
that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the
inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the order of
reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its
completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the
fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the
order of his reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the
art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to the
order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to
the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and
that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. iii, 6) that "every nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious
nature, in so far as it fails from the Divine art whereby it was made."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin,
i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better it is, so
the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more
lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a vicious habit
is worse than a vicious act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad
habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a vicious habit
is worse than a vicious act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit
produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their badness.
Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in
badness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for
a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action is
worse than a vicious habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is
evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in
Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well,
and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to
do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness,
habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit, even as a
good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in goodness or in
badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made
clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad, save in so
far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good
or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act
surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since "the cause of a thing
being such, is yet more so."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another
simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another
simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is
deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it in something
which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature
of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in goodness and in
badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting than act, is
accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a
nature such that it cannot always be in action, and whose action consists
in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and
badness, but habit excels in a certain respect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain
respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit
precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act
causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider
the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in
goodness and in badness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin is compatible with virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with
virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Now sin
is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore
sin is incompatible with virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit.
But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, therefore,
can sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary
matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural things,
except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are
due to corruption of some elemental force in the seed, as stated in Phys.
ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the
corruption of some virtue in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be
together in the same subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is
engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one virtuous act does
not cause a virtue, as stated above (Q[51], A[3]): and, consequently, one
sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the
same subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit.
Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a form
in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of
necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is
incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible
with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except
perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the habit that
resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but
is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possessing a habit,
may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man
having a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long
as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the
virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one
act, so neither is it destroyed by one act as stated above (Q[63], A[2],
ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then
it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For
every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the
infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity being banished by
one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are
expelled "as virtues." And I say on account of faith and hope, whose
habits remain unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer
virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to
charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the
other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one
act of any kind of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is
consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible with
virtues, whether infused or acquired.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by
reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but not with
the habit, of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to
virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts of
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as
the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the other
hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity;
hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every sin includes an action?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is
compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now there can be
no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without
action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera
Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, unless
it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save
through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies an act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man
sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never does
something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought.
Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is untrue.
Therefore there is no sin without an act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who knoweth
to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does
not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to the
sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some
say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or
exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not to go to church," when he
is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is
bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way
that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the
same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with
this other, wills, consequently, to go without this other: unless,
perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will
hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be
deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin of
omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not
doing what one is bound to do is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of
omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin consists,
the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man
wills "not to go to church": while sometimes it will be without any act
at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he
is bound to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or
occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity
include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we
can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do
or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united
with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's
power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone omits going to
church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to
the will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far as it is
voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act
of the will: which act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when
a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too much trouble; and in
this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because
the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin,
since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of
the will bears directly on something else which hinders man from doing
what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission,
as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church---or,
precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the
result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case
the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the omission, since the
omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the
intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it
is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with,
or preceding the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of
omission.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper
to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is
truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial
acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: More things are required for good than for evil, since
"good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results from
each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may
arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing what he
ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he
ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act, whereas there
can be sin without act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on which
the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which we have
the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not
to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in his power to
will, and not to will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept
which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, a man
sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to
the eternal law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: "Sin is
a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because "Word,"
"deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act,
as stated above (A[5]). Therefore this definition does not include every
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the will to
retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised under
desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it
was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law," nor was
there need to add "word" or "deed."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the
end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the end as
explained above (Q[1], A[3]; Q[18], AA[4],6; Q[20], AA[2],3): wherefore
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying
that "sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal things, and seek after
temporal things": and again he says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human
wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what
we should use." Now the definition is question contains no mention of
aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary
to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, but some
are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not
be defined as being against the law of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above
(A[1]). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div.
Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that sin is against
reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As was shown above (A[1]), sin is nothing else than a bad
human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary,
as stated above (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited
by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the
will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human
act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and
conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that
thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human
will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other
is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to
speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things
in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human
act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word,"
"deed," or "desire"; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and
which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the
eternal law."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus:
e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus
"relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so "word" and
"deed" denote equally what is said and what is not said, what is done and
what is not done.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all
voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it is that
Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But
since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, through being
evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to
include something referring to external action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end,
and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to things
which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to the
eternal law," he includes aversion from the end and all other forms of
inordinateness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil through being
forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. If,
however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is
contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural
code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being
prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely because it is
inordinate.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[71] A[6] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against
God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. Hence
Augustine defines sin with reference to its being "contrary to the
eternal law," more fittingly than with reference to its being contrary to
reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that
surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head
there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?
(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;
(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?
(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?
(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?
(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?
(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?
(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to
their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation,
chiefly, to their end, as shown above (Q[1], A[3]; Q[18], AA[4],6). Since
then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above (Q[71],
A[1]), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their
ends rather than according to their objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according
to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of
human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their
opposites rather than according to their objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their
objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with
diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about
things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and
avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ
in species according to their objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law." Now
words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various
objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above (Q[18], A[2]
). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[71], A[6]), two things concur in the
nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which
consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is referred
essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and
such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is
referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no one acts
intending evil," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident
that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not
from that which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the
specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the part of the
voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now
voluntary acts differ in species according to their objects, as was
proved above (Q[18], A[2]). Therefore it follows that sins are properly
distinguished in species by their objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and
therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the will
which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same
whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due
order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects of their
acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they
were distinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it would come
to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their
objects, as stated above (Q[60], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing
hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which aspect
sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in
reference to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things
adapted to human use.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished
from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the
flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty,
luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. from which it seems that all kinds
of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the
flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual
sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated
in Rm. 8:13: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if
by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." Now to
live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of
carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from
spiritual sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or
reason, is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in the
spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to a
gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the flesh,
flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act
belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on (Q[74], A[7]).
Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently
they should not be distinguished from one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly,
should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against his own body.
But, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "every sin that a man doth,
is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against
his own body." Therefore fornication would be the only carnal sin,
whereas the Apostle (Eph. 5:3) reckons covetousness with the carnal sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven
capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), sins take their species from
their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable
good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the possession of which
gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q[31], A[3]),
pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the
mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; this
can also be called spiritual pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in
human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is
realized in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called
spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, are called
carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the
table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle
says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the
flesh and of the spirit."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called
works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; but
flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when
he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3).
The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in
some way to the carnal sense.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the
act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are named, is
carnal pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul is
the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning it
can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although
carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It may also be said that
in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled
inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man said specifically to sin
against his body. While covetousness, which is reckoned among the carnal
sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of
another's wife. Again, it may be said that the thing in which the
covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect
covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself
does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory says
(Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their
causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it derives its
being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take
their species from them also. Therefore they differ specifically in
reference to their causes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least
reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its material
cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their
objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference to their
other causes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set on fire
and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear inducing false
humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor." For it is written (1
Jn. 2:16) that "all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the
flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.: 'and']
the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be in the world on account of
sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine
observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17),
distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all
these divisions refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins
differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one
species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus.
10:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and (1 Tim. 6:10) that
"the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that
there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ
specifically according to their different causes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed
to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and the
"material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and
consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form, both
in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly
movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations differ
specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however,
because the natural active principles are always determined to the same
acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only
from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also
from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are specifically
distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active
principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not
determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or
motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear
engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or to
neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may
proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that
sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or
motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause, which
is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above (Q[1],
A[3]; Q[18], AA[4],6) that human acts take their species from the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not being
determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts,
unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the
Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently sin
derives both its being and its species from the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character
of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of the
will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they
give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as the matter
"about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes
its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. x, 4); yet even terms of movement
specify movements, in so far as term has the character of end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct
species of sins, but to show their various causes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself,
and against one's neighbor?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against
God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that which is
common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of
sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it is stated in
the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above
(Q[66], A[6]). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of
the division of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to
one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another:
for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against
God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God
and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not distinguished
specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly
divided according to these three.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of
sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and
against his neighbor."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[71], AA[1],6), sin is an inordinate
act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the
rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be
commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the
rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and
if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would
suffice. But since man is naturally a civic and social animal, as is
proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is
directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these
orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever
things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the
order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of
God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things
due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, by
heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like
manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in
all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we need
to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we
are directed according to reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not
in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is
said to sin against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and
the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is
said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer.
Now the things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself
are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their
objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and
consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different
species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed,
differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from
what has been said (Q[62], AA[1],2,3) that by the theological virtues man
is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by
justice to his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the
order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order to God
surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When several things, of which one includes another, are
distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, not
to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond
another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures: for a
triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its
being contained thereby, but in respect of that in which it is surpassed
thereby: and the same applies to the numbers three and four.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner
himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it
as to its object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment
diversifies their species?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt
of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is
divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely
apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But
venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is
due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; and the measure
of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to
Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also
of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same
genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex
genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and
adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle
word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ
specifically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward,
so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is the end of
the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ
specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of
punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to the
species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as the
effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to
the debt of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold
difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be
found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational,"
"animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to
specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to
specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same
species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific
diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the
one species of man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin,
or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a
difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never
constitutes a species; and what is outside the agent's intention is
accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is
outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally
referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to
sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes
various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore
the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to
the specific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the
diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin. For
inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and
another which, without destroying the principle of order, implies
inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an
animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle
is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on the other
hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily
humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral
order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of
action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation
(Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to
turn away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity,
there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from
God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death
which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is
irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be
repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in
matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is
impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who
errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by
means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by
sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his
sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to
deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away
from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired,
because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said
to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to deserve to be
punished eternally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what
they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to," viz. the
object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from
including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species "adultery"
the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is,
generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its
species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that
this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not
that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in
things of the same species, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts
virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on
the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ
specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another
(Eph. 2:1), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and
sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,' by omitting to
do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." Whence
it is evident that "offenses" here denotes sins of omission; while "sin"
denotes sins of commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since
they are contrasted with one another as different species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this
is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said (Q[71],
A[6]). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the
sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, against which
is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ
specifically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and
negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species,
since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor
difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text. 67).
Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Omission and commission are found in the same species
of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is
a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give,
which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not
differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins; a material
difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be
observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal
difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is
also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one
another in the material specific difference, which are nevertheless
formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the one
same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one
species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically
according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the
material species in sins of omission and commission, they differ
specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and
privation may have a species. But if we refer to the formal species of
sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because
they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For
the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, and omits to give
what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite,
both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to
other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation,
which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes
under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not
give forth cold.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This division in respect of commission and omission, is not
according to different formal species, but only according to material
species, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and
negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, first
by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts,
and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative
precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong
to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue; and
consequently they are not of necessity, opposed to sins of different
species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away,
because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but by that to
which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not
differ specifically according to the various precepts of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It
must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, negation is
not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the
affirmation on which it is based.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of
thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes three
stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a
bait," which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached "when one
is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage,
"when consent is given to the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of
thought. Therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind
of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the
first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second, "when it is
done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the
fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume on God's mercy or to give
himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed
and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the
first division was unfitting.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede
sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically.
Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23: "The human race
is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by
thought, or word, or deed."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each
has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically:
secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of
degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the complete
generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the
setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the generation of
animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of
thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the
consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the
complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it
were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so
far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while
the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently
these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin.
Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete
species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry
man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then
he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful
deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in
respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into
three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this
reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas
Jerome (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between them,
because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is
intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of
the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward
manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following
the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the
complete generation of a man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the
sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found
by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole
movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break
in the movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the
species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and
less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess
and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying
from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is
due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of
falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the reality.
Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or
less from the rectitude of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry
declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency are
united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and
wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by
excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of
sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a
difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices that
differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another,
as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself
and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order of
reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its
inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, as stated above
(A[1]), but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the
object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently wherever
we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be
a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive for
sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in
sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as
the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while
the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore
these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity of
species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in so
far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that
fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1)
that "those who held that there are no different species of friendship,
by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by insufficient proof." In
this way to exceed reason or to fall short thereof belongs to sins
specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and
so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through
departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes
he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in this
respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however,
departure from the truth be not outside the intention, it is evident that
then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less; and in this
respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the
"boaster," who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the
"cheat," who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying
his debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one
another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different
objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. SS, Q[119], A[1], ad 1]
in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being
in the same subject, in different respects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different
circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil results from
each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual
circumstances. Therefore from the corruption of each circumstance there
results a corresponding species of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their
species from circumstances, as stated above (Q[18], A[10]). Therefore
sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are
corrupted.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/2
OBJ 3: Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to
the words contained in the following verse:
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 2/2
'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.' Now these pertain
to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner than is right; "too
much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the
species of sin is diversified according to the various circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every
vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not"; and in
like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins
are not diversified in this respect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[8]), wherever there is a special
motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the
motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes
that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one
motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought
not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on with the
circumstances, since he does this through an inordinate desire of
hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different
circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one
and the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises
from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be due
to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of
a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too much
food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice
meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such
matters, the corruption of different circumstances entails different
species of sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different
species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even as
other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or
aversion, as stated above (A[1]), but from turning to the object of the
act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to
another, save when there is another motive.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[72] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the various species of gluttony there are various
motives, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which
head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?
(2) Whether all are equal?
(3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?
(4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is
opposed?
(5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?
(6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?
(7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?
(8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?
(9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?
(10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person
sinning?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all sins are connected with one another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written
(James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one
point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of transgressing all
the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as
Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a transgression of the Divine law,
and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore whoever commits
one sin is guilty of all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks
one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above (Q[65], A[1]). Therefore
whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore
whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle
in common, as stated above (Q[65], AA[1],2). Now as the virtues have a
common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds
the city of God, is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so
self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as
Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins
are also connected so that whoever has one, has them all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Some vices are contrary to one another, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in
the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be
connected with one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in
pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the sinner in
straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting
according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the
intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the
virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done,
viz. prudence, as stated above (Q[65], A[1]). But the intention of the
sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason;
rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives
its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed
when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual
connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one another. Since,
therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they
turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's
species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not
consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues,
which are connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which
it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated above (Q[72]
, A[1]), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as
man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now all the
commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the
same passage, so that the same God is despised in every sin; and in this
sense he says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of
all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt of
punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[71], A[4]), the opposite virtue is not
banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue;
while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from God.
Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired
virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary
habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction of
which entails the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any
virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue
is possible, as stated above (Q[58], A[4]; Q[65], A[1]). Consequently all
the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of
virtue, which they have in so far as they partake of prudence, yet there
remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however,
are not virtues. Nevertheless it does not follow that for this reason man
contracts all vices of sins---first, because several vices are opposed to
one virtue, so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the
others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to
virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above
(Q[71], A[1]). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it
cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's
affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which flow from
the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's
affections among different things, in so far as man loves himself, by
desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds:
hence vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected
together.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all sins are equal?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what
is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same
way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way.
Therefore one sin is not graver than another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason,
which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things.
Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a
line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way from
it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less.
Therefore all sins are equal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal,
as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11): "He that hath
delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that
Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is greater than another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the
book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from which
opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins
to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal. So
far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at
their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the privation
only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from reason; wherefore
considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held
that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we
shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple
and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in "being" corrupted;
thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such
like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of
the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day after
his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his
corpse is already dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if
the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a
single shade shutting out all the light. There is, however, another
privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite
habit; it consists in "becoming" corrupted rather than in "being"
corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due commensuration
of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else
the animal would cease to live: and the same applies to deformity and the
like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains
or the contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity,
whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors or
members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the
privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy
the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as
stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of
the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of
reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one
departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we
must say that sins are not all equal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness
therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness are more
unlawful, and consequently graver sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure
privation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same
subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to its
species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same
species of virtue, as stated above (Q[66], AA[1],2). Moreover, even if
virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since
virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to
their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to its mode or
quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the
gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now
sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it turns,
and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns
away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their
various objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds.
But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one another, as is
proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than
another by reason of the difference of objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Sins take their species from their objects, as was
shown above (Q[72], A[1]). But some sins are graver than others in
respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the
gravity of sins varies according to their objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said (Q[71], A[5]), the
gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than
another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain
commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so the
good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in
accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the
principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the humors, the
graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body
from the heart, which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring
part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the
graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the
order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason directs all things
in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins
in human acts, the graver the sin. Now the object of an act is its end,
as stated above (Q[72], A[3], ad 2); and consequently the difference of
gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external
things are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to
God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very substance of man,
e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g.
theft; and graver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g.
unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin,
one sin will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or
lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their
objects, the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects is
first and foremost, as resulting from the species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the object is the matter about which an act is
concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention
of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above (Q[72], A[3], ad 2). Now the
form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above (Q[72], A[6];
Q[18], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable
good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which
aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of
malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to which
man turns.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All the objects of human acts are related to one another,
wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as they are
directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being
compared with one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to
which they are opposed?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to
the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, so that, to wit,
the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to
Prov. 15:5, "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." Now, as
Our Lord says (Mt. 5:20, seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which
is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice
restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "virtue is about the
difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the greater
virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to
fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less difficult. Therefore
the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (1 Cor.
13:13). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin
than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore
the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is
opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; and
the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is
opposed to the greatest virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first,
principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same
object: because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the
more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: because,
just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also
does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and virtue take their
species from the object, as shown above (Q[60], A[5]; Q[72], A[1]).
Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest
virtue, as being furthest removed from it in the same genus. Secondly,
the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain
extension of the virtue in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the
further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man
not only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it
is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also
from less grievous sins: even as the more perfect health is, the more
does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous
sin is opposed to the greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the opposition which consists in
restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is
opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. For in
each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be
more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome by the difficulty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence
not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred of God,
which is the most grievous of all sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than
spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: for
it is written (Prov. 6:30,32): "The fault is not so great when a man has
stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart
shall destroy his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is
a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal sin.
Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than spiritual sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The
quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil rejoices
chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin.
Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the carnal sins are
of most guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more
shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger is a
spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust
pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than
spiritual sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are
of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet
this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than each
carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual
and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other
things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is
on the part of the subject: because spiritual sins belong to the spirit,
to which it is proper to turn to God, and to turn away from Him; whereas
carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to
which it chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal
sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and for that reason,
implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a "turning
from" something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason
it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of
the person against whom sin is committed: because carnal sin, as such, is
against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order
of charity, than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual
sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. A
third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse
to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we shall state further on (A[6]).
Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of
the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to
the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under the head
of covetousness, as a gloss observes on Eph. 5:5. "No fornicator, or
unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more
grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more than his chattels.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust,
because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty be
withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason
why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger, is that
lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii,
10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy of reproach, because they
are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds":
hence, by these sins man is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same
reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that they are more shameful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its
cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly it moves to
sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by
the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes weakness in the
sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness
is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from
its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a
gloss on Rm. 7:7, "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is
good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now the
greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his
sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished by the greatness of its
cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous
act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. Now the
greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so
that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and
he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the
gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect is increased.
Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes
may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is
the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its
fruit, as a gloss observes on Mt. 7:18, "A good tree cannot bring forth
evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the
sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being
those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must
make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord
with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper
object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous,
because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the
intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin,
against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to
be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason.
Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g.
ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the will, (e.g.
weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even
as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be
altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which
diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes the
sin, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of
the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater
sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement
of the concupiscible power, then a greater concupiscence, forestalling
the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin,
because the man who sins, being stimulated by a greater concupiscence,
falls through a more grievous temptation, wherefore he is less to be
blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense
follows the judgment of reason, and the movement of the will, then the
greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement
of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its
object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the cause which renders the act
involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin.
Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance does
not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity
of a sin is not taken from a circumstance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it
causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it cannot
make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away
(from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the object to
which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who
sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven (Ethic.
iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated
a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue
(Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that
which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in
some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order of
reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action.
Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by
reason of its circumstances. This happens in three ways. First, in so far
as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication
is the intercourse of a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this
be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin
is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps
another's property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin
than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by
drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of sin:
thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought
not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were
to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin
is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more
parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. iii) that "in taking his
father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him,
who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his
position in the republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by
adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance:
thus, taking another's property constitutes the sin of theft; but if to
this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property,
the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take more or less
has not the character of a good or of an evil act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above
(Q[18], A[10]). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the
species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing is
weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to
an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not only according to
the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is
evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species; because
it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated
above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in relation to the
malice of another circumstance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Reason should direct the action not only as regards the
object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may turn
aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single
circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought not or
where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices
to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of reason results
from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its
causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the
sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or
malice, as stated above (Q[20], A[5]). Therefore a sin is not aggravated
on account of its causing more harm.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because
no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, according to Job
35:6,8: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?
. . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee." If, therefore,
sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins
against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against God or oneself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of
the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because the life
of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to
despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now, speaking
absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of
the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were
more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm, it would follow
that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than
murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous
on account of its causing a greater harm.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is
contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it
diminishes the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the integrity
of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more
harm.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because
sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when
a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a
thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin directly,
because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm
is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a man takes a short cut
through a field, the result being that he knowingly injures the growing
crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit
fornication. In this case again the quantity of the harm done aggravates
the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his
will being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from
doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not wish simply.
Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then
if this harm is connected with the sin accidentally, it does not
aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider
the harm that might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil
results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm
follow directly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor
intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly
consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that
sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that
many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it
perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself
incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act,
and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does
it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man in
running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this
harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be
neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make greater
sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a
greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains
of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a
sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither
intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer,
who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a
greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to sin; but the
gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As we have already stated (Q[20], A[5]), in treating of the
goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if
foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow
that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is
inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm
itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the act
more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted
chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are the most
grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found against
which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against
himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do God any harm
in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him,
e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things, which are most
grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm
on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally
to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some anxiety.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first,
because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors;
whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but
pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause of
bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of
another's spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually except by
sinning of his own will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person
against whom it is committed?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the
condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were
the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a
just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a virtuous
man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done
him, than others, who, through being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly.
Therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin is committed
does not aggravate the sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this
would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, because, as
Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave sins once: he
that takes his father's life sins many times." But the kinship of a
person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every
man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself
than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than another's horse, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person
sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin
chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to Wis. 6:7:
"The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and Lk. 12:47: "The servant who
knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with
many stripes." Therefore, in like manner, on the part of the person
sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position
and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict
an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man, since "there
is no respect of persons with God" (Col. 3:25), according to Whose
judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the
person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are
committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (3 Kgs. 19:14):
"They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the
sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man
against those who are akin to him, according to Micah 7:6: "the son
dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother."
Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are expressly
condemned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): "Who saith to the king: 'Thou
art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." Therefore the condition of
the person sinned against aggravates the sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of
the sin. Now it has been stated above (A[3]) that the primary gravity of
a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much
the more grave, as its object is a more principal end. But the principal
ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever
we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of
them is subordinate to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity
of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered on
the part of these three.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he
is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury inflicted on
such a person redounds on to God according to Zach. 2:8: "He that
toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the more
grievous, according as it is committed against a person more closely
united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the
part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the more grievously,
according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him,
either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond;
because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for
this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to Ecclus.
14:5: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part
of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according as his sin
affects more persons: so that a sin committed against a public personage,
e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is
more grievous than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is
expressly prohibited (Ex. 22:28): "The prince of thy people thou shalt
not curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person
of prominence, is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the
disturbance it would cause among many people.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as
he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that the
latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not
extenuate the sin of the injurer.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things
which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his
possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because
he does it of his own will; but in those things that are not subject to
the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a
graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for it is more grievous for a
man to kill himself than another. Since, however, things belonging to our
neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails
to prove, in respect of injuries done to such like things, that it is
less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be
willing, or give his approval.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is no respect for persons if God punishes more
severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is done
because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not
aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to God,
according to Ecclus. 25:13: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and
knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the
more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is
written (2 Paral. 30: 18,19): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to
all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their
fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified."
Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" (Rm. 2:11).
Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the
same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the
person sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would,
if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness.
Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the
person sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed
so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent
person."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on
account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are less
imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in
checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow us
to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from
deliberation: and these sins are all the more imputed to man according as
he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First,
because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and
virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said (Lk. 12:47) that
the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . .
shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly, on account of ingratitude,
because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man
is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any excellence, even in
temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according to Wis. 6:7: "The mighty
shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being
specially inconsistent with the excellence of the person sinning: for
instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as
the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas
he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or
scandal; because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin becomes much more
scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position": and the sins of
the great are much more notorious and men are wont to bear them with more
indignation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done
negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God does not respect persons in punishing the great more
severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin,
as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[73] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from
the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there
are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?
(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?
(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?
(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?
(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in
the higher reason?
(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the
higher reason?
(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?
(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?
(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to
its proper object?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is a subject of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and the
intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in
the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems
good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does not sin: and
that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect
in the apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin is
nowise in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient
cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause do not
coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of
sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states
(De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will
that we sin, and live righteously."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above (Q[71], AA[1],6). Now some
acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such
acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which the action
passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement
is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand,
there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the
agent, e.g. "to desire" and "to know": and such are all moral acts,
whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must
needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is
proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]
; Q[18], A[6]), it follows that the will, which is the principle of
voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the
principle of sins. Therefore it follows that sin is in the will as its
subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does
not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is an
apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is
in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject
to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in the
apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is
invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the apprehensive
power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument applies to those efficient causes whose
actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, but
move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will;
hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For
Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except by the
will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the
will alone is the subject of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil
pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore the will
alone is the subject of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine
states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so true is it
that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at
all." Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary, except in so
far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them
to be the subject of sin, because then even the external members of the
body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin; which is
clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one
same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are the
subject of virtues, as stated above (Q[56]). Therefore the will is not
the only subject of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As was shown above (A[1]), whatever is the a principle of
a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only
those which are elicited by the will, but also those which are commanded
by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating of
voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but
also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained
from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the subjects of
good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same
subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin
by the other powers as moved by the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects;
but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by reason
of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as
they partake of will and reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The members of the body are not principles but merely
organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves
them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the
internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because
they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3.
Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions that pass into
external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin
of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin
is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now sensuality
is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the
sensuality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine
states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement of the
sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever remains
corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore it is
signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13).
Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him
as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we do with
the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8).
Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the
deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 7:19): "The good which I will I do
not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine
explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring
to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the
sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],3), sin may be found in any power
whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of
sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive
appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it
follows that sin can be in the sensuality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are
common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have a
certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass
other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the powers of
cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the FP, Q[78], A[4]. In the
same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason
of a certain excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the
reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary
action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be
understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely
destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes,
its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" does not
hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate
movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his
thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to
something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus
when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his
thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science,
sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise.
Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the
aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary
sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the
deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing
therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it
cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect
of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the
reason, is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because
an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit a mortal
sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures.
Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal
sin can be found in the sensuality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in
the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the
irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore,
since it is natural to contraries to be about the same subject,
sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now
disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial sin
may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin can be
there also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate
movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even
be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin is
not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is
not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the
body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys the
principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death,
which is mortal sin, as stated above (Q[72], A[5]). Now it belongs to the
reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end:
and disorder in respect of the end can only belong to the power whose
function it is to order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be
in the sensuality, but only in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin:
yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being an act of
the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering
to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not to the
sensuality, but to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act
of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act of
reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral
virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act of moral
virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an
act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; and the same applies
to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which
it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same
subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science:
sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat
is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same
thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things which are subordinate
to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other,
e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in
the intellect. In this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may
be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin can be in the reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of
any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is not a sin,
on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account
of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above
(A[1]). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin
cannot be in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under
our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among those
things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally
deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the
lower and in the higher reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have
clearly shown (AA[1],2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its
proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of
knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other
powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason. First,
in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to
the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or error about what it is
able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate
movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the
reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the case when
it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know:
for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and excuses from sin, as is
evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of
reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is
not altogether excused from sin, and the defect is imputed to him as a
sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other
powers, is always imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always
obviate this defect by means of its proper act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[17], A[1]), when we were treating of the
acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in
one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in another: so that
both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the
reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through
being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason being the
principle of the will's act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad
1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the
reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power, as
stated above (Q[31], A[1]). But the appetitive power is distinct from the
reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is
not in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it
is through the act that the power is directed to its object. Now a morose
delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of
the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin
'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is no
reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose
delectation does not belong to the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent
to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the
pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken
of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes the lower reason, as he
himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose
delectation is in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated (A[5]), sin may be in the reason, not only in
respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing
human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only external
acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails in
directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also
when it fails in directing external actions. Now it fails, in two ways,
in directing internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful
passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a
movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the
unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having
deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate,
continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] upon it, and fails to
drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to
be in the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its
proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in
accordance with what has been stated above (A[1]), viz. that actions
which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object;
but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers
that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about
sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time,
but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, and
fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what
should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind," as Augustine
says (De Trin. xii, 12).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the
higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated
above (Q[15], A[1]): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power.
Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and
consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
[*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. FP, Q[15], AA[2],[3] where as in similar
passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St.
Thomas was speaking of the Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the
creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified
with the eternal law, (cf. A[8], OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But sometimes consent is
given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not
always think about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act.
Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according
to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures or other
passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by
deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes
ascribed to the lower reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the
reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act through
the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of
his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand, or foot.
Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act,
independently of the higher reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to
the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, so far
approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by
deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden fruit
to her husband."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which
consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers
its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges
and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must observe that in
every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the
supreme court, even as we see that in speculative matters the final
sentence touching any proposition is delivered by referring it to the
first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle,
the question can yet be submitted to it: wherefore the judgment is still
in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is
evident that human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason,
which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally;
and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above
(Q[19], A[4]). Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the
higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment
is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on
the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several
points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in
human acts, the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is
the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent
to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary
judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower reason,
which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can
also judge of the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment
of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court,
but not conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely,
but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as
stated above (Q[15], A[3]). Because the fact that the consent is finally
given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon
which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be
ascribed both to the will and to the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact
that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law,
whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's
law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it by a
kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds
from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12),
"the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a sin, unless by
its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members
to action, or of restraining them from action, it become the servant or
slave of the evil deed."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can
direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or
restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the
higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating the
matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this
delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower
reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man persists in
giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and
indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or lower
reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is
deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher reason can also
deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the
sinful act, this will deservedly by imputed to it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin,
for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does not
consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does
not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning away
from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (Q[71],
A[6]). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to
which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being such is
yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a
man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delectation
without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore
neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to
the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 3,5).
Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g.
fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation consequent to the act
of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of
fornication, as much as the inward thought differs from the outward deed;
and consequently there is a like difference of consent on either hand.
But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that
thought: and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal
sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also in the
marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now
he that consents to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to
the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple
fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation
resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal
sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of
fornication.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission
of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii). Now Augustine
teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the
Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "this sin is much less
grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought
to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts
and say: 'Forgive us our trespasses.'" Therefore consent to delectation
is a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be
altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven
those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the
will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them." But no man is
lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There have been various opinions on this point, for some
have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only a
venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this
opinion is more common and more probable. For we must take note that
since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x,
4, and again, that since every delectation may be compared to two things,
viz. to the operation from which it results, and to the object in which a
person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is
an object of delectation, because the action itself can be considered as
a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests.
Sometimes the action itself, which results in delectation, is the object
of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to
take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a
good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights in his thought, in so
far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight
consequent to an action, e.g. a thought, has for its object another
action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds
from the inclination of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to
the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication,
may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself,
secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the delectation in the
thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the
thought; and the thought itself is not in itself a mortal sin; sometimes
indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for
no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a
purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute
about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the
thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is
sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is
it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought. In this sense the first
opinion is true.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act
thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this act. Wherefore
the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing
less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to fornication:
for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his
appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his
appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. Wherefore such a
consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the
second opinion maintains.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason,
but also in the higher reason, as stated above (A[7]). Nevertheless the
lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not
intent on them, as regulating according to them, which is proper to the
higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to
them: and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since
even the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be
mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason fails in
directing them according to the eternal types.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a
venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to take
pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But
delectation in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus, a mortal
sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is
accidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the act: which
incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been given, so that
therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the delectation which has the
thought for its object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The delectation which has an external act for its object,
cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even though
there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some
higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, and consequently the
delectation will be inordinate also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in
an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the consent to
delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[8] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be
preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the
lower powers?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher
reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a sinful act.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher reason is intent on
considering and consulting the eternal law." But mortal sin consists in
turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be
no other than mortal sin in the higher reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual
life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of the heart
are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of
contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial sin,
deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher
reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the eternal
law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the
contempt of the Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason,
as stated above (A[7]). But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a
venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason
"is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it
contemplates it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and
directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the fact
that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or
dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinateness of the act to
which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, in the same way as
mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but
is beside that law, as an act of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher
reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from
the eternal law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very
substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and such a
disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting
in some disorder either of the movement or of the parts surrounding the
heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is
mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the order itself of the higher
reason to its proper object which is the eternal law, is destroyed; but
when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to
contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the
Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as
such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a power is not
found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to
its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in
respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore
there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be
no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate movement in
things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore
venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares,
is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, through the
reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting
against which, man sins more grievously; just as when the reason in
deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is
contrary to the law of God, it sins more grievously in consenting, than
if it only considered that it is contrary to moral virtue. But the higher
reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object.
Therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin,
neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is
clearly false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason
as such.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it
belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial sin
in the higher reason as such.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than
the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason.
For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far
as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard them
save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal
sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently the higher
reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers to which it
consents are mortal sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple
"intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again consults
the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition,
it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as when a man
suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its
genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial
sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the law of
God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present
itself to the reason suddenly under some other aspect, before the eternal
law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the
matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection
of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had
thus apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider
that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine law.
If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it
is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the higher reason may
sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin
in its genus; or it may sin mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but
in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in
things which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are
venial sins in their genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal
in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the
incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition of the
principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as
well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it
belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions:
consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[74] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of different
considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence
of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human
reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which is a higher
consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason
is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible to some yet
higher consideration: and in this way, that which in the sudden movement
was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation
which brought it into the light of a higher consideration, as was
explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in
particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sin has a cause?
(2) Whether it has an internal cause?
(3) Whether it has an external cause?
(4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin has a cause?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of
evil, as stated above (Q[71], A[6]). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of
necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for every
sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil.
It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for "a good
tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mt. 7:18). Likewise neither can evil
be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin,
and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to Job
5:6, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something
done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God."
Therefore sin has a cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is
an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far as
it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or
privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a negation:
in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the
negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in itself;
since the result of the removing the cause is the removal of the effect:
thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second
place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is
the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat
in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of
cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since
the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but
the privation of that which something ought naturally to have, such an
inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that
which naturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on
account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that
evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an
accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause is reducible to
the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has
an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of the act, a direct
efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result
of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction
of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable
good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act,
indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act
results from the lack of direction in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which
privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject of
that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a
cause, has been explained.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must
be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not impeded.
For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else,
and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on account of some
supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of
necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin
has a cause, it does not follow that this is a necessary cause, since its
effect can be impeded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of
reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact of not
applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the
nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it is applied
to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first
sin, but some good lacking some other good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin has an internal cause?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is
within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal cause,
man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements
of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary.
Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for sin is contrary
to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that
which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already a sin. Therefore
nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i,
9) that "the will is the cause of sin."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the direct cause of sin must be
considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold
internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate. The
proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in
respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the
apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. For
just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the will is moved to
something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the
senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which
inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain
further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may
be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason and will; and the
other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some
apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the rule of
reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good,
appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite; while
the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to
consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act
appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the conditions
we have just mentioned, is already a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That which is within a thing as its natural power, is
always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the
appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of
the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the
preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and
afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is proposed as
appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is inclined, that the
reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will
produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements that precede it
are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the
substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the will;
but some precede and some follow the sin itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is
natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which sin
follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through
appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from the very fact
that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought
to observe.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin has an external cause?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a
voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within
us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external
cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now
in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal cause; for
instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some
internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise from no
other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied.
Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements to sin are,
the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore
nothing external is a cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 21:16): "Are not these they, that
deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you
transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something
external can be a cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the internal cause of sin is both
the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the
due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something
external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will
itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive
appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]; Q[10], A[4]), none can move
the will inwardly save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we
shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]). Hence it follows that nothing
external can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or
devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain
external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the
reason, of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed
externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it
be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite
does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something
external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient
cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive cause of
sin being accomplished.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin
do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that it
remains in our power to sin or not to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent
its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of sin,
except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the
sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful act in
both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of
guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being voluntary and in
our power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one sin is a cause of another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For
there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one sin
causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is
inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like manner
neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an efficient
cause, but is weak and powerless," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv).
The material and formal cause seems to have no place except in natural
bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have
either a material or a formal cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as
stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially
something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same
way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we go on
indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of
another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not
quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of
sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same
way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one
sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes.
First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly
and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which removes an impediment is called
an indirect cause of movement: for when man, by one sinful act, loses
grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from
sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is the
accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man
is disposed to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause
dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after the
manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing
its matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife, which is
often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the
manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man
commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man
is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the
purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters, as
stated above (Q[1], A[3]; Q[18], AA[4],6), it follows that one sin is
also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication
committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material while the
latter is formal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of
evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least
apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate,
it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another sin. A sin has
matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from
its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of another, in respect of
the four kinds of cause, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral
imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act
it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[75] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no
need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is not
caused by another sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The
internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are
the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above (A[2]), the
first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we
shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of
reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on
the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice, which is the
cause of sin on the part of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether ignorance is a sin?
(3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?
(4) Whether it diminishes sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a
non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a non-being,
since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause
of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being
a "turning to" something, as was stated above (Q[75], A[1]). Now
ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it
should not be reckoned a cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not
turn to that which is not known, because its object is the good
apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin
through ignorance."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving
cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that moves
by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light
things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an impediment, or
the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance
can be the cause of a sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge
perfecting the reason that forbids the act of sin, in so far as it
directs human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance
with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in conferring
about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which
is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now actions are
about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a
singular proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a
universal proposition, except through the medium of a particular
proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the
knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's father, and that this man is his
father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of
the universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular
circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not
every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which
removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if
a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act
of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about
his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant
with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in
ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it
can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as
turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect of a sin is
the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown:
but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, the
will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for
instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a man, but not that
it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is
pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ignorance is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word,
deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above (Q[71], A[5]). Now
ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore
ignorance is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge.
Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting from sin.
Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it
is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, it
seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather
than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a sin, but
rather a result of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin,
except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act. Now
ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt
being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin, unless
perchance it be original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as
long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual in the one
who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually
sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be a most grievous
sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance
deserves punishment, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: "If any man know not, he
shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience
denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge
about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense
Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other
hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of
those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these we
are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the knowledge of
which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are
bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the universal
principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters
regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things which a man
may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them,
such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in
some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or
do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore
through negligence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin;
whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is
unable to know. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called
"invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason
such like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to
be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible
ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it
be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things
one is not bound to know.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[71], A[6], ad 1), when we say that sin
is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason
of which omissions have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as
much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin;
in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or
to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the knowledge which we
ought to have.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by
reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have the
character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a
difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas grace is
not acquired by acts, but by God's favor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not
only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is
commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the
will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in some way
voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of
consideration is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance,
the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge,
nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the
ignorance is said to be a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only
at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is it with
the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not
continually, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge that he
ought to have.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as
Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. Now ignorance
causes involuntariness, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore ignorance
excuses from sin altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done
accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown.
Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts.
But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore nothing that
is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or
virtuous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is
partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which perfects the
reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some things
done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things alone are
rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through
ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether excuse from
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it
causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated (AA[1],2) that
ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would
have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be
contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If,
however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not have
prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will thereto, the
lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing,
as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the
cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make the
act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any
ignorance that does not cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it
makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin, because
voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether
from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing
itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as
something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person
ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which circumstance
would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the
sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient for him to be
aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone,
knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be
ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance
constituting another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that
this man will defend himself and strike him back, and that if he had
known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the
sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though this man sins through
ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding,
he has knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the
ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either
directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain
things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man,
through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the
knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such like negligence
renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about
matters one is bound and able to know. Consequently this ignorance does
not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to
be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or through
being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance
excuses from sin altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above
(Q[6], A[8]). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the
intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his sin is not
accidental.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason
entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen and
imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and
so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that
which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is
common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every
evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But
ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore it does not
diminish a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin.
Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on Rm. 2:4, "Knowest
thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy
sin is most grievous if thou knowest not." Therefore ignorance does not
diminish sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would
seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which removes the
use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish
sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the
"punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not
diminish sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes
sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim. 1:13: "I obtained . .
mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance
diminishes or alleviates sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin,
in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render
it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that
the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it
altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it
altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the cause of the
sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor
increases the sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as
is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the
sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is
directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant
that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to
make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the
will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance,
for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance
which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary,
but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard
at his studies, the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man
willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk
and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and
consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a
sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only
accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and
therefore less sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not
the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from that
cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does
not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not
coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the
second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of them
alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a
man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk, although in the
latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness diminishes the
sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to
simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of the
sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores
the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an allusion to the
ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual
edifice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[76] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two
sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from
his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance
connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more, perhaps,
than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It
might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the
legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more severely
punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence
which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since more harm is
done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit.
ii).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT
ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive
appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin: and
under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the
will?
(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?
(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?
(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?
(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 Jn. 2:16: "Concupiscence of the eyes,
Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life."
(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?
(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the
sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its object.
Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover
and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in general (De
Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a
passion of the sensitive appetite, but good defined by the reason, it
seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the
soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational
appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a
lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that "the
rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly
bodies, one sphere moves another." Therefore the will cannot be moved by
a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is
material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a
corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii,
text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force, since it is
seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive
appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 13:56): "Lust hath perverted thy
heart."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move
the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways.
First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are
rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when
one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even
altogether impeded, in its act, both because all energy is weakened
through being divided, so that, on the contrary, through being centered
on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in
the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this
be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In
this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive
appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, the proper
movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become
remiss or altogether impeded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is
good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of
reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of
the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those
who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the
imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion
of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the
disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are
in some kind of passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from
the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the
reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and
consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a natural
inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the
direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the
judgment about the object of the will, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but,
in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion,
against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the weaker.
Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us.
Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is weak and soon
passes away.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the
apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is really
good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it
draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to
that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is
in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the
reason against its knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its
knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a
particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular
proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g. "Every
man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another,
they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. ii. If
therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce
an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary
opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular
which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who knows that
every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile,
provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i, text. 2.
Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that "no fornication is
lawful," knows this general proposition to contain, for example, the
particular proposition, "This is an act of fornication." Therefore it
seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/2
OBJ 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words
express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that man, while
in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even
in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in particular.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 2/2
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its
universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal
knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the
law of sin." Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of
which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a
passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its
knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of
Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore
he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of
ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the object of
the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil,
unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason;
so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance
or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that
work evil."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that
they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the
words of Lk. 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . .
and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of James 4:17:
"To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a
sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is necessary, with
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man
is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and
particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude
of the will and of the deed, as stated above (Q[76], A[1]). It may
happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no
fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know in particular that this
act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the
will not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must
be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from
not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have
correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, and yet not
to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem
difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider.
Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows
habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a
man who knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration of
geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment.
Sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on
account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or
some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of
passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so
far as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in
three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained above (A[1]).
Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to
something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of
bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow
fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or
drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the
use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the
fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the
use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through
excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason
to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold
the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, since
actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in
matters of action, passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if the
consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fact that something appears good in particular to the
reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this
particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or
true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the same
time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice
versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual knowledge
about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion
about a particular negative: because an act is directly opposed, not to a
habit, but to an act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on
account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to draw
the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition
suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion
accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the
syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two particular and
two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. No fornication is
lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence
passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and concluding
under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason
argues and concludes under the second.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of
deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, his
drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion,
may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so, yet his inner
thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of
weakness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be
called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement of the
sensitive appetite, as stated above (A[1]). Now vehemence of movements is
evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed
through passion, should not be called a sin of weakness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in
him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Ps. 77:39): "He
remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be
those which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due
to a passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which
are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, whether he do
or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to Gn.
4:7: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The lust thereof shall
be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore sin
committed through passion is not a sin of weakness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions
diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore
a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which,
chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of
likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be
weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper
action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and
members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive
power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the work of a
healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the
Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the
soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on
account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said
to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so
too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not
subject to the order of reason, for the reason is the ruling power of the
soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is
affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being
that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due action of
man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in
a manner contrary to his intention.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the
order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the
movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness
of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not
hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may have a
will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above
(A[1]). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of
soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul is called
weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the
flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive
appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to
what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our appetite
is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is
hindered in the way already explained (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether self-love is the source of every sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For
that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin.
Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is
commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev. 19:18). Therefore
self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 7:8): "Sin taking occasion by the
commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a
gloss says that "the law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it
forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the
cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as
stated above (Q[3], A[2]; Q[23], A[4]). Therefore self-love is not the
cause of every sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine in commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set on
fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing
us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility." Therefore
self-love is not the only cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so
does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. Therefore
self-love is not the cause of every sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love,
amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every
sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of
every sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[75], A[1]), the proper and direct
cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a
mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from inordinate
desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a
temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself
inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore it
is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good
for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love,
leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons
to be the cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is
reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself,
and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to
the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits,
as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil: for every sin
arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate
avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to self-love, since
it is through loving himself that man either desires good things, or
avoids evil things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the
sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed
through self-love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride
of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of
the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as causes of sin.
Because, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:10), "covetousness [*Douay:
'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is
not included in covetousness. Therefore it should not be reckoned among
the causes of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is
seen by the eyes, according to Dan. 13:56: "Beauty hath deceived thee."
Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with
concupiscence of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above
(Q[30], A[2]). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the
sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of the
hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire
of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of evil
things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here
pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are
insufficiently described.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:16): "All that is in the world
is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a
thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is
written (1 Jn. 5:19): "The whole world is seated in wickedness."
Therefore these three are causes of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[4]), inordinate self-love is the cause
of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man
desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate
desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the
object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the
cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it is the object of the
concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according
as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]).
Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q[30], A[3]). One is
natural, and is directed to those things which sustain the nature of the
body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as
food, drink, and the like, or as regards the preservation of the species,
such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is
called "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual
concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford
sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are
delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar
mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this
spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the eyes," whether
this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the
organ, so as to denote curiosity according to Augustine's exposition
(Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed
outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the
explanation of others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of
life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall
state further on (Q[84], A[2]; SS, Q[162], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be
reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible part
can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the
third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible passions
conform to spiritual concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as
the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How
covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is
the root of all sins, shall be explained further on (Q[84], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the
concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for
such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in
respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses,
and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its name is
transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions,
as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. xxxiii).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as
stated above (Q[25], A[2]; Q[39], A[2]); and so those passions alone are
mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause
inordinately the avoidance of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion.
For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing causes
something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause
of sin, as stated (A[5]). Therefore the more intense the passion, the
greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases
it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as
an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit: for a
man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity
to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also increases rather than
diminishes a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he
sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the will makes
it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion
aggravates a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of
the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less
grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will,
which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement of
the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the
free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a
passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will,
as stated above (AA[1],2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as
the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is
not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a
passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must
needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is
voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our
control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason
and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of
a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this
respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its
voluntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but
increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit,
as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it
is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which
anyone sins, the greater the sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which
the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of
that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to
something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his intention. Now an effect
is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its
direct cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason
increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well,
rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion
diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is
more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, as if it
were moved to sin by the reason alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For
whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether.
But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be
involuntary, according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the
spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore
passion excuses from sin altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular
matter, as stated above (A[2]; Q[76], A[3]). But ignorance of a
particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q[6],
A[8]). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body.
But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of mad
people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rm. 7:5) speaks of the passions as
"passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which
would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore
passion does not excuse from sin altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused
from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary.
Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act
wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not
excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed:
first, that a thing may be voluntary either "in itself," as when the will
tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," when the will tends towards
that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who
wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily
whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a
thing is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if
the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented
it, but did not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is
sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in
the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a
passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin,
because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to
drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for
instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a
passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly
involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the
passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and
then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or
it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members are not
put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above (Q[17],
A[9]): wherefore such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words, "So that you do not the things that you would"
are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement of
concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense
we are to understand the words of Rm. 7:19: "The evil which I will not,
that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the
passion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act counter to their
resolution on account of their concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is
ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after
taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a
particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to
a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as
stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison,
however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which
is a kind of bodily disease.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be
mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin
committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for
pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin of
weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion
cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as
stated above (Q[74], A[4]). Therefore a sin committed through passion
cannot be mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above
(AA[1],2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away
from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed
through passion cannot be mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:5) that "the passions of the
sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit
unto death." Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto
death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above (Q[72], A[5]), consists in
turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to
the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to direct towards the
end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to
be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to
the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone
proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this
does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the
rescue here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it
from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it does not come to
the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many
murders and adulteries are committed through passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its
cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens the
sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said
to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin, through
repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by
its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of venial sin that is
opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards the first kind.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something.
But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows
accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1): hence the
argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[77] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Passion does not always hinder the act of reason
altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its
free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the
use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either
mortal or venial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz.
malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice,
i.e. purposely?
(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain
malice?
(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through
habit?
(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than
through passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anyone sins through certain malice?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain
malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. Now
"every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that work evil." Therefore
no one sins through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works
intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the intention
of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia" (malice) from
"malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not denominated from that
which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through
malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause
of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, which is
absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Job 34:27): "[Who] as it were on purpose
have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand all His
ways." Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or
through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for
the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to
corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is
thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the principles
of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e.
the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts,
sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through
ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as
when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect
consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when
it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing
less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to
obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers
the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more.
Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches
or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine
charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the
loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some
temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a
man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he
is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good:
wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because
he chooses evil knowingly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a
particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance:
sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at
this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: and sometimes it
excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for
the sake of possessing a particular good, but not the simple knowledge
that it is an evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant, when he sins
through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it
can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining
another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to
obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering loss of the
other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without
offending God; but with the two set before him to choose from, he prefers
sinning and thereby incurring God's anger, to being deprived of the
pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to
denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is
called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through malice when
he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual
malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of evil (and thus
anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he sins through making
a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that
gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his
brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause:
for the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the
cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back
to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was
explained above (Q[75], A[4], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins
through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain malice,
seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a
slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word. Therefore sin
committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which
those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts which precede a
vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the
sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is
glad after having done it, according to Prov. 2:14: "Who are glad when
they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this,
because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those actions
which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through
habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e.
those who have a vicious habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4).
Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain
malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A sin committed through certain malice is one that is
done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to which
we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to
virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed
through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one who
has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary to
use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that
habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something we use when we will,"
as stated above (Q[50], A[1]). And thus, even as it may happen that one
who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a
bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains
unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are
generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a
vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through the uprising of a
passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious
habit he must needs sin through certain malice: because to anyone that
has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has
the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way,
connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now
the very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is
something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man
chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits
him in respect of that habit: and this is to sin through certain malice.
Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through
certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in
the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, but in
a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple
but a relative evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts
from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them as perfect
from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through
certain malice and sin committed through passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does
through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able not to
use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason,
which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the
habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often
happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is
displeasing to him, but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from
the sin.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins
through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an unjust
action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through choice,
"unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through certain malice is
to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore
no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not
suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little." But
the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain
malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from the
outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will
must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the
nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore
if he chooses evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is
passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not
through certain malice, but through weakness, as stated (Q[77], A[3]).
Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain malice, he sins through
habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same relation to the
choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something
evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a
virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. Therefore
sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose
evil, which is to sin through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil.
Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational
good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to
nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil, this
must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is
occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when anyone sins through
ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive
appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these
amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then alone does anyone sin
through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord.
This may happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt
disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that
disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and
to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as to
something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that
which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt disposition is either a
habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body,
as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by
reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its
own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle:
for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not through sin being
in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear
of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will
end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it
were.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice,
always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not
always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins
through certain malice, that he sins through habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to
do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with
pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and
this occurs only in one who has a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from
certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something is
not always a habit, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit
or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there is no
comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never
without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfect without the evil
of fault.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through
passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain
malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either
altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through
certain malice, than in one who sins through passion; since he that sins
through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle,
for he has a false estimation of the end, which is the principle in
matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins
through certain malice, than for one who sins through passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his
sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into sin by
a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is
impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that of passion.
Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing
evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. Therefore he
does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very
reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: "He hath
struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose,
have revolted from Him." Now punishment is not increased except for a
graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on
purpose, i.e. through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a
sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, as sin
consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things
being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the movement of
the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through
malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved
to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through passion,
when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were.
Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is committed
through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater;
whereas it is diminished by being committed through passion, and so much
the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion which
incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his
sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through
which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through
malice, abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick
man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent
man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers intermittently.
Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in
respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action;
and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins
through passion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose
is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now the
worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that
a sin committed through malice is more grievous than one committed
through passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither
excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above (Q[76], A[4]). Therefore
neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect
which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from
within. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[78] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin
through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while choosing,
but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first
principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion, to choose
what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand,
he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in
the way already explained (AA[2],3), so that his choosing, of which he
has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is
said to sin "through" choosing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of
God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether the act of sin is from God?
(3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of
heart?
(4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are
blinded or hardened?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is a cause of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of
certain ones (Rm. 1:28): "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to
do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss
comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts, by inclining
their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to evil." Now sin
consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to
evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): "The creatures of God are
turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men." But a
temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore
creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the FP, Q[44],
A[1], it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now
God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of sin.
Therefore God is the cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to
God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; since of this
evil it is written (Is. 45:7) that God creates evil, and (Amos 3:6):
"Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not
done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's goodness that He
should cause the evil of fault.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:25): "Thou . . . hatest none of
the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, according to Wis.
14:9: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore God
is not a cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of
another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's will
to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from
sinning. Hence (Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: "If thou say not
to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say to the
wicked, 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] . . . I
will require his blood at thy hand." Now God cannot be directly the cause
of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure
from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns
all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div.
Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or
to another the cause of departing from the order which is to Himself.
Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither
can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some
the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to
give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of
His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that
if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of
that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the ship,
through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and
bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from
the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it follows
that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right.
Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate sense, in so far
as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as
we are said to expose a person to danger if we do not protect him. The
saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted
is taken) to the effect that "God inclines men's wills to good and evil,"
is to be understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to
good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated above.
And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When it is said the "creatures of God are turned 'to' an
abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition "to"
does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay
Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem" admits of the
translation "were made to be an abomination," which might imply
causality.]; for God did not make the creatures that they might be an
evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, wherefore the text goes
on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their
folly, use creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were
made.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according
as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first cause;
but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the
order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first cause: thus if
a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed
to the master as though he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin,
which the free-will commits against the commandment of God, is not
attributed to God as being its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished,
who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed to
the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the
Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison between fault and
punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of sin is from God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine
says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not a thing." Now
whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because
he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending evil," as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated
above (A[1]). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as
was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause of a thing,
causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God
caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, as
was proved above (A[1]). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the
will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares (De
Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both
respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its
being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div.
Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since
nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every
being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who
is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so
far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a
defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as
falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently
this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will:
even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause,
but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is
of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of
sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the
act to have a defect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing,"
that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the act
of sin is not a thing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as
its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to Whom he
ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man
is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the act, in such a
way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so
that He is not the cause of the sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[72], A[1]), acts and habits do not take
their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of
evil, but from some object, to which that privation is united: and so
this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species
of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness
and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 3) that God
is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by
spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore God is not the cause
of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God does
not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened heart,
according to Ecclus. 3:27: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last."
Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But
the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man,
according to Wis. 2:21: "For their own malice blinded them," and again,
according to 2 Cor. 4:4: "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of
unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is
not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 6:10): "Blind the heart of this
people, and make their ears heavy," and Rm. 9:18: "He hath mercy on whom
He will, and whom He will He hardeneth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two
things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and
turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the
cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not
the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result
of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see aright, and
man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards this God is
the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening
of souls, according to Jn. 1:9: "That was the true light which
enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the sun is
the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same
way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works
freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as
it is concerned, enlightens all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an
obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose
window-shutters are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of
the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in
failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is
the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His own
accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so
that the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an
obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace.
In this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear,
and hardness of heart.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which
both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the
affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in
rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which the
former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is that
spiritual "blindness" corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to
hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding
of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man
no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs
them, even as other punishments.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is
a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin
is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is said to
blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of
those who are blinded and hardened?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always
directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. For
Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would
nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from every
evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of
which He Himself is the cause. Now God is the cause of blindness and
hardness of heart, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore they are directed to
the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that "God hath no pleasure in
the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, neither hath
He pleasure in the destruction of the living.']." Now He would seem to
take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness to
their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in
torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he
prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to
the profit of those who are blinded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" (Acts 10:34). Now He
directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some
of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in Christ, and,
through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with
compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang.
iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those
who are blinded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the other hand, according to Rm. 3:8, evil should not be done,
that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not
blind some for the sake of their welfare.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a
twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's
damnation---to another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. that
the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall into sin,
that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as
Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore blindness, of its
very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who are blinded; for
which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's
mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual
welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed
to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all
things work together unto good" (Rm. 8:28). Therefore as regards some,
blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their
damnation; as Augustine says (De Quaest. Evang. iii).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is
directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the
evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe:
thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, and the
punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards
the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that ensues
from the loss.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual
welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others is
directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His
mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God a respecter of persons,
as explained in the FP, Q[23], A[5], ad 3.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[79] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but
evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?
(2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?
(3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?
(4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's
sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. Now
Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends
with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the devil
"draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41;
iii, 5) that the devil "fills men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore
the devil is directly the cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is the
perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." But God is
directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause
of our sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics
(vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle of human
counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about
evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good counsel, and so is
the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and
consequently is directly the cause of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing
else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now man
does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the
cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's own will alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the
cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an
action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle
to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since
every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of
sin, except that which can move the will to act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now the will, as stated above (Q[9], AA[3],4,6), can be moved by two
things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is
said to move the appetite: secondly by that agent which moves the will
inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as
was shown above (Q[9], AA[3],4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as
stated above (Q[79], A[1]). Therefore it follows that in this respect, a
man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in
three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will: thus
we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes
or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will that the
object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion,
offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of
reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things, which approach
from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways,
either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by offering an object
of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of
these three ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the
will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as
stated above (Q[10], AA[1],2). Consequently neither the thing offered
from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the
sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause
of sin, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by
proposing the object of appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with
them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to
affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him
objects of appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat
the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause of our
good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God
causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas the devil
cannot move us in this way.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God is the universal principle of all inward movements of
man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is
directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or
offering the object of appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by
internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul are
vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an
intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are the
lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to
evil through his internal movements.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all the internal movements arise from the external
senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God alone to
do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the FP, Q[110],
A[4]. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal
movements, except in respect of things which are perceived by the
external senses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to
imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of these,
because, as stated in the FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2, the devil cannot
impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him
to produce imaginary species, since imaginary forms, being more
spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter,
which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from
what we have said in the FP, Q[110], A[2]; FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2.
Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless
he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and
sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will.
As regards the will, we have already stated (A[1]; FP, Q[111], A[1]) what
is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature,
is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which the
devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he darken
man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the
imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently the operation of the
devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by
moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may
result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to
incite the sensitive appetite to some passion or other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
The reason of this is, that as stated in the FP, Q[110], A[3], the
corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the
spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which
can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be
restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the
imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher
says (De Somno et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. iii, iv.] that "when an animal
sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and
the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action
of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible
species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they
appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by
them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or
humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so
it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions
according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits:
wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain
passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man
more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in
the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the
Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), "lovers
are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved."
It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put
before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued,
because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines
him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic
principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as
external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that
food may be more easily digested.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether
outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but
according to local movement, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these
forms are received originally from the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity.
Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of the devil
(Job 41:24) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him."
Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the earth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things
that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to the
imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we
cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30. 39). Now
the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above (A[2]); and also
the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this
evil," of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually
through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes,
blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore
it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some
sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the devil can cause
concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained
above (A[2]). Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 5:8): "Your adversary the devil,
as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it would
be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under the
necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to
sin of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] OTC Para. 2/2
Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): "Be subject . . . to God,
but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said
neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any
way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist
him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by
God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he
cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the
fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his
reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by
moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case with
one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever
man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is
not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, it can resist
sin, as stated above (Q[77], A[7]). It is consequently evident that the
devil can nowise compel man to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's
will; God alone can do this, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination
does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use of
reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the
reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise
of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power;
wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's
suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd of demons
are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil,
according to Jn. 8:34: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay:
'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he
is the slave" (2 Pt. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been
overcome by the devil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is
irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, if
any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from
any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly false.
Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our
evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a
movement of the free-will."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our
sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of whose
sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as
the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as
to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of
all the sins of men, as though each were the result of his suggestion.
Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from the fact that even if the
devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual
pleasures and the like; which desire might be inordinate, unless it were
subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as
regards their original cause, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by
him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it is thus that
one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[80] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he
sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already
prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin
of man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while
man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, by outward
suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of
origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration of
which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence;
(3) of its subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his
descendants?
(2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other
parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin?
(3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of
Adam by way of seminal generation?
(4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from
some part of the human body?
(5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and
not the man, had sinned?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his
descendants, by way of origin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not
contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech. 18:20):
"The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear
the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts any
sin from one of his parents by way of origin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless
its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass from one
subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is
not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the FP, Q[118], A[2].
Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is
caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it lacks the
rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore
no sin can be contracted by way of origin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful
in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to it, else
the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united
to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds
fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are so
through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to
be "naturally ugly," who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing
which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:12): "By one man sin entered
into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as
denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written (Wis. 2:24): "By
the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows therefore
that through origin from the first man sin entered into the world.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that
the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, by way
of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after
their birth, to show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness.
The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine
in many of his books [*For instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et
Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi, xii.]
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be
transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have
gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of
sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is
transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to
produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous,
endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be transmitted
to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact
that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to child---thus a
leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son,
on account of some seminal corruption, although this corruption is not
leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and
since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like
manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to the
child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is
not the subject of the guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some
bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child, and
granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in
consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case
of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by
the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is
essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational soul
were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul
is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its
subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no
one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men
born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one
common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in
civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one
body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic.,
De Specie) that "by sharing the same species, many men are one man."
Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many members of
one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for
instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of
the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the
hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by
itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something
belonging to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way,
then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, not
by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of
generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul's will
moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus
transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called "original,"
just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is
called "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member
of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that
member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin";
so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this
person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is
called the "sin of nature," according to Eph. 2:3: "We . . . were by
nature children of wrath."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father,
because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share in his
guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by
the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted
through being imitated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in
the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the motion
of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul:
so that the semen by its own power transmits the human nature from parent
to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that
is born is associated with his first parent in his guilt, through the
fact that he inherits his nature from him by a kind of movement which is
that of generation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human
nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act
proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the soul is
more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect,
and already affixed to a certain person.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin,
if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him as
referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may
from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account of a crime
committed by one of his forbears.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are
transmitted to their descendants?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent
or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. For
punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the
judgment of God for the sin of their immediate parents, according to Ex.
20:5: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers
upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." Furthermore,
according to human law, the children of those who are guilty of high
treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also
transmitted to their descendants.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has
of himself, than that which he has received from another: thus fire heats
better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the
way, of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much more therefore
should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first
parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our nature, which
he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in
principles of our nature, which however it be corrupt, can be corrupted
yet more by sin, according to Apoc. 22:11: "He that is filthy, let him be
filthier still." Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the
sins of their nearer ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their
first parent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits
of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much
less therefore are their sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi,
xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully
we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors,
or even any other but the first sin of our first parent to be transmitted
by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but
not in individual. Consequently those things that pertain directly to the
individual, such as personal actions and matters affecting them, are not
transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not
transmit to his son the knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his
own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of
the species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there
be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes,
unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of
the individual pertaining to natural disposition, are transmitted to the
children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth;
but nowise those that are purely personal, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also
something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the
nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and
something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice, as
stated in the FP, Q[100], A[1], was a gift of grace, conferred by God on
all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his
first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature
was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder.
Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do
not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person,
i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are
not transmitted.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad
Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment on
account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in
their origin, or by imitation, because every soul is God's immediate
property, as stated in Ezech. 18:4. Sometimes, however, by Divine or
human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents'
account, inasmuch as the child, as to its body, is part of its father.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man can more easily transmit that which he has of
himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer
ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The first sin infects nature with a human corruption
pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption
pertaining only to the person.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin,
to all men?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not
transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a
punishment consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born
of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still living at
the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered
from 1 Thess. 4:14: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord,
shall not prevent them who have slept." Therefore they do not contract
original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man
who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not
transmit it to his children.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as
the Apostle declares (Rm. 5:15, seqq). But the gift of Christ is not
transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:12): "Death passed upon all men
in whom all have sinned."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe
that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract
original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf.
Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through Christ;
and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has
been stated (A[1]), viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our
first parent, is transmitted to his posterity, just as, from the soul's
will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their
being moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be
transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved by
the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are
moved by Adam by the movement of generation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is held with greater probability and more commonly that
all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, and rise
again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP (XP, Q[78], A[1],
OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never
die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others in a letter to
Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep. cxix), then we must say
in reply to the objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of
death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death will be
remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual
sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in
so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless
original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes," which is the
disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body itself, in
respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of
generation. Consequently those who are baptized transmit original sin:
since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, but as still
retaining something of the oldness of the first sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of
Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that are
begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only
unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto the removal
of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously
from human flesh?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person
formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on Gn. 4:1 says that
"Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were
not severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned, but in the
place of exile after he had sinned." But if a man were to be formed in
the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be severed in the place of exile.
Therefore it would contract original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected
through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted. Therefore a
man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever
part of the flesh it was formed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so
far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who might be formed
out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would
contract original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal
virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin, as
Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],3), original sin is transmitted
from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him
through generation, even as the members are moved by the soul to actual
sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power of
generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended
from Adam through the active power of generation originally derived from
Adam, i.e. who are descended from him through seminal power; for the
seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But if
anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that
the active power would not be derived from Adam. Consequently he would
not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human
sin, if it were moved, not by the man's will, but by some external power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin.
Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account
of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active
generation extends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it
is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have
been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression is St.
Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica TP, Q[31], A[6], Reply
to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above.
Therefore he would not contract original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have
contracted original sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their
children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract original
sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the
word of the Apostle (Rm. 5:12): "In whom all have sinned." Now a man
pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would
have contracted original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his
father's.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would
have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is "the mother"
that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher states (De
Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and liability to suffering are the
necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity
of dying are punishments of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam,
had sinned, their children would contract original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the Holy
Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born without
original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not have been
necessary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted from the
mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the
mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children would have contracted
original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:12): "By one man sin entered
into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to
her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both of
them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned
first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the
mother, but by the father.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The solution of this question is made clear by what has
been said. For it has been stated (A[1]) that original sin is transmitted
by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his
children: wherefore it has been said (A[4]) that if anyone were begotten
materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin.
Now it is evident that in the opinion of philosophers, the active
principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the
matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not from the mother, but
from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned,
their children would not contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not
Eve, had sinned, they would contract it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The child pre-exists in its father as in its active
principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle.
Consequently the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their
children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject to the
necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary
result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not as punishments,
but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as
stated in the FP, Q[97], AA[1], 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility,
in the original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but
of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so long
as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is
original sin. If, therefore, supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin
would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it
is evident that the children would not have been deprived of original
justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and
subject to the necessity of dying.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[81] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not
needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because it
behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf.
Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy to receive God
unless it be pure, according to Ps. 92:5: "Holiness becometh Thy House, O
Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] Out. Para. 1/1
OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether original sin is a habit?
(2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?
(3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?
(4) Whether original sin is equally in all?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether original sin is a habit?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin
is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg.
ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is
opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original
sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual sin has
not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep,
would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit has the nature of a
fault.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil
habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not preceded by
an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants
(De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little
children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act.
Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original sin is a
habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[49], A[4]; Q[50], A[1]), habit is
twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus
science and virtue are called habits. In this way original sin is not a
habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature,
whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when
such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of
sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an
inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction of the harmony which
was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an
inordinate disposition of the body, by reason of the destruction of that
equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin
is called the "languor of nature" [*Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it
denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly
something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed,
so too original sin denotes the privation of original justice, and
besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul.
Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original
sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of nature, and
has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first
parent, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Now this inordinate disposition of
nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act
is not: and for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual
sin cannot.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection considers the habit which inclines a power
to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless a
certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin,
not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of the obstacle, i.e.
original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an
inclination to inordinate bodily movements results indirectly from bodily
sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that original sin is a habit
"infused," or a habit "acquired" (except by the act of our first parent,
but not by our own act): but it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt
origin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are several original sins in one man?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For
it is written (Ps. 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in
sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived
is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to
contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of nature which
tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to
various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one habit; but
several.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the
different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown above
(Q[74]). Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems
that original sin is not one but several.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for the
employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" is original
sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be
assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original sin.
For it has been stated (Q[81], A[2]), that the first sin alone of our
first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man
original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion,
i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken
from the very essence of original sin. Because in every inordinate
disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of
number is derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness:
various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. from
excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one
specific sickness in one man will be one in number. Now the cause of this
corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the
privation of original justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to
God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can
be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and
in proportion, but is numerically many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be explained
by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of the plural
for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child";
or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist in original sin,
as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there
being many deformities in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride,
disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; or by several parts of the soul
being infected by original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit
cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason why it
should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an
obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, the
elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony
of original justice is destroyed, the various powers of the soul have
various opposite tendencies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so
far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice held all
the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original
sin: just as there is but one fever in one man, although the various
parts of the body are affected.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether original sin is concupiscence?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every
sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the
proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power.
Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in us,
according to the Apostle (Rm. 7:5). Now there are several other passions
besides concupiscence, as stated above (Q[23], A[4]). Therefore original
sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are
disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is the
highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7).
Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the
guilt of original sin."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form: and it has
been stated (A[2]) that the species of original sin is taken from its
cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered
in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary
causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered with
respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the
whole order of original justice consists in man's will being subject to
God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function
it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q[9], A[1]
), so that the will being turned away from God, all the other powers of
the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original
justice, whereby the will was made subject to God, is the formal element
in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a
kind of material element in respect of original sin. Now the
inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their
turning inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called
by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin is
concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally
governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, as
it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it
trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary to
reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[25], A[1]), all the irascible passions
are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place:
and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt
most, as stated above (Q[25], A[2], ad 1). Therefore original sin is
ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including
all the others, in a fashion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first,
so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found to take
precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above (Q[77],
AA[1],2; Q[80], A[2]). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather
than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material
defects of original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether original sin is equally in all?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because
original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above (A[3]). Now all
are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is
not equally in all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul,
just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But sickness
is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust
transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation may be
more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be
greater in one than in another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above
(Q[81], A[1]). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is
too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the
privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this
privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to
man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no
degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and
privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness,
cannot be more or less, as stated above (Q[73], A[2]). In like manner,
neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally
to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from which principle
original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or
less. Consequently it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one
than in another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Through the bond of original justice being broken, which
held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each power
of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously,
as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the soul's powers are
stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily
temperaments. Consequently if one man is more prone than another to acts
of concupiscence, this is not due to original sin, because the bond of
original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the
soul are, in all, left to themselves equally; but it is due to the
various dispositions of the powers, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species,
has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused by
corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer
to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause of original sin is
equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[82] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for,
supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the
act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must
understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive appetite is
not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is
equally in all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the
soul?
(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through
its powers?
(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of
original sin?
(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the
generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the
soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from the
corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in
the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is
seated chiefly in the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus
heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the soul is
infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen.
Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so
far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls were not
in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the
soul, but in the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the
body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it would
follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God
would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's creation
and fusion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel,
knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational soul is
more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united
with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of original sin,
God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body.
And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore
original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or
sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of
virtue: for the Apostle says (Rm. 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth not
in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the
flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its
cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject.
Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its
principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rm. 5:12): "In
whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its
instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen that
original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the child. But
original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
The reason for this is that, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]), original sin
is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a
certain movement of generation, in the same way as actual sin is
transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this
transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from the motion
of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way
share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its instrument, has the
character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony,
concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking
of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are
moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further
action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal members, which
have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the
character of guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the
flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to the
soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt,
while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of guilt but
of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original
sin, and not the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu.
66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed,
who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason
of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." Consequently it follows
that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause.
Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental cause
than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way,
original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it had the nature of
actual sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of
his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a
dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted
from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational soul, but
disposes the matter for it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but
by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. And so,
since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be
said that the soul is tainted through being created. On the other hand,
infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into
which the soul is infused. And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot
be said that the soul is stained through being infused; but only with
regard to the body into which it is infused.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore
God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order of
things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this
soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that the nature of the
soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the
body, as stated in the FP, Q[90], A[4]; FP, Q[118], A[3]. And it is
better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be
at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, by means of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the
powers?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul
rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be the
subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will.
Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only as to
the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its
essence, but only according to the powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now
original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the subject
of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather
than in its essence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from
the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But original
sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the
powers than in the essence of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated
(Q[82], A[3]). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore
original sin is also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated
above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, in
respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the
FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin
chiefly in respect of its essence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to
which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the motive
cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power
through being its proper object, it follows that the concupiscible power
is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is
caused through our origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is
first reached by man's origin, is the primary subject of original sin.
Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as
it is the form of the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of
its essence, as was proved in the FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul, in
respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the
soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will of the
first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all
to the essence of the soul, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of
the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which the essence
of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard
the person, in as much as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence
they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the
person.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which
though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes first
in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is
related to the powers, as a subject to its proper accidents, which follow
their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection.
Consequently the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the
position of matter and effect, as stated above (Q[82], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before
the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by whose
act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative
power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power more than to
the others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen.
But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than the will
is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a
bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the
will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin infects all
the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the
intellect, as preceding the others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will,
because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg.
iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior
relation to the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of
original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect it
regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above (A[2]). In the
second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it
regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard first of all
that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and
this is the will, as stated above (Q[74], AA[1],2). Therefore original
sin regards first of all the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power
of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power.
Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the
subject of original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the
soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former follows
the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection.
Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers, are more akin
to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin
to the essence of the soul, the infection of original sin reaches it
first.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing
its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, in the
order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected
than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to pertain more
to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this
is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is most
infected by original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so
far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey reason,
as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most
infected by original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and
the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of things
differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the
reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that
the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the
members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members
serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein there is the
delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to
concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these
three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and
the sense of touch.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious,
which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to
another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the
like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is
transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]).
Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be
infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as it is
directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which
is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently,
while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original sin,
these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins,
belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above (A[3]). But in so far as it
is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers
proximately, and to the will, remotely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers
which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original
sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his
natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. Hence it is
this power that is infected by original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[83] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation except in
respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species is
seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch.
Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than to
the sight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER
(FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the
cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides
pride and covetousness?
(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For
covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is opposed to the
virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues.
Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the
end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are not
desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5.
Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds from
some deeper root.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for
covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires money through
ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root
of all sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): "The desire of money is
the root of all evil."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, According to some, covetousness may be understood in
different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and thus
it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any
temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because every
sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above
(Q[72], A[2]). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to
desire corruptible goods inordinately: and they say that in this sense
covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree,
which draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the
love of temporal things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of
the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins. For
in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they "will
become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil . . .
for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is evident that he
is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches.
Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as denoting a special sin, is
called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in
furnishing sustenance to the whole tree. For we see that by riches man
acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his
desire for any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner
of temporal goods, according to Eccles. 10:19: "All things obey money":
so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin
arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire of
that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the
root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the immutable
God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the
root of the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in
charity."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as
though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last end; but
because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And
since a universal good is more desirable than a particular good, they
move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many
others can be procured by means of money.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as in natural things we do not ask what always
happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature
of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the
same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what happens in the
majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the
will does not act of necessity. So when we say that covetousness is the
root of all evils, we do not assert that no other evil can be its root,
but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason
given.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For
the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of a sin seems
to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every
sin, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore it is also the beginning of every
sin, and not pride.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the
pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But apostasy
from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of pride, so
that the latter is not the beginning of every sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which
causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore
self-love and not pride, is the beginning of every sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as
denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin.
Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being
subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic sin.
Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the
corruption of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the beginning
of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, because covetousness
regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it
were, nourished and fostered, for which reason covetousness is called the
"root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose
commandment man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the
"beginning," because the beginning of evil consists in turning away from
God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind
of the wise man who said (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all
sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting
inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows (verse 17):
"God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the
point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even
as denoting a special sin, is the beginning of every sin. For we must
take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold
order, of intention, and of execution. In the former order, the principle
is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1], ad 1; Q[18],
A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end in acquiring
all temporal goods is that, through their means, he may have some
perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride,
which is the desire to excel, is said to be the "beginning" of every sin.
On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to
that which by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of
sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, from this
point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as
stated above (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride,
in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the fact
that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires
inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. Wherefore, in the
passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but
rather that general condition of every sin, consisting in its turning
away from God. It may also be said that apostasy from God is said to be
the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it
is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior,
and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted up,
in respect of the other species of pride.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love
oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently it
amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning
of every evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be
called capital?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and
avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to be to an
animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38:
for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called the
"root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be
called a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other
members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the head. But
sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of
head: so that no sins should be called capital.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital
punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished thus.
Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special
vices under the name of capital.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now
the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which is
the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically
speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and
govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called,
in the first place, from "head" taken in the proper sense, and thus the
name "capital" is given to a sin for which capital punishment is
inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital
sins, but in another sense, in which the term "capital" is derived from
head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this
way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being
their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above (Q[72], A[6]).
Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also
their director and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to
which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in
matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares
these capital vices to the "leaders of an army."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and applied to
something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some
property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And
therefore the capital vices are not only those which have the character
of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the "root," and pride
which is called the beginning, but also those which have the character
of proximate origin in respect of several sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in
this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine (De Natura
Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order." But in so far as
sin implies a turning to something, it regards some good: wherefore, in
this respect, there can be order in sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called from the
punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices,
viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, lust. For
sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as
stated above (Q[61], A[2]). Therefore there are only four principal or
capital vices.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated
above (Q[77]). But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of
which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins,
whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong,
since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and sadness to sloth and
envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should
not be placed among the principal vices.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so
is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above (A[2]). But avarice is
reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be
placed among the capital vices.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through
any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, or when
one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an
alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in
this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), the capital vices are those which
give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of
origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of
the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one
particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other
sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of
art, because man's particular dispositions are infinite in number.
Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one
another: and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from
another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of
art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 2/5
Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have
certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in respect
of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated.
Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First, directly and of its
very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the
same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on
account of something else, as it were: thus one seeks an evil on account
of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant
evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 3/5
Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a
certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility,
merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and
praise, and this good is sought inordinately by "vainglory." Secondly,
there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation
of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is pursued
inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g.
sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust." Thirdly,
there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness" is referred.
These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 4/5
Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some
property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first
place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to
which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by "pride" or
"vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks in
riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without
which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, 6,7,[8] and
this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] Body Para. 5/5
On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil
occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own good,
and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on
account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in respect of
another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to
"envy," which is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to
one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination with a view to
vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since
virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or to
the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite
for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal vices to
be contrary to the principal virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions
of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible part; and
these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure
and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins, as being the
most important of the passions, as stated above (Q[25], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a
distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special kind
of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's
good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right to vengeance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the
order of the end, as stated above (A[2]): and it is in the same order
that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore
pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but
is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi,
27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view,
as stated above (AA[1],2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[84] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: These vices are called capital because others, most
frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from
arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins
which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which pertains
the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on
account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can cause sin, is
due to negligence, as stated above (Q[76], A[2]). That a man commit a sin
with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows
not that evil should not be done that good may come of it.
