OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST---LOVE (TWO ARTICLES)
We now inquire concerning the name "Love," on which arise two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "Love" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "Love" is not the proper name of the Holy
Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): "As the Father, Son and Holy
Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I know not
why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called Charity, and all
together one Charity." But no name which is predicated in the singular of
each person and of all together, is a proper name of a person. Therefore
this name, "Love," is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love is not
used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing from
the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name of the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a unitive force." But a bond is a medium between
what it joins together, not something proceeding from them. Therefore,
since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as was shown
above (Q[36], A[2]), it seems that He is not the Love or bond of the
Father and the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a
lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must be
love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): "The Holy Ghost
Himself is Love."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken essentially and
personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost;
as Word is the proper name of the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
To see this we must know that since as shown above (Q[27], AA[2],3,4,5),
there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is
the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the
procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known to us, we
have been able to apply more suitable names to express our various
considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the
procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to employ circumlocution as
regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations following from this
procession which are called "procession" and "spiration," as stated
above (Q[27], A[4], ad 3), and yet express the origin rather than the
relation in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider
them in respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing is
understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a
conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so
when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak,
of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the
object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is
in the one who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves
himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the
object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is
in the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to
describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object
understood, as appears in the word "to understand"; and other words are
used to express the procession of the intellectual conception---namely,
"to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to understand" is applied only to
the essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that
proceeds; whereas "Word" is said personally, because it signifies what
proceeds; and the term "to speak" is a notional term as importing the
relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other
hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words
"dilection" and "love," which express the relation of the lover to the
object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation
of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover
by fact that he loves---to the principle of that impression, or "vice
versa." And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we
express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just as if
we were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom begotten."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to
the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of the essence, as
"understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as
these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what
proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is
understood the "love proceeding," and by "to love" is understood "the
spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the name of
the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to beget."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the
divine essence, as was said above (here and Q[24], A[2], ad 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although to understand, and to will, and to love signify
actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are actions that
remain in the agents, as stated above (Q[14], A[4]), yet in such a way
that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object.
Hence, love also in ourselves is something that abides in the lover, and
the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker; yet with a
relation to the thing expressed by word, or loved. But in God, in whom
there is nothing accidental, there is more than this; because both Word
and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is
the Love of the Father for the Son, or for something else; we do not mean
anything that passes into another, but only the relation of love to the
beloved; as also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the
thing expressed by the Word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and
Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves Himself and
the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy
Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and conversely, as
that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that the Father and
the Son mutually love one another, it necessarily follows that this
mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As regards origin,
therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third person in the
Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid relation He is the bond between
the two persons, as proceeding from both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As it does not belong to the Son, though He understands, to
produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand as the word
proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves, taking Love
as an essential term, still it does not belong to Him to spirate love,
which is to take love as a notional term; because He loves essentially as
love proceeding; but not as the one whence love proceeds.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love each other
by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves that the Father
is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten, so
the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as explained above (Q[27], A[3]).
Therefore the Father and the Son do not love Themselves by the Love
proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the proposition, "The Father and the Son love each other
by the Holy Ghost," this word "love" is to be taken either essentially or
notionally. But it cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the
same way we might say that "the Father understands by the Son"; nor,
again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like manner, it might be
said that "the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Ghost," or that
"the Father generates by the Son." Therefore in no way is this
proposition true: "'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy
Ghost."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself,
and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no
notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it
cannot be said that the "Father begets Himself," or that "He spirates
Himself." Therefore, neither can it be said that "He loves Himself by the
Holy Ghost," if "to love" is taken in a notional sense. Again, the love
wherewith He loves us is not the Holy Ghost; because it imports a
relation to creatures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this
also is false: "The Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): "The Holy Ghost is He
whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His
Begetter."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A difficulty about this question is objected to the
effect that when we say, "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost,"
since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean
that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the Son;
which cannot be admitted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that "the
Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost"; and they add that
it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the
effect that "the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten." Others say that
the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as that "the
Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost"---that is, "by His essential
Love," which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others further say that
this ablative should be construed as importing a sign, so that it means,
"the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son"; inasmuch as
the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love. Others, again, say that
this ablative must be construed as importing the relation of formal
cause, because the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son
formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should be construed
as importing the relation of a formal effect; and these approach nearer
to the truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is
commonly denominated from its forms, as "white" from whiteness, and "man"
from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this
particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. So when
I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is to be
construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the garment is
not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that
which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also
as from the term itself of the action---that is, the effect, when the
effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire
warms by heating, although heating is not the heat which is the form of
the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a
tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not the tree's form,
but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we
must say that since in God "to love" is taken in two ways, essentially
and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father
and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence.
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): "Who dares to say that the Father
loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the
Holy Ghost?" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But
when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else
than "to spirate love"; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to
flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a tree flowers by
its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks
Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each
other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in God;
therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or intelligent by the
Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional
sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the Son love each
other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When the idea of an action includes a determined effect,
the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action, and
from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its
flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of an action does
not include a determined effect, then in that case, the principle of the
action cannot be denominated from the effect, but only from the action.
For we do not say that the tree produces the flower by the flower, but by
the production of the flower. So when we say, "spirates" or "begets,"
this imports only a notional act. Hence we cannot say that the Father
spirates by the Holy Ghost, or begets by the Son. But we can say that the
Father speaks by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, "and speaks by
the speaking," as by a notional act; forasmuch as "to speak" imports a
determinate person proceeding; since "to speak" means to produce a word.
Likewise to love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love; and
so it can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by
the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[37] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and us,
by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken in a
notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person, but
also the person produced, by way of love, which has relation to the
object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by
His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word "begotten" adequately represents
the Father and every creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by
the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the
primal goodness whereby the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus
it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word
and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as
the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding and loving
all creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT (TWO ARTICLES)
There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether "Gift" can be a personal name?
(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "Gift" is a personal name?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "Gift" is not a personal name. For every
personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of "Gift" does
not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19):
that "the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, that He also gives
Himself as God." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the
divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, as Hilary
says (De Trin. ix). Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is
no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift implies a
subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by
whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it thus
seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of God from
eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of flesh
is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing but the
Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also therefore is
"Gift."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The word "gift" imports an aptitude for being given. And
what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that
to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was
his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person is
said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the
Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we
can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way a divine person
cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other
creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, in such a way as
to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The
rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made
partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to
know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the rational creature alone
can possess the divine person. Nevertheless in order that it may possess
Him in this manner, its own power avails nothing: hence this must be
given it from above; for that is said to be given to us which we have
from another source. Thus a divine person can "be given," and can be a
"gift."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction , in so far
as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin.
Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own,
and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man belongs to
himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): "What is more
yours than yourself?" Or we might say, and more fittingly, that a gift
must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase, "this is this one's,"
can be understood in several senses. In one way it means identity, as
Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix); and in that sense "gift" is the
same as "the giver," but not the same as the one to whom it is given. The
Holy Ghost gives Himself in that sense. In another sense, a thing is
another's as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is
essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a
created thing. In a third sense "this is this one's" through its origin
only; and in this sense the Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost
belongs to both. Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the
possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver,
and is a personal name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The divine essence is the Father's gift in the first sense,
as being the Father's by way of identity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Gift as a personal name in God does not imply subjection,
but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the one to whom it
is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from
its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift from
eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an
essential name because it imports relation to the creature; but that it
includes something essential in its meaning; as the essence is included
in the idea of person, as stated above (Q[34], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether "Gift" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Is. 9:16 says: "A Son
is give to us." Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to
the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property. But
this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost. Therefore
Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man,
whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but "God's Gift" only.
Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "As 'to be born' is,
for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, 'to be the
Gift of God' is to proceed from Father and Son." But the Holy Ghost
receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father and
Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable
giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)---i.e. a thing which is not
given with the intention of a return---and it thus contains the idea of a
gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is
love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously
forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love
whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature
of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the
Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; Q[37], A[1]),
He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24):
"By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, many particular gifts are
portioned out to the members of Christ."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds
by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of its
principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also,
because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is properly
called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given
is from the Father's love, according to the words, "God so loved the
world, as to give His only begotten Son" (Jn. 3:16).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver
through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the origin of the
Holy Ghost---that is, His procession.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[38] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but
when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, because
"Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of
man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been given, then
it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely,
we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence, to
the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these
with each other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] Out. Para. 2/2
As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?
(2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?
(3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the
plural, or in the singular?
(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be
predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?
(5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the
abstract?
(6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete
essential names?
(7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?
(8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person.
For whenever essence is the same as person or "suppositum," there can be
only one "suppositum" of one nature, as is clear in the case of all
separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the
same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is
one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above expounded
(Q[28], A[3]; Q[30], A[2]). Therefore essence is not the same as person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things
in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true
of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not.
Therefore person and essence are not the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject
to essence; whence it is called "suppositum" or "hypostasis." Therefore
person is not the same as essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the
person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the
Father."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider
the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Q[3], A[3]) that the
divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as
"suppositum," which in intellectual substances is nothing else than
person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the
divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its
unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), "relation multiplies
the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God essence and person
differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be "adjacent";
considering only in the relations the idea of "reference to another," and
not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Q[28], A[2])
in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine
essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really
distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished
from each other. For person, as above stated (Q[29], A[4]), signifies
relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to
the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of
thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real
distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and
three persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There cannot be a distinction of "suppositum" in creatures
by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in
creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are
subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they
distinguish the "supposita"; and yet the essence is not distinguished,
because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so
far as they are identified with the essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking,
it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the
other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the
other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of created
things, as above explained (Q[13], AA[1],3). And since created natures
are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature,
it follows that individuals are called "subjects," "supposita," or
"hypostases." So the divine persons are named "supposita" or
"hypostases," but not as if there really existed any real "supposition"
or "subjection."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one
essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost
"are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But the substance of
God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of one essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be
confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div.
Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are
of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It
suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the
essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it does
not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that
the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia]," lest we
should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons
in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the oblique
case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are "of
one essence [unius essentiae]."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of
error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or
substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.):
"One substance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one
subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two
imperfect substances; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the
other two." Therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of
one substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word
{homoousion}, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians,
means that the three persons are of one essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above explained (Q[13], AA[1],2), divine things are
named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that
way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things created. And
as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its
knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the matter,
and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the
"suppositum" of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as the form
of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in
creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form;
as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not say
of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some
adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That woman is of a
handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like manner, as
in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we
speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one
essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the
form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not for
the essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so
many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we
find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, "I and the Father
are one (Jn. 10:30)," and "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (Jn.
10:38)"; and there are many other texts of the same import.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Because "nature" designates the principle of action while
"essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one
nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but
only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which have one
being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three
persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are "of one nature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as
belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue of
Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be
designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or
designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one
signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the
form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great virtue [magnae
virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for
instance, "he is a man of blood"---that is, he is a man who sheds much
blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form
as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the
person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to
designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the
"divine essence"; or, the three persons are "of one essence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The preposition "from" or "out of" does not designate the
habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or
material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those
things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter,
nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears
in all immaterial things. So, when we say, "three persons of one
essence," taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean
that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said,
"three persons from the same essence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be prejudicial to
holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not
think them holy. So if some misunderstand {homoousion}, what is that to
me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does not
result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but
from one nature being proper to both Father and Son."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three
persons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name "God," should not
be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in the plural.
For as "man" signifies "one that has humanity," so God signifies "one
that has Godhead." But the three persons are three who have Godhead.
Therefore the three persons are "three Gods."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may be
rendered "Gods" or "Judges": and this word is used on account of the
plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are "several Gods," and
not "one" God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, this word "thing" when it is said absolutely, seems to
belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons in the
plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "The things that are
the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost."
Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the
three persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as this word "God" signifies "a being who has Deity," so
also this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual
nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can
say there are "three Gods."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God
is one God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some essential names signify the essence after the manner
of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives.
Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three
persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify
the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the
plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way
of substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident,
which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of
itself, so also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the
singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form
signified by the name. But as accidents have their existence in a
subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and
therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their
"supposita." In creatures, one form does not exist in several "supposita"
except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the
names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of
many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that
many men are a college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men
are collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a
form, as above explained (A[2]), which, indeed, is simple and supremely
one, as shown above (Q[3], A[7]; Q[11], A[4]). So, names which signify
the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three
persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason
why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three men"; whereas we do
not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are "three Gods," but "one God";
forasmuch as in the three "supposita" of human nature there are three
humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine
essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an
adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason
of the plurality of "supposita." For we say there are three "existent" or
three "wise" beings, or three "eternal," "uncreated," and "immense"
beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if
taken in a substantive sense, we say "one uncreated, immense, eternal
being," as Athanasius declares.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Though the name "God" signifies a being having Godhead,
nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name "God"
is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used adjectively.
Consequently, although there are "three having Godhead," it does not
follow that there are three Gods.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as
by reason of the plurality of "supposita" the Greeks said "three
hypostases," so also in Hebrew "Elohim" is in the plural. We, however, do
not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance," lest plurality be
referred to the substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so
far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural;
whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in
the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that "the same
Trinity is a thing supreme."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The form signified by the word "person" is not essence or
nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalities---that is,
three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost---it is
predicated of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for
the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For, as the
logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for." But this
name "God" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in
the plural, as above explained (A[3]). Therefore, since it signifies the
essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the
predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in
the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name "God" stands for
the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term "God" cannot by reason
of the notional predicate, stand for person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father
generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget,"
because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and
there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two
Gods.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is
Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; for,
as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself." Neither did
He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to
say, "God begot God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the
Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God
the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a
God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it cannot be
said that "God begot God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like,
properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason
of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion
apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which requires
that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the same. So
He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same
as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves,
the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing
signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the divine essence as in
Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a
subject, others more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode
of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the
word "man." So this word "God" sometimes stands for the essence, as when
we say "God creates"; because this predicate is attributed to the subject
by reason of the form signified---that is, Godhead. But sometimes it
stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, "God begets,"
or for two, as when we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is
said: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1
Tim. 1:17).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as
regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees
also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in
several "supposita." So it need not always stand for the essence it
signifies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This holds good against those who say that the word "God"
does not naturally stand for person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a different way
from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified by
this word "man"---that is, humanity---is really divided among its
different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is
no adjunct determining it to the person---that is, to a distinct subject.
The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality,
but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term "man" does
not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct,
as when we say, "man is a species"; whereas the form signified by the
name "God"---that is, the divine essence---is really one and common. So
of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be
restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when we say, "God
generates," by reason of the notional act this name "God" stands for the
person of the Father. But when we say, "God does not generate," there is
no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the
phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If,
however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this
proposition, for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true.
Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator," and
a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the
persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the
generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not
follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God,
as was said above (A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself,"
because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same
"suppositum." Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad
Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se]," forasmuch
as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it means "He
begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single relation, and thus
points to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an
emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, "He begot another
most like to Himself." Likewise also it is false to say, "He begot
another God," because although the Son is another than the Father, as
above explained (Q[31], A[2]), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is
"another God"; forasmuch as this adjective "another" would be understood
to apply to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there
is a distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God"
is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a substantive,
and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is
an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving
occasion to error.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is wrong,
because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to "God," the
word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would
mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and then the Father
would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of
the proposition is true, "He begot God Who is not God the Father." If
however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require
something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition
is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning would be, "He
begot God Who is God Who is the Father." Such a rendering however appears
to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative
proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said
that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative
"Who" in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the "suppositum";
whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the
"suppositum." Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God the
Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense
is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity
as well as from His personality. This, however, appears to be irrational;
since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to
affirmation, is open also to negation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the
person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence." For
Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are one
Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is from
Wisdom, as essence from essence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation
or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore
since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence
is generated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear
from what is above explained (Q[3], A[3]). But, as was shown, it is true
to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true: "Essence
begets essence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is
predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can
stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the essence
is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not
begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not begetting":
which cannot be.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the
principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by begetting or
spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets
itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only,
since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence.
Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting
that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence begot
essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is
nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we
wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only
the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as
above stated (A[4]). Now although "God" is really the same as "Godhead,"
nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For
since this word "God" signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses
it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for
person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be
predicated of this word, "God," as, for instance, we can say "God is
begotten" or is "Begetter," as above explained (A[4]). The word
"essence," however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for
Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form.
Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are
distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For
that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as
there exists distinction in the "supposita."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors
have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict
propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such
expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for instance, abstract
names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names;
as when we find "essence from essence"; or "wisdom from wisdom"; we
should take the sense to be, "the Son" who is essence and wisdom, is from
the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these
abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what
belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions
belong to "supposita." So "nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom"
are less inexact than "essence from essence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature
numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct,
which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by
corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas
God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the
divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although God and the divine essence are really the same,
nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we
must speak in a different way about each of them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of
identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that
it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different.
This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of
another as the universal of a particular.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names
consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas
the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence
logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light
of "suppositum," whereas the adjective indicates something added to the
"suppositum." Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of
the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a
personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the
"suppositum" implied in the substantive. But notional and personal
adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some
substantive. We cannot say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can
say that the "essence is a thing begetting," or that it is "God
begetting," if "thing" and God stand for person, but not if they stand
for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that
"essence is a thing begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in
the first case "thing" stands for person, and in the second it stands
for the essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: So far as Godhead is one in several "supposita," it agrees
in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say,
"the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the term Godhead can
be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in
all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle;
as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being
ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole
Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by
generation and spiration.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the
concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God is three
persons"; or "God is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man is every
man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject.
For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the
same way this proposition, "God is the Trinity," cannot be verified of
any one of the "supposita" of the divine nature. For the Father is not
the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, "God is
the Trinity," is false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by
accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is
accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the three
persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons
cannot be predicated of this name "God," except in an accidental sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in
coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above explained (A[5]), although adjectival terms,
whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence,
nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to the real
identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the
same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons.
Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence
as if we were to say, "The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the
Holy Ghost." And because this word "God" can of itself stand for the
essence, as above explained (A[4], ad 3), hence, as it is true to say,
"The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true to say, "God
is the three persons."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As above explained this term "man" can of itself stand for
person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal
human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man"; because it
cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the contrary, this
word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to
say of any of the "supposita" of the divine nature, "God is the Trinity,"
is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied
by Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the Father,"
the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard to a
higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence,
as this proposition, "The Father is God" is of itself true, so this
proposition "God is the Father" is true of itself, and by no means
accidentally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated
to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be
avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, "careless
words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance Ep. lvii.]. But to
appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three
persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that
such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they
belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the
essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract
signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another;
since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the
form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when expressed in
the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is
included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential attributes,
in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as what is common
is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes are not to
be appropriated to the persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the
wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the
essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For although
the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above
expounded (Q[32], A[1]), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared
by things which are more known to us. Now the essential attributes of God
are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal
properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential
attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as
we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above
explained (Q[32], A[1]). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of
the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine
persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential
attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of
the essential attributes is called "appropriation."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential
attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things which belong to
the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of
intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power is
appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason
of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to the
persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make the
persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above
explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of
the truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the
persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow
that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine
altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father is wise,
not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so
that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the
Father without the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father,
because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is
of Himself Wisdom; and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is
not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His
own essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept
prior to person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless, so
far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal
property from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color is
posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to "white
body," considered as white.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a
fitting manner by the holy doctors?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to
the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin.
ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in
the Gift." In which words he designates three names proper to the
persons: the name of the "Father," the name "Image" proper to the Son
(Q[35], A[2]), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift," which is proper to the
Holy Ghost (Q[38], A[2]). He also designates three appropriated terms.
For he appropriates "eternity" to the Father, "species" to the Son, and
"use" to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For
"eternity" imports duration of existence; "species," the principle of
existence; and 'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and operation
are not found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms
are not fittingly appropriated to the persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity is in
the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of
equality and unity." This does not, however, seem fitting; because one
person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to
another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above
explained (Q[37], A[2], ad 1). But, as he subjoins, "All these three are
one by the Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy
Ghost." The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the
Persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed
"power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness." Nor does this
seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas strength is found
to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, "Christ the
strength [*Douay: power] of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is likewise
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, "strength
[*Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all" (Lk. 6:19). Therefore
power should not be appropriated to the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the Apostle
says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in a
confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the Father,
'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost.'" This, however, seems
to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to imply the relation
of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this relation
of cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle from
no principle."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to Jn.
14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the book of
life," according to Ps. 39:9, "In the beginning of the book it is written
of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father Who is My
head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Is. 65:1, "Behold
I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I
am Who am." These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated.
For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), "is the supreme
similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude." So it seems that
it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a principle. Also the "book of
life" seems proper to the Son, as signifying "a thing from another"; for
every book is written by someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be
proper to the Son; because if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am,"
the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son,
and Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have
said further, "He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent
me to you," pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false;
because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be
common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 1/10
I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from
creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from
creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to
us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered
as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic
power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of
consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold
consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 2/10
According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God
absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies,
according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species" to
the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as meaning a "being"
without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is
"a principle without a principle." Species or beauty has a likeness to
the property of the Son. For beauty includes three conditions,
"integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are impaired are by
the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or "harmony"; and lastly,
"brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful which have
a bright color.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 3/10
The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch
as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father.
To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10):
"Where---that is, in the Son---there is supreme and primal life," etc.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 4/10
The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the express
Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful,
if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by
Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), "Where there exists wondrous
proportion and primal equality," etc.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 5/10
The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the
light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10):
"As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art
of the omnipotent God," etc.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 6/10
"Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the
"use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of "to
enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of the
will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin.
x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees
with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that felicity or
beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by which we
enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the Gift; and
Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "In the Trinity,
the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out
upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth." Thus it is clear
how "eternity," "species," and "use" are attributed or appropriated to
the persons, but not essence or operation; because, being common, there
is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the
Persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 7/10
The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that view
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" to the Father,
"equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is
manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For "unity"
is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this
reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not
presupposed since He is the "principle without principle." "Equality"
implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the same
quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the
"principle from a principle." "Union" implies the unity of two; and is
therefore appropriated to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from
two. And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says
(De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that "The Three are one, by reason of the
Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are united by reason of
the Holy Ghost." For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in
which we find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to
the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now
"unity" is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an
impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other
persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be
removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as
we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the
Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the
Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because
His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the
Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the
Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot
understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So
all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy
Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 8/10
According to the third consideration, which brings before us the
adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a
third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness." This
kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards
what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we
consider what is in creatures. For "power" has the nature of a principle,
and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the principle of
the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by
reason of old age. "Wisdom" has likeness to the heavenly Son, as the
Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son
this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. "Goodness," as the
nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems
repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent
impulse, according to Is. 25:4: "The spirit of the strong is as a blast
beating on the wall." "Strength" is appropriated to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes
used to express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that
the strong work done by an agent is its strength.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 9/10
According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His
effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by Whom,
and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies a
certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God; and
sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be
applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to
the Father in the same way as power. The preposition "by" [per] sometimes
designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works "by"
a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always appropriated to the Son, but
belongs to the Son properly and strictly, according to the text, "All
things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an instrument,
but as "the principle from a principle." Sometimes it designates the
habitude of a form "by" which an agent works; thus we say that an
artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to
the Son, so also is the expression "by Whom." The preposition "in"
strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things
in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be
in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression "in
Him" should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are
contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs
them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the expression
"in Him" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness."
Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be
appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle without a principle":
because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not
proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end;
but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to
the nature of a natural power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[39] A[8] Body Para. 10/10
Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth"
belongs to the intellect, as stated above (Q[16], A[1]), it is
appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For
truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing
itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are
referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be
said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as
appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge but
indirectly it means life. For, as above explained (Q[24], A[1]), it is
God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life.
Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior
movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as
Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered
as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not
imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The
expression "Who is" is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by
reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word
to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by
the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense,
it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and in that sense it
would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son is
the begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is personal." But taken
indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun "this"
[iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless
everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person,
although in its own nature it is not a person; as we may say, "this
stone," and "this ass." So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as
the word "God" signifies and stands for the divine essence, the latter
may be designated by the pronoun "this," according to Ex. 15:2: "This is
my God, and I will glorify Him."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or
properties; and there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether relation is the same as person?
(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?
(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves
the hypostases distinct?
(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding,
presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether relation is the same as person?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as person. For
when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others are
multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in the
person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration. Again, one
relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the Father and in
the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24),
nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor can it
be said that this occurs because they are identical, for otherwise
relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation, or property,
is not the same as person in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is predicated of
one is predicated of the others. But all that is predicated of a Person
is not predicated of His property. For we say that the Father begets;
but not that the paternity is begetting. Therefore property is not the
same as person in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same,
according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by
paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the
persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Different opinions have been held on this point. Some
have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons;
and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the
relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" something, but
rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the relations
"assistant," as above explained (Q[28], A[2]). But since relation,
considered as really existing in God, is the divine essence Itself, and
the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above
(Q[39], A[1]), relation must necessarily be the same as person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties
were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said, there
are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated above
(Q[32], A[2]). We must, however, say that there are properties in God; as
we have shown (Q[32], A[2]). These are designated by abstract terms,
being forms, as it were, of the persons. So, since the nature of a form
requires it to be "in" that of which it is the form, we must say that the
properties are in the persons, and yet that they are the persons; as we
say that the essence is in God, and yet is God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Person and property are really the same, but differ in
concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, the
other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, by
reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as
regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity
excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the
abstract is the same as the concrete, as "Godhead" and "God." And as the
divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it
follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and
so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the
divine essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is
the same person. For personal properties are the same as the persons
because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are
the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself,
and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the
non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the
other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His
own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the
Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting
person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also
there is one property in the two persons, as above explained (Q[30], A[2]
).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The properties are said to be in the essence, only by mode
of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity, not
merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the form
exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the
persons, but not the essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts:
and acts belong to a "suppositum." Now, properties are not designated as
"supposita," but as forms of "supposita." And so their mode of
signification is against notional participles and verbs being predicated
of the properties.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the
relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the persons
are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and
not by the relation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus.
For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But "hypostasis"
signifies an individual in the genus of substance. Therefore the
hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But the
distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction. Therefore
the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first
principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which
comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is towards
another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God cannot be
relation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone multiplies
the Trinity of the divine persons."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something
common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction.
So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to
know the principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now, there
are two principles of difference between the divine persons, and these
are "origin" and "relation." Although these do not really differ, yet
they differ in the mode of signification; for "origin" is signified by
way of act, as "generation"; and "relation" by way of the form, as
"paternity."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that
the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say
that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former
begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the
properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as
resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest the
distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the
material principles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
This opinion, however, cannot stand---for two reasons. Firstly, because,
in order that two things be understood as distinct, their distinction
must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both; thus in
things created it results from their matter or their form. Now origin of
a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means the way from
something, or to something; as generation signifies the way to a thing
generated, and as proceeding from the generator. Hence it is not possible
that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by
generation alone; but in the generator and in the thing generated we must
presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other. In a
divine person there is nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or
property. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it only remains to
be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the
relations. Secondly: because the distinction of the divine persons is not
to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided, because
the common essence remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles
themselves must constitute the things which are distinct. Now the
relations or the properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or
persons, inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as
paternity is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the
abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of
origin that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken
in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that
it presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as
"nativity," signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet
constituting the person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are
distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both
ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding
they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this name
"Father" signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis; whereas
this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies property only; forasmuch as
this name "Father" signifies the relation which is distinctive and
constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term "Begetter" or "Begotten"
signifies the origin which is not distinctive and constitutive of the
hypostasis.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence
it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be
distinguished by the relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being,
in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards
something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches
to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction. So the
distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least
possible; and this is by relation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when
it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not
presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that
relation is by nature to be towards another, the word "another" signifies
the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted
from the persons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties or
relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For that to which
something is added, may be understood when the addition is taken away; as
man is something added to animal which can be understood if rational be
taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis; for person is "a
hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity." Therefore, if a
personal property be taken away from a person, the hypostasis remains.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is someone, are
not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity,
supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son, in
Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone." So when paternity is
mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains "someone"---that
is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed from person, the
hypostasis remains.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is not the
same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would
prevent Him being called unbegotten." But if He had not begotten the Son,
there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if paternity be removed,
there still remains the hypostasis of the Father as unbegotten.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing else
than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore, if filiation be
removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds as
regards the other persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is twofold---when the
universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from
man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a
circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The
difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in
the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which
the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of
rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the
intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form
from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect;
as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from brass, there
remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle,
and of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in God,
nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards the mode of
signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God; and
thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "substance is common and
hypostasis is particular." So, if we speak of the abstraction of the
universal from the particular, the common universal essence remains in
the intellect if the properties are removed; but not the hypostasis of
the Father, which is, as it were, a particular.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the
non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases and
persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's being
unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father, the
Father's hypostasis or person remains.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of
the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not to
be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a
pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own "supposita,"
inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the
Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since
hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as relation distinguishes
and constitutes the hypostases, as above explained (A[2]), it follows
that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no
longer remain. Some, however, think, as above noted, that the divine
hypostases are not distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so
that the Father is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a
hypostasis as from another by generation. And that the consequent
relations which are to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute
the notion of a person, and are thus called "personal properties." Hence,
if these relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the
persons, remain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations
distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above (A[2]);
secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as
appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that, "person is
the individual substance of a rational nature." Hence, to have hypostasis
and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the rationality from
the nature, but not the property from the person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing property
absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all of which must
be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one of
dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting in a rational
nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property be removed from the person,
the hypostasis no longer remains; whereas it would remain were the
rationality of the nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are
individual substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation
belongs essentially to both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a
person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow, however,
that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it does not follow
that He is not a person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of the
Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed, as if
innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father;
for this would be impossible, since "being unbegotten" says nothing
positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But he speaks in a
general sense, forasmuch as not every unbegotten being is the Father. So,
if paternity be removed, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in
God, as distinguished from the other persons, but only as distinguished
from creatures; as the Jews understand it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the notional acts are understood before the
properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i, D, xxvii) that
"the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the Son." So it seems
that generation precedes paternity in the order of intelligence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes
that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes quantity. But
paternity is a relation founded on the action of generation. Therefore
paternity presupposes generation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is to
filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is so called
because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes generation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Generation is the operation of the person of the
Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore in
the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the opinion that the properties do not
distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest them
as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that the
relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts, so
that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that "because He begets,
He is the Father." A distinction, however, is needed if we suppose that
the relations distinguish and constitute the divine hypostases. For
origin has in God an active and passive signification---active, as
generation is attributed to the Father, and spiration, taken for the
notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passive, as
nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession to the Holy Ghost. For,
in the order of intelligence, origin, in the passive sense, simply
precedes the personal properties of the person proceeding; because
origin, as passively understood, signifies the way to a person
constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified actively is prior
in the order of intelligence to the non-personal relation of the person
originating; as the notional act of spiration precedes, in the order of
intelligence, the unnamed relative property common to the Father and the
Son. The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold
sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of
intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation, as such, is
founded upon an act: secondly, according as it constitutes the person;
and thus the notional act presupposes the relation, as an action
presupposes a person acting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When the Master says that "because He begets, He is
Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but not as
signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary to say
conversely that because He is Father He begets.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but not
as constituting a person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[40] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and so, in
the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as constituting
the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a proceeding from
the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes the personal property
of the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS (SIX ARTICLES)
We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts,
concerning which six points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?
(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?
(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or
from something?
(4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?
(5) What this power means?
(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to
the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is predicated of
God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what
pertains to the relation." But action is one of the ten "genera."
Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to
a notion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything which
is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance, or
relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the
essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the names
of the persons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in addition
to these, notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. But
we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional acts to
be placed in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It
is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional acts
are to be placed in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin.
But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore, to
signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute
notional acts to the persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a
twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him,
and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are
attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him,
belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God regards the
procession of person from person; wherefore the acts which designate the
order of this origin are called notional; because the notions of the
persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear from what
was above explained (Q[32], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons
only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether the
same. Whence the Master says that "generation and nativity in other words
are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D, xxvi). To see this, we must
consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred
from movement: for that anything be changed from its disposition by
movement evidently arises from some cause. Hence action, in its primary
sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement derived from another
into a mobile object, is called "passion," so the origin of movement
itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is
called "action." Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing
more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause
or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God
no movement exists, the personal action of the one producing a person is
only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the
principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions.
Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except
after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and
wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from
the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was
necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the
manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is
evident that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of
signification.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement, naturally
involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed to God.
Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical
standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we
attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the notional acts are voluntary?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary
says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget
the Son."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom of
the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the will. Therefore
the Son was begotten of the Father by will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost
proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He proceeds
voluntarily.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the Word.
But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore the Son
proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the
Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He begot
Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu.
vii).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father
begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will,
this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative
designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my
will---that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that
the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He
wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the
ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the
workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and
thus in that sense it must be said the God the Father begot the Son, not
by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the
book De Synod, it is said: "If anyone say that the Son was made by the
Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema." The
reason of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of
causation, in such a way that nature is determined to one, while the will
is not determined to one; and this because the effect is assimilated to
the form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that
of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence
such as it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the
will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas
understood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the
quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and understanding. So the
will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way;
whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the principle is
nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the divine
nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being; because God
is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing.
Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that
the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle.
But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not
by will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of
God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son
a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things
created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God,
subsists in the perfect likeness of God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying is directed against those who did not admit
even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the Son,
for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature
that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer many
things against our will from natural necessity---as, for instance, death,
old age, and like ills. This appears from what precedes and from what
follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we read: "Not against His
will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity
did the Father beget the Son."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God,
inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if love
were the principle of the Son's generation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally,
as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God naturally
wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself,
the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as above explained
(Q[19], A[3]). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God
loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by
mode of will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind,
a return is made to those first principles which are naturally
understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the
conception of the divine Word is natural.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by reason
of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning:
firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means
what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said
to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end
could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. In neither of
these ways is the divine generation necessary; because God is not the
means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to
be necessary "of itself" which cannot but be: in this sense it is
necessary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the
Father beget the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the notional acts proceed from something?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from
anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be
either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since
that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows
that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this
contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In them
nothing diverse or different exists." If the Father begets the Son from
Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something
permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we
say, "The man is white," since the man remains, when not from white he is
made white---it follows that either the Father does not remain after the
Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is false. Therefore
the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle
regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from His
own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the
Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle,
because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were,
an active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the one
begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates, which was disproved
above (Q[39], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three persons
are not from the same essence; because the essence is not another thing
from person. But the person of the Son is not another thing from the
Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father's essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son
is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the person of the
Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the
first-born before all creatures": and further on (Ecclus. 24:14) it is
said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the
world was I created." Therefore the Son was not begotten from something,
but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by
reason of what is said (Zach. 12:1): "Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth
forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth
the spirit of man within him"; and (Amos 4:13) according to another
version [*The Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth, and create the spirit."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says:
"God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal to
Himself."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the
Father's substance. For it was explained above (Q[27], A[2]; Q[33], AA[2]
,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God.
Now, this is the difference between true "generation," whereby one
proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the maker makes
something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of
wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman
makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as will
be shown later on (Q[45], A[1]), not as if this nothing were a part of
the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a
thing is produced by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So,
were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the Son
would be to the Father what the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as
is evident, the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of
similitude. Thus, if the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of
nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the
contrary is stated (1 Jn. 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus
Christ." Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He
made, but begotten.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God
is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain likeness
of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only
true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only begotten," according
to Jn. 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father,
He hath declared Him"; and so as others are entitled sons of adoption by
their similitude to Him, He is called the "first begotten," according to
Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable
to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many
brethren." Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of the
Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part of the
human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one
begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted; whence it
necessarily follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not
transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to
Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above (Q[40],
A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the
preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle, but
not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter, is made
by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the divine essence
is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the
Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this
denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds,
"the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"---that is, of the
Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): "When I
say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said more
explicitly, of the essence of the Father."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words.
For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence; but not that
it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by
observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes
consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder,
since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that
something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no
matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the
son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle, as a knife is
"of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the
forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say that
an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that
the Son is begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the
essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the
Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we say that
the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is nothing expressed
to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition, so there is no
parity of argument.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood
not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God
to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the
Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works" (Ecclus. 1:9,10).
Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom
begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of
participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to
the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, "From the
beginning and before the world was I made"---that is, I was foreseen as
united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and
begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for
in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and
this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not
changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the
Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of
creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from
generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way
Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The
other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created
spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of
man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the
notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or passive;
neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we
call passive power, as above explained (Q[25], A[1]); nor can active
power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons
were not made, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore in God there is no power
in respect of the notional acts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine
persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore, as
regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there
cannot be power in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of
the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs to the
will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards
intellect and will, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]). Therefore, in God
power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the
Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God
the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also
a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the principle
of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation;
and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must
attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of
spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of generation means
that whereby the generator generates. Now every generator generates by
something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of
generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed
as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts has no
reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as
proceeding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence
of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in God there is
no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of
possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it
can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it possible
that the Son should be generated.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies
distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a
double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the
other is a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by His
essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by
creation: just as one person is distinct from the other of which He is
principle by a notional act. But in God the distinction of action and
agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in
God. And therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which
certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or
essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of
principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may
ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating. But "to understand" and
"to will" are not such actions as to designate the procession of
something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore,
with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper
sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as
we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of
understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very
essence which has no principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating,
signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies a
principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the
principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God
principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God,
power does not signify essence but relation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are not
distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the same
applies to the power of begetting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to the
three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the three
persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the
essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills
to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence. Therefore,
also, the power to beget.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation
in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly
called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces
something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form
by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human
nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In
every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the
begotten is like the begetter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine
nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power of
begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God cannot but
contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other
than God, Who subsists from no other source than God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies
principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii), and
not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with
the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although paternity is
signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal
property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the
individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual form in
things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which
the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither
can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as
constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget
the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in
which the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. i, 18) that generation is the "work of nature," not of nature
generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator
generates. And therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine
nature directly, but the relation indirectly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle,
for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies that
which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the
agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which the agent
acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the
generator from that which it generates: but that by which the generator
generates is common to generated and generator, and so much more
perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the
divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is
common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only
of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact that we say
that the divine essence "is the principle by which the Begetter begets,"
it does not follow that the divine essence is distinct (from the
Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence
begets.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the act of
begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of
begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is
signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the
"essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is
signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons: but in
respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the
Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to several
Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated in
God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has
the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He cannot beget
Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore there can be
several Sons in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son did not
beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him not."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than has a
created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God can also:
the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after
begetting the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In God "that which is possible," and "that which is" do
not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be
several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more
than three Persons in God; which is heretical.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father, one
Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] Body Para. 2/5
The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the
Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations
themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several
Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more than one
filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a
material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied
except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there can be
but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one
subsistent whiteness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] Body Para. 3/5
The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God
understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can
be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is
the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which
person is the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] Body Para. 4/5
The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed.
For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said (A[2]), and nature is
determined to one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] Body Para. 5/5
The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons.
For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is
contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar
in regard to the other persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the
same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the power
"generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the gerund of the
active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the "power to
beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not
follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added.
But if the word "generandi" [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive
of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son---that is, the
power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the
gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be "the power of
generation"---that is, a power by which it is generated by some person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son
could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He could
not, as we shall see later on (Q[42], A[6], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[41] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God
require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained.
Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of
begetting power in the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] Out. Para. 1/1
OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly,
with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to mission.
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.
(1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?
(2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He
proceeds in eternity?
(3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?
(4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?
(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?
(6) Whether they are equal in power?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is equality in God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine
persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity
as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons
there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we
call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and
time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity, because
two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is not becoming to the
divine persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said
(Q[39], A[2]). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in
form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may speak
of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal
to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot
be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi,
10): "If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is the image, it
may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be
said to be equal to the image." But the Son is the image of the Father;
and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to
be found among the divine persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the
three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the relations.
Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Athanasius says that "the three persons are co-eternal
and co-equal to one another."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We must needs admit equality among the divine persons.
For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality
signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything
greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i):
"They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of
either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by
distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality." Now
the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity.
But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it
follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they
would not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be
one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the
divine persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk" or
dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and
has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of "virtue,"
which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form: to
this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more,
or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or less, perfect in heat. Now this
virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source---that is, by the
perfection of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual
things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and
perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which
are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more
perfect a thing is the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is
measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is
being, for everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect
is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual
quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action: in
regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of
longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more
perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius,
De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand equality to be in the Father,
Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in
eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity,
equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes
excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike,
even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as the air may
be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal if
one participates in the form more perfectly than another. And because not
only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in
perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the
Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is
equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two
ways---namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality
in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal
and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because the divine
essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore, just as the
Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal to the
Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore
equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are not mutual." For effects are said to
be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes; but
not conversely, for the form is principally in the cause, and secondarily
in the effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not
in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son
receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father,
and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to
the Father, but not conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider
but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they
are distinct. Now equality implies both ---namely, distinction of
persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself; and unity of
essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that
they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is clear that the
relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one
relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that
paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating
between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would
be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine
persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but
in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the
persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent.
i, D, xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are relative."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the
Son with the Father?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with
His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve modes
of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point;
wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the
emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of nature. The
third is like the mark or impression made by a seal; wherein is wanting
consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is the infusion of a
good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth
is the emanation of an accident from its subject; but the accident has no
subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as
sense receives the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting
equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will
by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is
transformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is
material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have effect
and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but this mode
has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the
genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio],
as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind. The twelfth is
birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which implies priority and
posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time
is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son
is from the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later
than the Father, or both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But
nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is
the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence
everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is
existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to
exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is
always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is begotten.
If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of generation,
a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which are
always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows that the
Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a
moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and before that
moment the Son did not exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are
co-eternal with each other."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father.
In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a
principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one
on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the
part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and
natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of time; for as
a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect, as stated above
(Q[41], A[2]), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect.
In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having
its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it
after a certain time; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate
from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived
from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the
action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists,
begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but
in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according
to what has been said (Q[41], A[2]), that the Father does not beget the
Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect
from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the
Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively
generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with
movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son
existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with
the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of
the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine
generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these
modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied from
another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let Splendor
tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the Father; let the
Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the name Son insinuate
His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the procession of the word
from the intellect represents it more exactly; the intellectual word not
being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from
potentiality to act; and this cannot be said of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the
principle of origin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts
begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however, is
not changed, as stated above (Q[27], A[2]). Hence the Son is ever being
begotten, and the Father is always begetting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In time there is something indivisible---namely, the
instant; and there is something else which endures---namely, time. But in
eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said above
(Q[10], A[2] ad 1, A[4] ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in
the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express the
presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that "He is ever
being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [*Moral.
xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is better to say "ever
born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of eternity, and "born"
the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son
imperfect, nor "was there a time when He was not," as Arius said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist
an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, or a
person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the
essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order
of nature in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before
another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the divine
persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by
Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But
there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not subject
to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no
order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists.
But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says.
Therefore in God order exists.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore
since there are many kinds of principle---namely, according to site, as a
point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and
according to each individual cause---so are there many kinds of order.
Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we
have stated (Q[33], A[1]): so there must likewise be order according to
origin, without priority; and this is called 'the order of nature': in
the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior to
another, but whereby one is from another."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in
general, not a special kind of origin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a
principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still
comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as
principle. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or
of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the
things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason,
inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other. But in God the
relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So,
neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one
person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of nature
itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to
natural origin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle,
but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly called
the order of nature than the order of essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in
greatness. For He Himself said (Jn. 14:28): "The Father is greater than
I"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): "The Son Himself shall be
subject to Him that put all things under Him."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity
does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not possess all the
Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are
more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more than two,
or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under
relation or notion, several notions are included. Therefore, since in the
Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, the
Son is evidently not equal to the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Phil. 2:6): "He thought it not robbery to
be equal with God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness.
For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature.
Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son
by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the
nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father
Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation
of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows that a man is not
equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by
due growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it
should happen otherwise. From what precedes (Q[27], A[2]; Q[33], AA[2]
,3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and
filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father was
defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive
manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally
equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27):
"Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain
and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural
nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These words are to be understood of Christ's human nature,
wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but in His divine
nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, "Equal
to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father in humanity": and by
Hilary (De Trin. ix): "By the fact of giving, the Father is greater; but
He is not less to Whom the same being is given"; and (De Synod.): "The
Son subjects Himself by His inborn piety"---that is, by His recognition
of paternal authority; whereas "creatures are subject by their created
weakness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness
signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (A[1], ad 1), and
belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have reference
to the essence; nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude arising from
the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim.
iii, 13), "The question of origin is, Who is from whom? but the question
of equality is, Of what kind, or how great, is he?" Therefore, paternity
is the Father's dignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is
something absolute, and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same
essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so
the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is
filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever dignity
the Father has; but we cannot argue---"the Father has paternity,
therefore the Son has paternity," for there is a transition from
substance to relation. For the Father and the Son have the same essence
and dignity, which exist in the Father by the relation of giver, and in
the Son by relation of receiver.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In God relation is not a universal whole, although it is
predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are one in
essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal,
the parts of which are distinguished in being. Persons likewise is not a
universal term in God as we have seen above (Q[30], A[4]). Wherefore all
the relations together are not greater than only one; nor are all the
persons something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of
the divine nature exists in each person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each other.
For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of one thing
existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in the Father,
or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each mode. Therefore
the Son and the Father are not in each other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing that has come out from another is within. But
the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Micheas 5:2:
"His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity."
Therefore the Son is not in the Father.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the Son
and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in the
other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 14:10): "I am in the Father, and the
Father is in Me."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are three points of consideration as regards the
Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and
according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is
in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence and
communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence
it follows that as the Father's essence is in the Son, the Father Himself
is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His own essence, it follows
that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is
expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), "The unchangeable God, so to speak,
follows His own nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting God. So we
understand the nature of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God." It
is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative
opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is
clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the
intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also
is uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently
represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes
enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each other.
The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in
that whereby something exists in its originating principle, except that
the unity of essence between the principle and that which proceeds
therefrom is wanting in things created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the
interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains
therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the
relations, not by any kind of essential separation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not
essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in the
other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in power.
For it is said (Jn. 5:19): "The Son cannot do anything of Himself but
what He seeth the Father doing." But the Father can act of Himself.
Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches
than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son
according to Jn. 14:31: "As the Father gave Me commandment so do I." The
Father also teaches the Son: "The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him
all things that Himself doth" (Jn. 5:20). Also, the Son hears: "As I
hear, so I judge" (Jn. 5:30). Therefore the Father has greater power than
the Son.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to
beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 7),
"Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the
omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as proved
above (Q[41], A[6]). Therefore the Son cannot do all that belongs to the
Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:19): "Whatsoever things the Father
doth, these the Son also doth in like manner."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power.
Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures,
for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power
is there for action. Now it was shown above (A[4]) that the very notion
of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the
Father's equal in greatness---that is, in perfection of nature. Hence it
follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same
applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words, "the Son cannot of Himself do anything," do not
withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it is
immediately added, "Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in
like manner"; but their meaning is to show that the Son derives His power
from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De
Trin. ix), "The unity of the divine nature implies that the Son so acts
of Himself [per se], that He does not act by Himself [a se]."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Father's "showing" and the Son's "hearing" are to be
taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as
He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be explained
in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge and will to act,
by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be referred to Christ in His
human nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[42] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and
filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the Son
is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father
can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to argue thus
would imply transition from substance to relation, for generation
signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same omnipotence as the
Father, but with another relation; the Father possessing power as
"giving" signified when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son
possesses the power of "receiving," signified by saying that He can be
begotten.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] Out. Para. 1/1
THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent?
(2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?
(3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent?
(4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent?
(5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent?
(6) To whom the invisible mission is directed?
(7) Of the visible mission
(8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a divine person can be properly sent?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly sent. For
one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine person is not
less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence Jerome
says, commenting on Ezech. 16:53: "What is joined and tied in one body
cannot be sent." But in the divine persons there is nothing that is
separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one person is not
sent by another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes anew
into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, Who is
everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be sent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 8:16): "I am not alone, but I and the
Father that sent Me."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, the notion of mission includes two things: the habitude
of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to the end
whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of
procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to command,
as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as an adviser
may be said to send the king to battle; or according to origin, as a tree
sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term to which he is sent is
also shown, so that in some way he begins to be present there: either
because in no way was he present before in the place whereto he is sent,
or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there
hitherto. Thus the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as
meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as
meaning a new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent
by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in
the world by taking our nature; whereas "He was" previously "in the
world" (Jn. 1:1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means
procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch
as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In
God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to
equality, as explained above (Q[42], AA[4],6).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it
did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is necessarily
separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no place in the
mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent neither begins to
exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where He
was. Hence such a mission takes place without a separation, having only
distinction of origin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection rests on the idea of mission according to
local motion, which is not in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory says (Hom.
xxvi, in Ev.), "The Son is sent as He is begotten." But the Son's
generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something temporally.
But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the mission of a divine
person is not temporal, but eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of the
divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gal. 4:4): "When the fullness of the time
was come, God sent His Son."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A certain difference is to be observed in all the words
that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express only
relation to the principle, as "procession" and "going forth." Others
express the term of procession together with the relation to the
principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as "generation" and
"spiration"; for generation is the procession of the divine person into
the divine nature, and passive spiration is the procession of the
subsisting love. Others express the temporal term with the relation to
the principle, as "mission" and "giving." For a thing is sent that it may
be in something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but that a
divine person be possessed by any creature, or exist in it in a new mode,
is temporal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Hence "mission" and "giving" have only a temporal significance in God;
but "generation" and "spiration" are exclusively eternal; whereas
"procession" and "giving," in God, have both an eternal and a temporal
signification: for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but temporally,
by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by
dwelling in man according to His invisible mission.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not
from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to mean that He
could be sent because eternally begotten.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That a divine person may newly exist in anyone, or be
possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the divine
person, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is called Lord
temporally by change of the creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Mission signifies not only procession from the principle,
but also determines the temporal term of the procession. Hence mission is
only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession,
with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine
person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be
called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, not that there is a
double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to
the gift of sanctifying grace?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine person is
not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the sending of a
divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine person is sent
only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the divine person
Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this is the error of
those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but that His gifts are
given.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, this preposition, "according to," denotes the habitude
of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the gift of
sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according to Rm. 5:5,
"the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who
is given to us." Therefore it is improperly said that the divine person
is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "the Son, when
temporally perceived by the mind, is sent." But the Son is known not only
by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith and
knowledge. Therefore the divine person is not sent only according to the
gift of sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the
apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a gift of
sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine person is
not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the Holy Ghost
proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification." But mission is a
temporal procession. Since then the creature's sanctification is by
sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of the divine person is
only by sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that He
exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone; and
neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according
to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which
participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however,
there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is
said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved
in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of
knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode
God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell
therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the
reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode,
except sanctifying grace. Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds
temporally only according to sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and
to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be according to
sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells
within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy
Ghost Himself is given and sent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is
perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself, but
enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes
place according to the gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the divine
person Himself is given.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the divine
person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy Ghost is
given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of
grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words, "the charity
of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the Son can be known by us according to other
effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us
according to those effects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as also
does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence
gratuitous grace is called the "manifestation of the Spirit" (1 Cor.
12:7). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the
working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with the
outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to them
without the grace itself, it would not be simply said that the Holy Ghost
was given, except with some qualifying term; just as we read of certain
ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy, or of miracles, as
having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying or of working
miracles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Father can be fittingly sent?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father should be
sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given. But the
Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His giving
Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the divine person is sent according to the indwelling of
grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us according to Jn.
14:23: "We will come to him and make Our abode with him." Therefore each
one of the divine persons is sent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them all,
except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify any person;
nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as stated above
(Q[32], A[3]). Therefore every divine person can be sent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), "The Father alone is
never described as being sent."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The very idea of mission means procession from another,
and in God it means procession according to origin, as above expounded.
Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him
to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to
Whom it belongs to be from another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the sense of "giving" as a free bestowal of something,
the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to be enjoyed by
the creature. But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what
is given, "to be given" only applies in God to the Person Who is from
another; and the same as regards "being sent."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the effect of grace is also from the Father, Who
dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still He is
not described as being sent, for He is not from another. Thus Augustine
says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Father, when known by anyone in time, is
not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He is, or from whom He
proceeds."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes the
signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in general; thus
"to be from another" is common to two of the notions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be sent
invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is according to the
gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, according
to 1 Cor. 12:11: "One and the same Spirit worketh all things." Therefore
only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the mission of the divine person is according to
sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of the
intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held
without the gift of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I should have
prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I
should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have not
charity, I am nothing." Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the word of
the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent invisibly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession, as
expounded above (AA[1],4). But the procession of the Son and of the Holy
Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions if
both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous, since one would
suffice for the creature's sanctification.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said of divine Wisdom (Wis. 9:10): "Send her from
heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying
grace, according to Jn. 14:23: "We will come to him, and will make Our
abode with him." But that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible
grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within him and
that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the Son and to
the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace, and to be from
another, it therefore belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to
the Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not belong to
Him to be from another, and consequently He is not sent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed
to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the first Gift, since
He is Love, as stated above (Q[38], A[1]), some gifts nevertheless, by
reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in a certain way
to the Son, those, namely, which belong to the intellect, and in respect
of which we speak of the mission of the Son. Hence Augustine says (De
Trin. iv, 20) that "The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is
known and perceived by anyone."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a divine
person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a likening of
the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Because
the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Ghost by the
gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy Ghost is according to the
mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but
one Who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): "The
Word we speak of is knowledge with love." Thus the Son is sent not in
accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, but
according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the
affection of love, as is said (Jn. 6:45): "Everyone that hath heard from
the Father and hath learned, cometh to Me," and (Ps. 38:4): "In my
meditation a fire shall flame forth." Thus Augustine plainly says (De
Trin. iv, 20): "The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by
anyone." Now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge; and
this is properly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge
[sapida scientia], according to Ecclus. 6:23: "The wisdom of doctrine is
according to her name."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since mission implies the origin of the person Who is sent,
and His indwelling by grace, as above explained (A[1]), if we speak of
mission according to origin, in this sense the Son's mission is
distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as generation is
distinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the
effect of grace, in this sense the two missions are united in the root
which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects of grace, which
consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the
affection. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be without the
other, because neither takes place without sanctifying grace, nor is one
person separated from the other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all who
participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their share
of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is said (Jn.
7:39): "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet
glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers in
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the invisible
mission is not according to progress in virtue; because progress in
virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or decreases; and thus
the mission would be continuous. Therefore the invisible mission is not
to all who share in grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace. But
mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas Christ, as
man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore the
invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and it is
not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore the
invisible mission is not to all that have grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27), the
invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every
creature that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission is
to every such creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As above stated (AA[3],4,5), mission in its very meaning
implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not
before, as occurs to creatures; or begins to exist where he was before,
but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine
persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two
things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal by grace. Thus the
invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be found these two
conditions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament
Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that the
invisible mission of the Son "is in man and with men. This was done in
former times with the Fathers and the Prophets." Thus the words, "the
Spirit was not yet given," are to be applied to that giving accompanied
with a visible sign which took place on the day of Pentecost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The invisible mission takes place also as regards progress
in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20),
that "the Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived by
anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according to the capacity
of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him."
Such invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone's
proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the acquisition of a
new state of grace; as, for example, the proficiency in reference to the
gift of miracles or of prophecy, or in the fervor of charity leading a
man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his
possessions, or to undertake any arduous work.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the
very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made to them
subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further revelation
of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such an increase is
by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a greater number of
objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of
His conception; but not afterwards, since from the beginning of His
conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the New
Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments of the
art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent to the
passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to its term.
Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the sacraments, but
to those who receive grace through the sacraments.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a
visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said to be
less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than
the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible
manner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to a
visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But the
Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot be
said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in others, unless
perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the sacraments, and in all
the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at
all, or His visible mission takes place in all these things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth the
whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason of those
visible creatures more than any other person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest kind
of creature---namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is
sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the
ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So
visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the angels.
Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner is only
for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as invisible things
are made known by the visible. So those to whom the invisible mission was
not sent, ought not to receive the visible mission; and to all who
received the invisible mission, whether in the New or in the Old
Testament, the visible mission ought likewise to be sent; and this is
clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent visibly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Mt. 3:16) that, when our Lord was baptized,
the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, God provides for all things according to the nature of
each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the
invisible by visible things, as explained above (Q[12], A[12]). Wherefore
the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things
that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has demonstrated
Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible creatures,
according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the invisible missions
also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible
creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to
the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love,
to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy
Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus the Son has
been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy Ghost as the
sign of sanctification.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He appeared,
into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said of that
creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the nature
assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost did
not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into the unity of
His person; so that what is said of it cannot be predicated of Him. Hence
He cannot be called less than the Father by reason of any visible
creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to the
imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as Augustine says (De
Trin. ii, 6): "The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by
corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the spiritual images of
bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire, saw them by their eyes.
Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same relation to these images that the
Son has to the rock, because it is said, "The rock was Christ" (1 Cor.
10:4). For that rock was already created, and after the manner of an
action was named Christ, Whom it typified; whereas the dove and the fire
suddenly appeared to signify only what was happening. They seem, however,
to be like to the flame of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the
column which the people followed in the desert, and to the lightning and
thunder issuing forth when the law was given on the mountain. For the
purpose of the bodily appearances of those things was that they might
signify, and then pass away." Thus the visible mission is neither
displayed by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not
to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament,
wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify something.
But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed
Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still
they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that
person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by diverse
names, so also can They each one be signified by different things;
although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the author
of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible mission of the
Son was necessarily made according to the rational nature to which it
belongs to act, and which is capable of sanctification; whereas any other
creature could be the sign of sanctification. Nor was such a visible
creature, formed for such a purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy
Ghost into the unity of His person, since it was not assumed or used for
the purpose of action, but only for the purpose of a sign; and so
likewise it was not required to last beyond what its use required.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the
angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the Person
of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those visible
creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account the Holy
Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] R.O. 6 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 6: It is not necessary that the invisible mission should
always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as is said (1
Cor. 12:7)---"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto
profit"---that is, of the Church. This utility consists in the
confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible signs. This has
been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles, according to Heb. 2:3,
"which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by
them that heard."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[7] R.O. 6 Para. 2/2
Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to
Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the
Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the visible
mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission made to
Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of His
conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time of His
baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show forth in
Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual regeneration;
hence the Father's voice spoke, "This is My beloved Son" (Mt. 3:17), that
others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only Begotten. The
Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of a bright cloud, to
show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it was said, "Hear ye Him"
(Mt. 17:5). To the apostles the mission was directed in the form of
breathing to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispensation
of the sacraments; and hence it was said, "Whose sins you shall forgive,
they are forgiven" (Jn. 20:23): and again under the sign of fiery tongues
to show forth the office of teaching; whence it is said that, "they began
to speak with divers tongues" (Acts 2:4). The visible mission of the Holy
Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because
the visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the
Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son manifests
the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine persons were, however,
given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed, cannot be called
visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De Trin. ii, 17), they
were not sent to designate the indwelling of the divine person by grace,
but for the manifestation of something else.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds
eternally?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one whence
He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), "The Father
is sent by no one because He is from no one." Therefore if a divine
person is sent by another, He must be from that other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But there
can be no authority as regards a divine person except from origin.
Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one sending.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He does not
proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although He proceeds
not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. xv).
Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to Is.
48:16, "Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit." But the Son is not
from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from Whom
He does not proceed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There are different opinions on this point. Some say that
the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally;
and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost,
this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by reason of which
He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine, however, says (De
Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by the Holy Ghost; and
the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son; so that to be sent in
God does not apply to each person, but only to the person proceeding from
another, whereas to send belongs to each person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person is
described as being sent, the person Himself existing from another is
designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the
mission of the divine person. Thus if the sender be designated as the
principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but
that person only Who is the principle of that person who is sent; and
thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by the Father
and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as the
principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole
Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a man can
send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[43] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
The answers to the objections appear from the above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] Out. Para. 1/2
TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-49)
THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL
THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)
After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider
the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will be
threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction
between them; (3) of their preservation and government. Concerning the
first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause
of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause;
(3) the principle of the duration of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?
(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent
coordinate principle with Him?
(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are
other exemplar causes?
(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be
created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found
without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause does
not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood
without it; therefore they can exist without it; and therefore it is
possible that some beings should not be created by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist.
Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient cause.
But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily
exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary things in
existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by
that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the efficient
cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore
not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Rm. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him
are all things."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing is
from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be
caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes
ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Q[3], A[4]) when treating
of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting
Being; and also it was shown (Q[11], AA[3],4) that subsisting being must
be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since
whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart
from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation.
Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse
participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by
one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude;
and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in
being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every
truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of the
definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what
belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by
participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be
without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of
laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter into the essence of
being as such, therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This objection has led some to say that what is necessary
has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false in the
demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of
necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph. v, text 6),
that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their
necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is not
merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect might
not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true,
whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as though it
were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in
reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient
cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of
mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is
not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the
mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its
efficient cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether primary matter is created by God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For
whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else (Phys. i,
text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter
cannot have been made by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division.
But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive principle
is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided
against each other, neither of which is from the other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every
agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that everything
made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in
potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against the
nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou
made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh unto
nothing"---viz. primary matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step
by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser
mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible
bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it
except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to
rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as
they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they assigned
certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity,
discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when
they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form
and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they
perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential
forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes,
such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according to Aristotle (De
Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into
consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate
species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by
a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance, man
by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under
some particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they
assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others there were
who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a
cause to things, not as "these," or as "such," but as "beings."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be
the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by accidental
forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also
according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus
it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the
universal cause of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of
"becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either accidental
or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their
emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation
matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former
mode of being made.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that
the first passive principle should be the effect of the first active
principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the
first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. xii,
text 40).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is not
created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything
created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that
even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to
its being is created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God.
For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far from
being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something
self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above
(A[1]). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by
participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all
sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also
individuating principles added to the principles of the species.
Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for
instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are
called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species
themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there is
no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some
beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, and
these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as
above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div.
Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life, and
before self-subsisting wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas,
according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are
contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things
are not outside God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof
whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an
exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a
determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter
by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld
externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind. Now it is
manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This
determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first
principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which
order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that
in the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have
called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (Q[15],
A[1]). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things,
in reality are not apart from the divine essence, according as the
likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In
this manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things.
Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by
the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy
of some kind of imitation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to
God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like to the
man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they
represent the divine idea, as a material house is like to the house in
the architect's mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man
without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man is a
man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything
self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species, such as
separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only
with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same
mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we
abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the
particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should
exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life
and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes the
powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as
the ancients asserted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God is the final cause of all things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For
to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God needs nothing.
Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing
generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70), because
the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the
first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the final cause of
all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not
desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the end of
all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore,
God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows that before
and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has made all things
for Himself."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would
not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it were
by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such
is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the impression
which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to
receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are both agent and
patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents, and to these it
belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But
it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the
acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection,
which is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own
perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness.
Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which
by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong to God,
and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He
does not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of
generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the
generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the
form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, since
the end is more noble than the means to the end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All things desire God as their end, when they desire some
good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural,
i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except
forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[44] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final
cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows
that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does
not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him, some of
which come into our mind before others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] Out. Para. 1/1
THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the
First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points
of inquiry:
(1) What is creation?
(2) Whether God can create anything?
(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?
(4) To what things it belongs to be created?
(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any
one Person?
(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?
(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and
of the will?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to create is to make something from nothing?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from
nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To make
concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by
bringing forth something from what was already."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from
their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and from being
to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the
most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore it is not from
nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some
cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue
is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in
any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from
nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God created,"
etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As said above (Q[44], A[2]), we must consider not only
the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the
emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this
emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by
particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man
is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man," and
white from "not-white." Hence if the emanation of the whole universal
being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any
being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the
same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the
"not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of
all being, is from the "not-being" which is "nothing."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense,
according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we
say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in
that way here, but as it is described above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term
"wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more
perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble
and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding to the term
"whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and
more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler
than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substantial form,
which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the
contrary, which is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation
is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because the
term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is
understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this
preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only
order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is
midday. But we must understand that this preposition "from" [ex] can
comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be
included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by
stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence.
But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied,
and the sense is, "It is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from
anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does
not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is
said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this
preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In
the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can create anything?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according
to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers
considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from
nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the contraries of first
principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less
than its part, or that affirmation and negation are both true at the same
time. Therefore God cannot make anything from nothing, or create.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be
created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears
by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in
potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of
nothing by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming.
But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time, is becoming
and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not,
and what has been made, already is: and so it would follow that something
would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made,
its becoming precedes its having been made. But this is impossible,
unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained. Therefore
it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite
distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen
that something is made from nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Not only is it impossible that anything should be created
by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created by God,
as appears from what has been said (Q[44], A[1]). For when anyone makes
one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is
presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action; thus the
craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused
not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So also nature
itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes
matter. If therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it
would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now
it has been shown above (Q[44], AA[1],2), that nothing can be, unless it
is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is
necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Q[44], A[2]),
considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular
causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action; whence
came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this
has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Creation is not change, except according to a mode of
understanding. For change means that the same something should be
different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same
actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion
according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same
being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the subject of
which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing
is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only
according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as
first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and
passion coincide as to the substance of motion, and differ only according
to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that when
motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in
the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of
understanding as was said above (Q[13], A[1]), creation is signified by
mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make
something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more
suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because
"to make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and
of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In things which are made without movement, to become and to
be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the term of
movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is
illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of movement,
as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In
these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its being made,
we mean that it is from another, and was not previously. Hence since
creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already
created at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if
there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is plainly
false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify
a change existing between two forms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For
as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature, so
creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But
creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise
it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore
creation taken passively is not anything in the creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature.
But creation is signified as the medium between them both: since it is
not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in
that case it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another
creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not
anything in the creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance,
it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident is in a
subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and
so the same thing would be the subject and also the term of creation.
This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and
preserves the accident; while the term is after the action and passion
whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action and passion cease.
Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made according to its
entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or
accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby
anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form, is
something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation,
whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in
the thing created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according
to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or by
change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something
pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of
some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the
universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation
produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed from
action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A[2], ad
2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the
Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which
implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Creation signified actively means the divine action, which
is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to
the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason;
whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was
said above (Q[13], A[7]) in treating of the divine names.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was said
above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover and
the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the
Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is in the
creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in
its creation; because relations, or their entire nature being referred to
something, are not referred by any other relations, but by themselves;
as was also shown above (Q[42], A[1], ad 4), in treating of the equality
of the Persons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The creature is the term of creation as signifying a
change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and is
prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless
creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object to
which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it
necessary that as long as the creature is it should be created; because
creation imports a relation of the creature to the Creator, with a
certain newness or beginning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and
subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv) it is said, "The
first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not
subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to
subsisting and composite things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite
things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own component
parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly
produced by the first: as natural generation produces the natural thing,
which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in
natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the composite,
is, properly speaking, that which is created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things.
Therefore creation belongs to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown
above (Q[44], A[2], ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of
a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever
being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things,
whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or
composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to
that which has being---that is, to what subsists in its own being. But
forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they
themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called
a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be
"of a being" than "a being." Therefore, as accidents and forms and the
like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to
exist, so they ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created"
things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the proposition "the first of created things is being,"
the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the
proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called
created because it is a being, not because it is "this" being, since
creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was
said above (A[1]). We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the
first visible thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing
colored is what is seen.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing
from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite" is
created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its
principles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is created,
but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation is the
production of the whole being, and not only matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create,
because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34), what is
perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more
perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their own
likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an
immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But immaterial
substance can be made only by creation, since it has no matter from which
to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing
made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a
"contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power
to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a creature can
do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature
do this.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the
measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we proved above
when treating of the infinity of God (Q[7], AA[2],3,4). Therefore only a
finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a
finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is
not impossible for a creature to create.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor
bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to
what precedes (A[1]), that to create can be the action of God alone. For
the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and
prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself:
and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal
cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that
"neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it
works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely, not as this
or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is
the proper act of God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of
another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts by
the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire.
And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper act of the
universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the
first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first
separate substance created by God created another after itself, and the
substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world
creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in the same manner the Master
says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of
creating, so that the latter can create ministerially, not by its own
power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause
does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch as
by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the
principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what is
proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need
of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in
cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form, produces the
form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now
the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other
effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act
dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not
from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the
instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any creature to
create, either by its own power or instrumentally---that is,
ministerially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no
body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its
action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is
contrary to the very idea of creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness
to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying it to
something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature
absolutely, because he would then be the cause of himself; but he is the
cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes
in his action a determinate matter whereby he is an individual man. But
as an individual man participates human nature, so every created being
participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own
being, as we have said above (Q[7], AA[1],2). Therefore no created being
can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in
"this": and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this
thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in an
immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it
is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has
being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial substance
cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its
being, but only as regards some added perfection; as we may say that a
superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
iv, x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle
says (Eph. 3:15): "From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is
named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause
anything, unless something is presupposed; which is against the very idea
of creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text
43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And so the
contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from
the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire intends to reduce the
matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and
contrary dispositions, whereby the potentiality (of the water) is
restrained from being reduced to act; and the more the potentiality is
restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter
to act. Hence a much greater power is required in the agent when no
potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of
much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the
substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made;
for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although
to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet to create
it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has
been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is required in the agent in
proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the act, it follows
that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed
potentiality is infinite, because there is no proportion between "no
potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural
agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and "being." And
because no creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an
infinite being, as was proved above (Q[7], A[2]), it follows that no
creature can create.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to create is proper to any person?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what
comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect is the
cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is
prior to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect, because the
divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas
the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions
of the divine Persons are the cause of the processions of things, and so
to create belongs to a Person.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other
only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever difference is
attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the
processions and relations of the Persons. But the causation of creatures
is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the
Father is attributed that "He is the Creator of all things visible and
invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by Him "all things were made";
and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver."
Therefore the causation of creatures belongs to the Persons according to
processions and relations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows
from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person, this does
not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by
every essential attribute---viz. by power, goodness and wisdom---and thus
does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate
mode of causation ought not to be attributed to one Person more than to
another, unless they are distinguished in creating according to relations
and processions.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused
are the common work of the whole Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the
being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of
action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be
fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God
according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the
three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is
common to the whole Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their
procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as
was said above (Q[14], A[8]; Q[19], A[4]), when treating of the knowledge
and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will,
just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the
craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the
love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made
the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through His Love,
which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the
type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the
essential attributes, knowledge and will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of
creation, as above explained.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons,
still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives
the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also
likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the three Persons,
belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the
Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to be the Creator is
attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the power of
creation from another. And of the Son it is said (Jn. 1:3), "Through Him
all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from
another; for this preposition "through" usually denotes a mediate cause,
or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the
same power from both, is attributed that by His sway He governs, and
quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason
for this particular appropriation may be taken from the common notion of
the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated
(Q[39], A[8], ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly
shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to be the
Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the
intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through Whom all
things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to
which belong both government, which brings things to their proper end,
and the giving of life---for life consists in a certain interior
movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute,
each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally
connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the
justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" poured out
super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very
substance of a thing, is reduced to "power."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a
trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its traces. But
the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above
stated (Q[32], A[1]). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in
creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the
trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of their
properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it
follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these
(properties): and so on to infinitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the
causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the
relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore
in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the
unity of essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of
the Trinity appears in creatures."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but
diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause,
but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is
called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not
who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of
its form, as fire generated represents fire generating; and a statue of
Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of
"image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the
acts of intellect and will, as was said above (Q[27]). For the Son
proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as
love of the will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect
and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of
image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the
love proceeding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch
as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced
to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in
its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and
has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance,
it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the
Person of the Father, Who is the "principle from no principle." According
as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the
thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. According as
it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is
love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will
of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the
trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one
individual," and according "as it is formed by a species," and according
as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced
those three, "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of
Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing limited
by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the
order. And to these three are reduced the other three mentioned by
Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also
those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): "that which exists; whereby it is
distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance,
is distinct by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar
expressions may be easily reduced to the above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The representation of the trace is to be referred to the
appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge of
the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said (Q[32],
A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting;
and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor is it
necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in
the creature; but only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in
regard to those three things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The processions of the persons are also in some way the
cause and type of creation; as appears from the above (A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and
art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is produced. But
it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it.
Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation of
nature and art there is creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in
natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is an active
or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the
operation of nature; and therefore it must be produced by creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found
generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in animals
generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from
nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in
nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow that
nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the
work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which,
some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but
previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This
arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how to
distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in
matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that they pre-exist "simply."
Others, however, said that the forms were given or caused by a separate
agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of
nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose from ignorance
concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural
body is not subsisting, but is that by which a thing is. And therefore,
since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing
alone, as shown above (A[4]), it does not belong to forms to be made or
to be created, but to be "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by
the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed
to the work of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are
made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial
forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its like
according to quality, but according to species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent
suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they
are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor
is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent.
However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does
not suffice, but a proper agent is required, in the shape of a univocal
generator.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[45] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The operation of nature takes place only on the
presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are
called creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)
Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures,
about which there are three points for treatment:
(1) Whether creatures always existed?
(2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?
(3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the universe of creatures always existed?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world,
had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything which begins
to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be
impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it was
a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter,
which is in potentiality to existence, which results from a form, and to
non-existence, which results from privation of form. If therefore the
world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But
matter cannot exist without form: while the matter of the world with its
form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist:
which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and
sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing extends so long
is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its
power does not extend to any determinate time. Therefore no incorruptible
thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a
beginning at some time is, and at some time is not; therefore no
incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible
things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual
substances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher
(Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and also (De Coelo
et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the
universe did not begin to exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might
be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body where the
body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would
not be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vacuum; which is
impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either
the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. But what
is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new
movement there was a previous movement. Therefore movement always was;
and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only
in a movable thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither
begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For nature always
moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the
nature of the mover, or in the movable thing, there cannot arise from the
natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will,
without itself being changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but
this can be only by some imagined change, at least on the part of time.
Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits
something which will be tomorrow, but is not today; and at least awaits
for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without
change, because time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains
that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so the
same conclusion follows as before.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its
end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not in its
end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its
beginning and end, because there is no time except "now" which is the end
of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin
or end, and consequently neither can movement, the measure of what is
time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature
only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only, therefore,
since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by
duration; since what is prior and posterior in duration constitutes time,
it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for
a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, requiring
something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause
of the world; being the final cause, by reason of His goodness, the
exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by
reason of His power as appears from the above (Q[44], AA[2],3,4). Since
therefore God is eternal, the world is also eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the
action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world is
eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 17:5), "Glorify Me, O Father, with
Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and (Prov.
8:22), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He
made anything from the beginning."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is
far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (Q[19], A[4])
that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are
necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the
necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v,
text 6). Now it was shown above (Q[19], A[3]), that, absolutely speaking,
it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is
not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always
exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the
being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not
therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be
proved by demonstration.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively,
demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the
ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite
impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both in
Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as
those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to
refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he
quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a
demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because
he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems,
about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, "whether the world is
eternal."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Before the world existed it was possible for the world to
be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but
according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is
called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from the
sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in
which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the
Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having
that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before it
received that power, it did not exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120)
does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist; but
that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and
corruptible begin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is
unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive
its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven
is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be
generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except
that matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some said,
especially about heaven. But we say that matter and heaven were produced
into being by creation, as appears above (Q[44], A[1], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing,"
but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which there is
not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we
hold that there was no place or space before the world was.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The first mover was always in the same state: but the first
movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas hitherto
it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which
is not change, as said above (Q[45], A[2], as 2). Hence it is evident
that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against
those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things, but not
eternal movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and
Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things began to
exist movement also existed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had
the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an
eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed,
not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into
consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes
something and produces something else, and the universal agent, who
produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and
presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the
form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say
that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on
account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so
of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to
say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end.
Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter.
Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in
time "before," according to an imaginary succession of time after time.
But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not
correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an
imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed
to His action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as
much as and when He willed, and according to what was fitting to
demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the
knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it
had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a
cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after"
belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning and
end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted
the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given moment in
movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if
movement be a beginning. The same applies to the "now" of time. Thus it
appears that the idea of the instant "now," as being always the beginning
and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence
Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those
who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the
word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may
say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time
really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is nothing,
the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is
possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature,
according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from the
voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the
agent, as appears from what was said above (Q[19], A[4]; Q[41], A[2]).
Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the
world, we should not say that the world was produced by Him, except as
preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being after not
being, in order more manifestly to declare its author.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[1] R.O. 10 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 10: Given the action, the effect follows according to the
requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents
acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the
form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the eternal action
of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God
willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a
demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made
has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively
that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by
the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively
proved that the world began.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by
God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something. But
it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would
have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of Aristotle (De
Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said
that the world was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not
being. Therefore it must have begun.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works from some
principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by
intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore,
which is His effect, did not always exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed,
and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But
this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is
manifest that the world did not always exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if
the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.
Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that
infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at
this present day; which is manifestly false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal.
Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the
father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in
efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved
(Metaph. ii, text 5).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been
an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: therefore an
infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is
impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world
began, and not only is it known by faith.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively,
because faith is of things "that appear not" (Heb. 11:1). But that God is
the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of
faith; for we say, "I believe in one God," etc. And again, Gregory says
(Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of
the world is stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known only by
revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it
be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of the
mystery of the Trinity (Q[32], A[1]). The reason of this is that the
newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world
itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now
everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now";
whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it
cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always.
Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient
cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by
reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity;
and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above
(Q[19], A[3]). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on
which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of
faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider
this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should
bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to
unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things
that are of faith.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of
philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For some
said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an
intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent.
Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For
they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation,
so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was always made. "And
they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if
the foot were always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a
footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also
the world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand
this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts by motion, of
necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the
end of the action, and every agent must be the principle of action. But
if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary
for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the
case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily
if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the
world in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world, is
not a successive change, as was said above (Q[45], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say
that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made after
nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that
it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do not reject the
word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys.
viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as
to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be
done, which is like movement. Such is the human intellect, but not the
divine intellect (Q[14], AA[7],12).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some
region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable
to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the
arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, were subject to an
infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i),
that it is absurd from such particular changes to hold the opinion of the
newness of the whole world.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be
equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because the
divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the
world it is otherwise.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Passage is always understood as being from term to term.
Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a
finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is
founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number
of mean terms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity
"per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are
"per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be
moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is
not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient
causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should
have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental,
as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one
after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one
particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is
accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another
man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For
all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of
a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be
generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the
generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body,
and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[2] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason
in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to be an
actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who
says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But this was disproved
above (Q[7], A[4]). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body.
And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as
Augustine says [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ.
Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls---viz. that
souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of
time; a fuller consideration of which matters will be given later (Q[75],
A[2]; Q[118], A[6]). But be it noted that this argument considers only a
particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or least
some creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are considering the
question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the creation of things was not in the
beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of
time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the
substance of things was brought into being; and time does not measure the
substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore
creation was not in the beginning of time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that
everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies a
"before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is
indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, since to be
created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not
created in the beginning of time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created
in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the beginning of
time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the
beginning of time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude
three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had
no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the beginning" are
expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles
of creation, one of good things and the other of evil things, against
which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son." For as the
efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so
the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by reason of wisdom, in
order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), "Thou hast made all things in
wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the
beginning---that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle
(Col. 1:16), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all things." But
others said that corporeal things were created by God through the medium
of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the
beginning"---i.e. before all things---"God created heaven and earth."
For four things are stated to be created together---viz. the empyrean
heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the
angelic nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not
as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because
together with time heaven and earth were created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being
made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since in
every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a
given movement---that is, whilst anything is in the process of being
moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is
in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in "being moved." But
creation is neither movement nor the term of movement, as was said above
(Q[45], AA[2],3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not
being created before.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[46] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of
time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according to some
"now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time
begins.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] Out. Para. 1/2
TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (Q[47])
OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (THREE ARTICLES)
After considering the production of creatures, we come to the
consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be
threefold---first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of
the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of the
spiritual and corporeal creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) The multitude or distinction of things.
(2) Their inequality.
(3) The unity of the world.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does
not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But God is
supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q[11], A[4]). Therefore He
produces but one effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But
God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (Q[44], A[3]).
Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of
the creation is one---viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above (Q[44]
, A[4]). Therefore the effect of God is but one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:4,7) that God "divided the light from
the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore the
distinction and multitude of things is from God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, The distinction of things has been ascribed to many
causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself
or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural
philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter
alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance
according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, however, attributed the
distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the agent together;
and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is
mixed up in matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 2/6
But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown
above (Q[44], A[2]), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we must
reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause.
Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form
for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their proper
forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the
matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is formless, in order
that it may be accommodated to different forms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 3/6
Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, as
did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced the
first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own being,
there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as will appear
later (Q[50], A[3]). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch as it
understood the first cause, produced the second intelligence; and in so
far as it understood itself as in potentiality it produced the heavenly
body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as
having actuality it produced the soul of the heavens.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 4/6
But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it was
shown above (Q[45], A[5]) that to create belongs to God alone, and hence
what can be caused only by creation is produced by God alone---viz. all
those things which are not subject to generation and corruption.
Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the universality of things
would not proceed from the intention of the first agent, but from the
concurrence of many active causes; and such an effect we can describe
only as being produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the
universe, which consists of the diversity of things, would thus be a
thing of chance, which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 5/6
Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from
the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into
being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and
be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately
represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse
creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the
divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God
is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the
whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly,
and represents it better than any single creature whatever.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] Body Para. 6/6
And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things,
therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word of God,
which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read in Gn.
1:3,4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the light from the
darkness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it
is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect is one
only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was shown above (Q[19],
A[4]), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against
God's unity and simplicity to understand many things, as was shown above
(Q[15], A[2]), it follows that, although He is one, He can make many
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This reason would apply to the representation which
reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by reason of
matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one.
But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly, which is the
divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things.
Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the plurality of ideas
corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In speculative things the medium of demonstration, which
demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one only; whereas probable
means of proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if the
means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is sufficient. But the
creature is not such a means to its end, which is God; and hence the
multiplication of creatures is necessary.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the inequality of things is from God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the inequality of things is not from God. For
it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things that are
best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who
is the Best, to make all things equal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text 20).
But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal
things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no inequality
of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives being to
things, it seems that He has made all things equal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ecclus. 33:7): "Why does one day excel
another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun
another sun? [Vulg.: 'when all come of the sun']. By the knowledge of the
Lord they were distinguished."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those who said that the
distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and
evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God.
For he asserted that God first created only the rational creatures and
all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some being
turned to God more and some less, and others turned more and others less
away from God. And so those rational creatures which were turned to God
by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels according to the
diversity of merits. And those who were turned away from God were bound
down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin; and he said this
was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies. But according to
this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures
would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to
creatures, but it would be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which
is contrary to what is said: "God saw all the things that He had made,
and they were very good" (Gn. 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
ii, 3): "What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect
provided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its
beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened
through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned,
there would be a hundred suns in the world?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the
distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their
inequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction is
found in things; one is a formal distinction as regards things differing
specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards things
differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account of the form,
material distinction exists for the sake of the formal distinction. Hence
we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each
species, forasmuch as the species is sufficiently preserved in the one;
whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of
one species for the preservation of the species. Whence it appears that
formal distinction is of greater consequence than material. Now, formal
distinction always requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. viii, 10), the forms of things are like numbers in which species
vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species
seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than
the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men
than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than
others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction
of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so it is the
cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one
grade of goodness were found in things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is
best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every part of
the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the
case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if
every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also
made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a
creature; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one
better than another. And therefore we find it said of each creature, "God
saw the light that it was good" (Gn. 1:4); and in like manner of each one
of the rest. But of all together it is said, "God saw all the things that
He had made, and they were very good" (Gn. 1:31).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes
multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son
proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the creature
proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless even creatures
share in a certain equality---namely, of proportion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it holds
only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of which is
due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things there is no
inequality of parts through any preceding inequality, either of merits or
of the disposition of the matter; but inequality comes from the
perfection of the whole. This appears also in works done by art; for the
roof of a house differs from the foundation, not because it is made of
other material; but in order that the house may be made perfect of
different parts, the artificer seeks different material; indeed, he would
make such material if he could.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is only one world?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not only one world, but many.
Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say that
God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason He
created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited to the
creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown above
(Q[25], A[2]). Therefore God has produced many worlds.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nature does what is best and much more does God. But it
is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many good things
are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied
in number, the species remaining the same, because multiplication in
number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as
when I say "man" I mean the form, and when I say "this man," I mean the
form in matter; so when we say "world," the form is signified, and when
we say "this world," the form in the matter is signified. Therefore there
is nothing to prevent the existence of many worlds.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 1:10): "The world was made by Him,"
where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The very order of things created by God shows the unity
of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, whereby
some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God,
have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself, as shown above
(Q[11], A[3]; Q[21], A[1]). Hence it must be that all things should
belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert that many worlds
exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in
chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides an infinite
number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This reason proves that the world is one because all things
must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity
of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity of
God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of the exemplar,
proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: No agent intends material plurality as the end forasmuch as
material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself tends to infinity,
and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said
that many worlds are better than one, this has reference to material
order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine
agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it might be said that if He had
made two worlds, it would be better if He had made three; and so on to
infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[47] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For it is
not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since every
earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever it was.
The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the world.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] Out. Para. 1/3
TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF GOOD AND EVIL (QQ[48]-49)
THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and
firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of the
spiritual and corporeal creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] Out. Para. 2/3
Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] Out. Para. 3/3
Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:
(1) Whether evil is a nature?
(2) Whether evil is found in things?
(3) Whether good is the subject of evil?
(4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?
(5) The division of evil into pain and fault.
(6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether evil is a nature?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature.
But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that "good and
evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things." Therefore evil
is a nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a
nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality; for
a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from
illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and
good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, as the
Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil
there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good. Therefore
evil signifies a nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts
good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except
what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection of the
universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the
"admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which even
what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent
commendation of what is good." Therefore evil is a nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a being
nor a good."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is
known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the
nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything
appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own
perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any
nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form
or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the
absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is
neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such, is good, the
absence of one implies the absence of the other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of
Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore
they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For
Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward examples that
in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may
be said that, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first
kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as being verified in all
contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to
another, as black in relation to white, and bitter in relation to sweet.
And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in
regard to contraries; because, as every form has the nature of good, so
every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in
morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object of
the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of
an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things;
good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does
the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except
as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of
the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another
form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in
morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the
end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of
reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil
is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that
is annexed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks
there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between good
and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something rightly
ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but also as
injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a
"prodigal man is foolish, but not evil." And from this evil in morality,
there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of evil, for from
blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one way,
formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that sense
evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as
it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another sense a thing
is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white.
Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final cause, as the end is said
to effect by moving the efficient cause. But in these two ways evil does
not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of
the good annexed to it. For every action comes from some form; and
everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired,
except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing
definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered
to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according as one
is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can
only happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither belongs to
the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the
same, except accidentally, that is, by reason of some good joined to it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether evil is found in things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that evil is not found in things. For whatever is
found in things, is either something, or a privation of something, that
is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is distant
from existence, and even more distant from non-existence." Therefore evil
is not at all found in things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil
is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is contrary
to what has been said (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the
Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed with
evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more
than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is no evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and
penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As was said above (Q[47], AA[1],2), the perfection of the
universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that
every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is
that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of
the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in
existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose their
existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose
it, as things corruptible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should
be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the
perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can
fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now
it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails
in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as
corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple
"not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a
privation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is
twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing,
as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it is
convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and neither
therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a
proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a copula,
notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what answers to
the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of blindness as being in
the eye; or of any other privation. In this way even evil can be called a
being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that
things may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that
evil was a positive thing in itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the
whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the
whole, as was said above (Q[47], A[2]). And the whole itself, which is
the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some
things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not
preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence
not to destroy, but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv);
but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail;
secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful
that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many good things would be
taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be
generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be
preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor
the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether evil is in good as in its subject?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good
is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that "evil
does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore, evil is not
in good as its subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But
"non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither
does evil require good as its subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and
evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also
the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as in its
subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said (Is. 5:20):
"Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only
in good."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As was said above (A[1]), evil imports the absence of
good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be
taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken
negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not
exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having
the good belonging to something else; for instance, a man would be evil
who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the
absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for
instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same---viz.
being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as
primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of
privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative
potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent
body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however,
manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a
good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential
being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has
being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the
subject of evil is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a
part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a
subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject,
but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not "sight," but
"animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the
rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries
cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and
evil in general, but not in reference to any particular good and evil.
For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like contraries, are only
considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some
determinate genus; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good
can coexist with the privation of another good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such
is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is clear
from the explanation given.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether evil corrupts the whole good?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary
is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries.
Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts
inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and uniform.
Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good.
But that from which something is always being removed, is at some time
consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created
good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot
wholly consume good."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must
consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed by
evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed
by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is neither
wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is
the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air is not
injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil,
but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject
to some actuality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by
way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of
remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise
of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this
kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the
matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in
the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form;
and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions
which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more they are
intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the
actuality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified
to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the aforesaid
aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and
passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the
aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot
be infinitely multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be
infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also infinitely
diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away,
because its root always remains, which is the substance of the subject.
Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and
the air, the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished,
but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which
in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made
to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more
lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between
us and God, according to Is. 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and
God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away,
for it belongs to its very nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but
other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act.
Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where it
touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is
like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, it
is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is
like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous is
infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion
(for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in the
present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a
division we keep the same proportion, we continue to subtract less and
less; for half of half is less than half of the whole. But a second sin
does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a
preceding sin, but perchance either equally or more.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite
thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per se," but
accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased
infinitely, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?
[*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification, being
derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain of loss,
Pain of sense."---Ed.]
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain and
fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all creatures there is
the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which
nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore evil is
inadequately divided into pain and fault.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain;
but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are evils.
Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for
"temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion for
the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not is it a
pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows
afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and
fault.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: On the contrary, It would seem that this division is superfluous:
for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil "because it
hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under
pain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Evil, as was said above (A[3]) is the privation of good,
which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act, however,
is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and integrity of
a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold.
In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of any part
required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is an evil, as also
it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body. In another way
evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it
does not exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But because
good in itself is the object of the will, evil, which is the privation of
good, is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will.
Therefore the evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and
integrity of the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on
the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and
justice, as was shown above (Q[22], A[2]); for it is of the very nature
of a pain to be against the will. But the evil which consists in the
subtraction of the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a
fault; for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards
perfect action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil
in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere
negation, as was said above (A[3]), therefore not every defect of good is
an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due. For the want
of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal; since
it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise, it is against
the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself, because
existence and conservation come from one and the same source. Hence this
kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered,
but evil that is found in voluntary things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always an
evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not, properly
speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is wrought
in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of the agent in the
patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls
into fault.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said that
the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent in
himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the
agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as including
the idea of injury.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault
is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good than merit,
as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater
good. But pain, as was said above (A[5]), is opposed to the good of the
agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since
the agent is better than the action, it seems that pain is worse than
fault.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in
forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of
the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent
a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body. But
divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a
greater evil than pain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not only
more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal goods,
which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any kind of
pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to include
privation of grace or glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil
by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be
made worthy of punishment." And this because, since good absolutely
considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate act
is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that the
absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use of
something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will. Hence
from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is called
good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a bad will
can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his own will
speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the
disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of
something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it than pain has.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of
the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because the
evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either
something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something
uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature
forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed to
uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine will,
and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself, and not
only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that fault has more
evil in it than pain has.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet
fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the reward;
but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may
be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more
perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection, than the
good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[48] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to
the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way, both
by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the
end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as this privation
belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] Out. Para. 1/1
THE CAUSE OF EVIL (THREE ARTICLES)
We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three
points of inquire:
(1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?
(2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
(3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all
evils?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether good can be the cause of evil?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is
said (Mt. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is
the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient
cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, if it has
one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the
cause of evil can only be evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no cause.
Therefore good is not the cause of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no
possible source of evil except good."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause.
For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing.
But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only
from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For a heavy
thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an
agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only good can
be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a
being, and every being, as such, is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent,
the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which belongs to
the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the
nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material
cause was shown above (Q[48], A[3]). For it was shown that good is the
subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation
of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but rather is it a
privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the
nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil,
however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action
otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of
the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the
instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal may
happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of
children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in
the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the
proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent,
sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter. It
is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there
necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the privation of
another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows
the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more
perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it
impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the
contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and water comes from
the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not
aim at the privation of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its
own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. But
if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire---as, for instance,
that it fails to heat---this comes either by defect of the action, which
implies the defect of some principle, as was said above, or by the
indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the action of the
fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being is
accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true
that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause; and thus is good the
cause of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord calls an
evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a good will
does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself
that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the movement itself
of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; and
thus good is the cause of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself,
but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes evil to the
water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And,
as explained above (Q[19], A[9]), this is by accident. Moreover, it does
happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident: for
instance, the exterior surrounding cold heats (the body) through the
concentration of the inward heat.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise
than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same kind of
effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and
this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never follows in
the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the
matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things the defect of the
action comes from the will actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not
actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not
a fault, but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with
this defect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as
was said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil.
For it is said (Is. 45:5,7): "I am the Lord, and there is no other God,
forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating
evil." And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath
not done?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the
first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (A[1]).
Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (Q[2]
, A[3]; Q[6], AA[1],4), it follows that also every evil is from God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the
cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God is the
cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all
perdition and of all evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the
author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As appears from what was said (A[1]), the evil which
consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the
agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was
shown above (Q[4], A[1]). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of
action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God
as to its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced
to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things and
voluntary things. For it was said (A[1]) that some agent inasmuch as it
produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect,
causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that
the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the
order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was
said above (Q[22], A[2], ad 2; Q[48], A[2]), that there should be some
things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in
things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were
by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kgs. 2:6:
"The Lord killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not
made death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for
its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of
the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to
sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not
of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the
evil of fault.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to
the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and
perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever
there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power,
whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive
power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there
is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause;
whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the
deficient secondary cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the
cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship
requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety
of all. Hence there is no parity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause
of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But contrariety
is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good is set against
evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man."
Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good, the other of
evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the
supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was shown
above (Q[2], A[3]; Q[6], AA[2],4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme
evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil and
worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what is best.
Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme
evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essential.
But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially, but by
participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil,
which is the cause of every evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is "per
se." But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose
some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils. Nor can it be
said that evil has no "per se" cause, but only an accidental cause; for
it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in
the few.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the
cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause, as
was said above (AA[1],2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in this
matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every
evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was
shown above (Q[2], A[3]; Q[6], A[4]). Therefore there cannot be any
principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first
principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 2/6
First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good,
as was shown above (Q[6], AA[3],4). But nothing can be essentially bad.
For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good (Q[5], A[3]);
and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject (Q[48], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 3/6
Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect
good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above (Q[6],
A[2]). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was shown above
(Q[48], A[4]), although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly
consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly and
perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if
the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself"; because all good
being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly evil), evil
itself would be taken away, since its subject is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 4/6
Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first
principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown above
(A[1]), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it
cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the
direct cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 5/6
Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other
evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other
strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to consider
the universal cause of all being, and considered only the particular
causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing
hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they thought that
the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance, if one should
say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor
man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not depend
upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in
itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has
its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above (Q[47], A[2], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] Body Para. 6/6
Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two
contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these
contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore
they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But
since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search
for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as
above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the power of a
heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there
exists one first principle of being, as was shown above (Q[2], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the
nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular
cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject.
Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was said
above (Q[48], A[3]). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears
from what was said above (Q[48], AA[1], 2,3), it is opposed to that good
which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a
thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a
perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by
approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from
that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of
access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be good and
better, by reason of access to the supreme good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by privation
of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential
evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above
(A[1]). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is impossible. And
to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false. For things
which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural
evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And again, in every
species the defect of nature is in the smaller number. In man alone does
evil appear as in the greater number; because the good of man as regards
the senses is not the good of man as man---that is, in regard to reason;
and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[49] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but
reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] Out. Para. 1/4
TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)
OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)
Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures:
firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called
angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite
creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] Out. Para. 2/4
Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their
substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what
belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] Out. Para. 3/4
Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] Out. Para. 4/4
Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether
incorporeal?
(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of
matter and form?
(3) We ask concerning their number.
(4) Of their difference from each other.
(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what
is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation to God, is
not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
"an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us; but
compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply
incorporeal."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says
(Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel
is an ever movable intellectual substance." Therefore an angel is a
corporeal substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every creature is
limited within its own nature." But to be limited belongs to bodies.
Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's creatures,
as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His angels"; and,
farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded,
and they were created." Therefore angels are corporeal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels spirits."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is
principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in
assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to
a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to
that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God
produces the creature by His intellect and will (Q[14], A[8]; Q[19], A[4]
). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be
intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body,
nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to "here" and
"now." Hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an
incorporeal creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence,
and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect,
thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended
by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under
imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the
Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the error of the
Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof
that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect
alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal
creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other
extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and thus it
is said that angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not,
however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied
to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile
substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were
sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are. Hence it is
clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only;
whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all
creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir.
Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in corporeal
place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form. For
everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus,
and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the
genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the form (Metaph.
xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of
matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he
is composed of matter and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is
matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;
whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form cannot be a subject":
and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an angel is
composed of matter and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an
angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel
is not form only, but has a form in matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So the
form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of an angel
is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an
angel is in matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first creatures are
understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and
form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of the
Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by
the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorporeal substance,
the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal
substance, and that which it has in common with it. Hence he concludes
that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of
form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it
were something common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal
matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be
understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the
matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity is
impressed in the matter of corporeal things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of
spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a
spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of
matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and
spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the
corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter, however,
is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity; and
without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys. i,
text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual things
is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that
corporeal and spiritual things should have the same matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any
kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to
the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial
operation, as appears from its object, whence any act receives its
species and nature. For a thing is understood according to its degree of
immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are individual forms
which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it must be that every
individual substance is altogether immaterial.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily
distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend things
according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence material
things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler
mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other
hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot attain to
apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own mode, according
as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God
(Q[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is difference which constitutes the species. Now
everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to
some special grade of being because "the species of things are like
numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things there is
one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is the form; and
another thing which is determined, and this is the matter; and hence from
the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the former the "difference."
Whereas in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing
determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in
being; and therefore in them "genus" and "difference" are not derived
from different things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless, this
differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect
considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea of their "genus"; and
inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their
"difference."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This reason is given in the book on the Fount of Life, and
it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect
and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For matter
receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species,
either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intellect does
not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles
(De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the effect that we know earth
by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect
according to the very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by the
intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter, but of an
immaterial substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in an
angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if
we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold
composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is
constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but
existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own
existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and
supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there
nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very
existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is
understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel
is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what
is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself subsisting; and
the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is
whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not
different as was explained above (Q[3], A[4]). Hence God alone is pure
act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its existence
is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to which it
belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being considered
relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the part of
matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter which
receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite in their being;
whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms are not received
in anything else; as if we were to say, for example, that whiteness
existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness,
forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while its "being"
is finite as determined to some one special nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite
from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is "infinite
from below," as not received in any matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels exist in any great number?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers. For
number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a continuous
body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as
was shown above (A[1]). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great
number.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less
is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other created
natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God
is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible number in the
angelic nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be
the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the heavenly
bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend.
Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements of the
heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and
intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
goodness." But a ray is only multiplied according to the different things
that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of
an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was
shown above (A[2]). Therefore it seems that the multiplication of
intellectual substances can only be according to the requirements of the
first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so that in some way the
shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence
the same conclusion is to be drawn as before.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands
ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood
before Him."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the
number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to maintain
that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and according to
this view it would have to be maintained that the number of the separate
substances is the number of the species of sensible things. Aristotle,
however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31) because matter is of the
very nature of the species of sensible things. Consequently the separate
substances cannot be the exemplar species of these sensible things; but
have their own fixed natures, which are higher than the natures of
sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that
those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as
that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out the number of
the separate substances according to the number of the first movements.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred
Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony, held
that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial substances, are
multiplied according to the number of heavenly movements or bodies, as
Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he contended that in the
Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are styled angels; and
again, even the powers of natural things, which manifest God's almighty
power. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for
the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are
immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all
material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv): "There
are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences, surpassing the
weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers." The reason whereof
is this, because, since it is the perfection of the universe that God
chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect some things
are, in so much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as in
bodies such excess is observed in regard to their magnitude, so in things
incorporeal is it observed in regard to their multitude. We see, in fact,
that incorruptible bodies, exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably
in magnitude; for the entire sphere of things active and passive is
something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is
reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances as it were
incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete quantity,
brought about by division of what is continuous, but that which is caused
by distinction of forms; according as multitude is reckoned among the
transcendentals, as was said above (Q[30], A[3]; Q[11]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto God, it must
needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not so as to be
found in few subjects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text 44), and it
would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were made for
corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances would exist to
no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in corporeal
things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on
account of the corporeal, because the end is nobler than the means to the
end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this is not a
necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make use of this
argument, since only through sensible things can we come to know
intelligible ones.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that
matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this was refuted
above (Q[47], A[1]). Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not
to be taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but according
to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels differ in species?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since
the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things which agree in
what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive
difference; and so they are the same according to species. But all angels
agree in what is noblest in them---that is to say, in intellectuality.
Therefore all the angels are of one species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the angels
seem to differ only from one another according to more and less---namely,
as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the
angels do not differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from
each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are the
angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it
to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but one
individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of one
species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as
"first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there are
first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). Therefore the
angels are not of the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls,
are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are of the one
species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one
hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ
in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If,
therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said
above (A[2]), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of
one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several
whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not
several, except in so far as they are in several substances. And if the
angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one
species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the principle of
distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division
of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity
of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely
of species, but of genus.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Difference" is nobler than "genus," as the determined is
more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, but not
as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be necessary
that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that there should
be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul. Therefore
irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined
degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner all the angels differ in
species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: More and less change the species, not according as they are
caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according as they
are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we say that fire
is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels are diversified
according to more or less.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good of the
individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in
the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out
infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific
multiplication, as was said above (Q[47], A[3]). Hence the perfection of
the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the
multiplying of individuals in one species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels are incorruptible?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for
Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is
"an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not by
nature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose maker
and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet
indissoluble because I so will it." But gods such as these can only be
understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by
their nature
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things would
tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them."
But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the
angels were made by God, it would appear that they are corruptible of
their own nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual
substances "have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death,
matter, and generation."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are
incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing
is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence,
since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above
(A[2]), it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what
belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it;
but what belongs to a thing, considered in relation to something else,
can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of
which it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle,
because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can lose
roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to be
belongs to a form considered in itself; for everything is an actual being
according to its form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form.
Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually
when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in
its own being, as happens in the angels, as was said above (A[2]), it
cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause
why it is incorruptible by its own nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual
operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the
operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and
nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an
intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every
intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which
includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of death,"
as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect
immutability only by favor, as will appear later (Q[62]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly
bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore
dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in
existence by the Divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[50] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As was observed above (Q[44], A[1]) there is a kind of
necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not
repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its
existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all
things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by
God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of
corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is dependent
upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely
because God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act of
preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption within
itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)
We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things;
and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of
the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their
comparison with local movement.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?
(2) Whether they assume bodies?
(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them.
For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute alone---that is,
it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of
nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and
without any companionship of corporeal addition." Bernard likewise says
(Hom. vi. super Cant.): "Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as
we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on
account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it
is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance." Augustine
also says (Gen. ad lit. iii): "The demons are called animals of the
atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies." But
the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies
naturally united to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational
animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels
have bodies naturally united to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But
the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the angels
animate bodies which are naturally united to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
understood to be incorporeal."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For
whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in
that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the
essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to
understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will
be shown later (Q[75], A[2]), it follows that to have a body united to it
is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is
accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else.
Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it
is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual
substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but
acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be
explained later on (Q[84], A[6]; Q[89], A[1]). Now whenever we find
something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in
that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly
intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from
sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united
to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call
angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As was said above (Q[50], A[1]) it was the opinion of some
that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have thought
that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as united to
bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the
world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to
Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above all things,
according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens";
Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above
opinion of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as
he was also in many other points, by following the opinions of the
ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be explained, that the
created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not naturally
united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained (A[2]).
Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion
of the Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals,
which they termed demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically,
on account of the likeness to the rational nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking;
hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kgs. 2:6): "The Lord killeth, and
maketh alive." But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is
part of some nature, and which has not within itself the full nature of
the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a
body is more perfect than one which is united to a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether angels assume bodies?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there is
nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of the
kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the angels to
assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his own
power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union; because to
assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a body is not
united to an angel as to a form, as stated (A[1]); while in so far as it
is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed,
otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels are assumed
by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or
they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise they
would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because air
is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared
to Abraham under assumed bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume
bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels
happened in prophetic vision---that is, according to imagination. But
this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in
imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination, and consequently
is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time to time
introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all; just as the
angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family,
by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the angel who
appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it is clearly
shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision, whereby the
object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can accordingly
be seen by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be beheld.
Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they bodies
naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said (A[1];
Q[50], A[1]), it follows that they sometimes assume bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on our
account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give evidence of
that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the
life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies under the Old Law was a
figurative indication that the Word of God would take a human body;
because all the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that
one whereby the Son of God appeared in the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as its form,
nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed
movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of
intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible,
in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by
angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an angel.
And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has
neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped and
colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of
air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is needful for
forming the assumed body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in
assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But it
would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to
exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions. Therefore the
angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without a
purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the senses,
would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if
he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel perceives by
the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions of
life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels are
manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said (Gn.
18:16) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had appeared to him,
"bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to the angel (Tob.
5:7,8): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of Medes?" he
answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all the ways
thereof." Therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in
assumed bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it is
produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from
the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture that
angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed bodies they
exercise functions of life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord after
His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having resumed life
(Lk. 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, and
Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored them as God
(Gn. 18). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed
bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has befallen
the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: "After the sons of
God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth children,
these are the mighty men of old, men of renown" (Gn. 6:4). Consequently
the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was
stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise
functions of life through assumed bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in
common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of a
living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far
as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far as it
is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed
bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such operations; but
not as to that which is special to living subjects; because, according to
the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that which has the faculty has the
action." Hence nothing can have a function of life except what has life,
which is the potential principle of such action.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible
things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it is
not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are
sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may be
understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it is not
contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their assumed
bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really not. For
the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual
properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the properties of
man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they were to
assume true men; because the properties of such men would lead us to men,
and not to angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it can
in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of their
assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for they are
not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this end,
that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made
manifest; just as by the eye the power of the angel's knowledge is
pointed out, and other powers by the other members, as Dionysius teaches
(Coel. Hier.).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of
life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved, since the
angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally, when
such bodies are moved, since they are in them as movers are in the moved;
and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere which cannot be
said of God. Accordingly, although God is not moved when the things are
moved in which He exists, since He is everywhere; yet the angels are
moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies assumed. But
they are not moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even
though they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because the
heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit
which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to any
restricted part of the world's substance, which now is in the east, and
now in the west, but according to a fixed quarter; because "the moving
energy is always in the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their
assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as they
fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat,
because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance
of the eater.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 2/3
Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the
substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter;
nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be
changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels
was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of such a
nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was not a
true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the angel
said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to
drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink" (Tob. 12:19).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 3/3
Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom,
nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the prophets, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[51] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons affirm
that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as have
experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call
incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have sought and
procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny it. But God's
holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the deluge. Hence by
the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth, who were good;
while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang
from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at that giants should be
born of them; for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more
before than after the deluge." Still if some are occasionally begotten
from demons, it is not from the seed of such demons, nor from their
assumed bodies, but from the seed of men taken for the purpose; as when
the demon assumes first the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man;
just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes,
as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), so that the person born is not the
child of a demon, but of a man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE (THREE ARTICLES)
We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are
three subjects of inquiry:
(1) Is the angel in a place?
(2) Can he be in several places at once?
(3) Can several angels be in the same place?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel is in a place?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says
(De Hebdom.): "The common opinion of the learned is that things
incorporeal are not in a place." And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv,
text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing which is in a place, but
only a movable body." But an angel is not a body, as was shown above
(Q[50]). Therefore an angel is not in a place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, place is a "quantity having position." But everything
which is in a place has some position. Now to have a position cannot
benefit an angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper
difference of which is to have a position. Therefore an angel is not in a
place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained
by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text
14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place,
because the container is more formal than the contained; as air with
regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is not in a
place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline,
Dominican Breviary]: "Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in
peace."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel
and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A body
is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place
according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such
quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an
angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic
power in any manner whatever to any place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed
commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the continuous;
for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive
quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the
angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance
virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not
contained by it: for the soul is in the body as containing it, not as
contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which
is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
And hereby we have the answers to the objections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel can be in several places at once?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once. For
an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But the soul is in
several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as
Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be in several places
at once.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since the
body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is in every
part thereof. But according to the various parts there are various
places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "where the angel
operates, there he is." But occasionally he operates in several places at
one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gn. 19:25).
Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while the
angels are in heaven, they are not on earth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the
Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things, is
infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and is
not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the
angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one
determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be
compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all being
is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one particular
being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since the angel is
in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that
he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in only one place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 2/5
Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were
unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the
indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they
thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point. But they
were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible, yet
having its situation; whereas the angel is indivisible, and beyond the
genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no occasion for
determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any
place which is either divisible or indivisible, great or small suffices,
according as to his own free-will he applies his power to a great or to a
small body. So the entire body to which he is applied by his power,
corresponds as one place to him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 3/5
Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be
everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to what is
first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there
is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the
Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly
mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers do
not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately.
Hence it need not be everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 4/5
So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite
differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a place
in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel,
however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not
measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such
a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither circumscriptively
nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[2] Body Para. 5/5
From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the
entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied, is
reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same time in the
same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same
place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a place,
because only a body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as appears
from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several angels can
be in the one place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a
body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at the
one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not filled
with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text. 58. Much more,
then, can two angels be in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to
Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess souls,
do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the
one time in the same place; and consequently for the same reason all
other spiritual substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore for
a like reason there are not two angels in the same place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason of
this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the causes
immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every class of
causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and there is one
proximate mover, although there may be several remote movers. Nor can it
be objected that several individuals may row a boat, since no one of them
is a perfect mover, because no one man's strength is sufficient for
moving the boat; while all together are as one mover, in so far as their
united strengths all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since
the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches
the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said (A[1]),
there can be but one angel in one place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the same
place because of their filling the place; but for another reason, as has
been said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way;
hence the conclusion does not follow.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[52] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body
according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its form,
while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which
heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.
(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening
space?
(3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel can be moved locally?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the
Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid of
parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is not
moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," for it is then already
moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it
is being moved, is partly in the term "wherefrom" and partly in the term
"whereto." But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be
moved locally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as the
Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not
imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels
have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved
as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that
a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that
Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved
locally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to
be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise
does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is
contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it
is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the
place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the continuity of
movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to
priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says
(Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and
contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the
local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it
to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity
therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in
a place only by virtual contact, as was said above (Q[52], A[1]), it
follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing
else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at
once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was
said above (Q[52], A[2]). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be
continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in
such contacts. Because, as was said above (Q[52], A[1]), there is
nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel
according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to a
body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all
at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises
continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively
quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement will
be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the
same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his
movement will not be continuous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason.
First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what is
indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily
indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which is
continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be said
that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and while it
is in the term "whereto": because the very succession of "wheres,"
regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever
of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But
the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which is
continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the
point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in
either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and
partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel's movement is not
continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good. But according
as the angel's movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted,
that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term
"wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto" (yet so that such
partiality be not referred to the angel's substance, but to the place);
because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the
whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is
actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits,
and in part of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he
can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this,
that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body
does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which
is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to
magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to
something which is divisible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of
an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application of energy is
the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of
an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any need of
its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our need, the
angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all [*Vulg.:
'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for
them who receive the inheritance of salvation."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate
space. For everything that passes through a middle space first travels
along a place of its own dimensions, before passing through a greater.
But the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is confined to
a point. Therefore if the angel passes through middle space, he must
reckon infinite points in his movement: which is not possible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our
soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going
through the middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria,
without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them. Therefore much
more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through
the middle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then,
when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but is
changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change:
consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he was
not moved so long as he was in the term "whence." Therefore, he was moved
while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him to pass
through intervening space.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the local
motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it be
continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without
passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the Philosopher
(Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), "The middle is that into which a thing
which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the last into which
it is moved"; because the order of first and last in continuous movement,
is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says
(Phys. iv, text 99).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
But if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him to
pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: which
is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are infinite
intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible or as
indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which are
indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite
intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a
middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of necessity
be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the continuous
movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to place except in
time. But in the whole time which measures the movement of a body, there
are not two "nows" in which the body moved is not in one place and in
another; for if it were in one and the same place in two "nows," it would
follow that it would be at rest there; since to be at rest is nothing
else than to be in the same place now and previously. Therefore since
there are infinite "nows" between the first and the last "now" of the
time which measures the movement, there must be infinite places between
the first from which the movement begins, and the last where the movement
ceases. This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let there be
a body of a palm's length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms,
along which it travels; it is evident that the first place from which the
movement starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the
movement ends is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it
begins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second.
According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the
intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in the
magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct
point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same.
Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in
every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it follows that
between every two places there are infinite intermediate places.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places
by the continuity of its movement; because, as the intermediate places
are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned some
infinitudes in movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the
movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement will be
actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by
continuous movement, it follows, either that it does not pass through all
the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite
places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then, as the angel's movement
is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate places.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going
through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature; but
not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained
under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its
movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained
thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence it is under his control
to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or without
the intervening place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him
according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the
angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even
the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above: but
they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident from
the foregoing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to
various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the things
thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no
comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In continuous movement the actual change is not a part of
the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede change.
Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in movement which
is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is a part of number:
hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space,
constitutes such movement.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous. For the
greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist the mover,
the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself
exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a body. Now the
proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the
time. But between one length of time and any other length of time there
is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in time, an angel is moved in
an instant.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily change.
But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as illumination;
both because the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot
successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than
what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel's movement instantaneous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it is
manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term
"whereto": but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the
place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term "wherefrom"; or
else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that he
is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the
preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom." Therefore he rests there:
since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was
said (A[2]). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last
instant of time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In every change there is a before and after. Now the
before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently every
movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after
in it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel
is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place to
place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term
"wherefrom"; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term
"whereto." Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just as
there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But there is a
mid-time between two "nows" of time: hence they say that a last "now"
cannot be assigned in which it was in the term "wherefrom," just as in
illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, there is no last
instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the matter
was under the privation of the form of fire: but a last time can be
assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the
air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and
substantial generation are called instantaneous movements.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus.
It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise
disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time
which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the same "where" in the
first, in the middle, and in the last "now." On the other hand, it is of
the very nature of movement for the subject moved to be otherwise now
than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time which measures
movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions; hence in the
last "now" it must have a different form from what it had before. So it
is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for
instance, in whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time.
Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the
whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that
time to be in the other term. But this is possible in movement: because
to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in
every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of the
kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is the term
of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local
movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement of an angel is
not the term of any other continuous movement, but is of itself,
depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is impossible to say
that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last "now"
he is in another place: but some "now" must be assigned in which he was
last in the preceding place. But where there are many "nows" succeeding
one another, there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than
the reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the
movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his movement
be continuous, and in non-continuous time if his movement is
non-continuous for, as was said (A[1]), his movement can be of either
kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement,
as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the
time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all
corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the
movement of the heavens; because the angel's movement does not depend
upon the movement of the heavens.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If the time of the angel's movement be not continuous, but
a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no proportion to the time
which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous;
since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be continuous, it is
indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the proportion of the
mover and the movable, but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes
in which the movement exists. Besides, the swiftness of the angel's
movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to
the determination of his will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an
alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood to
be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But the
angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of movement;
hence there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[53] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection is based on continuous time. But the same
time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel can be in
one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant,
without any time intervening. If the time of the angel's movement be
continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole
time which precedes the last 'now'; as was already shown (A[2]).
Nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous places, and partly in
another, not because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because
his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the
second, as was said above (A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)
After considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now proceed
to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first place
inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into his
medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects known: and fourthly, into
the manner whereby he knows them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Is the angel's understanding his substance?
(2) Is his being his understanding?
(3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?
(4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?
(5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel's act of understanding is his substance?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his
substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active
intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own
action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his
Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more is the
angel's substance his action---that is, his act of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that "the
action of the intellect is life." But "since in living things to live is
to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence.
Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who
understands.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ
from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is.
But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at
least in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore the act of
understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood,
is one with the substance of the angel who understands.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The action of anything differs more from its substance
than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance,
for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above
(Q[3], A[4]). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other
creature, is its substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any
creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the
actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance
or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure
act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own
actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is
pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His existence
and His action.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would
be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of
intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.
Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from
God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in
itself, nor from the substance of another angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then
be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes
about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own action,
such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its
very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action
accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this
has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the same
as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that between "a
race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and
the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if "to live" is "to
be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is sometimes put for the
essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), "Memory and understanding and
will are one essence, one life": yet it is not taken in this sense by the
Philosopher, when he says that "the act of the intellect is life."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The action which is transient, passing to some extrinsic
object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving
the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a
medium between the agent and the object, but only according to the manner
of expression; for it really follows the union of the object with the
agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the union of the
object understood with the one who understands it, as an effect which
differs from both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the angel to understand is to exist?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in
living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live" (De Anima ii, text.
37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to
effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by
which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to
understand is to exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as is
clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement.
Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any
creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16),
there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something
beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another
which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to
feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing outside is changed,
but the whole action takes place within the agent. It is quite clear
regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very
existence: because the agent's existence is signified as within him,
while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the
thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either
simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act "to
understand," of which the object is "the true"; and the act "to will," of
which the object is "the good"; each of which is convertible with being;
and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all
things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of
sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible
things; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every
creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God's being alone is
simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. v). Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of
understanding and its own act of will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living
subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby
something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to
understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the
various grades of living things according to the various functions of
life.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire
existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he
cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own
specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the existence of
the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included
in the idea of a more universal object, namely, truth and being. Thus it
is evident, that, although the form is the same, yet it is not the
principle of existence and of understanding according to the same
formality. On this account it does not follow that in the angel "to be"
is the same as 'to understand.'
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of
understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and
"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages of
his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds." Therefore
the angel is his own power of intelligence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides
his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which is besides
the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple form cannot
be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not
be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said
(Q[50], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the angelic
nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh unto
nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature
than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its
own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are
divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore substance,
power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or
operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus.
Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity
of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said
that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature
the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as
potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said
(Q[44], A[1]). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is
operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist,
nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as
his existence. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of
intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all his
knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly
intellectual and partly sensitive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of
accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to
act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there.
But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it
as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially
of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the
form---whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which
does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is
the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to
substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards
accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive
intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17)
that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby
it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all
things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active
and a passive intellect in an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to
receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active
intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel
receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one.
Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us
is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive
intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors
to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not so
in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the
angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is
derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality,
and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to
the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but
which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and
still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is
denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for admitting an active
intellect is due to this---that the natures of the material things which
we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually
intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they
are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be
some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: and
this power in us is called the active intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are
neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such
things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible in
potentiality, but they are actually such; for they first and principally
understand immaterial things, as will appear later (Q[84], A[7]; Q[85],
A[1]). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in
them, except equivocally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands
those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be
generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels,
but is present naturally. Hence there is not need for admitting an active
and a passive intellect in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten,
not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality,
in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It
belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to
things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to
apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does
not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither does it belong
to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to
supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in
potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active
and passive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is
not about names that we need trouble.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively
intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels
there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore there is a
sensitive faculty in them as well.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have learnt
many things by experience. But experience comes of many remembrances, as
stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power of memory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort of
"perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the
imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the
demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of
the same nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses in
common with the brutes, and understands with the angels."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are
exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of
the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some
other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through
bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of
the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is
manifest from what has been said already (Q[51], A[1]). Hence of the
soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the
separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in
keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual
creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For
this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was said
above (A[3], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[54] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it
may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the
opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies
naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in
his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De Civ.
Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for much labor." Secondly,
it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood by
way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension of its
proper sensible object, it is a common usage of speech, when he
understands something for certain, to say that we "sense it." And hence
it is that we use the word "sentence." Experience can be attributed to
the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by
likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know
single objects through the senses: the angels likewise know single
objects, as we shall show (Q[57], A[2]), yet not through the senses. But
memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x)
puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is
a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is
attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what
is the true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy,
whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things
themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (THREE ARTICLES)
Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic
knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some
species?
(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as they
have derived from things?
(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower
angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels know all things by their substance?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their substance.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels, according to the
proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth."
But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore the angel knows things
by his essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51; De
Anima iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the intellect
is the same as the object understood." But the object understood is the
same as the one who understands it, as regards that whereby it is
understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as the angels, the
medium whereby the object is understood is the very substance of the one
understanding it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there
according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an intellectual
nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible mode.
But all things are in him: because the lower orders of beings are
essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower
participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that God
"enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all. Therefore the angel
knows all things in his substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms of
things, and not by their own substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The medium through which the intellect understands, is
compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it is by
the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be
perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to which
the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in
things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly complete the
potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of the matter
extends to more things than are contained under this or that form. But
the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding all things:
because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal
truth. The angel's essence, however, does not comprise all things in
itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species. This is
proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to
comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by
His essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his
intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When it is said that the angel knows things according to
his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine the medium of
such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing known;
but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the angel of his own
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated in De
Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the sensible
object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one thing is made
from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the intellect in act
is said to be the thing understood in act, not that the substance of the
intellect is itself the similitude by which it understands, but because
that similitude is its form. Now, it is precisely the same thing to say
"in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same thing as
the object understood," as to say that "the intellect in act is the thing
understood in act"; for a thing is actually understood, precisely because
it is immaterial.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those which are
above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed perfectly, nor
according to their own proper formality---because the angel's essence, as
being finite, is distinguished by its own formality from other
things---but according to some common formality. Yet all things are
perfectly and according to their own formality in God's essence, as in
the first and universal operative power, from which proceeds whatever is
proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowledge of all
things by His own essence: and this the angel has not, but only a common
knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from
things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within
him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another
is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness is the cause
of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such
thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding must either be
the cause of the object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel's
knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine
knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the
angelic mind understands, to be derived from things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the
active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect
abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of the
angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So there is
nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands through
species drawn from things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is
present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from sensible
objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by species drawn
from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and
distant; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not
gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn
from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that there
is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances
and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The highest bodies
have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form;
whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely
perfected by the form, but receives from some agent, now one form, now
another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual substances ---that
is to say, human souls---have a power of understanding which is not
naturally complete, but is successively completed in them by their
drawing intelligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual
substances---that is, the angels---the power of understanding is
naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such
species connatural to them, so as to understand all things which they can
know naturally.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances. The
lower spiritual substances---that is, souls---have a nature akin to a
body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently from
their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intelligible
perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they would be
united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand, the higher
substances---that is, the angels---are utterly free from bodies, and
subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently
they attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible
outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known,
together with their intellectual nature. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 8): "The other things which are lower than the angels are so
created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of the
rational creature, and then in their own nature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not,
indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of
creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type, according to
which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the
creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists
first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very fashioning
of the creature."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to
pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination,
which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands
midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and the nature of
a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from
material conditions. Consequently, however powerful the angelic mind
might be, it could not reduce material forms to an intelligible
condition, except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined
forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no imagination, as was
said above (Q[54], A[5]). Even granted that he could abstract
intelligible species from material things, yet he would not do so;
because he would not need them, for he has connatural intelligible
species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is
near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not purposeless on
that account: for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring
knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the
lower angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand by more
universal species than the lower angels. For the universal, seemingly, is
what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand by
species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the
species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than
what is known generically; because to know anything generically is, in a
fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher
angels know by more universal species than the lower, it follows that the
higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower; which is not
befitting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if the
higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which the lower
angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the higher angel
uses one universal form for knowing various things. Therefore he will not
be able to have a proper knowledge of each; which seems unbecoming.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher angels
have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis it is
said that the higher angels have more universal forms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, For this reason are some things of a more exalted nature,
because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which is God.
Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in
one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God knows all
things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a
lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the
lower intelligences to know by many forms what God knows by one, and by
so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be
able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his
forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, extending to
more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in
ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible
truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and detail; this
comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others of stronger
intellect, who can grasp many things from few.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from
particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge
from things. But if there be an intellect which does not derive its
knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will not be
abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them;
either according to the order of causality, as the universal ideas of
things are in the Word of God; or at least in the order of nature, as the
universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two senses. In
one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only the universal
nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less
perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of a man who only
knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of the medium of
such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the
universal; for the intellect, which by one universal medium can know each
of the things which are properly contained in it, is more perfect than
one which cannot.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[55] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several
things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the proper type and
likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with
respect to all the acts of the virtues; which can be taken as the proper
type and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of
magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of wariness; and so on of the rest.
The Divine essence, on account of Its eminence, is in like fashion taken
as the proper type of each thing contained therein: hence each one is
likened to It according to its proper type. The same applies to the
universal form which is in the mind of the angel, so that, on account of
its excellence, many things can be known through it with a proper
knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS (THREE ARTICLES)
We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the
objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of
immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first heading
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Does an angel know himself?
(2) Does one angel know another?
(3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel knows himself?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For Dionysius
says that "the angels do not know their own powers" (Coel. Hier. vi).
But, when the substance is known, the power is known. Therefore an angel
does not know his own essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would not
act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing single is
intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge which
is intellectual, no angel can know himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object:
because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4 understanding is a kind of passion.
But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears in corporeal
things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the angel knew
himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As is evident from what has been previously said (Q[14],
A[2]; Q[54], A[2]), the object is on a different footing in an immanent,
and in a transient, action. In a transient action the object or matter
into which the action passes is something separate from the agent, as the
thing heated is from what gave it heat, and the building from the
builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the action to proceed, the
object must be united with the agent; just as the sensible object must be
in contact with sense, in order that sense may actually perceive. And the
object which is united to a faculty bears the same relation to actions of
this kind as does the form which is the principle of action in other
agents: for, as heat is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so
is the species of the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object exists
sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then there is only
knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may be actual
knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by
the species. But if it always actually possesses the species, it can
thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding change or reception.
From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of knower, as
knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in potentiality. Now,
for the form to be the principle of the action, it makes no difference
whether it be inherent in something else, or self-subsisting; because
heat would give forth heat none the less if it were self-subsisting, than
it does by inhering in something else. So therefore, if in the order of
intelligible beings there be any subsisting intelligible form, it will
understand itself. And since an angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting
form; and, consequently, he is actually intelligible. Hence it follows
that he understands himself by his form, which is his substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That is the text of the old translation, which is amended
in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they," that is to say the
angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which the old translation
read---"and furthermore they do not know their own powers." Although even
the letter of the old translation might be kept in this respect, that the
angels do not know their own power perfectly; according as it proceeds
from the order of the Divine Wisdom, Which to the angels is
incomprehensible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not
because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which is
their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any single
things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is nothing to
prevent them from being actually intelligible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as if is in
potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not happen
in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that he
understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of the
same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes into
some other matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one angel knows another?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one angel does not know another. For the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human intellect
were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then such a nature
existing within it would prevent it from apprehending external things; as
likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored with some particular
color, it could not see every color. But as the human intellect is
disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is the angelic mind for
understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since the angelic intellect
has within itself some one determinate nature from the number of such
natures, it would seem that it cannot understand other natures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is stated in De Causis that "every intelligence knows
what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is beneath
it, in so far as it is its cause." But one angel is not the cause of
another. Therefore one angel does not know another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the
essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way of a
likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of
the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what has been said
before (Q[50], A[4]; Q[55], A[1], ad 3). Hence, it follows that one angel
would not have a particular knowledge of another, but only a general
knowledge. In like manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another
by the essence of the angel known; because that whereby the intellect
understands is something within the intellect; whereas the Trinity alone
can penetrate the mind. Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the
other by a species; because that species would not differ from the angel
understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear
that one angel can understand another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be
either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God were now
to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the existing
angels; or else he would have to be known by a species drawn from things;
and so it would follow that the higher angels could not know the lower,
from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one
angel knows another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We read in De Causis that "every intelligence knows the
things which are not corrupted."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things as
pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him in two
ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to subsist in
their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in such a way,
that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the things which
He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word of God from
eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal things, but
likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of these
spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both corporeal and
spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so that in every angel
there was impressed the form of his own species according to both its
natural and its intelligible condition, so that he should subsist in the
nature of his species, and understand himself by it; while the forms of
other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him only
according to their intelligible natures, so that by such impressed
species he might know corporeal and spiritual creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from
one another in a certain order, as was already observed (Q[50], A[4], ad
1,2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the
other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower bear affinity to
his nature, the only difference being according to their various degrees
of perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to
know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and effect
are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the
angels, this will suffice for one to know another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One angel knows another by the species of such angel
existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image it
is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according to
natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a subsisting form
in his natural being; but his species in the intellect of another angel
is not so, for there it possesses only an intelligible existence. As the
form of color on the wall has a natural existence; but, in the deferent
medium, it has only intentional existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: God made every creature proportionate to the universe which
He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to make more angels or
more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible species
in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if he had intended to build a
larger house, would have made larger foundations. Hence, for God to add a
new creature to the universe, means that He would add a new intelligible
species to an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their natural
principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by His
incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards he
adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is remote from all
knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel. But
what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears that an
angel cannot know God by his natural principles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a
glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." From this it appears that
there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen in His
essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face; the other
whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already shown
(Q[12], A[4]), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his natural
principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels, since
they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible things, as
Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels cannot know God
by their natural powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet men
can know God through their natural principles; according to Rm. 1:19:
"what is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore much more so can
the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own
principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing is
known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in the knower,
as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that an angel knows
himself---secondly, by the presence of its similitude in the power which
knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye from its image being in the
eye---thirdly, when the image of the object known is not drawn directly
from the object itself, but from something else in which it is made to
appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He is
seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any
creature from its natural principles, as was said above (Q[12], A[4]).
The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are
on earth, by His likeness reflected in creatures, according to Rm. 1:20:
"The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made." Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror.
But the knowledge, whereby according to his natural principles the angel
knows God, stands midway between these two; and is likened to that
knowledge whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted from it.
For since God's image is impressed on the very nature of the angel in his
essence, the angel knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he
does not behold God's essence; because no created likeness is sufficient
to represent the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to
the specular kind; because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror
representing the Divine image.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension, as
his words expressly state. In this way God is not known by any created
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely
remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can he see
God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that
account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: because, as God is
infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God has of
Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has of Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[56] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway between
these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more to one of
them, as was said above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels.
Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?
(2) Whether they know single things?
(3) Whether they know the future?
(4) Whether they know secret thoughts?
(5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels know material things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For
the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But
material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are
beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist
within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On 2 Cor.
12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the material
things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into the
angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but
only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are apprehended,
and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in themselves. Now there is
neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but only
intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know material things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but are
knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does not
exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do
likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior
to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the
mind of an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The established order of things is for the higher beings
to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained
deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to be
contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of fulness and
simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all
things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His simple Being
itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among other creatures the
angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence they share more
fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more
simply and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more
manifold manner and less perfectly than in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner
of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of their own
nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the
angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their
intelligible species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one who
understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his
intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect
of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only
their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination;
for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone
apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima iii, text.
26) that the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," regarding
which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its proper
sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things are in the
intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who
understands, and not according to their real natures. But some things are
in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in either
case there is intellectual vision.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things
from the material things themselves, he would require to make them
actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not derive
his knowledge of them from the material things themselves; he has
knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things,
which species are connatural to him; just as our intellect has, by
species which it makes intelligible by abstraction.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel knows singulars?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the
Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object
singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in the angels there is no
power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident from
what was said above (Q[54], A[5]). Consequently they do not know
singulars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the
knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any assimilation
to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far as it is
singular; because, as was observed above (Q[50], A[2]), an angel is
immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. Therefore the
angel cannot know singulars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by
singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species; because
in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species. Nor
is it by universal species; since the universal is not the sufficient
principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular things are
not known in the universal except potentially. Therefore the angel does
not know singulars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not know. But angels
guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: "He hath given His angels
charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know singulars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of
singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith,
which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels,
according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits." Now, if they
had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision over what
is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals: and this is
against the text of Eccles. 5:5: "Say not before the angel: There is no
providence." Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of
philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of
the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their knowledge and
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of
singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular effects
are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from
the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This opinion does not
escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a singular, merely in
its universal causes, is not to know it as singular, that is, as it
exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing from computation of the
heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it in the
universal; yet he does not know it as taking place now, except by the
senses. But administration, providence and movement are of singulars, as
they are here and now existing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various
powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending universals
and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal
by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental power. For the
order of things runs in this way, that the higher a thing is, so much the
more is its power united and far-reaching: thus in man himself it is
manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense,
although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five
outward senses, and some other things which no outer sense knows; for
example, the difference between white and sweet. The same is to be
observed in other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the
order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of
his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge,
namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it
ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be unknown
to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph. text. 15).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered
from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may
subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that they
may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes forth
from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but
likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation;
since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to both
its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know; for
His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above (Q[14], A[8]).
Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all things, God is the
likeness of all things, and knows all things, not only as to their
universal natures, but also as to their singularity; so through the
species imparted to them do the angels know things, not only as to their
universal nature, but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far
as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which
apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction from
material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a
manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of the angels,
as was said above (Q[55], A[2], A[3] ad 1), and consequently there is no
comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not according to their nature that the angels are
likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by agreement
in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to
the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way there is in God a
resemblance of all things, as to both matter and form, in so far as there
pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever is to be found in things. For
the same reason, the species in the angel's intellect, which are images
drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to
their form, but also as to their matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which
nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and as
to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by the
same species, has been already stated above (Q[55], A[3], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether angels know the future?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For angels are
mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future events.
Therefore much more do the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But
the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said in De Causis,
"an intelligence keeps pace with eternity," that is, aeviternity.
Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future are not different, but he
knows each indifferently.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the angel does not understand by species derived from
things, but by innate universal species. But universal species refer
equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that the
angels know indifferently things past, present, and future.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time, so
is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are distant
according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant according
to future time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does
not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive
sign of the Divinity, according to Is. 41:23: "Show the things that are
to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore the
angels do not know future events.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be
known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily
from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will
rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the majority
of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus the doctor
knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of knowing future
events exists in the angels, and by so much the more than it does in us,
as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more
perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply into the causes of an
ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the future issue thereof. But
events which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite
unknown; such as casual and chance events.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the future
in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those events
which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual
and chance events; for God sees all things in His eternity, which, being
simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And therefore
God's one glance is cast over all things which happen in all time as
present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are in themselves,
as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge (Q[14], A[13]). But
the mind of an angel, and every created intellect, fall far short of
God's eternity; hence the future as it is in itself cannot be known by
any created intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Men cannot know future things except in their causes, or by
God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way, but much
more distinctly.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the angel's intellect is above that time according
to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a time in his
mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts; of which
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves the spiritual creature
according to time." And thus, since there is succession in the angel's
intellect, not all things that happen through all time, are present to
the angelic mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in so
far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past, and
future; nevertheless the present, past, and future; nevertheless the
present, past, and future do not bear the same relations to the species.
Present things have a nature according to which they resemble the species
in the mind of an angel: and so they can be known thereby. Things which
are yet to come have not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such
species; consequently, they cannot be known by those species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Things distant according to place are already existing in
nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel; whereas
this is not true of future things, as has been stated. Consequently there
is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether angels know secret thoughts?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For Gregory
(Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: "Gold or crystal cannot equal it,"
says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, "one
shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and when once the
mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same time be
penetrated." But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is stated
(Mt. 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in another's conscience.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the
intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its shape is
seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible
species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one angel beholds
another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the thoughts of both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more than
do the images in our imagination; because the former are actually
understood, while the latter are understood only potentially. But the
images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things
are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty. Therefore it
seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, What is proper to God does not belong to the angels.
But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts, according to Jer.
17:9: "The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable; who can
know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart." Therefore angels do not
know the secrets of hearts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in its
effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also by
man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is the
more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by outward
act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell some
passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can angels, or
even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult bodily
modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons
"sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions, not only
when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the
soul expresses them by certain signs in the body"; although (Retract. ii,
30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and
affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone can know the
thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is,
because the rational creature is subject to God only, and He alone can
work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be
developed later (Q[63], A[1]; Q[105], A[5]). Consequently all that is in
the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are known to God
alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will for anyone
actually to consider anything; because a man who has a habit of
knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will. Hence the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): "For what man knoweth the things of a man,
but the spirit of a man that is in him?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the present life one man's thought is not known by
another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the grossness
of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets. The first
obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at all
in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the angels now.
Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the quality of
the soul; as to its amount of grace and of glory. In this way one will be
able to see the mind of another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species of
another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of
these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it does
not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual
consideration.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but
follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause. Since,
therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they
can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the imaginative
apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man, in so far as the
sensitive appetite sometimes, through following some bodily impression,
influences his conduct, as always happens in brutes. Yet the angels do
not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the
imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are moved by the will
and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul has some share of
reason, as obeying its ruler, as is said in Ethics iii, 12. But it does
not follow that, if the angel knows what is passing through man's
sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or
will: because the intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive
appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses of them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace. For, the
mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. But
the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through the ages, yet so
that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places." And the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): "That great mystery of godliness appeared
unto angels*." [*Vulg.: 'Great is the mystery of godliness, which . . .
appeared unto angels.'] Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in
the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which is His
essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear
from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries of
grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): "For the Lord God doth nothing without
revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Therefore angels know
the mysteries of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the
highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated
(Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly essences
as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of His Divine
work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is evident in Is.
63:1, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who cometh up from Edom?"
Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice." Therefore the angels do not
know mysteries of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is
his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by his
essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know
mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will of God:
and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend
upon the will of such angel, much less can he ascertain what depends
entirely upon God's will. The Apostle reasons in this fashion (1 Cor.
2:11): "No one knoweth the things of a man [*Vulg.: 'What man knoweth the
things of a man, but . . . ?'], but the spirit of a man that is in him."
So, "the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of
God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it
is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By
such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do
they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by
revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath
revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels
beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper mysteries
in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the lower
angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they knew from the
very beginning of their creation; others they are taught afterwards, as
befits their ministrations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the
Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed to
all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that
this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are
ordered. For "all are [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all.'] ministering spirits,
sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation
(Heb. 1:14)"; and this is brought by the mystery of the Incarnation.
Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery
from the very beginning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to its
special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on all points
from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as
appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet
they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to know
everything hidden in it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[57] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries
of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And
although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day to
do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the apostles knew
some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know. Thus we
read (Eph. 3:4,5): "As you reading, may understand my knowledge in the
mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known to the sons
of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." Among the prophets
also, the later ones knew what the former did not know; according to Ps.
118:100: "I have had understanding above ancients," and Gregory says:
"The knowledge of Divine things increased as time went on" (Hom. xvi in
Ezech.).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (SEVEN ARTICLES)
After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic
knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and
sometimes in act?
(2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?
(3) Whether the angel's knowledge is discursive?
(4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?
(5) Whether there can be error in the angel's intellect?
(6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?
(7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they
differ?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in
act?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in
potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is in
potentiality, as stated in Phys. iii, 6. But the angels' minds are moved
by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the angelic
minds are sometimes in potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to
have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality thereto. But it
is said (1 Pt. 1:12): "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore the
angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the book De Causis it is stated that "an intelligence
understands according to the mode of its substance." But the angel's
intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes
understands potentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): "Since the angels
were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout
contemplation." Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but
in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys.
viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, "as
before learning or discovering," that is, before it has the habit of
knowledge; secondly, as "when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but
does not actually consider." In the first way an angel's intellect is
never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural
knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the heavenly, bodies have
no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same
way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible
potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible
species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is
nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the
heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the
sun.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
In the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with
regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always
actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But
as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the
Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always
actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the Word. For the
bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not
consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of something
imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the act
of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this way
understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated in De Anima
iii, text. 28.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the
object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire the
vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from
God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the angel's substance there is no potentiality divested
of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so in
potentiality as to be without act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the
same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that "it may happen
that we know many things, but understand only one."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed
by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by shape. But one
body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore neither can one
intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement
terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be understood
altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): "The spiritual
faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all
things that it wills."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so
is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that
several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a
continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they
are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped
by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are taken as
forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by sense and
intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire
continuous whole is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii, text. 23.
In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the
predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and also two things
compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison.
From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct,
cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under
one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything
is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect. All
things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known
as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously.
But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as
different intelligible objects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the
Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which is the
Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all
things at once: just as in heaven "our thoughts will not be fleeting,
going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all
our knowledge at the same time by one glance," as Augustine says (De
Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by
innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be
comprised under one species; but not such as are under various species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To understand many things as one, is, so to speak, to
understand one thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The intellect is informed by the intelligible species which
it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many intelligible
objects under one species; as one body can by one shape be likened to
many bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel's knowledge is discursive?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is discursive. For
the discursive movement of the mind comes from one thing being known
through another. But the angels know one thing through another; for they
know creatures through the Word. Therefore the intellect of an angel
knows by discursive method.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do. But
the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects; all of
which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel,
which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater reason do this.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that "demons learn
more things by experience." But experimental knowledge is discursive:
for, "one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from
many experiences," as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii; Metaph. vii).
Therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not
acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they led to
something particular from something common."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As has often been stated (A[1]; Q[55], A[1]), the angels
hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold
among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls them "heavenly minds"
(A[1]; Q[55], A[1]). Now, the difference between heavenly and earthly
bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by
chance and movement: while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection
at once from their very nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the
human, intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a
kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation; that is to say,
as they advance from one known thing to another. But, if from the
knowledge of a known principle they were straightway to perceive as known
all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process
at all. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which
they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can
be known in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore they are called "intellectual beings": because even with
ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to
be understood [intelligi]; hence "intellect" is defined as the habit of
first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the
discursive method are called "rational"; and this comes of the feebleness
of their intellectual light. For if they possessed the fulness of
intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first aspect of
principles they would at once comprehend their whole range, by perceiving
whatever could be reasoned out from them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all movement
is from something before to something after. Hence discursive knowledge
comes about according as from something previously known one attains to
the knowledge of what is afterwards known, and which was previously
unknown. But if in the thing perceived something else be seen at the same
time, as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it
is not discursive knowledge. And in this way the angels know things in
the Word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a
syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet
they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by
syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by way
of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are present,
yet without any discursion withal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and
dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there is
composition of the same, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But there
is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because angels
apprehend different things by various species, and not all at one time.
Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than any
two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is that of
affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant natures not
by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what was said (A[2]).
Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by diverse species. And
so it seems that he understands by composing and dividing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking to
men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which are signs of
composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest from many
passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the angel
understands by composing and dividing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the intellectual
power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine
concepts." But a simple intelligence is without composition and division.
Therefore the angel understands without composition or division.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is
compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and dividing,
the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our intellect were to
see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never
understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner, if the intellect
in apprehending the quiddity of the subject were at once to have
knowledge of all that can be attributed to, or removed from, the subject,
it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by
understanding the essence. Thus it is evident that for the self-same
reason our intellect understands by discursion, and by composing and
dividing, namely, that in the first apprehension of anything newly
apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in
it. And this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us,
as has been said (A[3]). Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect
in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by
reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of
enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for he
understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable
immovably, and material things immaterially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every multitude of things understood causes
composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of them
is attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends the
nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can be
either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a
nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by
composing and dividing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The various natures of things differ less as to their mode
of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way in which
they are known, affirmation and negation have something more in common;
because directly the truth of an affirmation is known, the falsehood of
the opposite negation is known also.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of
speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet not that
they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply the nature of
a thing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's
intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv), there is "a perverted fancy" in the demons. Therefore it
seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But, as
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in the angels.
Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom, and
which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its intellect. But
Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons. Therefore it seems
that there can be error in the minds of the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that "the
intelligence is always true." Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83, qu. 32)
that "nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence"
Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel's
knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The truth of this question depends partly upon what has
gone before. For it has been said (A[4]) that an angel understands not by
composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is. Now the
intellect is always true as regards what a thing is, just as the sense
regarding its proper object, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 26. But by
accident, deception and falsehood creep in, when we understand the
essence of a thing by some kind of composition, and this happens either
when we take the definition of one thing for another, or when the parts
of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to accept as the
definition of some creature, "a four-footed flying beast," for there is
no such animal. And this comes about in things composite, the definition
of which is drawn from diverse elements, one of which is as matter to the
other. But there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities,
as is stated in Metaph. ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at
all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known
precisely as they exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in
the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very
differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the
quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by
division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such
is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of the)
essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding it.
Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of
knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such thing, or excluded
from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's supernatural
ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright will, from their knowing
the nature of every creature, the good angels form no judgments as to the
nature of the qualities therein, save under the Divine ordinance; hence
there can be no error or falsehood in them. But since the minds of demons
are utterly perverted from the Divine wisdom, they at times form their
opinions of things simply according to the natural conditions of the
same. Nor are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of
anything; but they can be misled with regard to supernatural matters; for
example, on seeing a dead man, they may suppose that he will not rise
again, or, on beholding Christ, they may judge Him not to be God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
From all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the
question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes of their not
being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the angels as
regards things knowable, not naturally but supernaturally. It is,
furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing is, is
always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an undue manner,
referred to some composition or division.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is a "morning" and an "evening" knowledge in the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a morning
knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an admixture of
darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel; since
there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the angelic knowledge ought
not to be termed morning and evening knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes; while
noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, if there be a
morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same reason it
appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference of
the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 38),
"The sciences are divided just as things are." But there is a threefold
existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their own natures; and in
the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). If,
therefore, a morning and an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels,
because of the existence of things in the Word, and in their own nature,
then there ought to be admitted a third class of knowledge, on account
of the existence of things in the angelic mind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,31; De Civ. Dei xii,
7,20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and evening
knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The expression "morning" and "evening" knowledge was
devised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all
things, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the sun
was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, the day of
angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the
ordinary day, morning is the beginning, and evening the close of day, so,
their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called morning
knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their
knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it stands in its own
nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the being of things flows
from the Word, as from a kind of primordial principle; and this flow is
terminated in the being which they have in themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge are
not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as compared to
beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine puts it (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us from calling something
light in comparison with one thing, and darkness with respect to another.
In the same way the life of the faithful and the just is called light in
comparison with the wicked, according to Eph. 5:8: "You were heretofore
darkness; but now, light in the Lord": yet this very life of the
faithful, when set in contrast to the life of glory, is termed darkness,
according to 2 Pt. 1:19: "You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you
do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place." So the
angel's knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is day in
comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark in comparison with the
vision of the Word.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that
is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness,
that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the
creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn to darkness and
to night; but they refer this back to the praise of God, in Whom, as in
their principle, they know all things. Consequently after "evening" there
is no night, but "morning"; so that morning is the end of the preceding
day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the angels refer to
God's praise their knowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised
under the name of day, as the middle between the two extremes. Or else
the noon can be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has
neither beginning nor end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly the
existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under evening
knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own nature.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge are one.
For it is said (Gn. 1:5): "There was evening and morning, one day." But
by the expression "day" the knowledge of the angels is to be understood,
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the morning and
evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations
at the same time. But the angels are always using their morning
knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in God,
according to Mt. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were
different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening
knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is
perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But, if
the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is compared to it
as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowledge
cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): "There is a vast
difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God, and as
it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day, and the
latter to the evening."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As was observed (A[6]), the evening knowledge is that by
which the angels know things in their proper nature. This cannot be
understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper nature of
things, so that the preposition "in" denotes the form of a principle;
because, as has been already stated (Q[55], A[2]), the angels do not draw
their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that when we say "in their
proper nature" we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it
is an object of knowledge; that is to say, that the evening knowledge is
in the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those
things have in their own nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas, or
by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the Word,
they know not merely the being of things as existing in the Word, but the
being as possessed by the things themselves; as God by contemplating
Himself sees that being which things have in their own nature. It,
therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as when the angels
behold the Word, they know the being which things have in their proper
nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one
and the same, and only differ as to the things known. If it be called
evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas they know the being
which things have in their own natures, then the morning and the evening
knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to understand it when he assigns
one as inferior to the other.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken as
the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the day's unit is
taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which, nevertheless,
can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There can be two operations of the same faculty at the one
time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when the will
at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and the
intellect at the same instant perceives principles and conclusions
through those principles, when it has already acquired knowledge. As
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), the evening knowledge is referred
to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence there is nothing to hinder
both from being at the same time in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[58] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite imperfect is
done away: just as faith, which is of the things that are not seen, is
made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection of the evening
knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morning knowledge. For
that a thing be known in itself, is not opposite to its being known in
its cause. Nor, again, is there any inconsistency in knowing a thing
through two mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other less
perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a probable medium for
reaching the same conclusion. In like manner a thing can be known by the
angel through the uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] Out. Para. 1/1
THE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the
angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself; secondly,
of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in the angels?
(2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?
(3) Is there free-will in the angels?
(4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is will in the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in the reason."
But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason.
Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something higher than the
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is evident
from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appetite argues
something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as yet
possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels,
especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that the
will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible object
understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are incorporeal.
Therefore there is no will in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the image of
the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding, and
will. But God's image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in
the angelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing God. Therefore
there is will in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In
evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow
from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by
appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to good
by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate
bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural appetite."
Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge; not
that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some
particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and
so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called "a
sensitive appetite." Other things, again, have an inclination towards
good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness;
this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards
what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards
some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards
some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge,
but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed
"will." Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the
universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in
which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to the
diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects,
while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be one appetite
tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite belongs to reason;
and another with a tendency towards particular good, which appetite
belongs to sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of
knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason
knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless
by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it,
namely, the universal. Consequently the object presented to the
appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is
the same. Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is
no appetite higher than the will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is derived from
seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part reaches out not
to these things only, but also to many other things; thus the name of a
stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot [laesione pedis], though
not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty
is so denominated from anger [ira]; though at the same time there are
several other passions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to
will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there is
nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels,
since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated in De Anima
iii, text. 28.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the
intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural
body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end,
which is its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the angel's
form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some
species within his intellect. Therefore the angel inclines towards the
good through his own nature, or through an intelligible species. But such
inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of
the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the
object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ, not
really but only logically [*Cf. Q[16], A[4]]. Therefore will and
intellect are not really different.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not
differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives color
and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as
common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of the
intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ
from the intellect, whose object is the true.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good things only, while
their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both.
Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In the angels the will is a special faculty or power,
which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their
nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is
completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything
beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the
inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the
essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it,
and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But
the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something
superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or
lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes from
the active qualities.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there
alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within
the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing
beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot be said of
any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of
any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor that
of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect
of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object
known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to
what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it is
disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to
what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a
manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one faculty to have
within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to
tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must
necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with God,
for He has within Himself universal being, and the universal good.
Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial
form: while it is inclined to something outside by something additional,
as has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference
of their objects, but according to their formal distinction, which is
taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the diversity
derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of
intellect from will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Because the good and the true are really convertible, it
follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true;
while the true is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless,
the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying the
faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is free-will in the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the
act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the
angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel,"
while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But
the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to
the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no
free-will in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in
the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference;
because, as was observed already (Q[58], A[5]), their intellect is not
deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore
neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them
according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels the
intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will
does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels'
dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, with
much more reason is it in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous
judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the
arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind
of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals; for the
sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to
be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by
nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment
which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness;
from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently,
wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest
that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and
in a higher degree of perfection than in man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As
a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in this,
that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it
in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, yet not with
the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of
truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As was observed already (A[2]), knowledge is effected by
the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of
imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally
have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his
intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally.
But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection
is directed to something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not
come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something
which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an
angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him;
but it would argue imperfection in him, with he to be indeterminate to
what is above him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels
than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect.
Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is
considered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because
privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of
themselves; but only by their cause, or through the addition of some
qualification.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that in the
demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence." But demons
are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their nature.
Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the
angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger,
hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred
Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked
angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in
the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible
appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance
appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the
irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a
concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the
irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not
exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible
and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The reason
of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one
another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction
of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some
common idea, there will be no distinction of faculties according to the
diversity of the particular things contained under that common idea. Just
as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such, then
there are not several powers of sight distinguished according to the
difference of black and white: whereas if the proper object of any
faculty were white, as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be
distinguished from the faculty of seeing black.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is quite evident from what has been said (A[1]; Q[16], A[1]),
that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the
will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can there
be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part,
the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of some
particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which does
not crave for what is good according to its common aspect, but for some
particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the angels
only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into
irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it is called the
will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the
demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;---on account of the
resemblance in the effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the
concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act of the
will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish
well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good
possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the
angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[59] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite,
but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible appetite is the
good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the
object of charity, is not of any such kind. For the same reason it must
be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite; because the
object of the irascible appetite is something arduous belonging to the
sensible order, which the virtue of hope does not regard; since the
object of hope is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as
a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible pleasures, which
belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates
daring and fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently
temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the
concupiscible part, and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist
in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no passions of
concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and
fortitude. But temperance is predicated of them according as in
moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will.
Fortitude is likewise attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry
out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the
irascible or concupiscible appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)
The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is
love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of
love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] Out. Para. 2/2
Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?
(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?
(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of
choice?
(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves
himself?
(5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the
angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love,
as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel's love is
intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon
than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own nature.
Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves; because they
possess free-will, as was shown above (Q[59], A[3]). Consequently there
is no natural love in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now
ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to
wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is
above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no
natural love in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved
except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there
is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In
evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always
sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect,
because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently whatever
belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have
intellect. But it is common to every nature to have some inclination; and
this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found to exist
differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode.
Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural
inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to
the sensitive appetite; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only
according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an
angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural
love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature which
has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All things in the world are moved to act by something else
except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way
moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. So
there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in so far as
such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature.
Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act himself, because he
has free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love
well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination
implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is
not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of nature. Yet the
rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and
virtue: because the one rectitude perfects the other; even so the truth
of natural knowledge is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired
knowledge is of another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is love of choice in the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For
love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice follows counsel,
which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is
contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is said (Div.
Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as
is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the
knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can
know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, which it can
know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated
(A[1]; Q[16], A[1]). Consequently, besides their infused love, there is
only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in
them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But
by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of
choice in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of
choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice;
because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a
principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what belongs
to nature must be a principle in everything.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and
his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such
knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by
him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner, the
end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the
intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will
tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills happiness:
and all other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a
man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love of that
good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the
love which comes of this, which is of something loved for the end's sake,
is the love of choice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the
part of the will. Because, as was stated already (Q[59], A[2]), the
mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known
within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual
nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable
of being understood, but only a few things from which he is moved in a
measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive faculty, on the
contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which
are good in themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves;
others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible
on account of something else. Consequently it does not argue imperfection
in the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his end,
and something else from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since
the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not
deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in
them both natural love and love of choice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which
are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof:
but we shall speak of them later on (Q[62]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Not all love of choice is rational love, according as
rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love is so
called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (Q[59],
A[3], ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a
discursive act of the reason; but only human choice. Consequently the
conclusion does not follow.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of
choice?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both with
natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (A[2]), natural love
regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the
end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the end
and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the love of choice
cannot have the same object.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a
uniting and a binding power." But uniting and binding imply various
things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement tends
towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot love
himself with either natural or elective love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for others
comes of love for oneself."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and good is to be found
both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6, a thing
may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly
as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting good,
which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto
another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good: thus knowledge is
loved, not that any good may come to it but that it may be possessed.
This kind of love has been called by the name "concupiscence" while the
first is called "friendship."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything
naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to
mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own
good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man naturally
love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for
self. On the other hand, each loves self with the love of choice, in so
far as from choice he wishes for something which will benefit himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not under the same but under quite different aspects
that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with elective love, as
was observed above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As to be one is better than to be united, so there is more
oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which unites one
to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and "binding" in order to
show the derivation of love from self to things outside self; as uniting
is derived from unity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As love is an action which remains within the agent, so
also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not of
necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon
the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is reflected back
upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an angel does not love another with natural
love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an angel does
not know another as he knows himself: because he knows himself by his
essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as was said above
(Q[56], AA[1],2). Therefore it seems that one angel does not love another
with natural love as he loves himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the
principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes of
love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one
angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is
unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love can
be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no love for
the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another with natural
love as he loves himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That seems to be a natural property which is found in
all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its like,"
as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves another as
he loves himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As was observed (A[3]), both angel and man naturally love
self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself: consequently
every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if this be one with it by
natural union, it loves it with natural love; but if it be one with it by
non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. Thus a man
loves his fellow townsman with a social love, while he loves a blood
relation with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in the
principle of natural generation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with
another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves another
which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in so far as
it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things devoid of
knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to
another thing, wherein consists this other thing's good; as it is
naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne upwards.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural
affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an
angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from
him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The expression 'as himself' can in one way qualify the
knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and thus
one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other to be even
as he knows himself to be. In another way the expression can qualify the
knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover. And thus one
angel does not know another as himself, because he knows himself by his
essence, and the other not by the other's essence. In like manner he does
not love another as he loves himself, because he loves himself by his own
will; but he does not love another by the other's will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The expression "as" does not denote equality, but likeness.
For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the angel naturally
loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more what is
numerically one with himself, than what is one only generically or
specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like love for another
as for himself, in this respect, that as he loves self in wishing well to
self, so he loves another in wishing well to him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that end
to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one wills for
oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can
such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, without their still
retaining a natural affection towards the good angels, in so far as they
share the same nature with them. But they hate them, in so far as they
are unlike them according to righteousness and unrighteousness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural love
more than he loves himself. For, as was stated (A[4]), natural love rests
upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic
nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the angel loves God less
than self, or even than another angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more
so." But every one loves another with natural love for his own sake:
because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the angel
does not love God more than self with natural love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we behold
every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But nature's
operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards anything
else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not love God
more than himself from natural love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self. But
to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it is poured out
upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them," as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not love God more than
themselves by natural love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the love of
God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who sins; for
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two cities;
namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly city;
while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city."
Therefore it is not natural to love God more than self.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of
nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept
of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from
natural love the angel loves God more than himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There have been some who maintained that an angel loves
God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of
concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather
than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in so
far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself;
because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he wills
to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the natural love
he loves himself more than he does God, because he naturally loves
himself before God, and with greater intensity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider
whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because
the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the
natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature. Now,
in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to
another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that other to
which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural tendency is
evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because
"according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude to be
thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that the
part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for
instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the
whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same
inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous
citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of
the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such
inclination would be natural to him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both
man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every creature in
regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from
natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and with a
greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than God, it
would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it would not
be perfected but destroyed by charity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided
whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the other;
for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the
other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with the other.
But where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the
other, that one is naturally more loved than self; because, as we said
above, each part naturally loves the whole more than itself: and each
individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own
individual good. Now God is not only the good of one species, but is
absolutely the universal good; hence everything in its own way naturally
loves God more than itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in so far"
as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far" denotes an end,
then it is false; for he does not naturally love God for his own good,
but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of love on the lover's part,
then it is true; for it would not be in the nature of anyone to love God,
except from this---that everything is dependent on that good which is God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as to
certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for
everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but
likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural inclination
towards what is the absolutely universal good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom every
natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love. So far as
He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural
beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[60] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Since God's substance and universal goodness are one and
the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement of love
moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other things, and
according as it is the universal good. And because He is naturally loved
by all so far as He is the universal good, it is impossible that whoever
sees Him in His essence should not love Him. But such as do not behold
His essence, know Him by some particular effects, which are sometimes
opposed to their will. So in this way they are said to hate God; yet
nevertheless, so far as He is the universal good of all, every thing
naturally loves God more than itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR
ARTICLES)
After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will,
it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the
first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence;
secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly, how
some of them became wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?
(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?
(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?
(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their existence.
For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by God. But
there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not created by
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16) that if
any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has being and
unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity." But the angels
are immaterial forms, as was shown above (Q[50], A[2]). Therefore they
have no cause of their being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very fact of
its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels are
forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the angels
have no active cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:2): "Praise ye Him, all His
angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing,
except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while in
everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown
above (Q[3], A[4]). From this it is clear that God alone exists of His
own essence: while all other things have their existence by
participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what
exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused by fire. Consequently
the angels, of necessity, were made by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the angels were
not passed over in that account of the first creation of things, but are
designated by the name "heavens" or of "light." And they were either
passed over, or else designated by the names of corporeal things, because
Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet incapable of
understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had been divulged that
there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature, it would have
proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were inclined, and
from which Moses especially meant to safeguard them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no 'formal' cause
of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as produces its
effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality;
but they have a cause productive of their entire substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from eternity.
For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does not act
through something besides His essence. But His being is eternal.
Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at
another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid down
in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time existing
and at another non-existing, but exists always.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's
incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as
truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual
nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but
likewise eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten
Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He
made anything from the beginning." But, as was shown above (A[1]), the
angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity.
Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary
must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He made
them "from nothing"; that is, after they had not been.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God's being is His will. So the fact that God produced the
angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude that He made
them also by His will. But, as was shown above (Q[19], A[3]; Q[46], A[1]
), God's will does not act by necessity in producing creatures. Therefore
He produced such as He willed, and when He willed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure of the
movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a
corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure
of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and which is
also the measure of the succession which is in his operations. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that "God moves the spiritual
creature according to time."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the very
fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth. But they
did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed upon them when
God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not follow that the angels
existed from eternity.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal
world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand years of our
time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall
we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the
other orders served God?" Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii): "Some
say that the angels were begotten before all creation; as Gregory the
Theologian declares, He first of all devised the angelic and heavenly
powers, and the devising was the making thereof."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine and
the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity; while
corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced
ere time was made, and after eternity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal
nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal
nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production of
things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more, therefore, was
the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth." Now, this would not be true if anything had been
created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before
corporeal nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in
the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the angels
were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the angels are
part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of themselves;
but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe.
This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature;
because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the
universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently
it is improbable that God, Whose "works are perfect," as it is said Dt.
32:4, should have created the angelic creature before other creatures. At
the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on
account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, "whose authority in
Christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised
objection to his teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine of
Athanasius," as Jerome says.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek
Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken place
previously to that of the corporeal world.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole universe,
possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more
eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the
comparison does not hold.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the angels
do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation of the matter
of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all
things; but the creation of the angels does not involve creation of the
universe.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn. 1, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning,"
must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning of time": but
not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say
"Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the empyrean
heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a substance which
is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its existence; and as a
consequence, neither is it for its creation. Therefore the angels were
not created in any corporeal place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that the
angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the
empyrean heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. If
therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it would not
beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is contrary to
what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the sinning angel: "I
will ascend into heaven" (Is. 14:13).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the visible
firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual
firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor;
and which was filled with angels directly it was made."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As was observed (A[3]), the universe is made up of
corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures were
so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature, and to
rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the angels
to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over all
corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or whatever
else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven
of the angels, explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: "Behold heaven is the
Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as if
depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their being
made; because God could have created them before all corporeal creation,
as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal place in order
to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that they are by
their power in touch with bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means the
highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity
owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not speaking of all
the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the opinion of some,
belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing to hinder us from
saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted and universal power
over all corporeal things, were created in the highest place of the
corporeal creature; while the other angels, as having more restricted
powers, were created among the inferior bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[61] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven, but
of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the sinning angel wished
to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner to God, as will
appear later on (Q[63], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE
ARTICLES)
In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the order
of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points of
inquiry:
(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?
(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?
(3) Were they created in grace?
(4) Did they merit their beatitude?
(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?
(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural
capacities?
(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?
(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?
(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels were created in beatitude?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude. For it
is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue in the
beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess the
excellence they have." Therefore the angels were created in beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal
creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation was
made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in
time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 15).
Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and
incomplete. But its formation and perfection are derived from its
beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was created in beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5), the
things which we read of as being made in the works of the six days, were
made together at one time; and so all the six days must have existed
instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according to his
exposition, in those six days, "the morning" was the angelic knowledge,
according to which they knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore
straightway from their creation they knew the Word, and things in the
Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word. Consequently
the angels were in beatitude straightway from the very beginning of their
creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in good is of the nature
of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as soon as they
were created; the fall of some of them shows this. Therefore the angels
were not in beatitude from their creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate
perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that it
is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its ultimate
perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of
intellectual nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own
natural power; and this is in a measure called beatitude or happiness.
Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's ultimate happiness consists in
his most perfect contemplation, whereby in this life he can behold the
best intelligible object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is
still another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby "we shall
see God as He is." This is beyond the nature of every created intellect,
as was shown above (Q[12], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitude,
which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was created
already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by any
progressive action, as man does, but, as was observed above (Q[58], AA[3]
,4), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural dignity.
But the angels did not have from the beginning of their creation that
ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of nature; because such
beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end; and consequently they
ought not to have it immediately from the beginning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which
the angel had in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its
creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by its
operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v, 4,23;
viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take place at once
among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants
was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the
beginning of its existence had the perfection of its nature; but it did
not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word; the one
which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural
knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude thereof shining
in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he knows the Word
through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in
the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge, and perfectly by his
knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge of things in the Word
was present to the angel from the outset of his creation; while the
second was not, but only when the angels became blessed by turning to the
good. And this is properly termed their morning knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to
turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish
naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he loves God
naturally, as is clear from what has been said (Q[60], A[5]). Therefore
an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks. Now it
was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because there was
no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of
grace in order to turn to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace;
hence it is said (Zach. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you."
But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for
grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did not
need grace to turn to God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached to
beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it
would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess
everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Rm.
6:23): "The grace of God is life everlasting."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to
God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above (Q[60], A[2])
the natural movement of the will is the principle of all things that we
will. But the will's natural inclination is directed towards what is in
keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above
nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it, unless helped by some
other supernatural principle. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural
tendency to give forth heat, and to generate fire; whereas to generate
flesh is beyond the natural power of fire; consequently, fire has no
tendency thereto, except in so far as it is moved instrumentally by the
nutritive soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now it was shown above (Q[12], AA[4],5), when we were treating of God's
knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude
of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created
intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the movement of the
will directed towards such beatitude, except it be moved thereto by a
supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of grace. Therefore it
must be said that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such
beatitude, except by the help of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the author
of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, so far
as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A thing is "difficult" which is beyond a power; and this
happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the natural
capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some help, it is
said to be "difficult"; but if it can in no way be attained, then it is
"impossible"; thus it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way a
thing may be beyond the power, not according to the natural order of such
power, but owing to some intervening hindrance; as to mount upwards is
not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul;
because the soul, considered in itself, can be moved in any direction;
but is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body; consequently it
is difficult for a man to mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate
beatitude is difficult for man, both because it is beyond his nature, and
because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection
of sin. But it is difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a
conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The first
is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature enjoying the
possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate grace is required.
The next turning to God is that which merits beatitude; and for this
there is required habitual grace, which is the principle of merit. The
third conversion is that whereby a man disposes himself so that he may
have grace; for this no habitual grace is required; but the operation of
God, Who draws the soul towards Himself, according to Lam 5:21: "Convert
us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Hence it is clear that
there is no need to go on to infinity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels were created in grace?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature was first
made without form, and was called "heaven": but afterwards it received
its form, and was then called "light." But such formation comes from
grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If,
therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever have
turned away from God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the
angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that they
were not created in grace; but that they were first created in nature
only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were beatified.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), "Who wrought the
good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will,
that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time
building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on this point,
some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state, while
others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it seems more
probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that they
were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in
the process of time, being created by the work of Divine Providence, were
produced by the operation of God, were created in the first fashioning of
things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that
sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike
form in nature does to the natural effect; hence (1 Jn. 3:9) grace is
called the "seed" of God. As, then, in Augustine's opinion it is
contended that the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted
in the creature when corporeally created, so straightway from the
beginning the angels were created in grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be understood either
by comparison with their formation in glory; and so the absence of
formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or else it can be
understood of the formation according to grace: and so it did not precede
in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as Augustine holds with
regard to the formation of corporeal things (Gen. ad lit. i, 15).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the
subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be
inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the movement
of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can fail to make
use of it, and can sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes midway between
nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in created nature,
glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is the end of the
operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands not as the end of
operation, because it is not of works, but as the principle of right
operation. Therefore it was fitting for grace to be given straightway
with nature.
�Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an angel merits his beatitude?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude. For
merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the angel
experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous action
was not meritorious for him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it was
quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not thereby
merit beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did so
either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not before;
because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby to merit
it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be meriting it
now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower angel could by
meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and the distinct degrees of
grace would not be permanent; which is not admissible. Consequently the
angel did not merit his beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the "measure of the
angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of a man." Therefore
the same is the case with the angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because
existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude,
however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now
everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation leading
to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is not beyond
the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing art is
productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when such end
is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it; wherefore it
is looked for from another's bestowing. Now it is evident from what has
gone before (AA[1],2; Q[12], AA[4],5), ultimate beatitude exceeds both
the angelic and the human nature. It remains, then, that both man and
angel merited their beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit,
there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude: as
also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then
have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have
grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which
conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as some
others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their present
ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary, again, to the
notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means to an end; while
what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking, be moved towards
such end; and so no one merits to produce what he already enjoys. Or else
it will have to be said that one and the same act of turning to God, so
far as it comes of free-will, is meritorious; and so far as it attains
the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even this view will not stand,
because free-will is not the sufficient cause of merit; and,
consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming from free-will,
except in so far as it is informed by grace; but it cannot at the same
time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting,
and by perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does
not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the same
time to merit it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was
admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The angel's difficulty of working righteously does not come
from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but from the fact
that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement
towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude instantly
after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man to do well
than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one act of
merit. Therefore neither was the angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant, from the
very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to be moved in
the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of a body could
be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it would have
movement in the first instant of its generation. Consequently, if the
angel merited beatitude by one act of his will, he merited it in the
first instant of his creation; and so, if their beatitude was not
retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the first instant.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which are
far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far remote from
their natural condition: while merit comes midway between. Therefore the
angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in order to reach
beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for
beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints.
Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving
beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some obstacle.
Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his first act of
charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since there was no
obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by only one
meritorious act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of
charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because
grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every
perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according to
its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its natural
perfection not by passing from one stage to another; but to have it at
once naturally, as was shown above (A[1]; Q[58], AA[3],4). But as the
angel is of his nature inclined to natural perfection, so is he by merit
inclined to glory. Hence instantly after merit the angel secured
beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike can be from
merely one act; because man merits beatitude by every act informed by
charity. Hence it remains that an angel was beatified straightway after
one act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection at
once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to man than to the
angel for securing beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things; hence the
various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except as
reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which merited
beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of beatitude,
which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect grace, and the
other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains for different
instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel merited beatitude,
and in another was beatified.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain the
perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one meritorious
act is required; which act can so far be called an interval as through it
the angel is brought to beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of
their natural gifts?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and glory
according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is bestowed of
God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends on God's will,
and not on the degree of their natural gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with grace
than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. But grace
does not come "of works," as is said Rm. 11:6. Therefore much less does
the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or grace.
But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of his
natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent. ii,
D, 3) that "those angels who were created with more subtle natures and of
keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with greater gifts
of grace."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and
perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the
degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from two
sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His
wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the
angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude, so
likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the
various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the
builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he
prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is
clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the
house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of
grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is not
a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one
thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in whom
the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or thwarted by
the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is nothing to
retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy. So it is
reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature, were
turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing happens in
men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to the greater
earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that the angels who
had the greater natural powers, had the more grace and glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise does the
nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for grace, so did
it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the creature
itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it seems
rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than
according to works.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels, who
are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way in men,
who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on account of the
end; while numerical difference is because of the matter. Furthermore,
there is something in man which can thwart or impede the movement of his
intellective nature; but not in the angels. Consequently the argument is
not the same for both.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not remain in
the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is
perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But
natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with beatified
knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural knowledge and love
cease.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But the
knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels. Therefore
it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love to remain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts, as the
same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points. But the
beatified angels are always exercising their beatified knowledge and
love; for, as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness consists not in habit, but
in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge and love in the
angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its operation remains. But
beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection. Therefore
it does not take away natural knowledge and love.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as
principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations
themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to
second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must
ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved in
beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in the
act of beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite
imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the
perfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the
power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken
away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In the
same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to the
perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from knowing
a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at the one time
through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one. In like
manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this appertains to his
knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his own
essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient of
themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural
gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated
beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the
one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural knowledge
and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory. Accordingly
there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from existing in
the angel conjointly with those of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a beatified angel can sin?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as was said
above (A[7]), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it is of the
very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified
angel can sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as the
Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the angel in
beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards
good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be
able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened in
the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is in the
holy angels that nature which cannot sin." Therefore the holy angels
cannot sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is,
because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence. Now,
God's essence is the very essence of goodness. Consequently the angel
beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way as anyone else not
seeing God is to the common form of goodness. Now it is impossible for
any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good;
or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such. Therefore
the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards
God. Now whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently
the beatified angel cannot sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail. But from its
perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of beatitude,
it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already alleged.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in the things
to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the things whereunto
they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For
the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known principles; in the
same way, the will cannot help clinging to good, formally as good;
because the will is naturally ordained to good as to its proper object.
Consequently the will of the angels is referred to opposites, as to doing
many things, or not doing them. But they have no tendency to opposites
with regard to God Himself, Whom they see to be the very nature of
goodness; but in all things their aim is towards God, which ever
alternative they choose, that is not sinful.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just
as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident that it belongs to
the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different
conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to proceed to some
conclusion by passing out of the order of the principles, comes of its
own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the
free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping the order
of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to
choose anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to
sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot
sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beatitude.
For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect charity in
the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit
increases, the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the beatified
angels can progress in beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that "God makes use
of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same thing happens
to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations"; since "they are
all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to
minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb.
1:14). This would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby,
nor to advance to beatitude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels
can merit, and can advance in beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the
foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not in the
highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it
would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which is not
admissible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Merit and progress belong to this present condition of
life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude, they are
already in possession of beatitude. Consequently the beatified angels can
neither merit nor advance in beatitude.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In every movement the mover's intention is centered upon
one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject;
because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is
repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its
own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God,
as is clear from what has gone before (Q[12], A[4]), that it needs to be
moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore there must be some one
determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its
last end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] Body Para. 2/3
Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist
precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all the
blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision,
that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him Who
directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational
creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it should be led
on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension,
for this belongs to God only; as is evident from what was said above
(Q[12], A[7]; Q[14], A[3]). But since infinite efficacy is required for
comprehending God, while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only
finite; and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from
the infinite; it comes to pass that the rational creature understands God
more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as beatitude
consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of
the vision.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] Body Para. 3/3
Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its
beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a
determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once
secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end.
Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely passively,
but also by working actively. If the end is within the power of the
rational creature, then its action is said to procure the end; as man
acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be beyond its power, and
is looked for from another, then the action will be meritorious of such
end. But what is already in the ultimate term is not said to be moved,
but to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect
charity of this life; whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather
enjoys the reward. Even as in acquired habits, the operation preceding
the habit is productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired
habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect
charity has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of
the reward.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all, as
being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is useful.
Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall for a house.
In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the beatified angels,
inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for to pour out acquired
perfection upon others is of the nature of what is perfect, considered as
perfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[62] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest
degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the highest degree,
according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels
can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as are saved by
their ministrations, according to Lk. 15:10: "There is [Vulg.'shall be']
joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance." Such joy
belongs to their accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment
day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental
reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed can in no wise merit
without being at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor; like
Christ, Who alone was such. For the Blessed acquire such joy from the
virtue of their beatitude, rather than merit it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] Out. Para. 1/1
THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN (NINE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all
with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil of
punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for
consideration:
(1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?
(2) What kind of sins can be in them?
(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?
(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are
any of them naturally evil?
(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in
the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?
(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his
creation and fall?
(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the
angels?
(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning?
(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels.
For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, as
is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of
privation is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not being in
potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no
evil in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But
philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies.
Therefore neither can there by in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is
natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards God.
Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God
they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good. Now
for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good;
because in them either there can be no error at all, or at least not
before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it truly good.
But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Consequently the angel
does not sin by desire.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He found
wickedness."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature considered in his
own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin, such
creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature.
The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation
from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether we speak of sin
in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very
virtue of the agent, can never fall short of rectitude. Were the
craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood
otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness of engraving be judged by
another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine
will is the sole rule of God's act, because it is not referred to any
higher end. But every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it
is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be
referred: as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the
will of his superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the
will of his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be
no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature;
considering the condition of its nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural
existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as
regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect
there can be evil in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation.
Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so
neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But
besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the
angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement
of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being. But for
him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of
infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will.
First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing adultery,
which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error;
otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The adulterer errs
in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as
something good to be performed now, from the inclination of passion or of
habit; even though he does not err in his universal judgment, but retains
a right opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin in the
angel; because there are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or
intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above (Q[59], A[4]);
nor, again, could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In
another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself,
but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which
induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly
regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to
pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin
does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the
things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by
seeking his own good, from his own free-will, insubordinately to the rule
of the Divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides
those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any kind of
sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even in the
obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3).
Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth,
avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit,
just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be
pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices spring
from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is granted,
the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the
angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil "is
not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet he is
proud and envious."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by
actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in the
demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But
as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to
a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such
pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with
spiritual things; because nothing is affected except with regard to
something which is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no
sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order; unless in such
affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin
of pride---not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due.
Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them,
since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on its
part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over
the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neighbor's good
to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good could not be deemed a
hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he
coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be singular because
of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of pride, there
followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he grieved over
man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the
devil's will God makes use of man for the Divine glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of
the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures: it is
wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins,
so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the
immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human
life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are
not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures.
Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every
immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice, in
this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons.
Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can
only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness,
whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary
the body; which does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride
and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons; yet so
that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the
good of another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised
all other sins derived from them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the devil desired to be as God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For
what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire;
because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether
sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such
desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under
apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the finite
equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an angel
could not desire to be as God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But
to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature naturally
tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality,
but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom
than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal
of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only things which
are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation. Therefore much less
did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil (Is. 14:13,14),
"I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High." And
Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being "inflated with pride,
he wished to be called God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God.
But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly, by
likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because by
natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there was no
habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind,
so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some
particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were
possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there exists in
everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature; which would
not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently,
no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature;
just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so
upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays
us false; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy
a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the
destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to
which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite
evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but
also in degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently it is
impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a
higher; and still more to covet equality with God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In
one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened
unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits
no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is
to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire
to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of
God's power. In another way one may desire to be like unto God in some
respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create
heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire there would be
sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he
desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for
so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since no creature can exist
except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance
with God in this respect---by desiring, as his last end of beatitude,
something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning
his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God's
grace. Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is
bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature;
and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering. This
harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says [*De casu diaboli, iv.] that
"he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast." These two
views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have
final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of
another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have dominion
over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
From this we have the answer to all the objections.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any demons are naturally wicked?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry
says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is a class of
demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of
the dead." But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are
naturally wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some
men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Ws. 12:10): "Their malice
is natural." Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by
nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious;
yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God's
creatures, they may be naturally wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons are not
naturally wicked."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a
particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes from
a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now
a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it; thus
fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things: but
with the universal good no evil can be connected. If, then, there be
anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good, it can
tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected
with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined to good in
general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is
manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in
general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will.
Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise
have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they
cannot be naturally evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are
naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally so,
but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are
naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are animals with a
sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some
particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this way, then, it
can have a natural inclination to evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch
as evil is connected with good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The malice of some men can be called natural, either
because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the natural
proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate
passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful; but
not on the part of the intellectual nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive
nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils are
connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to
do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. Wherefore it is not evil
in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in
the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes (De Div. Nom. iv).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first
instant of his creation?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own
will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of the devil
(Jn. 8:44): "He was a murderer from the beginning."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the lack of
form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time, but
merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8), the
"heaven," which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies
the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said
that God said: "Be light made: and light was made," we are to understand
the full formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Consequently, the
nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant.
But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from
"darkness," whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the
first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and
some sinned.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature
can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of Christ, or
also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the
first instant of their creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal
nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first
instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in the first
instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation
in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either
ordinate or inordinate. It ordinate, then, since he had grace, he thereby
merited beatitude. But with the angels the reward follows immediately
upon merit; as was said above (Q[62], A[5]). Consequently they would have
become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false.
It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate action in their first
instant.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all the things that
He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also the
demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Some have maintained that the demons were wicked
straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their nature,
but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was made, the
devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean
heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil of itself. Since this
opinion, however, is in contradiction with the authority of
Scripture---for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of
Babylon (Is. 14:12): "How art thou fallen . . . O Lucifer, who didst rise
in the morning!" and it is said to the devil in the person of the King of
Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): "Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God,"
---consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as
erroneous.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their
creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is
repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the
other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one
instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to
his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel's very being,
while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems, then, an
impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of
his existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in such
movements as are measured by time, and take place successively; thus, if
local movement follows a change, then the change and the local movement
cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes are
instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a
term to the first and the second change; thus in the same instant in
which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the
moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is the
movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been already stated,
they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning (Q[58], A[3]
). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of
free-will from existing in the same instant.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for the
angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free-will. For
although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence,
nevertheless, that operation which begins with the existence comes of the
agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward movement in fire
comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which
derives its nature from a defective cause, which can be the cause of a
defective action, it can in the first instant of its existence have a
defective operation; just as the leg, which is defective from birth,
through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp.
But the agent which brought the angels into existence, namely, God,
cannot be the cause of sin. Consequently it cannot be said that the devil
was wicked in the first instant of his creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is stated
that "the devil sins from the beginning," "he is not to be thought of as
sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning
of sin": that is to say, because he never went back from his sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of
the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken as
according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi,
15), that "He alone could discern light and darkness, Who also could
foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an angel
could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same reason does
not hold good of sin; as has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: God did not distinguish between the angels before the
turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in
grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them at once
placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their
preceding merit; and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude
which they had merited.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the
angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there was some interval between the angel's
creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezech. 28:15): "Thou didst walk
perfect [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire;
thou wast perfect . . .'] in thy ways from the day of thy creation until
iniquity was found in thee." But since walking is continuous movement, it
requires an interval. Therefore there was some interval between the
devil's creation and his fall.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that "the serpent of old
did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly"; which refers to
his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant
of his creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel.
But there was some delay between man's formation and his sin. Therefore,
for the like reason there was some interval between the devil's formation
and his sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from
the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle time between
every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his creation
and his fall.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44): "He stood not in
the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must
understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not
remain in it."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more
probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the
Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his
creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act
of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was
created in grace; as we have said (Q[62], A[3]). For since the angels
attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said above (Q[62], A[5]),
if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at
once have received beatitude after that first instant, if he had not
placed an impediment by sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace, or
that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant, then
there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his
creation and fall.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous
movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured by
time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the movement of
free-will tending towards good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the first
walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in which he
was not wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will after once choosing;
consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a natural
movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude, he
would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man; and therefore
the argument does not hold good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time between every
two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved Phys. vi,
text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the heavenly movement,
which is primarily measured by continuous time, time is taken to mean the
succession of their mental acts, or of their affections. So the first
instant in the angels is understood to respond to the operation of the
angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge
because on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morning. This
operation was good in them all. From such operation some of them were
converted to the praise of the Word by their morning knowledge while
others, absorbed in themselves, became night, "swelling up with pride,"
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act was common
to them all; but in their second they were separated. Consequently they
were all of them good in the first instant; but in the second the good
were set apart from the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was
not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14): "Thou wast a
cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain
of God." Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of the
Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Therefore, the highest
angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it might
attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels sinned, it
follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature
which is unfitting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much
the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is, so much
the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he
turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the angel who sinned
was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief angel
who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in
brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the
proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels we
consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were less
likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the
terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the
Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6,7; x, 9,10,11).
For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons
were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' the intellectual substances
which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of "demons" the
intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the
order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith;
because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the
angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is
nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set
aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher
bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of
angels; yet in that order some of them remained good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in
the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said (A[2]),
the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is excellence, which
was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory says that he who sinned
was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view:
because the angels' sin did not come of any proneness, but of free choice
alone. Consequently that argument seems to have the more weight which is
drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the
other view; because there might be some motive for sinning in him also
who was the chief of the lower angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," while
"Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire."
Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with
mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity, which is
incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is
called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those who
sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end of both;
and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, and
punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual creature, when it
sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted
creature; because the intellectual creature was so made by God, that it
lies within its own will to act for its end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: However great was the inclination towards good in the
highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently it
was in his power not to follow it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause
of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect. But, as
Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time.
Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others' sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was shown
above (A[2]). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to
excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior;
and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be
subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin of one angel
would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he had induced them
to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear that the sin of the
highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another
against God, than to wish to be over another against God; because there
is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel
was the cause of the others sinning, in that he induced them to subject
themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply
than the highest one; which is contrary to a gloss on Ps. 103:26: "This
dragon which Thou hast formed---He who was the more excellent than the
rest in nature, became the greater in malice." Therefore the sin of the
highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the dragon "drew" with him
"the third part of the stars of heaven."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others
sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of
exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are
subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord's words: "Go
[Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was
prepared for the devil and his angels" (Mt. 25:41). For the order of
Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil
suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to (2
Pt. 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the
sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel needs no
delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who requires
deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal speech in order to
exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it is evident that even
man begins to speak in the very instant when he takes thought; and in the
last instant of speech, another who catches his meaning can assent to
what is said; as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts,
"which everyone accepts directly they are heard" [*Boethius, De Hebdom.].
Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is
required in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel expressed
his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to
consent thereto.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather be subject
to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to
an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an
inferior which he cannot under a superior. Consequently it was not
against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by
yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have him as their prince and
leader, so that they might attain their ultimate beatitude of their own
natural powers; especially because in the order of nature they were even
then subject to the highest angel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As was observed above (Q[62], A[6]), an angel has nothing
in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is moved to
whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently since the highest
angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin
with intenser energy, and therefore he became the greater in malice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm. For, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but good is in
few."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men
and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than good;
according to Eccles. 1:15: "The number of fools is infinite." Therefore
for the same reason it is so with the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons and
orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it would appear
that those who sinned were not from all the orders.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (4 Kgs. 6:16): "There are more with us than
with them": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us to aid
us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is
contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the
natural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its
effects either always, or more often than not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom
evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are known
to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason, which good
is known to the few. In the angels there is only an intellectual nature;
hence the argument does not hold.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[63] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to those who hold that the chief devil belonged
to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly affairs, it is
evident that some of every order did not fall, but only those of the
lowest order. According to those who maintain that the chief devil was of
the highest order, it is probable that some fell of every order; just as
men are taken up into every order to supply for the angelic ruin. In this
view the liberty of free-will is more established; which in every degree
of creature can be turned to evil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the
names of some orders, as of Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to
demons; since they are derived from the ardor of love and from God's
indwelling, which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of
Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities are attributed to them; because
these names are derived from knowledge and from power, which can be
common to both good and bad.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] Out. Para. 1/1
THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons;
under which heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of their darkness of intellect;
(2) Of their obstinacy of will;
(3) Of their grief;
(4) Of their place of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the demons' intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge
of all truth?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by being
deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For it they knew any truth at
all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to know separated
substances. But this is not in keeping with their unhappiness: for this
seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as that some writers have
assigned as man's last happiness the knowledge of the separated
substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all knowledge of truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be
specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same is
not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of our
intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes from the
weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the sun. But
the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of Himself, because He
is the sovereign truth; and this is because they are not clean of heart,
whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can they know other
things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the proper
knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and evening. But the
demons have no morning knowledge, because they do not see things in the
Word; nor have they the evening knowledge, because this evening
knowledge refers the things known to the Creator's praise (hence, after
"evening" comes "morning" [Gn. 1]). Therefore the demons can have no
knowledge of things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the
kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei xi).
But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: "for if they had known it,
they would never have crucified the Lord of glory," as is said 1 Cor.
2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of all other
knowledge of truth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either naturally,
as we know first principles; or by deriving it from someone else, as we
know by learning; or by long experience, as the things we learn by
discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth by their own nature,
because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33), the good angels are
separated from them as light is from darkness; and every manifestation is
made through light, as is said Eph. 5:13. In like manner they cannot
learn by revelation, nor by learning from the good angels: because "there
is no fellowship of light with darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath .
. ?']" (2 Cor. 6:14). Nor can they learn by long experience: because
experience comes of the senses. Consequently there is no knowledge of
truth in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts were
bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at all, but
remain entire and most brilliant." Now, the knowledge of truth stands
among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some knowledge of truth
in them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes of
nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of grace
is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when Divine
secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective, and
produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the gift of
wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor
lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the angel,
who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on account
of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn from his
nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural powers, as a
man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or of something
else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the natural gifts
remain entire in them. Consequently their natural knowledge was not
diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however, which comes of grace,
and consists in speculation, has not been utterly taken away from them,
but lessened; because, of these Divine secrets only so much is revealed
to them as is necessary; and that is done either by means of the angels,
or "through some temporal workings of Divine power," as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in the same degree as to the holy angels,
to whom many more things are revealed, and more fully, in the Word
Himself. But of the third knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are
utterly deprived.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Happiness consists in self-application to something higher.
The separated substances are above us in the order of nature; hence man
can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated substances,
although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the first substance,
namely, God. But it is quite natural for one separate substance to know
another; as it is natural for us to know sensible natures. Hence, as
man's happiness does not consist in knowing sensible natures; so neither
does the angel's happiness consist in knowing separated substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us by
its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely because our
intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine substance
surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, but even of the
angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own nature know God's
substance. Yet on account of the perfection of his intellect he can of
his nature have a higher knowledge of God than man can have. Such
knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although they do not possess
the purity which comes with grace, nevertheless they have purity of
nature; and this suffices for the knowledge of God which belongs to them
from their nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with the excellence
of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's knowledge in its own
nature is called "evening" knowledge. For the evening is akin to
darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the light fails utterly,
then it is night. So then the knowledge of things in their own nature,
when referred to the praise of the Creator, as it is in the good angels,
has something of the Divine light, and can be called evening knowledge;
but if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the demons, it is
not called evening, but "nocturnal" knowledge. Accordingly we read in Gn.
1:5 that the darkness, which God separated from the light, "He called
night."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the very beginning
respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its completion in
Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were beatified by the
vision of the Word, which vision the demons never had. Yet all the angels
did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence the demons much less fully
understood the mystery of the Incarnation, when Christ was in the world.
For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 21), "It was not manifested
to them as it was to the holy angels, who enjoy a participated eternity
of the Word; but it was made known by some temporal effects, so as to
strike terror into them." For had they fully and certainly known that He
was the Son of God and the effect of His passion, they would never have
procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first of all by the
subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by privation of
the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their
intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the holy angels; for
while not agreeing with them in conformity of will, they do agree,
nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual nature, according to
which they can accept what is manifested by others: thirdly, they know by
long experience; not as deriving it from the senses; but when the
similitude of their innate intelligible species is completed in
individual things, they know some things as present, which they
previously did not know would come to pass, as we said when dealing with
the knowledge of the angels (Q[57], A[3], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate in
evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual being,
which nature remains in the demons, as we said above (A[1]). But liberty
of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than to evil.
Therefore the demons' will is not so obstinate in evil as not to be able
to return to what is good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than the
demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the malice of
sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy. Therefore the
demons can likewise return from their state of malice to the state of
justice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then their
will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they fell. But that
sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the motive for the sin
no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore the demon is not
obstinate in malice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated by
another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed already
(Q[63], A[8]), the lower demons fell through the highest one. Therefore
their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they are not
obstinate in malice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any good
work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses the truth,
saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God" (Mk. 1:24).
"The demons" also "believe and tremble" (Jm. 2:19). And Dionysius
observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what is good and best, which
is, to be, to live, to understand." Therefore they are not obstinate in
malice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that hate
Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the demons.
Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that every
will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to good and
evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union of
the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of true beatitude,
because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude;
hence it is termed "life everlasting." It is also contrary to the
authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that demons and wicked men
shall be sent "into everlasting punishment," and the good brought "into
everlasting life." Consequently such an opinion must be considered
erroneous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be held firmly both
that the will of the good angels is confirmed in good, and that the will
of the demons is obstinate in evil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of the
sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to men, what the fall is to the angels."
Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are
pardonable before death; whereas after death they are without remission
and endure for ever.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind
that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the
apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For the
sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks the
universal good, as was said above (Q[59], A[1]); as also the sense
apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers universals.
Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this respect, that the
angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably
first principles which are the object of the habit of "intelligence";
whereas man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one
consideration to another; and having the way open by which he may proceed
to either of two opposites. Consequently man's will adheres to a thing
movably, and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the
opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly and immovably.
Therefore, if his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely
adhere either to this or to its opposite (namely, in such things as he
does not will naturally); but after he has once adhered, he clings
immovably. So it is customary to say that man's free-will is flexible to
the opposite both before and after choice; but the angel's free-will is
flexible either opposite before the choice, but not after. Therefore the
good angels who adhered to justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the
wicked ones, sinning, are obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of
the obstinacy of men who are damned (SP, Q[98], AA[1], 2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but according to
the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But such as
are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and are not
delivered by the Divine mercy.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him according to
desire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he
desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder, and
wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him;
nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would he
had done it, or still would do it if he could.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion, is not
the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable. Consequently the argument
does not hold good.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will; and
this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's part is
always wicked; because, although at times he does something good, yet he
does not do it well; as when he tells the truth in order to deceive; and
when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly, but compelled by the
evidence of things. Another kind of act is natural to the demon; this can
be good and bears witness to the goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even
such good acts to evil purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is sorrow in the demons?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For since
sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same
subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against
the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: "The devil has power
over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this
sinister power." Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things cause fear
while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are present. But
there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24, "Who was made to
fear no one." Therefore there is no grief in the demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the demons
can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least for the
evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man is
punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according
to Apoc. 18:7, "As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in
delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." Consequently much
more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, because he
especially glorified himself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are
passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the
sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According,
however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the
demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because sorrow,
as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the resistance
of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is evident that the
demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others to be,
which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish others to be damned, who
are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in them: and
especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be
repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of happiness, which
they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed in many respects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but not
about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man from being
sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so far as sorrow
and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not merely in different
things, but even in one and the same thing, there can be something that
we will, and something that we will not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so also
there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He was made to fear
no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God which restrains from
sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the devils believe and tremble"
(James 2:19).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin bears
witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin is opposed.
But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, for the evil of sin on
account of the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of nature, to
which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow for good lost by punishment, is the witness to
a good nature." Consequently, since the demon has a perverse and
obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our atmosphere is the demons' place of punishment?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons' place of
punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual nature is
not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of punishment for
demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But man's
place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the demons'
place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome atmosphere.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire. But there
is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome atmosphere
is not the place of punishment for the demons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the
darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment day."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand midway between God
and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it procures
the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But man's
welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of all,
directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil; and
this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,
indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against
opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be
brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be of
service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of punishment
is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this is hell; and
another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the darksome
atmosphere is their due place of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment
day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons
endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us here;
and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial: although some
of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they have led astray;
just as some of the good angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But
after the judgment day all the wicked, both men and angels, will be in
hell, and the good in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting the
nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it: because
the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to
its will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of nature, as
the demons are over men in the order of nature; consequently there is no
parallel.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons and
souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude of the
saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this is
erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:1): "If
our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have a house in
heaven." Others, again, while not admitting the same of souls, admit it
as to demons. But it is better to say that the same judgment is passed
upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good souls and good
angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[64] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs to
the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their coming
to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the same way as
we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is not actually
sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said, that although the
demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell while they are in
this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment is none the less;
because they know that such confinement is their due. Hence it is said in
a gloss upon James 3:6: "They carry fire of hell with them wherever they
go." Nor is this contrary to what is said (Lk. 8:31), "They besought the
Lord not to cast them into the abyss"; for they asked for this, deeming
it to be a punishment for them to be cast out of a place where they could
injure men. Hence it is stated, "They [Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He
would not expel them [Vulg. 'him'] out of the country" (Mk. 5:10).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] Out. Para. 1/2
TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ[65]-74)
THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)
From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of
corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture makes
mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as given in
the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"; the work of
distinction as given in the words, "He divided the light from the
darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters
that are under the firmament"; and the work of adornment, expressed thus,
"Let there be lights in the firmament."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] Out. Para. 2/2
First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work
of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
(2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?
(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels?
(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from
God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God. For it
is said (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which God hath
made, continue for ever." But visible bodies do not continue for ever,
for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): "The things which are seen are temporal,
but the things which are not seen are eternal." Therefore God did not
make visible bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all things that He had
made, and they were very good." But corporeal creatures are evil, since
we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the
sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil, in so far as it
is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but
leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the
Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): "While we look not at the things which are seen."
Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145:6): "Who made heaven and earth, the
sea, and all things that are in them."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not
created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof of
their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), "The god of this world
hath blinded the minds of unbelievers." But this position is altogether
untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point, there must be
some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be
united of themselves. Hence whenever in different things some one thing
common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive
that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot
receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all
things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one
principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have
their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and
corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this world, not as having
created it, but because worldlings serve him, of whom also the Apostle
says, speaking in the same sense, "Whose god is their belly" (Phil. 3:19).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All the creatures of God in some respects continue for
ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be
annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature
approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For
corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though
they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible
creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are mutable
in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly bodies; or
the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's words, "The
things which are seen are temporal," though true even as regards such
things considered in themselves (in so far as every visible creature is
subject to time, either as to being or as to movement), are intended to
apply to visible things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards.
For such rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal; while
those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor.
4:17): "It worketh for us . . . an eternal weight of glory."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good,
though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the
consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities,
though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate
things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can
derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply
evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one
person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same
thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And this could
not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but
lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20). If, then, they
withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly.
Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): "Creatures are turned into a snare to the
feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us
from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish
away from God except by the allurements of some good that they have from
Him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account
of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God "created all
things that they might be." Therefore all things were created for their
own being's sake, and not on account of God's goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the greater
good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual creatures are
related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser.
Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual
creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the
unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God must
precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by
God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all inequality
results from the different movements of free-will. Now, corporeal
creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the former were
made on account of movements of free-will, and not on account of God's
goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all things
for Himself."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal
creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in
punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God
in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature;
but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and,
according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a
lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and
became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of
their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the first place,
because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the
production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, "God saw that
it was good" (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being
for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen's
opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it
should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly,
because it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the
corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun's body was
made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some
sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual
creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun
had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so of
other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we
must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the entire
universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its
parts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that
whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the sake
of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly, that less
honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the
intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all parts are for
the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts
are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, the whole man is
on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God. So,
therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for
its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as
those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man,
whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire
universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is
ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and
shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable
creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their
end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and
loving Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all
corporeal things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it
represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that God
created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He
created them for His own goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end.
Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the sake
of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of God's
goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since
equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But this
does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an
architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in different
parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the
stones, but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire
building, which could not be obtained except by the different positions
of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to secure perfection in
the universe, has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures,
according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of
merit is presupposed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of
the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by God
through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed by the
Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps. 103:24
"Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to wisdom to
ordain," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence in
the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain
fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the
production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be
produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since
like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual and
corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity
in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God than another.
But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that some things are
corruptible because they are far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii,
text. 59).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite
effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be, and
was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike
beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible:
especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature,
unless it be in punishment of a fault.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These,
therefore, were produced immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God by
degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him
immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the
production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since
the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which
matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being the
imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that
anything should be created, save by God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the
more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the
underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which
informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living,
living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one
thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from a
higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs
properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary
cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing
produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the
production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed
either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create
except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order to show
that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said: "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the production of things an order exists, but not such
that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible; but
rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in
creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and
different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature, as
has been shown above (Q[15], A[2]); so that by His wisdom He is the cause
of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by apprehending
diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by
the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one and the same
thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But
the production of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as
existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can belong to no
creature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For
Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without matter come the
forms that are in matter." But forms that are without matter are
spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of
bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that
which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms
essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation.
Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual
substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than
the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things here
below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption.
Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from spiritual
substances.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not suppose
that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather
that it obeys God thus." But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve
that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not from
the angels, but from God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are
derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there
are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the forms
of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms immaterially
subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that there exists an
immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such
the individual sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as
in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these
separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or as he calls it,
"participation" (Phaedo xlix). And, according to the Platonists, the
order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for
example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and
the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or "per se"
life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above
this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of
all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that
the forms of corporeal things do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in
the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the
intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but
"angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of
his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This
theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times,
who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed
corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact,
sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought
into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves,
what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite." Now, such are the
forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another
exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but by reason
of the generation or corruption of the "composite"; since even forms have
not being, but composites have being through forms: for, according to a
thing's mode of being, is the mode in which it is brought into being.
Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause
of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is
composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms,
therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but
by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite
agent. But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a
created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it
follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual
substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement.
And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as
it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as
the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal creatures no
transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and
accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came
immediately form God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper
cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with the words, "God
said, Let this thing be," or "that," to denote the formation of all
things by the Word of God, from Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i.
in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is "all form and fitness and concord of
parts."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of
things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): "By faith
we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from
invisible things visible things might be made." But if by immaterial
forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material
forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to
self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but
either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which they
proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine
intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things,
that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[65] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by
emanation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] Out. Para. 1/1
ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of
creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under the
first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its
formation?
(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?
(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with
formless matter?
(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its
formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): "The earth was void and empty," or
"invisible and shapeless," according to another version [*Septuagint]; by
which is understood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says
(Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it received its
form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God, as a
secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of nature
formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine
working.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part of
substance. But God can effect that accident exist without substance, as
in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist
without form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent.
But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him (Dt.
32:4): "The works of God are perfect." Therefore the work of His creation
was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal creatures
was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is opposed to
distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore, formlessness
preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that at the
beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the
corporeal creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for
instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter
was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order
of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose (In
Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that formlessness of
matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem
mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for Augustine
takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the others. In
his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we thus understand it
we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to
its formation or to its distinction. As to formation, the argument is
clear. For it formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed;
for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being in
act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but
without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act,
which is a contradiction in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed
some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that
distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient
natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some
corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate
substance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be changed;
for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial being, and made
some particular thing to be, it would result that the supervening form
would not simply make an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is
the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would
be merely accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we
must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor
under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the
formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary
matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not precede in
time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as
Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the
part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness,
not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and
comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly
they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in
duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine
agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be
shown later (Q[69], A[1]; Q[74], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty
was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to be
without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent
body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that "darkness was upon
the fact of the deep." And the earth lacked beauty in two ways: first,
that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so
we read that "the earth was void," or "invisible," inasmuch as the waters
covered and concealed it from view; secondly, that which it derives from
being adorned by herbs and plants, for which reason it is called "empty,"
or, according to another reading [*Septuagint], "shapeless"---that is,
unadorned. Thus after mention of two created natures, the heaven and the
earth, the formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words,
"darkness was upon the face of the deep," since the air is included under
heaven; and the formlessness of the earth, by the words, "the earth was
void and empty."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The word earth is taken differently in this passage by
Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words
"earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is signified
on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea of such
matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the similitude of
well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in speaking of it,
calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they should think it to
be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so far a
likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and to water in its
adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is
said to be "void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," that matter is
known by means of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called
"invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is completed by form; thus
Plato says that matter is "place" [*Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys.
iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of
earth, and we have said (A[1]) how, in this sense, the earth was,
according to them, without form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality;
and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede
act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act
out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a perfect thing in an
instant, according to the greatness of His power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act;
whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence it
is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than for
accident to be without subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/3
In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if,
according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the
informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part,
but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the
disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 3/3
In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient
natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction;
except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and
without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy Scripture
enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being that of the
heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction is expressed,
as will be shown later (A[3]; Q[68], A[1]). This is signified by the
words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." The second
distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to their forms,
since both earth and water are named. That air and fire are not mentioned
by name is due to the fact that the corporeal nature of these would not
be so evident as that of earth and water, to the ignorant people to whom
Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be
signified by the words, "Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for
air, and considered that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held
heaven to be composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii,
11). But Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato,
says that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire
does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to
hold to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God"
Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the
waters," not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will may be
said to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The
third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under
the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of
darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words: "Darkness
was upon the face of the deep." The remaining distinctions will appear
from what follows (Q[71]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is
the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two things Thou
hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says that the latter
was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says, the matter of
all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the matter of all
corporeal things is the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): "Things that
are one in genus are one in matter." But all corporeal things are in the
same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and the
same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the same form,
corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in potentiality.
But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter considered in itself is
the same in all corporeal things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually
interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener. i,
text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each other
mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have
differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are
of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements have
one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption prove, it
followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the
incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not to the
condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he
represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: "By your own nature you are
subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My will
is more powerful than the link that binds you together." But this theory
Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of
bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural movement,
different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a
different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which is proper to
the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the
elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards:
so, therefore, the heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the
elemental bodies have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and
corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are
corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of this
difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity
of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed,
if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the other forms that
distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this argument would
necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter
immutably and so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption
would then be merely accidental through the disappearance of successive
forms---that is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but
partial, since a being in act would subsist under the transient form.
Thus the ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of
bodies was some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no
form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath
generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of
corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it
is in itself, is in potentiality to form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all
those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is in
act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all
other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect
than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For
potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and
imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a
perfect form, and "vice versa." Matter, therefore, whilst existing under
the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form
of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it
has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which
is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies
corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature
corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same
matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines,
that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven---beings in
potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its form
is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it is
impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be act
and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside, then, in
thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with motive power,
if the heavenly body is not something having form---that is, something
composed of a form and the subject of that form---it follows that in its
totality it is form and act. But every such thing is something actually
understood, which the heavenly bodies are not, being sensible. It
follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly bodies, considered in
itself, is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually
possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to inquire whether this
is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in
such a way that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to
being, but only to place, as Aristotle [*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So,
then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the
same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the character of
potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato, who does
not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter is one with
the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal
creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense, corruptible and
incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on account of their
different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26.
Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of all bodies,
since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same in all
bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are
distinguished, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As potentiality is directed towards act, potential beings
are differentiated by their different acts, as sight is by color, hearing
by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is
different from that of the elemental, because the matter of the celestial
is not in potentiality to an elemental form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless
matter?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at the
same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything at all,
must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable, and the
empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement would be
ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not the case.
The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with
formless matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the lower bodies
are governed by the higher in a certain order." If, therefore, the
empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise
some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be the case,
especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for one body cannot
move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven
was not created together with formless matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of
contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the contrary,
Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "In so far as we mentally apprehend
eternal things, so far are we not of this world"; from which it is clear
that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world.
Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly
transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. There
exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or
crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, it must
be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be
constantly illuminated, and there would be no night. Therefore the
empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," heaven denotes not the visible firmament, but
the empyrean or fiery heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of
Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect,
namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede
say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil [*Hom.
ii. in Hexaem.] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the lowest
darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond
this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest." But they
differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and
Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament, which
they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made, not in
the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given by Basil
is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His first work, as
the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of the Old
Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not very
cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made on the
second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by other
holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained according to
Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness,
signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but by origin.
According to others, however, since darkness is no creature, but a
privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it
created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and
afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn
from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold
glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body
to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the
spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness
of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was
fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some
beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the very outset
from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as
the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So,
then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat,
but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the
angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air, the latter the
ether, or empyrean. But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known
as sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal,
taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle
understands it, swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much
has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained
an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present state
of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is secured by
the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is finally
consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must have been
from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the
empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does not
influence inferior bodies of another order---those, namely, that are
directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that it
does influence bodies that are moved, though itself motionless, just as
angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra, Q[112], A[3]], influence
those of lower degree who act as messengers, though they themselves are
not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may
be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the
first heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that comes and
goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature,
as the power of conservation or causation, or something of the kind
pertaining to dignity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as
necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond to
that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: "The
ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual
dwelling in light and joy."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): "It is certain that the
heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently
strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses. On this
account it darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself
is lit up being shut out from that region. "But since the body of the
firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that it does not exclude
light (as is clear from the fact that we can see the stars through the
intervening heavens), we may also say that the empyrean has light, not
condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle
nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere
natural brightness.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously with
formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two
things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal
matter, and the angelic nature. "Therefore time was not created with
formless matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning
there was neither day nor night, for these began when "God divided the
light from the darkness. "Therefore in the beginning time was not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement; and the
firmament is said to have been made on the second day. Therefore in the
beginning time was not.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be reckoned
among the first things created, rather than time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so
is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the
things first created.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both spiritual and
corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were
these four---the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal
matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the
opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things
as first created---the angelic nature and corporeal matter---making no
mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two, namely, the angelic nature
and formless matter, precede the formation, by nature only, and not by
duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede
movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be included among them. But
the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that
the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view
postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for
otherwise there would be no such measure.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the
angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some
measure formless before it received its full form, so time was in a
manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and
night.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately
from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of
the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind.
For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's
movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first
movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for
everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted
that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at
least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind:
while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing
else than "the measure of priority and succession in movement."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned those
which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among these
time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not
movement, which is related only to the movable subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[66] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this
being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to
things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as
not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we
cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] Out. Para. 1/2
ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the work
of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly the work
of the third day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of
spiritual things?
(2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?
(3) Whether light is a quality?
(4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the word "light" is used in its proper sense in speaking of
spiritual things?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that "light" is used in its proper sense in
spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that "in
spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not called
Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the former is to be
taken literally, and the latter metaphorically."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the
intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper sense
in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in
spiritual matters.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made manifest
is light." But to be made manifest belongs more properly to spiritual
things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that "Splendor" is among
those things which are said of God metaphorically.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways---that is to say, either
in its original application or in its more extended meaning. This is
clearly shown in the word "sight," originally applied to the act of the
sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the
senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the
other senses. Thus we say, "Seeing how it tastes," or "smells," or
"burns. "Further, sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the
intellect, as in those words: "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they
shall see God" (Mt. 5:8). And thus it is with the word light. In its
primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of
sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to
cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is taken in its strict and
primary meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to
spiritual things, as Ambrose says (De Fide ii). But if taken in its
common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it
may properly be applied to spiritual things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has been
said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether light is a body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among bodies."Therefore
light is a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is a
species of fire." But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection, belong
properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and its rays.
Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) are
united and separated, which seems impossible unless they are bodies.
Therefore light is a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same place simultaneously.
But this is the case with light and air. Therefore light is not a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons. First,
on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different from
that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any two
bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place;
since contiguity requires distinction of place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its
diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement of
a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place to
another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the end:
whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be argued
that the time required is too short to be perceived; for though this may
be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in distances so great as
that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as the sun is at
the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end to end. It must
also be borne in mind on the part of movement that whereas all bodies
have their natural determinate movement, that of light is indifferent as
regards direction, working equally in a circle as in a straight line.
Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local movement of
a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a
body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence of
the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter would
receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a body,
this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from what
matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the intervening
hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a body of so great a bulk
is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And should anyone reply
that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves around with the sun,
we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is obscured by the
intervening object the whole room is darkened? It is not that the light
is condensed round the candle when this is done, since it burns no more
brightly then than it burned before.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but to
common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act---in
other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own
proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in earthly
matter is "burning coal." Nor must too much attention be paid to the
instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he merely
mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All these properties are assigned to light metaphorically,
and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because movement
from place to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is
proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to local movement in
speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For even the word
distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place, to that of all
contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether light is a quality?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every quality
remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality be
removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light does
not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn. Therefore
light is not a quality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is
opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case with
light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light therefore is
not a sensible quality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the light of
the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly bodies,
and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by making them actually
visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a substantial
or spiritual form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a
species of quality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Some writers have said that the light in the air has not
a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an intentional
being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot be the case
for two reasons. First, because light gives a name to the air, since by
it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not do this, for we
do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly, because light produces
natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and
natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions. Others have
said that light is the sun's substantial form, but this also seems
impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms are not of
themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what
a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible
of itself. In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the
substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another;
since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species:
wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the
species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were,
the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be
the substantial form of the sun.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the
substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on the
substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself
luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays of
different stars produce different effects according to the diverse
natures of bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the mode
in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode differs in
which a subject receives a substantial form. For when matter receives its
form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the form are firm and
enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted into fire. When,
however, substantial form is received imperfectly, so as to be, as it
were, in process of being received, rather than fully impressed, the
consequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent; as may be seen
when water which has been heated returns in time to its natural state.
But light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, as though
matter were in receipt of a substantial form, and light were a certain
inception of substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the
disappearance of its active cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary, forasmuch
as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of change,
which is itself removed from contrariety.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an
instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does light act
instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards producing
substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually visible,
inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the production of light is not fittingly
assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above (A[3]), is a
quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should have, not the
first, but a subordinate place. The production of light, then, ought not
to be assigned to the first day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and this
is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made on the
fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been on the
first day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular movement
of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an attribute of the
firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second day.
Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, ought not to
be assigned to the first day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken of, it
may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the darkness.
But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the demons were
in the beginning good, as has been shown (Q[63], A[5]). Therefore the
production of light ought not to be assigned to the first day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That without which there could not be day, must have
been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light.
Therefore light must have been made on the first day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, There are two opinions as to the production of light.
Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not have
fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and
therefore when we read, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth,"
a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the word
"heaven," and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the word
"earth." And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of higher
dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual nature
is signified by the production of light, that is to say, of spiritual
light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment
whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 2/5
Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was
purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [*Hom. i in
Hexaem.] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of time
which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or angelic
creation is passed over, as created beforehand.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 3/5
Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes.] gives as a reason for the omission that
Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things alone
appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of
idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken
to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal
creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship, since they were
prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and stars, which was
forbidden them (Dt. 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 4/5
But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the
corporeal creature. One is where we read that "the earth was void and
empty," and another where it is said that "darkness was upon the face of
the deep." Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the
formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production
of light. In the first place because light is a quality of the first
body, as was stated (A[3]), and thus by means of light it was fitting
that the world should first receive its form. The second reason is
because light is a common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and
celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from general principles,
so do we in work of every kind. For the living thing is generated before
the animal, and the animal before the man, as is shown in De Gener. Anim.
ii, 3. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that
among the works of distinction the production of light should take first
place, since light is a form of the primary body, and because it is more
common quality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 5/5
Basil [*Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all other
things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth, already
touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless light exists,
which was made therefore on the first day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to the opinion of those who hold that the
formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be held
to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms, afterwards
receiving those that are accidental, among which light holds the first
place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a kind
of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this returned to
the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot well be
maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture records the
institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to endure. We
cannot, then, say that what was made at that time afterwards ceased to
exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in
existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be indistinguishable.
But this is as much as to say that it is superfluous, whereas none of
God's works have been made in vain. On this account it is held by some
that the sun's body was made out of this nebula. This, too, is impossible
to those at least who believe that the sun is different in its nature
from the four elements, and naturally incorruptible. For in that case its
matter cannot take on another form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the light was the
sun's light, formless as yet, being already the solar substance, and
possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was afterwards
added the special and determinative power required to produce determinate
effects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a triple distinction
was made between light and darkness. First, as to the cause, forasmuch as
in the substance of the sun we have the cause of light, and in the opaque
nature of the earth the cause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for in
one hemisphere there was light, in the other darkness. Thirdly, as to
time; because there was light for one and darkness for another in the
same hemisphere; and this is signified by the words, "He called the light
day, and the darkness night."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day and night were
then caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather than by
movement. But Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there was
no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction since there
were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for whose service
this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous body seem to admit
of the withdrawal of light, so long as the body is actually present;
though this might be effected by a miracle. As to this, however,
Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the first founding of the
order of nature we must not look for miracles, but for what is in
accordance with nature. We hold, then, that the movement of the heavens
is twofold. Of these movements, one is common to the entire heaven, and
is the cause of day and night. This, as it seems, had its beginning on
the first day. The other varies in proportion as it affects various
bodies, and by its variations is the cause of the succession of days,
months, and years. Thus it is, that in the account of the first day the
distinction between day and night alone is mentioned; this distinction
being brought about by the common movement of the heavens. The further
distinction into successive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun on
the fourth day, in the words, "let them be for seasons, and for days, and
years" is due to proper movements.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[67] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,15),
formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must understand
the production of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures,
not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in which they were not
created, but with the perfection of grace, which they possessed from
their creation as said above (Q[62], A[3]). Thus the division of light
from darkness will denote the distinction of the spiritual creature from
other created things as yet without form. But if all created things
received their form at the same time, the darkness must be held to mean
the spiritual darkness of the wicked, not as existing from the beginning
but such as God foresaw would exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] Out. Para. 1/1
ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day?
(2) Whether there are waters above the firmament?
(3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?
(4) Whether there is more than one heaven?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the firmament was made on the second day?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the firmament was not made on the second day.
For it is said (Gn. 1:8): "God called the firmament heaven." But the
heaven existed before days, as is clear from the words, "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth." Therefore the firmament was not made on
the second day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to the
order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine wisdom to make
afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the firmament
naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are mentioned before
the formation of light, which was on the first day. Therefore the
firmament was not made on the second day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of
matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been
formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to
generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on the
second day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): "God said: let there be a
firmament," and further on (verse 8); "And the evening and morning were
the second day."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 1/8
I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to
observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first is, to
hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since
Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should
adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready
to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy
Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be
placed to their believing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 2/8
We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as made
on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be
understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is
necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some of
these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the
opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the
firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so
to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament to be
of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but
being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who
held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the heaven is
not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body,
existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel.
i, text. 6,32).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 3/8
According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted
that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day. For
it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the
elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to
give forms to the elements that pre-exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 4/8
But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on the
second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to whom
the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of
fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at
least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded
in time its formation, since the first form received by matter is the
elemental.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 5/8
Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the
firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle,
seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas the
firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not susceptible
of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of matter existing
antecedently in time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 6/8
Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of
creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day,
according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the
light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and
afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 7/8
If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural
order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in
time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one
of the opinions given above, that the substantial formation of the
firmament belongs to the second day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] Body Para. 8/8
Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was
made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but the part
of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has received
the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air. "For a body
is called firm," that is dense and solid, "thereby differing from a
mathematical body" as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). If,
then, this explanation is adopted none of these opinions will be found
repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), recommends
it thus: "I consider this view of the question worthy of all
commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and
believed."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses
prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in the
words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and then proceeds
to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as one might say:
"This house was constructed by that builder," and then add: "First, he
laid the foundations, then built the walls, and thirdly, put on the
roof." In accepting this explanation we are, therefore, not bound to hold
that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," and when we read that the firmament was made
on the second day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning is
not the same as that made on the second day; and there are several senses
in which this may be understood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 9) that
the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the formless spiritual
nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the corporeal heaven.
According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the heaven made on the first
day is the empyrean, and the firmament made on the second day, the starry
heaven. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) that of the first day
was spherical in form and without stars, the same, in fact, that the
philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth sphere, and the primary
movable body that moves with diurnal movement: while by the firmament
made on the second day he understands the starry heaven. According to
another theory, touched upon by Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 1] the
heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven, and the firmament
made on the second day was that region of the air where the clouds are
collected, which is also called heaven, but equivocally. And to show that
the word is here used in an equivocal sense, it is expressly said that
"God called the firmament heaven"; just as in a preceding verse it said
that "God called the light day" (since the word "day" is also used to
denote a space of twenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use
occur, as pointed out by Rabbi Moses.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
The second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has
been already said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are waters above the firmament?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the firmament. For
water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not
upwards. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest on a
sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a sphere,
there cannot be water above it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, water is an element, and appointed to the generation of
composite bodies, according to the relation in which imperfect things
stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature have their place
upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that water would be
useless there. But none of God's works are useless. Therefore there are
not waters above the firmament.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:7): "(God) divided the waters that
were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, "These words of
Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect.
Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence,
we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there." As to the nature of
these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in Gen.) that the
waters that are above the firmament are "spiritual substances." Wherefore
it is written (Ps. 148:4): "Let the waters that are above the heavens
praise the name of the Lord," and (Dn. 3:60): "Ye waters that are above
the heavens, bless the Lord."To this Basil answers (Hom. iii in Hexaem.)
that these words do not mean that these waters are rational creatures,
but that "the thoughtful contemplation of them by those who understand
fulfils the glory of the Creator." Hence in the same context, fire, hail,
and other like creatures, are invoked in the same way, though no one
would attribute reason to these.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact nature
will be differently defined according as opinions on the firmament
differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as
being of the nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may be
believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the
elemental waters. But if by the firmament we understand the starry
heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four elements then
the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the
elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one heaven is called
empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendor: so this
other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its
transparence; and this heaven is above the starry heaven. Again, if the
firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still
be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the element
but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich.
i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide
waters from waters.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in
which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament must
rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised above a
part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to say, as
some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), that waters
resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry heaven, is a mere
absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the intervening region of
fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the tendency in light and
rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the moon, as
well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to rise even to the tops
of the higher mountains, all to go to show the impossibility of this. Nor
is it less absurd to say, in support of this opinion, that bodies may be
rarefied infinitely, since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied
or divided, but up to a certain point only.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by supposing
that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in its place
above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1),
however will not admit this solution, but says "It is our business here
to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His creatures, not how
far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way of miracle." We leave
this view, then, and answer that according to the last two opinions on
the firmament and the waters the solution appears from what has been
said. According to the first opinion, an order of the elements must be
supposed different from that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the
waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around
the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion to the respective
density of the earth and of the heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to be
signified.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The solution is clear from what has been said, according to
the last two opinions. But according to the first opinion, Basil gives
two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as
concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or convex, above.
Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist
outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and that this is the
crystalline heaven of some writers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to the third opinion given, the waters above the
firmament have been raised in the form of vapors, and serve to give rain
to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they are above the
heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This, according to some,
is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily revolution of the entire
heaven, whereby the continuance of generation is secured. In the same way
the starry heaven, by the zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby
different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the rising and
setting of the stars, and their various influences. But according to the
first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the
celestial bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved by
the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that are
above the firmament.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters from
waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have naturally
one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic. i, 6): "All
water is the same species." Water therefore cannot be distinct from water
by place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, should it be said that the waters above the firmament
differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be argued, on
the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing else to
distinguish them. If then, these waters differ in species, it is not the
firmament that distinguishes them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from
waters must be something which is in contact with them on either side, as
a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident that the
waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore the firmament
does not divide the waters from the waters.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): "Let there be a firmament made
amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from the waters."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might lead
to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain philosophers
of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite in dimension, and
the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the words, "Darkness was upon
the face of the deep," the word "deep" might be taken to mean the
infinite mass of water, understood as the principle of all other bodies.
These philosophers also taught that not all corporeal things are confined
beneath the heaven perceived by our senses, but that a body of water,
infinite in extent, exists above that heaven. On this view the firmament
of heaven might be said to divide the waters without from those
within---that is to say, from all bodies under the heaven, since they
took water to be the principle of them all.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it
cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be
considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of
condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as
are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by their
senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not evident to
all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been philosophers who
said that air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no
express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant persons
something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth
to those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words: "Darkness
was upon the face of the deep," the existence of air as attendant, so to
say, upon the water. For it may be understood from these words that over
the face of the water a transparent body was extended, the subject of
light and darkness, which, in fact, is the air.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the
cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the waters
from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter, or
any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated under the name of
waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from
the higher, and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the air,
where the rain and similar things are generated, from the lower part,
which is connected with the water and included under that name.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven, the
waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But if by the
firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both these waters
are of the same species, and two places are assigned to them, though not
for the same purpose, the higher being the place of their begetting, the
lower, the place of their repose.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If the waters are held to differ in species, the firmament
cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of their destruction,
but only as the boundary of each.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: On account of the air and other similar bodies being
invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water, and
thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the firmament,
whatever be the sense in which the word is used.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is only one heaven?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the heaven is
contrasted with the earth, in the words, "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth."But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only
one heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own matter,
must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher proves (De Coel.
i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is
predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there are more
heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only,
they could not properly be called many. If, then, they are many, there
must be some common notion by reason of which each is called heaven, but
this common notion cannot be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more
than one heaven.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:4): "Praise Him, ye heavens of
heavens."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion
between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is only one
heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words 'heavens of heavens' are
merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the word is
always used in the plural, just as in Latin there are many nouns that are
wanting in the singular. On the other hand, Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.),
whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth. ii), says that there are many
heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than real. For
Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole body that is above the earth
and the water, for which reason the birds that fly in the air are called
birds of heaven [*Ps. 8:9]. But since in this body there are many
distinct parts, Basil said that there are more heavens than one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Body Para. 2/6
In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be
borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense.
Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it
denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and
incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the first
is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the aqueous or
crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called the starry
heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided
into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the
other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are the spheres of
the planets.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Body Para. 3/6
In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that
participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and
luminosity, actual or potential. Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) holds
as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon's orb,
calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three heavens,
the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of which the
Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was "rapt
to the third heaven."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Body Para. 4/6
But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and in
each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region Rabanus
subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher region of
fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian heaven from a
lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he calls, from its
brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the aerial. When, therefore,
these four heavens are added to the three enumerated above, there are
seven corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Body Para. 5/6
Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this
name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most
High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words, "I
will ascend into heaven"; whereby the evil spirit is represented as
seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual
blessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all
good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so
signified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the words,
"Your reward is very great in heaven" (Mt. 5:12).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] Body Para. 6/6
Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and
intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to which
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) expounds Paul's rapture "to the third
heaven."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the centre of
a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have many
circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be many
heavens.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as it
denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it is one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[68] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of
luminosity, as appears from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] Out. Para. 1/1
ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) About the gathering together of the waters;
(2) About the production of plants.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should
take place, as recorded, on the third day?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering together
of the waters should take place on the third day. For what was made on
the first and second days is expressly said to have been "made" in the
words, "God said: Be light made," and "Let there be a firmament made."But
the third day is contradistinguished from the first and the second days.
Therefore the work of the third day should have been described as a
making not as a gathering together.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the
waters, wherefore it was described as "invisible" [*Q[66], A[1], OBJ[1]].
There was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be
gathered together.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot occupy
one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact, and
therefore all were not gathered together into one place.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement. But
the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea. In
their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by the
words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore the
imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded without
necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is necessary to reply differently to this question
according to the different interpretations given by Augustine and other
holy writers. In all these works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i,
15; iv, 22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no order of
duration, but only of origin and nature. He says that the formless
spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all, and
that the latter are at first indicated by the words "earth" and "water."
Not that this formlessness preceded formation, in time, but only in
origin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in duration, but
merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, to this order, the
formation of the highest or spiritual nature is recorded in the first
place, where it is said that light was made on the first day. For as the
spiritual nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are
nobler than the lower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies is
indicated in the second place, by the words, "Let there be made a
firmament," by which is to be understood the impression of celestial
forms on formless matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of
origin only. But in the third place the impression of elemental forms on
formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only.
Therefore the words, "Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry
land appear," mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the
substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with the
substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
According, however, to other holy writers [*Q[66], A[1]] an order of
duration in the works is to be understood, by which is meant that the
formlessness of matter precedes its formation, and one form another, in
order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the formlessness of
matter implies the total absence of form, since heaven, earth, and water
already existed, since these three are named as already clearly
perceptible to the senses; rather they understand by formlessness the
want of due distinction and of perfect beauty, and in respect of these
three Scripture mentions three kinds of formlessness. Heaven, the highest
of them, was without form so long as "darkness" filled it, because it was
the source of light. The formlessness of water, which holds the middle
place, is called the "deep," because, as Augustine says (Contr. Faust.
xxii, 11), this word signifies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly,
the formless state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is said
to be "void" or "invisible," because it was covered by the waters. Thus,
then, the formation of the highest body took place on the first day. And
since time results from the movement of the heaven, and is the numerical
measure of the movement of the highest body, from this formation,
resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night and day. On the
second day the intermediate body, water, was formed, receiving from the
firmament a sort of distinction and order (so that water be understood as
including certain other things, as explained above (Q[68], A[3])). On the
third day the earth, the lowest body, received its form by the withdrawal
of the waters, and there resulted the distinction in the lowest body,
namely, of land and sea. Hence Scripture, having clearly expresses the
manner in which it received its form by the equally suitable words, "Let
the dry land appear."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 7,8; iii, 20],
Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was made, as
it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher and spiritual
forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies, are perfect and stable
in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable. Hence the
impression of such forms is signified by the gathering of the waters, and
the appearing of the land. For "water," to use Augustine's words, "glides
and flows away, the earth abides" (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again,
hold that the work of the third day was perfected on that day only as
regards movement from place to place, and that for this reason Scripture
had no reason to speak of it as made.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument is easily solved, according to Augustine's
opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not suppose that the
earth was first covered by the waters, and that these were afterwards
gathered together, but that they were produced in this very gathering
together. But according to the other writers there are three solutions,
which Augustine gives (Gen. ad lit. i, 12). The first supposes that the
waters are heaped up to a greater height at the place where they were
gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to the Red Sea, that
the sea is higher than the land, as Basil remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.).
The second explains the water that covered the earth as being rarefied or
nebulous, which was afterwards condensed when the waters were gathered
together. The third suggests the existence of hollows in the earth, to
receive the confluence of waters. Of the above the first seems the most
probable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which they
flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason why they
are said to be gathered together into one place. Or, "one place" is to be
understood not simply, but as contrasted with the place of the dry land,
so that the sense would be, "Let the waters be gathered together in one
place," that is, apart from the dry land. That the waters occupied more
places than one seems to be implied by the words that follow, "The
gathering together of the waters He called Seas."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The Divine command gives bodies their natural movement and
by these natural movements they are said to "fulfill His word." Or we may
say that it was according to the nature of water completely to cover the
earth, just as the air completely surrounds both water and earth; but as
a necessary means towards an end, namely, that plants and animals might
be on the earth, it was necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a
portion of the earth. Some philosophers attribute this uncovering of the
earth's surface to the action of the sun lifting up the vapors and thus
drying the land. Scripture, however, attributes it to the Divine power,
not only in the Book of Genesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the person
of the Lord it is said, "I set My bounds around the sea," and Jer. 5:22,
where it is written: "Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have
set the sand a bound for the sea?"
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), primary
matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned, but in the
present passage it is to be taken for the element itself. Again it may be
said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth is mentioned in the
first passage in respect of its nature, but here in respect of its
principal property, namely, dryness. Wherefore it is written: "He called
the dry land, Earth." It may also be said with Rabbi Moses, that the
expression, "He called," denotes throughout an equivocal use of the name
imposed. Thus we find it said at first that "He called the light Day":
for the reason that later on a period of twenty-four hours is also called
day, where it is said that "there was evening and morning, one day." In
like manner it is said that "the firmament," that is, the air, "He called
heaven": for that which was first created was also called "heaven." And
here, again, it is said that "the dry land," that is, the part from which
the waters had withdrawn, "He called, Earth," as distinct from the sea;
although the name earth is equally applied to that which is covered with
waters or not. So by the expression "He called" we are to understand
throughout that the nature or property He bestowed corresponded to the
name He gave.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on
the third day?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production of
plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as
animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of
distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as
also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded as
taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of
distinction.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have been
recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But the words
of Gn. 3:17, "Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall
it bring forth to thee," show that by the production of certain plants
the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of plants in general
should not have been recorded on the third day, which is concerned with
the work of formation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are stones
and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work of
formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the third
day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:12): "The earth brought forth the
green herb," after which there follows, "The evening and the morning were
the third day."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, On the third day, as said (A[1]), the formless state of
the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold. On the
one hand, the earth was "invisible" or "void," being covered by the
waters; on the other hand, it was "shapeless" or "empty," that is,
without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it, as it
were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect this formless
state ends on the third day: first, when "the waters were gathered
together into one place and the dry land appeared"; secondly, when "the
earth brought forth the green herb." But concerning the production of
plants, Augustine's opinion differs from that of others. For other
commentators, in accordance with the surface meaning of the text,
consider that the plants were produced in act in their various species on
this third day; whereas Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that
the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes,
that is, it received then the power to produce them. He supports this
view by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (Gn. 2:4,5): "These
are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created,
in the day that . . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant
of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the
ground before it grew." Therefore, the production of plants in their
causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the
earth's surface. And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these
first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and from
this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His
creatures, in the work of propagation, "He worketh until now."Now the
production of plants from out the earth is a work of propagation, and
therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their
causes only. However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said
that the first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six
days, but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the
government of the universe. And Scripture indicates this in the words,
"before it sprung up in the earth," and "before it grew," that is, before
like was produced from like; just as now happens in the natural course by
the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly (Gn. 1:11):
"Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed," as
indicating the production of perfection of perfect species, from which
the seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where the seminal
power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect the argument.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and local
movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible.
And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production
is treated as a part of the earth's formation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles had
been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not produced
in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled to gain his
food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is said: "Shall it
bring forth TO THEE."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[69] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Moses put before the people such things only as were
manifest to their senses, as we have said (Q[67], A[4]; Q[68], A[3]). But
minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth.
Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and would
seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he makes no
mention of them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] Out. Para. 1/3
OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by
itself, secondly as to all seven days in general.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] Out. Para. 2/3
In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day,
secondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and
fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) As to the production of the lights;
(2) As to the end of their production;
(3) Whether they are living beings?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been produced on
the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature incorruptible
bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without their form. But as
their matter was produced in the work of creation, before there was any
day, so therefore were their forms. It follows, then, that the lights
were not produced on the fourth day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light. But
light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore, should have
been made on the first day, not on the fourth.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants are
fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: "He set them in the
firmament." But plants are described as produced when the earth, to which
they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore, should have
been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is to say, on the
second day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other
heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature. The
lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but
on the third day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger than the
moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly described as
the "two great lights."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says (Gn.
2:1): "So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the furniture
of them," thereby indicating that the work was threefold. In the first
work, that of "creation," the heaven and the earth were produced, but as
yet without form. In the second, or work of "distinction," the heaven and
the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form to formless
matter, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the
order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers suppose. To these two
works is added the work of adornment, which is distinct from perfect. For
the perfection of the heaven and the earth regards, seemingly, those
things that belong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that
are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts
and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like. Now just as
distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local
movement, as separating one from another; so the work of adornment is set
forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens, and
upon the earth. But it has been stated above (Q[69], A[1]), that three
things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water, and the
earth; and these three received their form from the three days' work of
distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first day; on the second
day the waters were separated; and on the third day, the earth was
divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in the work of adornment; on
the first day of this work, which is the fourth of creation, are produced
the lights, to adorn the heaven by their movements; on the second day,
which is the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make
beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air and water, which
are here taken as one; while on the third day, which is the sixth,
animals are brought forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must
also here be noted that Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the
production of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers,
since he says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for
the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of
producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: "Let the firmament
produce lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth the green
herb."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here; for he
does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there was no
need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is
there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heavenly bodies
to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be said that they
were formed out of matter already existing, as animals and plants were
formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another
nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the answer must be
that the lights were substantially created at the beginning, but that
their substance, at first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving
not its substantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact
that the lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but
only as made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains
this by the need of guarding the people from the danger of idolatry:
since the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were
not from the beginning.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in holding the
light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made on this day to
be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first day is understood
to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have been produced on
that day merely as light in general; and that on the fourth day the
lights received a definite power to produce determinate effects. Thus we
observe that the rays of the sun have one effect, those of the moon
another, and so forth. Hence, speaking of such a determination of power,
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the sun's light which previously was
without form, was formed on the fourth day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not fixed
in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the movement of
the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.) that He is said
to have set them in the firmament, not because He fixed them there
immovably, but because He bade them to be there, even as He placed man in
Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of Aristotle, however, the stars
are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no other movement but that
of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the movement of the
luminaries and not that of the spheres (De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses
describes what is obvious to sense, out of condescension to popular
ignorance, as we have already said (Q[67], A[4]; Q[68], A[3]). The
objection, however, falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made
on the second day as having a natural distinction from that in which the
stars are placed, even though the distinction is not apparent to the
senses, the testimony of which Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel.
ii, text. 43). For although to the senses there appears but one
firmament; if we admit a higher and a lower firmament, the lower will be
that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars were
fixed in the higher firmament.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem.), plants were
recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry, since
those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that plants
originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom remarks
(Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the work of
production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates by his labor.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great, not so
much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and power. For
though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the influence of
the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower world. Moreover,
as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent size is greater.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production of the
lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): "Be not afraid of
the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear." Therefore the heavenly
lights were not made to be signs.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the lights
are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore they are not
signs.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the first
day. Therefore the lights were not made "for seasons, and days, and
years," that is, in order to distinguish them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is inferior
to itself, "since the end is better than the means" (Topic. iii). But the
lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not made "to
enlighten it."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said "to rule the night." But
such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from the new
moon. The moon, therefore, was not made "to rule the night."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As we have said above (Q[65], A[2]), a corporeal creature
can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act, or for
other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the glory of God. Of
these reasons only that which points out the usefulness of these things
to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his people from
idolatry. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:19): "Lest perhaps lifting up thy
eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of
heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the
Lord thy God created for the service of all nations." Now, he explains
this service at the beginning of Genesis as threefold. First, the lights
are of service to man, in regard to sight, which directs him in his
works, and is most useful for perceiving objects. In reference to this he
says: "Let them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth."
Secondly, as regards the changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness,
preserve health, and provide for the necessities of food; all of which
things could not be secured if it were always summer or winter. In
reference to this he says: "Let them be for seasons, and for days, and
years." Thirdly, as regards the convenience of business and work, in so
far as the lights are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul
weather, as favorable to various occupations. And in this respect he
says: "Let them be for signs."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes
effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which depend
upon the free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden effects
through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence nothing prevents a
sensible cause from being a sign. But he says "signs," rather than
"causes," to guard against idolatry.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The general division of time into day and night took place
on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is common to the
whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first day. But
the particular distinctions of days and seasons and years, according as
one day is hotter than another, one season than another, and one year
than another, are due to certain particular movements of the stars: which
movements may have had their beginning on the fourth day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of man, who,
by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. Nor is it
untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower,
considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of the universe.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the evening
and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it was probably
made in its full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were
animals and man himself. For although the perfect is developed from the
imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before
the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this,
for he says that it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect,
which He afterwards perfected.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings. For
the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a body
less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish,
birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of heaven, as
pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form. But
the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals, and
must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the
soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence Augustine (De Vera
Relig. xxix) says: "Every living substance stands higher in the order of
nature than one that has not life." The lights of heaven, therefore, are
living beings.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun, moon,
and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the case of
animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from the power of
the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly bodies a
living soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are
natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and natural movement is from an
intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly bodies
is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the desirer is
moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36). Therefore,
seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the heavenly
bodies: and consequently they are living beings.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all things
that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is proved in
Phys. viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself precedes that which
is by another. But only beings that are living move themselves, as is
shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore the heavenly bodies are
living beings.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "Let no one esteem
the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have
neither life nor sense."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras,
for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), "was
condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of
stone, and neither a god nor even a living being." On the other hand, the
Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was there less
diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. It was the belief
of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were alive, and
the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles. 1:6), "The
spirit goeth forward, surveying all places round about." But Basil (Hom.
iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that the
heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt,
without committing himself to either theory, though he goes so far as to
say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings, their souls
must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion
lviii).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of opinion
exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul and body
exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body; for the form does
not exist for the matter, but the matter for the form. Now the nature and
power of the soul are apprehended through its operation, which is to a
certain extent its end. Yet for some of these operations, as sensation
and nutrition, our body is a necessary instrument. Hence it is clear that
the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to
exercise their functions. There are, however, operations of the soul,
which are not exercised through the medium of the body, though the body
ministers, as it were, to their production. The intellect, for example,
makes use of the phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far
is dependent on the body, although capable of existing apart from it. It
is not, however, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and
generation, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be exercised
by the heavenly bodies, for such operations are incompatible with a body
naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that the functions of
the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body, since all the
senses depend on the sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities,
and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the
admixture of elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not
elemental. It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only
ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of
understanding and moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and
intellectual perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations
of the intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body
as their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses.
Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot
be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to
a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the
intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of the
heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the soul, in
order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its
form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he
moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after showing that
the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes
on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. This, he
says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the
part of one only, if one is a body and the other not. The Platonists
explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a
moving power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly
bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else but that substances
of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A
proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and
contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific
gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one
fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the
movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some
intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when
he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God
through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are
not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if
they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen that
the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny,
that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe by
reason of their proper movement; and in this way the heavenly luminaries
agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they are moved by a
living substance.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but not in
a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the souls of
heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must
be conceded that they are superior to them with regard to their
respective forms, since their form perfects their matter entirely, which
is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas a soul does not do this.
Also as regards movement the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a
nobler kind.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the
nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore
since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life
in virtue of that agent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on
account of their active principle, but on account of their passive
principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being
moved by an intelligent power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[70] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is
compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the
form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive
power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may be
called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect to
that active principle; just as we say that voluntary movement is natural
to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] Out. Para. 1/1
ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
We must next consider the work of the fifth day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For the
waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the
power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of
fishes and birds since we find that many of them are generated from seed.
Therefore the words, "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature
having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth," do not fittingly
describe this work.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only, but
earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is shown
by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and rest upon
it. It is not, then, fittingly that fishes and birds are produced from
water.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If,
then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced
from the air, and not from the waters.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some, as
seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of fishes is
not sufficiently described by the words, "Let the waters bring forth the
creeping creature having life."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes
which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and
generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings, whereas
birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has precedence in
the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not to have been
produced on the fifth day, before land animals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As said above, (Q[70], A[1]), the order of the work of
adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction. Hence, as
among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the middle, or
second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water, which is the
intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of adornment, the
middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the adornment of the
intermediate body, by the production of birds and fishes. As, then, Moses
makes mention of the lights and the light on the fourth day, to show that
the fourth day corresponds to the first day on which he had said that the
light was made, so on this fifth day he mentions the waters and the
firmament of heaven to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second.
It must, however, be observed that Augustine differs from other writers
in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs
about the production of plants. For while others say that fishes and
birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature
of the waters produced them on that day potentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can
be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally, without
any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature
produces its effects by determinate means, and consequently, those things
that are naturally generated from seed cannot be generated naturally in
any other way. It ought, then, rather to be said that in the natural
generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active
principle lies in the formative power of the seed, but that in the case
of animals generated from putrefaction, the formative power of is the
influence of the heavenly bodies. The material principle, however, in
the generation of either kind of animals, is either some element, or
something compounded of the elements. But at the first beginning of the
world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals
from material elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or
virtually, as Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by
water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the
water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to
the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed
or the influence of the stars.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from two
points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident that the
earthly element must predominate, since the element that is least active,
namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in quantity in order that
the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of the animal. But if
considered as by nature constituted to move with certain specific
motions, thus they have some special affinity with the bodies in which
they move; and hence the words in which their generation is described.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not
enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water,
because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery exhalations;
partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But birds move in the
lower part of the air, and so are said to fly "beneath the firmament,"
even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of clouds. Hence the
production of birds is ascribed to the water.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through the
medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type between
the animals of the air and those of the water, having something in common
with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class to which they
are most allied, through the characters possessed in common with that
class, rather than with the other. But in order to include among fishes
all such intermediate forms as have special characters like to theirs,
the words, "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having
life," are followed by these: "God created great whales," etc.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[71] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The order in which the production of these animals is given
has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set to adorn,
rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves. Moreover, in
generation also the more perfect is reached through the less perfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] Out. Para. 1/1
ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the work of the sixth day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For as
birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals. But these
animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words, "Let the
earth bring forth the living creature," should rather have been, "Let the
earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But
beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to be
enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and species, so
also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of his genus and
species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said about them in the
production of other animals, whereas it is said "according to its genus"
and "in its species."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded to
have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes are said
to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more reason, of the
other animals as well.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which
is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first
founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been
produced at that time.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man. But
there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man sinned.
Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at all, since
He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had sinned.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the
water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so
the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by the
production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the earth
is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
v) that the production was potential, and other holy writers that it was
actual.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The different grades of life which are found in different
living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which
Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.). The life
of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to discern, and
hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of their life,
but only their generation is mentioned, since only in generation is a
vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition and growth are
subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown later on (Q[78],
A[2]). But amongst animals, those that live on land are, generally
speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not because the fish is
devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine
rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but because their limbs are more distinct and
their generation of a higher order, (yet some imperfect animals, such as
bees and ants, are more intelligent in certain ways). Scripture,
therefore, does not call fishes "living creatures," but "creeping
creatures having life"; whereas it does call land animals "living
creatures" on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that
fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land
animals, from the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were,
living souls with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being
the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of
other animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By "cattle," domestic animals are signified, which in any
way are of service to man: but by "beasts," wild animals such as bears
and lions are designated. By "creeping things" those animals are meant
which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth, as serpents, or
those whose feet are too short to life them far from the ground, as the
lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as deer and goats, seem
to fall under none of these classes, the word "quadrupeds" is added. Or
perhaps the word "quadruped" is used first as being the genus, to which
the others are added as species, for even some reptiles, such as lizards
and tortoises, are four-footed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus
and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it was
unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been said of
other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals and plants may
be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their
remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas man is said to be
made "to the image and likeness of God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by generation,
and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the making of
birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the earth, without
requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is repeated in the case
of man, since in him generation of children has a special relation to the
number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. iii, 12], and to
prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin whatever in the act of
begetting children. As to plants, since they experience neither desire of
propagation, nor sensation in generating, they are deemed unworthy of a
formal blessing.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of
another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, that
from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be
generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate
things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But those generated
from corruption of animals could not have been produced then otherwise
than potentially.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[72] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i):
"If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in
it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if
he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. Moreover, should he
carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool,
he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful;
whereas the craftsman, knowing their use, laughs at his folly. And thus
some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through
not seeing the reasons for their existence. For though not required for
the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the
perfection of the universe." And, since man before he sinned would have
used the things of this world conformably to the order designed,
poisonous animals would not have injured him.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] Out. Para. 1/1
ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) About the completion of the works;
(2) About the resting of God;
(3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the
seventh day?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works ought not
to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are done in this
world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of the world will
be at the end of the world (Mt. 13:39,40). Moreover, the time of Christ's
Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore it is called "the time of
fulness [*Vulg.: 'the fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). And Christ Himself,
at the moment of His death, cried out, "It is consummated" (Jn. 19:30).
Hence the completion of the Divine works does not belong to the seventh
day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we do
not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather that He
rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works does not
belong to the seventh day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things are
added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is called perfect
to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But many things
were made after the seventh day, as the production of many individual
beings, and even of certain new species that are frequently appearing,
especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. Also, God
creates daily new souls. Again, the work of the Incarnation was a new
work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22): "The Lord hath created a new
thing upon the earth." Miracles also are new works, of which it is said
(Eccles. 36:6): "Renew thy signs, and work new miracles." Moreover, all
things will be made new when the Saints are glorified, according to
Apoc. 21:5: "And He that sat on the throne said: Behold I make all things
new." Therefore the completion of the Divine works ought not to be
attributed to the seventh day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): "On the seventh day God ended His
work which He had made."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first
perfection and the second perfection. The 'first' perfection is that
according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection
is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole having its
parts complete. But the 'second' perfection is the end, which is either
an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the harp; or something
that is attained by an operation, as the end of the builder is the house
that he makes by building. But the first perfection is the cause of the
second, because the form is the principle of operation. Now the final
perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect
beatitude of the Saints at the consummation of the world; and the first
perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding, and
this is what is ascribed to the seventh day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second, as above
said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are required, nature
and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection of beatitude will be
at the end of the world. But this consummation existed previously in its
causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world, as to grace, in
the Incarnation of Christ. For, "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ"
(Jn. 1:17). So, then, on the seventh day was the consummation of nature,
in Christ's Incarnation the consummation of grace, and at the end of the
world will be the consummation of glory.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new
creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper
to them, and thus He made some beginning of the "second" perfection. So
that, according to our version of the Scripture, the completion of the
works is attributed to the seventh day, though according to another it is
assigned to the sixth. Either version, however, may stand, since the
completion of the universe as to the completeness of its parts belongs to
the sixth day, but its completion as regards their operation, to the
seventh. It may also be added that in continuous movement, so long as any
movement further is possible, movement cannot be called completed till it
comes to rest, for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now God might
have made many other creatures besides those which He made in the six
days, and hence, by the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh
day, He is said on that day to have consummated His work.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but all
things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of
the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience materially,
as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed Eve; whilst
others existed not only in matter but also in their causes, as those
individual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their
kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand
in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species
of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and
elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise
occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different
species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even
these existed previously in their causes, in the works of the six days.
Some also existed beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now
created. And the work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed,
for as we read (Phil. 2:7), The Son of God "was made in the likeness of
men." And again, the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the
angels by way of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven,
especially the empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), "Nothing
under the sun is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that
were before us."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day from all
His work. For it is said (Jn. 5:17), "My Father worketh until now, and I
work." God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all His work.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which movement
causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and without labor,
He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from His work.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh day by
causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is set down
in contradistinction to His work; now the words "God created" or "made"
this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that He made man
create or make these things. Therefore the resting of God cannot be
explained as His making man to rest.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): "God rested on the seventh day
from all the work which He had done."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and
consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although
movement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is
applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one
hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine
goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating
itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other
hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to move
towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense meaning a
cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire. Now, in
either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day. First,
because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for, as said
above (A[1], ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not existed
previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly, because He
Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was happy in the
fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He is not said to
have rested "in" His works, as though needing them for His own happiness,
but to have rested "from" them, as in fact resting in Himself, as He
suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And even though from all
eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in Himself, which He took
after He had finished His works, is that rest which belongs to the
seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God's resting
from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and providing
for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new ones.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but to
the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an external
object.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the
enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment of
God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His works
and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God rested in
giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set down as the
only one, and the other is the first and principal explanation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due to the
seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for that some
good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided. But whether God
works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is lost to Him.
Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the seventh day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Latin "benedictio" [blessing] is derived from
"bonitas" [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and
communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days,
therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather
than the day on which He ceased producing them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as upon
each work it was said, "God saw that it was good." Therefore it was not
necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day should be
blessed.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:3), "God blessed the seventh day
and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As said above (A[2]), God's rest on the seventh day is
understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing new
works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has
made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself.
According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh day,
since, as we explained (Q[72], ad 4), the blessing referred to the
increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures
which He blessed: "Increase and multiply." Now, this increase is effected
through God's Providence over His creatures, securing the generation of
like from like. And according to the second meaning, it is right that the
seventh day should have been sanctified, since the special sanctification
of every creature consists in resting in God. For this reason things
dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because
anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because something
is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in their
first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and
preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the
perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that in
it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its fruition.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[73] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to the
first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the seventh
day, to its propagation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] Out. Para. 1/1
ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) As to the sufficiency of these days;
(2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?
(3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating
the works of the six days.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently enumerated.
For the work of creation is no less distinct from the works of
distinction and adornment than these two works are from one another. But
separate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and therefore
separate days should be assigned to creation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and water.
But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and another to the
distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought to be devoted to the
distinction of fire and air.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from the
beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other animals than all
animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day is devoted to the
production of fishes, and another to that of the beast of the earth.
Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the production of birds and
another to that of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of these
days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the luminaries in
the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is produced at the
same time as the accident proper to it. The light and the luminaries,
therefore, ought not to have been produced on different days.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting of the
world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that day ought
not to be enumerated with the others.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The reason of the distinction of these days is made clear
by what has been said above (Q[70], A[1]), namely, that the parts of the
world had first to be distinguished, and then each part adorned and
filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now the parts into
which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according to some holy
writers, these parts being the heaven, or highest part, the water, or
middle part, and the earth, or the lowest part. Thus the Pythagoreans
teach that perfection consists in three things, the beginning, the
middle, and the end. The first part, then, is distinguished on the first
day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle part distinguished on the
middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third part distinguished on
the third day, and adorned on the sixth. But Augustine, while agreeing
with the above writers as to the last three days, differs as to the first
three, for, according to him, spiritual creatures are formed on the first
day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher bodies being formed on
the first these two days, and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the
perfection of the Divine works corresponds to the perfection of the
number six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since
one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of
corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs to the
production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual nature, both
of which are outside of time, as he himself says (Confess. xii, 12).
Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there was any day.
But it may also be said, following other holy writers, that the works of
distinction and adornment imply certain changes in the creature which are
measurable by time; whereas the work of creation lies only in the Divine
act producing the substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason,
therefore, every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place
"in a day," but creation "in the beginning" which denotes something
indivisible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the unlettered,
are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the world, but
reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially as regards the
lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which the higher region of
air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 13).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The production of animals is recorded with reference to
their adorning the various parts of the world, and therefore the days of
their production are separated or united according as the animals adorn
the same parts of the world, or different parts.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made on
the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day does
not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they then
received a form that they had not before, as said above (Q[70], A[1] ad
2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15), after all
that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something
distinct is attributed to the seventh---namely, that on it God rested in
Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right that the seventh
day should be mentioned after the six. It may also be said, with the
other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day upon a new
state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that therefore the
seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to
cessation from work.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all these days are one day?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all these days are one day. For it is written
(Gn. 2:4,5): "These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when
they were created, in the day that the Lord . . . made the heaven and the
earth, and every plant of the field, before it sprung up in the earth."
Therefore the day in which God made "the heaven and the earth, and every
plant of the field," is one and the same day. But He made the heaven and
the earth on the first day, or rather before there was any day, but the
plant of the field He made on the third day. Therefore the first and
third days are but one day, and for a like reason all the rest.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is said (Ecclus. 18:1): "He that liveth for ever,
created all things together." But this would not be the case if the days
of these works were more than one. Therefore they are not many but one
only.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works. If,
then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows that
He did not make that day; which is not admissible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in an
instant, for with each work are the words (God) "said . . . . and it was
. . done." If, then, He had kept back His next work to another day, it
would follow that for the remainder of a day He would have ceased from
working and left it vacant, which would be superfluous. The day,
therefore, of the preceding work is one with the day of the work that
follows.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1), "The evening and the morning
were the second day . . . the third day," and so on. But where there is a
second and third there are more than one. There was not, therefore, only
one day.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, On this question Augustine differs from other expositors.
His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are one day
represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ. Dei xi,
9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were seven distinct
days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as explaining the
literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different. For Augustine
understands by the word "day," the knowledge in the mind of the angels,
and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their knowledge of the
first of the Divine works, the second day their knowledge of the second
work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then, each work is said to have
been wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought in some
one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe
without impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can
know many things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all
angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days
denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a succession in
the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced. Moreover, angelic
knowledge is appropriately called "day," since light, the cause of day,
is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit.
iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a
succession both in time, and in the things produced.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the
mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the
diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown (Q[67],
A[1]; Q[69], A[1]), between Augustine and other writers is taken into
account. First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as first
created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making of the
firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of dry land, to
denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter. But other holy
writers take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify the
elements of the universe themselves existing under the proper forms, and
the works that follow to mean some sort of distinction in bodies
previously existing, as also has been shown (Q[67], AA[1],4; Q[69], A[1]
). Secondly, some writers hold that plants and animals were produced
actually in the work of the six days; Augustine, that they were produced
potentially. Now the opinion of Augustine, that the works of the six days
were simultaneous, is consistent with either view of the mode of
production. For the other writers agree with him that in the first
production of things matter existed under the substantial form of the
elements, and agree with him also that in the first instituting of the
world animals and plants did not exist actually. There remains, however,
a difference as to four points; since, according to the latter, there was
a time, after the production of creatures, in which light did not exist,
the firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the
waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth
difference; which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. In
order, therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either
side.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and the earth,
He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed, actually, but
"before it sprung up in the earth," that is, potentially. And this work
Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to the first
instituting of the world.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God created all things together so far as regards their
substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all things
together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in
distinction and adornment. Hence the word "creation" is significant.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new things, but
not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it belongs
that the first day is succeeded by other days.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned together, not
from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in which to work,
but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the world.
Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the
different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to the world
a fresh state of perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the
natural order of the works attributed to the days.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words to
express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament, and other
similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the heaven and the
earth. For "all things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3). Therefore in the
creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, mention should have
been made of the Word of God.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is not
mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently
described.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all the things that He
had made, and they were very good." It ought, then, to have been said of
each work, "God saw that it was good." The omission, therefore, of these
words in the work of creation and in that of the second day, is not
fitting.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not befit
God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, "The Spirit of God
moved over the waters," are unbecoming.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again. Therefore
to the words, "God said: Let the firmament be made . . . and it was so,"
it is superfluous to add, "God made the firmament." And the like is to be
said of other works.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the day,
since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, "The evening and
morning were the second day" or, "the third day," are not suitable.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, "first," not "one," corresponds to "second" and "third."
It should therefore have been said that, "The evening and the morning
were the first day," rather than "one day."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the person of
the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and in its
distinction and adornment, but differently in either place. For
distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world receives
its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means of the form
of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called his
intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is by the word of
God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and adornment the
Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned as the beginning,
by the words, "In the beginning God created," since by creation is
understood the production of formless matter. But according to those who
hold that the elements were created from the first under their proper
forms, another explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom.
ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, "God said," signify a Divine command.
Such a command, however, could not have been given before creatures had
been produced that could obey it.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the heaven
is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth, the
formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted.
But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the heaven and the earth, as
the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the intervening things being left
to be understood, since all these move heavenwards, if light, or
earthwards, if heavy. And others say that under the word, "earth,"
Scripture is accustomed to include all the four elements as (Ps.
148:7,8) after the words, "Praise the Lord from the earth," is added,
"fire, hail, snow, and ice."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the account of the creation there is found something to
correspond to the words, "God saw that it was good," used in the work of
distinction and adornment, and this appears from the consideration that
the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, "there are two things," says Augustine
(Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God's love of His creatures, their
existence and their permanence. That they might then exist, and exist
permanently, "the Spirit of God," it is said, "moved over the
waters"---that is to say, over that formless matter, signified by water,
even as the love of the artist moves over the materials of his art, that
out of them he may form his work. And the words, "God saw that it was
good," signify that the things that He had made were to endure, since
they express a certain satisfaction taken by God in His works, as of an
artist in his art: not as though He knew the creature otherwise, or that
the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise, than before He made it. Thus
in either work, of creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is
implied. In creation the Person of the Father is indicated by God the
Creator, the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and
the Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters.
But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God that
speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the
Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with which God saw that
what was made was good. And if the words, "God saw that it was good," are
not said of the work of the second day, this is because the work of
distinguishing the waters was only begun on that day, but perfected on
the third. Hence these words, that are said of the third day, refer also
to the second. Or it may be that Scripture does not use these words of
approval of the second days' work, because this is concerned with the
distinction of things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again,
because by the firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the
air, which is not one of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the
principal divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by
Rabbi Moses [*Perplex. ii.], and to these may be added a mystical one
derived from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom the
work of the second day is not marked with approval because the second
number is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection of unity.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the "Spirit of the
Lord," the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says that it is so
called according to the custom of Scripture, in which these things are
throughout attributed to God. But according to the holy writers, the
Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over
the water"---that is to say, over what Augustine holds to mean formless
matter, lest it should be supposed that God loved of necessity the works
He was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For love of that
kind is subject to, not superior to, the object of love. Moreover, it is
fittingly implied that the Spirit moved over that which was incomplete
and unfinished, since that movement is not one of place, but of
pre-eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7). It is the
opinion, however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit moved
over the element of water, "fostering and quickening its nature and
impressing vital power, as the hen broods over her chickens." For water
has especially a life-giving power, since many animals are generated in
water, and the seed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the soul
is given by the water of baptism, according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be
born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom
of God."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these three
phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being in
the Word, denoted by the command "Let . . . be made"; secondly, their
being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, "It was . . . done";
thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words, "He made." And
because the formation of the angels is recorded on the first day, it was
not necessary there to add, "He made." It may also be said, following
other writers, that the words, "He said," and "Let . . . be made," denote
God's command, and the words, "It was done," the fulfilment of that
command. But as it was necessary, for the sake of those especially who
have asserted that all visible things were made by the angels, to mention
how things were made, it is added, in order to remove that error, that
God Himself made them. Hence, in each work, after the words, "It was
done," some act of God is expressed by some such words as, "He made," or,
"He divided," or, "He called."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,30), by the
"evening" and the "morning" are understood the evening and the morning
knowledge of the angels, which has been explained (Q[58], A[6],7). But,
according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire period takes its
name, as is customary, from its more important part, the day. And
instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, "The days of my
pilgrimage," where night is not mentioned at all. But the evening and the
morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day begins with
morning and ends with evening, or because evening denotes the beginning
of night, and morning the beginning of day. It seems fitting, also, that
where the first distinction of creatures is described, divisions of time
should be denoted only by what marks their beginning. And the reason for
mentioning the evening first is that as the evening ends the day, which
begins with the light, the termination of the light at evening precedes
the termination of the darkness, which ends with the morning. But
Chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it is intended to show that the
natural day does not end with the evening, but with the morning (Hom. v
in Gen.).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[74] A[3] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The words "one day" are used when day is first instituted,
to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours. Hence, by
mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed. Another reason
may be to signify that a day is completed by the return of the sun to the
point from which it commenced its course. And yet another, because at the
completion of a week of seven days, the first day returns which is one
with the eighth day. The three reasons assigned above are those given by
Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] Out. Para. 1/2
TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)
OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN
THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL
(SEVEN ARTICLES)
Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now
proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal
substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his
origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the
soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has
relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be
the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi) says that three things are
to be found in spiritual substances---essence, power, and operation---we
shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly,
of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the
nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the
soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of
inquiry.
(1) Whether the soul is a body?
(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?
(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?
(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?
(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul is a body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving
principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, because
seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives
what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat.
Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it
must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find proved
Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of
an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover
moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul is a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But
there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If,
therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of
corporeal things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact.
But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul moves the
body, it seems that the soul must be a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is
simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space
by its bulk."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the
soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which
live: for we call living things "animate," [*i.e. having a soul], and
those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is shown
principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of
old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the
principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted
that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is
nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal. This
opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of
only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which shows
clearly that the soul is not a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for
then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the
same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the
"first" principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may
be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a
principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first
principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to
be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were
the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life.
Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of
life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to
some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the
first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat,
which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a
body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by something
else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow
that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from
potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing
moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys.
viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved
either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an
invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which,
though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason
it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul.
There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially---namely, the
body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed
but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul
is moved directly, and is a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually
in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially,
and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in
the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus color
is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it
is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be
actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in
the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to
distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the
soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it
must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in
order to know all bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of
"power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the
latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that
body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the human soul is something subsistent?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent.
For that which subsists is said to be "this particular thing." Now "this
particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed
of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not
operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to say that the
soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds."
Therefore the soul is not subsistent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some
operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the
body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does
not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the
body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that
the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body,
will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are
led astray through associating with the soul those things without which
they are unable to think of any nature---i.e. imaginary pictures of
corporeal things." Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not
only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something
subsistent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of
intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both
incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the
intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever
knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because
that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything
else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a
feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and
everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle
contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now
every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for
the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it
to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of
that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain
determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a
glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the
intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that
which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate
but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts
heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that
the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something
incorporeal and subsistent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses.
Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and
is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence
of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the
imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this particular
thing" in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human
soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called "this particular
thing," in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the
second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to
be "this particular thing."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own
opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be
moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate "per
se" belongs to what exists "per se." But for a thing to exist "per se,"
it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a
material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that is
rightly said to subsist "per se," which is neither inherent in the above
sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand
cannot be said to subsist "per se"; nor can it for that reason be said to
operate "per se." Hence the operation of the parts is through each part
attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels
with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot
gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat.
We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it
is more correct to say that man understands through the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not
as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm
is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a
dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent;
otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it
requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of
perception.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For
man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as we have just shown
(A[2]), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other
animals are subsistent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible
objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible
objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible
objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from the body, perceives
sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are
sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent; just as the human
intellectual soul is subsistent.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body
is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute animals has an
operation apart from the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi,
xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the souls
of animals are not subsistent."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between
sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has been
said (A[1]). Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and
sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that
sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it
follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent. But
Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is
performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the
consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied
with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye
is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses. Hence
it is clear that the sensitive soul has no "per se" operation of its own,
and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite.
Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no "per se"
operations they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything follows
the mode of its being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although man is of the same "genus" as other animals, he is
of a different "species." Specific difference is derived from the
difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply
a diversity of "genus."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible
object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the
intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object.
But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of
the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that
excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never
occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands
the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand
those that are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual
operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the
intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the
production of the phantasms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power,
commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive soul is not
apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are
accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power is that which
executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the
act of this power does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence
it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the
body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul is man?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2 Cor.
4:16): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is
renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the soul. Therefore
the soul is the inward man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal
substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore it is a
"hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person. Therefore
the soul is man; for a human person is a man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as
holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and
body."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two
senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates,
for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this,
forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while
matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be
true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition
signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form
only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is
part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle
of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion
of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of
these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul,
flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all
the individuals contained under a given species, must belong to the
substance of the species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and
this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the
sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that
case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the
soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is
that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man.
But it has been shown above (A[3]) that sensation is not the operation of
the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not
proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something
composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation was
proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the
body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems
to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the governor of a state
does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle in
man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in
accordance with truth, is called the "inward" man; and sometimes the
sensitive part with the body is called man in the opinion of those whose
observation does not go beyond the senses. And this is called the
"outward" man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person,
but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a
foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul
alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For
potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in
actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of
Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is clear
from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things
are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality. But the first
potentiality is primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after
a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a
man is potentially understanding; it seems that the human soul must
participate of primary matter, as part of itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there
matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul---namely,
to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and
virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to
virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their
existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the
soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore
the soul has matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act,
and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul has
matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the
soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in
two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs to
the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form
by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of
itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible
that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand
something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that
which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality
is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a
form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and
that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul
inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received
into something is received according to the condition of the recipient.
Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the
intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance,
it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone
absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul.
Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not
something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were
composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into
it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it
happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal
organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized.
It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual
substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from
composition of matter and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all acts;
because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a
part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as
potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But
the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are
participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one
potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all
participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would
equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive
potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive
potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things
received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas
the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a
potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is
composed of matter and form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by
reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of
the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter
another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change.
For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from
ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with
regard to the intelligible species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent;
wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by
transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not
owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause
transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above,
the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form
"there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act;
while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once." [*The
Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid." The
Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se
unum quiddam est . . . et ens quiddam."]
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Everything participated is compared to the participator as
its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per se," must
have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that
sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the
participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act
and infinite. But in intellectual substances there is composition of
actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form
and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of
that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself
is that by which a thing is.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the human soul is incorruptible?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those
things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end.
But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for
they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both;
because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the
beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as the same text
concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the condition of both
is equal." But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore,
also, the human soul is corruptible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness;
because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as it is written
(Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which is true, not only of the
body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same
passage, "After this we shall be as if we had not been," even as to our
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the
operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a phantasm,
cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a
phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the Philosopher
says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution
of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to
Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an
incorruptible substantial life."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we
call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two
ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance
to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or
corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a
thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation
and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has existence "per se" cannot
be generated or corrupted except 'per se'; while things which do not
subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lost
it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now it was
shown above (AA[2],3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent,
whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted,
when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be
corrupted unless it were corrupted "per se." This, indeed, is impossible,
not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything
subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a
thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs
to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter
acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted
so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form
to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a
subsistent form to cease to exist.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some
pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is
incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety;
since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries.
Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to
contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety in the
intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its
existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety;
for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since
contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for
the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of
this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after
its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon
knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the
conditions of "here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends
existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an
intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot
be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as
expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and
animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all
animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the
souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human
soul is produced by God. To signify this it is written as to other
animals: "Let the earth bring forth the living soul" (Gn. 1:24): while of
man it is written (Gn. 2:7) that "He breathed into his face the breath of
life." And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded:
"(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the
spirit return to God Who gave it." Again the process of life is alike as
to the body, concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): "All things
breathe alike," and (Wis. 2:2), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke."
But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas
animals are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than
beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive
potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who can
produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be
reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to
non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain
existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in it a
potentiality to non-existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of
the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After separation from the
body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other
substances separated from bodies, as will appear later on (Q[89], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel.
For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of its
species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of
the soul is the same as that of an angel---namely, eternal happiness.
Therefore they are of the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because
it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing nobler
either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature.
Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific
difference: therefore they belong to the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel
except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the essence
of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore
the soul and angel are of the same species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Things which have different natural operations are of
different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an angel
are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), "Angelic minds
have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowledge of
Divine things from visible things." Subsequently he says the contrary to
this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an angel are not of the same
species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and
angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that in
these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting
from their free-will: as we have seen above (Q[47], A[2]). But this
cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of
number without diversity of species and inequality of nature; because, as
they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is
clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species. For a
separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single
species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, it could only be
one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in
this or that subject. But diversity of species is always accompanied with
a diversity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than
another; and the same applies to other species, because differences which
divide a "genus" are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are
compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the
"principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," as is written
Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances
were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of one be distinct
from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the
principle of the distinction of matter---that is to say, that the matter
is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even then
there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or
else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms. But one
matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of
quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an
angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul
to be of the same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one
species will be explained later (Q[76], A[2], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end.
Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it
is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler than
potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest,
because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of
intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the
sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one species, so
neither are all intellectual things of one species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[75] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by
the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, properly
speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is the species. And
the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its
operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of
intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning this
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?
(2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically
according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for all
men?
(3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle,
there is some other soul?
(4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?
(5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual
principle is the form?
(6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?
(7) Whether by means of an accident?
(8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the
body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the
intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body.
Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the
matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would be
required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united
to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate nature, it
would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it
would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear from what has
been said (Q[75], A[2]); which is contrary to the nature of the
intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a
form materially and individually; for what is received must be received
according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing
understood is not received into the intellect materially and
individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the
intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and
universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore
the intellect is not united to the body as its form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same
subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is not
the action of a body, as appears from above (Q[75], A[2]). Therefore
neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or
power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which
the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of
the intellect the form of a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, whatever has "per se" existence is not united to the
body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so that
the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself. But
the intellectual principle has "per se" existence and is subsistent, as
was said above (Q[75], A[2]). Therefore it is not united to the body as
its form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature
exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form by
reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an
accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form
would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one.
Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the
intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above
(Q[75], A[6]), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of
the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body
as its form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii (Did. vii
2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which
constitutes man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of his
intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form
of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 1/8
I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle
of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby
primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be
attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily healed is
health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence
health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The
reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a
thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first
thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through
various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we
primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the
soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local
movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by
which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the
intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration
used by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 2/8
But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the
body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is
the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is
himself who understands. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in
three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a thing is
said to move or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as
a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or
through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is
white builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white. So
when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is
not attributed to him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man,
which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either that
Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained,
holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part
of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Q[75], A[4]),
for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both
that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a
body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore
that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates,
so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 3/8
The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible
species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and in
the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the
intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this
or that particular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently
explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act of Socrates.
This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive faculty, from
which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect.
For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of
colors to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore, as
the species of colors are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms
in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because the colors, the
images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is
not attributed to the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but
rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of
phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that
Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his
phantasms are understood.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 4/8
Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the
body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing
so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This
is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the intellect does
not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which
presupposes the operation of the intellect. The reason therefore why
Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect, but
rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he
understands. Secondly, because since Socrates is an individual in a
nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be
not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, and then
the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved.
Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass into
something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action of
understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is
moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action of a motor is never
attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action
of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if understanding is attributed to
Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is
attributed to him as to an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching
of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through
a corporeal instrument (De Anima iii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the
action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is
attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except
perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye
sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above
manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If,
however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with
whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to
those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one
absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a
being according as it is one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 5/8
There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by
Aristotle---namely, that this particular man understands, because the
intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of the
intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to
the body as its form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 6/8
The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For
the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper
operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses
all other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the
ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly
belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that which
is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything is
derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual
principle is the proper form of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 7/8
But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above
corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels
matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a
mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities.
And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that
the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative
soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the
vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms.
Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has
an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever.
This power is called the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] Body Para. 8/8
It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of
matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the
form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in
potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the
form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by
virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call
the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the "primary animate,"
as was said above (Q[75], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate natural
form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is directed is
indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact
that "man and the sun generate man from matter." It is separate indeed
according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does
not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the
eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal
organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul
itself, to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the
term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that
the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal
organ.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections:
since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of
his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things
and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the
act of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form
merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there is
nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body,
although the soul is essentially the form of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists
to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there
results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite
is also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with other
non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own
existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not so with
other forms.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of
itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised
up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its proper
place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper
place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from
the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to
the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number
of bodies?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied
according to the number of bodies, but that there is one intellect in all
men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one
species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it is not
composed of matter and form as was shown above (Q[75], A[5]). Therefore
there are not many human souls in one species. But all men are of one
species. Therefore there is but one intellect in all men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed.
Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the number of
bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls
would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a single
remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction
of rewards and punishments.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my
intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are things
which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is received
into anything must be received according to the condition of the
receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received individually
into my intellect, and also into yours: which is contrary to the nature
of the intellect which knows universals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which
understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what is
understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and
consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be only
potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have
to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse something
intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is contrary to
the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not to be
distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to follow that there
is one intellect in all men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it
cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge in the
disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as
heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the same
individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the
disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both.
Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and master is but
one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were to
say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself." But the
soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there
is one intellect of all men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the relation of
universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes
to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul, one in species, should
belong to animals of different species. Therefore it is impossible that
one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong
to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect
itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that
they are not distinct from each other, except by something outside the
essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no
other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak; which
is quite absurd.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the
opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the intellect
is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man. For it is
impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form, as it is
impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle
of existence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the
manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is
manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two
instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but several
actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there
will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary, we
suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that
there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many
drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many drawing, but one
pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we
say that there is one agent and one action, as when the smith strikes
with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Now it is clear
that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that
man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which
appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at
its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several intellects
and one sense---for instance, if two men had one eye---there would be
several seers, but one sight. But if there is one intellect, no matter
how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as
instruments, in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are
otherwise than one understanding man. And if to this we add that to
understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any
organ other than the intellect itself; it will further follow that there
is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one
"understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that
is, of one intelligible object.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form
yours by the distinction of the phantasms---that is to say, were there
one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you---if the phantasm
itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the
possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms
produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of things with
regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the phantasm itself
is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species
abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from
different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is
abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom there may be different
phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species
of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one
operation, understands the nature of a stone, notwithstanding the
diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all
men, the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would
not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man.
It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable
to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no
matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter;
in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the division of
matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is quite impossible
for many angels to be of one species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Everything has unity in the same way that it has being;
consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge of
its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its
very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution
of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. In like manner
the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the multiplicity of the
bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies, the souls retain their
multiplied being.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the species
whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals;
otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent substances, and
consequently individual, they could not understand universals. But the
materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes
the knowledge of the universal. For as every action is according to the
mode of the form by which the agent acts, as heating is according to the
mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by
which the knower knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes
distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which
come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of
knowledge, is material---that is, not abstracted from material
conditions---its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be
according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means
of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing
in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from the
conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature
without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there
will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this
particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even
if there were but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect,
and the species whereby it understands, an individual species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is
one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own
nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul,
but its likeness is," as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone
which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a
reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences
would not be things, but only intelligible species. Now it happens that
different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same
thing. And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of
the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen
to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses;
for several see the same color, according to different likenesses. In the
same way several intellects understand one object understood. But there
is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the
sense and the intelligence---that a thing is perceived by the sense
according to the disposition which it has outside the soul ---that is, in
its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed
outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the
soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. For the common
nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas
such is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the
opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the
same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed
that the natures of things exist separate from matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the
master. How it is caused will be shown later on (Q[117], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a
plurality of species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls
essentially different from one another?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man
other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive
soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of
the same substance. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible; whereas
the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as
was shown above (Q[75], A[6]). Therefore in man the essence of the
intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be
the same.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is
incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ
generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the
sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is
corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive
soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same "genus." Now an
animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, therefore,
"animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is
absurd.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that
the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form. But
"rational," which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the
intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" by reason of his having a
body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be
compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form to matter.
Therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the
sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv:
"Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other
Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is
mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason; but
we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to
the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls in one body,
distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different
vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the
concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain.
Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to
those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this reason, that
in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided in
each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite.
Now this would not be the case if the various principles of the soul's
operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various
parts of the body. But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems to
leave it in doubt whether it be "only logically" distinct from the other
parts of the soul, "or also locally."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 2/6
The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was
supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor. For
it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by
several motors; and still less if it be moved according to its various
parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its
form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to
be in one body. This can be made clear by three different reasons.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 3/6
In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which
there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one
form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same
source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are
denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, "a
white man." If, therefore, man were 'living' by one form, the vegetative
soul, and 'animal' by another form, the sensitive soul, and "man" by
another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not
absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6),
against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of
a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this reason,
against those who hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks
(De Anima i, 5), "what contains them?"---that is, what makes them one? It
cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather does
the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 4/6
Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one
thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from
various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the
forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white
is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication,
(if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the
definition of the predicate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so
that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second
manner of essential predication.) Therefore, if we have one form by which
a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows
either that one of these two things could not be predicated of the other,
except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one
another---or that one would be predicated of the other according to the
second manner of essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the
other. But both of these consequences are clearly false: because "animal"
is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not
part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. Therefore
of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man
would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be
essentially predicated of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 5/6
Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one
operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be
the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] Body Para. 6/6
We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the
intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This
can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and
forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ from
one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the
animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect
than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these genera
there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did.
vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in
species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he
compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which
contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the
intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive
soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore,
as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one
shape, and pentagonal by another---since a tetragonal shape would be
superfluous as contained in the pentagonal---so neither is Socrates a man
by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is
both animal and man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its
being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When,
therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with
sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For
although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot
deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not forms, but composites, are classified either
generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other animals.
And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the
part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between man and
the other animals.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely
sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect
soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown further
on (Q[118], A[2], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: We must not consider the diversity of natural things as
proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow
from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and
the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said, the
intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul,
and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the
power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material. And
because it observes that this is something common to man and to other
animals, it forms thence the notion of the "genus"; while that wherein
the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and
perfecting; thence it gathers the "difference" of man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides the
intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the
soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially." Therefore
the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body has a
substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other substantial
form in the body precedes the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now everything
that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one moves, and the
other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5). But the part
which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part must be such that it
can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it
is a being only potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body.
Therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial
form, by which the body is constituted.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to primary
matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to some beginning.
Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides
the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately to primary
matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms
which inhere to matter immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does not
result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption.
Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and
these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body there are other
substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But
the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing
there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form
of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another
substantial form besides the intellectual soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to
the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists maintain,
it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial
form, by which the body is established in its being as movable by the
soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its
substantial form, as we have said above (A[1]), it is impossible for
another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in
man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial
form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form
does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not
make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of
the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply,
but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like
manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be
corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives
being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated
simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the
old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual
being---for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort---maintained
that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that
"every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. i, 4.
Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter
another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an
actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply;
and consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the
advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its
removal simple corruption, all of which is clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man
besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually
contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain
all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do
in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute
animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more
perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body
only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life
potentially"; and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul."
Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself
is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and
light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were two separate
things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. In like manner,
the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc., because by the soul it
is a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is
said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for
such a potentiality "does not reject"---that is, does not exclude---the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form
of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes the
body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive
power is the part which moves; and the animate body is the part moved.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as
existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is
always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the
first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form which
gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most
perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 4: Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements
remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made by the
contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average. But this
is impossible, because the various forms of the elements must necessarily
be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must
suppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter
subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. But various
bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements in
the mixed body would be distinct as to situation. And then there would
not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but only a
mixture apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 2/3
Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their
imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms, and
so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they are
modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from them.
But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial being of each
thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and
subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii
(Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form
to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less impossible for anything to be
a medium between substance and accident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 3/3
Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i,
10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not
actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain,
though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. This
quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form
of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to
such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. But the
intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united
to a corruptible body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a
proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does not share.
But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the
soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and
not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form
cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul is one
form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of
parts belonging to various species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself
be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect of souls.
Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a
covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and hoofs instead
of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws,
teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual soul should not have
been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the above
means of protection.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul
is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the
matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the
matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul,
as we have seen above (Q[55], A[2]) in the order of nature, holds the
lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not
naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has
to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in necessary
things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with
the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the
action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument.
Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted
to be a convenient organ of sense.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ
of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and
cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the
perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is
able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced
to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch. But the
intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness; because
what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the
superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Therefore the body to which
the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others
reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason among animals,
man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best
sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we
observe "those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind," as
stated in De Anima ii, 9.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying
that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does not
seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by
nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its immortality would
not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions
are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the matter be suitable
to the form; the other which follows by force of the first disposition.
The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted
for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may
become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. So the
intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however,
is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God
could avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural things we do
not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of
things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in
this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason
of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the
sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament.
Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body, and not
to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess;
because otherwise there could not be an equability of temperament. And
this body of an equable temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of
its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly
body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh,
and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the whole does, and
therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of different
species, but that they are of various dispositions. This is suitable to
the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on
account of its perfection, is manifold in power: and therefore, for its
various operations it requires various dispositions in the parts of the
body to which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a
greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in
these a greater variety than in plants.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a
power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature
to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether
of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other animals, the souls
of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed
particular things. Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and
his hands, which are "the organs of organs" (De Anima iii), since by
their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety,
and for any number of purposes.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of
accidental dispositions?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body
through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form exists in
its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents.
Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the
substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a
substantial form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, various forms of one species require various parts of
matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without division
in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter
before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by
virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. Therefore it
seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is
an accident.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order
of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. vii
(Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental form
exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial form.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor,
there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions
mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be
necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required the power to
move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be
moved by the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the
substantial form, as we have already said above (A[1]), it is impossible
for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or
between any substantial form whatever and its matter. The reason is
because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a
certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be understood
as being first in matter. Now the first among all acts is existence.
Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as
having quantity, before it is actual. But matter has actual existence by
the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said
above (A[4]). Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions
to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently
before the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As appears from what has been already said (A[4]), the more
perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms;
therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter according
to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes
man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it
is clear that to every "genus" follow its own proper accidents. Therefore
as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is
understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which belong to
existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus
dispositions are understood in matter before the form, not as regards all
its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the
corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once
understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in
its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the
further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same
form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection, as we have
said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when brought under the
observation of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its
motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual
soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides
and moves the body by its power and virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a
body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the soul
administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air, which is
most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are bodies. Therefore the soul
is united to the human body by means of a body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the
removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when
breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the
breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and
body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not
united except by something between them. But the intellectual soul is
very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because
it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to the body by means
of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which
would harmonize the elements, and unite them together.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need not ask
if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its shape
are one." But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening.
Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to
the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other
bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal
whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of
something nearer.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said
(A[1]), it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body.
The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it is a being.
Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is
itself essentially an act; nor does it give existence by means of
something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and
form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature
is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union
except the agent, which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher
says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained
the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and body of man. Of
these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an
incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is never
separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of
man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by means of a
corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of light,
which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so
that the vegetative soul would be united to the body by means of the
light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light of
the crystal heaven; and the intellectual soul by means of the light of
the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictious and ridiculous: for light
is not a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the
composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only
virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body
as the form to matter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body;
whence he uses the word "administration." It is true that it moves the
grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the first
instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher
says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of
breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the
removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a
union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first
instrument of motion.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we
consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a separate
existence, many means of connection would have to intervene. But inasmuch
as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from
the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body
immediately. This is the case with every form which, if considered as an
act, is very distant from matter, which is a being only in potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the soul is in each part of the body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the
body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot.
animal. x): "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the
body; it suffices that it be in some principle of the body causing the
other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But it
is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an organic
body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Therefore
the whole soul is not in each part.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima. ii, 1) that the relation
of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the sight to the
pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole
body of an animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is in each part of the
body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of
the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the body, it
follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body;
thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is
absurd.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each part
of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus one part would not
depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than another; which is
clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each part of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that "in each body the
whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As we have said, if the soul were united to the body
merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the
body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But
since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be
in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental
form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the substantial form
perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. For since a
whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give
existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in
composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is
accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and therefore it must be
the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part.
Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an
animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a
stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as
the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of which is, that on the
withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action;
although that which retains its species, retains the action of the
species. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be
in the whole body, and in each part thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Body Para. 2/4
That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that
since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are three kinds
of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a whole
which is divided into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole
body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential
parts: as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and
a composite into matter and form. There is, further, a third kind of
whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. The first kind of
totality does not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then
only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a
quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is
concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole surface and in each
part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the
whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form which requires variety in
the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is
not equally related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided
accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative
totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or
accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical
and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and
likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the principle of
operation.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Body Para. 3/4
Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole
surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If we
mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the
whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to be
said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole
surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part
thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, then the whole
whiteness is in each part of a surface.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] Body Para. 4/4
Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither
essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say that
the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and
of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of
the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it
is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so
forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul requires variety of
parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the
parts; for to the whole it is compared primarily and essentially, as to
its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily,
inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of
the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary
and proportionate perfectible.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole
body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate perfectible. Thus the
soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal
is an animal.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it
exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and the
will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body.
Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of these
powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the
body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[76] A[8] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: One part of the body is said to be nobler than another, on
account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body are the
organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler
part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same power in a
nobler manner.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT
ARTICLES)
We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the
soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?
(2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?
(3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?
(4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;
(5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?
(6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?
(7) Whether one power rises from another?
(8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the essence of the soul is its power?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For
Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and love are in
the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially": and
(De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, and will are one life, one
mind, one essence."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary
matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its own
power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental
form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified or
relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power.
Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the
intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and understand" is
the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the
soul is its own power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident.
Therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides the essence
thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that
the foregoing (see OBJ 1) "are not in the soul as in a subject as color
or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; for whatever
is so, does not exceed the subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can
love and know other things" (De Trin. ix, 4).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, " a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is a
simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we have said
above (Q[75], A[5]). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as
in a subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial
difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; and
they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul.
Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it would seem
that the power of the soul is its own essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly spirits
are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more, then, in the
soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is
its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose
this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power and act
divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act
to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of
substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the genus of
substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of
substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own
substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His
operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the
soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when speaking of the
angels (Q[54], A[3]). Secondly, this may be also shown to be impossible
in the soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if the
very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation,
whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which
has a soul is always an actually living thing. For as a form the soul is
not an act ordained to a further act, but the ultimate term of
generation. Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does
not belong to it according to its essence, as a form, but according to
its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the
first act, with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe that
what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital
operations; whence also it is said in the definition of the soul, that it
is "the act of a body having life potentially"; which potentiality,
however, "does not exclude the soul." Therefore it follows that the
essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by
reason of an act, as act.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves
itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and
loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very
substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the same way are
we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those things are
"one life, one mind, one essence." Or, as some say, this passage is true
in the sense in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts,
being midway between the universal whole, and the integral whole. For the
universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and
power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly
predicated of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part,
neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole power.
Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is
predicated, though improperly, of all the parts together; as if we were
to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the
potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not,
however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be
predicated of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In
this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the will
are the one essence of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the
substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else
but its essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to
act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial existence
through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results
from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental form is to the
substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of
fire) as the power of the soul is to the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: That the accidental form is a principle of action is due
to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first
principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the
Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we understand and sense."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: If we take accident as meaning what is divided against
substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident;
because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according
to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a subject. In this sense,
as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and
it belongs to the second species of accident, that of quality. But if we
take accident as one of the five universals, in this sense there is a
medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that
belongs to the essence of a thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence
of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not
caused by the essential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does
not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential
principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence
and accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be
said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural
properties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are
not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood in the
sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as
loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this
sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would
follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even other things
are loved through the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet
it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q[75], A[5],
ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The
statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act; in treating of
which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De Trin. i).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[1] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from
the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational soul
itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to
us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents us from sometimes
substituting accidents for substantial differences.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are several powers of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For
the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of God. But in
God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the
intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore above all
others it has one virtue or power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one
essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different degrees of
perfection, as we have seen above (Q[76], AA[3],4). Therefore by the one
power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De
Anima ii, 2,3).
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To
make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii,
12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they
acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which
belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and
those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the
highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect
goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed
of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few
remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means
of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of
all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude,
therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited
goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But
man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire
beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of
those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires
many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety
of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His
own Essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of
powers---because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal
creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness,
more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness;
although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more
perfect creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things:
but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One thing has one substantial existence, but may have
several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several
powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished
by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species by what is
subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power;
and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul's powers are not
specifically distinct by acts and objects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, contraries are what differ most from each other.
Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows
that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly
false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to white
and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Hence if
the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, the same
object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for
the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired by the
appetitive.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the
cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong to
various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color belong
to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they come under the
one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished
according to the difference of their objects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what
precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts and
operations precede the powers according to reason; and these again are
preceded by their opposites," that is their objects. Therefore the powers
are distinguished according to their acts and objects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek
to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and
consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the
act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to
the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active
power or of a passive power. Now, the object is to the act of a passive
power, as the principle and moving cause: for color is the principle of
vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of
an active power the object is a term and end; as the object of the power
of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from
these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle,
or from its end or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of
cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is
the active principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is
the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity
distinguished by their acts and objects.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not
change the species. For since to be colored is accidental to an animal,
its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a difference
in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to say, by a
difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and
sometimes otherwise. Hence "rational" and "irrational" are differences
dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like manner
therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul,
but a difference in that to which the power of its very nature is
directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the
passive quality which of itself is divided into color, sound, and the
like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color,
namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But
it is accidental to a passive quality, for instance, to something
colored, to be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a
stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers of the soul are
not distinct.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is,
nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with
regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is,
nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions
which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and
end.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If any power were to have one of two contraries as such for
its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. But the
power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but
rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does not regard
white as such, but as color. This is because of two contraries one, in a
manner, includes the idea of the other, since they are to one another as
perfect and imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from
being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong to
various powers of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The higher power of itself regards a more universal
formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power
is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore many things
are combined in the one formality of the object, which the higher power
considers of itself; while they differ in the formalities regarded by the
lower powers of themselves. Thus it is that various objects belong to
various lower powers; which objects, however, are subject to one higher
power.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the
soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is no
before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of
the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there is no
order among them.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects and
to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order among
them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and
dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no order among the
powers of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the
operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action of
one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can
act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there is no order
among the powers of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts or
powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among
themselves. Therefore the powers of the soul have order.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since
a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain order;
there must be some order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may
observe a triple order among them, two of which correspond to the
dependence of one power on another; while the third is taken from the
order of the objects. Now the dependence of one power on another can be
taken in two ways; according to the order of nature, forasmuch as perfect
things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to
the order of generation and time; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a
thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to the first kind of order
among the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive
powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise the
sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers
of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of the
sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is
to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. But
in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among
themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visible
naturally comes first; since it is common to higher and lower bodies. But
sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of
elements, of which smell is the result.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The species of a given genus are to one another as before
and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature;
although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive
the predication of the common genus.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part
of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, has a
certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of
the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we have said
above.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument is verified as regards those powers among
which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the two
other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on
another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as
their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body; so are the
powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the
corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed
to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, 2), "The soul is that by which we sense and understand
primarily." But the natural principles of the operations of the soul are
the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul
senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body,
as fear and such like; and some things through the body. But if the
sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul
could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the
subject of the sensitive powers; and for a similar reason, of all the
other powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that
"sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the
composite." Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its
subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The subject of operative power is that which is able to
operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the same
is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore
the "subject of power" is of necessity "the subject of operation," as
again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now,
it is clear from what we have said above (Q[75], AA[2],3; Q[76], A[1], ad
1), that some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal
organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers of these operations
are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are
performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing
by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive
and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of
these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the
soul alone.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their
subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that the
composite has the power to perform such operations.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to
the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper
to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating to
Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting
them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the present question
is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some things with the
body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways. Firstly,
the words "with the body or without the body" may determine the act of
sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses
nothing without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed
from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be
understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object
sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, things
existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort;
while it senses some things without the body, that is, which do not exist
in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels
sad or joyful on hearing something.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its
essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing. But
the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers
of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the
essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers; as is
clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the
powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is
moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii, 1,2); except,
perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved
by itself, because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither
is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore
the soul does not produce its powers within itself.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But
the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is
included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii
(Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence
as their cause.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and
partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by each
of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two
respects. First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist
absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the
accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such,
or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an
actual being. Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the
substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject: and since
that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the
substantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other hand,
actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its
being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the
accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the
subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the
accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I
say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the
extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident being
caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental forms
differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the
sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on
account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental
form exists on account of the completeness of the subject.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is clear, from what has been said (A[5]), that either the subject
of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject
of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have
said above (A[1], ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the
composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers
of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite,
flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle; because it
has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject
according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in
potentiality.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in
a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. Thus, from
the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because
order exists among these powers; and also by reason of the diversity of
the corporeal organs.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the
active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material
cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may
gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as
their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive
thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is
not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus
one thing results naturally from another, as color from light.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one power of the soul arises from another?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from
another. For if several things arise together, one of them does not arise
from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time
with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an
accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the
subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident.
Therefore one power does not arise from another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but
everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the powers
of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of
them does not proceed from another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Powers are known by their actions. But the action of
one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of the
imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul
is caused by another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In those things which proceed from one according to a
natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer
to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more remote. Now
it has been shown above (A[4]) that among the powers of the soul there
are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from
the essence of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence
of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and
final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or
together with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect,
while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect; it follows that
those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of
perfection and nature, are the principles of the others, after the manner
of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the
sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses,
moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence;
wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the
intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as
receptive principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard
to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is
considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the
intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the
others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the
man.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a
transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous
with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident;
but one accident is received prior to another into substance, as quantity
prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of
another; as surface is of color, inasmuch as substance receives an
accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the
powers of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as
perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures.
But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another,
because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul
separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that
"the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and
imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility."
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But
properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never
separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after
death.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened
when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i,
4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even
as well as a young man." But weakness is the road to corruption.
Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is
corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the
Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the
separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in
hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime"
(Lk. 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and
consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a
power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls grieve
or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the
concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the soul,
when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some things by
imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from
the body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. Therefore
the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and
consequently all the other powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two substances
only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with its
senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not
remain.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As we have said already (AA[5],6,7), all the powers of
the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers
belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the
will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the
body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers
of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after
the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed,
such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the
soul, as in their principle or root.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even
after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they say
also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these
powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That book has no authority, and so what is there written
can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although we may
say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but
virtually.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the
separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the
composite.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when the body
becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual
principle of these powers.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same
way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the mind; not
as a part of the sensitive soul.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the
sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FP Q[77] A[8] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as
asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said there
(Retrac. ii, 24).
