Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] Out. Para. 2/4
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the
corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite
vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] Out. Para. 3/4
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3)
the habit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] Out. Para. 4/4
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e.
whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain
number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth.
For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed to us to
be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the
First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also things
concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, and
the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the
First Truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they are
opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things contained in
Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an
unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things contained in Holy
Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning man and other
creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth, but
also created truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above (FS,
Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the sovereign
Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only
the First Truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about the
simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth. Therefore the
object of faith is the First Truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things:
first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to
speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal
aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions
are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is
the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are
speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by
God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they
include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do
not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to
God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.
Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a
way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in
relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it
considers nothing save in relation to health.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments
of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as
by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to them on
account of the Divine Truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things
contained in Holy Writ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that
its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further on (Q[25]
, A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something complex
by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First Truth, as
stated above (A[1]). Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore
the object of faith is not something complex.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. Now
the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is not
stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . .
almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor. 13:12:
"We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now
I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known." But the object
of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence.
Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the
mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about
propositions; so that its object is something complex.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of
the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the
truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the FP, Q[85], A[5]. Hence
things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a
certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine
intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in
themselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as
regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith
is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith.
Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of
faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of
truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the object of faith on the part of
the thing believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in so
far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is evident from
the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does not
terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in science we do not
form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through
their means, so is it in faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the First Truth
seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We know that when He shall
appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is":
hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way of a
simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not apprehend
the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anything false can come under faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith. For
faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can come
under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it.
The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being good, who,
nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be the object
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, according to
Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw
it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham, God might not have
taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He did, so that
what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false. Therefore the
object of faith can be something false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ, and
many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of the
Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to preach,
it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore something false
can come under faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe that
the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the altar. But
it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated, and that
there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread. Therefore
something false can come under faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to the
false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the
intellect, as we shall show further on (Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore nothing
false can come under it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through
the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (A[1]) that the formal
aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that nothing can
come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth,
under which nothing false can stand, as neither can non-being stand under
being, nor evil under goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false
can come under faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of the
appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the
intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the nature
of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other hand those
virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely exclude the
false, for it is possible to act in accordance with justice or
temperance, while having a false opinion about what one is doing.
Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity
perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man hopes
to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be an act
of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein
he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be; so
that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual whom we
love for God's sake.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself was
possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands in God's
foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as explained
in the FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it is thus that it comes under faith.
Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot be false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe in
Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time, wherein
some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human conjecture.
For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion through a human
conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false opinion to be the
outcome of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such and such
accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ is under
the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly consecrated. Hence
if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow that anything false
comes under faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen. For Our
Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou
hast believed." Therefore vision and faith regard the same object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of faith,
says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner."
Therefore what is believed is seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen under
every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine states
(De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard, according
to Rm. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore faith is of
things seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is
believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either
by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the
habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in
the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science). Secondly
the intellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved
to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice,
whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if
this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be
opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the other side,
there will be faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the senses
or by the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another" [*St. Gregory:
Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to be God, he
made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those things which come under faith can be considered in
two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and believed
at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under
the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the
believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or
of something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just
as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is becoming to him
in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is
directed to assent to such things as are becoming to a right faith, and
not to assent to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but not of
the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not follow that
these things are seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science
[*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration]?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be an
object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance, since
ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance of
those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things savors of
unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in unbelief."
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers
employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such
things can be an object of science.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science,
since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science." Now certain
matters of faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the
Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. Therefore things that are of
faith can be an object of science.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since
faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and
science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. i.
Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a thing
is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception."
Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception,
whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception.
Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of
science.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore
"seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a
fashion, seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Now as stated above (A[4]), it is impossible that one and the same thing
should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally
impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of
belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing which is
an object of vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we
hope to see some day what we now believe about the Trinity, according to
1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face
to face": which vision the angels possess already; so that what we
believe, they see. In like manner it may happen that what is an object of
vision or scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a
wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not
know it by demonstration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things which
are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about the
same things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith,
for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do they know them
to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by
demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them see that they
ought to believe them, as stated above (A[4], ad 2,3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are
of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments
showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else
they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the
authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is
based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful,
as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all.
Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this
work (FP, Q[1], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are reckoned
among the articles of faith, not because they are believed simply by all,
but because they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so
that those who do not known them by demonstration must know them first of
all by faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and opinion
about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we have
stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the
same man to have science and faith about the same thing relatively, i.e.
in relation to the object, but not in the same respect. For it is
possible for the same person, about one and the same object, to know one
thing and to think another: and, in like manner, one may know by
demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. On
the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same object, and in
the same respect, science is incompatible with either opinion or faith,
yet for different reasons. Because science is incompatible with opinion
about the same object simply, for the reason that science demands that
its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is
essential to opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be
otherwise. Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the
certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the
reason why science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the
same respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas
the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain
articles?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should not be
divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy Writ are
matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be
reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to
distinguish certain articles of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and
therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal aspect of
the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above (A[1]), viz.
the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in
respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should be taken of a
material division of matters of faith into articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa
Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, exacting
[arctans] our belief." Now belief is a voluntary act, since, as Augustine
says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man believes against his will."
Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be divided into
articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine truth,
tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth by way of
analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in our
intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek;
for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which the
Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar,
articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their
gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit
together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your
passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles,
in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated
above (A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason, is
unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known or
not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various
articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God suffered,
and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead, wherefore the
article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article of the Passion.
But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same difficulty,
so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others;
wherefore all these belong to one article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of
faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation
to others: even as in sciences certain propositions are put forward on
their own account, while others are put forward in order to manifest
others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things
which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for," it follows that those things are in themselves
of faith, which order us directly to eternal life. Such are the Trinity
of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three
Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christ's
Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of faith. On
the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief,
not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those
mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man
rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are
related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or
the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct
articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in
two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there is one
formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from
this point of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the
formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from our point of
view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is that it is
something unseen; and from this point of view there are various distinct
articles of faith, as we saw above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This definition of an article is taken from an etymology of
the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in accordance with its
real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much
weight. Yet even then it could be said that although faith is exacted of
no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief is a voluntary act, yet
it is exacted of him by a necessity of end, since "he that cometh to God
must believe that He is," and "without faith it is impossible to please
God," as the Apostle declares (Heb. 11:6).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not increased in
course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1), "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." Now the same things are to be hoped
for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to be
believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised by man,
on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered them, as the
Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of faith was not
devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated in Eph. 2:8:
"It is the gift of God." Since then there can be no lack of knowledge in
God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was perfect from the
beginning and did not increase as time went on.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion no
less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a beginning
with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii). Therefore it
seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect things, so that
those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it most perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us through
the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of faith was
delivered by the early fathers to those who came later, according to Dt.
32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee." Now the apostles
were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for "they received them
more fully than others, even as they received them earlier," as a gloss
says on Rm. 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the first fruits of the
Spirit." Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has not
increased as time went on.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the knowledge
of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they
were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the
mysteries of salvation."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the
doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on
natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that
some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced,
as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing cannot be
affirmed and denied at the same time," as the Philosopher states (Metaph.
iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in
certain primary matters of faith, such as God's existence, and His
providence over the salvation of man, according to Heb. 11: "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that
seek Him." For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist
in God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in
His providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for
man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this
way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained
in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the
Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on:
since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained, albeit
implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But there
was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly, since to
those who lived in later times some were known explicitly which were not
known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said to
Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of
Jacob [*Vulg.: 'I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to
Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said
(Ps. 118:100): "I have had understanding above ancients": and the Apostle
says (Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of Christ, "in other generations was not
known, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped for from
Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through Christ, the
further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the further they
were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle says (Heb.
11:13): "All these died according to faith, not having received the
promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the further off a thing is
the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were nigh to Christ's
advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good things to be hoped for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the
part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in knowledge
as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes place in
sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus the
master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at
once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not be able to
take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's capacity and
instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress
in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24)
compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation can take
place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active cause,
the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a
beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to
perfection, except by something perfect already in existence. On the
other hand, in the order of the material cause, the imperfect comes
first, and in this way nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.
Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having
perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened to matter in
receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among men, the knowledge of
faith had to proceed from imperfection to perfection; and, although some
men have been after the manner of active causes, through being doctors of
faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men
for the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of
faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so
far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the people,
either openly or in figures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by Christ,
wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of fulness [*Vulg.:
'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were nearest to Christ,
wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had
a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with regard to
man's state we find that the perfection of manhood comes in youth, and
that a man's state is all the more perfect, whether before or after, the
nearer it is to the time of his youth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do not
belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above (A[5]
). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God; hence the
Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many other
philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there is one
God" should not be set down as an article of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should believe
God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to be
"all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points some
have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should have
been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His omnipotence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know the
Son, according to Jn. 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father also."
Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and Son,
and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the Person of
the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several articles about the
Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the Person of the Son.
Therefore there should be several articles about the Person of the Father.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of the
Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too is
something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets."
Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated to
the Son in respect of His Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have
been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that there
is not a sufficient number of articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
articles thus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (AA[4],6), to faith those things in
themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and
by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are proposed to
us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see
which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ's Incarnation,
"by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons of God, according to
Rm. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they
may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent."
Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern
the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of
Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 2/4
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed
to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the first
article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three
articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the
works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of
nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is proposed
to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to which all
matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article;
while the third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this
another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead
and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the
Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 3/4
In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion,
death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His
resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for
the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 4/4
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three
Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the glory
of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one
article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance His
providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of
which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching
over things, as stated in the FP, Q[13], A[8]. Now in beings having an
intellect, power does not work save by the will and knowledge. Hence
God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal knowledge and providence.
For He would not be able to do all He wills in things here below, unless
He knew them, and exercised His providence over them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article refers:
but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of
origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, include knowledge
of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a Son; the bond
whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view, there was a
sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the three
Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain points have
to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error, looking at it
in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the three Persons.
For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did
not believe the Son to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father;
hence the need for an article about the Person of the Son in order to
settle this point. In like manner it was necessary to appoint a third
article about the Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the
same way Christ's conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life
everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one
article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another
point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as each one
separately presents a special difficulty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to sanctify
the creature; and about this several things have to be believed. Hence it
is that there are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy
Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never sent, as we
stated in the FP, Q[43], A[4].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its
consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is
appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but
under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the
Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this respect it
is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is that
Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is included
under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are ascribed to
God's almighty power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a
symbol?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of faith to
be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of faith, to which
no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since it is written (Dt.
4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall
you take away from it." Therefore it was unlawful to make a symbol as a
rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been published.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but "one
faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is not
fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the
symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all competent
to believe in God, but only those who have living faith. Therefore it is
unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in the words: "I
believe in one God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of faith,
as stated above (A[8]). But the descent into hell is not mentioned in the
symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the passage,
"You believe in God, believe also in Me" (Jn. 14:1) says: "We believe
Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God." Since then the
Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting to say: "In
the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith. Now
a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly. Therefore
every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass.
Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of faith in a symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed
by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's
promise to His disciples (Jn. 16:13): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is
come, He will teach you all truth." Now the symbol is published by the
authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing
defective.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be
proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of
faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be
proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through ignorance
of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of faith that
the symbol [*The Greek {symballein}] takes its name.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely,
under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in
order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study
and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require to know the
truth of faith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy with
other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather together a clear summary
from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This
indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the symbols.
Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about the truth of
faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded persons be
corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the necessity of
formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one another, save
that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one contains more
explicitly what another contains implicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the
person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by
faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is the
faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only outwardly
but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is expressed in a
symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living faith, so that even if
some of the faithful lack living faith, they should endeavor to acquire
it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen among
heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that point.
For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers, but is
supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a
subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it expound
it, as stated above (ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must be
taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy Ghost,
Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in the Holy
Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in keeping with
the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the holy Catholic
Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.] observes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of the
symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was already
spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is sung
publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the Apostles, which
was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the faith was made
public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as though it were against
the darkness of past and future errors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign Pontiff to
draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol becomes
necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated above
(A[9]). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and
more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of faith becoming
clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated above (A[7]). Since
then this reason ceased with the advent of the New Law, there is no need
for the articles of faith to be more and more explicit. Therefore it does
not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a
new edition of the symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under pain
of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under pain of
anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of the symbol.
For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of Ephesus (P. ii,
Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council had been read
through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter, write or
draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by the Fathers
assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and this under pain of
anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish
it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as the "Latrocinium" and
condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated in the acts of the council
of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it seems that the Sovereign
Pontiff has no authority to publish a new edition of the symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but patriarch
of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung in the Church.
Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign Pontiff any more
than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of the symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such
a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5].
Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up
a symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ 1), a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise.
Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that
authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so that
they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to the
authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more important and more
difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred," as stated in
the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence our Lord said to Peter whom he
made Sovereign Pontiff (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for thee," Peter,
"that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy
brethren." The reason of this is that there should be but one faith of
the whole Church, according to 1 Cor. 1:10: "That you all speak the same
thing, and that there be no schisms among you": and this could not be
secured unless any question of faith that may arise be decided by him who
presides over the whole Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly
to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other
matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general
council and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching
of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pt. 3:16, some men
are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other
doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was necessary as
time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors
which arose.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was intended
for private individuals, who have no business to decide matters of faith:
for this decision of the general council did not take away from a
subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of the symbol,
containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with greater
explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a subsequent
council would expound matters more fully than the preceding council, if
this became necessary through some heresy arising. Consequently this
belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose authority the council is
convoked, and its decision confirmed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under the
form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine, as
appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly the
whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign
Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2) the
external act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith?
(2) In how many ways is it expressed?
(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above
natural reason?
(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable
by natural reason?
(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things
explicitly?
(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?
(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation?
(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity
explicitly?
(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?
(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to believe is to think with assent?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with assent.
Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a research, for
"cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to "coagitare," i.e. "to
discuss together." Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that faith is
"an assent without research." Therefore thinking has no place in the act
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show further on
(Q[4], A[2]). Now to think is an act of the cogitative power, which
belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the FP, Q[78], A[4].
Therefore thought has nothing to do with faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its object
is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect, but of the
will, even as consent is, as stated above (FS, Q[15], A[1], ad 3).
Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine (De
Praedest. Sanct. ii).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a
general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as
Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now the
faculty whereby we understand when thinking." Secondly, "to think" is
more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is
accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect's
arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of
sight. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of
God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought
realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word.
Hence the Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the part
of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed."
In this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while
yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth.
Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of deliberation
either about universal notions, which belongs to the intellectual
faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the sensitive
part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for an act of the
deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the cogitative power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the first
sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely what is
meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with assent even
when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is certain knowledge
of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.], or understands.
If, on the other hand, "to think" be understood in the second way, then
this expresses completely the nature of the act of believing. For among
the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a firm assent without any
such kind of thinking, as when a man considers the things that he knows
by science, or understands, for this consideration is already formed. But
some acts of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent,
whether they incline to neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or incline
to one side rather than the other, but on account of some slight motive,
as in one who "suspects"; or incline to one side yet with fear of the
other, as in one who "opines." But this act "to believe," cleaves firmly
to one side, in which respect belief has something in common with science
and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of
clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence
it is proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of
believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect,
which are about the true or the false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which
demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things whereby a
man is induced to believe, for instance that such things have been
uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the cogitative
power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to one object,
not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken here for an
act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God,
believing in a God and believing in God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably distinguished
as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in God. For one habit
has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is one virtue. Therefore
it is unreasonable to say that there are three acts of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not be
reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe God" is
common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the First Truth.
Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from certain other acts
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be called
an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a God.
Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose
object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the
will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which implies
movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species of that act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this distinction
(De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi---Tract. xxix in Joan.).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of
that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(A[1], ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part of
the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be
observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]). One of
these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is
"to believe in a God"; because, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]) nothing is
proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The
other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account
of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of
faith is "to believe God," since, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]) the formal
object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so
as to assent to Its sake to whatever he believes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the intellect
is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in God." For the
First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect of an end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but one
and the same act having different relations to the object of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God" as we
understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not believe
that God exists under the conditions that faith determines; hence they do
not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher observes
(Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things defectively is not to know
them at all."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As stated above (FS, Q[9], A[1]) the will moves the
intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this
respect an act of faith is "to believe in God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the
natural reason?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe anything above
the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of a thing seem to
be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith,
surpass man's natural reason, since they are things unseen as stated
above (Q[1], A[4]). Therefore to believe seems unnecessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters, wherein he
cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true or false,
according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words?" Now a man
cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he cannot
trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments are
guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters. Therefore
to believe is not necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps. 36:39:
"But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the invisible
things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according to Rm. 1:20: and
those things which are clearly seen by the understanding are not an
object of belief. Therefore it is not necessary for man's salvation, that
he should believe certain things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find
that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one of
which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, while the other is
in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water by its proper
movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while according to the
movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb and flow. In like
manner the planets have their proper movements from west to east, while
in accordance with the movement of the first heaven, they have a movement
from east to west. Now the created rational nature alone is immediately
subordinate to God, since other creatures do not attain to the universal,
but only to something particular, while they partake of the Divine
goodness either in "being" only, as inanimate things, or also in
"living," and in "knowing singulars," as plants and animals; whereas the
rational nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good
and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only
in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it
acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness. Hence
it was said above (FS, Q[3], A[8]) that man's ultimate happiness consists
in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man cannot attain unless
he be taught by God, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of
the Father and hath learned cometh to Me." Now man acquires a share of
this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and little,
according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns thus must
needs believe, in order that he may acquire science in a perfect degree;
thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it
behooves a learner to believe."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the
master who is teaching him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature, natural
knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some supernatural
knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural
light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue,
judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the
light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to matters of
faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently "there is
no" danger or "condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus," and whom
He has enlightened by faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things of
God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God from
His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many things are shown
to thee above the understandings of man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by
natural reason?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which can be
proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's works, much
less even than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to employ
other means, where one already suffices. Therefore it would be
superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural
reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object of
faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as stated
above (Q[1], AA[4],5). Since therefore all things that can be known by
natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no need
to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is certain
knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration] would
seem to come under one head: so that if some of them are proposed to man
as objects of faith, in like manner the others should also be believed.
But this is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those
things which can be proved by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is one and
incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only
things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by
reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive
more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to
whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of
all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other
sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would
arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the
knowledge of God may be more general. For many are unable to make
progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or
through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even
through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of
the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought to their
knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of
certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God. A
sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural
investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have
disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might
have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary
for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to
them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind for
the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved by
reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and about
the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can be an
object of faith for another, as stated above (Q[1], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although all things that can be known by science are of one
common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to beatitude:
hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything
explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it is
not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written (Rm.
10:14,15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not heard? And
how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless
they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe anything explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we by
charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and it is
enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the precept of
Our Lord (Mt. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: 'thy right']
cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the same kind,
according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xix).
Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything explicitly, and it is
enough if he be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according to
Rm. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the virtue of
obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed precepts, but it is
enough that his mind be ready to obey, according to Ps. 118:60: "I am
ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy commandments." Therefore
it seems enough for faith, too, that man should be ready to believe
whatever God may propose, without his believing anything explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God, must
believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to fulfil,
concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining salvation. Now an
act of virtue, as stated above (FS, Q[60], A[5]) depends on the relation
of the habit to its object. Again two things may be considered in the
object of any virtue; namely, that which is the proper and direct object
of that virtue, and that which is accidental and consequent to the object
properly so called. Thus it belongs properly and directly to the object
of fortitude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with
danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just
war, a man be armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is
reduced to the object of fortitude, but indirectly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a
precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in its
proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the
precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate in those
things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the proper and
direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and at certain
times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of faith is that
whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]):
while the indirect and secondary object comprises all things delivered by
God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that
David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is
bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to other
points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only
implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he is prepared
to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then alone is
he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to him that
they are contained in the doctrine of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man's power,
which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound to do many
things which we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as to
love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe the articles of faith.
But with the help of grace we can do this, for this help "to whomsoever
it is given from above it is mercifully given; and from whom it is
withheld it is justly withheld, as a punishment of a previous, or at
least of original, sin," as Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi
[*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. viii.]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things which
are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God and our
neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity which belong,
as a consequence, to the objects of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking, in
the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority, suffices for
the act of obedience, because it is the proper and direct object of
obedience. But this or that precept is accidental or consequent to that
proper and direct object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have explicit faith.
For all are bound to those things which are necessary for salvation, as
is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is necessary for
salvation that certain things should be believed explicitly. Therefore
all are equally bound to have explicit faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is not
bound to believe. But simple reasons are sometimes tested in reference to
the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are bound to believe
everything explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but only
implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith of the
learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the learned to
err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have explicit faith;
so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have explicit faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Job 1:14): "The oxen were ploughing, and
the asses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory expounds this passage
(Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified by the asses, ought, in
matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by the oxen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of Divine
revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now Divine
revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are over them,
in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the angels, and to the
lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. iv,
vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding of faith must needs reach
men of lower degree through those of higher degree. Consequently, just as
the higher angels, who enlighten those who are below them, have a fuller
knowledge of Divine things than the lower angels, as Dionysius states
(Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of higher degree, whose business it is to
teach others, are under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of
faith, and to believe them more explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally
necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree, whose
duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly more things
than others are.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about subtle
questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been corrupted by
heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in such
questions. If, however, it is found that they are free from obstinacy in
their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to their simplicity, it is
no fault of theirs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the learned,
except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine teaching. Hence the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of
Christ." Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine truth that is
the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this rule, he
does not harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the learned
believe aright; unless the simple hold obstinately to their individual
errors, against the faith of the universal Church, which cannot err,
since Our Lord said (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that
thy faith fail not."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should
believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation of all
that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ. For man is
not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are ignorant about: since
the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine revelation, which reaches
man by means of the angels, as stated above (A[6]; FP, Q[111], A[1]). Now
even the angels were in ignorance of the mystery of the Incarnation:
hence, according to the commentary of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is
they who ask (Ps. 23:8): "Who is this king of glory?" and (Is. 63:1):
"Who is this that cometh from Edom?" Therefore men were not bound to
believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the
teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Mt. 11:11) that
"there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater than"
he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the mystery of
Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Mt. 11:3): "Art Thou He that
art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore even the teachers were
not bound to explicit faith in Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the ministry of
the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it would seem that
the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith in Christ, since
they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that it was not necessary
for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc): "Our
faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is delivered from
the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except by the one Mediator
of God and men, Jesus Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[5]; Q[1], A[8]), the object of faith
includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man obtains
beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion is the way
by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written (Acts 4:12): "There is
no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved."
Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation was
necessary at all times and for all persons, but this belief differed
according to differences of times and persons. The reason of this is that
before the state of sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ's
Incarnation, in so far as it was intended for the consummation of glory,
but not as it was intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and
Resurrection, since man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does,
however, seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ,
from the fact that he said (Gn. 2:24): "Wherefore a man shall leave
father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," of which the Apostle
says (Eph. 5:32) that "this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the
Church," and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about this
sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the
Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the
human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else,
have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before and
after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the learned
explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those sacrifices,
believed them to be ordained by God in reference to Christ's coming, and
thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so to speak. And, as stated
above (Q[1], A[7]), the nearer they were to Christ, the more distinct was
their knowledge of Christ's mysteries.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound to
explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards those which
are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such as the
articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we have spoken above
(Q[1], A[8]). As to other minute points in reference to the articles of
the Incarnation, men have been bound to believe them more or less
explicitly according to each one's state and office.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely hidden
from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19), yet certain
aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ revealed them to
them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist inquired
of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly professed his
belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony, that this is the
Son of God" (Jn. 1:34). Hence he did not say: "Art Thou He that hast
come?" but "Art Thou He that art to come?" thus saying about the future,
not about the past. Likewise it is not to be believed that he was
ignorant of Christ's future Passion, for he had already said (Jn. 1:39):
"Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sins [Vulg.:
'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling His future immolation; and since
other prophets had foretold it, as may be seen especially in Isaias 53.
We may therefore say with Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked
this question, being in ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into
hell in His own Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of
Christ's Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo,
according to Zach. 9:11: "Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament hast
sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no water"; nor
was he bound to believe explicitly, before its fulfilment, that Christ
was to descend thither Himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on
Lk. 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from
devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he
inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his
disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the latter
framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing to the
signs of His works.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as is
clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25): "I know that my
Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl too foretold certain things about Christ, as
Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we read in the
history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine Augustus and his
mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a man on whose breast was
a golden plate with the inscription: "Christ shall be born of a virgin,
and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime of Irene and
Constantine, thou shalt see me again" [*Cf. Baron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If,
however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not
saved without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in
Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through
believing in Divine providence, since they believed that God would
deliver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the
revelation of the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job
35:11: "Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the
Trinity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to believe
explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): "He that
cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that
seek Him." Now one can believe this without believing in the Trinity.
Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further our Lord said (Jn. 17:5,6): "Father, I have manifested
Thy name to men," which words Augustine expounds (Tract. cvi) as follows:
"Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the name whereby Thou art
called My Father," and further on he adds: "In that He made this world,
God is known to all nations; in that He is not to be worshipped together
with false gods, 'God is known in Judea'; but, in that He is the Father
of this Christ, through Whom He takes away the sin of the world, He now
makes known to men this name of His, which hitherto they knew not."
Therefore before the coming of Christ it was not known that Paternity and
Filiation were in the Godhead: and so the Trinity was not believed
explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God is
the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly happiness is
the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in God, without any
distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not necessary to believe
explicitly in the Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is
expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is written
in manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our image and
likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was necessary
for salvation to believe in the Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of
Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of Christ
includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the world
through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was conceived by
the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of Christ
was believed explicitly by the learned, but implicitly and under a veil,
so to speak, by the simple, so too was it with the mystery of the
Trinity. And consequently, when once grace had been revealed, all were
bound to explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who are
born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation of the
Trinity, according to Mt. 28:19: "Going therefore teach ye all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy
Ghost."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all
times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and for
all people.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden in
the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it was
shown to the world.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now through
its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of Persons: but as
understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be understood
without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the mission of the Divine
Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to believe is meritorious?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to believe in not meritorious. For the
principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (FS, Q[114], A[4]).
Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an
act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by our natural
gifts, so neither is an act of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific
knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known [*Science
is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious,
nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a
sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a sufficient
motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit on his part,
since he is no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas if he
has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of levity,
according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is hasty to give credit, is light of
heart," so that, seemingly, he gains no merit thereby. Therefore to
believe is by no means meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints "by faith .
. obtained promises," which would not be the case if they did not merit
by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[114], AA[3],4), our actions are
meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace
by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from the free-will, if it be
referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act
of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will
moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the free-will in
relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of
merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the
disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that the
subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor can a
preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after the
advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding disposition act by
virtue of the form, which is the chief principle of action, even as the
heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form of fire. Accordingly
neither nature nor faith can, without charity, produce a meritorious act;
but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith is made meritorious
thereby, even as an act of nature, and a natural act of the free-will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely the
scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that
fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because the
scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration, wherefore
scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consideration of
what a man knows scientifically is subject to his free-will, for it is in
his power to consider or not to consider. Hence scientific consideration
may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the
honor of God or the good of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the case
of faith, both these things are subject to the free-will so that in both
respects the act of faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of
opinion, there is no firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the
Philosopher observes (Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed
from a perfect act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the
assent, it does not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as
regards the actual consideration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is
moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and,
what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he
does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason for
scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the merit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe lessen
the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "there is
no merit in believing what is shown by reason." If, therefore, human
reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith is altogether taken
away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human reasoning in support of
matters of faith, diminishes the merit of believing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens the
amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish
the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to be
about the unseen, as stated above (Q[1], AA[4],5). Now the more a thing
is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore human reasons in
support of matters of faith diminish the merit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an inducement
in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether it consist in
persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man to renounce his
faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so. Therefore reasons in
support of faith diminish the merit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 3:15): "Being ready always to
satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of
that hope which is in you.' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken from
Bede.] and hope which is in you." Now the Apostle would not give this
advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith. Therefore
reason does not diminish the merit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[9]), the act of faith can be
meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the
use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of what we
believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer.
First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man
either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be
moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason diminishes the merit
of faith. In this sense it has been said above (FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1;
Q[77], A[6], ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes
choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a man ought
to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment of his
reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe matters
of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the Divine
authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will of the
believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth
he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can
find in support thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude
the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral
virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated
above (FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words
of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: "We now
believe, not for thy saying" (Jn. 4:42).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no will
to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons. But when a
man has the will to believe what is of faith on the authority of God
alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration of some of them,
e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is not, for that
reason, lost or diminished.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of the
authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring intellectual
vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease to be unseen.
But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what faith proposes
is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not diminish the merit or
the measure of faith. On the other hand, though demonstrative reasons in
support of the preambles of faith [*The Leonine Edition reads: 'in
support of matters of faith which are however, preambles to the articles
of faith, diminish,' etc.], but not of the articles of faith, diminish
the measure of faith, since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet
they do not diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready
to believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit
is not diminished.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist in a
man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit of faith,
in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm in believing.
Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through not renouncing faith
on account of persecution; and even the wise have greater merit of faith,
through not renouncing their faith on account of the reasons brought
forward by philosophers or heretics in opposition to faith. On the other
hand things that are favorable to faith, do not always diminish the
promptness of the will to believe, and therefore they do not always
diminish the merit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:
under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?
(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether confession is an act of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For the
same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession belongs to
penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of
confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19)
asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence, to make
known the mystery of the gospel." Now it belongs to fortitude, which
moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from doing good on account
of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that confession is not an act of
faith, but rather of fortitude or constancy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one's faith
outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works, for it is
written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by charity." But other
external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore neither is
confession an act of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and the
work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a work
proper to faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to whose
end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred specifically
to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, and consequently it
is an act of abstinence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred
specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according to 2
Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe, and
therefore we speak also." For the outward utterance is intended to
signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of
matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward
confession of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures. One
is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act of faith,
since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above. Another is the
confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an act of "latria," for
its purpose is to give outward honor to God, which is the end of
"latria." The third is the confession of sins, which is ordained to the
blotting out of sins, which is the end of penance, to which virtue it
therefore belongs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an
indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence
fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz. fear
or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, but an
indirect cause so to speak.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all outward
acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, but not
eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession as its proper
act, without the help of any other virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary for
salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if it is
a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of faith is
the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can be realized
without any outward confession. Therefore confession of faith is not
necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his faith
to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have to
instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple folk are
not bound to confess the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others, is
not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32): "Be
without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church of
God." Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among
unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 10:10): "With the heart we
believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto
salvation."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation come under the
precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is something
affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its
necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative
precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated above (FS,
Q[71], A[5], ad 3; FS, Q[88], A[1], ad 2) do not bind for always,
although they are always binding; but they bind as to place and time
according to other due circumstances, in respect of which human acts have
to be regulated in order to be acts of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at
all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain times,
when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due honor, or
our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: for instance, if a
man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain silent, so as to make
people believe either that he is without faith, or that the faith is
false, or so as to turn others away from the faith; for in such cases as
these, confession of faith is necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must be
referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our
neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good demand,
man should not be contented with being united by faith to God's truth,
but ought to confess his faith outwardly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every one
is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good example and
encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check the attacks of
unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty of all the faithful to
instruct others in the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public confession
of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among unbelievers, without any
profit either to the faith or to the faithful. Hence Our Lord said (Mt.
7:6): "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls
before swine . . . lest turning upon you, they tear you." Yet, if there
is hope of profit to the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should
disregard the disturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in
public. Hence it is written (Mt. 15:12) that when the disciples had said
to Our Lord that "the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were
scandalized," He answered: "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders
of the blind."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first
place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause
of faith; fourthly, its effects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is faith?
(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?
(3) Whether its form is charity?
(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are one
identically?
(5) Whether faith is a virtue?
(6) Whether it is one virtue?
(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;
(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting definition of
faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance of things to be
hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." For no quality is a
substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue,
as stated above (FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore it is not a substance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things to
be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be
included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, since
charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (A[3]).
Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing to be
loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different genera.
Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and neither is
subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith
is both "substance" and "evidence."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which it
is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is already
manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of
"evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is unfittingly defined.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can
be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of a
definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the
syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are known
by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit, should
be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object. Now the
act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q[2], AA[2],3), which is an
act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will's command.
Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to
the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the
true. And since faith, through being a theological virtues, as stated
above (FS, Q[62], A[2]), has one same thing for object and end, its
object and end must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. Now
it has been already stated (Q[1], AA[1],4) that the object of faith is
the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold on account thereof: so
that it must needs be under the aspect of something unseen that the First
Truth is the end of the act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing
hoped for, according to the Apostle (Rm. 8:25): "We hope for that which
we see not": because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not
for what one has already, but for what one has not, as stated above (FS,
Q[67], A[4]). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end
which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." For we are wont to call by the name
of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole
subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning; for
instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are the
substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us the
first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in
them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the "substance of
things to be hoped for," for the reason that in us the first beginning of
things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which
contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made
happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as
was made evident when we were speaking of happiness (FS, Q[3], A[8]; FS,
Q[4], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,
considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, "evidence
of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of
evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth,
wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of
faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another reading has "conviction,"
because to wit, the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine
authority, so as to assent to what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone
would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say
that "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us,
making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to
the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it
from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect
adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear
not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of
which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance of
things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith
commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this
one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.:
QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we
do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that "faith
is an assent without research," and when others say that "faith is that
certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but
falls short of science," these all amount to the same as the Apostle's
words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid foundation of the believer,
establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the truth in him," comes
to the same as "substance of things to be hoped for."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus
condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance
which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus
contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the
will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of those
virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we shall prove
further on (Q[18], A[1]). For this reason the definition of faith
includes the object of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the present
and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so adapted to
faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of the absent and
the unseen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the definition of
faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor different acts, but
different relationships of one act to different objects, as is clear from
what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing, make
it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority does not make a
thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence referred to in the
definition of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith resides in the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect. For
Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith resides in the
believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct from the intellect.
Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds from
the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its praise
to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is in the
will, and not in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical. Now
faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not concerned
with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in De Anima iii, 9, so
that it is not a principle of operation, whereas "faith . . . worketh by
charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the practical intellect,
the object of which is some true, contingent thing, that can be made or
done. For the object of faith is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above
(Q[1], A[1]). Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according to
1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face
to face." Now vision is in the intellect. Therefore faith is likewise.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect.
Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active principles,
each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not possible for a
thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the art, and the saw be
well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the soul, which is related to
opposite objects, a disposition to act well is a habit, as stated above
(FS, Q[49], A[4], ad 1,2,3). Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such
powers must be perfected by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it
has been stated above (Q[2], AA[1],2) that to believe is an act of the
intellect inasmuch as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds
from the will and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to
be perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be
perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the
intellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason,
besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, in order
that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately
an act of the intellect, because the object of that act is "the true,"
which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is
the proper principle of that act, must needs reside in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is
described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his intellect
assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but also
the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of the
will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed in
order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a habit of
virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the assenting
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as evidenced by
its object. But since this object, which is the First Truth, is the end
of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves (De Trin. i, 8), it
follows that faith worketh by charity just as "the speculative intellect
becomes practical by extension" (De Anima iii, 10).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is the form of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For each
thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two things are
opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of the other. Now
faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a division, as
different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore charity is not the
form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in one
subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the
intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the
form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now
obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of believing,
on the part of the will, according to Rm. 1:5: "For obedience to the
faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the
form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Each thing works through its form. Now faith works
through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (FS, Q[1], A[3];
FS, Q[18], A[6]), voluntary acts take their species from their end which
is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing its species, is after
the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore the form of any
voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that act is directed,
both because it takes its species therefrom, and because the mode of an
action should correspond proportionately to the end. Now it is evident
from what has been said (A[1]), that the act of faith is directed to the
object of the will, i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is
the end of faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity.
Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act of
faith is perfected and formed by charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens the
act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by
different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain
order, as stated above (FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; FS, Q[61], A[2]) when we were
treating of human acts in general.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is not
thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it quickens
the act of faith, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other
virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as we
shall show further on (Q[23], A[8]), and consequently charity is spoken
of as the form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living, or
living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that which
is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." Now
lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith. Therefore
when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that they are
not one identical habit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now
lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works is
dead." Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a
believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it causes
the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who hitherto
had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of faith in him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents cannot
be altered." Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith cannot be
at one time living, and at another, lifeless.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead"
(James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more." Therefore faith which
was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and living.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There have been various opinions on this question. For
some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that living
and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living faith comes,
lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner, when a man sins
mortally after having living faith, a new habit of lifeless faith is
infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting that grace should deprive
man of a gift of God by coming to him, and that a gift of God should be
infused into man, on account of a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have said
that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but that, all
the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith is not
taken away, and that it remains together with the habit of living faith
in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable that the habit of
lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person having living faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are
one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated by
that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a
perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which
pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not
pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit of
faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in respect of
something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in respect of
something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and lifeless
faith are not distinct habits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect things
from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the perfect comes
the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the advent of clear
vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially "of the things that
appear not." When, however, imperfection is not inseparable from the
imperfect thing, the same identical thing which was imperfect becomes
perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man and consequently the same
identical subject who was a child, becomes a man. Now lifelessness is not
essential to faith, but is accidental thereto as stated above. Therefore
lifeless faith itself becomes living.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an
animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul: consequently a
dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living and a dead thing
differ specifically. On the other hand that which gives faith its form,
or makes it live, is not essential to faith. Hence there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to be in
a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said above (FP,
Q[104], A[1]; FS, Q[109], A[9]) that God is always working man's
justification, even as the sun is always lighting up the air. Hence grace
is not less effective when it comes to a believer than when it comes to
an unbeliever: since it causes faith in both, in the former by confirming
and perfecting it, in the latter by creating it anew.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the
disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one who
has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin does not
take away grace from one who has already lost it through a previous
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not changed,
but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without charity,
and at another time, with charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is directed
to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject good," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is directed to the true.
Therefore faith is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. Now
faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the acquired
intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much
less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as
stated above (A[4]). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is not
connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living faith a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct from
the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces (1 Cor.
12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore faith is not a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice is all
virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified by
faith according to Rm. 5:1: "Being justified therefore by faith let us
have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts are
rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle of a good
act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living faith. For
since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth at the
command of the will, two things are required that this act may be
perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infallibly tend to its
object, which is the true; while the other is that the will should be
infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it assents to
the true: and both of these are to be found in the act of living faith.
For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the intellect should
ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object of faith, as
proved above (Q[1], A[3]): while the effect of charity, which is the form
of faith, is that the soul ever has its will directed to a good end.
Therefore living faith is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the
act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the intellect, it
has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if temperance be
in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the rational part,
temperance is not a virtue, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]), because
the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and an act of the
concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith requires an act of the
will, and an act of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it is
its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good in so
far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it has a
relation to the good considered as the object of the will, inasmuch as it
is formed by charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on human
reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity, from its
premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like faith is not
a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are speaking is based
on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and consequently its object
cannot be anything false; so that faith of this kind can be a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, as
though they belonged to different species. But they differ as perfect and
imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith, being imperfect,
does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue, for "virtue is a
kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the gratuitous
graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason, since the
gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are not common to
all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle says: "There are
diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given" this grace and "to
another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all members of the Church,
because its lifelessness is not part of its substance, if we consider it
as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore, say that in that passage, faith
denotes a certain excellency of faith, for instance, "constancy in
faith," according to a gloss, or the "word of faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain
pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss on
the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are enumerated,
explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is one virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is a gift
of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge are numbered
among God's gifts according to Is. 11:2. Now wisdom and knowledge differ
in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and knowledge about
temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 14,15). Since, then,
faith is about eternal things, and also about some temporal things, it
seems that faith is not one virtue, but divided into several parts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q[3],
A[1]). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all: since
what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet to come, as
appears from Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Therefore faith
is not one.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one
accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two
ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith.
Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to
which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the
part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it is
in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as any other
habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is
individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit
whereby we believe, it is one specifically, but differs numerically
according to its various subjects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then,
again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one same
thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be
diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do not
belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something eternal,
viz. the First Truth, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]). Hence there is one
faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is different with wisdom
and knowledge, which consider temporal and eternal matters under their
respective aspects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from any
difference in the thing believed, but from the different relationships of
believers to the one thing believed, as also we have mentioned above (FS,
Q[103], A[4]; FS, Q[107], A[1], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is the first of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues. For a
gloss on Lk. 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that fortitude is the
foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is founded
thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that hope
"leads on to faith." Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further on
(Q[17], A[1]). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it was stated above (A[2]) that the intellect of the
believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of
faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the first
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as a
gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.]. Now
faith is formed by charity, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore it is owing
to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is the
foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first part
of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts.
Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by
charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by faith,
as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity precedes faith.
Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." Now the substance of a thing is
that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its
very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes
all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of
action, as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[3]; FS, Q[34], A[4], ad 1), the
theological virtues, the object of which is the last end, must needs
precede all the others. Again, the last end must of necessity be present
to the intellect before it is present to the will, since the will has no
inclination for anything except in so far as it is apprehended by the
intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in the will by hope and
charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first of all the virtues
must, of necessity, be faith, because natural knowledge cannot reach God
as the object of heavenly bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and
charity tend towards Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an
accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which removes
an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the Philosopher
(Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be said to precede
faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles to belief. Thus
fortitude removes the inordinate fear that hinders faith; humility
removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself to the truth of
faith. The same may be said of some other virtues, although there are no
real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra
Julian. iv, 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot hope
to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible, since
hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above (FS, Q[40], A[1]).
It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to persevere in faith,
or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this sense that hope is said to
lead to faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the
inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it is
not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue; since
all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law, as stated
above (FS, Q[100], A[2]); and thus it is requisite for faith. In another
way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the commandments
considered as a duty. In this way it is a special virtue, and a part of
justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when he obeys him: and
thus obedience follows faith, whereby man knows that God is his superior,
Whom he must obey.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come first,
but also to be connected with the other parts of the building: since the
building would not be founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it.
Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is charity, according to
Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things have charity which is the bond of
perfection." Consequently faith without charity cannot be the foundation:
and yet it does not follow that charity precedes faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not an
act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes faith,
because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless the
intellect possesses right faith about Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual
virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than science and the
other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude, wherefore
a thing would seem to be the more certain, through being less doubtful,
just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an admixture of black.
Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free of any doubt about
their objects; whereas the believer may sometimes suffer a movement of
doubt, and doubt about matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more
certain than the intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/2
OBJ 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is
through hearing" according to Rm. 10:17; whereas understanding, science
and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore science and
understanding are more certain than faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 2/2
Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the
more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since faith
is the way to understanding, according to another version [*The
Septuagint] of Is. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you shall not
understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1)
that "faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it seems that science
or understanding is more certain than faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had
received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . . . "you
received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of
God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore science
is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[57], A[4], ad 2) two of the
intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and art;
to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of its
matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas the
other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science [*In English the
corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and understanding, are about
necessary things, as stated above (FS, Q[57], A[5], ad 3). But it must be
observed that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in two ways:
first, as intellectual virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
2,3); secondly, for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in
the first way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways.
First, on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more
certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain
than those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth,
whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Secondly,
certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more
a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this
way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human
intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not.
Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but
relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it
follows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are more
certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise if these three be taken as
gifts received in this present life, they are related to faith as to
their principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith
is more certain.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but on
our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith with our
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than
hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear greatly
surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain than sight:
thus a man of little science is more certain about what he hears on the
authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him
according to his own reason: and much more is a man certain about what he
hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than about what he sees with his
own reason, which can be mistaken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect
than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness, but
not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the whole certitude of
the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from the certitude of
faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of conclusions arises from
the certitude of premisses. But in so far as science, wisdom and
understanding are intellectual virtues, they are based upon the natural
light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God's word, on
which faith is founded.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original
state?
(2) Whether the demons have faith?
(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in others?
(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the angels, or
in man, in their original state. For Hugh St. Victor says in his
Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or things that are
in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation." Now the angels, in
their original state, before they were either confirmed in grace, or had
fallen from it, had their eyes opened to contemplation, since "they saw
things in the Word," according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
Likewise the first man, while in the state of innocence, seemingly had
his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i,
6) that "in his original state man knew his Creator, not by the mere
outward perception of hearing, but by inward inspiration, not as now
believers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him clearly present
to their contemplation." Therefore there was no faith in the angels and
man in their original state.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure, according to
1 Cor. 13:13: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Now in their
original state there was not obscurity either in the angels or in man,
because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore there could be no faith in
the angels or in man, in their original state.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 10:17) that "faith . . . cometh by
hearing." Now this could not apply to angels and man in their original
state; for then they could not hear anything from another. Therefore, in
that state, there was no faith either in man or in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God, must
believe." Now the original state of angels and man was one of approach to
God. Therefore they had need of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some say that there was no faith in the angels before
they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he
sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of Divine
things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of things that appear
not," according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since "by faith we
believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in Joan.; QQ.
Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes faith, which
renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. Now the principal
object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of which gives the
happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as the
angels before their confirmation in grace, and man before sin, did not
possess the happiness whereby God is seen in His Essence, it is evident
that the knowledge they possessed was not such as to exclude faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be
explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith. And
if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as some
[*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold that
there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in grace, or
in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses not only a
man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Since, however, we stated in the FP, Q[62], A[3]; FP, Q[95], A[1] that
man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we must needs say
that there was in them a certain beginning of hoped-for happiness, by
reason of grace received but not yet consummated, which happiness was
begun in their will by hope and charity, and in the intellect by faith,
as stated above (Q[4], A[7]). Consequently we must hold that the angels
had faith before they were confirmed, and man, before he sinned.
Nevertheless we must observe that in the object of faith, there is
something formal, as it were, namely the First Truth surpassing all the
natural knowledge of a creature, and something material, namely, the
thing to which we assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard
to the former, before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to
all who have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas
with regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of
faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another, even in
the present state, as we have shown above (Q[1], A[5]; Q[2], A[4], ad 2).
In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels before being
confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest knowledge about
certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we cannot know except
by believing them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the words of Hugh of St. Victor are those of a
master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that the
contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly contemplation,
whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence. Now the angels did
not possess this contemplation before they were confirmed, nor did man
before he sinned: yet their contemplation was of a higher order than
ours, for by its means they approached nearer to God, and had manifest
knowledge of more of the Divine effects and mysteries than we can have
knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them so that they sought an absent
God as we seek Him: since by the light of wisdom He was more present to
them than He is to us, although He was not so present to them as He is to
the Blessed by the light of glory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the original
state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural obscurity in
the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every creature is darkness
in comparison with the immensity of the Divine light: and this obscurity
suffices for faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything from
man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring inwardly: thus
the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9: "I will hear what the
Lord God will speak in me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the demons there is faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For Augustine says
(De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the believer's will": and
this is a good will, since by it man wishes to believe in God. Since then
no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated above (FP, Q[64],
A[2], ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is no faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Eph. 2:8:
"By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift of God."
Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, "They look to strange gods, and
love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their gifts of grace by
sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons after they sinned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as
Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on Jn. 15:22, "If I had not
come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no
excuse for their sin." Now the sin of unbelief is in some men.
Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a sin
graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in
the demons there is no faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe
and tremble."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[1], A[4]; Q[2], A[1]), the believer's
intellect assents to that which he believes, not because he sees it
either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident principles,
but because his will commands his intellect to assent. Now, that the
will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes. First,
through the will being directed to the good, and in this way, to believe
is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the intellect is convinced
that it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction is not
based on objective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching the word
of God, were to foretell something, and were to give a sign, by raising a
dead person to life, the intellect of a witness would be convinced so as
to recognize clearly that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the
thing itself foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently
the essence of faith would not be removed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in
the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons, but
only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby they
recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although they do
not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for instance that
there are three Persons in God, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the
evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their belief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe,
by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that faith is
lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, is not a gift of
grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their natural
intellectual acumen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident, that
the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so that
their malice is by no means diminished by their believe.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless
faith in the other articles?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article of
faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the natural
intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a catholic. Now a
catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to
believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics
cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of lifeless faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one
science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess
the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be
ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some articles
of faith without believing the others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of
faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a man
can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can believe
some articles, and disbelieve others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is
disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not
remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after
a man disbelieves one article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic
who disbelieves one article of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the
formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit
cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as
manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds
from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an
infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds
from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith,
but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is
evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it
is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it.
Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as
to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise,
if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold,
and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the
teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will.
Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one
article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in
all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but
only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to
one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of
opinion in accordance with his own will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about
which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful does,
namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so,
a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the things that
are of faith, by his own will and judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The various conclusions of a science have their respective
means of demonstration, one of which may be known without another, so
that we may know some conclusions of a science without knowing the
others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles of faith by
reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in
Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church who has the right
understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether
lacking in faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either to
their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept without
another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God,
in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment, according to
James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend in one point is become guilty
of all."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than in
another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its object. Now
whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by failing
in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above (A[3]).
Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme cannot
be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme, because it
requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things.
Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding of
principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith are the
first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above (Q[1], A[7]).
Now the understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree by all
men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree by all the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Wherever we find great and little, there we find more
or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our
Lord said to Peter (Mt. 14:31): "O thou of little faith, why didst thou
doubt?" And to the woman he said (Mt. 15: 28): "O woman, great is thy
faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[52], AA[1],2; FS, Q[112], A[4]),
the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of view: first,
on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its participation by
the subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in respect
of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material object which
is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith is one and
simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]). Hence in
this respect there is no diversity of faith among believers, but it is
specifically one in all, as stated above (Q[4], A[6]). But the things
which are proposed as the matter of our belief are many and can be
received more or less explicitly; and in this respect one man can believe
explicitly more things than another, so that faith can be greater in one
man on account of its being more explicit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its
participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the act of
faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated above
(Q[2], AA[1],2; Q[4], A[2]). Consequently a man's faith may be described
as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, on account of
its greater certitude and firmness, and, in another way, on the part of
his will, on account of his greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of faith,
has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly believe
all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In this
respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of the
object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first
place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to it
with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is
greater in one than in another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: The understanding of principles results from man's very
nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from the
gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above (FS,
Q[112], A[4]). Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to
another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?
(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is infused into man by God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and
nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science
begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith
does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems
to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing
miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (Jn.
4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus
said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house";
and (Rm. 10:17) it is said that "faith is through hearing." Therefore man
attains to faith by acquiring it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired by
him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according to Augustine
(De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 2:8,9): "By grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory . .
for it is the gift of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the
things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in
order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite
for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed
to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be
from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason,
hence they do not come to man's knowledge, unless God reveal them. To
some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which
were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are
proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Rm.
10:15: "How shall they preach, unless they be sent?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of
faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such
as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith:
neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same
miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not.
Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to
assent to matters of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's
free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from
ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent
to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from
God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false,
for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his
nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle
moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the
assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly
by grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external
persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith
is that which moves man inwardly to assent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument again refers to the cause that proposes
outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by
words or deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer:
but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that he
may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above (Q[2]
, A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God. For it is
written (Dt. 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now lifeless
faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through lacking
its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when it lacks
the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from God, as
stated above (FS, Q[79], A[2], ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith
from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is written
(Jn. 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the
law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I have healed
the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now faith heals man from unbelief.
Therefore whoever receives from God the gift of faith, is at the same
time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by living
faith. Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and consequently
lifeless faith is not from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that "the faith which lacks
charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless
faith is a gift of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that
privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes it is
not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper species:
thus privation of the due equilibrium of the humors is essential to the
species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to a diaphanous
body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, when we assign the cause of
a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that thing as existing in its
proper species, it follows that what is not the cause of privation,
cannot be assigned as the cause of the thing to which that privation
belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot assign as the
cause of a sickness, something which is not the cause of a disturbance in
the humors: though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something
which is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the
diaphanous body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith,
since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic form, as
stated above (Q[4], A[4]). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith is
that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this is God, as
stated above (A[1]). It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a gift
of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with the
perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a perfection that
suffices for the essential notion of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's species,
considered as a moral act, as stated above (FP, Q[48], A[1], ad 2; FS,
Q[18], A[5]): for an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of
an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act's
circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of a deformed
act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He is the cause of
the act as such.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due
form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is compared to
the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not
from God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is from God,
so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened by charity,
as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who receives faith from God without charity, is healed
from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous unbelief is
not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from committing
such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that a man desists from
one act of sin, through God causing him thus to desist, without desisting
from another act of sin, through the instigation of his own malice. And
in this way sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe, and yet
he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or
the like, is given to some without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?
(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear is an effect of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For an effect
does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it is written
(Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him." Therefore fear is
not an effect of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now fear
and hope are contraries, as stated above (FS, Q[23], A[2]): and faith
begets hope, as a gloss observes on Mt. 1:2. Therefore fear is not an
effect of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object of
faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of fear is an
evil, as stated above (FS, Q[42], A[1]). Again, acts take their species
from the object, according to what was stated above (FS, Q[18], A[2]).
Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe
and tremble."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as stated
above (FS, Q[41], A[1]). Now the principle of all appetitive movements is
the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the principle of fear and
of every appetitive movement must be an apprehension. Again, through
faith there arises in us an apprehension of certain penal evils, which
are inflicted in accordance with the Divine judgment. In this way, then,
faith is a cause of the fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God;
and this is servile fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be separated
from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to Him, and holds
Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an
unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the greatest
evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of the first
fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while living faith
is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it makes man adhere
to God and to be subject to Him by charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if we
knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and punishments,
concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear Him. If,
however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain articles of faith,
for example the Divine excellence, then reverential fear follows, the
result of which is that man submits his intellect to God, so as to
believe in all the Divine promises. Hence the text quoted continues: "And
your reward shall not be made void."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be the cause of
contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets hope, in so
far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God awards to the
just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it makes us appreciate
the punishments which He intends to inflict on sinners.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the good which is
the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes also certain
evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to submit to God, or
to be separated from Him, and that sinners will suffer penal evils from
God: in this way faith can be the cause of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For purity of
the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith is in the
intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying the heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with
impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be
seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not purify
the heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way, it
would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify the
intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge. Therefore faith
nowise purifies the heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Peter said (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by
faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed with baser things:
for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which betters it,
but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that the rational
creature is more excellent than all transient and corporeal creatures; so
that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to transient things by
loving them. From this impurity the rational creature is purified by
means of a contrary movement, namely, by tending to that which is above
it, viz. God. The first beginning of this movement is faith: since "he
that cometh to God must believe that He is," according to Heb. 11:6.
Hence the first beginning of the heart's purifying is faith; and if this
be perfected through being quickened by charity, the heart will be
perfectly purified thereby.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of
those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good moves
the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which is
contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the human
intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself, through wishing
to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible objects. But when it is
quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind of impurity,
because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity of
sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect, according
to the present state of life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gifts of understand and knowledge, which
respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of understanding
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?
(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is only
speculative, or practical also?
(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of
understanding?
(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?
(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other gifts;
(7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?
(8) Which of the fruits?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of nature, since they
are given in addition to the latter. Now understanding is a natural habit
of the soul, whereby self-evident principles are known, as stated in
Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according to
their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now the mode
of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of
understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason), as
Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge which
is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather than a gift
of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is
condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy
Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost
should receive the name of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall
rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for
"intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read
inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between
intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with
external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates
into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect is
"what a thing is," as stated in De Anima iii, 6.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which
human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under the
accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words
lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth they
denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed within as
compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and
effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of
understanding with regard to all these things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it
were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding,
the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural
light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to
a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light in
order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know by its
natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on man is
called the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests only
certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man is
ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[3]; FS, Q[3]
, A[8]), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for which he
requires the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an understanding
and ends at an understanding; because we reason by proceeding from
certain understood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected
when we come to understand what hitherto we ignored. Hence the act of
reasoning proceeds from something previously understood. Now a gift of
grace does not proceed from the light of nature, but is added thereto as
perfecting it. Wherefore this addition is not called "reason" but
"understanding," since the additional light is in comparison with what we
know supernaturally, what the natural light is in regard to those things
which we known from the first.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite without
indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a certain
excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things. Hence
the supernatural gift is called after the understanding rather than after
the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is incompatible with
faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that "the thing which is
understood is bounded by the comprehension of him who understands it."
But the thing which is believed is not comprehended, according to the
word of the Apostle to the Philippians 3:12: "Not as though I had already
comprehended [Douay: 'attained'], or were already perfect." Therefore it
seems that faith and understanding are incompatible in the same subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding. But
faith is of things that appear not, as stated above (Q[1], A[4]; Q[4],
A[1]). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding in the same
subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But science
and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated above (Q[1],
AA[4],5). Much less, therefore, can understanding and faith be in the
same subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding
enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard." Now one who has
faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard; thus
it is written (Lk. 24:27,32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures to His
disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore understanding is
compatible with faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on the
side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 2/5
On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain things,
of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery to three
Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son; whereas other
things come under faith, through being subordinate, in one way or
another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is contained in
the Divine Scriptures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 3/5
On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that
there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way, we
understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence of
the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in itself of the
proposition understood. In this way, so long as the state of faith lasts,
we cannot understand those things which are the direct object of faith:
although certain other things that are subordinate to faith can be
understood even in this way.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 4/5
In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of a
thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity or
mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward appearances,
they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we understand that we
ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the sake of things that
appear externally. In this way, even during the state of faith, nothing
hinders us from understanding even those things which are the direct
object of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 5/5
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to the
understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of the
Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according to
Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more exalted
things." But the practical intellect is occupied, not with exalted, but
with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions are concerned.
Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more excellent
than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the intellectual
virtue of understanding is concerned with none but necessary things,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much more, therefore, is the
gift of understanding concerned with none but necessary matters. Now the
practical intellect is not about necessary things, but about things which
may be otherwise than they are, and which may result from man's activity.
Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in matters
which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with which the
practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural reason, which is
the directing principle in matters of action, as was made clear above
(FS, Q[58], A[2]; FS, Q[71], A[6]). Therefore the gift of understanding
is not practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 110:10): "A good understanding to
all that do it."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the gift of understanding is not
only about those things which come under faith first and principally, but
also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good actions have a
certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh through charity,"
according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift of understanding
extends also to certain actions, not as though these were its principal
object, but in so far as the rule of our actions is the eternal law, to
which the higher reason, which is perfected by the gift of understanding,
adheres by contemplating and consulting it, as Augustine states (De Trin.
xii, 7).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The things with which human actions are concerned are not
surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred to the
rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, they are
exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding consists
precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only as
they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is the more
excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and the
eternal law, as stated above (FS, Q[71], A[6]). Now the eternal law
surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as ruled
by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires the
supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in all who
are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the gift
of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness of mind." Now many
who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind. Therefore the
gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge,
faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith Christ
dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of
understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who have
faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not necessary for
salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in a state of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a state
of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of understanding
and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself profitably, for, at
times, "when the mind is puffed up with understanding sublime things, it
becomes sluggish and dull in base and vile things," as Gregory observes
(Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who
are in a state of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 81:5): "They have not known or
understood, they walk on in darkness." But no one who is in a state of
grace walks in darkness, according to Jn. 8:12: "He that followeth Me,
walketh not in darkness." Therefore no one who is in a state of grace is
without the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs be
rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,
according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will cannot
be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some knowledge of
the truth, since the object of the will is good understood, as stated in
De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost directs man's will by the
gift of charity, so as to move it directly to some supernatural good; so
also, by the gift of understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that
it knows some supernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have
sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of mind
with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but with
regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are sufficiently
instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Jn. 2:27: "His unction
teacheth you of all things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully the things
that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that they ought to
believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift of
understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order that they
may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes with regard to
other things, so that their mind is unable to penetrate all things
clearly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not
sanctifying grace?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found also in
those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in expounding the
words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will is weak
and slow to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace, the will is
prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of understanding can be
in those who have not sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is no
prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be prophecy
without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Mt. 7:22, where those who say:
"We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not prophesied in Thy
name?]," are answered with the words: "I never knew you." Therefore the
gift of understanding can be without sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of
faith, according to Is. 7:9, following another reading [*The Septuagint]:
"If you will not believe you shall not understand." Now faith can be
without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding can be
without it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:45): "Every one that hath heard of
the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by the intellect,
as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or understand what we
hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of understanding, cometh to Christ,
which is impossible without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of
understanding cannot be without sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) the gifts of the
Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the motion of
the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of grace is
called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's understanding is
easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of which movement
depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore unless the human
intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to have a right estimate
of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of understanding, however
much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in regard to other truths
that are preambles to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in error
about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest good: and
no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in moral matters a
man has a right estimate about the end through a habit of virtue.
Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of intellectual
light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions of a gift,
unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a right estimate
about the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a kind
of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed to the
prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with regard to a
right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the gift of
understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but
understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which
perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the
end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between understanding
and faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not distinct from
the other gifts. For there is no distinction between things whose
opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to folly,
understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to rashness,
knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49).
But there would seem to be no difference between folly, dulness,
ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does understanding differ from
the other gifts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs from
the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be about
self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not about any
self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first principles
suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally self-evident:
while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as are supernatural,
since the articles of faith are like first principles in supernatural
knowledge, as stated above (Q[1], A[7]). Therefore the gift of
understanding does not differ from the other intellectual gifts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or
practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as stated
above (A[3]). Therefore it is not distinct from the other intellectual
gifts, but comprises them all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, When several things are enumerated together they must
be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction is the
origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated together
with the other gifts, as appears from Is. 11:2. Therefore the gift of
understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The difference between the gift of understanding and
three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, since
the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while the three
belong to the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Body Para. 2/4
But the difference between this gift of understanding and the remaining
three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also belong to the
cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of understanding differs from
the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that these two belong to practical
knowledge, while the gift of understanding belongs to speculative
knowledge; and that it differs from the gift of wisdom, which also
belongs to speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is concerned with
judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to grasp the things
that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very heart. And in this
sense we have assigned the number of the gifts, above (FS, Q[68], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Body Para. 3/4
But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is
concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters, as
stated above (A[3]), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards both
matters, as we shall show further on (Q[9], A[3]), and consequently, we
must take their distinction in some other way. For all these four gifts
are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, in us, takes its
foundation from faith. Now "faith is through hearing" (Rm. 10:17). Hence
some things must be proposed to be believed by man, not as seen, but as
heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first and principally, is
about the First Truth, secondarily, about certain considerations
concerning creatures, and furthermore extends to the direction of human
actions, in so far as it works through charity, as appears from what has
been said above (Q[4], A[2], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Body Para. 4/4
Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two
things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated or
grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of understanding.
Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these things aright, that
he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these things, and to withdraw
from their opposites: and this judgment, with regard to Divine things
belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard to created things, belongs
to the gift of knowledge, and as to its application to individual
actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts is
clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which Gregory
assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to sharpness, since
an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when it is able to
penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed to it. Hence it
is dulness of mind that renders the mind unable to pierce into the heart
of a thing. A man is said to be a fool if he judges wrongly about the
common end of life, wherefore folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which
makes us judge aright about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a
defect in the mind, even about any particular things whatever, so that it
is contrary to knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about
particular causes, viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to
counsel, whereby man does not proceed to action before deliberating with
his reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The gift of understanding is about the first principles of
that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than faith,
because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it belongs to the
gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the things that are said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment, but as
to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart," etc.,
responds to the gift of understanding?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of
heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift of
understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to the
appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the appetite, but
rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does
not respond to the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by
faith." Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart being purified.
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to the virtue of faith
rather than to the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the present
state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the present life,
since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed, as stated above
(FS, Q[3], A[8]). Therefore the sixth beatitude which comprises the sight
of God, does not respond to the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to the
clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye hath not
seen."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as also
in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the other by
way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above (FS, Q[69], AA[2]
,4), and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift of
understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Body Para. 2/4
For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to seeing
God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate affections:
and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and gifts
belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart is a kind
of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of the mind that
is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the truths which are
proposed to it about God, no longer by way of corporeal phantasms, nor
infected with heretical misrepresentations: and this cleanness is the
result of the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Body Para. 3/4
Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's
Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not what
God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly do we
know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses all that
the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God belongs to the gift of
understanding; the first, to the gift of understanding in its state of
perfection, as possessed in heaven; the second, to the gift of
understanding in its state of inchoation, as possessed by wayfarers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two
arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers to
the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in this
life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above (FS,
Q[69], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not respond to
the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit of faith, since
it is written (Is. 7:9) according to another reading [*The Septuagint]:
"If you will not believe you shall not understand," where our version
has: "If you will not believe, you shall not continue." Therefore fruit
is not the fruit of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what follows.
But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the foundation of
the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above (Q[4], AA[1],7). Therefore
faith is not the fruit of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the
appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;
namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. Therefore
faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more than to wisdom,
knowledge or counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of
understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith,
which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says that
the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen." Therefore
faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above (FS, Q[70],
A[1]), when we were discussing them, are so called because they are
something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of the
Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an end,
which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that which is
ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be, after a
fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to the other
powers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a
power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same
power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. In
this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the
gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while the
fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue. But
we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of certitude
of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it would
be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be believed,
without understanding it in some way. However, the perfection of
understanding follows the virtue of faith: which perfection of
understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that
very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own
sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand, speculative
knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is the certitude
about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which belongs only to
practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of its own: while the
gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge, which can belongs also to
speculative knowledge, have but one corresponding fruit, which is
certainly denoted by the name of faith. The reason why there are several
fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty, is because, as already
stated, the character of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to
the appetitive rather than to the intellective part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?
(2) Whether it is about Divine things?
(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether knowledge is a gift?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect
of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a
"demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge." Therefore
knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy
persons, as stated above (Q[8], A[4]; FS, Q[68], A[5]). Now Augustine
says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack knowledge though
they have faith." Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated
above (FS, Q[68], A[8]). Therefore one gift suffices for the perfection
of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of
faith, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]). Therefore the gift of knowledge does
not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to which other virtue it
can respond. Since, then, the gifts are perfections of virtues, as stated
above (FS, Q[68], AA[1],2), it seems that knowledge is not a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Is. 11:2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does
not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now,
when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some
truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first,
because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect
may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he
should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be believed,
and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated above (Q[8],
A[6]): while the other is that he should have a sure and right judgment
on them, so as to discern what is to be believed, from what is not to be
believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is required.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures, according
to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a sure
judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so
human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning. On the
other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any
discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in the FP, Q[14],
A[7]; wherefore God's knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but
absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened which is a gift
of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated likeness thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief. One
is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning things to be
believed from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is a gift
and is common to all holy persons. The other is a knowledge about matters
of belief, whereby one knows not only what one ought to believe, but also
how to make the faith known, how to induce others to believe, and confute
those who deny the faith. This knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous
graces, which are not given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after
the words quoted, adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he
ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to
the godly, and to defend it against the ungodly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and intellectual
virtues; but they are not more perfect than the theological virtues;
rather are all the gifts ordained to the perfection of the theological
virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not unreasonable if several gifts
are ordained to one theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets, nourishes
and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things, because its
object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]). Therefore the
gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than acquired
knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine things, for
instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift of
knowledge about Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Rm. 1:20, "the invisible things of God . .
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." If
therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems that there is
also knowledge of Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge of
Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human
affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its
cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order of
causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought
the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the first cause:
nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other cause;
wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first cause, is the
first and most perfect judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of
the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect
thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms,
that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special name of
"definition," but the convertible terms which fall short of this, retain
the common name, and are called "proper" terms.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as
stated above (A[1]), if this certitude of the judgment is derived from
the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is wisdom: for
a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the highest cause
of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all matters by that
cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who knows the cause which is
absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is
called "wisdom," while the knowledge of human things is called
"knowledge," this being the common name denoting certitude of judgment,
and appropriated to the judgment which is formed through second causes.
Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from
the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or
created things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet faith
itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence to know
what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know
in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them,
belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds
more to charity which unites man's mind to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic acceptation of
the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special gift, but according
as it is restricted to judgments formed through created things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[1], A[1]), every cognitive habit regards
formally the mean through which things are known, and materially, the
things that are known through the mean. And since that which is formal,
is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions
about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather
among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have
more in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated
in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man
knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to
which it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs
materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to
Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among the
gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14) that
"knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use of external
things." But the knowledge which is concerned about actions is practical.
Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if it
hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lacks
the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this authority that
knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative science.
Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the righteous,
as stated above (Q[9], A[5]). But speculative knowledge can be also in
the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do
good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Therefore the gift of
knowledge is not speculative but practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own day
prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the
mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of
knowledge is both speculative and practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[9], A[8]), the gift of knowledge, like
the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith. Now
faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, in as much as it
is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the last
end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that faith
extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6: "Faith . . . worketh by charity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and
principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what he
ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we
are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and of
conclusions drawn therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so far
as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet not
action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As we have already stated (Q[8], A[5]) about the gift of
understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of
understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace: and
so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that they
alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters of
faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never to
wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of holy
things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the just . . . through
the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," etc.
corresponds to the gift of knowledge?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that
mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as evil
is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now
knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is
known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and the
crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not
suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now there
is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there joy, since it
is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her
company any tediousness, but joy and gladness." Therefore the aforesaid
beatitude does not suitably correspond with the gift of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, before
operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow does not
correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not concerned about
things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore the
aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond with the gift
of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge
befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the
evil which he coveted as though it were good."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is
occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned to an
abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those,
namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the
perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last end
in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment of
creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the
occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in so far
as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of
spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond
directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge there
corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in
consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs
creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in this
beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward;
which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may
sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers: it is
thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it
consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude does
consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-ordered love
of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence
beatitude relating to contemplation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to
understanding and wisdom, which are about Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] Out. Para. 1/3
OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,
which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to
confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are
contrary to knowledge and understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] Out. Para. 2/3
As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy;
(3) apostasy from the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?
(5) Of the species of unbelief;
(6) Of their comparison, one with another;
(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?
(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?
(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?
(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?
(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?
(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against
their parents' will?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelief is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is
contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now
unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be
capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have faith,
even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful."
Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every sin
is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief, for he
cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says (Rm.
10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard? And
how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore unbelief does not seem
to be a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (FS, Q[84], A[4]), there are seven
capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem
to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and
unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure
negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has
not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to
the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises
it, according to Is. 53:1: "Who hath believed our report?" It is this
that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that
unbelief is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those
who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of
sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a
result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are
damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away
without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our
Lord said (Jn. 15:22) "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would
not have sin"; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as
"referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it is
part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner
instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way,
unbelief is contrary to nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure negation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride,
through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of
faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not
reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices
opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its
subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De Duabus
Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore
unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching of
the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief is in
the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor. 11:14
"Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says that if
"a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for a good
angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or says
what is becoming to a good angel." This seems to be because of the
rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his
intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief
seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it does
not reside in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one another are in the
same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the
intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[74], AA[1],2), sin is said to be
in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a sinful act
may have two principles: one is its first and universal principle, which
commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because every sin is
voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act is the proper and
proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: thus the concupiscible
is the principle of gluttony and lust, wherefore these sins are said to
be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to
unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just
as assent is.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate
subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which
way every sin is said to be in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent, which
completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief is in the
will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does not
dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are deceived,
while his mind does not depart from a true and right judgment" as the
gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But, according to the same
authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to invite one to his abode,
i.e. wickedness and error, is not without sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins. For
Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate to
decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic,
in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact that he is
a heretic." But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we ought not to say
absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not,
seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes sin:
for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): "I . . . before was a blasphemer,
and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . . mercy . . .
because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore unbelief is not the
greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment,
according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the
measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater punishment is due to
believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more,
do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot
the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by
which he was sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Jn. 15:22, "If I had not come,
and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract. lxxxix in
Joan.): "Under the general name, He refers to a singularly great sin. For
this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others may be traced."
Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
stated above (FS, Q[71], A[6]; FS, Q[73], A[3]). Hence the more a sin
severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever
separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of
God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is
severed from Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him
in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin
that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins
that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further
on (Q[20], A[3]; Q[34], A[2], ad 2; Q[39], A[2], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus from
being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence Augustine
hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning
otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more grave generically,
it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the sin of the
Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory thereto,
and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect it is a
most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain
reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from malice, as was the
case with the Apostle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of
unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider the
kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by
a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other things being equal,
sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on account of his knowledge
of the truth through faith, and on account of the sacraments of faith
with which he has been satiated, and which he insults by committing sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin. Because a
gloss on Rm. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole
life of unbelievers is a sin." Now the life of unbelievers consists of
their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no good
save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among unbelievers, no
action can be good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which
follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all
the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers,
they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts
10:4,31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every
action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[85], AA[2],4) mortal sin takes
away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature.
Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace
indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is
evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from
grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do
those good works for which the good of nature suffices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For even
as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even
mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the
end of his unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the life
of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is taken
away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same
authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts according to his
unbelief, sins grievously."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the supernatural
last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct the intention
in respect of a connatural good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in
unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them,
whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard,
however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an
unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom
none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth of
the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to give
him fuller instruction in the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are several species of unbelief?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not several species of unbelief.
For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another, they must be
about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
whence it derives its unity, although its matter contains many points of
belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First Truth; while
the things which an unbeliever disbelieves are the matter of his
unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not on material but on
formal principles. Therefore there are not several species of unbelief,
according to the various points which the unbeliever disbelieves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in an
infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of unbelief
correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to follow that
there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and consequently,
that we ought not to make these species the object of our consideration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different species. Now
a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points of
truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species
of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue,
because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is
a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[55], A[4]; FS, Q[64], A[1]), every
virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge or operation.
Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach
of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are opposed to one
virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed to each virtue may be
considered in two ways, first, with regard to their different relations
to the virtue: and in this way there are determinate species of vices
contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is opposed by
exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of the virtue.
Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one virtue may be considered
in respect of the corruption of the various conditions required for that
virtue. In this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one
virtue, e.g. temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of
ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so
that the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the
Pythagoreans held evil to be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to
faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number. For,
since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this may
happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been
accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the
Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either
in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very
manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we
may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the
various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not determinate
species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied indefinitely, as
Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two ways.
First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case the thing
to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines
the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be considered as an
evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is the formal object of
the sin; which however does not derive its species from this point of
view, in fact it is a privation. We must therefore reply that the object
of unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbelief
forsakes, but its formal aspect, considered as that to which unbelief
turns, is the false opinion that it follows: and it is from this point of
view that unbelief derives its various species. Hence, even as charity
is one, because it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various
species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign
Good by turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various
inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering
to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because
unbelievers follow many false opinions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the various species of unbelief
according to various points in which errors occur.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many things in
relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things, be one
in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one
man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as one man may be
subject to various vices, and to various bodily diseases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is graver
than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according as it
endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so does sin
appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which holds a
more important place in virtue. Now that which is most important in
faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the heathens deviate by
believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest of all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which
contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important points:
thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more detestable
than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ from the Person
of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more numerous and more
important points than Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the
faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good in
the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from God, and
there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament.
Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who receive neither
Testament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pt. 2:21): "It had been better for
them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it,
to turn back." Now the heathens have not known the way of justice,
whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way.
Therefore theirs is the graver sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (A[5]), two things may be considered in
unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this point of
view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more grievously
against faith, than he who resists it without having accepted it, even as
he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more grievously than if
he had never promised it. In this way the unbelief of heretics, who
confess their belief in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting
it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted
the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith
in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false interpretations, their
unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the
latter have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 2/4
The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of
matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points than
Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is
more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews than
that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the Manichees, who,
in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 3/4
Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of
view of guilt; since, as stated above (A[1]) unbelief has the character
of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere absence of
faith, for the latter as was stated (A[1]) seems rather to bear the
character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of
heretics is the worst.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with unbelievers in
public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words, for it
is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers." But it is
impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly without contending in
words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the canons
[*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus: "It is an
insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone ventures to
debate or dispute in public about matters which have once been judged and
disposed of." Now all matters of faith have been decided by the holy
councils. Therefore it is an insult to the councils, and consequently a
grave sin to presume to dispute in public about matters of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments. But an
argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas things
that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt.
Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22,29) that "Saul increased much
more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that "he spoke . . . to
the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be
observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of his
hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his intention.
For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and
did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended to
probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as being doubtful of
the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is praiseworthy to
dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or for practice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the
disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and wavering.
As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be
no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as to
simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because either they are
provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or
pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not
subject to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where there
are not unbelievers. In the first case it is necessary to dispute in
public about the faith, provided there be those who are equal and adapted
to the task of confuting errors; since in this way simple people are
strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the
opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the
perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend to
strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as a
thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence
leave those in error who might have been instructed." On the other hand,
in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith,
in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very reason is
more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from what they
believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have
to say against the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but such
as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than of sound
speeches.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the faith,
which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are for the
safeguarding thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as though
one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known, and to
confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary
sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending the faith,
according to 1 Pt. 3:15: "Being ready always to satisfy everyone that
asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you [*Vulg.: 'Of
that hope which is in you' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken from
Bede]." Sometimes again, it is necessary, in order to convince those who
are in error, according to Titus 1:9: "That he may be able to exhort in
sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be compelled
to the faith. For it is written (Mt. 13:28) that the servants of the
householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: "Wilt thou
that we go and gather it up?" and that he answered: "No, lest perhaps
gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it": on
which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Matth.): "Our Lord says this
so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics,
because if you do you will necessarily slay many innocent persons."
Therefore it seems that for the same reason unbelievers ought not to be
compelled to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De Judaeis):
"The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for the future,
none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in like manner, neither
should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that "it is
possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot
believe unless he is willing." Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought
not to be compelled to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): "I
desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth']." Now we
ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above (FS, Q[19],
AA[9],10). Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put to
death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): "Go out into the highways
and hedges; and compel them to come in." Now men enter into the house of
God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be
compelled to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received
the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means
to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to
believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled by the
faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the
faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even by
their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ's faithful
often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing
them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and take them
prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will,
but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted
the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such
should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what
they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, not
the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from the
words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of
himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to union
with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with arguments.
However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of contradiction,
but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable,
that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our chains asunder."
Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's words, "Suffer both to grow until
the harvest," must be gathered from those which precede, "lest perhaps
gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with it." For,
Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) "these words show that when
this is not to be feared, that is to say, when a man's crime is so
publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none
such as might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not
slacken."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought not
by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have received
it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same
chapter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a
vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter of
the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a
matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled to keep the
faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): "What do
these people mean by crying out continually: 'We may believe or not
believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel?' They should remember
that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards taught Him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us wishes
any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to have
peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had
raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers together
some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her maternal
heart by the delivery of so many nations."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.
For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that believe not,
invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before
you." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad Heb.): "If you wish
to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any reservation." Now to
sit at table with anyone is to communicate with him. Therefore it is
lawful to communicate with unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to
judge them that are without?" Now unbelievers are without. When,
therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain
people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he
communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or
pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully
communicate with them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): "Thou shalt make no league
with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages with
them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at the return of the
month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we should
not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have any
dealings with them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to
the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with whom
they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who
are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be gathered
from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had pronounced
sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know you not that a
little leaven corrupts the whole lump?" and afterwards he adds the reason
on the part of the punishment inflicted by the sentence of the Church
when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge them that are within?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Body Para. 2/4
Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful to
communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the right
to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal judgment, in
the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are guilty of some
misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some temporal
punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a punishment, the
Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who
have forsaken the faith they once received, either by corrupting the
faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith, as apostates,
because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication on both.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Body Para. 3/4
With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time.
For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their
communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter
rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. These are not
to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have not received
the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be some urgent
necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people and those who
are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as a probable
result, they should be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers, and
especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or to communicate with
them without necessity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against unbelievers
in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them: but she does
exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of temporal punishment.
It is under this head that sometimes the Church, for certain special
sins, withdraws the faithful from communication with certain unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled by
his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his master who
is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the faithful are
not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however, the master were
in danger, through communicating with such a servant, he should send him
away, according to Our Lord's command (Mt. 18:8): "If . . . thy foot
scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives
this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord
gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory the
Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry, so
that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those
nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes on
(Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or dominion
over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1): "Whosoever are
servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all
honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of unbelievers, since he adds
(1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing masters, let them not despise
them." Moreover it is written (1 Pt. 2:18): "Servants be subject to your
masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the
froward." Now this command would not be contained in the apostolic
teaching unless unbelievers could have authority over the faithful.
Therefore it seems that unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes'
households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All
the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar's household,"
referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can have
authority over the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave is
his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even as a
craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the working
of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject to an
unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on
those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any of
you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust,"
i.e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore it seems that
unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First,
we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful as
of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no means
to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the faith, for
subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their
commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover unbelievers
hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall away. Hence the
Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving judge.
And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over
believers, or to have authority over them in any capacity whatever.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 2/5
Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions of
human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers arises
from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of grace, does
not do away with human law which is the law of natural reason. Wherefore
the distinction between faithful and unbelievers, considered in itself,
does not do away with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the
faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 3/5
Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done away
with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the authority of
God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit
their power over the faithful who are converted into children of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 4/5
This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church and
her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew became a
Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without paying any
price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i.e. born in slavery; and
likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his service:
if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be offered for
sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in this, because
since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church, she can dispose of
their possessions, even as secular princes have enacted many laws to be
observed by their subjects, in favor of liberty. On the other hand, the
Church has not applied the above law to those unbelievers who are not
subject to her or her members, in temporal matters, although she has the
right to do so: and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord
showed (Mt. 17:25,26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute,
because "the children are free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in
order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants
should honor their masters, adds, "lest the name of the Lord and His
doctrine be blasphemed."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 5/5
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of
faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the conversion
of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that there should be a
few of the faithful in the emperor's household, that they might defend
the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian encouraged those
whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while, remained hidden
under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole
lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas the
craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special works. Hence it
would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or authority
over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to employ them in
some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to work on the land
of Jews, because this does not entail their living together with them.
Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send master workmen to hew the
trees, as related in 3 Kgs. 5:6. Yet, if there be reason to fear that the
faithful will be perverted by such communications and dealings, they
should be absolutely forbidden.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
therein, as a gloss observes on Rm. 1:32: "Not only they that do them,
but they also that consent to them that do them." Therefore it is a sin
to tolerate their rites.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, because
a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of bondage," says:
"The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of idolatry." But it
would not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, in
fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols to be closed,
and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii,
54). Therefore it follows that even the rites of Jews ought not to be
tolerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above (A[3]
). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites
of unbelievers to be tolerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. xlv,
can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be allowed to
observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers have
for ages observed them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government,
and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely
good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe,
which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be
forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also,
those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain
goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says
(De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with harlots, the world will be
convulsed with lust." Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they
may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom,
or because of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe
their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we
hold, there follows this good---that our very enemies bear witness to our
faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For
this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance
in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might
ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if they were
unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the
Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans,
when unbelievers were very numerous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized
against their parents' will?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other unbelievers
ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the bond of
marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over children,
since the right of parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is
set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be severed by man,
according to Mt. 19:6: "What . . . God hath joined together let no man
put asunder." And yet the marriage bond is broken on account of unbelief:
for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): "If the unbeliever depart, let him
depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases":
and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if
the unbelieving partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without
insult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to
cohabitation." Much more, therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of
unbelieving parents' authority over their children: and consequently
their children may be baptized against their parents' will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger of
everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death. Now it
would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed
to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other unbelievers
are in danger of everlasting death, should they be left to their parents
who would imbue them with their unbelief, it seems that they ought to be
taken away from them and baptized, and instructed in the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, and
under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and
princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and
princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children.
Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against their
parents' wishes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his
soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it
is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, and
consecrated to God in Baptism.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching does,
since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of
punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not
preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to the
words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the sword coming and sounds
not the trumpet." Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost
through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who could
have baptized them and did not.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an
injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their
will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their
children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not be
baptized against their parents' will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and
ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of
catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to
abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine
or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the
Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the will of their
parents, although at times past there have been many very powerful
catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy
bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with Constantine,
and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to
obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems
therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews
should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the
Church's custom observed hitherto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Body Para. 2/3
There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason,
afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by
their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this
would be detrimental to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Body Para. 3/3
The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is
by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its
parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother's
womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its
free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a
spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs
not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs
to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes,
as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before
coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care. Hence it would
be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of
reason, were to be taken away from its parents' custody, or anything done
to it against its parents' wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have
the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to
look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law,
and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to
embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized,
even against its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of
reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they
were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to
understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of
their children, especially before they come to the use of reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of
the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other's
consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of
reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has come to the use
of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against the
order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the judge to
temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one
ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the
custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of
everlasting death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does
not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know
Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural
order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, under whose
care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all
matters relating to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching,
threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Hence
it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made thee a watchman to
the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the other hand, to provide
the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty
of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if through
being deprived of the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] Out. Para. 1/1
OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?
(2) Of the matter about which it is;
(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?
(4) Whether converts should be received?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief. For
unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q[10], A[2]). Now
heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather to the
appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf. Decretals xxiv, qu.
iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is derived
from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of that
school which he deems best." But choice is an act of the appetitive
power, as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore heresy is not a
species of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery that he may
steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer." Now the end of heresy is
temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong to the vice
of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util. Credendi i) that
"a heretic is one who either devises or follows false and new opinions,
for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that he may lord and be
honored above others." Therefore heresy is a species of pride rather than
of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would seem
not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of the
flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are
manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the others, he
adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as heresies. Therefore
heresy is not a species of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is one
who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is opposed
to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it is a species
of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first objection denotes
a choosing. Now choice as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[3]) is about things
directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in matters of faith,
the will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was shown above
(Q[4], A[3]): wherefore that which is the chief truth, has the character
of last end, while those which are secondary truths, have the character
of being directed to the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every
form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to hold
the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by holding
which one assents to that person hold a secondary place. Consequently he
that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his will, to Christ,
in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the
rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to
assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in respect
of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in pagans and
Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to Christ, yet he
fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents to Christ, because
he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the suggestions of his own
mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who
profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will regards
faith, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Vices take their species from their proximate end, while,
from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus in the case
of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the species of
adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the ultimate end shows
that the act of adultery is both the result of the theft, and is included
under it, as an effect under its cause, or a species under its genus, as
appears from what we have said about acts in general (FS, Q[18], A[7]).
Wherefore, as to the case in point also, the proximate end of heresy is
adherence to one's own false opinion, and from this it derives its
species, while its remote end reveals its cause, viz. that it arises
from pride or covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing
[*From the Greek {airein} [hairein], to cut off], so does sect derive its
name from its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore states (Etym.
viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each belongs
to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act itself of
unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason of its cause,
which is either the desire of an undue end in which way it arises from
pride or covetousness, as stated in the second objection, or some
illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to error, as the
Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for this faculty has
a certain connection with the flesh, in as much as its act is independent
on a bodily organ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters of faith.
For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, so were there
among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym. viii, 3,4,5).
Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith. Therefore heresy
is not about matters of faith, as though they were its proper matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now heresy is
not only about things, but also about works, and about interpretations of
Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that "whoever expounds the
Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy Ghost by Whom they were
written, may be called a heretic, though he may not have left the
Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies spring up from words spoken
amiss." [*St. Thomas quotes this saying elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13,
and TP, Q[16], A[8], but it is not to be found in St. Jerome's works.]
Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about matters
pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on the
question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet this was
without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly about
the matter of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ. Dei
xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold mischievous
and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may think soundly and
rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing to mend their
pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending them." Now
pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which are contrary to
the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth" (Rm. 1:17). Therefore
heresy is about matters of faith, as about its proper matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a corruption of
the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption of the Christian
faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that are not of faith, for
instance, in questions of geometry and so forth, which cannot belong to
the faith by any means; but only when a person has a false opinion about
things belonging to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above (FP, Q[32],
A[4]; FS, Q[1], A[6], ad 1; FS, Q[2], A[5]), in one way, directly and
principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way, indirectly and
secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of which leads to the
corruption of some article of faith; and there may be heresy in either
way, even as there can be faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were about
opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies among
Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense than
that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning of Holy
Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has revealed. Hence it
is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets: "They have persisted
to confirm what they have said," viz. by false interpretations of
Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by the words that he
utters, since confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q[3], A[1]
). Wherefore inordinate words about matters of faith may lead to
corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope Leo says in a letter
to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The enemies of Christ's cross lie in
wait for our every deed and word, so that, if we but give them the
slightest pretext, they may accuse us mendaciously of agreeing with
Nestorius."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated in the
Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no means should we
accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion may
be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the truth with careful
anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have found the truth,"
because, to wit, they do not make a choice in contradiction to the
doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have
differed either in matters the holding of which in this or that way is of
no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or even in matters of
faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church; although if anyone
were obstinately to deny them after they had been defined by the
authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a heretic. This
authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret.
xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: "Whenever a question of faith is in dispute,
I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the
matter to none other than Peter, as being the source of their name and
honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of
the holy doctors defended their opinion." Hence Jerome says (Exposit.
Symbol [*Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): "This, most
blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic
Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed,
we beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of
Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment of
your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself is
ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the Apostle
says (2 Tim. 2:24,25): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle . . .
with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if peradventure God
may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover
themselves from the snares of the devil." Now if heretics are not
tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of repentance.
Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be tolerated.
Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle says (1 Cor.
11:19): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . . who are reproved,
may be manifest among you." Therefore it seems that heretics should be
tolerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Mt. 13:30) to suffer
the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i.e. the end of the world, as a
gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle denotes heretics.
Therefore heretics should be tolerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:10,11): "A man that is a
heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that he,
that is such an one, is subverted."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one,
on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their own
side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from
the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by
death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens
the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if
forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by
the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as
they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put
to death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the
conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but
"after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after
that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his
conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and
separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the
secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death. For
Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, "A little leaven," says: "Cut off the
decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house,
the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die.
Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once
put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should be
admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to retract, he
must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather from the words
of the Apostle quoted above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the intention
of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the faithful being put
to the test, and "makes us shake off our sluggishness, and search the
Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine states (De Gen. cont. Manich. i,
1). What they really intend is the corruption of the faith, which is to
inflict very great harm indeed. Consequently we should consider what they
directly intend, and expel them, rather than what is beside their
intention, and so, tolerate them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can. Notandum), "to be
excommunicated is not to be uprooted." A man is excommunicated, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may be saved in the day of Our
Lord." Yet if heretics be altogether uprooted by death, this is not
contrary to Our Lord's command, which is to be understood as referring to
the case when the cockle cannot be plucked up without plucking up the
wheat, as we explained above (Q[10], A[8], ad 1), when treating of
unbelievers in general.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to receive those
who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in the person of the
Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return
to Me saith the Lord." Now the sentence of the Church is God's sentence,
according to Dt. 1:17: "You shall hear the little as well as the great:
neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment of
God." Therefore even those who are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief
which is spiritual prostitution, should be received all the same.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Mt. 18:22) to forgive his
offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy times
seven times," which Jerome expounds as meaning that "a man should be
forgiven, as often as he has sinned." Therefore he ought to be received
by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back into heresy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers who
wish to be converted are received by the Church. Therefore heretics also
should be received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix) says
that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which they had
already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal." Therefore they
should not be received by the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church
extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who
persecute her, according to Mt. 5:44: "Love your enemies; do good to them
that hate you." Now it is part of charity that we should both wish and
work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiritual,
namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the object of
charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for one another.
Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who return after falling
no matter how often, are admitted by the Church to Penance whereby the
way of salvation is opened to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz.
temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good
repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by
charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal
salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of these
goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal salvation in
many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a good to that person,
rather should we desire him to be without it, both because eternal
salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and because the good of the
many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics were always
received on their return, in order to save their lives and other temporal
goods, this might be prejudicial to the salvation of others, both because
they would infect others if they relapsed again, and because, if they
escaped without punishment, others would feel more assured in lapsing
into heresy. For it is written (Eccles. 8:11): "For because sentence is
not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit
evils without any fear."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who return
from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their lives, and
sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the ecclesiastical dignities
which they may have had before, should their conversion appear to be
sincere: we read of this as having frequently been done for the good of
peace. But when they fall again, after having been received, this seems
to prove them to be inconstant in faith, wherefore when they return
again, they are admitted to Penance, but are not delivered from the pain
of death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always received,
because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who return in
sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she presumes
that those who relapse after being once received, are not sincere in
their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of salvation,
but neither does she protect them from the sentence of death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed against
oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and spare our
brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied to sins
committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is not left to
our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says on Mt. 18:15, "If
thy brother shall offend against thee." Yet even in this matter the law
prescribes limits according as God's honor or our neighbor's good demands.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received the faith
are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy in faith, as
relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] Out. Para. 1/1
OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are
absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to unbelief. For
that which is the origin of all sins, does not, seemingly, pertain to
unbelief, since many sins there are without unbelief. Now apostasy seems
to be the origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The
beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from
God," and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all
sin." Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas
apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance, or
even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov. 6:12-14):
"A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a perverse
mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the foot, speaketh with
the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, and at all times he
soweth discord." Moreover if anyone were to have himself circumcised, or
to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an apostate.
Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a determinate
species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to unbelief, it would
follow that it is a determinate species of unbelief, which does not seem
to agree with what has been said (Q[10], A[5]). Therefore apostasy does
not pertain to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:67): "Many of his disciples went
back," i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously (Jn. 6:65):
"There are some of you that believe not." Therefore apostasy pertains to
unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may happen
in various ways according to the different kinds of union between man and
God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by faith; secondly, by
having his will duly submissive in obeying His commandments; thirdly, by
certain special things pertaining to supererogation such as the religious
life, the clerical state, or Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be
removed, that which precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold.
Accordingly a man may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the
religious life to which he was bound by profession, or from the Holy
Order which he had received: and this is called "apostasy from religious
life" or "Orders." A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in
his mind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize
in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God
altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that
whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of
perfidy." In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy, which
denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's commandments, an
act that is to be found in every mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart should believe,
but also that external words and deeds should bear witness to the inward
faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way too, certain
external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far as they are signs
of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself to be healthy. Now
although the authority quoted may be understood as referring to every
kind of apostate, yet it applies most truly to an apostate from the
faith. For since faith is the first foundation of things to be hoped for,
and since, without faith it is "impossible to please God"; when once
faith is removed, man retains nothing that may be useful for the
obtaining of eternal salvation, for which reason it is written (Prov.
6:12): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man": because faith is
the life of the soul, according to Rm. 1:17: "The just man liveth by
faith." Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man's
every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of
justice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all his
members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands revealed;
secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of movement; fourthly,
in his will, which tends to evil. The result is that "he sows discord,"
endeavoring to sever others from the faith even as he severed himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The species of a quality or form are not diversified by the
fact of its being the term "wherefrom" or "whereto" of movement: on the
contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the terms. Now
apostasy regards unbelief as the term "whereto" of the movement of
withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not imply a special
kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance thereof, according to 2
Pt. 2:21: "It had been better for them not to know the truth [Vulg.: 'the
way of justice'], than after they had known it, to turn back."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of
apostasy from the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his dominion over
his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, that they no longer
owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine, Super Ps. 124:3] says
that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate, nevertheless had under him
Christian soldiers, who when he said to them, "Fall into line for the
defense of the republic," were bound to obey. Therefore subjects are not
absolved from their allegiance to their prince on account of his apostasy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we find
that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph served
Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served Assuerus.
Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects from
allegiance to their sovereign.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away
from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy from
the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of their
subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on account of
other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we ought not to
refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his apostatizing from the
faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to the
institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority,
absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred
bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and we
absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance to such persons,
until these shall have made amends." Now apostates from the faith, like
heretics, are excommunicated, according to the Decretal [*Extra, De
Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore princes should not be obeyed
when they have apostatized from the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[10], A[10]), unbelief, in itself, is
not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the law of
nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between believers
and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul human right.
Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced to the loss of
his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account of other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief in
those who have never received the faith, according to the saying of the
Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that are
without?" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbelief
of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that they should
be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their subjects: for
this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption of the faith,
since, as was stated above (A[1], OBJ[2]), "a man that is an apostate . .
with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . . soweth discord," in order
to sever others from the faith. Consequently, as soon as sentence of
excommunication is passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith,
his subjects are "ipso facto" absolved from his authority and from the
oath of allegiance whereby they were bound to him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted, and
had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she allowed
the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that were not
contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet greater danger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of those
unbelievers who have never received the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether, as
stated above (A[1]), which is not the case in any other sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the
confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy
which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?
(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of
faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or insult against the
Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to
unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, "Let blasphemy . . . be put away from
you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the saints."
But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other things than those
pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore blasphemy is not
always opposed to the confession of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of blasphemy.
The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed of God; the
second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and the third, when
something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so that, seemingly,
blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His creatures. Now the
object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to confession
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): "I . . . before was
a blasphemer and a persecutor," and afterwards, "I did it ignorantly in"
my "unbelief." Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement of
some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence whatever
befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does not befit Him, is
far removed from the perfection of goodness which is His Essence.
Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting God, or affirms
anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen merely
in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way this
opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections, even as, on
the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him. Accordingly
this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the intellect
alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought only, it is
blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself outwardly in speech
it is blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of reviling
Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood
in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will,
whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to God, and this
is perfect blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as praise
is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does blasphemy
against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this way
divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or to deny
fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and negation. For
this diversity does not cause distinct species of habits, since the
falsehood of affirmations and negations is made known by the same
knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs in either way, since
negatives are proved by affirmatives, according to Poster. i, 25. Again
to ascribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems to amount to
the same as affirming something unfitting of Him, since whatever is
proper to God is God Himself: and to ascribe to a creature, that which is
proper to God, is to assert that God is the same as a creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin. Because
a gloss on the words, "Now lay you also all away," etc. (Col. 3:8) says:
"After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins": and yet among
the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy is comprised among
the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts of
the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of them.
Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal:
hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the
deliberation of the reason, as was shown above (FS, Q[74], AA[3],10). Now
blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the reason. Therefore
it is not always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 24:16): "He that blasphemeth the
name of the Lord, dying let him die." Now the death punishment is not
inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[72], A[5]), a mortal sin is one
whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual life,
which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever things are
contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now
blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as
stated above (A[1]), it disparages the Divine goodness, which is the
object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal sin, by reason of
its genus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all the
sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those mentioned
previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are
less grievous; and yet among the latter some more grievous sins are
included.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since, as stated above (A[1]), blasphemy is contrary to the
confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the prohibition
of unbelief, expressed by the words: "I am the Lord thy God," etc. (Ex.
20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: "Thou shalt not take the
name of . . . God in vain" (Ex. 20:7). Because he who asserts something
false about God, takes His name in vain even more than he who uses the
name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur unawares
and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing to advert to
the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen through his
being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into words suggested
by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of those words: this
is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so called. In the second
way, by adverting to the meaning of his words, and to their blasphemous
nature: in which case he is not excused from mortal sin, even as neither
is he who, in a sudden movement of anger, kills one who is sitting beside
him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin of blasphemy is the greatest sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the greatest sin.
For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing is said to be evil
because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since it destroys a man's
life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy, which can do no harm to
God. Therefore the sin of murder is more grievous than that of blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood, and
thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer goes so
far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more grievous sin
than blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, on Ps. 74:6, "Lift not up your horn on high," a gloss
says: "To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all." Therefore
blasphemy is not the greatest sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, On Is. 18:2, "To a terrible people," etc. a gloss says:
"In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), blasphemy is opposed to the
confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief: while
the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added thereto, and yet
more, if it breaks out into words, even as love and confession add to the
praise of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore, since, as stated above (Q[10], A[3]), unbelief is the
greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy also
is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as unbelief and
being an aggravated form of that sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the objects
of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin committed
directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against
one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in respect of the
harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for murder does more harm
to one's neighbor, than blasphemy does to God. Since, however, the
gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the evil will, rather than
on the effect of the deed, as was shown above (FS, Q[73], A[8]), it
follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do harm to God's honor,
absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously that the murderer.
Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins
committed against our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put away from
you" (Eph. 4:31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The reason is
that the perjurer does not say or think something false about God, as the
blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a falsehood, not that he
deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as it were, that God will not
testify to the matter by some evident sign.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that aggravates
every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the most grievous sin,
for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned blaspheme?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because some
wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the fear of
future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments, so
that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more are they restrained
from blaspheming.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most
demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting or
demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that "the tree . . . in
what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it clearly
follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor sin, which
he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were
not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they blaspheme in
the life to come.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 16:9): "The men were scorched with
great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power over
these plagues," and a gloss on these words says that "those who are in
hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will nevertheless
complain that God is so powerful as to torture them thus." Now this would
be blasphemy in their present state: and consequently it will also be in
their future state.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],3), detestation of the Divine
goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in hell
retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's justice, since
they love the things for which they are punished, would wish to use them
if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for those same
sins. They regret indeed the sins which they have committed, not because
they hate them, but because they are punished for them. Accordingly this
detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of
the heart: and it is credible that after the resurrection they will
blaspheme God with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with
their voices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy through
fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas, in hell,
the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne
towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer,
wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious. In
the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is part of
their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned, evil is not
demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that
detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in this
respect there can be blasphemy in him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] Out. Para. 1/1
OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost:
under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as
the sin committed through certain malice?
(2) Of the species of this sin;
(3) Whether it can be forgiven?
(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost
before committing other sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed
through certain malice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same
as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin against the
Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Mt. 12:32. But not every
sin committed through certain malice is a sin of blasphemy: since many
other kinds of sin may be committed through certain malice. Therefore the
sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through
certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sin committed through certain malice is condivided
with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed through weakness:
whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is condivided with the sin against
the Son of Man (Mt. 12:32). Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is
not the same as the sin committed through certain malice, since things
whose opposites differ, are themselves different.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic sin,
having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed through certain
malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition or general
circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at all. Therefore
the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed
through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that "to sin against
the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for its own
sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore it seems that
the sin committed through certain malice is the same as the sin against
the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Three meanings have been given to the sin against the
Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super Matth. xii,
32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc. xii, 10), Jerome
(Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in Matth.), say that the sin
against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a blasphemy against the Holy
Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we understand the essential name
applicable to the whole Trinity, each Person of which is a Spirit and is
holy, or the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity, in which
sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy
against the Son of Man (Mt. 12:32), for Christ did certain things in
respect of His human nature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions,
while He did others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils,
raising the dead, and the like: which things He did both by the power of
His own Godhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was
full, according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking
blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Mt. 11:19) that He was
"a glutton . . . a wine drinker," and a "friend of publicans": but
afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they ascribed to
the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the power of His own
Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy or
the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely, a man
perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not confined to
utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in thought and deed, not
to one word only, but to many. Now this word, in this sense, is said to
be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because it is contrary to the
remission of sins, which is the work of the Holy Ghost, Who is the
charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor did Our Lord say this to
the Jews, as though they had sinned against the Holy Ghost, since they
were not yet guilty of final impenitence, but He warned them, lest by
similar utterances they should come to sin against the Holy Ghost: and it
is in this sense that we are to understand Mark 3:29,30, where after Our
Lord had said: "But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost," etc.
the Evangelist adds, "because they said: He hath an unclean spirit."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of blasphemy
against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that good which is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is appropriated to the
Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the Father, and wisdom to the
Son. Hence they say that when a man sins through weakness, it is a sin
"against the Father"; that when he sins through ignorance, it is a sin
"against the Son"; and that when he sins through certain malice, i.e.
through the very choosing of evil, as explained above (FS, Q[78], AA[1]
,3), it is a sin "against the Holy Ghost."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very inclination
of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this way, to sin through
malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy Ghost. In another way
it happens that by reason of contempt, that which might have prevented
the choosing of evil, is rejected or removed; thus hope is removed by
despair, and fear by presumption, and so on, as we shall explain further
on (QQ[20],21). Now all these things which prevent the choosing of sin
are effects of the Holy Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin
through malice is to sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the confession of faith consists in a protestation
not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy against the Holy Ghost
can be uttered in word, thought and deed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the third interpretation, blasphemy against
the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son of Man,
forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the "power of God and the
wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense, the sin against
the Son of Man will be that which is committed through ignorance, or
through weakness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it
results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but a
general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a special
contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the character of a
special sin. According to this interpretation the sin against the Holy
Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to the first
interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not a species of
sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of any kind of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is fitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy
Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against
the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy,
resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual good, which
are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny God's justice
or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man rejects God's mercy,
and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each of these is a kind of
unbelief rather than of the sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while
obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not diversify
the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith whereby we
believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed that He would be
born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not be reckoned as two
species of sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (Jn. 1:17).
Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a
brother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son rather than
against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that "to
refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost." Moreover a gloss on Lev.
10:16, says that "a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the Holy
Ghost." Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the Holy Ghost
by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems that the
species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii) says
that "those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without merits
presume on God's mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost," and (Enchiridion
lxxxiii) that "he who dies in a state of obstinacy is guilty of the sin
against the Holy Ghost," and (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that
"impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte xxii), that "to resist fraternal goodness with the brands of envy
is to sin against the Holy Ghost," and in his book De unico Baptismo (De
Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that "a man who spurns the truth, is
either envious of his brethren to whom the truth is revealed, or
ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the Church is taught," and
therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin
against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are
distinguished in respect of the removal of contempt of those things
whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These things
are either on the part of God's judgment, or on the part of His gifts, or
on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine judgment, wherein
justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered from sinning through
choice, both by hope, arising from the consideration of the mercy that
pardons sins and rewards good deeds, which hope is removed by "despair";
and by fear, arising from the consideration of the Divine justice that
punishes sins, which fear is removed by "presumption," when, namely, a
man presumes that he can obtain glory without merits, or pardon without
repentance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
God's gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the
acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the "resistance of
the known truth," when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has
acknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the
assistance of inward grace, against which there is "envy of a brother's
spiritual good," when, namely, a man is envious not only of his brother's
person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the world.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man
therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the
consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the sin he
has committed, and against this there is "impenitence," not as denoting
permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken above (for
thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of sin), but as
denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing is the smallness
or brevity of the good which is sought in sin, according to Rm. 6:21:
"What fruit had you therefore then in those things, of which you are now
ashamed?" The consideration of this is wont to prevent man's will from
being hardened in sin, and this is removed by "obstinacy," whereby man
hardens his purpose by clinging to sin. Of these two it is written (Jer.
8:6): "There is none that doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I
done?" as regards the first; and, "They are all turned to their own
course, as a horse rushing to the battle," as regards the second.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in
disbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of
past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects by
reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be
considered in sin, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the gifts
of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned
repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a brother's
spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are united together.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be
forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): "We should
despair of no man, so long as Our Lord's patience brings him back to
repentance." But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible to
despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be
forgiven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being healed
by God. But "no disease is incurable to an all-powerful physician," as a
gloss says on Ps. 102:3, "Who healeth all thy diseases." Therefore the
sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil.
Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any virtue,
since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job
4:18,19): "In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall they
that dwell in houses of clay?" Therefore, in like manner, a man can
return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin against
the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 12:32): "He that shall speak against
the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor
in the world to come": and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22)
that "so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot submit to the
humiliation of asking for pardon."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, According to the various interpretations of the sin
against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said
that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost we
understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since in no
way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man perseveres until
death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since it was not remitted
by repentance in this life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be
unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because,
considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two
ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through
ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins
through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his
punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man before
His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account of the
weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence, they
deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against His very
Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy Ghost, had no
excuse in diminution of their punishment. Wherefore, according to
Chrysostom's commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews are said not to
be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in the world to come,
because they were punished for it, both in the present life, through the
Romans, and in the life to come, in the pains of hell. Thus also
Athanasius adduces the example of their forefathers who, first of all,
wrangled with Moses on account of the shortage of water and bread; and
this the Lord bore with patience, because they were to be excused on
account of the weakness of the flesh: but afterwards they sinned more
grievously when, by ascribing to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who
had brought them out of Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the
Holy Ghost, saying (Ex. 32:4): "These are thy gods, O Israel, that have
brought thee out of the land of Egypt." Therefore the Lord both inflicted
temporal punishment on them, since "there were slain on that day about
three and twenty thousand men" (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them with
punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): "I, in the day of
revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease
is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which
removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the
power of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although God
is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy Ghost is
said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far as it removes
those things which are a means towards the pardon of sins. This does not,
however, close the way of forgiveness and healing to an all-powerful and
merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so to speak, restores
spiritual health to such men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We should despair of no man in this life, considering God's
omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of sin, some
are called (Eph. 2:2) "children of despair" [*'Filios diffidentiae,'
which the Douay version renders 'children of unbelief.'].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the question on the part of God's
omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain subject
to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as it is
concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself this sin
is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man can sin first of all against the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against the Holy
Ghost, without having previously committed other sins. For the natural
order requires that one should be moved to perfection from imperfection.
This is evident as regards good things, according to Prov. 4:18: "The
path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards and increases even
to perfect day." Now, in evil things, the perfect is the greatest evil,
as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21). Since then the sin
against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it seems that man comes
to commit this sin through committing lesser sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain
malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has sinned
many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6,9) that "although a man
is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once do them as an
unjust man does," viz. from choice. Therefore it seems that the sin
against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same object.
But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore the same
applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against the Holy
Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make a
poor man rich" (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is possible for
a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts him, to be led to
commit the most grievous of sins which is that against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), in one way, to sin against the
Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin through
certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place: first, through
the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly speaking, to sin
against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to commit this sin all at
once, in as much as sinful acts must precede so as to cause the habit
that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin through certain malice, by
contemptuously rejecting the things whereby a man is withdrawn from sin.
This is, properly speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated
above (A[1]); and this also, for the most part, presupposes other sins,
for it is written (Prov. 18:3) that "the wicked man, when he is come into
the depth of sins, contemneth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to sin
against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his free-will, and
on account of the many previous dispositions, or again, through being
vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly attached to good. Hence never
or scarcely ever does it happen that the perfect sin all at once against
the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen says (Peri Archon. i, 3): "I do not
think that anyone who stands on the highest step of perfection, can fail
or fall suddenly; this can only happen by degrees and bit by bit."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally
for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord
speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand
the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does not
regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy Ghost
requires persistence in sin until the end of life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most
part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good or
evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater (good or
evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from which a man begins
can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus, although it may be
imperfect as regards the series of good or evil actions whereby a man
progresses in good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the sin which is committed through
certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a habit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De Verb.
Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear that it
presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we take it for
habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against the Holy Ghost,
it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is possible for a man who
has never sinned to have the purpose either of repenting or of not
repenting, if he should happen to sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding.
Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which is opposed to
knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins (FS, Q[76]), we
must now inquire about blindness of mind and dulness of sense, which are
opposed to the gift of understanding; and under this head there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?
(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin. Because,
seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin. Now blindness
of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (Jn. 9:41): "If you were
blind, you should not have sin." Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind is
a punishment as appears from Is. 6:10, "Blind the heart of this people,"
for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it not a
punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera
Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as Augustine
says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent truth," and as we
read in Eccles. 11:7, "the light is sweet and it is delightful for the
eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of mind
among the vices arising from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the
principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of the
principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a threefold
principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light, since it
pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never forfeit from the
soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from exercising its proper act,
through being hindered by the lower powers which the human intellect
needs in order to understand, for instance in the case of imbeciles and
madmen, as stated in the FP, Q[84], AA[7],8.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light
superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes
forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a punishment,
in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a punishment. Hence
it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): "Their own malice blinded
them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle,
through which a man understands other things; to which principle a man
may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens in two
ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is deliberately
turned away from the consideration of that principle, according to Ps.
35:4, "He would not understand, that he might do well": whereas sometimes
it is due to the mind being more busy about things which it loves more,
so as to be hindered thereby from considering this principle, according
to Ps. 57:9, "Fire," i.e. of concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they
shall not see the sun." In either of these ways blindness of mind is a
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which arises
from the natural defect of one who cannot see.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the second kind of blindness which
is a punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all; and
yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a man is
hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin from
blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now dulness is
opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii,
49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes a principle
of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness
describes it as "dullness of sense in respect of understanding." Now
dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as a
defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind. Therefore
dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the
fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above (A[1]), while
dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is not a sin:
so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin, which is
contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it
among the sins arising from gluttony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Different causes produce different effects. Now Gregory
says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony, and
that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these others are different
vices. Therefore those are different vices also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be sharp
because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through being
obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of metaphor,
is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its object from a
distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive the smallest
details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in corporeal things the
senses are said to be acute when they can perceive a sensible object from
afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, while on the other hand they are said
to be dull, through being unable to perceive, except sensible objects
that are near at hand, or of great power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in
connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of
certain primals and extremes, as stated in Ethic. vi, even as the senses
are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of knowledge.
Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does not perceive
its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but through certain
other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a thing's essence
through a property thereof, and the cause through its effect.
Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in connection with his
understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a property or effect of a
thing, he understands the nature or the thing itself, and if he can
succeed in perceiving its slightest details: whereas a man is said to
have a dull sense in connection with his understanding, if he cannot
arrive at knowing the truth about a thing, without many explanations; in
which case, moreover, he is unable to obtain a perfect perception of
everything pertaining to the nature of that thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes a
certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual goods;
while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the knowledge
of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of understanding, whereby a
man knows spiritual goods by apprehending them, and has a subtle
penetration of their inmost nature. This dulness has the character of
sin, just as blindness of mind has, that is, in so far as it is
voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to his affection for carnal
things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration of spiritual
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the
flesh?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of sense do not
arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i, 4) retracts what
he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God Who didst wish none but the
clean to know the truth," and says that one might reply that "many, even
those who are unclean, know many truths." Now men become unclean chiefly
by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense
are not caused by sins of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects in
connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal sins
pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not act on the
soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the flesh do not
cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all things are more passive to what is near them than to
what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than carnal vices
are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are caused by
spiritual rather than by carnal vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense
arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in an
abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's intellect
is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it be able to
consider things intelligible, and to set in order all things sensible.
Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to be "detached" in
order to command, and that the agent must have power over matter, in
order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that pleasure fixes a
man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that we all do best that which we take
pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do them either not at
all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with pleasures
of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most impetuous of
all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices cause man's
attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so that in
consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things is weakened,
more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as sexual pleasures
are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore lust gives rise to
blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely the knowledge of
spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from gluttony, which
makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible things. On the other
hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man
very much to the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence it is
written (Dan. 1:17) that "to these children" on account of their
abstinence and continency, "God gave knowledge and understanding in every
book, and wisdom."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at
times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on
account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit
superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the
body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently withdrawn
from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can know some
truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by
altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid manner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are further
removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's attention to more
remote things, so that they hinder the mind's contemplation all the more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and under
this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) The precepts concerning faith;
(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the Old Law there should have been given precepts of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have been given
precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due and
necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should believe,
according to Heb. 11:6, "Without faith it is impossible to please God."
Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith to be given.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the
reality in the figure, as stated above (FS, Q[107], A[3]). Now the New
Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance Jn. 14:1:
"You believe in God; believe also in Me." Therefore it seems that some
precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same as to
forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many precepts
forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me," and (Dt. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to hear the words of the
prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them away from their faith in
God. Therefore precepts of faith should have been given in the Old Law
also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q[3],
A[1]). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession and the
promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27) that, when
their children should ask them, they should tell them the meaning of the
paschal observance, and (Dt. 13:9) they were commanded to slay anyone who
disseminated doctrine contrary to faith. Therefore the Old Law should
have contained precepts of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in the
Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (Jn. 15:25) that it was written in the
Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is found written
in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the
Lord, believe Him." Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rm. 3:27) calls the Old Law the "law of
works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith." Therefore the Old Law
ought not to have contained precepts of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A master does not impose laws on others than his
subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone who
receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the primary
subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is." Hence faith is presupposed to
the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2) that which is of
faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the words, "I am the
Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt," and, likewise
(Dt. 6:4), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg.: 'our'] God is
one," precede the recording of the precepts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith
whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all
articles of faith, as stated above (Q[1], AA[1],7), it follows that, if
we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to Him, it is
possible for precepts to be given about other articles of faith. Thus
Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment" (Jn. 15:12) says
(Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received many precepts of faith.
In the Old Law, however, the secret things of faith were not to be set
before the people, wherefore, presupposing their faith in one God, no
other precepts of faith were given in the Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual
life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith,
namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God," and
commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one Person
is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith of the New
Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt virtue.
Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated above (FS,
Q[18], A[4], ad 3; FS, Q[19], A[6], ad 1, A[7], ad 3). Therefore faith in
one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts had to be given in the
Old Law, so that men might be warned off those particular defects whereby
their faith might be corrupted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also
presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law could
contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of faith, rather
than to faith itself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby we
believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the Lord," which is
not possible without faith. The words which follow---"believe Him"---must
be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly to those things
which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore the passage
concludes---"and your reward shall not be made void."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were
fittingly set down in the Old Law?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge and
understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For knowledge and
understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition precedes and directs
action. Therefore the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding
should precede the precepts of the Law referring to action. Since, then,
the first precepts of the Law are those of the decalogue, it seems that
precepts of knowledge and understanding should have been given a place
among the precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn from
another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains precepts
about teaching---both affirmative precepts as, for example, (Dt. 4:9),
"Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"---and prohibitive precepts, as, for
instance, (Dt. 4:2), "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you,
neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it seems that man ought
to have been given also some precepts directing him to learn.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary to a
priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The lips
of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his
mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I will
reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood to Me." Now
the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law (Dt. 17:18,19). Much
more therefore should the Law have commanded the priests to learn the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on things
pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is hindered by
extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 6:7):
"Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy
journey, sleeping and rising." Therefore the precepts relating to
knowledge and understanding are unfittingly set down in the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): "That, hearing all these
precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Three things may be considered in relation to knowledge
and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly, the use; and
thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of knowledge or
understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and both are
prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Dt. 6:6): "These words which I
command thee . . . shall be in thy heart." This refers to learning, since
it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to what is said, while the
words that follow---"and thou shalt tell them to thy children"---refer to
teaching.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those things
which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text goes on:
"thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this, the
text continues---"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand, and
they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write them
in the entry, and on the doors of thy house." Thus the continual
remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it is impossible
for us to forget those things which are continually attracting the notice
of our senses, whether by touch, as those things we hold in our hands, or
by sight, as those things which are ever before our eyes, or to which we
are continually returning, for instance, to the house door. Moreover it
is clearly stated (Dt. 4:9): "Forget not the words that thy eyes have
seen and let them not go out of thy heart all the days of thy life."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New
Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the apostles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Dt. 4:6, "this is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of the nations." By this we are given to
understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in God
consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the Law had
to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know and
understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid precepts
should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which take the first
place.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to learning, as
stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more expressly than
learning, because it concerned the learned, who were not under any other
authority, but were immediately under the law, and to them the precepts
of the Law were given. On the other hand learning concerned the people of
lower degree, and these the precepts of the Law have to reach through the
learned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with the
priestly office that being charged with the office implies being charged
to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts to be given
about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the doctrine of
God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office, because a king is
placed over his people in temporal matters: hence it is especially
commanded that the king should be instructed by the priests about things
pertaining to the law of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man should
meditate on God's law of sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he should
meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep, because this
leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so far as our
movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of sleep, as the
Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we are commanded to
meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not that we are bound to be
always actually thinking about the Law, but that we should regulate all
our actions according to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] Out. Para. 1/2
ON HOPE (QQ[17]-22)
OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2)
the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding precepts.
The first of these points gives rise to a twofold consideration: (1)
hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is a virtue?
(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?
(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
happiness?
(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?
(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?
(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?
(7) Of its relation to faith;
(8) Of its relation to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes ill
use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may
make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions,
is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works virtue
in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xvii). But
hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii,
D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing" (Phys.
vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing, of
one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of
Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore hope
is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue
of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good
likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must
correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled,
the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat
is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement.
But, as we stated above (Q[8], A[3], ad 3) human acts have a twofold
measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the
other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human act is
good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof
we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated (FS, Q[40],
A[1]), when we were treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope
is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is
possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of
others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for
anything as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our
hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident
that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to
attain its due rule.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason
being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue. Wherefore in
hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's attaining, by hoping, the
due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot make ill use of hope which
attains God, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains
the reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue.
Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion but a
habit of the mind, as we shall show further on (A[5]; Q[18], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing
hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace and
merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope,
whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but
from grace alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which
he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as
he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of
hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every movement of
the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal
happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of man."
Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written (Ps.
36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it."
Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for eternal happiness, but
also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life,
and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer, to be delivered from evils which
will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is
not the proper object of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many
things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore eternal
happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope "which
entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i.e. into
the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a gloss on
these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the hope of which we speak now,
attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good.
Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good
which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is the infinite
good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it
belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a
good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For
we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His
goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than
His Essence. Therefore the proper and principal object of hope is
eternal happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man
perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its nature
and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good, it is
possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that
the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle says pointedly
(Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within the veil," because that
which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in
reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness
chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily
and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards God
principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to God, as
stated above (Q[1], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser things
seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing
else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as compared
with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides may be
arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in reference to
its principal object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one man may hope for another's eternal happiness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal happiness.
For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this very thing,
that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day
of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will be eternal
happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's eternal happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. But
we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16:
"Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore we can hope for
another's eternal happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is
possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine would
have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should not
despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can also hope for
another's eternal salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only of
such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first, absolutely,
and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and pertaining to
the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through
something else being presupposed, and in this way its object can be
something pertaining to someone else. In order to explain this we must
observe that love and hope differ in this, that love denotes union
between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching
forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union is of things
that are distinct, wherefore love can directly regard the other whom a
man unites to himself by love, looking upon him as his other self:
whereas movement is always towards its own term which is proportionate to
the subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and
not that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of
love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another
man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal's
life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same
virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so
too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and
for another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the object of
hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain eternal happiness
by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that
"predestination is furthered by the saints' prayers." Therefore one may
hope in man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not to be
reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in him. Yet
this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: "Let every man
take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any brother of his."
Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above (A[2],
OBJ[2]). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something. Therefore it is
lawful to trust in him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Hope, as stated above (A[1]; FS, Q[40], A[7]), regards
two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the help by
which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain,
has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to
obtain that good, has the character of an efficient cause. Now in each of
these kinds of cause we find a principal and a secondary cause. For the
principal end is the last end, while the secondary end is that which is
referred to an end. In like manner the principal efficient cause is the
first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and
instrumental agent. Now hope regards eternal happiness as its last end,
and the Divine assistance as the first cause leading to happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature, as
though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is,
however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and
instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods that
are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the saints,
and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this reason some are
blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is a theological virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a
theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for
its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain from
God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as
stated above (FS, Q[64], A[4]). But hope is a mean between presumption
and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of
fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope
is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs
to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous.
Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and
charity, which are theological virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide
a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we
must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now it has been stated above (A[1]) that hope has the character of
virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions:
and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it
leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it
expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God
is the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the
very idea of a theological virtue is one that has God for its object, as
stated above (FS, Q[62], A[1]), it is evident that hope is a theological
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in
reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, as
stated above (A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the
measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. Now
a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things
are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as
regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is
concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is
its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue,
with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may
happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to
its principal object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the
point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust
too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean
and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So
too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since
it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may
have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain,
in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of
things of which he is capable.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of
hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to
longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether
that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of
obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper
object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a
theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as
stated above (FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the object of hope is the same as of
the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the
other theological virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of
faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the
world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as
stated above (A[5]). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to
charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is
numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i,
16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope
is distinct from the theological virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for
the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two
ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is
attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own
sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God
both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive
the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us is true:
while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect
goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance
for obtaining happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God is the object of these virtues under different aspects,
as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices for the
distinction of habits, as stated above (FS, Q[54], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as
though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope
presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (A[7]). Hence
an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained
finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity, properly
speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that
we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope precedes faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on Ps.
36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance to
faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is by faith whereby
we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should precede
the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in the
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things to be
hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive
fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes
faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i.e.
"Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object
of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order,
therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to be
proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way,
eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as
explained above (A[2]; A[6], ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us
by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to obtain eternal
life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is ready for us,
according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is,
and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Therefore it is evident that
faith precedes hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called
"the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope we
enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the
"entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established and
perfected in faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition of
faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not apparent in
itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a circumlocution by
something resulting from faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it
suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity precedes hope?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says on Lk.
27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc.: "Charity
flows from faith, and hope from charity." But faith precedes charity.
Therefore charity precedes hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good emotions
and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to hope,
considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul. Therefore it
flows from charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope proceeds
from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but also hope
itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore
charity precedes hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i.e.
"from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of
matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the other
is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the perfect
naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order hope
precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and all
movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above (FS, Q[27],
A[4]; FS, Q[28], A[6], ad 2; FS, Q[40], A[7]) in the treatise on the
passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some
good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is
that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he may
obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The first
love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own sake;
while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to
obtain possession of something for himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a
man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his
sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too,
hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be rewarded
by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments. On the other
hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally precedes hope,
wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because
we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Ambrose states
(OBJ[1]) that charity flows from hope: so that this suffices for the
Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from some
kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every kind of
hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, viz.
that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a friend.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is naturally
preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
(3) Whether it is in the damned?
(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is in the will as its subject?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject. For
the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q[17], A[1]; FS,
Q[40], A[1]). Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the
irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another. Now
charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the most
perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the same
time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously.
Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since,
then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it follows that
the act of hope does not belong to that power: so that, therefore, hope
is not in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards the
mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares (De
Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for its
object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the
intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
in the will as its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As shown above (FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known by
their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive faculty,
since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold appetite in
man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible and
concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as stated
in the FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the lower
appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite are
without passion, as shown above (FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1; FS, Q[22], A[3],
ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive
appetite, since the good which is the principal object of this virtue, is
not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore hope resides in the higher
appetite called the will, and not in the lower appetite, of which the
irascible is a part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible: whereas
the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather
superintelligible.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to one
act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required in order
to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of hoping.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are
mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is no
reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the same
power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the same time
if they be related to one another, as stated in the FP, Q[85], A[4].
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the blessed there is hope?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For Christ was a
perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His conception. Now He had
hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O
Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person. Therefore in the blessed
there can be hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous good,
so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men hope to
obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to
continue in its possession.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness, not
only for himself, but also for others, as stated above (Q[17], A[3]). But
the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they
would not pray for them. Therefore there can be hope in them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory of
the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints in
heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10; Augustine,
Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for?" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore hope
has no place in them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be removed, the species
is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as when a
natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same specifically.
Now hope takes its species from its principal object, even as the other
virtues do, as was shown above (Q[17], AA[5],6; FS, Q[54], A[2]): and its
principal object is eternal happiness as being possible to obtain by the
assistance of God, as stated above (Q[17], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except
in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is no
longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of hope.
Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither of them
can be in the blessed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore blessed as
to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same time, a
wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was still
subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of
impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the
principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the enjoyment
of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal life,
because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of God's
eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of happiness
does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence the blessed
do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as regards this
there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same hope
that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others. But when
hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own
happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not by the
virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he that has
Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor, without having
the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its
object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists in
the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover, although
the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison with human
nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the soul; both
because the glory of the body is a very small thing as compared with the
glory of the soul, and because one who has the glory of the soul has
already the sufficient cause of the glory of the body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is in the damned?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the devil is
damned and prince of the damned, according to Mt. 25:41: "Depart . . .
you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and
his angels." But the devil has hope, according to Job 40:28, "Behold his
hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that the damned have hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope. But
lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to James
2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it seems that
lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit
that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree fall to
the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there
shall it be." Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and never
despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Rm. 12:12, "Rejoicing in
hope." Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according to Is.
65:14, "My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and you shall
cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit." Therefore
no hope is in the damned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will
should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what
is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which is
not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will: wherefore
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could not be
perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation, or
unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what would
happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one should
be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not rest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary
condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal
unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they
were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it belongs
to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that they
cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness. Wherefore
it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not that he may return from
darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend
happiness as a possible good, as neither can the blessed apprehend it as
a future good. Consequently there is no hope either in the blessed or in
the damned. On the other hand, hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this
life or in purgatory, because in either case they apprehend happiness as
a future possible thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the
devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it be
understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he
expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before (Job
40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth": this is
not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is about
things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or another's;
whereas hope is only about good things, future and concerning oneself."
Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the damned, but not
hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future possible things, but
far removed from them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their demerit,
as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase their merit:
but both these things are due to the change in their respective states.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to the
will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above
(Q[17], A[1]). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain that
we are in a state of grace, as stated above (FS, Q[112], A[5]). Therefore
there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail. Now
many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore wayfarer's
hope has no certainty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness,"
as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from 2
Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able
to keep that which I have committed to Him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially
and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power; by
participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive
power. In this way we say that nature works with certainty, since it is
moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with certainty to
its end. In this way too, the moral virtues are said to work with greater
certainty than art, in as much as, like a second nature, they are moved
to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope tends to its end with
certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of faith which is in the
cognitive faculty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but
on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can
obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is
certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is due to
a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but not to any
deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its trust. Hence
this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is to be feared?
(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;
(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?
(4) Whether servile fear is good?
(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?
(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?
(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?
(11) Whether it remains in heaven?
(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can be feared?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of fear
is a future evil, as stated above (FS, Q[41], AA[2],3). But God is free
of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God cannot be feared.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God. Therefore
we cannot fear Him at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear those
things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from God, but
from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O
Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be feared.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear Thee, O
King of nations?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where is My fear?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future
good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone's
help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too,
fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man
shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come.
Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an
object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in so
far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation to
Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good. Because,
since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an end, while
evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the order to the
last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. On the other
hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as it is the
privation of some particular good, yet absolutely speaking, it is a good,
in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated
from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being the
evil which a man shuns.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of
which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which He
sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear,
but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that,
accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under different
aspects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author but from
us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment is from
God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good, since it is
something just, through being inflicted on us justly; although originally
this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is written (Wis. 1:13,16):
"God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called
it to them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and
worldly fear?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into filial,
initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness, shamefacedness,"
etc. of which we have treated above (FS, Q[41], A[4]), and which are not
mentioned in the division in question. Therefore this division of fear
seems unfitting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But there is
a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good, since it is in
the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . . believe and
tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk. 14:33, Jesus
"began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the aforesaid division of fear is
insufficient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of wife
to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now filial
fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is distinct
from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison with his
master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the wife in
comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all these
other fears.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial and
worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear
about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the desire for
things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the flesh,"
which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore "worldly fear,"
whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from "human fear,"
whereby one fears harm to one's own person.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us
turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of fear
is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man withdraws
from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on account of
the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This latter evil
is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of
committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to
fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it will
be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether it is
possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated above
(FS, Q[42], A[3]) when we were considering the passion of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul: whereas
this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as explained
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while moral
evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all the fears
mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now natural fear
is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not numbered among
these kinds of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power
which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the contrary,
the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her husband is based
on the son's affection towards his father to whom he submits himself, or
on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom she binds herself in
the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear amount to the same,
because by the love of charity God becomes our Father, according to Rm.
8:15, "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry:
Abba [Father]"; and by this same charity He is called our spouse,
according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may
present you as a chaste virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no
connection with these, since it does not include charity in its
definition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: These three fears regard punishment but in different ways.
For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man away from
God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten: whereas
servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are drawn to
God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile fear regards
this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it secondarily.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God
through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of forfeiting
the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to the body.
Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although they fear
different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of different
goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins, all of which
alike however lead man away from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether worldly fear is always evil?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil. Because
regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are blamed for
having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of whom we read
(Lk. 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded man." Therefore it seems
that worldly fear is not always evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the punishments
inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments incite us to
good actions, according to Rm. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be afraid of the
power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same."
Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil,
since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to fear
detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the present
life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always
evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that kill
the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is evil is
forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As shown above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[1]; FS,
Q[54], A[2]) moral acts and habits take their name and species from their
objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement is the final
good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement is both
specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were to describe
covetousness as love of work because men work on account of covetousness,
this description would be incorrect, since the covetous man seeks work
not as end but as a means: the end that he seeks is wealth, wherefore
covetousness is rightly described as the desire or the love of wealth,
and this is evil. Accordingly worldly love is, properly speaking, the
love whereby a man trusts in the world as his end, so that worldly love
is always evil. Now fear is born of love, since man fears the loss of
what he loves, as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly
fear is that which arises from worldly love as from an evil root, for
which reason worldly fear is always evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so far as
there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of grace or of
virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in this way those
are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may have regard for
men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is praiseworthy to have no
regard for men, according as we read of Elias or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13):
"In his days he feared not the prince."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to
withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister, according to Rm.
13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him
that doth evil." To fear the secular power in this way is part, not of
worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his own
body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that account is
contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1)
that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear should
drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to suffer any
punishment whatever.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether servile fear is good?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the use of a
thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of servile fear is
evil, for according to a gloss on Rm. 8:15, "if a man do anything through
fear, although the deed be good, it is not well done." Therefore servile
fear is not good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear grows
from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, "Why did I not
die in the womb?" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a man dreads the
punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer loves the
friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of pride, not of
humility." Therefore servile fear is evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of
charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But
mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear
is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rm. 8:15, "You have not received
the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit that
bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear." Therefore servile fear
is not evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be
evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free is
cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as cause
of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever does a
thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it is by his
own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is contrary to the
very notion of servility that one should act from love. Consequently
servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if servility were
essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply, even as adultery is
evil simply, because that which makes it contrary to charity belongs to
its very species.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile fear,
even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless faith. For
the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the object. Now the
object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by accident that, either
the good to which the punishment is contrary, is loved as the last end,
and that consequently the punishment is feared as the greatest evil,
which is the case with one who is devoid of charity, or that the
punishment is directed to God as its end, and that, consequently, it is
not feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who has
charity. For the species of a habit is not destroyed through its object
or end being directed to a further end. Consequently servile fear is
substantially good, but is servility is evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who does
something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not justice, and
fears nothing but the punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride, but
its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to subject his
affections to the yoke of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the sake of
worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity, so that
mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its substance,
implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be feared as the
principal evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same as
filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently as
living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by mortal
sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are
substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are
substantially the same.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the same
thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both fear
God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors from
Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished by Him.
Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to receive
other favors from Him, as stated above (Q[17], A[2], ad 2). Therefore
filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the same as servile
fear whereby we fear His punishments.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that
there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and
habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (FS, Q[54], A[2]
), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear correspond to
different kinds of evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown above
(A[2]). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are not the same
substantially but differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the
object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in
respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of charity,
and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand, servile and
filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in the same
light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the infliction of
punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as the active cause
of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks to be separated by
guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz. God, does not prove a
specific identity of fear, since also natural movements differ
specifically according to their different relationships to some one term,
for movement from whiteness is not specifically the same as movement
towards whiteness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of the
enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot be
said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether servile fear remains with charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with charity. For
Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that "when charity takes
up its abode, it drives away fear which had prepared a place for it."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by
the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rm. 5:5). Now "where the Spirit of
the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then freedom excludes
servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away when charity comes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as
punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the contempt of self
builds up the city of God." Therefore it seems that servile fear is
driven out when charity comes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above (A[4]). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited through
the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us. Therefore
servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear
of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the fear of
punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is:
because it comes to the same that a man love his own good and that he
fear to be deprived of it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one
way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of
his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man loves
himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is indeed
distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a man loves
himself from the point of view of his own good, yet not so as to place
his end in this his own good: even as one may have another special love
for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity which is founded on God,
when we love him by reason of usefulness, consanguinity, or some other
human consideration, which, however, is referable to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,
because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns
exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is
contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is
opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in opposition to
the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear of punishment is
not consistent with charity. In another way fear of punishment is indeed
substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to wit, a man fears a
penal evil, not because it separates him from God, but because it is
hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place his end in this good,
so that neither does he dread this evil as being the principal evil. Such
fear of punishment is consistent with charity; but it is not called
servile, except when punishment is dreaded as a principal evil, as
explained above (AA[2],4). Hence fear considered as servile, does not
remain with charity, but the substance of servile fear can remain with
charity, even as self-love can remain with charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile: and
such is the sense of the two other objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom. For the
beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part of
wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom is
in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of
wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of the
Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems that
fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is
prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that fear is
not the beginning of wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the Lord
is the beginning of wisdom."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two
ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its
essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art
as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art
proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that
wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the
beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is where
the builder begins his work.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state
further on (Q[45], A[1]), it is considered by us in one way, and in
another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained to the
enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a participation of
the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace, wisdom, as we look at
it, is considered not only as being cognizant of God, as it is with the
philosophers, but also as directing human conduct; since this is directed
not only by the human law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows
(De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence
consists in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith,
and in this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as
regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom
begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet
servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile fear is
like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he
refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for
the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27, "The fear of the Lord
driveth out sin." On the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the
beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of wisdom. For since the
regulation of human conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order
to make a beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to
Him: for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of
wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life that is
ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is written
(Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for [Vulg.:
'and'] the branches thereof are longlived." Consequently, as the root is
said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said to be wisdom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom in one
way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 25:16): "The fear
of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith is to be fast
joined to it."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from filial
fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the
beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of God is the
beginning of love." Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object of
servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be the same.
But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore initial fear
also is substantially distinct from initial fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the extremes.
Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear. Therefore
it differs from both filial and servile fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance of
a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection and
imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan.
Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from
filial fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning
[initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some way,
the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial fear
in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in the
sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom
there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of
charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear,
because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity.
Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as
imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ,
not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we must conclude that
initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially from
filial fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear,
which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the
thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if it be
referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of love, not
absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper
object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it: for
this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with charity, its
servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with imperfect
charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not only through
love of justice, but also through fear of punishment, though this same
act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which "casteth out fear,"
according to 1 Jn. 4:18.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear, not
as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is a mean
between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph. ii, for it
is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it differs
altogether from non-being.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. For no
gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also from the
Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to Himself. Now
fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear is not a gift
of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for its
object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is feared.
Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a
theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being
connected with the same matter, as it were.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is bestowed as a
remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is opposed to pride.
Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since they
are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49).
Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, while fear
regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not be said that
fear is a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts
of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above (A[2]). Now it
is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib. Arb.
xviii), "that is a gift of God"---for it was by this fear that Peter
denied Christ---but that fear of which it was said (Mt. 10:28): "Fear Him
that can destroy both soul and body into hell."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] Body Para. 2/3
Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De
Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as they
are inseparable from charity, as stated above (FS, Q[68], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] Body Para. 3/3
It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among the
seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it was
stated above (FS, Q[68], AA[1],3) that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are
certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby these are
rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as, by the moral
virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to the motion of
reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of a certain mover,
the first condition required is that it be a non-resistant subject of
that mover, because resistance of the movable subject to the mover
hinders the movement. This is what filial or chaste fear does, since
thereby we revere God and avoid separating ourselves from Him. Hence,
according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds
the first place, as it were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the
ascending order, and the last place, in the descending order.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since
thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by God's
help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore filial
fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the evil
shunned, and in this way, as stated above (A[1]), God cannot be an object
of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the other
theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in God's
help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to obtain God
Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies to the other
theological virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does not
follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity which is
the love of God, since love is the origin of all the emotions, and yet we
are perfected by different habits in respect of different emotions. Yet
love is more of a virtue than fear is, because love regards good, to
which virtue is principally directed by reason of its own nature, as was
shown above (FS, Q[55], AA[3],4); for which reason hope is also reckoned
as a virtue; whereas fear principally regards evil, the avoidance of
which it denotes, wherefore it is something less than a theological
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride of
man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to God, and
this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts off the
source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy against
pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the virtue of
humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost are
the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as stated above (FS,
Q[68], A[4]), while the theological virtues are the origin of the gifts,
as stated above (FS, Q[69], A[4], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[9] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear decreases when charity increases?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For
Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity
increases, the more fear decreases."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity
increases when hope increases, as stated above (Q[17], A[8]). Therefore
fear decreases when charity increases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation. Now
separation decreases when union increases. Therefore fear decreases when
the love of charity increases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the fear of
God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love God above
all things, and our neighbor as ourselves."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Fear is twofold, as stated above (AA[2],4); one is filial
fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be separated from
him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] Body Para. 2/3
Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as an
effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one loves a
man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated from him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] Body Para. 3/3
On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely
cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains as
to its substance, as stated above (A[6]). This fear decreases as charity
increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man loves God,
the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less of his own
good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, because, the faster he
clings, the more confident he is of the reward, and, consequently the
less fearful of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope
increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases,
because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by another's
help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated from him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but
submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet, in a
way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal
oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be
observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than himself
and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of charity
implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear remains in heaven?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it is
written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear of
evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who already enjoy
wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some evil, since
evil is the object of fear, as stated above (AA[2],5; FS, Q[42], A[1]).
Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to 1
Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But God fears
nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good,
and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore neither will
there be fear in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord is
holy, enduring for ever and ever."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be
in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is
essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above (FS, Q[5], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] Body Para. 2/3
But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of charity,
so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in heaven, it
will not have quite the same act as it has now.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] Body Para. 3/3
In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of
fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a possible
good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance, fear
implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for little evils inspire no
fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its staying in its own order, so
a thing's evil consists in forsaking its order. Again, the order of a
rational creature is that it should be under God and above other
creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational creature to
submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too is it an evil for it, if it
submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him or contemn Him.
Now this evil is possible to a rational creature considered as to its
nature on account of the natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in
the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory.
Therefore the avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to
God, and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss,
will be in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as
of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words of
Job (26:11), "The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck," says
(Moral. xvii, 29): "The heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing,
tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal
nature, is one not of fear but of wonder," because, to wit, they wonder
at God's supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 9) in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the
question doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for
ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is
afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds fast
to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we have
acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is allowable to
say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste fear denotes a
will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we avoid sin without
trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess ourselves in the
tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear is possible there,
perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever, because that which fear
will lead us to, will be everlasting."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear that
denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear which is
accompanied by security.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things are both
like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable imitation of
the Inimitable"---that is, because, so far as they can, they imitate God
Who cannot be imitated perfectly---"they are unlike because they are the
effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short infinitely and immeasurably."
Hence, if there be no fear in God (since there is none above Him to whom
He may be subject) it does not follow that there is none in the blessed,
whose happiness consists in perfect subjection to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of
happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear implies a
natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely distant from
God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence fear will not be
cast out altogether.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of
fear?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude
corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the beginning of the
spiritual life, as explained above (A[7]): whereas poverty belongs to the
perfection of the spiritual life, according to Mt. 19:21, "If thou wilt
be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore
poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my flesh with
Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to restrain
the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong rather to the
beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of mourning corresponds to
the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of poverty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope, as
stated above (A[9], ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is, "Blessed are
the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God," seems
above all to correspond to hope, because according to Rm. 5:2, "we . . .
glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore that
beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than poverty of spirit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it was stated above (FS, Q[70], A[2]) that the fruits
correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits correspond to the
gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the beatitudes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The fear
of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed are the
poor in spirit."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because,
since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to God,
whatever results from this submission belongs to the gift of fear. Now
from the very fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he ceases
to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it only in
God. For that would be inconsistent with perfect subjection to God,
wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some trust in chariots and some in
horses; but we will call upon the name of . . . our God." It follows that
if a man fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek greatness either
in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and riches. In either case,
this proceeds from poverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes
either the voiding of a puffed up and proud spirit, according to
Augustine's interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the
renunciation of worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own
will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the
expounding of Ambrose on Lk. 6:20 and Jerome on Mt. 5:3.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the
beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this
perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a perfect
share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly goods,
wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts. Perfection,
however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of temporal goods;
since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial fear, to which the
beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent with the perfection of
wisdom, as stated above (AA[7],10).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in another
is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is the result of
filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in consequence,
opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to Him, takes no
delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, pleasure is not
concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous character of a thing which
fear regards: and so the beatitude of poverty corresponds to fear
directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of tendency to
a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation of withdrawal
from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the term of spiritual
perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of ultimate object;
while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal from external things
which hinder submission to God, fittingly corresponds to fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[19] A[12] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things
correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of
temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty, continency
and chastity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] Out. Para. 1/1
OF DESPAIR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether despair is a sin?
(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether it arises from sloth?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether despair is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin includes
conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from the immutable
good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair includes no
conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no sin,
because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mt. 7:18). Now
despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from horror
at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for the
damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault but as
part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to wayfarers as
their fault, so that it is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a sin
itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle says
of certain men (Eph. 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given themselves up to
lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness and [Vulg.: 'unto']
covetousness." Therefore despair is not only a sin but also the origin of
other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation
and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance in the
appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good
and evil in the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement which is
conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every appetitive
movement which is conformed to a false intellect is evil in itself and
sinful. Now the true opinion of the intellect about God is that from Him
comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners, according to Ezech.
18:23, "I desire not the death of the sinner, but that he should be
converted, and live" [*Vulg.: 'Is it My will that a sinner should die . .
and not that he should be converted and live?' Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while
it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or
that He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore,
just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true
opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of
despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is
vicious and sinful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion from
the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not always in
the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have God for their
object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as hatred of God,
despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion from the immutable
good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a mutable good, in so
far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must necessarily turn to
other things. Other sins, however, consist principally in conversion to a
mutable good, and, consequently, in aversion from the immutable good:
because the fornicator intends, not to depart from God, but to enjoy
carnal pleasure, the result of which is that he departs from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways: first,
directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act proceeds
from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a virtuous root, for
in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no man
makes evil use of virtue." Secondly, a thing proceeds from a virtue
indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and in this way nothing hinders
a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus sometimes men pride themselves of
their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep. ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for
good works that they may die." In this way fear of God or horror of one's
own sins may lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those
good things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of the
impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed to them
that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even so, it
would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that which he had
no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due to be obtained by
him; for instance, if a physician were to despair of healing some sick
man, or if anyone were to despair of ever becoming rich.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be despair without unbelief?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without unbelief. For
the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so long as the cause
remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a man cannot lose the
certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his faith be removed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and goodness,
is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so savors of
unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to the Divine mercy
and goodness, according to Gn. 4:13: "My iniquity is greater than that I
may deserve pardon." Therefore whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an unbeliever.
But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy, viz. that of
the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon for sins after Baptism.
Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, If we remove that which follows, that which precedes
remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (Q[17], A[7]). Therefore
when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not everyone who
despairs, is an unbeliever.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to the
appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the appetite is
moved in connection with particulars, since the appetitive movement is
from the soul towards things, which, in themselves, are particular. Now
it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion in the universal,
is not rightly disposed as to his appetitive movement, his estimate being
corrupted in a particular matter, because, in order to pass from the
universal opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary
to have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is impossible
to infer a particular conclusion from an universal proposition, except
through the holding of a particular proposition. Hence it is that a man,
while having right faith, in the universal, fails in an appetitive
movement, in regard to some particular, his particular estimate being
corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as the fornicator, by choosing
fornication as a good for himself at this particular moment, has a
corrupt estimate in a particular matter, although he retains the true
universal estimate according to faith, viz. that fornication is a mortal
sin. In the same way, a man while retaining in the universal, the true
estimate of faith, viz. that there is in the Church the power of
forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of despair, to wit, that for him,
being in such a state, there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being
corrupted in a particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just
as there can be other mortal sins, without belief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first cause is
removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the movement
of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the universal
estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of the certainty
of hope, but also by the removal of the particular estimate, which is the
secondary cause, as it were.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy is
not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs judges not
thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some particular
disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians
denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether despair is the greatest of sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins. For there
can be despair without unbelief, as stated above (A[2]). But unbelief is
the greatest of sins because it overthrows the foundation of the
spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than hope,
according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater sin than
despair.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but inordinate
aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only inordinate
aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion. Therefore the sin
of despair is not more but less grave than other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, An incurable sin seems to be most grievous, according
to Jer. 30:12: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very grievous." Now
the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer. 15:18: "My wound is
desperate so as to refuse to be healed." [*Vulg.: 'Why is my wound,'
etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Those sins which are contrary to the theological virtues
are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since the
theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are opposed
to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now every
mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact of its
turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a mutable good,
even inordinately, without turning away from God, it would not be a
mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its very nature,
includes aversion from God, is most grievous among mortal sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the theological
virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and unbelief to
despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in respect of their
proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief is due to a man not
believing God's own truth; while the hatred of God arises from man's will
being opposed to God's goodness itself; whereas despair consists in a man
ceasing to hope for a share of God's goodness. Hence it is clear that
unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself, while
despair is against Him, according as His good is partaken of by us.
Wherefore strictly speaking it is more grievous sin to disbelieve God's
truth, or to hate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point of
view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from evils
and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is given up,
men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good works. Wherefore
a gloss on Prov. 24:10, "If thou lose hope being weary in the day of
distress, thy strength shall be diminished," says: "Nothing is more
hateful than despair, for the man that has it loses his constancy both in
the every day toils of this life, and, what is worse, in the battle of
faith." And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14): "To commit a crime is to
kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into hell."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether despair arises from sloth?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth. Because
different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now despair of the
future life arises from lust, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
Therefore it does not arise from sloth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth
contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope, according
to Rm. 12:12, "rejoicing in hope." Therefore sloth arises from despair,
and not vice versa.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope, the
contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration of
Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 10): "Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than that we
should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof could we
have of this than that God's Son should deign to unite Himself to our
nature?" Therefore despair arises rather from the neglect of the above
consideration than from sloth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among the
effects of sloth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[1]; FS, Q[40], A[1]), the
object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by oneself or
by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness may be lacking
in a person in two ways: first, through his not deeming it an arduous
good; secondly, through his deeming it impossible to obtain either by
himself, or by another. Now, the fact that spiritual goods taste good to
us no more, or seem to be goods of no great account, is chiefly due to
our affections being infected with the love of bodily pleasures, among
which, sexual pleasures hold the first place: for the love of those
pleasures leads man to have a distaste for spiritual things, and not to
hope for them as arduous goods. In this way despair is caused by lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good impossible
to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his being over
downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his affections, it
seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any good. And since
sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way despair is
born of sloth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Now this is the proper object of hope---that the thing is possible,
because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence
despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise from
lust, for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as hope
gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope: and,
accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into despair,
according to 2 Cor. 2:7: "Lest . . . such an one be swallowed up by
overmuch sorrow." Yet, since the object of hope is good, to which the
appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not naturally but only on
account of some supervening obstacle, it follows that, more directly,
hope gives birth to joy, while on the contrary despair is born of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[20] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises from
sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he considers
chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a man who is
full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful things, but only
of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his thoughts away from
sadness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PRESUMPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?
(2) Whether presumption is a sin?
(3) To what is it opposed?
(4) From what vice does it arise?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether presumption trusts in God or in our own power?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against the Holy
Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the lesser the
power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it too much. But
man's power is less than God's. Therefore it is a more grievous sin to
presume on human power than to presume on the power of God. Now the sin
against the Holy Ghost is most grievous. Therefore presumption, which is
reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts to human rather
than to Divine power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy Ghost,
for this sin is called malice which is a source from which sins arise.
Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby man presumes on
himself rather than from the presumption whereby he presumes on God,
since self-love is the origin of sin, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption which is a sin against the
Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a mutable
good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from turning to human
power, which is a mutable good, rather than from turning to the power of
God, which is an immutable good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Just as, through despair, a man despises the Divine
mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he despises the
Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice is in God even as
mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in aversion from God, so
presumption consists in inordinate conversion to Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the
object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible to a
man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power of God
alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption owing to lack
of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on his own power,
there is presumption if he tends to a good as though it were possible to
him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according to Judith 6:15: "Thou
humblest them that presume of themselves." This presumption is contrary
to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to the mean in this kind of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there may
be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends to some
good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of God, whereas it
is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to obtain pardon without
repenting, or glory without merits. This presumption is, properly, the
sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to wit, by presuming thus a man
removes or despises the assistance of the Holy Spirit, whereby he is
withdrawn from sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[20], A[3]; FS, Q[73], A[3]) a sin which
is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins. Hence
presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a more grievous
sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power, since to rely on
the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to God, is to
depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is a graver sin to
detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate one's own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on God,
includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately. For when
we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure it through
others, even though we cannot.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Presumption on God's mercy implies both conversion to a
mutable good, in so far as it arises from an inordinate desire of one's
own good, and aversion from the immutable good, in as much as it ascribes
to the Divine power that which is unbecoming to it, for thus man turns
away from God's power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether presumption is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin is a
reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption some are
heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): "Hear me a poor wretch
making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy." Therefore
presumption on God's mercy is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there cannot be
excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are
infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for the
Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that "Adam sinned less, because he sinned
in the hope of pardon," which seems to indicate presumption. Therefore
presumption is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[20], A[1]) with regard to despair,
every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false intellect, is evil
in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an appetitive movement, since it
denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it is conformed to a false
intellect, just as despair is: for just as it is false that God does not
pardon the repentant, or that He does not turn sinners to repentance, so
is it false that He grants forgiveness to those who persevere in their
sins, and that He gives glory to those who cease from good works: and it
is to this estimate that the movement of presumption is conformed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair, since,
on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God to have
mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes God in
Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the
right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be
measured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the
immensity of the goodness of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though man
hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God
something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little in
Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated above (A[1],
ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and through
the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does not diminish,
but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of obtaining pardon
some time, and with the intention of refraining from sin and of repenting
of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin, because this seems to
indicate a will less hardened in sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear than to
hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now presumption
seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written (Wis. 17:10): "A
troubled conscience always presumes [Douay: 'forecasteth'] grievous
things," and (Wis. 17:11) that "fear is a help to presumption [*Vulg.:
'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up of the succours from thought.']."
Therefore presumption is opposed to fear rather than to hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now
presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because presumption
implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas fear denotes
movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary to fear rather
than to hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it does
not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope. Since
therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that presumption is
contrary to fear rather than to hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, When two vices are opposed to one another they are
contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to
fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of despair,
which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that presumption
also is more directly opposed to hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "every virtue
not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as temerity is
opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice, alike, not in truth
but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning is opposed to prudence."
This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue
seems to have more in common with one of the contrary vices than with the
other, as temperance with insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear,
especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from God's
justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a kind of
false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an inordinate
hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed when they belong
to the same genus, than when they belong to different genera, it follows
that presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear. For they
both regard and rely on the same object, hope inordinately, presumption
inordinately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and properly
applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in this way that
inordinate fear is called presumption.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from one
another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a movement
of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate. Hence
presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear, since it is
opposed to hope in respect of its specific difference, as an inordinate
thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is opposed to fear, in respect of
its generic difference, which is the movement of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic contrariety,
and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety. Hence presumption
excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas it does not exclude
hope except by reason of its difference, by excluding its ordinateness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether presumption arises from vainglory?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that presumption does not arise from vainglory. For
presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine mercy. Now mercy
[misericordia] regards unhappiness [miseriam] which is contrary to glory.
Therefore presumption does not arise from vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair arises
from sorrow, as stated above (Q[20], A[4], ad 2). Since therefore
opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to arise from
pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which give the most
absorbing pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some
impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to ignorance
that one deems an impossible thing to be possible. Therefore presumption
arises from ignorance rather than from vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumption of
novelties is a daughter of vainglory."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), presumption is twofold; one
whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something beyond
his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like presumption
clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great desire for
glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and especially
novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory states
explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or
power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or
pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise directly
from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to esteem that
God would not punish him or exclude him from glory, however much he might
be a sinner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[21] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under which
head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) The precepts relating to hope;
(2) The precepts relating to fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there should be a precept of hope?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no precept should be given relating to the
virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by one cause,
there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is sufficiently induced
by his natural inclination to hope for good. Therefore there is no need
of a precept of the Law to induce him to do this.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the chief
precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the chief of all
the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope, faith and
charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are those of the
decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated above (FS,
Q[100], A[3]), it seems that if any precept of hope were given, it should
be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it is not to be found
there. Therefore it seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a
prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be
found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it seems
that the Law should contain no precept of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says on Jn. 15:12, "This is My commandment,
that you love one another" (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.): "How many things
are commanded us about faith! How many relating to hope!" Therefore it is
fitting that some precepts should be given about hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some belong to
the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law. The preambles
to the Law are those without which no law is possible: such are the
precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of hope, because the
act of faith inclines man's mind so that he believes the Author of the
Law to be One to Whom he owes submission, while, by the hope of a reward,
he is induced to observe the precepts. The precepts that belong to the
substance of the Law are those which relate to right conduct and are
imposed on man already subject and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law
was given these precepts were set forth from the very outset under form
of a command.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the form
of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it would be
useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of faith had to be
given under the form of an announcement or reminder, as stated above
(Q[16], A[1]), so too, the precept of hope, in the first promulgation of
the Law, had to be given under the form of a promise. For he who promises
rewards to them that obey him, by that very fact, urges them to hope:
hence all the promises contained in the Law are incitements to hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise man
to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and much more,
to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after the first
promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many inducements to
hope, even by way of warning or command, and not merely by way of
promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Ps. 61:9: "Hope [Douay:
'Trust'] in Him all ye congregation of the people," and in many other
passages of the Scriptures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is
proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural
good he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly by
promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there was need
for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those things to which
natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the moral virtues, for
sake of insuring a greater stability, especially since the natural reason
of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the
first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept of
hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to induce men
to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the case of the first
and fourth commandments.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In those observances to which man is bound as under a duty,
it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what he has to
do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must avoid doing: thus
he is given a precept concerning the honor due to parents, but not a
prohibition against dishonoring them, except by the law inflicting
punishment on those who dishonor their parents. And since in order to be
saved it is man's duty to hope in God, he had to be induced to do so by
one of the above ways, affirmatively, so to speak, wherein is implied the
prohibition of the opposite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there should have been given a precept of fear?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have been given
a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things which are a
preamble to the Law, since it is the "beginning of wisdom." Now things
which are a preamble to the Law do not come under a precept of the Law.
Therefore no precept of fear should be given in the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now love is
the cause of fear, since "every fear proceeds from some kind of love," as
Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the precept of
love, it would have been superfluous to command fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But the Law
contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it seems that
neither should any precept of fear have been given.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what doth
the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?"
But He requires of us that which He commands us to do. Therefore it is a
matter of precept that man should fear God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man is
induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so too is he
induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is servile.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
And just as according to what has been said (A[1]), in the promulgation
of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of hope, and men
were to be induced thereto by promises, so neither was there need for a
precept, under form of command, of fear which regards punishment, and men
were to be induced thereto by the threat of punishment: and this was
realized both in the precepts of the decalogue, and afterwards, in due
sequence, in the secondary precepts of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to
strengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered their teaching
about hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they in
the matter of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort of
genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of all
observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of filial
fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love, because each is a
preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to which the
precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the passage quoted in the
argument, "On the contrary," man is required "to have fear, to walk in
God's ways," by worshipping Him, and "to love Him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it were
extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law, just as love
is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are like general
principles of the whole Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From love proceeds filial fear as also other good works
that are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of charity,
precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the same time
precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just as, in
demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first
principles, unless the conclusions also are given which follow from them
proximately or remotely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[22] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Inducement to fear suffices to exclude presumption, even as
inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as stated above (A[1], ad
3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] Out. Para. 1/2
ON CHARITY (QQ[23]-46)
OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself;
(2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be
fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its acts;
(4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] Out. Para. 2/2
The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity,
considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation to
its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether charity is friendship?
(2) Whether it is something created in the soul?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
(5) Whether it is one virtue?
(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?
(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is friendship?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing is so
appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the
angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation'] is not with men" (Dan.
2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic.
viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according to Mt.
5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are
three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the delightful,
the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the
useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which is
to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True friendship cemented by
Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not
by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the
fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it
friendship for the virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners,
whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic.
viii). Therefore charity is not friendship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 15:15): "I will not now call you
servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of
nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every
love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together
with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to
him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good
for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like),
it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it
would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain
mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend:
and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God,
inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship
must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1
Cor. 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship
of His Son." The love which is based on this communication, is charity:
wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect
of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there
is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The
other is man's spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to
this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels,
imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written
(Phil. 3:20): "Our conversation is in heaven." But this "conversation"
will be perfected in heaven, when "His servants shall serve Him, and they
shall see His face" (Apoc. 22:3,4). Therefore charity is imperfect here,
but will be perfected in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in
respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one's
friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when
a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all
belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in
any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we
love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in
this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we
love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity
is chiefly directed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to
none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love
those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way
charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to
sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God's sake.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is something created in the soul?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul.
For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his neighbor,
consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love. Therefore it follows
that he loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17):
"It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit."
Therefore charity is not something created in the soul, but is God
Himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul
is the life of the body, according to Dt. 30:20: "He is thy life." Now
the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by
Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 Jn. 3:14: "We know
that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren."
Therefore God is charity itself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary
every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed
to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to
the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By charity
I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His own
sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul.
Therefore charity is something created in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q[17]
of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created
in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does
he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy
Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without any
intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost
by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith
or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the
excellence of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary,
detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind the
movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that
the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this
movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For
this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs
to be in itself, as stated above (FS, Q[6], A[1]): so that it would
follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a
contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in
such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument,
for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has
not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to
be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above (FS,
Q[114], A[4]) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given
that the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is
necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be
connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle of
that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends,
bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end
appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things sweetly"
(Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the
nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be
superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this
same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the
other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this
is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its
act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great
pleasure. Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act
of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the
natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it
to act with ease and pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom
and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness
which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness
whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and
the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so
too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation
of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the
Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of
adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by charity,
and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of the
soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we may
conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to the
body, so is charity to the soul.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends
on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident
that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect,
since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves the
infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind
of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a virtue, as may
be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues
whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et
Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies rather
to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and
that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not
an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the soul
itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore
charity is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is a
virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to
God, for by it we love Him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Human acts are good according as they are regulated by
their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle
of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of human acts,
which is twofold, as stated above (Q[17], A[1]), viz. human reason and
God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with
right reason," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue
consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to faith,
(Q[4], A[5]) and hope (Q[17], A[1]). Wherefore, it follows that charity
is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as
evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friendship
is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or with a virtue."
For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of
another person, but under a different aspect from justice. For justice is
about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the
legal due, whereas friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and
moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher
explains (Ethic. viii, 13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is
not a virtue distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its
praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in
so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This
is evident from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and
virtuous, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility.
Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue
rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since
it is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness
of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice
about him, since joy results from love, as stated above (FS, Q[25], A[2])
in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue,
rather than joy, which is an effect of love. And when virtue is described
as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of
effect, but in the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed
sixty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its
being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its
being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which
results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject,
even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that
results from a participation of some higher nature is superior to its
subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as
light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way charity is superior
to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome
says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby we love
God" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and Augustine
says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that "virtue is the
order of love." Now no special virtue is included in the definition of
virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be a
special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue, according to
1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed it extends to
all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be
done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now
Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt love" is
"a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general
prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing general is enumerated together with what is
special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz.
hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "And now there remain faith,
hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown
above (FS, Q[18], A[2]; FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the proper object of love
is the good, as stated above (FS, Q[27], A[1]), so that wherever there is
a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine
good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of
good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of that good, is a
special kind of love. Therefore charity is a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not
as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it
in a way, as we shall state further on (AA[7],8). In this way prudence
is included in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained in
Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end,
commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends which
are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-riding
(Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object the last end of
human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that it extends to the
acts of a man's whole life, by commanding them, not by eliciting
immediately all acts of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command,
because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, according
to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is one virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits are
distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of
charity---God and our neighbor---which are infinitely distant from one
another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, even
though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q[17], A[6]; FS,
Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which God is an
object of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of each one
of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But the
Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii, 3,11,12).
Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a number of
various species.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the object
of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine
truth, according to Eph. 4:5: "One faith." Therefore charity also is one
virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Charity, as stated above (A[1]) is a kind of friendship
of man for God. Now the different species of friendship are
differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, and in
this way there are three species of friendship, namely friendship for the
useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of
the different kinds of communion on which friendships are based; thus
there is one species of friendship between kinsmen, and another between
fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being based on natural
communion, the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of the
road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its
end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of
everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also one.
Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into
several species.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were
equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the
principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity
for God's sake.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity
regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely God's goodness,
which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: "Give glory to the Lord
for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with love for Him, or
which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary and result from the
first.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has
various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to
charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is the most excellent of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of the
virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as it has a
higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will, since it
directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect, is more
excellent than charity which is in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less
excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is
beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according to
Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to be
the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something additional to
charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is
an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): "The greater of these is
charity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since good, in human acts, depends on their being
regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is a
principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts. Now
the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (A[3]), namely, human
reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even human reason
must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues, which consist in
attaining this first rule, since their object is God, are more excellent
than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining
human reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues
themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains God most.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by
another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive from
Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas charity
attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may
accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent than faith or
hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just as prudence,
which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the other moral
virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human
operations or passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by the thing
understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the excellence of
the intellectual operation is assessed according to the measure of the
intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will and of every
appetitive power is completed in the tendency of the appetite towards a
thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the appetitive operation
is gauged according to the thing which is the object of the operation.
Now those things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the
soul than they are in themselves, because a thing is contained according
to the mode of the container (De Causis xii). On the other hand, things
that are above the soul, are more excellent in themselves than they are
in the soul. Consequently it is better to know than to love the things
that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference
to the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8):
whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God,
ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more
excellent than faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by his
servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but
charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance
therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as
hope does, since what is already united has not the character of arduous:
and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any true virtue is possible without charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without charity. For
it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those who have not
charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the naked, or feed the
hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it comes of
"an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now, in
unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their
concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true
virtue is possible without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to Ethic. vi. But
they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore true virtue
can be without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should distribute
all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned,
and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet true virtue is
very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth temperance, and
prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can
have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no true virtue is
possible without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above (FS, Q[55]
, A[4]). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things directed to the end
are not said to be good except in relation to the end. Accordingly, just
as the end is twofold, the last end, and the proximate end, so also, is
good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal good, the other proximate
and particular. The ultimate and principal good of man is the enjoyment
of God, according to Ps. 72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to God," and
to this good man is ordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were,
particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in
itself, it can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end;
while the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us
away from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true
virtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus also the
Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the disposition of
a perfect thing to that which is best": and in this way no true virtue is
possible without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end,
then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as it
is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is not a
true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordered to
such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine says (Contra
Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser, whereby he devises various
roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser's justice, whereby he
scorns the property of another through fear of severe punishment; nor the
miser's temperance, whereby he curbs his desire for expensive pleasures;
nor the miser's fortitude, whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea,
he crosses mountains, he goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'"
(Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be
a true good, for instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will
indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the
final and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible
without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one is
in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something that is
referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is always evil:
thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the actions which an
unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always sinful, even when he
clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and directs it to his unbelief
as end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in accordance
with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his possession of some
other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even his natural good,
which is not completely taken away by sin, as stated above (Q[10], A[4];
FS, Q[85], A[2]). In this way it is possible for an act, without charity,
to be generically good, but not perfectly good, because it lacks its due
order to the last end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the principle
is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly true science,
if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so,
there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity, without that due
ordering to the end, which is effected by charity, however rightly a man
may be affected about other matters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation to
some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life, as do
the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above (FS, Q[56]
, A[3]). Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is the form of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the virtues.
Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential. Now charity
is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it would follow that
the other virtues are of the same species as charity: nor is it the
essential form of the other virtues, since then it would not be distinct
from them. Therefore it is in no way the form of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their root
and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity."
Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a
thing, since it is the first part in the making. Therefore charity is not
the form of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide with
one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the mother
of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that charity
is the form of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the
end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is the will,
whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of an act
always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, in morals, that
which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give the act its
form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been said (A[7]),
that it is charity which directs the acts of all other virtues to the
last end, and which, consequently, also gives the form to all other acts
of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the
form of the virtues, for these are called virtues in relation to
"informed" acts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as
being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of
efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid
manner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far as
all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom, and
not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character of a
material cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[23] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it
directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is one who
conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother of
the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of
the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which
head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine
infusion?
(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?
(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?
(5) Whether it increases by addition?
(6) Whether it increases by every act?
(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?
(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?
(9) Of the various degrees of charity;
(10) Whether charity can diminish?
(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?
(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is the subject of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity. For
charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii,
3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is also in the
concupiscible and not in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated above
(Q[23], A[6]). But the reason is the subject of virtue. Therefore it
seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1 Cor.
16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Now the principle of
human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is chiefly
in the free-will as its subject and not in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, which is also the
object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since, as stated in the FP, Q[80], A[2], the appetite is
twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which is called the
will, the object of each is the good, but in different ways: for the
object of the sensitive appetite is a good apprehended by sense, whereas
the object of the intellective appetite or will is good under the
universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended by the
intellect. Now the object of charity is not a sensible good, but the
Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the subject
of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the
will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of the
intellective appetite, as proved in the FP, Q[81], A[2]: wherefore the
love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of sensible good: nor can
the concupiscible reach to the Divine good which is an intelligible good;
the will alone can. Consequently the concupiscible cannot be the subject
of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the will
also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from the reason
through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by the reason,
as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and transcends the rule of
human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ, which
surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not in the reason, either as its
subject, like prudence is, or as its rule, like justice and temperance
are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in the FP, Q[83], A[4], the free-will is not a
distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in the will considered
as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For choice is of things
directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end itself (Ethic. iii,
2). Hence charity, whose object is the last end, should be described as
residing in the will rather than in the free-will.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by infusion. For
that which is common to all creatures, is in man naturally. Now,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine good", which is the
object of charity, "is for all an object of dilection and love."
Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by infusion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love it.
Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good. Therefore it is
easier to love Him than other things. But we need no infused habit in
order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we need one in order
to love God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an
unfeigned faith." Now these three have reference to human acts. Therefore
charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from infusion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), charity is a friendship of
man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness. Now
this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of gratuitous gifts,
for, according to Rm. 6:23, "the grace of God is life everlasting":
wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural facilities. Now that which
surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be natural or acquired by the
natural powers, since a natural effect does not transcend its cause.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through
acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy Ghost,
Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom
in us is created charity, as stated above (Q[23], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is founded
on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all naturally. On
the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural fellowship, so the
comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to us,
on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible things,
so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He is the
object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in this way,
on account of the inclination of our appetite towards visible goods.
Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all things in this way,
it is necessary that charity be infused into our hearts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from "a pure
heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this must be
referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things. Or
again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to receive the
infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the saying of Augustine
(Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): "Fear leads to charity," and of a
gloss on Mt. 1:2: "Faith begets hope, and hope charity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the capacity
of our natural gifts. For it is written (Mt. 25:15) that "He gave to
every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper ability']." Now, in
man, none but natural virtue precedes charity, since there is no virtue
without charity, as stated above (Q[23], A[7]). Therefore God infuses
charity into man according to the measure of his natural virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the second is
proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things that the form
is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous gifts, that glory is
proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a perfection of nature, it
is compared to the capacity of nature as second to first. Therefore it
seems that charity is infused according to the capacity of nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the
same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Mt. 22:30
and Lk. 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are bestowed on the
angels, according to their natural capacity, as the Master teaches (Sent.
ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently applies to man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:8): "The Spirit breatheth where He
will," and (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the same Spirit
worketh, dividing to every one according as He will." Therefore charity
is given, not according to our natural capacity, but according as the
Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause of
that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater effect.
Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature, as stated
above (A[2]) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on the sole grace
of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the quantity of charity
depends neither on the condition of nature nor on the capacity of natural
virtue, but only on the will of the Holy Ghost Who "divides" His gifts
"according as He will." Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:7): "To every one
of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts to
each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of the one
who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this disposition
or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less, according as He
will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): "Who hath made us worthy to
be partakers of the lot of the saints in light."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter. In
like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for grace is
nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity and nature do
not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is consistent
with his condition that he should be borne wholly whithersoever he is
borne, as stated in the FP, Q[61], A[6]. Hence there was a greater effort
in the higher angels, both for good in those who persevered, and for evil
in those who fell, and consequently those of the higher angels who
remained steadfast became better than the others, and those who fell
became worse. But man's is a rational nature, with which it is consistent
to be sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not
necessarily borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are
greater natural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the
comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity can increase?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing increases
save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely dimensive and
virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a spiritual
perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in respect of
which charity does not increase, since the slightest charity loves all
that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore charity does not increase.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no
increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the greatest
of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good. Therefore
charity cannot increase.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever there
is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of essence there
is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of essence save either
by corruption or generation. Therefore charity cannot increase
essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or corrupted, which is
unreasonable.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep.
clxxxv.] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit
perfection."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are called
wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the last end
of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to God, Who is
approached, "not by steps of the body but by the affections of the soul"
[*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and this approach is the result
of charity, since it unites man's mind to God. Consequently it is
essential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can increase, for if it
could not, all further advance along the way would cease. Hence the
Apostle calls charity the way, when he says (1 Cor. 12:31): "I show unto
you yet a more excellent way."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to virtual
quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of objects,
namely whether they be in greater number or of greater excellence, but
also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a thing is loved more,
or less; it is in this way that the virtual quantity of charity increases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its object,
in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it follows
that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not every charity
consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in its
essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according to
its fervor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since
charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an
essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet more
in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject.
Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that an
essential increase of charity implies ability to produce an act of more
fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by beginning anew,
or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection imagines, but by
beginning to be more and more in its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity increases by addition?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For just as
increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be according to
virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity results from addition;
for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that "increase is addition to
pre-existing magnitude." Therefore the increase of charity which is
according to virtual quantity is by addition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul,
according to 1 Jn. 2:10: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the
light." Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in a
house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also
increases in the soul by addition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as the
causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: "He will increase the growth of
the fruits of your justice." Now when God first infuses charity, He puts
something in the soul that was not there before. Therefore also, when He
increases charity, He puts something there which was not there before.
Therefore charity increases by addition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater results
from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved in Phys. iii,
text. 59, and Metaph. ii, 4. Therefore charity does not increase by
addition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Every addition is of something to something else: so that
in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things added
together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if charity be
added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as distinct from
charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a distinction of
reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For God is able to
increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which did not exist
before, but was created at that very moment; which magnitude, though not
pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless capable of being distinguished
from the quantity to which it is added. Wherefore if charity be added to
charity we must presuppose the distinction, at least logical, of the one
charity from the other.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric. Specific
distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while numeric
distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a habit may
receive increase through extending to objects to which it did not extend
before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who acquires
knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored hitherto. But this
cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest charity extends to all
that we have to love by charity. Hence the addition which causes an
increase of charity cannot be understood, as though the added charity
were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to which it is
added.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must
presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a
distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one
white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not make
a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in point, since
the subject of charity is none other than the rational mind, so that such
like an increase of charity could only take place by one rational mind
being added to another; which is impossible. Moreover, even if it were
possible, the result would be a greater lover, but not a more loving one.
It follows, therefore, that charity can by no means increase by addition
of charity to charity, as some have held to be the case.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of charity
more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of increase in
a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists
wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently, since the magnitude
of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is greater is the
same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not that another form
is added to it: for this would be the case if the form, of itself, had
any quantity, and not in comparison with its subject. Therefore charity
increases by being intensified in its subject, and this is for charity to
increase in its essence; and not by charity being added to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and something
else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity, it is
distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this way we have
the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in animals. But in
so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable only in respect
of its subject, and in this way it has its proper increase, like other
accidental forms, by way of intensity in its subject, for instance in
things subject to rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9. In like
manner science, as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and
accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows more things; and
again, as an accidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in
its subject, and in this way it increase in a man who knows the same
scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same way
charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that which it has from
its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it follows that
it increases solely by being intensified.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The addition of light to light can be understood through
the light being intensified in the air on account of there being several
luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not apply to the case
in point, since there is but one luminary shedding forth the light of
charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state of
"having" charity from the state of "not having it," so that something
must needs come which was not there before. On the other hand, the
increase of charity denotes a change to "more having" from "less having,"
so that there is need, not for anything to be there that was not there
before, but for something to be more there that previously was less
there. This is what God does when He increases charity, that is He makes
it to have a greater hold on the soul, and the likeness of the Holy Ghost
to be more perfectly participated by the soul.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity increases through every act of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act of
charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less. But
every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more than a
simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection of charity.
Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered by
acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act of charity. Now
each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue. Therefore also
each virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.] says
that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back." Now no man goes
back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore whoever is moved by
an act of charity goes forward in the way to God. Therefore charity
increases through every act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But
an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or slackness. Therefore
it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, rather does it dispose
one to a lower degree.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like the
increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is not a
continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so
much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part of that time,
as happens in local movement; but for a certain space of time nature
works by disposing for the increase, without causing any actual increase,
and afterwards brings into effect that to which it had disposed, by
giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In like manner charity
does not actually increase through every act of charity, but each act of
charity disposes to an increase of charity, in so far as one act of
charity makes man more ready to act again according to charity, and this
readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of more fervent love,
and strives to advance in charity, and then his charity increases
actually.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which,
however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper time. In
like manner every act of charity merits an increase of charity; yet this
increase does not take place at once, but when we strive for that
increase.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each act
does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces towards that
effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is the most perfect,
and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it, reduces the virtue into
act, just as when many drops hollow out a stone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual
increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity increases indefinitely?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity does not increase indefinitely. For
every movement is towards some end and term, as stated in Metaph. ii,
text. 8,9. But the increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it tends
to an end and term. Therefore charity does not increase indefinitely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But the
capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity is
finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase, attain to
the quantity of another finite thing however much greater, unless the
amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the Philosopher states
(Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an indefinite number of
parts, and take these parts away and add them indefinitely to another
line, we shall never arrive at any definite quantity resulting from those
two lines, viz. the one from which we subtracted and the one to which we
added what was subtracted. But this does not occur in the case in point:
because there is no need for the second increase of charity to be less
than the first, since rather is it probable that it would be equal or
greater. As, therefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite,
if the charity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow
that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is
absurd. Therefore the wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had
already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may,
by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if he has
made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.' For
whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his destination."
Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more and more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three
ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed measure, and when
this has been reached it is no longer possible to go any further in that
form, but if any further advance is made, another form is attained. And
example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, by continual
alteration, be passed, either so that whiteness ensues, or so that
blackness results. Secondly, on the part of the agent, whose power does
not extend to a further increase of the form in its subject. Thirdly, on
the part of the subject, which is not capable of ulterior perfection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of man's
charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity itself
considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a
participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In like
manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of
infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no limit to this
increase can be determined, because whenever charity increases, there is
a corresponding increased ability to receive a further increase. It is
therefore evident that it is not possible to fix any limits to the
increase of charity in this life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is not
in this, but in a future life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The capacity of the rational creature is increased by
charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Cor. 6:11:
"Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains capable of receiving a
further increase.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument holds good in those things which have the
same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds: thus
however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity of a
superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity which follows the
knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the quantity of the charity
of the blessed, which follows open vision. Hence the argument does not
prove.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity can be perfect in this life?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this life. For
this would have been the case with the apostles before all others. Yet it
was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had
already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore charity cannot be
perfect in this life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "whatever
kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect, cupidity
is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this world, wherein it is
impossible to live without sin, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that
we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all sin arises from some
inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any more.
But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above (A[7]).
Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
"Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been brought
to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to be with
Christ.'" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of Paul.
Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The perfection of charity may be understood in two ways:
first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to the person
who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is perfect, if the
object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is as lovable as He is
good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is infinitely lovable.
But no creature can love Him infinitely since all created power is
finite. Consequently no creature's charity can be perfect in this way;
the charity of God alone can, whereby He loves Himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he loves
as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a man's
whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the perfection
of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this life, wherein, by
reason of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to think always
actually of God, and to be moved by love towards Him. Secondly, so that
man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to God and Divine things,
while scorning other things except in so far as the needs of the present
life demand. This is the perfection of charity that is possible to a
wayfarer; but is not common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a
man gives his whole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor
desiring anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is
common to all who have charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of heaven,
wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a perfect
wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which the way leads."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are contrary,
not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are incompatible,
not with the perfection of the way, but with that of heaven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection simply,
wherefore it can always increase.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning,
progress, and perfection?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of charity,
beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many degrees between
the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection. Therefore it is not
right to put only one.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to be.
Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as progressing and
as beginning.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may be,
it can increase, as stated above (A[7]). Now for charity to increase is
to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be distinguished from
progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees are unsuitably
assigned to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) "As
soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to beginners, "after
taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to those who are progressing,
"and when it has become strong it is perfected," which refers to the
perfect. Therefore there are three degrees of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity may be considered in
respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For
although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it has
certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or pursuits
to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak of a man being
an infant until he has the use of reason, after which we distinguish
another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to use his reason,
while there is again a third state, that of puberty when he begins to
acquire the power of generation, and so on until he arrives at perfection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] Body Para. 2/3
In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished according
to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the increase of
charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy himself chiefly
with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences, which move him in
opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in whom charity has to be
fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the second place man's chief
pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and this is the pursuit of the
proficient, whose chief aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to
it: while man's third pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with and
enjoyment of God: this belongs to the perfect who "desire to be dissolved
and to be with Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] Body Para. 3/3
In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is
withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and thirdly,
rest in this term.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in the
increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even as every
division of continuous things is included in these three---the beginning,
the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although those who are beginners in charity may progress,
yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins which disturb
them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they come to feel this
onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection with greater security;
yet with one hand doing the work, and with the other holding the sword as
related in 2 Esdr 4:17 about those who built up Jerusalem.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is not
their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards union
with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek this, yet
their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the beginner, about
avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing in virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity can decrease?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries by their
nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease are contraries.
Since then charity increases, as stated above (A[4]), it seems that it
can also decrease.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He loves
Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) he
says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity." For this it seems to
follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity quenches charity. But
cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides God, can increase in man.
Therefore charity can decrease.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God makes the
just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man turns
away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine operation."
From this we may gather that when God preserves charity in man, He works
in the same way as when He first infuses charity into him. Now at the
first infusion of charity God infuses less charity into him that prepares
himself less. Therefore also in preserving charity, He preserves less
charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore charity can decrease.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, according to
Cant 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i.e. of charity, "are fire and flames."
Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts. Therefore as long as
charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i.e. decrease.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, The quantity which charity has in comparison with its
proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, as
stated above (A[4], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Body Para. 2/6
Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in comparison
with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it can decrease
in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be either through an
act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true that virtues acquired
through acts decrease and sometimes cease altogether through cessation
from act, as stated above (FS, Q[53], A[3]). Wherefore the Philosopher
says, in reference to friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of
intercourse," i.e. the neglect to call upon or speak with one's friends,
"has destroyed many a friendship." Now this is because the safe-keeping
of a thing depends on its cause, and the cause of human virtue is a human
act, so that when human acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases
and at last ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity,
because it is not the result of human acts, but is caused by God alone,
as stated above (A[2]). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases,
it does not for this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the
cessation involves a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Body Para. 3/6
The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except
either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by
God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace in
punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by way of
punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Body Para. 4/6
It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this
decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But mortal
sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but destroys it
entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is contrary to
charity, as we shall state further on (A[12]), and by way of merit, since
when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he deserves that
God should withdraw charity from him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Body Para. 5/6
In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either
effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not
touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial sin is
a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love for the end
is none the less through his committing an inordinate act as regards the
things directed to the end. Thus sick people sometimes, though they love
health much, are irregular in keeping to their diet: and thus again, in
speculative sciences, the false opinions that are derived from the
principles, do not diminish the certitude of the principles. So too,
venial sin does not merit diminution of charity; for when a man offends
in a small matter he does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter.
For God does not turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him:
wherefore he that is out of order in respect of things directed to the
end, does not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to
the last end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] Body Para. 6/6
The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we
speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption may be
said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial sins,
or even the cessation from the practice of works of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that subject stands
in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal relation
to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of increase, but not of
decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in
creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison, as
Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e. less
than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing charity
but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must understand the
saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside Thee," for he adds
these words, "which he loveth not for Thee." This does not apply to
venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which we love in venial
sin, is loved for God's sake habitually though not actually. There is
another cupidity, that of venial sin, which is always diminished by
charity: and yet this cupidity cannot diminish charity, for the reason
given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the infusion of
charity, as stated above (FS, Q[113], A[3]). Wherefore that which
diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces dispositively to a
diminution in the charity to be infused. On the other hand, no movement
of the free-will is required for the safe-keeping of charity, else it
would not remain inn us while we sleep. Hence charity does not decrease
on account of an obstacle on the part of the intensity of the free-will's
movement.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we have it.
For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who has charity
cannot sin, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God,
committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin,
because he is born of God." But none save the children of God have
charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of God from the
children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17). Therefore he
that has charity cannot lose it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be not
true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a letter to
Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true." [*The quotation is
from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam comitem, vii., among the works
of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of
Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was no charity at all. Therefore, when once
we have charity, we cannot lose it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx)
that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to work it
is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great things.
Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some
motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning, both
self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity cannot be
lost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat against
thee, because thou hast left thy first charity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above
(A[2]; QQ[23],24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three ways:
first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love God, and
in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the power of the
Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do. Hence it is
impossible for these two things to be true at the same time---that the
Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and
that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of
perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby "whoever is
delivered, is most certainly delivered," as Augustine says in his book on
the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] Body Para. 2/4
Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable of
anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin at all,
even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine
says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] Body Para. 3/4
Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is
changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be compared
with this subject, both from the general point of view of form in
comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit as
compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its subject in
such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely fill the
potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things generated
and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one form in
such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form, as though
its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one form. Hence
the one form may be lost by the other being received. On the other hand
the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its
matter, so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another
form, is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the
blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational mind,
since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is possessed
by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not
so fill the potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always
actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually directed to
God, something may occur whereby charity is lost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] Body Para. 4/4
It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to a
habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem good,
and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges of
savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind judge of
things to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as a man is, so does the end
appear to him." Accordingly charity is inseparable from its possessor,
where that which pertains to charity cannot appear otherwise than good,
and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His Essence, which is the
very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost,
whereas the charity of the way can, because in this state God is not seen
in His Essence, which is the essence of goodness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the
power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills to
move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no true
charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only for a time,
and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love.
If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness of the subject,
and against the purpose of charity included in its act, this is not
contrary to true charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose,
which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great things
in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[11] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for
sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting actually,
and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we
consent to this motive, we lose charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one mortal sin.
For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has mounted to the stage
of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that he will become empty or
fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so gradually and by little and
little." But man falls away by losing charity. Therefore charity is not
lost through only one mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (60) addresses Peter
thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not an averted love,
but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never failed, and the
words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the fount of charity."
From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.]
drew his assertion that "charity in Peter was not quenched, but cooled."
But Peter sinned mortally in denying Christ. Therefore charity is not
lost through one mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a habit
of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act. Much
less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now,
seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of God
and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things directed
to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated above (A[10]
). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there be a mortal sin
through an inordinate affection for some temporal good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end. Now
the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not done away
by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless. Therefore charity
can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has been committed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal death,
according to Rm. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death." On the other hand
whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it is written (Jn.
14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and I will love
Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in which manifestation everlasting
life consists, according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life; that they
may know Thee the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent."
Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal life and of
eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a man to have charity with
a mortal sin. Therefore charity is destroyed by one mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, That one contrary is removed by the other contrary
supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very
nature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and
subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to God.
It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God as to
wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the rule of His
commandments; since whatever is contrary to His commandments is
manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its very nature is
capable of destroying charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] Body Para. 2/3
If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its
subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, for act
is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a
habit in its subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that
when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not at once done
away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends on the action of God
Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the infusion and safekeeping of
charity, as the sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as stated
above (A[10], OBJ 3). Consequently, just as the light would cease at once
in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit up by the sun, even
so charity ceases at once to be in the soul through the placing of an
obstacle to the outpouring of charity by God into the soul.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] Body Para. 3/3
Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to
God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of charity,
since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to God's
friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it follows that
the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is enlightened by God's
presence, but he is darkened at once by God's absence, because distance
from Him is effected not by change of place but by aversion of the will."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way, that a
man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so far as to
commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some previous negligence,
for which reason venial sins are said to be dispositions to mortal sin,
as stated above (FS, Q[88], A[3]). Nevertheless he falls, and loses
charity through the one mortal sin if he commits it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he
recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we may
reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied and
falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin through
malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by actual
contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity. Secondly,
indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity, through some passion
of desire or fear; it was by sinning against charity in this way, that
Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Not every inordinate affection for things directed to the
end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only such as
is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the inordinate
affection is contrary to charity, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[24] A[12] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope do
not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated above
(Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is contrary to
charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain determinate sins,
which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even as charity is destroyed
by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that charity cannot remain
lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form regarding God under the
aspect of last end as stated above (Q[23], A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will be
twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The order in
which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we love
our neighbor also?
(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?
(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?
(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?
(5) Whether one's own body?
(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?
(7) Whether sinners love themselves?
(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?
(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?
(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?
(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and does not
extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe Him fear,
according Dt. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require
of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now the fear with which
we fear man, and which is called human fear, is distinct from the fear
with which we fear God, and which is either servile or filial, as is
evident from what has been stated above (Q[10], A[2]). Therefore also the
love with which we love God, is distinct from the love with which we love
our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be loved
is to be honored." Now the honor due to God, which is known as "latria,"
is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as "dulia."
Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct from that
with which we love our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Mt. 1:2. Now
hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man, according
to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man." Therefore charity
is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have
from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[6]; Q[19], A[3]; FS, Q[54],
A[3]) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of different
species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same habit. Now
since the species of an act is derived from its object, considered under
its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is specifically the
same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and that tends to the
object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the same visual act
whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color under the aspect
of light.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since
what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence it
is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God, and
whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity extends
not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in two
ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as when a man
fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by reason of his
own desire to get something from him. Such like human fear is distinct
from the fear of God, and the same applies to love. Secondly, we fear a
man, or love him on account of what he has of God; as when we fear the
secular power by reason of its exercising the ministry of God for the
punishment of evildoers, and love it for its justice: such like fear of
man is not distinct from fear of God, as neither is such like love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the
honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in recognition of
his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on account
of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so long as it is
referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is distinguished
according to the good belonging to individuals. Consequently we love all
our neighbors with the same love of charity, in so far as they are
referred to one good common to them all, which is God; whereas we give
various honors to various people, according to each one's own virtue, and
likewise to God we give the singular honor of latria on account of His
singular virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the principal
author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us ministerially
under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man loved his neighbor
as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved him for God's sake;
and this is what charity does.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we should love charity out of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of charity. For
the things to be loved out of charity are contained in the two precepts
of charity (Mt. 22:37-39): and neither of them includes charity, since
charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore charity need not be
loved out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness, as
stated above (Q[23], A[1]). But charity cannot participate in happiness.
Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q[23],
A[1]). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an accident,
since such things cannot return love for love, which is essential to
friendship, as stated in Ethic. viii. Therefore charity need not be loved
out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves his
neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself." But we love our
neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is loved
out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature of the
power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for since the
object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the aspect of
good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to will is
itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the intellect, whose
object is the true, understands that it understands, because this again
is something true. Love, however, even by reason of its own species, is
capable of reflecting on itself, because it is a spontaneous movement of
the lover towards the beloved, wherefore from the moment a man loves, he
loves himself to love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as
stated above (Q[23], A[1]). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two
ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom we
wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend. It is
in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved out of
charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those whom
we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and to the other
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are friends,
but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we love both God
and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and our neighbor to love
God, and this is to love charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life,
whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which we
desire for all whom we love out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to those
with whom we are friends.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be loved
out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are conformed to
God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity, for He loves "all
things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He loves, He loves by Himself
Who is charity. Therefore we also should love irrational creatures out of
charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends to
other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational creature is
referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance of image, so
too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear the
resemblance of a trace [*Cf. FP, Q[45], A[7]]. Therefore charity extends
also to irrational creatures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the object
of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we believe
that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes and birds were
brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and plants, out
of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none but God and our
neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational
creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life.
Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, According to what has been stated above (Q[13], A[1])
charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is twofold:
first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship is given,
secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for our friend.
With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be loved out of
charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer in a general
way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational creature for its
object: first because friendship is towards one to whom we wish good
things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good things to an
irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly speaking, to
possess good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through
its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good it possesses.
Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or
evil befalling such like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because
all friendship is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so
proper to friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves
(Ethic. viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in
human life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational
creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason
is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of
everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain.
Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational
creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we
regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to
wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use;
thus too does God love them out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the capacity
for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and so the
comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true, whereas
the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a natural
capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is bound to love himself out of charity.
For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there "can be no
charity between less than two." Therefore no man has charity towards
himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love and
equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man towards himself.
But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]).
Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy,
since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man deserves
to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim. 3:1,2): "In
the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be lovers of
themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy friend
as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore we should
love ourselves too out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
(Q[23], A[1]), we may consider charity from two standpoints: first, under
the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must hold that,
properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more
than a friend, since friendship implies union, for Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a man is one with
himself which is more than being united to another. Hence, just as unity
is the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is
the form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship with others it
is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves, hence we read in
Ethic. ix, 4,8, that "the origin of friendly relations with others lies
in our relations to ourselves." Thus too with regard to principles we
have something greater than science, namely understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,
namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and,
consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself
who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of
charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general notion of
friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the same sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far as
they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they humor.
This is not to love oneself truly according to one's rational nature, so
as to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to the perfection
of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through charity that a man loves
himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out of
charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to associate.
But those who have charity shun the society of the body, according to Rm.
7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" and Phil. 1:23:
"Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." Therefore our
bodies are not to be loved out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in the
enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that enjoyment.
Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards
those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot love us
out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23,26) that there
are four things that we should love out of charity, and among them he
reckons our own body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of sin
and its punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as the
Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's service,
according to Rm. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as instruments of
justice unto God." Consequently, out of the love of charity with which we
love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but we ought not to love the
evil effects of sin and the corruption of punishment; we ought rather, by
the desire of charity, to long for the removal of such things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his body, as
regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he was loth to be
deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would not be unclothed,
but clothed over." He did, however, wish to escape from the taint of
concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from the corruption of the
body which weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it from seeing God.
Hence he says expressly: "From the body of this death."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing and
loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we are able to
attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the enjoyment in the
soul there overflows a certain happiness into the body, viz., "the flush
of health and incorruption," as Augustine states (Ep. ad Dioscor.
cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a fashion, a share of happiness,
it can be loved with the love of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for
another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in respect
of his soul, or in respect of his body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of charity.
For it is written (Ps. 118:113): "I have hated the unjust." But David had
perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated rather than loved, out
of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a homily
for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the unjust: on
the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of hate, according
to Ps. 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land":
and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live."
Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and wish
good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity, desire
evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: "May the wicked be
turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: 'The wicked shall be,' etc. See Reply
to this Objection.]." Therefore sinners should not be loved out of
charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the same
things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will, nor to
rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore
sinners should not be loved out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together, according
to Ethic. viii. But we ought not to associate with sinners, according to
2 Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them." Therefore we should not love
sinners out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that "when it
is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that we ought to
look upon every man as our neighbor." Now sinners do not cease to be men,
for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love sinners out
of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature
and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a
capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as
stated above (A[3]; Q[23], AA[1],5), wherefore we ought to love sinners,
out of charity, in respect of their nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to
happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are opposed
to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or mother or
kindred, according to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate, in the
sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable
of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for God's sake.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object of
his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is
perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated them with a
perfect hatred." Now hatred of a person's evil is equivalent to love of
his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our
friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of
friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and we
ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover money,
had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money to
friendship. When, however, they fall into very great wickedness, and
become incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is for
this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like sinners to
be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of their harming
others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this
into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of
charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good to the life of the
individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner,
if he be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not
converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the sinner
is thus deprived of the power to sin any more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy Writ,
may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction, not by way
of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked be," that is, "The wicked
shall be, turned into hell." Secondly, by way of wish, yet so that the
desire of the wisher is not referred to the man's punishment, but to the
justice of the punisher, according to Ps. 57:11: "The just shall rejoice
when he shall see the revenge," since, according to Wis. 1:13, not even
God "hath pleasure in the destruction of the wicked [Vulg.: 'living']"
when He punishes them, but He rejoices in His justice, according to Ps.
10:8: "The Lord is just and hath loved justice." Thirdly, so that this
desire is referred to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment
itself, to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the
man may live.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what they
will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make them will
what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is written (Jer.
15:19): "They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not to be turned to
them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[6] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on account
of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them. But it is
commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to
associate with sinners that they may convert them. For thus did Our Lord
eat and drink with sinners as related by Mt. 9:11-13. Yet all should
avoid the society of sinners, as regards fellowship in sin; in this sense
it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): "Go out from among them . . . and touch not
the unclean thing," i.e. by consenting to sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sinners love themselves?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that which is the
principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love of self is the
principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that it
"builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore sinners most of all love
themselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping with
nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even irrational
creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance, the preservation
of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love themselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore many
sinners love themselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity,
hateth his own soul."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Love of self is common to all, in one way; in another way
it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the wicked. For
it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to be.
Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first, in respect of his
substance and nature, and, this way all think themselves to be what they
are, that is, composed of a soul and body. In this way too, all men, both
good and wicked, love themselves, in so far as they love their own
preservation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] Body Para. 2/5
Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some predominance,
as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the state, and so, what
the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In this way, all do not
think themselves to be what they are. For the reasoning mind is the
predominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal nature takes
the second place, the former of which the Apostle calls the "inward man,"
and the latter, the "outward man" (2 Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon
their rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing in them,
wherefore in this way they think themselves to be what they are. On the
other hand, the wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or
the outward man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not
themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what they
think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and therefore
truly love themselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] Body Para. 3/5
The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to
friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to be
and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he does
good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company; fifthly,
he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same
things. In this way the good love themselves, as to the inward man,
because they wish the preservation thereof in its integrity, they desire
good things for him, namely spiritual goods, indeed they do their best to
obtain them, and they take pleasure in entering into their own hearts,
because they find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of past
good, and the hope of future good, all of which are sources of pleasure.
Likewise they experience no clashing of wills, since their whole soul
tends to one thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] Body Para. 4/5
On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the
integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for him,
nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in their own
company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever they find
there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor do they agree
with themselves, on account of the gnawings of conscience, according to
Ps. 49:21: "I will reprove thee and set before thy face."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] Body Para. 5/5
In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves, as
regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not love
themselves thus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The love of self which is the principle of sin is that
which is proper to the wicked, and reaches "to the contempt of God," as
stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire external goods
as to despise spiritual goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by wicked
men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as they
think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but apparent:
and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity requires that we should love our enemies?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love our
enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great good,"
namely, the love of our enemies, is "not so universal in its application,
as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us our trespasses."
Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity, because, according to
Prov. 10:12, "charity covereth all sins." Therefore charity does not
require that we should love our enemies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now everything,
even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary, as a lamb hates a
wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity "doth nothing perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now it
seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate one's
friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kgs. 19:6): "Thou lovest
them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee." Therefore
charity does not make us love our enemies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 4:44): "Love your enemies."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Love of one's enemies may be understood in three ways.
First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is perverse,
and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that which is evil in
another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their
nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we should
love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor, we should
not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor in general.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
Thirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially directed
to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of love towards
our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely, because it does
not require that we should have a special movement of love to every
individual man, since this would be impossible. Nevertheless charity does
require this, in respect of our being prepared in mind, namely, that we
should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the necessity were
to occur. That man should actually do so, and love his enemy for God's
sake, without it being necessary for him to do so, belongs to the
perfection of charity. For since man loves his neighbor, out of charity,
for God's sake, the more he loves God, the more does he put enmities
aside and show love towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain man
very much, we would love his children though they were unfriendly towards
us. This is the sense in which Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in
the First Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now our
enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself should be
hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They are not,
however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it is as
such that we are bound to love them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is wrong to love one's enemies as such: charity does not
do this, as stated above.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the
signs and effects of love?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his enemy the
signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:18): "Let us not
love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth." Now a man loves in
deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects of love. Therefore
charity requires that a man show his enemies such signs and effects of
love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Mt. 5:44): "Love your
enemies," and, "Do good to them that hate you." Now charity demands that
we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we should "do good to
them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of
charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx), that
"love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great things, and
if it ceases to work, it is no longer love." Hence charity towards our
neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity requires us to
love our neighbor without exception, though he be an enemy. Therefore
charity requires us to show the signs and effects of love towards our
enemies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Mt. 5:44, "Do good to them that hate you,"
says: "To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection"
[*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to do
that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not require
us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[9] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The effects and signs of charity are the result of inward
love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely necessary, for
the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly love our enemies
in general, but not individually, except as regards the mind being
prepared to do so, as explained above (A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[9] Body Para. 2/3
We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and signs
of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to our
neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or for a
whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole community: and
the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like
favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we did not so, it
would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to what is written (Lev.
19:18): "Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens."
But there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows to certain
persons in particular: and it is not necessary for salvation that we show
our enemies such like favors and signs of love, except as regards being
ready in our minds, for instance to come to their assistance in a case of
urgency, according to Prov. 25:21: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to
eat; if he thirst, give him . . . drink." Outside cases of urgency, to
show such like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity,
whereby we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil,
but also wish to overcome evil by good [*Rm. 12:21], which belongs to
perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on
account of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to love
us on account of our kindliness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[9] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels out of
charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity is a
twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of the angels
is not contained in the love of God, since they are created substances;
nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our neighbor, since they
do not belong with us to a common species. Therefore we are not bound to
love them out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the angels
have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do. But we have
not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (A[3]). Neither,
therefore, have we towards the angels.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship with
one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our companions; we
cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give them the friendship
of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): "If the name
of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those who pity
us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our neighbor
includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many merciful favors."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the friendship of charity
is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in which men
share in common with the angels. For it is written (Mt. 22:30) that "in
the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of God in heaven." It
is therefore evident that the friendship of charity extends also to the
angels.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a
common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the
blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter
fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate genus, by
reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers of everlasting
happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our rational mind
wherein we associate with the angels.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist in outward
fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive nature; it consists
in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in this life, but perfect
in heaven, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of charity.
For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their fellowship with us in
a rational mind. But the demons also share in our fellowship thus, since
natural gifts, such as life and understanding, remain in them unimpaired,
as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons
out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the matter
of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves the sinner
out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our
neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the passage
of Augustine quoted above (A[9]). Now the demons are useful to us in many
things, for "by tempting us they work crowns for us," as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of
charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 28:18): "Your league with death
shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not stand." Now the
perfection of a peace and covenant is through charity. Therefore we ought
not to have charity for the demons who live in hell and compass death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), in the sinner, we are bound, out
of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name of
demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore demons
should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying stress on the
word, the question as to whether the spirits called demons ought to be
loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance with the statement
made above (AA[2],3), that a thing may be loved out of charity in two
ways. First, a thing may be loved as the person who is the object of
friendship, and thus we cannot have the friendship of charity towards the
demons. For it is an essential part of friendship that one should be a
well-wisher towards one's friend; and it is impossible for us, out of
charity, to desire the good of everlasting life, to which charity is
referred, for those spirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this
would be in opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of
His justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be enduring
as another's good. In this way we love irrational creatures out of
charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory to God and
be useful to man, as stated above (A[3]): and in this way too we can love
the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as we desire
those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, unto God's glory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not impossible
for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon; consequently the
friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of everlasting
life, rather than on the fellowship of nature, is possible towards the
angels, but not towards the demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility of
obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in hell, who,
in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to their
intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this leads us
to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their perverse
intention to our profit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity,
viz. God, our neighbor, our body and ourselves?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly reckoned as
to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor, our body, and
ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan. lxxxiii), "he
that loveth not God, loveth not himself." Hence love of oneself is
included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is not distinct
from the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole. But
our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be condivided
with ourselves as a distinct object of love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since
then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from the
love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man loves
his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with which he
loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not rightly
distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There are
four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely God, "another,
which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely our neighbor,
"and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], AA[1],5), the friendship of
charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this fellowship,
one thing is considered as the principle from which happiness flows,
namely God; a second is that which directly partakes of happiness, namely
men and angels; a third is a thing to which happiness comes by a kind of
overflow, namely the human body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] Body Para. 2/2
Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its
being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness, can
be an object of love for two reasons, either through being identified
with ourselves, or through being associated with us in partaking of
happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to be loved out of
charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The different relations between a lover and the various
things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since the
relation between the human lover and God is different from his relation
to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of love, for the
love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, so that the former
love being removed the latter is taken away.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be
capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach
directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind
which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves himself in
one way, and his own body in another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[25] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to his
body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness. Wherefore, on the
part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him; and our
neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object of love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are
thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is an order in charity?
(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?
(3) Whether more than himself?
(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?
(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?
(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?
(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who
is more closely united to him?
(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or
one who is united to him by other ties?
(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his
father ?
(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?
(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?
(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those
whom we are kind to?
(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is order in charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For charity is a
virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues. Neither,
therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so is
the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is appointed for
faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither, therefore, ought
there to be any order in charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs, not to
the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be ascribed to
charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Cant 2:4): "He brought me into the
cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms
"before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle. Now order
implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence
wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some
kind. But it has been said above (Q[23], A[1]; Q[25], A[12]) that the
love of charity tends to God as to the principle of happiness, on the
fellowship of which the friendship of charity is based. Consequently
there must needs be some order in things loved out of charity, which
order is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as last end:
and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Q[23], A[6]
). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of appetite and
action, as was shown above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; FS, A[1], ad 1). Wherefore
charity, above all, implies relation to the First Principle, and
consequently, in charity above all, we find an order in reference to the
First Principle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation
depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand,
charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the soul
tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things
themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is more
appropriate to charity than to faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly
about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and to
the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in this
way that order is stated to be in charity.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our
neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 4:20): "He that loveth not his brother
whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" Whence it seems
to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it is, since
loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now God is less
visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity,
than our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every
beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his neighbor than
to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he
loves God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according to
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27). Now God is not greater in Himself
than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in
Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love God more
than our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be
hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's sake,
if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Lk. 14:26: "If any
man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end
children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be My disciple."
Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject in
which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that friendship
is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler of the state,
on whom the entire common good of the state depends; hence to him before
all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the friendship of
charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, which consists
essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it flows to all who
are capable of happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity:
for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our neighbor is loved
as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the
reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since each
thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing
causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that
seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable
according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we are led to
love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more visible is more
lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before others: and
that is the sense of the Apostle's argument. For, since our neighbor is
more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, because
"the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love what it knows not,"
as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that,
if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because
his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand
our love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the
likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we
share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we become
like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we ought to love
God more than we love our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Considered in His substance, God is equally in all, in
whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in anything. And
yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally with God, for
God has it essentially, and our neighbor by participation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether out of charity, man is bound to love God more than himself?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to love God
more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) that "a man's
friendly relations with others arise from his friendly relations with
himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect. Therefore man's
friendship towards himself is greater than his friendship for anyone
else. Therefore he ought to love himself more than God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good. Now
the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself which
is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the reason for
knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves himself more than any
other good loved by him. Therefore he does not love God more than himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God. But a
man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this is the
highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out
of charity, to love God more than himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou
oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of Him
in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take offense if
him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause of a thing being
such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God more than himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of
nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods
bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of
which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves God
above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature,
each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by a rational, or
by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones do, for instance,
and other things bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves
the common good of the whole more than its own particular good. This is
evidenced by its operation, since the principal inclination of each part
is towards common action conducive to the good of the whole. It may also
be seen in civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage
even to their own property and persons for the sake of the common good.
Wherefore much more is this realized with regard to the friendship of
charity which is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common good
of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the universal
and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share of that
happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations towards
another person in whom the good, which is the object of friendship,
resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly relations with
another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as becomes
a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to itself, but
rather itself to the good of the whole.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of God
which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of
friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the Divine
good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying Him. Hence,
out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether our of charity, man ought to love himself more than his neighbor?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to love
himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of charity is
God, as stated above (A[2]; Q[25], AA[1],12). Now sometimes our neighbor
is more closely united to God than we are ourselves. Therefore we ought
to love such a one more than ourselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid injuring
him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his neighbor's
sake, according to Prov. 12:26: "He that neglecteth a loss for the sake
of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to love his
neighbor more than himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) "charity seeketh not its
own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most.
Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his
neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18, Mt. 22:39): "Thou shalt love
thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it seems to
follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love for another.
But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a man ought to
love himself more than his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and his
corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of his
loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above
(Q[25], A[7]): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love
himself more than he loves any other person.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated above
(Q[25], AA[1],12), God is loved as the principle of good, on which the
love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by
reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his
neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now fellowship is a
reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God.
Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a
share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that
another should be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man, out of
charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a
man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share
of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The love of charity takes its quantity not only from its
object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that has
charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way on the
subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God, yet
because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man is to
himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his neighbor more
than himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's sake,
and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual
mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of
the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought not to suffer injury
by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from sin, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying,
"'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the
private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the
individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is more
lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as stated above
(A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to love his neighbor more
than his own body. For his neighbor includes his neighbor's body. If
therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body, it
follows that he ought to love his neighbor's body more than his own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his
neighbor's, as stated above (A[4]). Now a man's own body is nearer to his
soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more than our
neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake of
what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own body
for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect, according to Jn.
15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life
for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound, out of charity, to love
his neighbor more than his own body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we ought
to love our neighbor more than our own body."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Out of charity we ought to love more that which has more
fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above (A[2];
Q[25], A[12]). Now fellowship in the full participation of happiness
which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater reason for
loving, than the participation of happiness by way of overflow, which is
the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore, as regards the welfare
of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing seems
to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that we ought
to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to his soul,
which is his predominant part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Our body is nearer to our soul than our neighbor, as
regards the constitution of our own nature: but as regards the
participation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more closely
associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every man is immediately concerned with the care of his own
body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps in cases of
urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to imperil
his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a case where he is
under obligation to do so and if a man of his own accord offer himself
for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor more than
another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One ought to love
all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we ought to
consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any other
circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely united to us."
Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving
several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and the
same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God, as
Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to love
all our neighbors equally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an
equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our
neighbors equally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, One's obligation to love a person is proportionate to
the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love. Now it is
a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain neighbors, than
against the love of others. Hence the commandment (Lev. 10:9), "He that
curseth his father or mother, dying let him die," which does not apply to
those who cursed others than the above. Therefore we ought to love some
neighbors more than others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question: for some
have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our neighbors
equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the outward effect.
They held that the order of love is to be understood as applying to
outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are connected with
us in preference to those who are unconnected, and not to the inward
affection, which ought to be given equally to all including our enemies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the
inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite,
which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from
Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural
inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that is
becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the inclination of
gravity is greater than in water, because it is becoming to earth to be
beneath water. Consequently the inclination also of grace which is the
effect of charity, must needs be proportionate to those actions which
have to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection of our
charity be more intense towards those to whom we ought to behave with
greater kindness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought to
love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the
principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be that
the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to one or
the other of those principles. For as we stated above (A[1]), wherever we
find a principle, order depends on relation to that principle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of the
good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally out of
charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, namely
everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater through its
action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to love all
equally.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two
ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As regards
beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot do
good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not to be thus
unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some more than
others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter inequality, but
the former, as is evident from what he says of beneficence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some are
nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we ought,
out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on the part of
the good which we wish our friends.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to love those who are better more those who are more
closely united us?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better more
than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is in no way
hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for some reason:
just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black mixed with it.
Now those who are connected with us are hateful for some reason,
according to Lk. 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father,"
etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful for any reason. Therefore
it seems that we ought to love those who are better more than those who
are more closely connected with us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God
loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought to
love the better man more than one who is more closely united to him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in every friendship that ought to be loved most which
has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by natural
friendship we love most those who are connected with us by nature, our
parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship of charity is
founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has more to do with
better men than with those who are more closely united to us. Therefore,
out of charity, we ought to love better men more than those who are more
closely connected with us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not care
of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the
faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of charity
ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity regards
those who are nearer to us before those who are better.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Every act should be proportionate both to its object and
to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, from the
power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus movement has
its species from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of its
speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and the power of the
mover. Accordingly love takes its species from its object, but its
intensity is due to the lover.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] Body Para. 2/5
Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore
the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity,
as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so
that, out of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer
to God; for though the good which charity wishes to all, viz. everlasting
happiness, is one in itself, yet it has various degrees according to
various shares of happiness, and it belongs to charity to wish God's
justice to be maintained, in accordance with which better men have a
fuller share of happiness. And this regards the species of love; for
there are different species of love according to the different goods that
we wish for those whom we love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] Body Para. 3/5
On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to the
man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely
united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for
them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes
for them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] Body Para. 4/5
Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors are
connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which cannot be
severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are. But the
goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come and go,
increase and decrease, as was shown above (Q[24], AA[4],10,11). Hence it
is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more closely
united to one, to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of
happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] Body Para. 5/5
Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we love
more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love them in
more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us we have no
other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are connected with
us, we have certain other friendships, according to the way in which
they are connected. Now since the good on which every other friendship of
the virtuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to the good on which
charity is based, it follows that charity commands each act of another
friendship, even as the art which is about the end commands the art which
is about the means. Consequently this very act of loving someone because
he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or
for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be
commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and
commanding, we love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with
us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their
kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and God.
In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according to Micah
7:6: "A men's enemies are they of his own household."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making man
comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is His. For
we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to us which God
does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them, as stated above
(FS, Q[19], A[10]), when we were treating of the goodness of the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the
object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is
that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to love more those who are connected with us by ties of
blood?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who are more
closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written (Prov. 18:24):
"A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother." Again,
Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7): "The ties of
friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties of blood."
Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that as to the latter, the
lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract the former by an
untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to love
more than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less you
whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in
wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we ought
to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than those who
will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not love our
kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states (Hom. in
Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than our
kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than his
father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The commandments of the decalogue contain a special
precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12). Therefore we
ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of blood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[7]), we ought out of charity to love
those who are more closely united to us more, both because our love for
them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for loving them.
Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and
therefore we should measure the love of different persons according to
the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved in matters
touching that particular union in respect of which he is loved. And,
again, in comparing love to love we should compare one union with
another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among blood relations is
based upon their connection by natural origin, the friendship of
fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship, and the friendship of those
who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in
matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred most, in matters
concerning relations between citizens, we should prefer our
fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each
class of people such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in
fact the principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations
to a wedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty to afford our
parents the means of living . . . and to honor them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
The same applies to other kinds of friendship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union
arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all
others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas
other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the friendship
of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be stronger in
respect of that which is proper to each of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades originates through
their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the love of
kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for instance in
matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more stable, since it
is more natural, and preponderates over others in matters touching
nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in the providing of
necessaries.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors
respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in
this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he
has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he is
bound to support in bodily sustenance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer rather
than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not simply
relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on fellowship in
battle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his
father?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his children
more than his father. For we ought to love those more to whom we are more
bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our children than
to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:14): "Neither ought the
children to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children."
Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love their
children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his
parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity. But
God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also ought
to love our children more than our parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We ought to
love God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those of
our household."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1; A[7]), the degrees of love
may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object. In
this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the more is
it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father more than
his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his principle, in
which respect he is a more exalted good and more like God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of the
lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more closely
connected with him, in which way a man's children are more lovable to him
than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii). First, because
parents love their children as being part of themselves, whereas the
father is not part of his son, so that the love of a father for his
children, is more like a man's love for himself. Secondly, because
parents know better that so and so is their child than vice versa.
Thirdly, because children are nearer to their parents, as being part of
them, than their parents are to them to whom they stand in the relation
of a principle. Fourthly, because parents have loved longer, for the
father begins to love his child at once, whereas the child begins to
love his father after a lapse of time; and the longer love lasts, the
stronger it is, according to Ecclus. 9:14: "Forsake not an old friend,
for the new will not be like to him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of respect and
honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and care. Hence
the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in honor: while
that of parents to their children is especially one of care.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his children
more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we
consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his
father more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves us
for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is related to
us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the father to
receive honor from his children, and to the children to be provided by
their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in cases of
necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to provide for
his parents before all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more than his
father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), "the
female produces the body in generation." Now man receives his soul, not
from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in the FP, Q[90],
A[2]; Q[118]. Therefore a man receives more from his mother than from his
father: and consequently he ought to love her more than him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due. Now a
mother loves her child more than the father does: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for their children.
For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she knows more surely
than the father who are her children."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have labored
for us more, according to Rm. 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath labored much
among you." Now the mother labors more than the father in giving birth
and education to her child; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 7:29):
"Forget not the groanings of thy mother." Therefore a man ought to love
his mother more than his father.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that "man ought to love God
the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions the mother
afterwards.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In making such comparisons as this, we must take the
answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether the
father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The
reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such like
matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in
Cant.] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked children."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the
mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural
origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the
mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a passive
and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the father is to
be loved more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the formless
matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through the
formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though this power
cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of the body
to receive that form.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the friendship
between lover and lover differs specifically from the friendship between
child and parent: while the friendship we are speaking of here, is that
which a man owes his father and mother through being begotten of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more than his
father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another unless he love
the latter more. Now it is written (Gn. 2:24) that "a man shell leave
father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore a man ought to love
his wife more than his father and mother.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband should "love
his wife as himself." Now a man ought to love himself more than his
parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than his parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons for
loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship of a man
towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12) that "in
this friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure, and also of
virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous." Therefore a man's love for his
wife ought to be greater than his love for his parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to Eph. 5:28, "men ought to love their wives
as their own bodies." Now a man ought to love his body less than his
neighbor, as stated above (A[5]): and among his neighbors he should love
his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents more than his
wife.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[9]), the degrees of love may be taken
from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those who love.
On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man should love his
parents more than his wife, because he loves them as his principles and
considered as a more exalted good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] Body Para. 2/2
But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, because
she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to Mt. 19:6:
"Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh." Consequently a man loves
his wife more intensely, but his parents with greater reverence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father and mother
for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to succor his
parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all his kinsfolk, and
cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal connection and
co-habitation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought to
love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for himself is
the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: There are also several reasons for a man's love for his
father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good, are
more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the
latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in
the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but the
motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife is her
being united to him in the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor more than
one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv): "Nothing
will incite another more to love you than that you love him first: for he
must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses to love, but declines
to return love already given." Now a man's benefactor forestalls him in
the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors
above all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man or
by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a more
grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against him, than to
cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly actions. Therefore
we ought to love our benefactors more than those to whom we are kind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and then
one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25]. Now these
are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should be loved
above all others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that "benefactors
seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather than vice versa."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (AA[9],11), a thing is loved more in two
ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent good,
secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we ought to
love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle of good to the
man he has benefited, he has the character of a more excellent good, as
stated above with regard to one's father (A[9]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] Body Para. 2/2
In the second way, however, we love those more who have received
benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four
arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the handiwork
of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He was made by
so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own work (thus it is
to be observed that poets love their own poems): and the reason is that
we love "to be" and "to live," and these are made manifest in our
"action." Secondly, because we all naturally love that in which we see
our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor has some good of his in
the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient some good in the
benefactor; but the benefactor sees his virtuous good in the recipient,
while the recipient sees his useful good in the benefactor. Now it gives
more pleasure to see one's virtuous good than one's useful good, both
because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits by, and the
pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it
present and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods than the
profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it the lover's
part to act, since he wills and works the good of the beloved, while the
beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so that to love surpasses
being loved, for which reason the greater love is on the part of the
benefactor. Fourthly because it is more difficult to give than to receive
favors: and we are most fond of things which have cost us most trouble,
while we almost despise what comes easy to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the
recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient, not
through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of his own
accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do through
another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more of a
duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other hand, the
love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more spontaneous, wherefore
it is quicker to act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents love
their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow that we
love all who have received good from us, more than any of our
benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents, from
whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we have
bestowed lesser benefits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure in
heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect charity
consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods less." Now
charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who
are better more than either himself or those who are connected with him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now
each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more good,
else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's will: and
there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in heaven each one
loves more those who are better, and consequently he loves others more
than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake, for then
will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: "That God may be all in
all." Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so that a man
will love a better man more than himself, and one who is not connected
with him, more than one who is.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. Now
the order of charity given above (AA[2],3,4) is derived from nature:
since all things naturally love themselves more than others. Therefore
this order of charity will endure in heaven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as
regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized
simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order
between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be
necessary, because, as we stated above (AA[7],9), the degrees of love may
be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man desires for
another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In the first way a
man will love better men more than himself, and those who are less good,
less than himself: because, by reason of the perfect conformity of the
human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will desire everyone to
have what is due to him according to Divine justice. Nor will that be a
time for advancing by means of merit to a yet greater reward, as happens
now while it is possible for a man to desire both the virtue and the
reward of a better man, whereas then the will of each one will rest
within the limits determined by God. But in the second way a man will
love himself more than even his better neighbors, because the intensity
of the act of love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated
above (AA[7],9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is
bestowed by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his
mind to God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in
the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and
even work for that end according to his capacity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] Body Para. 2/2
As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply
love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because the
entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to God,
wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with respect to
God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be nearer to himself
those who are nearer to God. For then one man will no longer succor
another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein each man has to
succor those who are closely connected with him rather than those who are
not, no matter what be the nature of their distress: hence it is that in
this life, a man, by the inclination of charity, loves more those who are
more closely united to him, for he is under a greater obligation to
bestow on them the effect of charity. It will however be possible in
heaven for a man to love in several ways one who is connected with him,
since the causes of virtuous love will not be banished from the mind of
the blessed. Yet all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that
which is taken from nighness to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument should be granted as to those who are
connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love himself
so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect, since
perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity directs man
to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the order of charity in respect of
the degree of good one wills the person one loves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[26] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his love, for
God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible supposition that
God were not man's good, He would not be man's reason for loving. Hence
it is that in the order of love man should love himself more than all
else after God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE PRINCIPLE ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of
charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow
from that act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?
(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as
goodwill?
(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?
(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?
(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?
(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy? (8) Which
is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be loved than
to love. For the better charity is to be found in those who are
themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved.
Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to be
more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved than love,
and lovers of flattery always abound." Therefore it is better to be loved
than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping with charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more so." Now
men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv)
that "nothing incites another more to love you than that you love him
first." Therefore charity consists in being loved rather than in loving.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friendship
consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of
friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since charity
is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its proper act.
Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person loved; for
this act is to love: and to be loved is competent to him as coming under
the common notion of good, in so far as another tends towards his good by
an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love is more proper to
charity than to be loved: for that which befits a thing by reason of
itself and its essence is more competent to it than that which is
befitting to it by reason of something else. This can be exemplified in
two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more commended for loving
than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are
blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks
rather to love than to be loved: for "some women," as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their children to a nurse; they do
love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not
to be loved."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A better man, through being better, is more lovable; but
through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more, however,
in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does not love that
which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved: whereas he who is
less good fails to love one who is better, as much as he ought to be
loved.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men wish to be
loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as honor is
bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in him,
so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good alone is
lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored, for the sake
of something else, viz. to make known the good which is in the person
loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek to love for the
sake of loving, as though this were itself the good of charity, even as
the act of any virtue is that virtue's good. Hence it is more proper to
charity to wish to love than to wish to be loved.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be
loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way leading
a man to love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of charity, is
nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that
"to love is to wish a person well"; and this is goodwill. Therefore the
act of charity is nothing but goodwill.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit. Now
the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above (Q[24],
A[1]). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the will. But it
tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is
nothing else than goodwill.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to
friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should wish
his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live;
the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth, that
he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he should
grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain to goodwill.
Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is
neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now
charity is friendship, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]). Therefore goodwill
is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from
actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but
also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which is
in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its
object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused
suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved;
wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and
the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not
imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager
inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one
man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous
acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to
us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win.
But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from
goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the
lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him. On
the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a
person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the
affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of
charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of
affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill
is a beginning of friendship."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does not
describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in which
the act of love is chiefly manifested.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the good,
but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is not denoted
by goodwill.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to
friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he says
in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in respect
of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this belongs to the
aforesaid union of the affections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for Himself
but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a homily (In
Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to love those it
knows not," where by things unknown he means the intelligible and the
Divine, and by things known he indicates the objects of the senses.
Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of something else.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
something else, according to Rm. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Therefore He
is also loved on account of something else and not for Himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Mt. 1:1, and
"fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his commentary on the
First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Now
hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear shuns
something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems that God is
to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some evil to be
feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy
is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be enjoyed" as
he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The preposition "for" denotes a relation of causality.
Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, efficient, and
material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though
it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four
different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect of
the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in respect
of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to wit, by
his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in respect of the
efficient cause, we love certain men because, for instance, they are the
sons of such and such a father; and in respect of the disposition which
is reducible to the genus of a material cause, we speak of loving
something for that which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for
the favors received from him, although after we have begun to love our
friend, we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue.
Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for
anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything else
as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He
require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very substance
is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other good things;
nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else, but from Him to
all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can be loved for
something else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance in
His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope
to receive from Him, or even by the punishments which we are minded to
avoid through Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love what it
knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for its
loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or efficient
cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man to love the
unknown.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other things,
but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but through
Himself, according to Jn. 4:42: "We now believe, not for thy saying: for
we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed the Saviour of
the world."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain
disposition, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]; Q[19], AA[4],7,10).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this life.
For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Now
we do not know God immediately in this life, since "we see now through a
glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Neither, therefore, do we love
Him immediately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more.
Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is joined" to
God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But man cannot know
God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him immediately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Is. 59:2:
"Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now sin is in
the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love
God immediately than to know Him immediately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be
"enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But
charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage (1 Cor.
13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (FP, Q[82], A[3]; Q[84], A[7]), the act
of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the knower,
whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the appetite being
inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the movement
of the appetitive power is towards things in respect of their own
condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows the mode of the
knower.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable and
lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness itself,
whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to us, since
our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are knowable
first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of knowledge is
that which is most remote from our senses.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the
appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and
flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God
immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with regard
to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other things,
either as a cause through its effects, or by way of pre-eminence or
negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf. FP, Q[12], A[12]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not follow
that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, since love
is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once where
knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known through another
thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since to love God is something greater than to know Him,
especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God presupposes
knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest in creatures,
but, through them, tends to something else, love begins there, and thence
goes on to other things by a circular movement so to speak; for knowledge
begins from creatures, tends to God, and love begins with God as the last
end, and passes on to creatures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is
removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving
God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q[184], A[2]]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love follows
knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this would imply
comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved by us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div. Nom.
iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, because "God is
greater than our heart" (1 Jn. 3:20). Therefore God cannot be loved
wholly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved
wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves Himself.
But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved by a
creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Since love may be considered as something between lover
and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question
may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification "wholly"
be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved wholly, since
man should love all that pertains to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover:
and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love God
with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God, according
to Dt. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the
thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing
loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion to
its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is infinite.
Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of creatures,
whether it be natural or infused, is finite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first three
objections consider the question in this third sense, while the last
takes it in the second sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving God.
For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine
states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing in
man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things, have charity."
Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee, tell me
which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the desire and
love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would be useless to
seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one. Therefore there
is a mode of the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure
which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure of the
human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore just as
it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the exterior effect
of charity, according to Rm. 12:1: "Your reasonable service," so also the
interior love of God requires a mode.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the cause
of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (OBJ
3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to
be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the
same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure
is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things; whereas
in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so far as they
attain to the measure. Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the
measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to
the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end,
because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken
from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the end
has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being
proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i,
3), "in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited,"
whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put
limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he puts
a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he can, but
according as health demands so that if he give too much or too little,
the medicine would be immoderate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God,
whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above (Q[23],
A[6]), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be taken as in a
thing measured where we find too much or too little, but as in the
measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more the rule
is attained the better it is, so that the more we love God the better our
love is.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of that
which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the measure which
has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the thing
measured, which has its mode through something else; and so too, charity,
which has a mode as a measure has, stands before the other virtues, which
have a mode through being measured .
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the measure of our
love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that is to love Him as
much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper to
the measure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An affection, whose object is subject to reason's judgment,
should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine love which is
God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not measured by
reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the interior act
and external acts of charity. For the interior act of charity has the
character of an end, since man's ultimate good consists in his soul
cleaving to God, according to Ps. 72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to
my God"; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, and so have
to be measured both according to charity and according to reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a
friend. For it is written (Mt. 5:46): "If you love them that love you,
what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving of reward to
love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, to love one's
enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more meritorious to love
one's enemy than to love one's friend.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding from a
greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God to love
their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity love their
friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's enemy than to
love one's friend.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to be
more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward according to
his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a greater effort to
love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is more difficult.
Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love
one's friend.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The better an action is, the more meritorious it is.
Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love a
better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy who
hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend than to
love one's enemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of
charity, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]). When therefore it is asked which
is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's enemy, these
two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the part of our neighbor
whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason for which we love him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] Body Para. 2/4
In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy,
because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so that he
is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of love that
passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is worse,
for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] Body Para. 3/4
In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than one's
friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible to love
one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the only reason
for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that both are
loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the stronger through
carrying a man's affections to things which are furthest from him,
namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the power of a furnace is
proved to be the stronger, according as it throws its heat to more
distant objects. Hence our love for God is proved to be so much the
stronger, as the more difficult are the things we accomplish for its
sake, just as the power of fire is so much the stronger, as it is able to
set fire to a less inflammable matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] Body Para. 4/4
Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near than
on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor those who
are united to us than those who are far removed; and in this respect the
love of friends, considered in itself, is more ardent and better than the
love of one's enemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict sense:
because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in God's sight when
we love them merely because they are our friends: and this would seem to
be the case when we love our friends in such a way that we love not our
enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is meritorious, if we
love them for God's sake, and not merely because they are our friends.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said in
the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the reason
for loving, while the last considers the question on the part of those
who are loved.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor
than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem to be what
the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neighbor
to the love of God, according to Rm. 9:3: "I wished myself to be an
anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it is more meritorious
to love one's neighbor than to love God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious to
love one's friend, as stated above (A[7]). Now God is our chief friend,
since "He hath first loved us" (1 Jn. 4:10). Therefore it seems less
meritorious to love God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous and
meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult and good"
(Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's neighbor,
both because all things love God naturally, and because there is nothing
unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's neighbor. Therefore it
is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more
so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason
of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God is more
meritorious than the love of our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by
considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love of
God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own
sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom the
movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him that
loves God (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father,
and I will . . . manifest Myself to him." Secondly, the comparison may be
understood to be between the love of God alone on the one side, and the
love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other. In this way love of
our neighbor includes love of God, while love of God does not include
love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be between perfect love
of God, extending also to our neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love
of God, for "this commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God,
love also his brother" (1 Jn. 4:21).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire this,
viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in a state
of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief,
so that we should not imitate him in this respect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in Ep.
ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his neighbor
more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he wished to
be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains to love of
one self, in order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which
pertains to the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less meritorious
in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall short of the
true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. Hence that God
be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit, but is the entire
reason for merit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[27] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do with the
reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that whatever is
more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, and
at the same time better.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] Out. Para. 1/2
OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)
WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of
charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior
effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy,
(2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?
(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?
(3) Whether this joy can be full?
(4) Whether it is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether joy is effected in us by charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity. For the
absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God, Whom we
love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this state of
life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord" (2
Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than joy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit happiness.
Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among those things
whereby we merit happiness, according to Mt. 5:5: "Blessed are they that
mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow, rather than joy,
is an effect of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown above
(Q[17], A[6]). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Rm. 12:12:
"Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." But joy is
caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rm. 14:17: "The kingdom of
God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in the Holy
Ghost." Therefore charity is a cause of joy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[25], AA[1],2,3), when we were
treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in
contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence of
the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved exists and
endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the love of
benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his friend,
though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love, either
through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved object to
which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with some evil.
Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable, since He is His
goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He is in those who
love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that
abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." Therefore spiritual
joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be "absent
from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He is present to
some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle goes on to say (2
Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Nevertheless, even in
this life, He is present to those who love Him, by the indwelling of His
grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about those things
that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the same that
charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about God, since to
rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to grieve for things
that are contrary to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways. First,
when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself; secondly, when
we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The former joy is
the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the latter joy
proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy the Divine
good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is
obtained according to the measure of one's charity.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with
an admixture of sorrow?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from charity is
compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to charity to
rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,6: "Charity . .
rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." But this joy
is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, according to Rm. 12:15:
"Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep." Therefore the
spiritual joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv), "penance
consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we
have deplored." But there is no true penance without charity. Therefore
the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with Christ
according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with
Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain sadness,
according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!"
Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now
such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: "Her
conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity is
incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God arises
from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and with
this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This joy of
charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the good
which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil: hence the
Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good as
participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything
contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for
that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us or
in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some evil.
Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign good: hence
charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he is hindered from
participating in the Divine good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Is. 59:2;
wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins, or for
those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating in the
Divine good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a
fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the unhappiness
of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in the Divine
good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the delay of
glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of the Divine
good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity
cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is our joy in
Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is meet that we
should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is infinite, surpasses
the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy in God can never be
filled.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the joy,
even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is greater than
another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the fulness
of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is finite,
so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be comprehended by
any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God can be filled.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:11): "That My
joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on
the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as
it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in
Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to
the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be
finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the one
who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement, as
stated above (FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), when we were treating of the passions:
and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when
there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world,
the movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains
possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown above
(Q[24], AA[4],7). When once, however, perfect happiness has been
attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there will be
full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he had desired,
even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth
thy desire with good things." Hence desire will be at rest, not only our
desire for God, but all our desires: so that the joy of the blessed is
full to perfection---indeed over-full, since they will obtain more than
they were capable of desiring: for "neither hath it entered into the
heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him" (1
Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by the words of Lk. 6:38: "Good measure
and pressed down, and shaken together, and running over shall they give
into your bosom." Yet, since no creature is capable of the joy condignly
due to God, it follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into
man, but, on the contrary, man enters into it, according to Mt. 25:21:
"Enter into the joy of thy Lord."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to the
thing in which we rejoice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the term
appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further will
remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some will
approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy will be full
with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at rest; yet
one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a fuller
participation of the Divine happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect of
the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There is
however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as we have
said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That you may be
filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and spiritual
understanding."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether joy is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary to
virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth and
envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which is
"good," so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be virtues.
Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. But we
are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4: "Rejoice in
the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor
among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from
what has been said above (FS, QQ[57],60,62).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[55], AA[2],4), virtue is an
operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to a
certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed
several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from
another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous
habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is
defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those
other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we
have said about the passions (FS, Q[25], AA[2],4) that love is the first
affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from
it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the
beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first
of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire,
but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct
from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it is
numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate
self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of the
vices, as stated above (FS, Q[77], A[4]); so that it was necessary to
account certain particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not
arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other hand love of
God is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which joy must be
referred, as its proper act, as stated above (here and A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds, on
the part of the object, a special character, viz. "difficult," and
"possible to obtain"; for which reason it is accounted a special virtue.
On the other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that might
cause a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[28] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of charity, albeit
not its first act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] Out. Para. 1/1
OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?
(2) Whether all things desire peace?
(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?
(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether peace is the same as concord?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered concord."
Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men. Therefore
peace is the same as concord.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace
consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that peace
unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as
concord.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves
identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz.
dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not the God of
dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as concord.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But
"there is no peace to the wicked" (Is. 48:22). Therefore peace is not the
same as concord.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence
wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever
there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the
same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse
things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive
powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is
opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh
lusteth against the spirit." Secondly, in so far as one and the same
appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot
obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of
the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is
essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he
has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains
something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On
the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord
denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace denotes, in
addition to this union, the union of the appetites even in one man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is between
one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, not indeed
any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man
agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both of them .
For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through
being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such
concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not
observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason
he premises that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity
consists in all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest
together.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with another
man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself, unless
at the same time all his appetitive movements be in agreement.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension
between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another.
The latter alone is opposed to concord.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all things desire peace?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But there cannot be
unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such
things cannot desire peace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the
same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do not
desire peace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain peace
is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Mt. 10:34): "I
came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not desire peace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign good
which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it is
attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command (Mk.
9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not desire peace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14) that "all
things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it
follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence,
to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may
be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary desire
either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by peace, as
stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever desires anything
desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything, desires to attain,
with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he desires: and
this is what is meant by peace which Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix,
13) "the tranquillity of order."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or
rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which consent
may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that
"peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness," where "consent"
denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and
"connaturalness," the union of natural appetites.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but
peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated above,
there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he
would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this
concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain
peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged
that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had
heretofore.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as the
appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good apparently,
so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace
except where the appetite is directed to what is truly good, since every
evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appetite in
some respect, has, nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to
remain restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in good men and
about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a
semblance thereof, wherefore it is written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they
lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils
peace."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true
good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a
twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect
enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires by giving
them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature,
according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in thy borders." The other
is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief
movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things
within and without which disturb the peace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether peace is the proper effect of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For
one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But some have peace
who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace.
Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its contrary is
not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace,
is compatible with charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as
Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their opinions. We also read
that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one another (Acts 15). Therefore it
seems that peace is not the effect of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different
things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Is. 32:17: "And
the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the effect of
charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they that
love Thy Law."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (A[1]).
The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to one
object; while the other results from one's own appetite being united with
the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by
charity---the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by
referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one
object---the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the
result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's will as though it were
ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people "make choice of
the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that
friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sallust, Catilin.)
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace,
for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his end in
something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true
final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without sanctifying grace,
peace is not real but merely apparent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not
agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and
especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small
matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those who
have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an obstacle to
peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which precedes the
appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if there be concord as
to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some that are of little
account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissension proceeds from a
difference of opinion, because one man thinks that the particular good,
which is the object of dissension, belongs to the good about which they
agree, while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly such like
dissension about very slight matters and about opinions is inconsistent
with a state of perfect peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and
every desire fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect
peace of the wayfarer.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so far as
justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity
directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For
love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): and peace is
the union of the appetite's inclinations.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether peace is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a matter of
precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are precepts about
keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you" (Mk. 9:49). Therefore
peace is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is
meritorious to keep peace, according to Mt. 5:9: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Therefore
peace is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which are
contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20). Therefore
peace is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. But
peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[28], A[4]), when a number of acts all
proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other, they all
arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue from which
they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, though fire by
heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not two powers in fire,
one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire produces all such
actions by its own power of calefaction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and
of our neighbor, as shown above (A[3]), there is no other virtue except
charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in reference to
joy (Q[28], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of
charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is
placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated
above (FS, Q[69], AA[1],3). It is also numbered among the fruits, in so
far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[29] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of its
various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in respect
of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect of joy, and
dissension in respect of peace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] Out. Para. 1/1
OF MERCY (FOUR ARTICLES) [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies
either pity or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may
stand either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for
the virtue.]
We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person pitied?
(2) To whom does it belong to pity?
(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the motive of
mercy. For, as shown above (Q[19], A[1]; FS, Q[79], A[1], ad 4; FP, Q[48]
, A[6]), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now fault provokes
indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not excite mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for pity but
drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of evils
excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8). Therefore
evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a
kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is the
motive of mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is heartfelt
sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him if we can.
For mercy takes its name "misericordia" from denoting a man's
compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another's unhappiness. Now
unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude or
happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to
Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has whatever he desires,
and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to
unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appetite;
thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a man wishes a
thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in
itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for
him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly the motive of "mercy," being something pertaining to
"misery," is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's natural
appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which
man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that
"pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or distressing."
Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of pity if they are
contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
8) that evil excites our pity "when it is the result of an accident, as
when something turns out ill, whereas we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they
cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as
when evil befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one who
suffers undeservedly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in this
respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since, however, fault
may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something connected with
it that is against the sinner's will, it may, in this respect, call for
mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and commiserate sinners. Thus
Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that "true godliness is
not disdainful but compassionate," and again it is written (Mt. 9:36)
that Jesus "seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they
were distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is
directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself, except
figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to have
various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): "Have
pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [*Cf. Q[106], A[3], ad 1].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself, but
suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves, so
too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be part
of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity their
distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the Philosopher
says that "harshness drives pity away."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of good
things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection of
evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the senses.
Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they represent as
present, the evil that excites our pity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in
the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be merciful,
wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are over all His
works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect cannot be the
reason for taking pity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom
there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is false: for
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a desperate
state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity
is not a defect in the person who pities.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to contumely
are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in
the person who pities.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason of
sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow more
easily, as we shall say further on (Q[35], A[1], ad 2). Therefore the
reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Since pity is grief for another's distress, as stated
above (A[1]), from the very fact that a person takes pity on anyone, it
follows that another's distress grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is
about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for another's distress, in
so far as one looks upon another's distress as one's own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections,
which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon
his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his own, so
that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt himself.
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with one's friend"
as being one of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says (Rm.
12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's
evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them,
and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to
themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider that
they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous persons, are
more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves happy, and so
far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt,
are not so inclined to pity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either
because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being
united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in
the same way.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as He
loves us as belonging to Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear to
suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this applies
to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own
passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through having
been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are incited to
anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the human spirit to
attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think that he is going to
suffer something in the future, so that while they are disposed in that
way they are pitiless, according to Prov. 27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor
fury when it breaketh forth." For the same reason the proud are without
pity, because they despise others, and think them wicked, so that they
account them as suffering deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory
says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud,
"is not compassionate but disdainful."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether mercy is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief part of
virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). Now choice is
"the desire of what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2).
Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But mercy
hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.): "All
those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from . . .
anger . . . and mercy, because the mind does not easily see aright, when
these things stand in the way." Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But nemesis
is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9), and yet it
is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they
result from charity, as stated above (Q[28], A[4]; Q[29], A[4]). Now
mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we weep
with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice. Therefore
mercy is not a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is not
an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object, neither
is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because
neither is it about operations, for this belongs to justice; nor is it
about passions, since it is not reduced to one of the twelve means
mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore mercy is not a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in praising
Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at once more humane
and more in accordance with religious feeling, when he says: 'Of all thy
virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful than thy mercy.'"
Therefore mercy is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now this
grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive appetite, in
which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another way,
it may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as much as one
person's evil is displeasing to another. This movement may be ruled in
accordance with reason, and in accordance with this movement regulated by
reason, the movement of the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz.
mercy) "obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that
justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the
repentant." And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements
of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (FS, Q[59],
AA[4],5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying to
the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it impedes
the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis,
considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one another
on the part of their respective estimation of another's evils, for which
pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer undeservedly,
whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer
deservedly, and grieves, if things go well with the undeserving: "both of
these are praiseworthy and come from the same disposition of character"
(Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which is opposed to
pity, as we shall state further on (Q[36], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which is
the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other virtue
besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the
misery of the person pitied.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having
relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called nemesis,
because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Now
the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but as passions,
because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing prevents
them from proceeding from some elective habit, in which case they assume
the character of a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether mercy is the greatest of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For the
worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is preferred before
the worship of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Mt. 12:7: "I have desired
mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is the greatest virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: "Godliness is profitable to
all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of life
consists in mercy and godliness." Now the Christian rule of life embraces
every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained in
mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good," according
to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man like God, the
better is that virtue: since man is the better for being more like God.
Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of God is it said (Ps.
144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all His works," and (Lk. 6:36)
Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father also is merciful."
Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): "Put ye on . . .
as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc., adds (Col. 3:14):
"Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not the greatest of
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways:
first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself,
mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be
bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants,
which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is accounted
as being proper to God: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be
chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth Sunday after Pentecost].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest
virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others, surpassed by none
and excelling all: since for him that has anyone above him it is better
to be united to that which is above than to supply the defect of that
which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy is not strained./'Tis mightiest
in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned monarch better than his crown."
Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God
above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater than mercy,
whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues
which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act
surpasses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to
supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not for
His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs
not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to
arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we
supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as
conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according to Heb.
13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices
God's favor is obtained."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy,
as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are
united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[30] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the bond
of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as regards
similarity of works.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] Out. Para. 1/2
OF BENEFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1)
Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3)
Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity ?
(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?
(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely
united to us?
(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether beneficence is an act of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity. For
charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God, according
to Job 35:7: "What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He receive of thy
hand?" Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But this
belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of liberality and
not of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or as
not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice while a
benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this respect is an
act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is either an act of
justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q[23]
, A[1]). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of friendship (Ethic.
ix, 1) "doing good," i.e. being beneficent, "to one's friends." Therefore
it is an act of charity to do good to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This good
may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of good,
and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of friendship,
and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love includes goodwill
whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]; Q[27]
, A[2]). Now the will carries into effect if possible, the things it
wills, so that, consequently, the result of an act of love is that a man
is beneficent to his friend. Therefore beneficence in its general
acceptation is an act of friendship or charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some
special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special character
and will belong to some special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "love moves those,
whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the inferior to the
superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the superior to watch over the
inferior:" and in this respect beneficence is an effect of love. Hence it
is not for us to benefit God, but to honor Him by obeying Him, while it
is for Him, out of His love, to bestow good things on us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of gifts. One
is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward passion that
a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to liberality to moderate
this inward passion so as to avoid excessive desire and love for riches;
for this makes a man more ready to part with his wealth. Hence, if a man
makes some great gift, while yet desiring to keep it for himself, his is
not a liberal giving. On the other hand, as regards the outward gift, the
act of beneficence belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it
does not detract from a man's friendship, if, through love, he give his
friend something he would like to I keep for himself; rather does this
prove the perfection of his friendship.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the benefit
bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see therein the
aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of distress or defect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to do good to all?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to do good
to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible.
Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) "Give to the good, and
receive not a sinner." But many men are sinners. Therefore we need not do
good to all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now to
do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to do
good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to an
excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding communion
with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of charity, we ought not
to do good to all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have time, let
us work good to all men."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1), beneficence is an effect of
love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the inferior. Now
degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels, because men are
subject to many failings, so that he who is superior in one respect, is
or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since the love of charity
extends to all, beneficence also should extend to all, but according as
time and place require: because all acts of virtue must be modified with
a view to their due circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every
single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be bound to do
good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not
actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do good to
anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do
to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we
pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his nature.
Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the maintenance of
his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this would be to do evil
rather than good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal are
deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from doing
evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor lest it fail,
we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in danger of death
through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like distress, unless this be
according to the order of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united
to us?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that we are nor bound to do good to those rather
who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Lk. 14:12): "When
thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren,
nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most closely united to us. Therefore
we are not bound to do good to those rather who are more closely united
to us, but preferably to strangers and to those who are in want: hence
the text goes on: "But, when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the
maimed," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very great
goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a
fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.
Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the
preference to those who are most closely united to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring gratuitous
favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who have been good to
him. Therefore we ought to do good to our benefactors rather than to
those who are closely united to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his children,
as stated above (Q[26], A[9]). Yet a man ought to be more beneficent to
his children, since "neither ought the children to lay up for the
parents," according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not bound to be
more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "Since one
cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason
of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more
closely united to us."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is
established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that every
natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on the
things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next to it.
In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first and most
plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as Dionysius
declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is an act of
charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards
those who are most closely connected with us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to
the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the
intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens is
in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and so
forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways
according to these various connections, because we ought in preference to
bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which,
speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may
vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in
hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a
stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is
not in such urgent need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our friends
and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they may invite us
in return, since that would be an act not of charity but of cupidity. The
case may occur, however, that one ought rather to invite strangers, on
account of their greater want. For it must be understood that, other
things being equal, one ought to succor those rather who are most closely
connected with us. And if of two, one be more closely connected, and the
other in greater want, it is not possible to decide, by any general rule,
which of them we ought to help rather than the other, since there are
various degrees of want as well as of connection: and the matter requires
the judgment of a prudent man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the good of an
individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to endanger even
his own life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal common good of
his country. Since therefore men engage together in warlike acts in order
to safeguard the common weal, the soldier who with this in view succors
his comrade, succors him not as a private individual, but with a view to
the welfare of his country as a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for
wonder if a stranger be preferred to one who is a blood relation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which should
be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as belonging
to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may have another's
goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he has stolen them, or
because he has received them on loan or in deposit or in some other way.
In this case a man ought to pay what he owes, rather than benefit his
connections out of it, unless perchance the case be so urgent that it
would be lawful for him to take another's property in order to relieve
the one who is in need. Yet, again, this would not apply if the creditor
were in equal distress: in which case, however, the claims on either side
would have to be weighed with regard to such other conditions as a
prudent man would take into consideration, because, on account of the
different particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it
is impossible to lay down a general rule.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the
debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not
because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity, as
in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a
benefit equal to that which a man receives from his parents: wherefore in
paying back benefits received, we should give the first place to our
parents before all others, unless, on the other side, there be such
weightier motives, as need or some other circumstance, for instance the
common good of the Church or state. In other cases we must take to
account the connection and the benefit received; and here again no
general rule can laid down.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's love tends to
conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to honor their
parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it would be lawful to
abandon one's children rather than one's parents, to abandon whom it is
by no means lawful, on account of the obligation we lie under towards
them for the benefits we have received from them, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. iii, 14).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For precepts
are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men virtuous
(Ethic. i 9,13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are prescribed as
distinct from one another, for it is written (Mt. 4:44): "Love your
enemies, do good to them that hate you." Therefore beneficence is a
virtue distinct from charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed to
beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our neighbor,
for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore beneficence is a
special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas
there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according to the
various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue
from charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The internal and the external act do not require
different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as external
and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of goodwill.
Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from charity, so neither
is beneficence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Virtues differ according to the different aspects of
their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of
beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect of
good, as explained above (A[1]). Wherefore beneficence is not a distinct
virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of
virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not of
habits, but of acts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we
consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to love,
so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to be traced
to hatred. But if we consider these same things under certain special
aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to certain special
virtues or vices, and in this way also there are various kinds of
benefits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[31] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] Out. Para. 1/1
OF ALMSDEEDS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?
(2) Of the different kinds of alms;
(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?
(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?
(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?
(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?
(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?
(8) Who can give alms?
(9) To whom should we give alms?
(10) How should alms be given ?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity. For
without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible to give
alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should
distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it
profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now
satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of
justice and not of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of religion.
But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to Heb. 13:16:
"Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's
favor is obtained." Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity, but of
religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, l) that to give for a
good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true of
almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written 2 Jn. 3:17: "He that hath the substance
of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his
bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, External acts belong to that virtue which regards the
motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to relieve
one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being "a deed
whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion and for God's
sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above (Q[30], AA[1],2).
Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly speaking, an act of mercy.
This appears in its very name, for in Greek {eleemosyne} it is derived
from having mercy {eleein} even as the Latin "miseratio" is. And since
mercy is an effect of charity, as shown above (Q[30], A[2], A[3], OBJ[3]
), it follows that almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of
mercy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first
materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an act
of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having the habit
of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of reason, or
through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak of a thing being
an act of justice formally, and thus an act of justice is to do what is
just, in the same way as a just man, i.e. with readiness and delight, and
such an act of virtue cannot be without the virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give
alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and
altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue being
commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it to this
other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is reckoned among
works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in distress is
directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far as it is directed
to placate God, it has the character of a sacrifice, and thus it is
commanded by religion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as liberality
removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from excessive love of
riches, the result of which is that one clings to them more than one
ought.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the different kinds of almsdeeds are suitably enumerated?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/3
OBJ 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are
unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds, namely, to
feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to
harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, to bury
the dead; all of which are expressed in the following verse: "To visit,
to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe, harbor or bury."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 2/3
Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the ignorant,
to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to reprove the sinner,
to forgive injuries, to bear with those who trouble and annoy us, and to
pray for all, which are all contained in the following verse: "To
counsel, reprove, console, to pardon, forbear, and to pray," yet so that
counsel includes both advice and instruction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 3/3
And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. For
the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead man
profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have spoken
truly when He said (Mt. 10:28): "Be not afraid of them who kill the body,
and after that have no more that they can do." [*The quotation is from
Lk. 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in enumerating the works of mercy,
made no mention of the burial of the dead (Mt. 25:35,36). Therefore it
seems that these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (A[1]), the purpose of giving alms is to
relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs of human life other
than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind man needs a leader, a
lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs riches. Therefore
these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of the
wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy.
Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a defect. But
no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or other.
Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who is ignorant
of what he knows himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that hath
understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath
abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him
who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill and profit
with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the
wealthy, fear lest he be condemned for retaining his talent, if when he
has the chance he plead not with him the cause of the poor." Therefore
the aforesaid almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of those
things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably taken
from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect the soul,
and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others affect the body,
and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal need occurs either
during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is
either a common need in respect of things needed by all, or it is a
special need occurring through some accident supervening. In the first
case, the need is either internal or external. Internal need is twofold:
one which is relieved by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we
have "to feed the hungry"; while the other is relieved by liquid food,
viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have "to give drink to the
thirsty." The common need with regard to external help is twofold; one in
respect of clothing, and as to this we have "to clothe the naked": while
the other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have "to
harbor the harborless." Again if the need be special, it is either the
result of an internal cause, like sickness, and then we have "to visit
the sick," or it results from an external cause, and then we have "to
ransom the captive." After this life we give "burial to the dead."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two
ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have
"prayer," whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human
assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a
deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in the
speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by "instructing," and if in
the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by "counselling."
Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the appetitive power,
especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by "comforting." Thirdly,
the deficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may be the
subject of a threefold consideration. First, in respect of the sinner,
inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordinate will, and thus the
remedy takes the form of "reproof." Secondly, in respect of the person
sinned against; and if the sin be committed against ourselves, we apply
the remedy by "pardoning the injury," while, if it be committed against
God or our neighbor, it is not in our power to pardon, as Jerome observes
(Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly, in respect of the result of the
inordinate act, on account of which the sinner is an annoyance to those
who live with him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy
is applied by "bearing with him," especially with regard to those who sin
out of weakness, according to Rm. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to
bear the infirmities of the weak," and not only as regards their being
infirm and consequently troublesome on account of their unruly actions,
but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them, according to
Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his body could
be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord said that
those who kill the body "have no more that they can do"; and for this
reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with the other works of
mercy, but those only which are more clearly necessary. Nevertheless it
does concern the deceased what is done with his body: both that he may
live in the memory of man whose respect he forfeits if he remain without
burial, and as regards a man's fondness for his own body while he was yet
living, a fondness which kindly persons should imitate after his death.
It is thus that some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and
those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for blindness and
lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the blind, and to support
the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick. In like manner to assist
a man against any distress that is due to an extrinsic cause comes to the
same as the ransom of captives. And the wealth with which we relieve the
poor is sought merely for the purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs:
hence there was no reason for special mention of this particular need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of the act of
reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to the
intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil of sin,
it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to Prov. 27:6:
"Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses of an
enemy."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is about
what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to supply this
defect by instruction. In doing this however we should observe the due
circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in other virtuous acts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account than
spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to one who is
in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised because it relieves
one who is in need. Now the body which is relieved by corporal alms, is
by nature more needy than the spirit which is relieved by spiritual alms.
Therefore corporal alms are of more account.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if the
kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Lk. 14:12): "When thou
makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich, lest
perhaps they also invite thee again. Now there is always compensation in
spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another, profits thereby,
according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall be turned into my bosom: and he
who teaches another, makes progress in knowledge, which cannot be said of
corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal almsdeeds are of more account than
spiritual almsdeeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is comforted
by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his sides have not
blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): "The bowels of
the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother." Now a corporal alms is
sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a spiritual alms. Therefore
bodily almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on the
words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Mt. 5:42): "You should give so
as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse what
another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and send
him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is better than what is
asked for, if you reprove him that asks unjustly." Now reproof is a
spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to corporal
almsdeeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds. First,
simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the first place,
for three reasons. First, because the offering is more excellent, since
it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to
Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law." Secondly,
on account of the object succored, because the spirit is more excellent
than the body, wherefore, even as a man in looking after himself, ought
to look to his soul more than to his body, so ought he in looking after
his neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the
acts themselves by which our neighbor is succored, because spiritual acts
are more excellent than corporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, when
some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a man in
hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher
observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is better than
philosophy," although the latter is better simply.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater want, other
things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better, and is in want
of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is thus in the case
in point.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if it
be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not detract
from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that "the less he
sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it is with spiritual
almsdeeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not detract
from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in which the will
of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in which it rests when
it is inordinate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a spiritual
effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual goods exceed
corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal for
the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one ought not
to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If
therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater the
alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what we read
(Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the treasury, and
in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all." Therefore bodily
almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man . . .
shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely a
corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's corporal needs.
Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in so far as
a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his neighbor, and in
this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit, according to Ecclus.
29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy brother . . . place thy treasure in
the commandments of the Most High, and it shall bring thee more profit
than gold."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a
spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a corporal
alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above text goes
on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the poor, and it shall
obtain help for thee from all evil."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their
substance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a spiritual
thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things
infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a spiritual
fruit through the love of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept. For the
counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a matter of
counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the
King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem thou thy sins with alms." Therefore
almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is his
own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is lawful not
to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the transgressor
at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because positive precepts
are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if almsgiving were a matter
of precept, it would be possible to point to some fixed time when a man
would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an alms. But it does not appear
how this can be so, because it can always be deemed probable that the
person in need can be relieved in some other way, and that what we would
spend in almsgiving might be needful to ourselves either now or in some
future time. Therefore it seems that almsgiving is not a matter of
precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of the
Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what is
not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for omitting to
give alms, as is clear from Mt. 25:41-43. Therefore almsgiving is a
matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever
is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of
precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only should
we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers, according to
1 Jn. 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in
truth." And in order to be a person's well-wisher and well-doer, we ought
to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is
a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all
almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary to
virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right
reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the
part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the
part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms." This surplus
is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what is
unnecessary to the individual, but also in reference to those of whom he
has charge (in which case we have the expression "necessary to the
person" [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking the
word "person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of
all look after himself and then after those over whom he has charge, and
afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others. Thus nature
first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for the upkeep of
one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the formation of
another by the power of generation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need,
else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it is not
possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not bound
to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be succored
if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of Ambrose apply,
"Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain
him" [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are
taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to
give alms to one whose need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any
other greater good, is a matter of counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to God's Law,
wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he did not
profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been speaking in
reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to the
ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone but
also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have over and
above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii, 18]: "If you
acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming from God, is He
unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are you rich while
another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good
stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the hungry man's bread
that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you have stored away, the
shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot, the money of the needy
that you have buried underground: and so you injure as many as you might
help." Ambrose expresses himself in the same way.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give
alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is evident
and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored otherwise---on the
part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods, which he does not need
for the time being, as far as he can judge with probability. Nor need he
consider every case that may possibly occur in the future, for this would
be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord forbade us to do (Mt. 6:34),
but he should judge what is superfluous and what necessary, according as
things probably and generally occur.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the precept
about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle interpret it (1
Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable
to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which
is to come," and he says this because the precept about honoring our
parents contains the promise, "that thou mayest be longlived upon the
land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness comprises all kinds of almsgiving.
[*"Pietas," whence our English word "Piety." Cf. also inf. Q[101], A[2].]
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what one
needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only as regards
the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior
affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because
this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of charity
requires that a man should love himself more than his neighbor, it seems
that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he needed, in order to
succor his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself, squanders his
own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done. Therefore we should
not give alms out of what we need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not care
of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the
faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now if a man gives of what he needs
for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the care he
should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems that whoever
gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect,
go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Now he that gives all he
has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but also what he
needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because without
it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give alms out
of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a man found
himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient
to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, he would
be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give away in
alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I say this without prejudice to
such a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving himself of
necessaries a man might help a great personage, and a support of the
Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy act to endanger one's
life and the lives of those who are under our charge for the delivery of
such a person, since the common good is to be preferred to one's own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it
live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or
those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not an
invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's property, and
yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much from
him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life in
keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is good to give alms of
this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not of precept but of
counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one's own, in
order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be
insufficient for one to live in keeping with one's station and the
ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly.
There are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first is when
a man changes his state of life, for instance, by entering religion, for
then he gives away all his possessions for Christ's sake, and does the
deed of perfection by transferring himself to another state. Secondly,
when that which he deprives himself of, though it be required for the
decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be recovered, so that he does
not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly, when he is in presence of
extreme indigence in an individual, or great need on the part of the
common weal. For in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the
requirements of one's station, in order to provide for a greater need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods. For
it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the mammon of
iniquity." Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is lawful to make
unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of ill-gotten riches.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the profits
from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to
offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: "Thou shalt not offer the
hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of . . . thy God." In like manner
gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 1), "we take such like gains from our friends to whom we
ought rather to give." And most of all are the profits from simony
ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of
such gains it is lawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of
ill-gotten goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser evils.
Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to commit
murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who is in
extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf. Canon
Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken): "Feed him
that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him".
Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of ill-gotten
goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms from
your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not to hear
you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from interest and
usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the first
place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom it is
gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained possession of
it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a man
may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,
and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,
because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly. This
happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene the justice
of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the giver,
but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar cases of illegal
giving and receiving.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful, but
because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case of a
woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so called,
because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law of God,
yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in taking the money.
Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is thus
acquired by an unlawful action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have
misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's property
and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the
commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended. Yet all
riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De Quaest. Ev. ii, 34,
because "riches are not unjust save for those who are themselves unjust,
and put all their trust in them. Or, according to Ambrose in his
commentary on Lk. 16:9, "Make unto yourselves friends," etc., "He calls
mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the various allurements
of wealth." Or, because "among the many ancestors whose property you
inherit, there is one who took the property of others unjustly, although
you know nothing about it," as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A,
5). Or, all riches are styled riches "of iniquity," i.e., of
"inequality," because they are not distributed equally among all, one
being in need, and another in affluence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We have already explained how alms may be given out of the
profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made therefrom
at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through reverence for
sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out of the profits of
simony, because they are not due to him who paid, indeed he deserves to
lose them. But as to the profits from games of chance, there would seem
to be something unlawful as being contrary to the Divine Law, when a man
wins from one who cannot alienate his property, such as minors, lunatics
and so forth, or when a man, with the desire of making money out of
another man, entices him to play, and wins from him by cheating. In these
cases he is bound to restitution, and consequently cannot give away his
gains in alms. Then again there would seem to be something unlawful as
being against the positive civil law, which altogether forbids any such
profits. Since, however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those
who are subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated through
desuetude, it follows that all such as are bound by these laws are bound
to make restitution of such gains, unless perchance the contrary custom
prevail, or unless a man win from one who enticed him to play, in which
case he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not deserve
to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long
as that positive law is in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give
it away in alms.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All things are common property in a case of extreme
necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take another's goods
in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who is willing to give
him something. For the same reason a man may retain what belongs to
another, and give alms thereof; or even take something if there be no
other way of succoring the one who is in need. If however this be
possible without danger, he must ask the owner's consent, and then succor
the poor man who is in extreme necessity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one who is under another's power can give alms?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can give
alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to whom they
have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give alms, they
would lose by entering the state of religion, for as Ambrose [*The
quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to ecclesiastical
authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim. 4:8: "'Dutifulness
[Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things': The sum total of the
Christian religion consists in doing one's duty by all," and the most
creditable way of doing this is to give alms. Therefore those who are in
another's power can give alms.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gn. 3:16). But a
wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it is
related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge of
her betrothed [*"Sponsus" The matrimonial institutions of the Romans were
so entirely different from ours that "sponsus" is no longer accurately
rendered either "husband" or "betrothed."] Therefore a person is not
prevented from giving alms, by being under another's power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is founded
on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children, obey your
parents in the Lord." But, apparently, children may give alms out of
their parents' property. For it is their own, since they are the heirs;
wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily use, it seems that
much more can they use it in giving alms so as to profit their souls.
Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, servants are under their master's power, according to
Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters." Now they
may lawfully do anything that will profit their masters: and this would
be especially the case if they gave alms for them. Therefore those who
are under another's power can give alms.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of another's property; and
each one should give alms out of the just profit of his own labor as
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject to
anyone were to give alms, this would be out of another's property.
Therefore those who are under another's power cannot give alms.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Anyone who is under another's power must, as such, be
ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the natural order
demands that the inferior should be ruled according to its superior.
Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is subject to his
superior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior's permission.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of
anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in so
far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has something
in respect of which he is not under the power of his superior, he is no
longer subject to another in its regard, being independent in respect of
that particular thing, and he can give alms therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned by his
superior, he can give alms from the property of his monaster, in
accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such
dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would be
lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor does it
follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De Eccles.
Dogm. lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's property to the poor little
by little, but it is better still to give all at once in order to follow
Christ, and being freed from care, to be needy with Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry which is
for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property be
gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give alms,
out of that property, without asking her husband's permission: yet such
alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much she impoverish her
husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without the express or
presumed consent of her husband, except in cases of necessity as stated,
in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply. For though the wife be her
husband's equal in the marriage act, yet in matters of housekeeping, the
head of the woman is the man, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As
regards Blessed Lucy, she had a betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she
could give alms with her mother's consent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the father:
wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small quantity that
one may presume the father to be willing: unless, perchance, the father
authorize his child to dispose of any particular property. The same
applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely
united to us?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those rather who
are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus. 12:4,6): "Give
to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do good to the humble and
give not to the ungodly." Now it happens sometimes that those who are
closely united to us are sinful and ungodly. Therefore we ought not to
give alms to them in preference to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an eternal
reward in return, according to Mt. 6:18: "And thy Father Who seeth in
secret, will repay thee." Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly by the
alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk. 16:9: "Make unto
you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail, they may
receive you into everlasting dwellings, which passage Augustine expounds
(De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have everlasting dwellings unless the
saints of God? And who are they that shall be received by them into their
dwellings, if not those who succor them in their needs? Therefore alms
should be given to the more holy persons rather than to those who are
more closely united to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man cannot
give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to give
alms to those who are most closely united to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the
faith, and is worse than an infidel."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it falls to
us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those who are
more closely united to us." Nevertheless in this matter we must employ
discretion, according to the various degrees of connection, holiness and
utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much holier and in
greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common weal, rather
than to one who is more closely united to us, especially if the latter be
not very closely united, and has no special claim on our care then and
there, and who is not in very urgent need.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by
encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an eternal
reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this respect an
almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order of charity,
which requires that, other things being equal, we should, in preference,
help those who are more closely connected with us. Wherefore Ambrose says
(De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable liberality that you forget
not your kindred, if you know them to be in need, for it is better that
you should yourself help your own family, who would be ashamed to beg
help from others." Secondly, almsdeeds deserve to be rewarded eternally,
through the merit of the recipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in
this sense that Augustine is speaking.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man does not,
properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of comparison, as
stated above (Q[30], AA[1],2), so too, properly speaking, no man gives
himself an alms, unless he act in another's person; thus when a man is
appointed to distribute alms, he can take something for himself, if he be
in want, on the same ground as when he gives to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether alms should be given in abundance?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in abundance. For we
ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most closely connected with
us. But we ought not to give to them in such a way that they are likely
to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30). Therefore
neither should we give abundantly to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not lavish
our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by degrees." But
to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms should not be
given in abundance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others should
be eased," i.e. should live on you without working themselves, "and you
burthened," i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result if alms were
given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms abundantly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Tobias 4:93): "If thou have much, give
abundantly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in relation either to the
giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when that which a
man gives is great as compared with his means. To give thus is
praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended the widow because
"of her want, she cast in all the living that she had." Nevertheless
those conditions must be observed which were laid down when we spoke of
giving alms out of one's necessary goods (A[9]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;
first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is
praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than
sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to give to
several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I
should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which words a gloss
comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to give,
not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding the
needs of the recipient.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on the part
of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to lavish all
his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of life, wherefore
he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who slew his oxen and fed
the poor with what he had, so that no household cares might keep him
back" (3 Kgs. 19:21).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others should be
eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which surpasses the
need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not that he may have
an easy life, but that he may have relief. Nevertheless we must bring
discretion to bear on the matter, on account of the various conditions of
men, some of whom are more daintily nurtured, and need finer food and
clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms
to a man, you should take into consideration his age and his weakness;
and sometimes the shame which proclaims his good birth; and again that
perhaps he has fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his
own."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[32] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer to
abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the same
passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give in
abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them so
to give that they lack not for themselves."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] Out. Para. 1/1
OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?
(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?
(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?
(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through
being corrected?
(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?
(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of charity.
For a gloss on Mt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend against thee,"
says that "a man should reprove his brother out of zeal for justice." But
justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore fraternal correction
is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition. Now
admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence, for a
prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now it
is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear
ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,"
which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the correction of a
sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him, is not an act of
charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But
almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above (Q[32], A[1]). Therefore
fraternal correction is an act of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should
be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be considered in two
ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing to the
harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being detrimental
to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by that man's sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which applies
a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner himself. This is
fraternal correction properly so called, which is directed to the
amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's evil is the same as
to procure his good: and to procure a person's good is an act of charity,
whereby we wish and do our friend well. Consequently fraternal correction
also is an act of charity, because thereby we drive out our brother's
evil, viz. sin, the removal of which pertains to charity rather than the
removal of an external loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the
contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body
or of external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of
charity rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving
of an external bodily need. There is another correction which applies a
remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others, and
especially to the common good. This correction is an act of justice,
whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice between one man
and another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an act
of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it takes
justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further on (Q[58]
, A[5]), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1 Jn. 3:4), through
being contrary to justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence
regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel and
choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we perform
some action aright which is directed to the end of some virtue, such as
temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly to the virtue to
whose end it is directed. Since, then, the admonition which is given in
fraternal correction is directed to the removal of a brother's sin, which
removal pertains to charity, it is evident that this admonition is
chiefly an act of charity, which virtue commands it, so to speak, but
secondarily an act of prudence, which executes and directs the action.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with the
weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with a sinner,
in so far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his goodwill
towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do better.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter of
precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according to the
saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed be he who
says that God has commanded any. thing impossible." Now it is written
(Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom
He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of
precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to the
precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come under
any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin, which
has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are found to omit
fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "Not only
those of low degree, but also those of high position, refrain from
reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, not by the claims of
charity." Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due. If,
therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due to our
brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man owes anyone a
material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he must not be
content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek him out, that
he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go seeking for those who
need correction, in order that we might correct them; which appears to be
inconvenient, both on account of the great number of sinners, for whose
correction one man could not suffice, and because religious would have to
leave the cloister in order to reprove men, which would be unbecoming.
Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become
worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him." But this would not be
so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept.
Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must
observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid
sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful
acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or
when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature they are
connected with an evil end, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore negative
precepts bind always and for all times. On the other hand, acts of virtue
must not be done anyhow, but by observing the due circumstances, which
are requisite in order that an act be virtuous; namely, that it be done
where, when, and how it ought to be done. And since the disposition of
whatever is directed to the end depends on the formal aspect of the end,
the chief of these circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the
end, which in this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a
circumstance be omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely takes away the
good of virtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however, the
circumstance omitted from a virtuous act be such as not to destroy the
virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good of
virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 9)
says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not contrary to
the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean virtue is destroyed
in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed to a brother's
amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so far as it is
necessary for that end, but not so as we have to correct our erring
brother at all places and times.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious without
the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his power. Hence
Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we ignore who is
predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our feelings, that we
wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do our brethren the
kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's help.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[32], A[5], ad 4), all the precepts about
rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept about the
honor due to parents.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/4
Reply OBJ 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/4
First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct someone.
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains from chiding
and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable time for so doing,
or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may become worse, or
hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who are weak and
need to be instructed in a life of goodness and virtue, this does not
seem to result from covetousness, but to be counselled by charity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 3/4
Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one
commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage)
"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain or
death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such things,
that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity." This would seem
to be the case when a man reckons that he might probably withdraw some
wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so, through fear or covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 4/4
Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or
covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet not
to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw him from
sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or covetousness,
because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to these things. It
is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to correct wrongdoers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and
certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without
waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find him.
Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek him, when
the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that has spiritual
charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in order to reprove him
for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound to seek someone on whom to
bestow such favors as are due, not to any certain person, but to all our
neighbors in general, whether those favors be material or spiritual
goods, but it suffices that we bestow them when the opportunity occurs;
because, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon
this as a matter of chance. For this reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi,
1) that "Our Lord warns us not to be listless in regard of one another's
sins: not indeed by being on the lookout for something to denounce, but
by correcting what we see": else we should become spies on the lives of
others, which is against the saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor
seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest." It
is evident from this that there is no need for religious to leave their
cloister in order to rebuke evil-doers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to prelates
alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let priests
endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother sin against
thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were usually designated
under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that fraternal correction
belongs to prelates alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now corporal
almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in temporal
matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction belongs to
those who are placed above others in spiritual matters, i.e. to prelates.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his rebuke
to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is moved by
the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which follows the
order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct inferiors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam Sacerdotes):
"Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be most solicitous
for those who perish, so that their reproof may either correct their
sinful ways. or, if they be incorrigible, cut them off from the Church."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), correction is twofold. One is an
act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an erring
brother by means of a simple warning: such like correction belongs to
anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing the
common good, which is procured not only by warning one's brother, but
also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear, desist
from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose business it
is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of punishments.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even as regards that fraternal correction which is common
to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei i, 9): "for just as a man ought to bestow temporal favors on those
especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought he to confer
spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the like, on those who
are entrusted to his spiritual care." Therefore Jerome does not mean that
the precept of fraternal correction concerns priests only, but that it
concerns them chiefly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal
assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted with a
sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another's wrong-doing, is, in
this respect, to be looked on as a superior.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even in the physical order certain things act mutually on
one another, through being in some respect higher than one another, in so
far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in potentiality with regard
to another. In like manner one man can correct another in so far as he
has a sane judgment in a matter wherein the other sins, though he is not
his superior simply.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a mann is bound to correct his prelate?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no man is bound to correct his prelate. For it
is written (Ex. 19:12): "The beast that shall touch the mount shall be
stoned," [*Vulg.: 'Everyone that shall touch the mount, dying he shall
die.'] and (2 Kgs. 6:7) it is related that the Lord struck Oza for
touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark signify our prelates.
Therefore prelates should not be corrected by their subjects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, "I withstood him to the face,"
adds: "as an equal." Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his
prelate, he ought not to correct him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that "one ought not to
presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks better of
oneself." But one ought not to think better of oneself than of one's
prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one's prelate.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says in his Rule: "Show mercy not only to
yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position among you,
is therefore in greater danger." But fraternal correction is a work of
mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A subject is not competent to administer to his prelate
the correction which is an act of justice through the coercive nature of
punishment: but the fraternal correction which is an act of charity is
within the competency of everyone in respect of any person towards whom
he is bound by charity, provided there be something in that person which
requires correction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever is
contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision extends to
all things comprised in the object of sight. Since, however, a virtuous
act needs to be moderated by due circumstances, it follows that when a
subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do so in a becoming manner, not
with impudence and harshness, but with gentleness and respect. Hence the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): "An ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as
a father." Wherefore Dionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep.
viii), for rebuking a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him
out of the church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It would seem that a subject touches his prelate
inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he speaks
ill of him: and this is signified by God's condemnation of those who
touched the mount and the ark.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of fraternal
correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter then, unless he
were in some way his equal as regards the defense of the faith. But one
who is not an equal can reprove privately and respectfully. Hence the
Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17) tells them to admonish their
prelate: "Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy ministry [*Vulg.: 'Take heed to
the ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.'
Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5]." It must be observed, however, that if the faith were
endangered, a subject ought to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence
Paul, who was Peter's subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the
imminent danger of scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of
Augustine says on Gal. 2:11, "Peter gave an example to superiors, that if
at any time they should happen to stray from the straight path, they
should not disdain to be reproved by their subjects."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To presume oneself to be simply better than one's prelate,
would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no presumption in
thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in this life, no man is
without some fault. We must also remember that when a man reproves his
prelate charitably, it does not follow that he thinks himself any better,
but merely that he offers his help to one who, "being in the higher
position among you, is therefore in greater danger," as Augustine
observes in his Rule quoted above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer. For no
man is excused from obeying a precept by having committed a sin. But
fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above (A[2]).
Therefore it seems that a man ought not to forbear from such like
correction for the reason that he has committed a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than corporal
almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from administering
corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account of a previous
sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we say that we have no
sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on account of a sin, a man is
hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to reprove the
wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable: therefore the
former is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He that is
subject to vice should not correct the vices of others." Again it is
written (Rm. 2:1): "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest
thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer
belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right judgment.
Now sin, as stated above (FS, Q[85], AA[1],2), does not destroy the good
of nature so as to deprive the sinner's reason of all right judgment, and
in this respect he may be competent to find fault with others for
committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin proves somewhat of a
hindrance to this correction, for three reasons. First because this
previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke another; and especially is
he unworthy to correct another for a lesser sin, if he himself has
committed a greater. Hence Jerome says on the words, "Why seest thou the
mote?" etc. (Mt. 7:3): "He is speaking of those who, while they are
themselves guilty of mortal sin, have no patience with the lesser sins of
their brethren."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the
scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin be well known,
because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more for
the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Mt. 7:4, "How sayest thou to
thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] thus: "That
is---'With what object?' Out of charity, think you, that you may save
your neighbor?" No, "because you would look after your own salvation
first. What you want is, not to save others, but to hide your evil deeds
with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by men for your knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a man
thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself above
his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh severity, as though he
himself were just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
19): "To reprove the faults of others is the duty of good and kindly men:
when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke is the latter's acquittal."
And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "When we have
to find fault with anyone, we should think whether we were never guilty
of his sin; and then we must remember that we are men, and might have
been guilty of it; or that we once had it on our conscience, but have it
no longer: and then we should bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in
order that our reproof may be the outcome, not of hatred, but of pity.
But if we find that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke
him, but groan with him, and invite him to repent with us." It follows
from this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does
not sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although
thereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his
brother's or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one ought to forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest
he become worse?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one ought not to forbear from correcting
someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is weakness of the
soul, according to Ps. 6:3: "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak."
Now he that has charge of a sick person, must not cease to take care of
him, even if he be fractious or contemptuous, because then the danger is
greater, as in the case of madmen. Much more, therefore should one
correct a sinner, no matter how badly he takes it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be foregone
on account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital truths. Since,
therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above
(A[2]), it seems that it should not be foregone for fear of scandalizing
the person to be corrected.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Rm. 3:8) we should not do evil
that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should not be
omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good thing.
Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person corrected
become worse.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 9:8): "Rebuke not a scorner lest
he hate thee," where a gloss remarks: "You must not fear lest the scorner
insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in mind that by
making him hate you, you may make him worse." Therefore one ought to
forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may make a man worse.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]) the correction of the wrongdoer is
twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed to the common
good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be omitted lest the
person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is unwilling to amend
his ways of his own accord, he should be made to cease sinning by being
punished, and because, if he be incorrigible, the common good is
safeguarded in this way, since the order of justice is observed, and
others are deterred by one being made an example of. Hence a judge does
not desist from pronouncing sentence of condemnation against a sinner,
for fear of disturbing him or his friends.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the
wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes. Consequently
when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take the warning, and
will become worse, such fraternal correction should be foregone, because
the means should be regulated according to the requirements of the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is unwilling to
submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with the correction
administered by prelates, which has coercive power, but not with simple
fraternal correction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far as
it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far as it is
proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a hindrance to the
end, for instance when a man becomes worse through it, it is longer a
vital truth, nor is it a matter precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whatever is directed to end, becomes good through being
directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction hinders the end,
namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer good, so that when
such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted lest evil should befall.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precept of fraternal correction demands that a private
admonition should precede denunciation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction does not
demand that a private admonition should precede denunciation. For, in
works of charity, we should above all follow the example of God,
according to Eph. 5:1,2: "Be ye followers of God, as most dear children,
and walk in love." Now God sometimes punishes a man for a sin, without
previously warning him in secret. Therefore it seems that there is no
need for a private admonition to precede denunciation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn from
the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the commandments of
Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden sin is
publicly denounced, without any previous admonition in private. Thus we
read (Gn. 37:2) that "Joseph accused his brethren to his father of a most
wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4,9) that Peter publicly denounced Ananias and
Saphira who had secretly "by fraud kept back the price of the land,"
without beforehand admonishing them in private: nor do we read that Our
Lord admonished Judas in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the
precept does not require that secret admonition should precede public
denunciation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce. Now
one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without
previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal
(Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing else need precede
accusation except inscription." [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to
endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this
endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he
failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the
accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore it seems that
the precept does not require that a secret admonition should precede
public denunciation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs observed by
religious in general are contrary to the precepts of Christ. Now it is
customary among religious orders to proclaim this or that one for a
fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore it seems that
this admonition is not required by the precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a
prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in
particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires
correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them
this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not
require secret admonition before public denunciation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the words,
"Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (Mt. 18:15): "Aiming at his
amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he might
begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to make a better man,
you make worse." Now we are bound by the precept of charity to beware
lest our brother become worse. Therefore the order of fraternal
correction comes under the precept.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is
necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or
secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for the
sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know of his
sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be
denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim.
5:20): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have
fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as
Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Body Para. 2/4
On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord
seem to apply (Mt. 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend against thee,"
etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others, he no
longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he
'disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at his
secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further distinction. For
certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor either in his body or in
his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots secretly to betray his
country to its enemies, or when a heretic secretly turns other men away
from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins not only
against you in particular, but also against others, it is necessary to
take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent him doing such
harm, unless by chance you were firmly persuaded that this evil result
would be prevented by admonishing him secretly. On the other hand there
are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and the person sinned
against, either because he alone is hurt by the sinner, or at least
because he alone knows about his sin, and then our one purpose should be
to succor our sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body
restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cutting off a limb,
but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb which is least
indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the whole body, so too he
who desires his brother's amendment should, if possible, so amend him as
regards his conscience, that he keep his good name.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Body Para. 3/4
For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not only
in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he lose his
good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are restrained
from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man finds his
honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome says on Mt.
18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke him in private, lest
he persist in his sin if he should once become shameless or unabashed."
Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother's good name, both
because the dishonor of one leads to the dishonor of others, according to
the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): "When a few of
those who bear a name for holiness are reported falsely or proved in
truth to have done anything wrong, people will seek by busily repeating
it to make it believed of all": and also because when one man's sin is
made public others are incited to sin likewise.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] Body Para. 4/4
Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name, Our
Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so deliver
his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his good name.
Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret admonition to
precede public denunciation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden sins
are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to the judgment of
man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by secretly
admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration, either while
they wake or while they sleep, according to Job 33:15-17: "By a dream in
a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men . . . then He openeth
the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn,
that He may withdraw a man from the things he is doing."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were
public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He did not,
but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin of
Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's executor, by
Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to Joseph it is
probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture does not say so.
Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to his brethren,
wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused "his brethren."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When there is danger to a great number of people, those
words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not sin
against thee alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are about
little faults which do not affect a man's good name, wherefore they are
reminders of forgotten faults rather than accusations or denunciations.
If, however, they should be of such a nature as to injure our brother's
good name, it would be contrary to Our Lord's precept, to denounce a
brother's fault in this manner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine precept,
according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather then men." Therefore
when a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything that he knows to need
correction, the command rightly understood supports the safeguarding of
the order of fraternal correction, whether the command be addressed to
all in general, or to some particular individual. If, on the other hand,
a prelate were to issue a command in express opposition to this order
instituted by Our Lord, both would sin, the one commanding, and the one
obeying him, as disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not
to be obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but
God alone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of
hidden matters, except in so far as they are made known through certain
signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can
command just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiastical, can bind a
man under oath to tell the truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought
forward?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation witnesses ought
not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not to be made known to
others, because by so doing "a man would betray his brother's sins
instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).
Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known a brother's sin to
others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one ought not to bring
witnesses forward before the public denunciation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man
brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore ought
one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our brother.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something. But
witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is useless to
bring witnesses forward in such cases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing it to
the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the superior." Now
to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to tell the Church.
Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward before the public
denunciation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 18:16): "Take with thee one or two
more, that in the mouth of two," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The right way to go from one extreme to another is to
pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning of
fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects another
between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end to be public,
when such a one would be denounced to the Church. Consequently it is
befitting that a citation of witnesses should be placed between the two
extremes, so that at first the brother's sin be indicated to a few, who
will be of use without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be amended
without dishonoring him before the public.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal correction to
demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly, and that
if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin be
altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in the matter,
whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of several by various
signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according to Our Lord's command.
But this is contrary to what Augustine says in his Rule that "we are
bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will cause a worse corruption in
the heart." Wherefore we must say otherwise that when the secret
admonition has been given once or several times, as long as there is
probable hope of his amendment, we must continue to admonish him in
private, but as soon as we are able to judge with any probability that
the secret admonition is of no avail, we must take further steps, however
secret the sin may be, and call witnesses, unless perhaps it were thought
probable that this would not conduce to our brother's amendment, and that
he would become worse: because on that account one ought to abstain
altogether from correcting him, as stated above (A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin: yet
they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin. Hence the
comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First, to
show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly, to
prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (in his
Rule): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has done
what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[33] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known to
the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as the
prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than
others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as
holding the position of judge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] Out. Para. 1/2
OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which is
opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy of
charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4) offense
and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal correction.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?
(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) From what capital sin does it arise?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object of love and
dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore He is
hated by none.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36,[39] it is
written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well like
of her works." Now God is the very truth according to Jn. 14:6. Therefore
all love God, and none can hate Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to Dionysius
(Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore none can hate
Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that hate
Thee ascendeth continually," and (Jn. 15:24): "But now they have both
seen and hated both Me and My Father."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As shown above (FS, Q[29], A[1]), hatred is a movement of
the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save by something
apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in two ways; first, in
Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly, in His effects,
when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God . . . "are clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20). Now God in His
Essence is goodness itself, which no man can hate---for it is natural to
good to be loved. Hence it is impossible for one who sees God in His
Essence, to hate Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary
to the human will, since "to be, to live, to understand," which are
effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God
cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such
like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are contrary to an
inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and the
prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are repugnant to
a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God may
be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look upon Him as
forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is true of those who see God's Essence, which
is the very essence of goodness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended as
the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among which
are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the
source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be
like God, Who is Being itself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of sins. For
the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost, since it cannot
be forgiven, according to Mt. 12:32. Now hatred of God is not reckoned
among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as may be seen
from what has been said above (Q[14], A[2]). Therefore hatred of God is
not the most grievous sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an
unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away
from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows Him.
Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the sin of
hatred against God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those of
His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is
punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin.
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the love
of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God is man's
worst sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as
stated above (Q[10], A[3]): and this aversion would not have the
character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt
consists in a voluntary aversion from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred
of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. For just as
the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun what
it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted from
God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns away
from God, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he desires
an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God is connected. Now that
which is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is so by
another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous than other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing not
to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good things, even as
it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately."
This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good things, is to sin
deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence it is
evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against the Holy Ghost, in so
far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and
yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost,
because it is universally found in every kind of that sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary:
wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it becomes
voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him.
Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness from hatred
of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and hence just as a cause is
greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a greater sin than unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the author
of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on them, and yet
they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine justice.
Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands us to bear with
penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break out into
hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate God's very
justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv,
11): "Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so
is it more wicked to hate justice than, not to have done it."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.
For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according to Prov. 8:8:
"All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them."
Now, it is written (Lk. 14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his
father and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore hatred of
one's neighbor is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it is
in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written (Rm.
1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore it is possible to hate
certain people without committing a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a
"wandering away from what is according to nature," according to Damascene
(De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a thing to hate
whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing. Therefore it seems
that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:9): "He that . . . hateth his
brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore there
cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (FS, Q[29],
A[2]); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of that
thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of what he
holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect
of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect of sin and
lack of justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and whatever
pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate our
brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love for
our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him, since
desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil.
Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is
always sinful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our
parents---as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them in
so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection of
Divine justice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his
nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which
they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should love
them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility
towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we should hate
them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are hostile to us.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our
neighbor?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous
sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:15): "Whosoever
hateth his brother is a murderer." Now murder is the most grievous of
sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give our
neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love. Therefore
hatred is the worst.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[4] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as
Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man
hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and adultery.
Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[4] OTC Para. 2/2
Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Mt. 5:19, "He that shall break one
of these least commandments," says: "The commandments of Moses, Thou
shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little in their
reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the other hand
the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry, Thou shalt
not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little in the
transgression." Now hatred is an internal movement like anger and desire.
Therefore hatred of one's brother is a less grievous sin than murder.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two
counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins, secondly
by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against. On the
first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions that
hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man's will, which is
the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that if a man's
outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder in his will,
they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through
ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in
a man's outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his
inward hatred.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a
man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hatred is a capital sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is
directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the
virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of
the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of our
passions, according to Rm. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did work in
our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other passions of
the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown above (FS,
Q[25], AA[1],2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned one of the capital
sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more than
any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be reckoned
a capital sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the
seven capital sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital vice is
one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is contrary to
man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and when a thing
acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it is corrupted
little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail in that which is
less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in that which is most
in accordance with its nature, since what is first in construction is
last in destruction. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural
to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of the Divine
good, and of his neighbor's good. Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to
this love, is not the first but the last thing in the downfall of virtue
resulting from vice: and therefore it is not a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of a thing
consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its nature." Hence
what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first and foremost in
the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the foremost of the virtues,
and for the same reason hatred cannot be first among the vices, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's natural good,
is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of one's natural good
is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be first, but is something
last, because such like hatred is a proof of an already corrupted nature,
even as love of an extraneous good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason that it
is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of such an evil
may have priority over the other passions. There is, however, another
which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, namely, is a true and
connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account of the corruption of
nature: and the hatred of such an evil must needs come last. This hatred
is vicious, but the former is not.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hatred arises from envy?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is sorrow
for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for, on the
contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate. Therefore
hatred does not arise from envy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is
referred to our love of God, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]; Q[26], A[2]).
Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But
hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are
very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is caused
by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows into hatred."
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy cometh
hatred."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[5]), hatred of his neighbor is a man's
last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he
naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is
natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an
object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as
it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, x).
Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from
sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in
as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we are
moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason
it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our
neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to
us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive power,
reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of circular
movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so according to the
first forward course of the appetitive movement, love gives rise to
desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained what one desired.
And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the good one loves is a
kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love. And in the same way
sorrow causes hatred.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the object
of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore love is due
to God in the first place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other
hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in God Himself, but only in
His effects, for which reason it has been stated above (A[1]), that God
is not an object of hatred, except in so far as He is considered in
relation to His effects, and consequently hatred is directed to our
neighbor before being directed to God. Therefore, since envy of our
neighbor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in
consequence, the cause of hatred towards God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[34] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in
various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger and
from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks upon
the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore hateful,
whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at first,
through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a certain
measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance: but
afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so far as
absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is part of hatred.
Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy formally as regards
the aspect of the object, but dispositively by anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] Out. Para. 1/2
OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy
is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or about
our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we must
consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sloth is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither praised
nor blamed for our passions, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5).
Now sloth is a passion, since it is a kind of sorrow, according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above (FS, Q[35], A[8]
). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a sin.
But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x, [*De
Institutione Caeobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth chiefly about
the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and inflicts the soul
of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular and fixed
intervals." Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly, no
sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian says (De Instit.
Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at being
deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries and those
which are a long way off are much better than the one we dwell in": all
of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2:
"Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent." Now Cassian says (De
Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is not
to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance." Therefore
sloth is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such
is sloth [acedia]: for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down thy
shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not grieved
[acedieris] with her bands." Therefore sloth is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is
an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, that he
wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth implies
a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on Ps. 106:18,
"Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the definition of some
who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind which neglects to begin
good."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its
effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is
apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand, pleasure
is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in truth,
evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth, sorrow about
spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also which is about
a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses man as to draw him
away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not
wish those who repented to be "swallowed up with overmuch sorrow."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for
spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in point of
its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil movement
of the appetite, as appears from what has been said above (Q[10], A[2];
FS, Q[74], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they are
blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as they
deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good. Wherefore
sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame: whereas
moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for good, and
again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in this sense
that sloth is said to be a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may either be venial
sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And since the
sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows that on account of some
bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some particular sin.
Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more insistent, through
certain bodily transmutations occurring at certain fixed times. Now all
bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to sorrow; and thus it is that
those who fast are harassed by sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to
feel the want of food, and to be parched by the sun's heat.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think too much
of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man contemns the
good things he has received from God, this, far from being a proof of
humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like contempt results
sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon evil and worthless.
Accordingly we ought to think much of the goods of others, in such a way
as not to disparage those we have received ourselves, because if we did
they would give us sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of sin should
be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance; by flight when
a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as in lust; for which
reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly fornication"; by resistance,
when perseverance in the thought diminishes the incentive to sin, which
incentive arises from some trivial consideration. This is the case with
sloth, because the more we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing
they become to us, and forthwith sloth dies away.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sloth is a special vice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that which is
common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of vice. But every
vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual good: for the
lustful man is sorrowful about the good of continence, and the glutton
about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is sorrow for spiritual
good, as stated above (A[1]), it seems that sloth is not a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to
joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth should
not be reckoned a special vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object, which
virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special virtue or
vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing, seemingly,
except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special vice;
because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they are
toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: while dislike of toil,
and love of bodily repose seem to be due to the same cause, viz.
idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems untrue,
for idleness is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy.
Therefore sloth is not a special vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the
other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
because, as stated above (FS, Q[71], A[1]), every vice shuns the
spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that sloth
is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as toilsome, or
troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's pleasure, for
this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices, whereby a man seeks
bodily comfort and pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual goods,
since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each virtue are
directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good, about which
there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper to each
virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in its own
act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that spiritual joy
whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In like manner the sorrow
whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in each act of
virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every vice, but sorrow
in the Divine good about which charity rejoices, belongs to a special
vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the Replies to the
Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sloth is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every mortal
sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth seems contrary
to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of the
Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous
than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed from
some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a mortal sin not
to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal sin to refrain in
thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore sloth is not a mortal
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But sloth
is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit. Caenob. x,
l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a most vexatious and
persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore sloth is not always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the world
worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow "according to
God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world. Therefore it is a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[88], AA[1],2), mortal sin is so
called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the effect of
charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which by its very
nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its genus.
And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy in God, as
stated above (Q[28], A[1]), while sloth is sorrow about spiritual good in
as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore sloth is a mortal sin in
respect of its genus. But it must be observed with regard to all sins
that are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are not mortal, save
when they attain to their perfection. Because the consummation of sin is
in the consent of reason: for we are speaking now of human sins
consisting in human acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore
if the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without
attaining to the consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the
imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the concupiscence
that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial sin, whereas if it
reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal sin. So too, the movement
of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality alone, by reason of the
opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and then it is a venial sin;
whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason, which consents in the
dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine good, on account of the
flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In this case it is evident that
sloth is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the Sabbath
day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept, implicitly
commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind about the Divine
good is contrary thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual
good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to adhere.
Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do acts of
virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of sloth; but when
he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy men,
but they do not reach to the consent of reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a capital
vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful acts, as
stated above (Q[34], A[5]). Now sloth does not move one to action, but on
the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it should not be accounted
a capital sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are assigned.
Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to sloth, viz.
"malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard to the
commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful things." Now these do
not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For "spite" is, seemingly the
same as hatred, which arises from envy, as stated above (Q[34], A[6]);
"malice" is a genus which contains all vices, and, in like manner, a
"wandering" of the mind after unlawful things is to be found in every
vice; "sluggishness" about the commandments seems to be the same as
sloth, while "faint-heartedness" and "despair" may arise from any sin.
Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the vice of
sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man shirks his
duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow, and in so
far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: and of sorrow he says
that it gives rise to "spite, faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair,"
whereas he states that from sloth seven things arise, viz. "idleness,
drowsiness, uneasiness of the mind, restlessness of the body,
instability, loquacity, curiosity." Therefore it seems that either
Gregory or Isidore has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together
with its daughters.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that sloth is
a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital vice is
one which easily gives rise to others as being their final cause. Now
just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in order to obtain
it, and through being moved to do something under the impulse of
pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow, either that we
may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing something under
pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of sorrow, as stated
above (A[2]; FS, Q[85], A[8]), it is fittingly reckoned a capital sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing things
that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do certain things,
either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such as weeping, or
because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For
since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) "no man can be a
long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it follows
that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man shuns
whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things that
give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual pleasures,
have recourse to pleasures of the body, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that
man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and secondly he even
struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which
are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance
of the end is the result of "despair," while avoidance of those goods
which are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty which come under
the counsels, is the effect of "faint-heartedness," and in matters of
common righteousness, is the effect of "sluggishness about the
commandments." The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow is
sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is called
"spite"; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when
a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is properly called
"malice." In so far as a man has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure,
the daughter of sloth is called "wandering after unlawful things." From
this it is clear how to reply to the objections against each of the
daughters: for "malice" does not denote here that which is generic to all
vices, but must be understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as
synonymous with hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above:
and the same applies to the others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[35] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given by
Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly (Moral.
xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated above (A[2]),
sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man shirks a distasteful
and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any other cause whatever,
but only in so far as he is sorry on account of the Divine good, which
sorrow belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so
far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things which Isidore
reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by
Gregory: for "bitterness" which Isidore states to be the result of
sorrow, is an effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness" are reduced
to "sluggishness about the precepts": for some are idle and omit them
altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence. All
the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to the
"wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This tendency to wander,
if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing after various
things without rhyme or reason, is called "uneasiness of the mind," but
if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is called "curiosity"; if it
affect the speech it is called "loquacity"; and in so far as it affects a
body that changes place, it is called "restlessness of the body," when,
to wit, a man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate
movements of members of his body; while if it causes the body to move
from one place to another, it is called "instability"; or "instability"
may denote changeableness of purpose.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] Out. Para. 1/1
OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) What is envy?
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the object
of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the envious man
that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which is racked by
the prosperity of another." Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of
pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, in
knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy is not
a kind of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who are in
great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (FS, Q[47], A[3])
when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack little, and who
love honors, and who are considered wise, are envious, according to the
Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects have
not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of goods
once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (FS, Q[32], A[3])
it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of envy; for the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those who have or have had
things that befitted ourselves, or which we possessed at some time."
Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a species
of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it may
happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and in this
way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in two ways:
first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far as it
threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves for
his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some harm: such like
sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the Philosopher
states (Rhet. ii, 9).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in so
far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or excellence.
It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good: and consequently
men are envious of those goods in which a good name consists, and about
which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the Philosopher remarks
(Rhet. ii, 10).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being reckoned as
evil for another: and in this way it is possible for sorrow to be about
good, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far as it
diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man is
envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in reputation.
But this does not apply to people who are far removed from one another:
for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors to rival or surpass
in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a commoner does not envy
the king, nor does the king envy a commoner whom he is far above.
Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed from him, whether
in place, time, or station, but those who are near him, and whom he
strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our will that these should
be in better repute than we are, and that gives rise to sorrow. On the
other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far as it is in agreement with
the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he is
very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in such
matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to him that
this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort; wherefore, if his
effort fails through the other's reputation surpassing his, he grieves.
Hence it is that those who love to be honored are more envious; and in
like manner the faint-hearted are envious, because all things are great
to them, and whatever good may befall another, they reckon that they
themselves have been bested in something great. Hence it is written (Job
5:2): "Envy slayeth the little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that
"we can envy those only whom we think better in some respect than
ourselves."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had them,
causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow; and in so
far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above all, seems to
belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that the
old envy the young, and those who have spent much in order to get
something, envy those who have got it by spending little, because they
grieve that they have lost their goods, and that others have acquired
goods.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether envy is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to Laeta
about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have companions,
so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and be nettled when
they are praised." But no one should be advised to commit a sin.
Therefore envy is not a sin
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it is
written (Prov. 29:2): "When the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall
mourn." Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good zeal,
according to Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up."
Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a kind
of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul sore of
envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself shows how
forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes the
complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed, while the
limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is gnashing with
the teeth." Therefore envy is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made desirous
of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), envy is sorrow for another's
good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man
grieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause harm either to
himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy, as stated above
(A[1]), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 11): "It
very often happens that without charity being lost, both the destruction
of an enemy rejoices us, and again his glory, without any sin of envy,
saddens us, since, when he falls, we believe that some are deservedly set
up, and when he prospers, we dread lest many suffer unjustly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it, but
because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly speaking,
is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this zeal be about
virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor. 14:1: "Be zealous
for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about temporal goods, it may be
either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may grieve over another's good,
because he who happens to have that good is unworthy of it. Such sorrow
as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which make a man
righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is about riches, and those
things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this
sorrow {nemesis} [*The nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of
the word "nemesis" to signify "revenge" does not represent the original
Greek.], saying that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because
he considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem
great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to the
teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are unworthy,
are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either for the
correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such goods are as
nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are prepared for good
men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according
to Ps. 36:1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work
iniquity," and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2,3): "My steps had well nigh slipped,
for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners
[*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the
prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we grieve over a man's good, in so
far as his good surpasses ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is
always sinful, as also the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to
do so is to grieve over what should make us rejoice, viz. over our
neighbor's good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to strive
to progress with those who are better than we are.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good in the
first sense given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a certain
zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as
stated above (FS, Q[87], A[2]) when we were treating of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether envy is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since envy is a
kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Now there is
no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason, as Augustine
declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. FS, Q[74], A[4]]. Therefore envy is not
a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can be
in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen and known
even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and looked
bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is
contrary, not to a virtue but to {nemesis}, which is a passion, according
to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little one."
Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore envy is a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For the
genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the aspect
of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives its
spiritual life, according to 1 Jn. 3:14: "We know that we have passed
from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now the object both of
charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by contrary movements,
since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good, while envy grieves over
it, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal
sin in respect of its genus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless, as stated above (Q[35], A[4]; FS, Q[72], A[5], ad 1), in
every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in the
sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of
concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of anger,
in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find sometimes
even in perfect men certain first movements, which are venial sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of the
sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the
principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a
mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have not
the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is
manifest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is
contrary both to {nemesis} and to pity, but for different reasons. For it
is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being contrary to
one another, since the envious man grieves over his neighbor's good,
whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's evil, so that the
envious have no pity, as he states in the same passage, nor is the
pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is contrary to {nemesis} on
the part of the man whose good grieves the envious man, for {nemesis} is
sorrow for the good of the undeserving according to Ps. 72:3: "I was
envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners" [*Douay:
'because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of
sinners'], whereas the envious grieves over the good of those who are
deserving of it. Hence it is clear that the former contrariety is more
direct than the latter. Now pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to
charity: so that envy is contrary to pity and charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether envy is a capital vice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the capital
vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the daughter of
vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "those who love
honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy is not a capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the other
vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "The
leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind under some
kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the soul to all
kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild outcry." Now envy
is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "Though
in every evil thing that is done, the venom of our old enemy is infused
into the heart of man, yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs his whole
bowels and discharges the bane of spite fitted to enter deep into the
mind." Therefore envy is not a capital sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned by
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise "hatred,
tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes, and grief
for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor's misfortunes and grief for
his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from what has been
said above (A[3]). Therefore these should not be assigned as daughters of
envy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who
states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters
thereto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good, so
envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated above
(Q[35], A[4]) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that it incites
man to do certain things, with the purpose either of avoiding sorrow or
of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is accounted a capital vice for
the same reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), "the capital vices are
so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other. For the
first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting the mind it
occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power of an empty
name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire that power."
Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not exclude its
originating from another vice, but it demands that it should have some
principal reason for being itself the origin of several kinds of sin.
However it is perhaps because envy manifestly arises from vainglory, that
it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by
Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is the
greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he is
enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as quoted
further on in the same passage, "by the envy of the devil, death came
into the world" (Wis. 2:24).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most
grievous sins, viz. envy of another's spiritual good, which envy is a
sorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our neighbor's
good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, because thereby
a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who is glorified in His
works.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[36] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The number of envy's daughters may be understood for the
reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by way of
beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of term. The
beginning is that a man strives to lower another's reputation, and this
either secretly, and then we have "tale-bearing," or openly, and then we
have "detraction." The middle consists in the fact that when a man aims
at defaming another, he is either able to do so, and then we have "joy at
another's misfortune," or he is unable, and then we have "grief at
another's prosperity." The term is hatred itself, because just as good
which delights causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above
(Q[34], A[6]). Grief at another's prosperity is in one way the very same
as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over another's prosperity, in so far
as it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter
of envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper
notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, "joy at
another's misfortune" is not directly the same as envy, but is a result
thereof, because grief over our neighbor's good which is envy, gives rise
to joy in his evil.
�Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] Out. Para. 1/1
OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall
consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is on
the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz. schism,
quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether discord is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether discord is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to disaccord with
man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this does not seem to be
a sin, because God's will alone, and not our neighbor's, is the rule of
our own will. Therefore discord is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself. But
it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for it is written
(Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were Sadducees, and the
other Pharisees, cried out in the council: "Men brethren, I am a
Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope and resurrection of
the dead I am called in question. And when he had so said, there arose a
dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees." Therefore discord is
not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a holy
man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is written
(Acts 15:39): "There arose a dissension" between Paul and Barnabas, "so
that they departed one from another." Therefore discord is not a sin. and
least of all a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "Dissensions," that is, discords, are reckoned among
the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of which it is said afterwards (Gal.
5:21) that "they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God."
Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from the kingdom of God.
Therefore discord is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above
(Q[29], AA[1],3) concord results from charity, in as much as charity
directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the Divine
good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord is a sin,
in so far as it is opposed to this concord.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in two
ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts and
movements are said to be direct when they are according to one's
intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor, when he
knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and his
neighbor's good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal sin in
respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although the
first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their being
imperfect acts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the intention.
Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God's honor, or our
neighbor's profit, while one deems a certain thing good, and another
thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case accidentally contrary to
the Divine good or that of our neighbor. Such like discord is neither
sinful nor against charity, unless it be accompanied by an error about
things necessary to salvation, or by undue obstinacy, since it has also
been stated above (Q[29], AA[1],3, ad 2) that the concord which is an
effect of charity, is union of wills not of opinions. It follows from
this that discord is sometimes the sin of one party only, for instance,
when one wills a good which the other knowingly resists; while sometimes
it implies sin in both parties, as when each dissents from the other's
good, and loves his own.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: One man's will considered in itself is not the rule of
another man's will; but in so far as our neighbor's will adheres to God's
will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to its proper
measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a will, because by
that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a right rule,
to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that is opposed to
God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good. Hence to cause a
discord, whereby a good concord resulting from charity is destroyed, is a
grave sin: wherefore it is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are,
which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," which seventh
is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be "him that soweth discord among brethren." On
the other hand, to arouse a discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord
in an evil will) is destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to
be commended for sowing discord among those who concorded together in
evil, because Our Lord also said of Himself (Mt. 10:34): "I came not to
send peace, but the sword."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental and
not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought one
thing good, while the other thought something else, which was owing to
human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things necessary to
salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine providence, on
account of the good which would ensue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether discord is a daughter of vainglory?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of vainglory. For
anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord is apparently the
daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: "A passionate man stirreth
up strifes." Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of Jn. 7:39, "As yet the
Spirit was not given," says (Tract. xxxii) "Malice severs, charity
unites." Now discord is merely a separation of wills. Therefore discord
arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be a
capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on Mt.
12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate,"
says: "Just as concord makes small things thrive, so discord brings the
greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should itself be reckoned a
capital vice, rather than a daughter of vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far,
to wit, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the other man's
will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will holds fast to its
own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers what is his own to
that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it is due
to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, whereby a man holds to his own
way of thinking, and departs from that of others, is reckoned to be a
daughter of vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists in
external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from anger,
which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor; whereas discord consists
in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises from pride or
vainglory, for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term
"wherefrom," i.e. another's will from which we recede, and in this
respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is the
term "whither," i.e. something of our own to which we cling, and in this
respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the term
"whither" is more important than the term "wherefrom" (because the end is
of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a daughter of
vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from both for
different reasons, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[37] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while
discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because "the more united a force
is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the weaker it
becomes" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is part of the
proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills, and in no way
indicates that other vices arise from discord, as though it were a
capital vice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] Out. Para. 1/1
OF CONTENTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether contention is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For there is
no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be found in
them, according to Lk. 22:24: "And there was also a strife amongst" the
disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the greatest."
Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his neighbor
commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17): "Some out of
contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (Phil. 1:18): "In this
also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." Therefore contention is not a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts or
in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good intention,
as, for example, those who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a
gloss on 1 Kgs. 14:1, "It came to pass one day," etc. says: "Catholics do
not raise contentions with heretics, unless they are first challenged to
dispute." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to Job
39:32: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?" And yet
Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him (Job 42:7):
"You have not spoken the thing that is right before me, as my servant Job
hath." Therefore contention is not always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is against the precept of the Apostle who says (2
Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words." Moreover (Gal. 5:20) contention is
included among the works of the flesh, and as stated there (Gal. 5:21)
"they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Now
whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God and is against a precept,
is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just as
discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies
contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various
contrary things in a speech, this is called "contentio," which Tully
calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he says
that "it consists in developing a speech from contrary things," for
instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter end."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with
regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with regard
to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider
whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or
against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we
must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the
persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy,
hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that "contention is a sharp
speech suitable for proof and refutation"---or whether it exceeds the
demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is
blameworthy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth
and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose [*Cf. Gloss.
Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a disclaimer of
the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however, contention denote a
disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is
praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together
with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless the contention
be conducted so inordinately, as to give scandal to others. Hence the
Apostle after saying (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words," adds, "for it
is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not with the
intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for what he
thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention,
because they contended about a matter which they ought not to have
contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were not spiritual
men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and for this reason Our
Lord checked them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who preached Christ "out of contention," were to be
blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith, but
preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that they
thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was preaching
the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their contention,
but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that Christ would be
made known---since evil is sometimes the occasion of good results.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in
contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in a
disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense Catholics
do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when, whether in
court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in respect of the
acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job had
said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to reason with
God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in
seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be inordinate in mind or in
speech.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of vainglory. For
contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 3:3):
"Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention, are
you not carnal, and walk according to men?" Now zeal pertains to envy.
Therefore contention arises rather from envy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice. But
the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares (Moral.
xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter of
pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: "Knowledge puffeth up." Now
contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do not
impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore contention is not a daughter of
vainglory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[37], A[2]), discord is a daughter of
vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his own
opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is proper to pride
and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as people are discordant
when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts, so are they
contentious when each defends his own opinion by words. Consequently
contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the same reason as
discord.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as a
man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with whom
he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to something, it is
akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he clings to his own
opinion, as stated above (Q[37], A[2], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud
voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the
chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention arises
from the same source as the raising of the voice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[38] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods even
those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is proud of his
humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does so not directly
but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one contrary from arising
out of another. Hence there is no reason why the "per se" and direct
effects of pride or vainglory, should not result from the contraries of
those things which are the occasion of pride.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] Out. Para. 1/1
OF SCHISM (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to deeds:
such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first place, then,
about schism, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether schism is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?
(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;
(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether schism is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For "schism," as
Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.), "denotes a
division." But every sin causes a division, according to Is. 59:: "Your
sins have divided between you and your God." Therefore schism is not a
special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the
Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the Church,
because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is disobedience
against the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is a schism.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of faith. If,
therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem not to
differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon. ii, 4)
distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a "schismatic
is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same worship, as
others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community, whereas
a heretic is one who holds another faith from that of the Catholic
Church." Therefore schism is not a generic sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its name
"from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to unity.
Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially
opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical order, the species
is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the moral order,
the essential is that which is intended, and that which results beside
the intention, is, as it were, accidental. Hence the sin of schism is,
properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic
intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect of charity:
because charity unites not only one person to another with the bond of
spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and
intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; for this
is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several individuals among
themselves is subordinate to the unity of the Church, even as the mutual
adaptation of each member of a natural body is subordinate to the unity
of the whole body. Now the unity of the Church consists in two things;
namely, in the mutual connection or communion of the members of the
Church, and again in the subordination of all the members of the Church
to the one head, according to Col. 2:18,19: "Puffed up by the sense of
his flesh, and not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints
and bands, being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto
the increase of God." Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent
in the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those
who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with
those members of the Church who acknowledge his supremacy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The division between man and God that results from sin is
not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention as a result
of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is not schism
properly so called.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously disobeying
the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a schismatic both
obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit
to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this, wherefore not every
sin is a schism.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those
things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy is
essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to the
unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and charity are
different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks charity, so too
schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever is a heretic is
also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what Jerome says in his
commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [*In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I
consider the difference between schism and heresy to be that heresy holds
false doctrine while schism severs a man from the Church." Nevertheless,
just as the loss of charity is the road to the loss of faith, according
to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which things," i.e. charity and the like, "some
going astray, are turned aside into vain babbling," so too, schism is the
road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at
the outset it is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference
between schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise
some heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for
separating from the Church."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. For the
graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Dt. 25:2:
"According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the
stripes be." Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely than
even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28) that some
were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of idolatry:
whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): "If the Lord do a new
thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them down, and all things
that belong to them, and they go down alive into hell, you shall know
that they have blasphemed the Lord God." Moreover the ten tribes who were
guilty of schism in revolting from the rule of David were most severely
punished (4 Kgs. 17). Therefore the sin of schism is graver than the sin
of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "The good of the multitude is greater and more godlike
than the good of the individual," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i,
2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude, namely,
ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the particular good
of one man, namely the faith of an individual. Therefore it seems that
schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed to charity,
which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is opposed, as
shown above (Q[10], A[2]; Q[23], A[6]). Therefore schism is a graver sin
than unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That which results from an addition to something else
surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy results from
something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as Jerome
declares in the passage quoted above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore schism is a
less grievous sin than unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways:
first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to its
circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in number,
so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways: wherefore if one
were to ask in general which of two sins is the graver, the question must
be understood to refer to the gravity derived from the sin's genus. Now
the genus or species of a sin is taken from its object, as shown above
(FS, Q[72], A[1]; FS, Q[73], A[3]). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to
the greater good is, in respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance
a sin committed against God is graver than a sin committed against one's
neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself,
according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith is founded;
whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a
participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore it is
manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the
sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular schismatic sins
more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either because his contempt
is greater, or because his sin is a source of greater danger, or for some
similar reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: It had already been declared to that people by the law
which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God was
to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among them by
many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those who sinned
against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be punished in an
unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be punished in the usual
way. On the other hand, it was not so well known among them that Moses
was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved those who rebelled
against his authority to be punished in a miraculous and unwonted manner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more
severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to seditions
and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): "This city since days gone
by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and wars were raised
therein [*Vulg.: 'This city is a rebellious city, and hurtful to the
kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised therein of old']." Now
sometimes a more severe punishment is inflicted for an habitual sin (as
stated above, FS, Q[105], A[2], ad 9), because punishments are medicines
intended to keep man away from sin: so that where there is greater
proneness to sin, a more severe punishment ought to be inflicted. As
regards the ten tribes, they were punished not only for the sin of
schism, but also for that of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the good
of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic good to
which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank in the army
is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like manner the good
of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is less than the
good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal object and is
the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is our
neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor, are
opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is less than
the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these sins are less
grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of God, which is
opposed to charity in respect of its principal object, is not less
grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins committed by man against
his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem to be the greatest, because it
is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether schismatics have any power?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For Augustine
says (Contra Donat. i, 1): "Just as those who come back to the Church
after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who return after
being ordained, are not ordained again." Now Order is a kind of power.
Therefore schismatics have some power since they retain their Orders.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra Donat.
vi, 5]): "One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as he can
have it." But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great power.
Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church, have a spiritual
power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf. Can.
Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: "We command that persons consecrated by
bishops who were themselves consecrated according to the Catholic rite,
but have separated themselves by schism from the Roman Church, should be
received mercifully and that their Orders should be acknowledged, when
they return to the unity of the Church, provided they be of commendable
life and knowledge." But this would not be so, unless spiritual power
were retained by schismatics. Therefore schismatics have spiritual power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu. 1,
can. Novatianus): "He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the
concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and
from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power or honor."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the
other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is
conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of the
Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as appears
even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated, is not
consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently such a power
as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has received it by
consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or heresy:
and this is proved from the fact that if he come back to the Church, he
is not consecrated anew. Since, however, the lower power ought not to
exercise its act, except in so far as it is moved by the higher power, as
may be seen also in the physical order, it follows that such persons lose
the use of their power, so that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet
if they use it, this power has its effect in sacramental acts, because
therein man acts only as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects
are not precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who
confers the sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred
by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not adhere to the
recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in heretics and
schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor excommunicate, nor
grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and if they do, it is
invalid.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual
power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second power, or
if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the essence of
the power, but to its lawful use.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with
excommunication?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished with
excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a share in
the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that "Baptism
can be received from a schismatic." Therefore it seems that
excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back those
who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain persons
(Ezech. 34:4): "That which was driven away you have not brought again,
neither have you sought that which was lost." Now schismatics are more
easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them. Therefore it
seems that they ought not to be excommunicated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the
same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: "God will not judge the same twice"
[*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the sin
of schism, according to Q[23], A[5], where it is stated: "Both divine and
earthly laws have laid down that those who are severed from the unity of
the Church, and disturb her peace, must be punished by the secular
power." Therefore they ought not to be punished with excommunication.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 16:26): "Depart from the tents of
these wicked men," those, to wit, who had caused the schism, "and touch
nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to Wis. 11:11, "By what things a man sinneth,
by the same also he should be punished" [Vulg.: 'he is tormented']. Now a
schismatic, as shown above (A[1]), commits a twofold sin: first by
separating himself from communion with the members of the Church, and in
this respect the fitting punishment for schismatics is that they be
excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the
Church, wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the
Church's spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by the
secular power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic, save
in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit this life,
marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may receive it,
whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that mark, which is
bestowed in Baptism.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby a
person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the Church
those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation brings them
back somewhat, because through confusion at their separation, they are
sometimes led to do penance
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[39] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and
therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man, another
is added: just as physicians employ several body medicines when one has
no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommunication does not
sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the compulsion of the secular
arm. If, however, one punishment suffices, another should not be employed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] Out. Para. 1/1
OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?
(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?
(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?
(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is always sinful to wage war?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because
punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are
threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Mt. 26:52: "All that
take the sword shall perish with the sword." Therefore all wars are
unlawful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But
war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Mt. 5:39): "But I
say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rm. 12:19): "Not revenging
yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath." Therefore war
is always sinful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue.
But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is
evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take place
in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are slain in
these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it seems
that war is a sin in itself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion
[*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion forbade war
altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather
have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up soldiering
altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to no man . . .
and be content with your pay' [*Lk. 3:14]. If he commanded them to be
content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are
necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war
is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to
declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the
tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private
individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in
wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are
in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the
city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for
them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against
internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the
words of the Apostle (Rm. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for
he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth
evil"; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war
in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said
to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and deliver
the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason Augustine
says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive to peace
among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be
in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked,
should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.
Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): "A just war
is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or
state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs
inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful
intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance
of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words quoted are to be
found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud. Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]):
"True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for
motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing
peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good." For it may
happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a
just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention.
Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for
inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and
relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like
things, all these are rightly condemned in war."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take the
sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the
command or permission of superior or lawful authority." On the other
hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the
authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal
for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to "take
the sword," but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does
not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of the
sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they always perish with
their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally
for their sinful use of the sword.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be
ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or
self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes for a man to act
otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom he is
fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom
we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is necessary to handle in
many ways against their will. For when we are stripping a man of the
lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is
more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty
impunity, and an evil will, like an internal enemy."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not
opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came not to
send upon earth" (Mt. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Bonif.
clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war
that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you
may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity
of peace."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all
forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in
slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no such
danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or "bloodless
wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference incorrect: cf. Veget.,
De Re Milit. i].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. For, as
stated above (A[1]), wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect
the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at the hands of the
foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory
says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon the sheep, when any unjust
and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who
was thought to be the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, end
flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up
against his injustice." Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics
to fight.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): "As
untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said
that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly;
for which reason we commanded our people to gather together, and ordered
them to go down to the seashore." Therefore it is lawful for bishops to
fight.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does a
thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according to Rm.
1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they
that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them." Now
those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce others to do it.
But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce others to fight: for
it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that Charles went to war with
the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop of Rome.
Therefore they also are allowed to fight.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is lawful
for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and meritorious to
make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni timore) that if "a
man die for the true faith, or to save his country, or in defense of
Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward." Therefore it is lawful
for bishops and clerics to fight.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing bishops and
clerics (Mt. 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard [Vulg.:
'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in Jn. 18:11]." Therefore it is
not lawful for them to fight.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Several things are requisite for the good of a human
society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number
of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1), while
certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that they
cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those who are
deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy themselves with
things of small importance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers who
are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce
[*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a
bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general one,
because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they hinder
the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise of
God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties of a cleric.
Wherefore just as commercial enterprises are forbidden to clerics,
because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits,
according to 2 Tim. 2:4: "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth
himself with secular business." The second reason is a special one,
because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of
the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is represented sacramentally,
according to 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as you shall eat this bread, and
drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He come."
Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and it is more
fitting that they should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so
as to imitate in deed what they portray in their ministry. For this
reason it has been decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin,
become irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can
lawfully do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is
altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the
shedding of blood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who brings
spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the oppressor
who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to
material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according to the saying
of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of our warfare are not carnal,
but mighty through God." Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and,
for those who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their
superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms themselves,
but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting
and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the Old
Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to sound the sacred
trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that bishops or clerics
were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an abuse of this
permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[23], A[4], ad 2) every power, art or
virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to the
end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as having
for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are deputed.
Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel other men to
engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up arms, not as
though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is unbecoming their
personality.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless
it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being deputed to
works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious;
and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have vowed virginity,
because they are bound to a yet greater good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war. For it
is written (Dt. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is
just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain
to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just war.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to
faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with
all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend.
xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy, as
Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is unlawful to
lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would that men
should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to observe this in
all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor.
Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to be prepared for
himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos):
"Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be
carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the authority of
the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai
(Joshua 8:2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the
enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways.
First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a
promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy
in this way, for there are certain "rights of war and covenants, which
ought to be observed even among enemies," as Ambrose states (De Officiis
i).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not
declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do
this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed,
especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Mt. 7:6:
"Give not that which is holy, to dogs." Wherefore much more ought the
plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other
things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his purpose
lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated in the Book on Strategy
[*Stratagematum i, 1] by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is
meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they
contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an
inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything
from him
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy days are
instituted that we may give our time to the things of God. Hence they are
included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex. 20:8: for "sabbath"
is interpreted "rest." But wars are full of unrest. Therefore by no means
is it lawful to fight on holy days.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Is. 58:3) because on
fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of strife, and
of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it unlawful to fight
on holy days.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. But
fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed. Therefore no
one should fight on a holy day even through the need of avoiding temporal
harm.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Machab 2:41): The Jews rightly
determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight on
the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those
things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence
Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (Jn. 7:23): "Are you angry at Me
because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?" Hence physicians
may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Now there is much
more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby many are saved from
being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual
prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. Therefore, for the
purpose of safeguarding the common weal of the faithful, it is lawful to
carry on a war on holy days, provided there be need for doing so: because
it would be to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to
choose to refrain from fighting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[40] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on
a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] Out. Para. 1/1
OF STRIFE (TWO ARTICLES) [*Strife here denotes fighting between
individuals]
We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether strife is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether strife is always a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For strife seems a
kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that the word "rixosus
[quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu] of a dog, because the
quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in brawling, and
provokes contention." Now contention is not always a sin. Neither,
therefore, is strife.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is related (Gn. 26:21) that the servants of Isaac
"digged" another well, "and for that they quarrelled likewise." Now it is
not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled publicly, without
being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin. Therefore strife is not a
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But war is
not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are
reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and "they who do such
things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore strifes are not
only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, While contention implies a contradiction of words, strife
denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Gal. 5:20
says that "strifes are when persons strike one another through anger."
Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes place between
private persons, being declared not by public authority, but rather by an
inordinate will. Therefore strife is always sinful. In fact it is a
mortal sin in the man who attacks another unjustly, for it is not without
mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the deed be done by
the hands. But in him who defends himself, it may be without sin, or it
may sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this
depends on his intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if
his sole intention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend
himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say properly
that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand, his
self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin. It
is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance obtrude
itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending himself:
but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with the fixed
intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and there are
three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express the
inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always ready
to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready to contradict,"
that is to say, whether the other man says or does well or ill. Secondly,
he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the passage proceeds, "and
delights in brawling." Thirdly, "he" provokes others to quarrel,
wherefore it goes on, "and provokes contention."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of Isaac
quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled with
them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore the
calumny [*Cf. Gn. 26:20].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared by
authority of the governing power, as stated above (Q[40], A[1]); whereas
strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or hatred. For if the
servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their public authority,
attack certain men and these defend themselves, it is not the former who
are said to be guilty of strife, but those who resist the public
authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this case who are guilty of
strife and commit sin, but those who defend themselves inordinately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether strife is a daughter of anger?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger. For it is
written (James 4:1): "Whence are wars and contentions? Are they not . . .
from your concupiscences, which war in your members?" But anger is not in
the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a daughter, not of anger,
but of concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth and
puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels." Now strife is apparently the
same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of pride or
vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): "The lips of a fool
intermeddle with strife." Now folly differs from anger, for it is
opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife is
not a daughter of anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Hatred stirreth up
strifes." But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi,
17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): "He that studieth discords,
soweth [Vulg.: 'loveth'] quarrels." But discord is a daughter of
vainglory, as stated above (Q[37], A[2]). Therefore strife is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that "anger gives rise
to strife"; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): "A passionate man
stirreth up strifes."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), strife denotes an antagonism
extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there are
two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In one way it is as
though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in this case is the
outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is directed to the hurt of
one's enemy either openly or secretly. In another way a man intends to
hurt another who knows and withstands his intention. This is what we mean
by strife, and belongs properly to anger which is the desire of
vengeance: for the angry man is not content to hurt secretly the object
of his anger, he even wishes him to feel the hurt and know that what he
suffers is in revenge for what he has done, as may be seen from what has
been said above about the passion of anger (FS, Q[46], A[6], ad 2).
Therefore, properly speaking, strife arises from anger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), all the irascible
passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so that whatever
is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from concupiscence as from
its first root.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of
anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of
quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being preferred
to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in quarrel and
strife.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Anger, as stated above (FS, Q[48], A[3]) hinders the
judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly. Hence they
have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in the reason that a
man designs to hurt another inordinately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not the
proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it is beside
his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner, since
sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees himself
prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel. But to hurt
a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the reason given
above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[41] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts of
those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies," i.e., intends
to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among themselves.
Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by directing it to
its own end. This does not, however, prove that strife is the daughter of
vainglory properly and directly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] Out. Para. 1/1
OF SEDITION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin distinct from
other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a seditious man is one
who sows dissent among minds, and begets discord." Now, by provoking the
commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of sin than that which
he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a special sin
distinct from discord.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism takes
its name from scission, as stated above (Q[39], A[1]). Therefore,
seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that of schism.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins, is
either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now sedition is
reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those vices which
arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where both kinds of
vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special sin, distinct
from other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other sins (2
Cor. 12:20).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in common
with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something
in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it
differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife denote
actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said to denote
either actual aggression, or the preparation for such aggression. Hence a
gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says that "seditions are tumults tending to fight,"
when, to wit, a number of people make preparations with the intention of
fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking,
carried on against external foes, being as it were between one people and
another, whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between
few people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its
proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as
when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part.
Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely
the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition, and
since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a seditious man
is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a
multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who sows discord,
but also in those who dissent from one another inordinately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First,
because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude, viz.
ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the temporal or
secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or kingdom.
Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a material fight as
sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord, since
each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between the parts
of a multitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sedition is always a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin. For
sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the gloss
quoted above (A[1]). But fighting is not always a mortal sin, indeed it
is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q[40], A[1]). Much more,
therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A[1], ad
3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes without any sin
at all. Therefore sedition can be also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a
tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension
in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the
tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be
sedition without mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle forbids seditions together with other
things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), sedition is contrary to the
unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom. Now
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the word
people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those
who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the
common good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition is
opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it follows manifestly
that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by
reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will be all the
greater according as the common good which it assails surpasses the
private good which is assailed by strife.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors, who
sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by them to
disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common good, and
withstand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious, even as
neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends himself, as
stated above (Q[41], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common good,
as stated above (Q[40], A[1]). But sedition runs counter to the common
good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without
sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin: and
sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity of the
multitude, which is a manifest good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[42] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it is
directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler,
as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10). Consequently
there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless
indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects
suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the
tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of
sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects,
that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being
conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the injury of the
multitude.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] Out. Para. 1/1
OF SCANDAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to
beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those, to
wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to be
specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider scandal,
under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is scandal?
(2) Whether scandal is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a special sin?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?
(6) Whether they can give scandal?
(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?
(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said
or done that occasions spiritual downfall?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as "something
less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual downfall." For scandal
is a sin as we shall state further on (A[2]). Now, according to Augustine
(Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a "word, deed, or desire contrary to
the law of God." Therefore the definition given above is insufficient,
since it omits "thought" or "desire."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more virtuous
or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect rectitude
would not seem to be a "less" right one. If, therefore, scandal is
something "less" rightly said or done, it follows that every virtuous act
except the best of all, is a scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing
accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the
thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say
that it is an "occasion."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of another's
spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate.
Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another's spiritual
downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems unreasonable.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall when
he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with offense and
weakness, for the Apostle says (Rm. 14:21): "It is good not to eat flesh,
and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or
scandalized, or weakened." Therefore the aforesaid definition of scandal
is unfitting.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome in expounding Mt. 15:12, "Dost thou know that
the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we read
'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by deed or
word, occasion another's spiritual downfall.'"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As Jerome observes the Greek {skandalon} may be rendered
offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For when a body,
while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to
stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle is a
{skandalon}.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be
disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so far, to
wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another
to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall,
except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly
right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his downfall.
Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as "something less rightly done
or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart,
wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle
conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the head
of scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because something
else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of
rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or through
having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were to "sit
at meat in the idol's temple" (1 Cor. 8:10), though this is not sinful in
itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet, since it has a
certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of worshipping the idol, it
might occasion another man's spiritual downfall. Hence the Apostle says
(1 Thess. 5:22): "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves."
Scandal is therefore fittingly described as something done "less
rightly," so as to comprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all
that has an appearance of evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (FS, Q[75], AA[2],3; FS, Q[80], A[1]),
nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's spiritual downfall, which is
sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man's words or deeds can only
be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that downfall. For this
reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but an occasion, which is
an imperfect, and not always an accidental cause. Nor is there any reason
why certain definitions should not make mention of things that are
accidental, since what is accidental to one, may be proper to something
else: thus the accidental cause is mentioned in the definition of chance
(Phys. ii, 5).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Another's words or deed may be the cause of another's sin
in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man either
intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if
he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as to lead
another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly commits a sin or does
something that has an appearance of sin. In this case he that does such
an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of another's spiritual
downfall, wherefore his act is called "active scandal." One man's word or
deed is the accidental cause of another's sin, when he neither intends to
lead him into sin, nor does what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and
yet this other one, through being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for
instance, into envy of another's good, and then he who does this
righteous act, does not, so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of
the other's downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion
according to Rm. 7:8: "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in
me all manner of concupiscence." Wherefore this is "passive," without
"active scandal," since he that acts rightly does not, for his own part,
afford the occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes therefore it
happens that there is active scandal in the one together with passive
scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being induced thereto by
another; sometimes there is active without passive scandal, for instance
when one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does
not consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we
have already said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while "offense"
signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin, which
resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and "scandal" is
the stumbling that results in downfall.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether scandal is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not occur
from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above (FS, Q[74],
AA[1],2). Now it is written (Mt. 18:7): "It must needs be that scandals
come." Therefore scandal is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness, because "a
good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mt. 7:18). But scandal may come
from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter (Mt. 16:23):
"Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which words Jerome says
that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of dutifulness, and such
is never inspired by the devil." Therefore scandal is not always a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles does
not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall, can be
without sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Scandal is "something less rightly said or done." Now
anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is always with
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As already said (A[1], ad 4), scandal is of two kinds,
passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal in the
person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual downfall.
Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person scandalized;
for he is not scandalized except in so far as he succumbs to a spiritual
downfall, and that is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the person
whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when a person
is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active scandal is
always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either what he does
is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it should always be
left undone out of that love for our neighbor which binds each one to be
solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare; so that if he persist in
doing it he acts against charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person
scandalized, as stated above (A[1], ad 4).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: These words, "It must needs be that scandals come," are to
be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the conditional necessity
of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever God foresees or
foretells must happen, provided it be taken conjointly with such
foreknowledge, as explained in the FP, Q[14], A[13], ad 3; FP, Q[23],
A[6], ad 2.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity of
end, because they are useful in order that "they . . . who are reproved
may be made manifest" (1 Cor. 11:19).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails to
shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man partaking of
unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs injure his health,
which is to be understood on the condition that he does not change his
diet. In like manner it must needs be that scandals come, so long as men
fail to change their evil mode of living.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of hindrance: for
Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense of dutifulness
towards Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept back
somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether scandal is a special sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For scandal is
"something said or done less rightly." But this applies to every kind of
sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and consequently, scandal is not a
special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind of
injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in Ethic.
v, 3,5. But scandal is not to be found separately from other sins.
Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something which
specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in its being
something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a sin being
committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance, does not seem
to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal is not a special
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it. But
scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is written
(Rm. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou
walkest not now according to charity." Therefore scandal is a special sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), scandal is twofold, active and
passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through
another's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the fact
that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed, does not
constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply a special
deformity in opposition to a special virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways,
directly and accidently. The scandal is accidental when it is beside the
agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his inordinate deed
or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall, but merely to satisfy
his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not a special sin,
because a species is not constituted by that which is accidental.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word or
deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind of sin
on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because moral
actions take their species from their end, as stated above (FS, Q[1],
A[3]; FS, Q[18], AA[4],6). Hence, just as theft and murder are special
kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention of doing a
special injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a special kind of
sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to his neighbor, and it
is directly opposed to fraternal correction, whereby a man intends the
removal of a special kind of harm.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but it may
derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other sins, as
when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a sin in
itself, but has an appearance of evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin from
the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether scandal is a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every sin that is
contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q[24], A[12]; Q[35]
, A[3]). But scandal is contrary to charity, as stated above (AA[2],3).
Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment of
eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal
damnation, according to Mt. 18:6: "He that shall scandalize one of these
little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a mill-stone
should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the
depth of the sea." For, as Jerome says on this passage, "it is much
better to receive a brief punishment for a fault, than to await
everlasting torments." Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin, because
mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a sin against
God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): "When you wound the weak
conscience of the brethren [*Vulg.: 'When you sin thus against the
brethren and wound their weak conscience'], you sin against Christ."
Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It may be a venial sin to lead a person into venial
sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal may be a
venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), scandal denotes a stumbling
whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently
passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it consists in a
stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed by a
movement of venial sin occasioned by another's inordinate word or deed:
while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the stumbling results in a
downfall, for instance, when a person goes so far as to commit a mortal
sin through another's inordinate word or deed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin; for
instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either commits a
venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself, but has some
appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a mortal sin,
either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because he has such
contempt for his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he declines, for the
sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he wishes to do. But in the
case of active direct scandal, as when a person intends to lead another
into sin, if he intends to lead him into mortal sin, his own sin will be
mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing a mortal sin
himself, to lead another into venial sin; whereas if he intends, by
committing a venial sin, to lead another into venial sin, there will be a
venial sin of scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether passive scandal may happen even to the perfect?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to the
perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to Peter (Mt.
16:23): "Thou art a scandal to Me." Much more therefore can other perfect
men suffer scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a person's
spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their progress
along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We would have come
to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath hindered us."
Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins, according to
1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now
passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial, as
stated above (A[4]). Therefore passive scandal may be found in perfect
men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Mt. 18:6, "He that shall
scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is the
little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take scandal."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person who
takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man can be
unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, i.e.
the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is unchangeable, for
though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as these
adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16: "Be ye followers of me, as I
also am of Christ." Wherefore, however much others may appear to them to
conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they themselves do not stray from
their righteousness, according to Ps. 124:1: "They that trust in the Lord
shall be as Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in
Jerusalem." Therefore scandal is not found in those who adhere to God
perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165: "Much peace have they that
love Thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block [scandalum]."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[2], ad 2), in this passage, scandal is
used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our Lord
said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he was endeavoring to
weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of external
actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of others, from
tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according to Rm.
8:38,39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be able to separate us from
the love of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins through the
weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking scandal in
its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there can be
an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My feet were
almost moved."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the perfect.
For passion is the effect of action. Now some are scandalized passively
by the words or deeds of the perfect, according to Mt. 15:12: "Dost thou
know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were scandalized?"
Therefore active scandal can be found in the perfect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the state
of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for it is
written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly unto the
truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i.e. Peter, "before them all: If
thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gentiles, and not as the
Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to live as do the Jews?"
Therefore active scandal can be in the perfect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But venial
sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in perfect
men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than
passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much less,
therefore, can active scandal be in them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a man
says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion another's
spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or does is
inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their actions
according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40: "Let all
things be done decently and according to order"; and they are careful to
do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only would they do wrong,
but would also be to others an occasion of wrongdoing. And if indeed they
fail in this moderation in such words or deeds as come to the knowledge
of others, this has its origin in human weakness wherein they fall short
of perfection. Yet they do not fall short so far as to stray far from the
order of reason, but only a little and in some slight matter: and this is
not so grave that anyone can reasonably take therefrom an occasion for
committing sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active scandal; yet
this active scandal is not always in another, but in the very person who
is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii) and of
Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in withdrawing from the
gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because he did this
somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles who had been converted to the
faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter's action was not so grave a
sin as to give others sufficient ground for scandal. Hence they were
guilty of passive scandal, while there was no active scandal in Peter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in sudden
movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If, however, they
commit any venial sins even in their external words or deeds, these are
so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether spiritual goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone on
account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) teaches
that "punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of schism is
feared." But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since it is an act
of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone on account of
scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet one
ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to Mt. 7:6:
"Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before
swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you." Therefore a spiritual
good should be foregone on account of scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity, it is a
spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in order to
avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 9).
Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc.
xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego whatever it
is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold truth, i.e. "the
truth of life, of justice and of doctrine." Now the observance of the
counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be omitted without
prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else whoever omitted them
would always be guilty of sin, and yet such things are the greatest of
spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works should be omitted on account
of scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good, since any
sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that one ought
sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing one's
neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially, one would prevent
someone else from committing a mortal sin: because one is bound to hinder
the damnation of one's neighbor as much as one can without prejudice to
one's own salvation, which is not precluded by a venial sin. Therefore
one ought to forego a spiritual good in order to avoid scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): "If people are
scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of scandal,
than to abandon the truth." Now spiritual goods belong, above all others,
to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to be foregone on account
of scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the
present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active
scandal is "something said or done less rightly," nothing ought to be
done that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply to
passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be foregone
in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in spiritual
goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and cannot be
foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man ought to
commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from sinning, because
according to the order of charity, a man ought to love his own spiritual
welfare more than another's. Therefore one ought not to forego that which
is necessary for salvation, in order to avoid giving scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are not
necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from such
things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man wishes to
hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This is the "scandal
of the Pharisees," who were scandalized at Our Lord's teaching: and Our
Lord teaches (Mt. 15:14) that we ought to treat such like scandal with
contempt. Sometimes scandal proceeds from weakness or ignorance, and such
is the "scandal of little ones." In order to avoid this kind of scandal,
spiritual goods ought to be either concealed, or sometimes even deferred
(if this can be done without incurring immediate danger), until the
matter being explained the scandal cease. If, however, the scandal
continue after the matter has been explained, it would seem to be due to
malice, and then it would no longer be right to forego that spiritual
good in order to avoid such like scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment
itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties in checking
sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as
it checks sin. But if it is evident that the infliction of punishment
will result in more numerous and more grievous sins being committed, the
infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice. It is in
this sense that Augustine is speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication
of a few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for in that
case it would be contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce
excommunication.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: With regard to a man's doctrine two points must be
considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of teaching.
The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that he whose duty
it is to teach should no' teach what is contrary to the truth, and that
he should teach the truth according to the requirements of times and
persons: wherefore on no account ought he to suppress the truth and teach
error in order to avoid any scandal that might ensue. But the act itself
of teaching is one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q[32],
A[2]), and so the same is to be said of it as of the other works of
mercy, of which we shall speak further on (ad 4).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[33], A[1]), fraternal correction aims at
the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be reckoned among
spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained, which is not the
case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected. And so, if
the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no spiritual good is
foregone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice comprises
not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also whatever is a
means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according to 1 Cor. 12:31:
"Be zealous for the better gifts." Wherefore neither the counsels nor
even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted in order to avoid
scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or deferred, on account
of the scandal of the little ones, as stated above. Sometimes, however,
the observance of the counsels and the fulfilment of the works of mercy
are necessary for salvation. This may be seen in the case of those who
have vowed to keep the counsels, and of those whose duty it is to relieve
the wants of others, either in temporal matters (as by feeding the
hungry), or in spiritual matters (as by instructing the ignorant),
whether such duties arise from their being enjoined as in the case of
prelates, or from the need on the part of the person in want; and then
the same applies to these things as to others that are necessary for
salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial sin in
order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since if it
ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be a
matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of some
circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be were it
not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin, when it is
uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause, it is
neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive a man of
grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it disposes him
to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on account
of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual welfare which
is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods whatever. But we
forego what we love less for the sake of what we love more. Therefore we
should forego temporal goods in order to avoid scandalizing our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A[7], OBJ[4]], whatever
can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth, should be
omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can be foregone
without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they should be
foregone in order to avoid scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But we
ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rm.
14:15: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died." Much more
therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account of
scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering
temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to have
recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is written (Mt.
5:40): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy
coat, let go thy cloak also unto him"; and (1 Cor. 6:7): "Already indeed
there is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits one with
another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do you not rather suffer
yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore it seems that we ought to forego
temporal goods on account of scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those
temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we ought
to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while sowing
spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he "should give
any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ" as we read 1 Cor. 9:12. For a like
reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain countries, in order
to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we to forego other temporal
goods in order to avoid scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the restitution
of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took scandal from his
doing so.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for either
they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of them for
someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to prelates, and
the goods of the community are entrusted to all such persons as have
authority over the common weal. In this latter case the care of such
things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of necessity on those
persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore, even as other things that
are necessary for salvation, they are not to be foregone on account of
scandal. On the other hand, as regards those temporalities of which we
have the dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal, we are bound to
forego them, and sometimes we are not so bound, whether we forego them by
giving them up, if we have them in our possession, or by omitting to
claim them, if they are in the possession of others. For if the scandal
arise therefrom through the ignorance or weakness of others (in which
case, as stated above, A[7], it is scandal of the little ones) we must
either forego such temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be
abated by some other means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): "Thou shouldst give so as
to injure neither thyself nor another, as much as thou canst lend, and if
thou refusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou
wilt give him something better than he asks, if thou reprove him that
asks unjustly." Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This is
scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not to forego temporal goods for
the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for this would both
be harmful to the common good, since it would give wicked men an
opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious to the plunderers
themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they were in possession of
another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 13): "Sometimes we
ought to suffer those who rob us of our temporalities, while sometimes we
should resist them, as far as equity allows, in the hope not only that we
may safeguard our property, but also lest those who take what is not
theirs may lose themselves."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob other people
of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the truth of life
and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to forego our temporal
goods in order to avoid scandal.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total
abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare requires
that we should take food: but he intended to counsel abstinence from a
particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal, according to 1 Cor.
8:13: "I will never eat flesh, lest I should scandalize my brother."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) this
precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of the mind,
namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to suffer being
harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But sometimes it is not
expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same applies to the saying of the
Apostle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[43] A[8] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from an error
of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it behooved him
to forego it for the time being, so that they might be taught first of
all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason the Church refrains
from demanding tithes in those countries where it is not customary to pay
them.
