Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be
made in God's image, in so far as the image implies "an intelligent being
endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of
the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the
power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of
His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions,
as having free-will and control of his actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] Out. Para. 1/2
OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and
secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this
end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is
ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to be
happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?
(3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?
(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?
(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?
(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?
(7) Whether all men have the same last end?
(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end.
For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, implies
something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for
which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this preposition
"for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to
man to act for an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But
in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts
deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes
not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's
foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.
Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the
principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human
operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs
to man to do everything for an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called
"human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational
animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those
actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man
is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the
free-will is defined as "the faculty and will of reason." Therefore those
actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will.
And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of
a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to
man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power,
are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But
the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore all human
actions must be for an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it
is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way that
it is a cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary,
else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is voluntary
in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to
walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the will, for
instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act
elicited by the will to be the last end. For the object of the will is
the end, just as the object of sight is color: wherefore just as the
first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is
directed to a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end,
cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a
human action be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will:
so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, is for
the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts
for an end, even when he does that action in which the last end consists.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since
they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper
principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end,
but not one that is fixed by reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for
an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, never acts for an
unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no
knowledge of an end; either because they are altogether without
knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the
idea of an end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper
to the rational nature to act for an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end.
But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to things
that lack reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the
will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for an end
belongs to none but a rational nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only
mind but also nature acts for an end."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a
number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the
others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes
is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive
form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces
itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of
intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some
particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another:
consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of
necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an
end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature,
by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other
things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the
"natural appetite."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its
action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the
end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an
arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer who
directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed
of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over
their actions through their free-will, which is the "faculty of will and
reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural
inclination, as being moved by another and not by themselves; since they
do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain
anything to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For
the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to
the principal agent, as stated above (FP, Q[22], A[2], ad 4; FP, Q[103],
A[1], ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to
an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the end: whereas it is
proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by
another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do
not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether
void of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end:
but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he acts at
another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is
not necessary that he should know the end. And it is thus with irrational
creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs
itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that which
is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational
nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in
universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack
reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they
have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some
particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a
universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the common
good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of the city.
Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to
their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the
universal good, namely by the Divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human acts are specified by their end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For
the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by an
intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before
it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a human act
does not derive its species from the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one
and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. Therefore the
end does not give the species to human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13):
"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds
worthy of blame or praise."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and
not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and
form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And
this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are,
in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its
species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of
acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement.
Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement
proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is nothing else than a
movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific
nature. And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as
actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For human
acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is
moved by himself. Now it has been stated above (A[1]) that acts are
called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the
object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear that
the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In
like manner it is their terminus: for the human act terminates at that
which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of the
thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as
Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man,"
moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for
moral acts are the same as human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it
is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just this
that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered
as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention,
pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus that
it gives the species to the human or moral act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from
the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its
species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is
the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an act which is one
in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the
will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but one act in respect of
its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to the safeguarding
of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there
would be several acts in different species of morality: since in one way
there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a
movement does not receive its species from that which is its terminus
accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus. Now
moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation
to a natural end is accidental to morality. Consequently there is no
reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species,
should not be diverse, considered in their moral species, and conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is one last end of human life?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that
we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is
itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good: so that the
diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an
end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to
infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same reason
the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason
can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on the
apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an
infinite series of ends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the
will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can will
something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there
is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no last end
of the human will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a
thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good is that
which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of
an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one last
end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed
indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in
whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the
first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity
be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we
cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there
would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since
they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be
observed a twofold order in ends---the order of intention and the order
of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something
first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the
principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove
this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other
hand, the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its
beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to
work. Now the principle in the intention is the last end; while the
principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to
the end. Consequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity
since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any
action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest;
while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the
end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no
term, but would continue indefinitely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that
are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for
accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that
there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the
end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from it,
but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good has the
nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not
prove that there is no last end; but that from the end, already supposed,
we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are
ordained to the end. And this would be true if we considered but the
power of the First Good, which is infinite. But, since the First Good
diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow
forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that
there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good
from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the
diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written
(Wis. 11:21), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from
principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore
the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process
in demonstrations, because there we find a process of things having an
essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those
things which are accidentally connected, nothing hinders the reason from
proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity or
number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such
like things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself,
is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact that in
regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently
once or several times.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one man can have several last ends?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the
same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz.
"in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue." But these are
clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of
his will in many things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude
one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition to one
another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the
will does not exclude others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing,
the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its last end in
that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g.
riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in pleasure, a
man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is
possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several
things, as last ends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master
of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life.
Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is their belly":
viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now
according to Mt. 6:24, "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as
are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man
to have several last ends not ordained to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the
same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be assigned
for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a
man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect
and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of
the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so as to be no more,
but that it is perfected so as to be complete." It is therefore necessary
for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides
it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be
required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the
appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the
principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the
rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is
naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one
thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is
the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end,
is one.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their
species from the end, as stated above (A[3]), they must needs receive
their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as
natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form. Since,
then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one
genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every
genus there is one first principle; and the last end has the nature of a
first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as
man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man
to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one
last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All these several objects were considered as one perfect
good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although it is possible to find several things which are
not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect
good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The power of the will does not extend to making opposites
exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend to
several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills,
for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said to be
serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter.
Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics
1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot
be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does
not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that
end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he desires
or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end
of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love
it for its own sake."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he
desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First,
because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And
if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must,
of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the
beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly
the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning
of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved
through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the same
relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements.
Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as
they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the
appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object
of the appetite, which is the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external
end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford him
pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is desired
as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good, which is
the ultimate end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever
one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention,
which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to
any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be not actually directed
to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be
thinking of the end at every step.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all men have the same last end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before
all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man. But some
turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have
not the same last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end.
If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various
pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of
individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they
differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not
the same last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in
desiring the last end, which is happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first,
considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing
in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect
of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the
fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in
which the last end consists, as stated above (A[5]). But as to the thing
in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last
end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure;
others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to
some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of
honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of
all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes most
pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with
well disposed affections desires for his last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really
consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end,
which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of
the various things in which men seek to find their last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their first
principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above
(A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether other creatures concur in that last end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end.
For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e.
God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things
concur in man's last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things
to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's last end; because
He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object
of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all. Therefore
other things, too, concur in man's last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible for
animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore
other things do not concur in man's last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is
twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing
itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition
of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body
is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use";
and the end of the miser is money as "thing," or possession of money as
"use."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the
end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the
last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's
last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do
not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures
attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible
to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share
in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means
the acquisition of the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what
it is; (3) how we can obtain it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?
(2) Whether in honor?
(3) Whether in fame or glory?
(4) Whether in power?
(5) Whether in any good of the body?
(6) Whether in pleasure?
(7) Whether in any good of the soul?
(8) Whether in any created good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since
happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which has the
greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written
(Eccles. 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness
consists in wealth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a
state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." Now
money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be a
sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore
happiness consists in wealth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it
seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything
else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" (Eccles.
5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than
in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines in
giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the
generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in
wealth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in
wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3),
viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a
remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars,
dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a
direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for
the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth.
For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz. as
a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end,
rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of
nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Ps.
8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of
natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its means,
he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less
can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is
impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in
wealth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of
fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be
obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not
from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person whose
sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual
things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov. 17:16): "What
doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they
suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial
wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence,
which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3). Yet
this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the
sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed,
the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we
possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:29):
"They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and
for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we
already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the
sense of Our Lord's words (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water,"
by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason
of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them:
and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good
does not consist therein.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man's happiness consists in honors?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For
happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by
which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great
excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good.
But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory."
Therefore happiness consists in honor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But
nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in
all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore
happiness consists in honor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the
honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the
person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore
happiness does not consist in honor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For
honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and
consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in
the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, especially
to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e.
those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore
honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist
therein.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that
reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive honor
from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to
offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the
virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a
virtue, but ambition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a
sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes
them excellent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises from his
natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above.
Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose
judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For
happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the
trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the
Apostle says (Rm. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to
be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us."
Therefore happiness consists in glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius
(Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge of
others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose
[*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory consists "in being well
known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to
be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion.
Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves
eternity, when you think of your fame in future time." Therefore man's
happiness consists in fame or glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame
or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe their
renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more
shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own
praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory.
For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose
[*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is
related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for human
knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the
cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which
is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather
human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion,
is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently
man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's
good depends on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's
beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God;
according to Ps. 90:15,16: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I
will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails,
especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this
reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be
deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. 10:18):
"He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with
men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is
written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His
Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38 with Lk. 12:8
owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was
quoting from memory].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the
knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from
good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or
inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize
with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as
famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by
false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But
happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man's happiness consists in power?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things
desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first beginning.
But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to
be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called "gods" (Ex.
22:28), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness
consists in power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest
perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those
who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary
to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men
shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists
in power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most
imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man
cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of
anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded
by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still
more?"
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and
this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, as
is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end.
Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness
is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist
in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists
in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since happiness
is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the
foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly, because,
since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in
Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good.
But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many
goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and
such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil
can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for
it is written (Eccles. 5:12) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the
hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three.
Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that
are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods
mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to
fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it
is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power
otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not
enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he
become like Him in goodness also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use
of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use
of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power:
therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme
good consists in power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For
it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above the riches of
the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best.
Therefore it consists in the health of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better
than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. But for
man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since,
therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that health of the
body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle
from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the
scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause
consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end
consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause
is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which
attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most
desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things
pertaining to his being, such as the health of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness.
But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, by the
elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness.
Therefore man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the
goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing
be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the
preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end,
the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained
to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is
entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course, so man is given
over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus. 15:14: "God made man
from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it
is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not
the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot
be the preservation of man's being.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the
preservation of man's being, it could not be said that the end of man is
some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and
though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the
human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (FP, Q[75], A[2]); and
the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the
instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their means
he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the
goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is
man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so
are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it is with
reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which
are signified by "riches," just as the good of the soul is preferred to
all bodily goods.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being,
surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes
all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being
itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the
whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of
any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an
additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same passage
Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist,
and intelligent better than living things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument
proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every
perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion,
some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being
which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For
since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else,
but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to
anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in
wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists
principally in pleasure and delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than
the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end consists in
its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most
the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is
pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will
and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems
that man's last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire
is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even
irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore
happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses
to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad
ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we
should not say that the very beasts are happy too."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the
name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13),
although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in
them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is
distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is
a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We
must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting
from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a
man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or
in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the
perfect good, is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is
a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent.
Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the
perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting
therefrom as its proper accident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that
way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of
the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the
body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For since
the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of
the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain
infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied
down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as
compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted
and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is,
in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows
the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect,
which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is
abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars.
Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and
which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not
man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of
the soul. Hence it is written (Wis. 7:9) that "all gold in comparison of
her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither
happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire
delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus it
is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards
and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself,
so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the
preposition "for" denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or
rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else,
i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently
is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is
desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from
the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of
our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures
are desired by the majority.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and
yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as
stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the
supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some
good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and
supreme good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's
happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: external
goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not
consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above
(AA[4],5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the
good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire
money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he
desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other
goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from
the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore
happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of
the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is
perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is
something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the
body, as shown above (A[5]). Therefore it is something belonging to the
soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that
which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake."
But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to
be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[1], A[8]), the end is twofold: namely,
the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the
attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last
end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or
something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as
something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from
being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially
virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its
fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last
end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power,
habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good
fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the
universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good,
and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's
last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession
thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end,
thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last
end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing
itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and
makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness.
Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the
soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can
desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but
also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way
nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good
of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is
loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that
for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently
it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man loves
anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be
occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul,
is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness,
viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites the ends of
first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may
gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher
nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is
above man in the order of nature, as stated in FP, Q[111], A[1], it seems
that man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to
it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the
universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man
who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect.
Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural
desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing
his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which
surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy
by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's
happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is
the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it is
written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Ps. 143:15)."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's
happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite
altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained
to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's appetite, is the
universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal
true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the
universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God
alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore
God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps.
102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone
constitutes man's happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic
nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last
end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the
common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and
perfect good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further
end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but
something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared
as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its
last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe,
but God himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is
capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less
than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is
infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the
whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] Out. Para. 1/2
WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are
required for it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?
(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?
(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the
intellectual part?
(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an
operation of the intellect, or of the will?
(5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation
of the speculative or of the practical intellect?
(6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it
consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?
(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz.
angels?
(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His
Essence?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether happiness is something uncreated?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius
says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God is happiness
itself."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to
be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it
seems that happiness is the same as God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends
naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to
God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is
something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3):
"Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness
is not something uncreated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[2], A[7]), our end is
twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus
for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the attainment or
possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say
that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the
intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense,
then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His
infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. But in the second
way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is
nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the
last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness
in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we
consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something
created.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by
acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. On
the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by
participation; just as they are called "gods," by participation. And this
participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy,
is something created.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the
attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as
the attainment of the end is called the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether happiness is an operation?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle
says (Rm. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end,
life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being of
living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an
operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state does
not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one:
since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of operation does not
imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding
therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does
not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are
many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human
operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other
occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is
an operation according to perfect virtue."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In so far as man's happiness is something created,
existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness
is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is
actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently
happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that
operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher
calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can
be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially
considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said
to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must
of necessity consist in an operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of
the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown (Q[2]
, A[5]) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not
that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that His Being is His
Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which
operation the principle of life is made actual: thus we speak of active
and contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense
eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from Jn. 17:3: "This
is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in
general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he
signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the
aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the state of a happy
man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the
very essence of happiness, showing by what man is established in this
state, and that it is by some kind of operation. And so it is that he
proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds
from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to cut." And
such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action
and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the patient, as is
stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the
agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and such an action is
a perfection and an act of the agent. And such an operation can be
happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according
as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of
perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For
in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being is His
operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels,
the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are
united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of theirs is one only
and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life,
the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united
to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently,
is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued.
And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness
cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's
happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and
after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men."
But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the
angels . . . in heaven" (Mt. 22:30).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails:
because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by
one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far
as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we
fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of
happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation can be more
continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with
many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is
busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. And if at any
time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can
always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by
sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the
latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to
Objections 5 and 6 are evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the
intellective part only?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the
senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than that of
the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective
operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot understand without a
phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation
of the senses also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some goods
are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore
it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in
Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby in
all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive
operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in
common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore
happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1)
essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness
consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is
his last end, as shown above (A[1]): to Which man cannot be united by an
operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above
(Q[2], A[5]), man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body,
which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both
antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect
happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the
intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in
that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the
resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says
(Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain
overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will
be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (SS, QQ[82]
-85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not
depend on the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection proves that the operation of the senses is
required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this
life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the
aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source of
all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this
imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice
for the most perfect operation of this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the
lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in the
imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the
perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of
the intellect or of the will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness consists in
peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): "Who hath placed peace in thy
end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's
happiness is in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of
the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the
last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general,
who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the
will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on
(Q[9], AA[1],3). Therefore happiness regards the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's
most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of the
will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation
of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13). Therefore it seems
that happiness consists in an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who
has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And a little further
on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires:
for good things make a man happy, and such a man already possesses some
good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the
will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that
they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end,
as stated above (A[2], ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the
knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for
happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as
it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say,
then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it
to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been
said (AA[1],2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last
end. But the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of
the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it
desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it
is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the
end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will
from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present,
by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be
present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act
of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the
acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man
would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the
moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand,
or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it
is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain an
intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by
an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end
when attained.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the
intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the
will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is
"joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of
happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the
very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent
thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which
disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent inasmuch as
when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being
at rest.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is
the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore,
from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's
first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as its act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet
motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will
belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz.
delight or enjoyment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge
precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known," as
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an
intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a
sensible end by an act of sense.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has
what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the act of
his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a
necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the good
things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the
will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for
instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical
intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical
intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming like God.
But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of
things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect, which
derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in
an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical
intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect,
which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference
to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference to the
perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said
to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man's happiness consists in an
act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative
intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas the
practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself,
viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's happiness consists in
an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is
promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting
perfection of our joys."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative
rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three
reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs
be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is that of his
highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is
the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the
object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect.
Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in
the contemplation of Divine things. And since that "seems to be each
man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7,
therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to
him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought
principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is
not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very
actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the
last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the
practical intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative
life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God and
the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things
pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in
common with man, although imperfectly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to
come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such
as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of
the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated
in Ethic. x, 7,8.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is
one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in relation
to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the
speculative intellect to God is one of union and "information"; which is
a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to
the principal thing known, which is His Essence, God has not practical
but merely speculative knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is
outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the
contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is
perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has
not; but it directs man thereto.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last
end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and passions
would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of
him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative
intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the
speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration
of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that
"happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in
distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three speculative
virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to
the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore man's final
happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be
man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire
to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative
sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in
the consideration of speculative sciences.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is
perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act. But the
human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative
sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of these sciences,
man's final happiness consists.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): "Let not the wise man glory
in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences.
Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration of
these.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold,
one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to
understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by
imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of
some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man,
with whom is the idea of things to be done; while imperfect prudence is
in certain irrational animals, who are possessed of certain particular
instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the
consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe
that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond
the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science is
virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of
speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher
clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end
of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration
of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles
can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot
consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by
something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something
higher. Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is
lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form
of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to
that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or
something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to
that which is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be
through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been
shown (FP, Q[88], A[2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the
knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect.
Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms
there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration
of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect
happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect
happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2], ad 4).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also
any likeness or participation thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the
consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect
act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances,
namely, angels?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of
separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi
in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we
fail to take part in the feasts of angels"; by which he means final
happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by
contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final happiness
consists in contemplating the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be
united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of
human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human
intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature;
just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the spiritual
nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the
angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to be
united to the angels by contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:24): "Let him that glorieth,
glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's
final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[6]), man's perfect happiness consists
not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in
that which is so by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the
perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of that
power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true.
Therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not
perfect the intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the
order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1);
whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now
angels have being by participation: because in God alone is His Being His
Essence, as shown in the FP, Q[44], A[1]. It follows that contemplation
of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we
should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of
the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative
science.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by
contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God
Himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to those that hold human souls to be created by
the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should consist
in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with
his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in FP, Q[90], A[3].
Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with
God, Who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of
its enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated
in the FP, Q[111], A[2], ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps
man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First,
according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's final
perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that
of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the power: and thus
the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found
the fulness of its formal object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision
of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that
which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something
altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not
altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect,
namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His Essence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature.
But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the Divine
intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not
reach to this, but consists in something less.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear, we
shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else
than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as
something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the
perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now
the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a
thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains
perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an
intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to
know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is";
that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may
be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is.
Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause,
there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause,
"what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is
stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a
man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some
cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from
wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he
arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created
effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that
intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in
it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet
perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs
to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its
perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone
man's happiness consists, as stated above (AA[1],7; Q[2], A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying
towards happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[3] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[1], A[8]), the end has a twofold
acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this
way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and
indeed of all things, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]). Secondly, as to the
attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is
different from that of the lower, according to their respective habitudes
to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his
Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees
It indeed, but comprehends It not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness:
and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?
(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?
(3) Whether comprehension is required?
(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?
(5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?
(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?
(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether delight is required for happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of
faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the
Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides
vision is required for happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs something
else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists
in seeing God, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]); it seems that delight is not
necessary for happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be
unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the
intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy
in truth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways.
First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary
for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for
the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from without: thus friends
are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on
it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire. And in this way
delight is necessary for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite
being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing
else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without
concomitant delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the
will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight.
Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who
sees God cannot need delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the
intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in
Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and
perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the
operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention
because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those things that
delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be
less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a
sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of
prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For
"delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection
ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the
operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet
more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight they
afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which
are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species,
lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness,
delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment
corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the
cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4),
and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the
operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before
delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that
the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness
of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an
operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation.
Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act
of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above (Q[1], A[1],
ad 2; Q[3], A[4]): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because
that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation
in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects
operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth.
Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a
perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the
universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And
consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals,
operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect
apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in
delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to
delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the Author of
nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations.
And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the
order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the
intellectual appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of
delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good
gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its
end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness.
For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm. xxxciii De
Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him
is impossible." Therefore happiness is without comprehension.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his
intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is
sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him.
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are
determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects, the
true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to
delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you may
comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual
race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good fight, I have
finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid
up for me a crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for
Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those
things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in
which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end
partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through his
intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end
pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is the
will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of
the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For
sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no
longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to
attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is
possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the
attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation
of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and this relation alone
causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding
three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds
to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation
of hope; but delight in the end now present results from love, as already
stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with
Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible
end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or
enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the
comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended
by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the
holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs
after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say 'catch.']
him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is
necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is
the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while not
possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since
it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but
a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision
itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of
comprehension.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for
Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of the
intellect, as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But rectitude of the will, by
reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for
the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i,
4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will
none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For it can be answered
that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore
rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the
operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will. Therefore
Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not
depend on rectitude of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not
necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, after
arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is
ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness once obtained,
rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of
heart; for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all
men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both
antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in
comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to matter.
Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly
disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained
thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without rectitude of
the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (Q[3], A[8]), final
Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very
essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the Essence of God,
of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as
the will of him who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever
he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this is
precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that
Happiness cannot be without a right will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the
intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the
intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is
happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is required
antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in
order to strike the target.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the
getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, such as
movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when
the end has been gained: but the due order to the end is necessary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the
perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of nature. But
Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without
the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally a part
of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its
whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (Q[3],
AA[2],5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing
operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the
soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as
neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it seems that the soul
cannot be happy without the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul,
without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul
separated from the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the
operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is "not
hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because,
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul "has a natural desire
to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to
speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward journey," i.e.
to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul cannot be happy
without the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But
this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to be
united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore
the soul is not happy while separated from the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul
without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed']
are the dead who die in the Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in
this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now it
is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For
the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect,
either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in
this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ,
as was shown in the FP, Q[84], AA[6],7. Consequently that happiness which
can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to
perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, some have
maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body;
and have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies,
do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will
receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by
authority and by reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor.
5:6): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he
points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and
not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith
and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not
present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their
bodies, are in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are
confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to
be present with the Lord." Whence it is evident that the souls of the
saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence
of God, wherein is true Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the
body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it
looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the FP, Q[84], A[7]. Now it
is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms,
as stated in the FP, Q[12], A[3]. Wherefore, since man's perfect
Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not
depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's
perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof; thus
the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for
its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to
man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first
way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way.
For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the more perfect is the
soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation,
wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the
souls of the dead separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot
see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for
some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to
rule the body."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the
intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of the
body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body.
Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which
happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection
in respect of which it is the form of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that
of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual
part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole
is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal is
destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a
part of a line has another being from that of the whole line. But the
human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of
the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of
its matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists
in its own being, as stated in the FP, Q[75], A[2]. It follows,
therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being
and that consequently it can have a perfect operation; although it has
not the perfect specific nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and,
therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. Thus the
teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can
retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way
of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a hindrance
to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of
defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not all that is
necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to
operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents it from being
perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from the body is
said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision
of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way
that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible.
And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the
body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a way, that
it would still wish the body to attain to its share.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as
regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its
appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it
does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it.
Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in
intensity, but in extent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect
that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is not to
be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now
some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the angels,
thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to
inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the lowest, have every
perfection of Happiness that they ever will have, whereas the separated
souls of the saints have not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for
man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily good. But
it has been shown above (Q[2]) that Happiness does not consist in bodily
goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for
man's Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine
Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not part in this
operation, as shown above (A[5]). Therefore no disposition of the body is
necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the
more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the most perfect
operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from
the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposition of the body
necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is
written (Jn. 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the
reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written
(Is. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones
shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of the body is
necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in
this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect virtue";
and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body,
from every operation of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no
disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is
necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said
that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything
corporeal." But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul
to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the
soul to exclude its natural perfection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is
necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which
is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, that the governance thereof is difficult
and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the
soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven."
Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no longer be 'natural,'
but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be
its glory, which erstwhile was its burden." Consequently, because from
the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so
that this too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its
exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into
the lower nature."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object:
but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the body has not part in that operation of the
intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a
hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary,
lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that
the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon
the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject
to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of this
work (SS, Q[82], seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for
Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to
Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food
and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Lk. 22:30): "That you
may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (Mt. 6:20): "Lay up to
yourselves treasures in heaven": and (Mt. 25:34): "Come, ye blessed of My
Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary
for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some of
man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary for
Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Our Lord said (Mt. 5:12): "Your reward is very great in
heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least
external place is necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in heaven?
and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I
desire nothing but this,"---"It is good for me to adhere to my God."
Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life,
external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in
an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this
life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of
contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which
latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its
operations.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect
Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all
suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the
animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life, which
we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness
which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from
the body, or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but
spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for
that Happiness, since they are ordained to the animal life. And since, in
this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike,
approaches nearer than that of action to the likeness of that perfect
Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body
as stated in Ethic. x, 8.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture,
are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to
express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order
"that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things unknown,"
as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the
delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the
kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are
incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists.
Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good
things, because whatever good there be in these things, we shall possess
it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is
not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, but a
heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily
place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as
a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For
future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of
"glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of
many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that "there is no delight
in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us."
But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends
is also necessary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes
the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship
of friends is necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in
contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man
needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to
make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them,
since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for
the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that
he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped
by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in
the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he
needs the fellowship of friends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly
Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness;
since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the
fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures
receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and
charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from
without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice
in God, at their fellowship."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which
man has, not with man but with God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession of good
that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question under
consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[4] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the
love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there
were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no
neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him
results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it
were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man can attain Happiness?
(2) Whether one man can be happier than another?
(3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?
(4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?
(5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?
(6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher
creature?
(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may
obtain Happiness of God?
(8) Whether every man desires Happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man can attain happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the
rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is above the
rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several
passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only,
cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man,
who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual nature,
which is Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure
Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material things:
wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De
Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But
we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. Since,
therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway
between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:12): "Blessed is the man whom
Thou shalt instruct, O Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever,
therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness. Now, that
man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect
can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his will can
desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved
again from the fact that man is capable of seeing God, as stated in FP,
Q[12], A[1]: in which vision, as we stated above (Q[3], A[8]) man's
perfect Happiness consists.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than
the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds the
sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the
senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, whereas the reason
has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational
nature, as to the mode of knowing the same intelligible truth: for the
intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth which the rational nature
reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the FP, Q[58],
A[3]; FP, Q[79], A[8]. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at
that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can
attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but
otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after
the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. But
the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To man in the present state of life the natural way of
knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this state
of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the FP, Q[84], A[7]
; FP, Q[89], A[1].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so
as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation
of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels
something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, he will be
perfectly happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one man can be happier than another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For
Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is
written (Mt. 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every
man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), "each was
equally rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one man cannot be happier
than another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass
the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed by
another's.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good"
(Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire is not at
rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing
that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore either man
is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.)
signify "the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal life." But
the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is
Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and
Happiness is not equally in all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[2], A[7]), Happiness
implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good;
and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that Good
itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot
be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely,
God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or
enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the
more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one man enjoys
God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or
ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this sense one man can be happier
than another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its
object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
divers degrees of enjoyment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is
the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they
have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good," as
Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be happier than
another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the
addition of other goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says
(Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the
happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing Thee alone."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one can be happy in this life?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is
written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in
the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be
happy in this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not
destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be happier than
another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by
knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man can be happy in
this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since
what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does not fail
altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as
appears from Ps. 143:15: "They have called the people happy that hath
these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be
happy in this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, living
for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes
misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this
life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This may
be seen from a twofold consideration.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a
"perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils every
desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present
life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of
the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and
to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De
Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for good be satiated in
this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be
abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass away; since life itself
passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold
abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is
impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz.
the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this life,
as was shown in the FP, Q[12], A[11]. Hence it is evident that none can
attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account
of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according to Rm.
8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain participation of
Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign Good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of
two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which is not
seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true
Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part of the
participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself,
namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way in which
God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the true nature of
Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above
(Q[3], A[2]), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object,
which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had
in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness. And
thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether happiness once had can be lost?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a
perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according to
the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it
seems that Happiness is participated by man in a changeable manner. And
consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the
intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed to
opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation
whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it
seems that it has an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46) of the righteous that "they
shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated (A[2]), is
the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore
Happiness cannot be lost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in
this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative
happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when
knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain occupations,
whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 2/5
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed
so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness
principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward
changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as they hinder
many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because
there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a
praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this life can be lost, a
circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness,
therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in
this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 3/5
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this
life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following the
error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the
final Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 4/5
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the
general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and
sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude
every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has,
and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be
troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that
he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man
have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If
this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but
if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false
opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the true
is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be
truly happy, if evil be in him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 5/5
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of
Happiness. For it has been shown above (Q[3], A[8]) that man's perfect
Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is
impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It.
Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is
either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its stead;
or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of which it
becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul
with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness;
hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory
shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me together with
her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has
it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is written of the
contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no
bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the
happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither
can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because,
since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced
by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that sees God
cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the will, of necessity,
results from that vision as was shown above (Q[4], A[4]). Nor again can
it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to
God is raised above all other things: and consequently no other agent can
sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as
time goes on, man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa;
because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are
subject to time and movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every
defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it
altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises
man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are
ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, to the
last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to
be happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the
participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the good,
the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of
happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural
powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so
necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this
is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness by his
natural powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it
seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational creatures
can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man
attain Happiness by his natural powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs to the
same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect
operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is subject to
man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems
that he can attain to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural
powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his
intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints,
surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the
heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him."
Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be
acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in
whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on
(Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]),
consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's
Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every creature,
as was shown in the FP, Q[12], A[4]. For the natural knowledge of every
creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of
the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are
above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its
substance." But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created
substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which
infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor
any creature, can attain final Happiness by his natural powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although
it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided other
animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to
get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in things
necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness:
since this it could not do. But it did give him free-will, with which he
can turn to God, that He may make him happy. "For what we do by means of
our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs
help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition than
a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect
good, although it need no help from without in order to attain it, as the
Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health
who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who
can attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine. And
therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of
happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more
perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining
this good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they
can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity,
if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the
disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. Now the
imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of
the same species as that perfect operation which is man's happiness:
since operation takes its species from its object. Consequently the
argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of
some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a twofold order
in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other,
of the whole universe to a good which is outside the universe; the former
order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the
mutual order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the
parts of an army is dependent on the order of the whole army to the
general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in
the higher creatures acting on the lower, as stated in the FP, Q[109],
A[2]: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is
outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a
higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to
act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially hot, is
made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is
potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually happy by an angel
who is actually happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as
stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten man's intellect as
shown in the FP, Q[111], A[1]. Therefore an angel can make a man happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace
and glory."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature,
from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which
surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature.
Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is done
by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to
the blind, and such like. Now it has been shown above (A[5]) that
Happiness is a good surpassing created nature. Therefore it is impossible
that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone
is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we
speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as of the
virtue, in whose act it consists.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to
one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the last end,
while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by
causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing, which commands
the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which
it was made. Thus, too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed
helped by the angels in the attainment of his last end, in respect of
certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end
itself through the First Agent, which is God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it
can be the principle of action on something else: for instance a hot
thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly,
and not naturally, it cannot be the principle whereby it is communicated
to something else: thus the "intention" of color which is in the pupil,
cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can everything enlightened or
heated give heat or light to something else; for if they could,
enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory,
whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any
creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation.
Consequently no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a
lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to the
vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the FP, Q[106], A[1]:
since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from
God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may
obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite power,
He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but
can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works, since they are
not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated
above (A[6]), can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God
who does not require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness
without any previous works.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is
He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established nature,
He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the
part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith in its species.
Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous
works.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 4:6) that Happiness is of the man
"to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man
are necessary for attaining Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:17): "If you know these things,
you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained
through works.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is
necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order of
the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the
end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to receive the
form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his
Happiness: for God could make a will having a right tendency to the end,
and at the same time attaining the end; just as sometimes He disposes
matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine
wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel.
ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect
good, one has it without movement, some by one movement, some by
several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs to
that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to
God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards
Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every
created nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without
the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who
is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of
Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained in
the FP, Q[62], A[5]; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works
which are called merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not
on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows
Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect
forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the creature;
because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that
through them nature might be propagated to their progeny. In like manner,
because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God
and Man, "Who," according to Heb. 2:10, "had brought many children into
glory"; therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul
was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But this is
peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the
gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits of their own; because by
Baptism they are made members of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is
bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account of
previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is;
rather is it the principle of the movement that tends towards Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every man desires happiness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can
desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object of the
appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is
evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4), "some
thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a
virtue of the soul; some in other things." Therefore not all desire
Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine
Essence, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]). But some consider it impossible
for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not.
Therefore all men do not desire Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who
has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all do not desire
this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire
such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had
said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he would
have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will."
Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according
to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man
desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the
perfect good, as stated above (AA[3],4). But since good is the object of
the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his
will. Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire
that one's will be satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may
speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which
it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness; because they know not in
what thing the general notion of happiness is found. And consequently, in
this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first
Objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or
reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction, there
may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it
happen that one and the same thing is desired in one way, and not desired
in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect
good, which is the general notion of happiness: and thus the will
naturally and of necessity tends thereto, as stated above. Again it can
be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the
operation itself, or on the part of the operating power, or on the part
of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[5] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This definition of Happiness given by some---"Happy is the
man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is fulfilled" is a
good and adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if understood
in another. For if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his
natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is
happy: since nothing satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect
good which is Happiness. But if we understand it of those things that man
desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not
belong to Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does
it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things
hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that
reason sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to the
knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration
that Augustine added so as to include perfect Happiness---that he
"desires nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly
understood, to wit, that "happy is he who has all he desires."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] Out. Para. 1/5
TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)
OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we
must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts
we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining
it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things singular,
consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account
of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of
human acts, should consider first the general principles; and secondly
matters of detail.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] Out. Para. 2/5
In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves
for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their
principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common
to man and animals. And since Happiness is man's proper good, those acts
which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have
those which are common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must
consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which
are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions. The
first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (1) What makes a
human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] Out. Para. 3/5
And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary,
because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we
must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] Out. Para. 4/5
First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general;
secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will,
and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts which are
voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will
through the medium of the other powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] Out. Para. 5/5
And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to
which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the
voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of those
acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the first head
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
(2) Whether in irrational animals?
(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?
(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?
(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?
(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?
(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?
(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For
that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself." as Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the principle of human
acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's appetite is
moved to act, by the appetible object which is outside him, and is as a
"mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is nothing voluntary
in human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in animals
no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from without. But
all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the
principle of all human acts is from without: and therefore there is
nothing voluntary in them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But this
is not true of man; for it is written (Jn. 15:5): "Without Me you can do
nothing." Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary
is an act consisting in a rational operation." Now such are human acts.
Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In
order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some
acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas
the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is
moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone:
whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in
the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle,
some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved,
acts or is moved for an end, as stated above (Q[1], A[2]); those are
perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is
one not only of movement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a
thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary.
Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that
it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its
act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if
a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic
principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or
being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by
which the principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing,
but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an
end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move
themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a
knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them
a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end. And
consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that
they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such things are
said to be voluntary: for the word "voluntary" implies that their
movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that,
according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and
Damascene [*See Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as having
"a principle within" the agent, but also as implying "knowledge."
Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves
himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore,
although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be
within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of the
voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an
extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary act
that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet again it must be
observed that a principle of movement may happen to be first in a genus,
but not first simply: thus in the genus of things subject to alteration,
the first principle of alteration is a heavenly body, which is
nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is moved locally by a
higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, i.e.
the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus
of appetitive movement, although it is moved by an extrinsic principle
according to other species of movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a motion
from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by means of
an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with something
sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite. Thus a lion,
on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him, begins to be moved
towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some extrinsic motion produces a
physical change in an animal's body, as in the case of cold or heat; and
through the body being affected by the motion of an outward body, the
sensitive appetite which is the power of a bodily organ, is also moved
indirectly; thus it happens that through some alteration in the body the
appetite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not contrary
to the nature of voluntariness, as stated above (ad 1), for such
movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of
movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible
to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving
the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature,
proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible
with nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover,
inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it: so it is not
contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God,
inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both natural and
voluntary movements have this in common, that it is essential that they
should proceed from a principle within the agent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational
animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from "voluntas" [will]. Now
since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it cannot be in
irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything voluntary in them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said to be
master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters of their
actions; for "they act not; rather are they acted upon," as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no such thing as a
voluntary act in irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that "voluntary acts
lead to praise and blame." But neither praise nor blame is due to the
acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "both
children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary." The same
is said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius,
De Nat. Hom. xxxii.].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), it is essential to the voluntary
act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowledge
of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect.
Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing
which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the
relationship of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none
but the rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in
mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end,
or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is
exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural
estimative power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect
voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from
deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to
gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect
voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not
deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the voluntary in
its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature: whereas the
imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The will is the name of the rational appetite; and
consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word
"voluntary" is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to
those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of
likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to
irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some
kind of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to his
being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating reason is
indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to
either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals,
as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act,
wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in
irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For
that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing can proceed
from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will.
Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, so
when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But not to wish
implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore
there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated above
(AA[1],2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot
be without some act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which we are
masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to will
and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so
also are not to act and not to will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing
proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense
something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for
instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense
something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the
sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having ceased to
steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows from want of
action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then when the
agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer the
ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the sinking of the
ship would not be set down to him, although it might be due to his
absence from the helm.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes
ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and
not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus
it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without
outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not
to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not
will to act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that which
proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that
which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as though it
were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish." Consequently just
as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is, "I wish not to
read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to wish not to read," and
in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness. Secondly it is taken
as a sentence: and then no act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense
"not to wish" does not imply involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way
as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in one's power
to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not
to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it
voluntary not to consider.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether violence can be done to the will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For
everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there is
something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will.
Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active
principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force: for
it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is
sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is
compelled.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature.
But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature; as is clear
of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the movement of the will can be
compelled.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is done by
the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under compulsion
is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the will, cannot be
compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act,
as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an act of the
will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other
power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are commanded by the will
to be executed by means of the motive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer
violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from
executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act,
violence cannot be done to the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an
inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge: just as
the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior
principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from an
exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of the
will's own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and violence:
just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or
movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that
this violent movement be from its natural inclination is impossible. In
like manner a man may be dragged by force: but it is contrary to the very
notion of violence, that he be dragged of his own will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the
will of man, according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the
hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But if this
were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor
would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not always a violent movement, when a passive subject
is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done against the
interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise every alteration
and generation of simply bodies would be unnatural and violent: whereas
they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter
or subject to such a disposition. In like manner when the will is moved,
according to its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement
is not violent but voluntary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That to which the will tends by sinning, although in
reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless is
apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is
suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious
habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether violence causes involuntariness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For
we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in respect of the will. But
violence cannot be done to the will, as shown above (A[4]). Therefore
violence cannot cause involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 5) say.
But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby.
Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some
violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when a man with a
heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a way
contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not cause
involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are involuntary."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as
likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in
common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is
from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things
devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so in
things endowed with knowledge, it effects something against the will. Now
that which is against nature is said to be "unnatural"; and in like
manner that which is against the will is said to be "involuntary."
Therefore violence causes involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has
been said (A[4]) that not only the act, which proceeds immediately from
the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will.
Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will,
violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above (A[4]): wherefore
violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded act,
the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence
causes involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As that is said to be natural, which is according to the
inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is
according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be
natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an active
principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly,
according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is in nature an
inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle: thus the
movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the natural
aptitude in a heavenly body to receive such movement; although the cause
of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an act is said to
be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard to action, for instance, when
one wishes to be passive to another. Hence when action is brought to bear
on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that
action remains in the passive subject, there is not violence simply: for
although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by
being willing to suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the movement of an
animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural
inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is
nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is natural to be
moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, not simply
but in a certain respect. The same remark applies in the case of one who
contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary to their natural
disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. as to that
particular limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear causes involuntariness simply?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. For just
as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the time, so
fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence
causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes involuntariness
simply.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever be
added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it remains, is still
hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done through fear, is
involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the addition of fear, it is
involuntary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a
certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition, is such
simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in
some respect: but what is necessary absolutely, is necessary simply. But
that which is done through fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not
voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in order that the evil feared
may be avoided. Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary
simply.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done through fear
are "voluntary rather than involuntary."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory
of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such things are
done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly voluntary and
partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in
itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular
case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary
rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary
in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it
is in act; but according as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply,
but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act
in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with singulars;
and the singular, as such, is here and now; that which is done is in act,
in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating
circumstances. And that which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch
as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the
circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the
throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm,
through fear of the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary
simply. And hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially
voluntary, because its principle is within. But if we consider what is
done through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is
repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And
consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered in that
respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only
according to present and future time, but also in this, that the will
does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done
through compulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes voluntary,
because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its own sake, but on
account of something else, that is, in order to avoid an evil which is
feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act are satisfied, if it be
done on account of something else voluntary: since the voluntary is not
only what we wish, for its own sake, as an end, but also what we wish for
the sake of something else, as an end. It is clear therefore that in what
is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what
is done through fear, the will does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things
done through fear, a violent action is defined as not only one, "the
principal whereof is from without," but with the addition, "in which he
that suffers violence concurs not at all"; because the will of him that
is in fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be
added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but things
that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared with
different things. For what is big in comparison with one thing, is small
in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only
for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also for the sake of
something else, as it were relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a
thing which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming
voluntary when compared with another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which is done through fear, is voluntary without any
condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but it is
involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear
were not threatening. Consequently, this argument proves rather the
opposite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. For just
as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes
involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that
which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through concupiscence. But
fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence
does so also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But
concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5)
that "delight," or the lust of pleasure, "destroys the judgment of
prudence." Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24): "The involuntary
act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with regret." But neither
of these can be said of that which is done out of concupiscence.
Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the
contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be
voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence
inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the
effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than
involuntary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards good. Now evil
of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with the will.
Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause
involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to
that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from
concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his former will
whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; for his will is
changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated.
Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to a certain
extent, but that which is done from concupiscence is nowise involuntary.
For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he
purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas
the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as
happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow
that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet properly
speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary, because in
things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But
sometimes in those actions which are done from concupiscence, knowledge
is not completely destroyed, because the power of knowing is not taken
away entirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular
possible act. Nevertheless, this itself is voluntary, according as by
voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example
"not to act" or "not to will," and in like manner "not to consider"; for
the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on (Q[10], A[3];
Q[77], A[7]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that ignorance does not cause involuntariness. For
"the involuntary act deserves pardon," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 24). But sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not
deserve pardon, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: "If any man know not, he shall
not be known." Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to Prov. 14: 22:
"They err, that work evil." If, therefore, ignorance causes
involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary: which is
opposed to the saying of Augustine, that "every sin is voluntary" (De
Vera Relig. xiv).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "involuntariness is not without sadness," as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things are done out of ignorance,
but without sadness: for instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes
to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing a stag. Therefore
ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through ignorance is involuntary."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is in so far as
it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of
voluntariness, as was declared above (A[1]). But it is not every
ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must take
note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will:
in one way, "concomitantly"; in another, "consequently"; in a third way,
"antecedently." "Concomitantly," when there is ignorance of what is done;
but, so that even if it were known, it would be done. For then, ignorance
does not induce one to wish this to be done, but it just happens that a
thing is at the same time done, and not known: thus in the example given
(OBJ 3) a man did indeed wish to kill his foe, but killed him in
ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance of this kind, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1), does not cause involuntariness,
since it is not the cause of anything that is repugnant to the will: but
it causes "non-voluntariness," since that which is unknown cannot be
actually willed. Ignorance is "consequent" to the act of the will, in so
far as ignorance itself is voluntary: and this happens in two ways, in
accordance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary (A[3]). First,
because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as when
a man wishes not to know, that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he
may not be withheld from sin; according to Job 21:14: "We desire not the
knowledge of Thy ways." And this is called "affected ignorance."
Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary, when it regards that which
one can and ought to know: for in this sense "not to act" and "not to
will" are said to be voluntary, as stated above (A[3]). And ignorance of
this kind happens, either when one does not actually consider what one
can and ought to consider; this is called "ignorance of evil choice," and
arises from some passion or habit: or when one does not take the trouble
to acquire the knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense,
ignorance of the general principles of law, which one to know, is
voluntary, as being due to negligence. Accordingly, if in either of these
ways, ignorance is voluntary, it cannot cause involuntariness simply.
Nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as
it precedes the movement of the will towards the act, which movement
would not be, if there were knowledge. Ignorance is "antecedent" to the
act of the will, when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's
willing what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of
some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result
being that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of that
circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may
not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots an
arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[6] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the first
objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know. The
second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent,
as stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is concomitant with
the act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is a circumstance?
(2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human
acts?
(3) How many circumstances are there?
(4) Which are the most important of them?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human
act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circumstance is that
from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." But
oratorical arguments are derived principally from things pertaining to
the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species,
and the like, from which also Tully declares that an orator should draw
his arguments. Therefore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "to be in" is proper to an accident. But that which
surrounds [circumstat] is rather out than in. Therefore the circumstances
are not accidents of human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts themselves
are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The particular conditions of any singular thing are
called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1)
calls the circumstances particular things [*{ta kath' ekasta}], i.e. the
particular conditions of each act. Therefore the circumstances are
individual accidents of human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
"words are the signs of what we understand," it must needs be that in
naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our
intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the less known.
Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are transferred so as
to signify things less obvious: and hence it is that, as stated in
Metaph. x, 4, "the notion of distance has been transferred from things
that are apart locally, to all kinds of opposition": and in like manner
words that signify local movement are employed to designate all other
movements, because bodies which are circumscribed by place, are best
known to us. And hence it is that the word "circumstance" has passed from
located things to human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is
outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever
conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch
the human act, are called circumstances. Now what is outside a thing's
substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident.
Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should be called their
accidents.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first
place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the
circumstances of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first, through
being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently, or
from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in
the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that the orator "adds strength
to his argument," as though this were something secondary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways.
First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to be an
accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that thing in
the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident of the art of music,
inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as
it were. And in this sense circumstances are said to be the accidents of
human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to be the
accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the same
subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two accidents
are both related to the same subject, without any relation to one
another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly, when
such accidents are related to one another; as when the subject receives
one accident by means of the other; for instance, a body receives color
by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident said to be in
another; for we speak of color as being in the surface.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For
some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent
otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person; whereas
others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner in which
the act is done.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of the
circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider human
acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it
seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a thing
is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but
by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should not take note of the
circumstances of acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing
may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher says
(Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers accidental being,
except only the art of sophistry." Therefore the theologian has not to
consider circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the
orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not a
theologian's business to consider circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be
involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from
sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian. Therefore
circumstances also should be considered by the theologian.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Circumstances come under the consideration of the
theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian
considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness.
Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate to
that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a certain
commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances. Hence the
theologian has to consider the circumstances. Secondly, because the
theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or
evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on circumstances, as we
shall see further on (Q[18], AA[10],11; Q[73], A[7]). Thirdly, because
the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and
demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that
they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or
involuntary, according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as
stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore the theologian has to consider
circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this
implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the
genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to that which
is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic
to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and
"unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts
consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called
good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are
adjacent to them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by
every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such like
accidents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances
although, as stated above (A[1]), they are extrinsic to the act,
nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it.
Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist,
the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as with
respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts
and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in so far as
circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or
indictment. In different ways, however: because where the orator
persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this consideration
belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are
subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as
the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts
according as they are deserving of reward or punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of
Ethics?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth
in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is described as something
outside the act. Now time and place answer to this description. Therefore
there are only two circumstances, to wit, "when" and "where."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well
or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore all the
circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of acting."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an act.
But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance. Therefore no
circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself.
Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about what," are
circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to the
final cause, and "about what" to the material cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives
seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:
"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando---
Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when."
For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or
"instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he did
it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet
another, to wit, "about what," which Tully includes in the circumstance
"what."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a
circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act,
and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first,
inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches
the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It
touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as "time" and "place";
or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting." It touches the effect
when we consider "what" is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to
the final cause, by the circumstance "why"; as to the material cause, or
object, in the circumstance "about what"; as to the principal efficient
cause, in the circumstance "who"; and as to the instrumental efficient
cause, in the circumstance "by what aids."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Time and place surround [circumstant] the act by way of
measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other way,
while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance, but
results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a
quality of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a man
walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the act
depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional condition. Thus,
in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the
object is another's property, for this belongs to the substance of the
act; but that it be great or small. And the same applies to the other
circumstances which are considered in reference to the other causes. For
the end that specifies the act is not a circumstance, but some additional
end. Thus, that a valiant man act "valiantly for the sake of" the good of
the virtue or fortitude, is not a circumstance; but if he act valiantly
for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or some
such purpose. The same is to be said with regard to the circumstance
"what"; for that a man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash
him, is not a circumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give
him a chill, or scald him; heal him or harm him, these are circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act
consists"?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that these are not the most important
circumstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*hen ois e
praxis]" as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is seem
to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most important of
the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the
act. Therefore those things in which the act is are not the most
important circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it is
not the most important circumstance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to each
thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the person
that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done.
Therefore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest importance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.] says
that "the most important circumstances" are "why it is done" and "what is
done."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[1], A[1]), acts are properly called
human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the
will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most important of all
which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circumstance
"why": and the second in importance, is that which touches the very
substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did." As to the
other circumstances, they are more or less important, according as they
more or less approach to these.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By those things "in which the act is" the Philosopher does
not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are affixed to the
act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi], as
though he were explaining the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the
latter's term---"in which the act is"---said, "what is done."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the end is not part of the substance of the act,
yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the
agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[7] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The person that does the act is the cause of that act,
inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in this
respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of the
person have not such an important relation to the act. As to the mode, it
is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial
form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as it were, a
certain accidental quality of the act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] Out. Para. 1/3
OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first
place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being
elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the
will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] Out. Para. 2/3
Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must
therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the
end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it seems
that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end; viz.
"volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1) volition;
(2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three things must be
considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By what is the will
moved? (3) How is it moved?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is of good only?
(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?
(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and
to the means, by the same movement?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is of good only?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the same
power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and black. But
good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but
also of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite purposes,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will is a rational
power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in De Anima iii, 9.
Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and consequently its
volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is directed
not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we wish "not to
walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for future things,
which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not of good only.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the
scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is
only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards
that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to
the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being
and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to
something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1)
that "the good is that which all desire."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form,
the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of
things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or
rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended
form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a
thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is
apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is
requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be
apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that
"the end is a good, or an apparent good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is not referred to
them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred both to good and
evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore the
actual desire of good is called "volition" [*In Latin, 'voluntas'. To
avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will) St. Thomas adds a word of
explanation, which in the translation may appear superfluous], meaning
thereby the act of the will; for it is in this sense that we are now
speaking of the will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better
described as "nolition": wherefore, just as volition is of good, so
nolition is of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite
purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object; for
no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of the will
is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite purposes as
are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak
or to be silent, and such like: for the will can be directed to either
under the aspect of good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a
being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said to be
"beings of reason." In this way, too, future things, in so far as they
are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such like are
beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is thus
that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end
only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition is of the
end, while choice is of the means."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "For objects differing in genus there are corresponding
different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the end and the means
are in different genera of good: because the end, which is a good either
of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus "quality," or "action," or
"passion"; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to and end,
is in the genus "relation" (Ethic. i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of
the end, it is not of the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are
perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical arts,
the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the use of a
ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman; whereas the
building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of
the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end, it is not of the
means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing
passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But the
means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the end or
terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the
will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]].
Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to
the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in
which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way
whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any
way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of
the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly
speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated
from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to
understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the
simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object
of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end.
Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the other
hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred
to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it
is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end. Thus,
to understand, is properly directed to things that are known in
themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding
with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as
we see the principles in those things. For in morals the end is what
principles are in speculative science (Ethic. viii, 8).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to the
simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are different powers for objects that differ in genus
and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color are different
genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the
useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but are as that which is
of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now such like
objects are always referred to the same power; for instance, the power of
sight perceives both color and light by which color is seen.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the
powers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain
special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and
the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end, as
that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the
other hand, the ship-building art considers the means as that which it
effects; but it considers that which is the end, as that to which it
refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end
proper to it and means that belong properly to that art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to the end
and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 2)
"where one thing is on account of another there is only one." But the
will does not will the means save on account of the end. Therefore it is
moved to both by the same act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as
light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen by
the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby it
wills the end and the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends
through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in comparison
to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus. Therefore it is the
same movement of the will whereby it is directed to the end and to the
means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to their objects. But
the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful
good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as
such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be
moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be
moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end. Accordingly
the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely
and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the means. Hence it is
evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement, to the end,
as the reason for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it
is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely. And
sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man
first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to
be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The same happens in
regard to the intellect: for at first a man understands the principles in
themselves; but afterwards he understands them in the conclusions,
inasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on account of the principles.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being moved to
the end as the reason for willing the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is seen;
but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like manner
whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not
the conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle
space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural movement
sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus; so
sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But in
willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes to
will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions through
the principles which are called "means." Hence it is that sometimes the
intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence to the
conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end, and yet
does not proceed to will the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what
has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are
not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its
own sake and that which is for the sake of something else: wherefore the
act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but not
conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?
(3) Whether the will moves itself?
(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?
(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?
(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For
Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly
or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not." But it
would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: because
movement of the movable results from motion of the mover. Therefore the
intellect does not move the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the
will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in representing
the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does
not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination
affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us
not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move
the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same
thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the intellect
when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the
appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it
is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality
needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to
move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different
things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting;
secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes
sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and
sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to
the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act.
The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes
acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the
object, by reason of which the act is specified.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every
agent acts for an end, as was shown above (Q[1], A[2]), the principle of
this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is
concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned
with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art of
shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the nature of
an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the
will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of
the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other
power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good:
and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to
their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends
included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends
the common good---i.e. the order of the whole army---by his command moves
one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the
manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are
specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is
universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect. And
therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as
presenting its object to it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not
move, but that it does not move of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of
fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither
does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and
desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but
the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act;
since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is
included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the
determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the
intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a
special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore
evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive
appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive,"
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appetite is
less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite; just as
sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the sensitive appetite
does not move the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But
the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows the
particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement
of the will, which movement is universal, as following the universal
apprehension of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not moved by
that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion. But
the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite
obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by
his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man would not
be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the
sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the
sensitive appetite moves the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), that which is apprehended as good
and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to
be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition,
either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For
fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both
extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously
disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or
unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According
as a man is, such does the end seem to him."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite
man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is
affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not
seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when
angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the
sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in itself,
from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly the will is
simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in respect of the
man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that
passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars.
Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular
power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to
him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in
which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and
concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a
slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty,"
as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter
to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter
to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by
them at times.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will moves itself?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every
mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in potentiality;
since "movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such"
[*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not in potentiality and in
act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither,
therefore, can the will move itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But the
will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it
would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above
(A[1]). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the
same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems
unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs
to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power
to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), it belongs to the will to move
the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object. Now,
as stated above (Q[8], A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what the
principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the
intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from
potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus it
moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the
end, moves itself to will the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself
and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality in
respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it
reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as,
in a word, to will them actually.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The power of the will is always actually present to itself;
but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the
will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly it does not
follow that it is always moving itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by
itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas
it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the
end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior.
For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential to the
voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is
essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not
from anything exterior.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above
(Q[6], A[4]). But the violent act is one "the principle of which is
outside the agent" [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the will cannot
be moved by anything exterior.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs not
to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore
it is not moved by anything exterior.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1]
). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the
sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident
that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved
in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some
exterior principle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another
time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is
evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did
not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to
will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (A[3]), in so far
as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the
means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel: for when a man
wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and
through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed
by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always actually
will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something
moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will
this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel
following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to
infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced
to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior
mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii,
14).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be
within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward principle be
the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary
act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle
is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement
is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that its
principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of him
that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is moved by an
exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved by
another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the
movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible; since then
the will would will and not will the same thing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in
its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot move
itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved
by another as first mover.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause,
to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in Phys.
viii, 9. But human movements are various and multiform, since they begin
to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as
to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is uniform
according to its nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the lower
bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements of the human body,
which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the
heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the
heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell
the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the will. But this
would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move man's will.
Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly
bodies are not the causes of our acts." But they would be, if the will,
which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies.
Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly
bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in
so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered to
the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are
subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the
human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as to
the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as
stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason." Now the reason is a power
of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the
will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident
that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse:
because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and
more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore it is
impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will.
For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held
that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the will
of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on"
[*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the
entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of
bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e.
through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
But since it has been stated (A[2]) that the intellectual appetite is
moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the
heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as the
will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to
some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will. This
can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance.
Therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be referred to
the movement of the heavens, as to its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their
cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition
suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of
heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite is stirred by
the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as exterior bodies
are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose
presence, the will begins to will or not to will something; for instance,
when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this
movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without:
not on the part of an inward instigation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Cf. FP, Q[84], AA[6],7) the sensitive
appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why
man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion,
by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his
natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by the passions,
which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases
predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly
bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v),
"the wise man governs the stars"; which is a though to say that by
resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free and nowise
subject to the movement of the heavens, to such like effects of the
heavenly bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when
the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden
inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And
since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the
lying spirits."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior
principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its superior:
thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is
something which is higher than the will of man and below God, namely, the
angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior
principle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect.
But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but also by the
angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). For the same
reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things,
according to Gn. 1:31: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they
were very good." If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone, it
would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin and
whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in
us" [Vulg.'you'] "both to will and to accomplish."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as also is the
movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a
natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that
alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can cause a
natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man,
who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this movement is not
natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused by
no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys. vii,
4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things. Accordingly
man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his
cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle
that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is
evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the
rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated
in the FP, Q[90], A[2]. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the
will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the
cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while
every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good,
and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence
neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be
created by some particular agent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause
of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural forms, from
which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the
object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man's
knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from
without, as stated above (A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the
universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal
motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his
reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good.
Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of
something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He
moves by grace, as we shall state later on (Q[109], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?
(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?
(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally.
For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent, as stated
at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is not moved to
anything naturally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as "being
hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. Therefore no
movement is natural to the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will is
referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the
intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore
the will, too, wills some things naturally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher
also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For
sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In
this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in
Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even
for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing
which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of
itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to
the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs of
itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in
this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a
thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the
intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally
known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be
something naturally willed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does
each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in
the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of
demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is all
those things which belong to the willer according to his nature. For it
is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also
that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man. Wherefore man
wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things
that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth,
which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things
which regard the natural well-being; all of which are included in the
object of the will, as so many particular goods.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause
from another; for some things happen naturally and some are done
voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper
to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner proper to
nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will is founded
on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be
shared by the will, to some extent: just as what belongs to a previous
cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing, being
itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from the will.
And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a
result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire.
But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them
actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is act,
whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is "the act of that which is
in potentiality" (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1). Wherefore that which belongs
to, or results from, movement, in regard to natural things, is not always
in them. Thus fire does not always move upwards, but only when it is
outside its own place. [*The Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper
place is the fiery heaven, i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner it is
not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act,
when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but
only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will,
which is pure act, is always in the act of volition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding,
proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a
genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as
species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the
individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since,
therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one
general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as to
the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the
true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in general are
included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its object. For
the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to movable, as
stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the
movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of necessity by its
object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the
intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as stated
above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by its
object: therefore the will also, by its object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something
ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily: because
it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which principle one
assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason for willing the means;
and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily. Therefore the
will is moved of necessity by its object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational
power, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore
the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved, of
necessity, to either of the opposites.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise
of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from
the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily,
for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of
it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner
of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not.
For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what
aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the sight, under
the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to
the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes
away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were
confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only
so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of
necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the
object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it. Now
just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good the
object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is
good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of
necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the
opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is
not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity.
And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that
good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that
the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness. Whereas any other
particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be
regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside
or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from
various points of view.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object
that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power. If,
on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of
necessity, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is
such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that which may be
either true or false---viz. by that which is contingent: as we have said
of the good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the
perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end, and
without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to live,"
and the like. But other things without which the end can be gained, are
not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he who assents
to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the conclusions, without
which the principles can still be true.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a passion of
the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rm. 7:19): "The good which I
will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": and this is
said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore the will
is moved of necessity by a passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man is, such
does the end seem to him." But it is not in man's power to cast aside a
passion once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to will that to
which the passion inclines him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular effect,
except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal reason
does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as stated in De
Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the particular
estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the will
is not moved to will something particular, except through the sensitive
appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite happen to be disposed to
something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary
sense.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust
thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it."
Therefore man's will is moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[9], A[2]), the passion of the
sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by its
object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such
a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he
would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of a
passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is wholly
bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those who
through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious or
insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such like
passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of such
the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of
necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither
movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion,
so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom:
and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree.
Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the
passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of
necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently, either
there is no movement of the will in that man, and the passion alone holds
its sway: or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily
follow the passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of
concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which I
will not, that I do---i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the will
not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus it
does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and
sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of his
whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to this
reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by
passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by
passion, yet something of this reason remains free. And in respect of
this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold himself
in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed,
since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the
soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it
does according to a passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good
apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.
Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a
passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without
passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases
wherein reason resists passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For
every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God cannot be
resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rm.
9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves the will of
necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills
naturally, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). But "whatever God does in a
thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3).
Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from
its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the supposition
that the will does not will that to which God moves it: because in that
case God's operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it is not possible
for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills
it of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the
beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore He
does not of necessity move man's will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine
providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things."
Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so
that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of
necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.
Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one
thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves
it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its
movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to
which it is moved naturally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something
by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is
fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more
repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity,
which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which
is becoming to its nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that
it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a thing,
according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that
whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for instance, that
the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each
thing---that it be subject to the Divine power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[10] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with
this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not
impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved
by God necessarily.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] Out. Para. 1/1
OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to
irrational animals?
(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the appetitive
power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the fruit. But it
is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as shown above (Q[3],
A[4]), that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness.
Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, each power has its proper end, which is its perfection:
thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the hearing, to
perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit.
Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible
delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for the same
reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore
enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin. x,
10,11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake."
But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an
act of the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, "Fruitio" [enjoyment] and "fructus" [fruit] seem to refer
to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which, matters
not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one which is more
clearly known, was first named. Now those things are most manifest to us
which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that the word
"fruition" is derived from sensible fruits. But sensible fruit is that
which we expect the tree to produce in the last place, and in which a
certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to have
relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the
longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the object
of the appetitive power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act
of the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging,
under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision of
God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is
the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the
intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the
motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and enjoying the end
attained.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The perfection and end of every other power is contained in
the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained in the
common, as stated above (Q[9], A[1]). Hence the perfection and end of
each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power.
Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends; and
itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In delight there are two things: perception of what is
becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency in
that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive
power, in which power delight is formally completed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to
irrational animals?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men to enjoy and
to use." Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational animals
cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to enjoy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the
intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the sensitive.
If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, it seems that
for the same reason it can belong to the natural appetite. But this is
evidently false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore
the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: and accordingly enjoyment is not
possible for irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so absurd
to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As was stated above (A[1]) to enjoy is not the act of the
power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands
the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power.
Now things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way
of execution, as that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency,
whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet the power of command in
respect of the end is not in them, but in some higher nature, which moves
all nature by its command, just as in things endowed with knowledge, the
appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Wherefore it is clear that
things void of knowledge, although they attain an end, have no enjoyment
of the end: this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect
knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is the
end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and the
good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On the
other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are
known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals: whose
appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to
a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Consequently, enjoyment
belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect degree; to irrational
animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of that
which each one chooses for his last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so the
natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment. This is
clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it is not so absurd to
suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it would be, if one were to
say that they "use."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. For the
Apostle says (Philem. 20): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord."
But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a man.
Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says (Gal.
5:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and other like
things, which are not in the nature of the last end. Therefore enjoyment
is not only of the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I will
to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will: since
"it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10).
Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man is not
enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore
enjoyment is not only of the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy
that which he desires for the sake of something else." But the last end
alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else.
Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]) the notion of fruit implies two
things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm the
appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either
simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else;
relatively, if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that
which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end, is
properly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly said to enjoy.
But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only as
referred to something else, e.g. a bitter potion for the sake of health,
can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something delightful about
it, to which a number of preceding things are referred, may indeed by
called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot be said to enjoy it
properly or as though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the
delighted will is at rest therein." But its rest is not absolute save in
the possession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for,
the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached
something. Thus in local movement, although any point between the two
terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered as an actual
end, except when the movement stops there.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if he had
said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would seem to
have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he set his
end in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him": as if we were to
say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a term but as a
means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and
another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it, it is
compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final object
of his longing and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly these
fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain
effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they are called "fruits of the
spirit": but not as though we are to enjoy them as our last end. Or we
may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits because "we should
desire them for their own sake": not indeed as though they were not
ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we ought to find
pleasure in them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[2], A[7]), we speak of an
end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself; secondly, as
the attainment thereof. These are not, of course, two ends, but one end,
considered in itself, and in its relation to something else. Accordingly
God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the
enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just as God is
not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another: so it is the same
enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of
God. And the same applies to created happiness which consists in
enjoyment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed. For
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to use joyfully, with
the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so long as a thing is not
had, there is joy, not of possession, but of hope. Therefore enjoyment is
only of the end possessed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (A[3]), enjoyment is not properly
otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the
appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the end.
Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does not
lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end. Therefore
enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its
own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is
possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession.
Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the
last end, according as the will has something by way of last end. Now an
end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when
it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly,
when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is
of the end already possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end
possessed not really, but only in intention.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest. First
on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last end, but
ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one who desires
the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it. Now it is
the object that specifies an act: but on the agent depends the manner of
acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect, as compared with the
actual circumstances of the agent. Therefore enjoyment of anything but
the last end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short of the
nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is
enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect
way in which it is possessed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[11] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only in
reality, but also in intention, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] Out. Para. 1/1
OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?
(2) Whether it is only of the last end?
(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the
means?
(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not
of the will. For it is written (Mt. 6:22): "If thy eye be single, thy
whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to Augustine (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention. But since the eye is
the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive power. Therefore
intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the apprehensive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that Our
Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Mt. 6:23): "If the
light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains to knowledge.
Therefore intention does too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end. But to
ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs not to the will
but to the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the means.
But the act of the will in respect of the end is called volition, or
enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from which intention
is distinct. Therefore it is not an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the intention
of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained
in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought."
Therefore intention is an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to tend
to something." Now both the action of the mover and the movement of thing
moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing moved tends
to anything, is due to the action of the mover. Consequently intention
belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end: hence we
say that an architect or anyone who is in authority, by his command moves
others to that which he intends. Now the will moves all the other powers
of the soul to the end, as shown above (Q[9], A[1]). Wherefore it is
evident that intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The eye designates intention figuratively, not because
intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes
knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the latter moves;
thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him
who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness because a man knows what
he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds
(De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will does not ordain, but tends to something according
to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention" indicates an
act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders something
to the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now
the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely;
and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to have health,
and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place of rest; and
thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the
term towards which something is ordained; and thus "intention" regards
the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only
that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether intention is only of the last end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For it is
said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The intention of
the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of the human heart.
Therefore intention is always regards the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated
above (A[1], ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore intention
always regards the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does enjoyment.
But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention is too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, There is but one last end of human wills, viz.
Happiness, as stated above (Q[1], A[7]). If, therefore, intentions were
only of the last end, men would not have different intentions: which is
evidently false.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 4), intention regards the end
as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement may
be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the movement
comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement. Secondly,
some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the movement,
and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in the movement from A to C
through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the
last. And intention can be both. Consequently though intention is always
of the end, it need not be always of the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that
God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our intention.
Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention
has the force of a cry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A terminus is something last, not always in respect of the
whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the
last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end, not rest.
Wherefore the comparison proves nothing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at the same
time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17) that
man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily
benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to any other two things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards a
terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same direction of
one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same
time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the
intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things at the
same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore
neither is it possible to intend several things at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two purposes by
means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the purpose of taste and
speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art or reason
can at the same time direct one thing to two ends: so that one can intend
several ends at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The expression "two things" may be taken in two ways:
they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they be
ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a
man can intend several things at the same time. For intention is not only
of the last end, as stated above (A[2]), but also of an intermediary end.
Now a man intends at the same time, both the proximate and the last end;
as the mixing of a medicine and the giving of health.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus
also a man can intend several things at the same time. This is evident
from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the
better of the two. Now one of the reasons for which one thing is better
than another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore one
thing can be chosen in preference to another, because of the greater
number of purposes for which it is available: so that evidently a man can
intend several things at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time
direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last ends:
since, as stated above (Q[1], A[5]), one man cannot have several last
ends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There can be several termini ordained to one another, of
the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they be
ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed that what
is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason. Now intention is
a movement of the will to something already ordained by the reason, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore where we have many things in
reality, we may take them as one term of intention, in so far as the
reason takes them as one: either because two things concur in the
integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to
health; or because two things are included in one which may be intended.
For instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth,
as in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders the man who
intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in the FP, Q[12], A[10]; FP, Q[58], A[2]; FP,
Q[85], A[4] it is possible to understand several things at the same time,
in so far as, in some way, they are one.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the intention of the end and the volition of
the means are not one and the same movement. For Augustine says (De Trin.
xi, 6) that "the will to see the window, has for its end the seeing of
the window; and is another act from the will to see, through the window,
the passersby." But that I should will to see the passersby, through the
window, belongs to intention; whereas that I will to see the window,
belongs to the volition of the means. Therefore intention of the end and
the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But the
end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention of the
end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But choice
and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the end and the
willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The means in relation to the end, are as the mid-space
to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that passes through the
mid-space to the terminus, in natural things. Therefore in things
pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is the same movement as
the willing of the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The movement of the will to the end and to the means can
be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved to each
of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are really two
movements of the will to them. Secondly, it may be considered accordingly
as the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end: and thus the
movement of the will to the end and its movement to the means are one and
the same thing. For when I say: "I wish to take medicine for the sake of
health," I signify no more than one movement of my will. And this is
because the end is the reason for willing the means. Now the object, and
that by reason of which it is an object, come under the same act; thus it
is the same act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above
(Q[8], A[3], ad 2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it
consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a
distinct act; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the
principles, there is but one act of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of seeing,
through the window, the passersby, according as the will is moved to
either absolutely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that end,
are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is the formal
object in willing the means, they are one and the same object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ,
according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end, as in
the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in so far as
the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the end, it is
called "choice": but the movement of the will to the end as acquired by
the means, it is called "intention." A sign of this is that we can have
intention of the end without having determined the means which are the
object of choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For in
things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational
nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But nature
intends the end even in things void of reason, as is proved in Phys. ii,
8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoyment. But
enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above (Q[11], A[2]).
Therefore intention is too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an end;
since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something. But irrational
animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to
do something of the kind. Therefore irrational animals intend an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Intention of an end implies ordaining something to an
end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals are void
of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), to intend is to tend to
something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According,
therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to intend
the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end
by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational
animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something by
natural instinct. The other way of intending an end belongs to the mover;
according as he ordains the movement of something, either his own or
another's, to an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irrational
animals do not intend an end in this way, which is to intend properly and
principally, as stated above (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument takes intention in the sense of being moved
to an end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to
another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[12] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they
thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this belongs to one
that intends; but through desiring the end by natural instinct, they are
moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another, like other things that
are moved naturally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] Out. Para. 1/2
OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS (SIX
ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means.
There are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to use. And choice is
preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice:
secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent; fourthly, use.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end?
(4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves?
(5) Whether choice is only of possible things?
(6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of reason.
For choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference to
another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act
of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is for the same faculty to form a syllogism, and to
draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the reason that
forms syllogisms. Since therefore choice is a kind of conclusion in
practical matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3, it seems that it is an act
of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the
cognitive power. Now there is an "ignorance of choice," as is stated in
Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to the will
but to the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is
"the desire of things in our power." But desire is an act of will.
Therefore choice is too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The word choice implies something belonging to the reason
or intellect, and something belonging to the will: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice is either "intellect influenced by
appetite or appetite influenced by intellect." Now whenever two things
concur to make one, one of them is formal in regard to the other. Hence
Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that choice "is
neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a combination of the two. For
just as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body, and that it
is neither a mere body, nor a mere soul, but both; so is it with choice."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act
belonging essentially to some power or habit, receives a form or species
from a higher power or habit, according as an inferior is ordained by a
superior: for if a man were to perform an act of fortitude for the love
of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally, an act
of charity. Now it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the will
and ordains its act: in so far as the will tends to its object, according
to the order of reason, since the apprehensive power presents the object
to the appetite. Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to
something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end
by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of
the reason. Now in such like matters the substance of the act is as the
matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore
choice is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will: for
choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good
which is chosen. Consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive
power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it consists
in the comparison itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the
conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called "a decision" or
"judgment," to be followed by "choice." And for this reason the
conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to that which results
from it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In speaking "of ignorance of choice," we do not mean that
choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what ought
to be chosen.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that irrational animals are able to choose. For
choice "is the desire of certain things on account of an end," as stated
in Ethic. iii, 2,3. But irrational animals desire something on account of
an end: since they act for an end, and from desire. Therefore choice is
in irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the very word "electio" [choice] seems to signify the
taking of something in preference to others. But irrational animals take
something in preference to others: thus we can easily see for ourselves
that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another. Therefore choice is
in irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, "it is from prudence that a
man makes a good choice of means." But prudence is found in irrational
animals: hence it is said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1 that "those
animals which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are prudent by instinct."
We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the
works of various animals, such as bees, spiders, and dogs. For a hound in
following a stag, on coming to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the
stag has passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that the
stag has not passed there, being thus assured, takes to the third road
without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way of
exclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed by this way, since he
did not pass by the others, and there is no other road. Therefore it
seems that irrational animals are able to choose.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says
that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice."
Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to
another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can be
chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether determinate to
one there is no place for choice. Now the difference between the
sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above (Q[1], A[2], ad
3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing,
according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although determinate
to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature,
is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods.
Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the
sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have. Wherefore
irrational animals are not competent to choose.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is
called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing from
another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to
several things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to
another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing.
Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its
imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is naturally
inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just as
fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its making any choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in Phys. iii, 3 "movement is the act of the
movable, caused by a mover." Wherefore the power of the mover appears in
the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things moved by
reason, the order of reason which moves them is evident, although the
things themselves are without reason: for an arrow through the motion of
the archer goes straight towards the target, as though it were endowed
with reason to direct its course. The same may be seen in the movements
of clocks and all engines put together by the art of man. Now as
artificial things are in comparison to human art, so are all natural
things in comparison to the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be
seen in things moved by nature, just as in things moved by reason, as is
stated in Phys. ii. And thus it is that in the works of irrational
animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a
natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner
through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain
animals are called prudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or
exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all
that share in one nature, invariably act in the same way.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes also of the end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "virtue makes us choose aright; but
it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to direct aright
those things which are to be done for its sake." But that for the sake of
which something is done is the end. Therefore choice is of the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, choice implies preference of one thing to another. But
just as there can be preference of means, so can there be preference of
ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition is
of the end, but choice of the means."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As already stated (A[1], ad 2), choice results from the
decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical
syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism,
is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the
position of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end, as such, is not a matter of choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of
one demonstration or of one science, from being the conclusion of
another demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable
principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science; so
too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to something
as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus in the work of
a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a matter of choice for
a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the health of the body is
ordained to the good of the soul, consequently with one who has charge of
the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the
Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:10): "For when I am weak, then am I powerful."
But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as to
their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[1], A[5]), there is but one last end.
Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of
choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that choice is not only in respect of human acts.
For choice regards the means. Now, not only acts, but also the organs,
are means (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore choice is not only concerned with
human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice has a
place even in contemplation; in so far as one opinion is preferred to
another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular or
ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard.
Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "no man
chooses save what he can do himself."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard
the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And when the end
is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in so far as man
produces the thing which is the end, as the physician produces health
(wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of the
physician); or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or enjoys the
thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the possession of
money is the end. The same is to be said of the means. For the means must
needs be either an action; or a thing, with some action intervening
whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or puts it to some
use. And thus it is that choice is always in regard to human acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as man makes
use of them for the sake of the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In contemplation itself there is the act of the intellect
assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action that is put in
contradistinction to contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high
position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that post. Else, if
he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or official, he
would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we speak of one thing
being chosen in preference to another, it is in conjunction with some
action of the chooser.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether choice is only of possible things?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that choice in not only of possible things. For
choice is an act of the will, as stated above (A[1]). Now there is "a
willing of impossibilities" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore there is also a
choice of impossibilities.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above (A[4]).
Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing is concerned,
whether one choose that which is impossible in itself, or that which is
impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we are unable to
accomplish what we choose: so that this proves to be impossible to us.
Therefore choice is of the impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But the
Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command what
is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be of the
impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "there is no
choice of impossibilities."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[4]), our choice is always concerned
with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible to us.
Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an end.
But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end. A sign of this is that
when men in taking counsel together come to something that is impossible
to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the business.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the reason.
For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the end, as the
conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an impossible
conclusion does not follow from a possible principle. Wherefore an end
cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now no one is moved to
the impossible. Consequently no one would tend to the end, save for the
fact that the means appear to be possible. Therefore the impossible is
not the object of choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The will stands between the intellect and the external
action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the will
causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the
will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something under
the universal notion of good: but the term or perfection of the will's
act is to be observed in its relation to the action whereby a man tends
to the attainment of a thing; for the movement of the will is from the
soul to the thing. Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect
of something that is good for one to do. Now this cannot be something
impossible. Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect of
what is possible and good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of
the will is in respect of the impossible; and by some is called
"velleity," because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were
it possible. But choice is an act of the will, fixed on something to be
done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what
is possible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we
must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended. And
so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as
good, and yet is not really good; so is choice sometimes made of
something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to
him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reason for this is that the subject should not rely on
his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible; but in
each case should stand by his superior's judgment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end stands
in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that which
follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But
conclusions follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man is
moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the means).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), choice follows the
reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of necessity
about some things: on account of the necessity of the premises. Therefore
it seems that choice also follows of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved to
one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato says (Cf. De
Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of food
equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not moved towards one
more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility
of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if that which is equally
(eligible) with something else cannot be chosen, much less can that be
chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if two or more things
are available, of which one appears to be more (eligible), it is
impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore that which appears to
hold the first place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is
in regard to something that seems in some way better. Therefore every
choice is made necessarily.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; which according
to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to opposites.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because
that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now the reason why
it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a
twofold power in man. For man can will and not will, act and not act;
again, he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of this
is seated in the very power of the reason. For the will can tend to
whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the reason can apprehend
as good, not only this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also this, viz.
"not to will" or "not to act." Again, in all particular goods, the reason
can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has
the aspect of evil: and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one
of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone,
which is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as
lacking in any way. Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, nor
can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of
the end, but of the means, as stated above (A[3]); it is not of the
perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods.
Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The conclusion does not always of necessity follow from the
principles, but only when the principles cannot be true if the conclusion
is not true. In like manner, the end does not always necessitate in man
the choosing of the means, because the means are not always such that the
end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be such, they are not
always considered in that light.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason's decision or judgment of what is to be done is
about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such matters the
conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that are
absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; as, for
instance, "If he runs, he is in motion."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[13] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect,
nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point
of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than
towards the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] Out. Para. 1/1
OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?
(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?
(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?
(5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
(6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether counsel is an inquiry?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "an act of the appetite." But
inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an
inquiry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for which
reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive, as we
have shown in the FP, Q[14], A[7]. But counsel is ascribed to God: for it
is written (Eph. 1:11) that "He worketh all things according to the
counsel of His will." Therefore counsel is not inquiry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given in
matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:25):
"Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give
counsel." Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says:
"Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Choice, as stated above (Q[13], A[1], ad 2; A[3]),
follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there is
much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because actions are
concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their
vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain the
reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry: wherefore
the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on the
objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has
been already counselled."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When the acts of two powers are ordained to one another, in
each of them there is something belonging to the other power:
consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now it is
evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the means, and
the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason's
direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently there is to be found
something of the reason, viz. order, in that act of the will, which is
choice: and in counsel, which is an act of reason, something of the
will---both as matter (since counsel is of what man wills to do)---and
as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man is moved to take
counsel in regard to the means). And therefore, just as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice "is intellect influenced by appetite,"
thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "appetite based on inquiry,"
so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose
behalf and by whose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that
executes the inquiry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The things that we say of God must be understood without
any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us science is of
conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects: but science when
said of God means sure knowledge of all effects in the First Cause,
without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe counsel to God,
as to the certainty of His knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us
arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God;
wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only
take counsel who lack knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It may happen that things which are most certainly good in
the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in the
opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently in such
things counsel may be given.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but also of
the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of inquiry. Now in
things to be done by man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end
and not only as to the means. Since therefore inquiry as to what is to be
done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be of the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some human
actions are ends, as stated in Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel can be of
the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says
that "counsel is not of the end, but of the means."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The end is the principle in practical matters: because
the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the principle
cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry.
Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only of
the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to
some things, is ordained to something else; just as also what is the
principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of another: and
consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may be
looked upon as the means in another; and thus it will become an object of
counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That which is looked upon as an end, is already fixed:
consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not looked
upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be
counsel not about the end, but about the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Counsel is about operations, in so far as they are ordained
to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it will not, as
such, be the matter of counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we do. For
counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible for many to
confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are not the
result of our actions, such as the nature of various things. Therefore
counsel is not only of things that we do.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are laid
down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those who seek
counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore counsel is
not only of things that we do.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some are said to take consultation about future events;
which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is not only of
things that we do.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no would take
counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue. Therefore
counsel is not only of things that we do.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says:
"We take counsel of things that are within our competency and that we are
able to do."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Counsel properly implies a conference held between
several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting
together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to
confer with one another. Now we must take note that in contingent
particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is
necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration,
which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several
with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice
of another; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view is
brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man
by himself may be sufficient to consider these things. Wherefore the
inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent
singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank
so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of things
universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards
action, because actions bear on things singular and contingent.
Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about what
is to be done, for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is not due to
the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him in his
action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about
whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak of
consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit
something, through the knowledge of future events.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far as
they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of affection---thus a
man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as though it concerned
himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for the principal agent
and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through the
other; thus the master takes counsel about what he would do through his
servant.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether counsel is about all things that we do?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to
do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as stated above
(A[1]). But choice is about all things that we do. Therefore counsel is
too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever we
do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the
reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we do.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it appears
that something can be done by more means than one, we take counsel by
inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be
accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this." But whatever is
done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place
in all things that we do.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says
that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to science
or art."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above (A[1]). But
we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the
process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a reason that
attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat.].
Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises
from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained
by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts which are governed
by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how
to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the
fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; this
occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to
the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings.
Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel,
although they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being
done, as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that
admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory
of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or
decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without
inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry,
but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel in all that
is done by reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in
different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished by
several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the means,
but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is no need of
counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of analysis.
For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of our actions is
not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. from the simple to
the composite. Therefore counsel does not always proceed by way of
analysis.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason proceeds
from things that precede to things that follow, according to the more
appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the
present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel one should
proceed from the past and present to the future: which is not an
analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one of
analysis.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to us,
according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as to whether a certain
thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable to do, in
order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of counsel
should begin from things present.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who takes
counsel seems to inquire and analyze."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And
if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process is
not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is
to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than effects. But
if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the
process is one of analysis, as when our judgment deals with effects,
which by analysis we trace to their simple causes. Now the principle in
the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention,
but comes afterwards into execution. Hence the inquiry of counsel must
needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is
intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is
to be done at once.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their
reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about
actions is contrary to the order of actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Reason begins with that which is first according to reason;
but not always with that which is first in point of time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We should not want to know whether something to be done for
an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that end. Hence
we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before
considering whether it be possible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite. For
counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which action is
concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel
is indefinite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what is
to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action can be
hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason. Therefore
the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on
indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are self-evident,
which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is not to be had in
contingent singulars, which are variable and uncertain. Therefore the
inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly
reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the
infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would
begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides,
on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold principle
is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs
to the very genus of things pertaining to operation: this is the end
which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its
principle, as stated above (A[2]). The other principle is taken from
another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstrative sciences one science
postulates certain things from another, without inquiring into them. Now
these principles which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel
are any facts received through the senses---for instance, that this is
bread or iron: and also any general statements known either through
speculative or through practical science; for instance, that adultery is
forbidden by God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment.
Of such things counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that
which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in the
light of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of a
conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done first,
holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to
an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from being infinite potentially,
for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be
inquired into by means of counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is not
always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take counsel
about removing the obstacle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[14] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In contingent singulars, something may be taken for
certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it
concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a
necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to
sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] Out. Para. 1/1
OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive
power?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?
(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul
only?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part
of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent to the
higher reason. But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent
belongs to an apprehensive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, consent is "co-sense." But sense is an apprehensive
power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to
something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect, which is
an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive
power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "if a man
judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no
sentence," i.e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power.
Therefore consent does also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to something. Now it
is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the
imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the
absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the
intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend
indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since the
act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself,
the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it
cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as
it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves,
in so far as it takes complacency in it. Hence it is written (Wis. 1:1):
"Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness." And on these grounds consent
is an act of the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 9, "the will is in the reason."
Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes reason as
including the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive
faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking
acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: "Assentire" [to assent] is, to speak, "ad aliud sentire"
[to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain distance from
that to which assent is given. But "consentire" [to consent] is "to feel
with," and this implies a certain union to the object of consent. Hence
the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more
properly said to consent: whereas the intellect, whose act does not
consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather the reverse, as we
have stated in the FP, Q[16], A[1]; FP, Q[27], A[4]; FP, Q[59], A[2], is
more properly said to assent: although one word is wont to be used for
the other [*In Latin rather than in English.]. We may also say that the
intellect assents, in so far as it is moved by the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational animals.
For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one thing. But the
appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one thing. Therefore
consent is to be found in irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what follows.
But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there were no
consent in irrational animals, there would be no act accomplished; which
is clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something,
through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But irrational
animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after
judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and
this is called the sentence," i.e. consent. But counsel is not in
irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals.
The reason of this is that consent implies an application of the
appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the
appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to the subject in
whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is an
action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that it touch the
stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick. But
irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for
this is in them through natural instinct. Hence in the irrational animal,
there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not apply that
movement to some particular thing. And hence it is that the irrational
animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to the rational
nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to
apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to
a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent implies a
determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If the first be removed, then what follows is removed,
provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only. But if
something can follow from several things, it is not removed by the fact
that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect of heat and
of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen water is
hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not follow that
there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an act follows not only
from consent, but also from the impulse of the appetite, such as is found
in irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The man who acts through passion is able not to follow the
passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. Hence the
comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because that
on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But it is on
account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still more do
we consent to the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as the
act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man consents to
his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above (Q[13],
A[1]). If therefore consent were only directed to the means it would
nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be false by the
authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after the
approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes the choice." Therefore
consent is not only directed to the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the
"sentence," i.e. the consent, takes place "when a man approves and
embraces the judgment of his counsel." But counsel is only about the
means. Therefore the same applies to consent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to
something that is already in the power of him who causes the application.
Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the
end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then
the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to the last end
naturally: wherefore the application of the appetitive movement to the
apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of simple volition.
But as to those things which come under consideration after the last end,
in so far as they are directed to the end, they come under counsel: and
so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as the appetitive movement
is applied to the judgment resulting from counsel. But the appetitive
movement to the end is not applied to counsel: rather is counsel applied
to it, because counsel presupposes the desire of the end. On the other
hand, the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel. And
therefore the application of the appetitive movement to counsel's
decision is consent, properly speaking. Consequently, since counsel is
only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but
the means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles
is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science, but
something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on
account of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but
something greater, namely, volition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the end
of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he consents to that
act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a
certain relation to something to which something else is preferred: and
therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen
that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the
end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been
given to each: but after approving of many, we have given our preference
to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with approval, then consent
and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at
them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that
thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet
with our approval.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to
the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and perfects it, just as
beauty perfects youth" [*oion tois akmaiois he hora}--as youthful vigor
perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4). But consent to delight
belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the higher reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary. But
it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore the higher
reason is not alone in consenting to the act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the
contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine says (De
Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal, but for
temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the soul.
Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is impossible
for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty
which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining
them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest
place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long as
judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision
has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher
reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge of
sensible things; and of things pertaining to human principles we judge
according to Divine principles, which is the function of the higher
reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or
not, according to Divine principles, no judgment of the reason can be
considered in the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of
what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act
belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason
includes the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher
reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight in
thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower reason it
belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises judgment on
the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action; and in
like manner on the delight that results. But in so far as the act of
thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it belongs to the
lower reason. For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a
lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordained: hence the
art which is concerned with the end is called the master or principal art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that we
consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each power,
but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), and
from which the voluntary act is named.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The higher reason is said to consent not only because it
always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also because
it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] Out. Para. 1/1
OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether use is an act of the will?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?
(4) Of the relation of use to choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether use is an act of the will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that "to use is to refer that which is the
object of use to the obtaining of something else." But "to refer"
something to another is an act of the reason to which it belongs to
compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason and not of
the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man "goes
forward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then he makes use
(of the powers) and this is called use." But operation belongs to the
executive power; and the act of the will does not follow the act of the
executive power, on the contrary execution comes last. Therefore use is
not an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "All things that were
made were made for man's use, because reason with which man is endowed
uses all things by its judgment of them." But judgment of things created
by God belongs to the speculative reason; which seems to be altogether
distinct from the will, which is the principle of human acts. Therefore
use is not an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "To use is to apply to
something to purpose of the will."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The use of a thing implies the application of that thing
to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is called
its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of a stick is to
strike. Now we apply to an operation not only the interior principles of
action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the body; as the
intellect, to understand; and the eye, to see; but also external things,
as a stick, to strike. But it is evident that we do not apply external
things to an operation save through the interior principles which are
either the powers of the soul, or the habits of those powers, or the
organs which are parts of the body. Now it has been shown above (Q[9],
A[1]) that it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts,
and this is to apply them to operation. Hence it is evident that first
and principally use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as
directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which
powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the
instruments are compared to the principal agent. Now action is properly
ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building
is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools. Hence it is evident that
use is, properly speaking, an act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the will
tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else. And in
this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to the
executive powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the
act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative reason is
said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the
other powers.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational animals. For
it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine says (De Trin.
x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something else which we are
to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be found in irrational animals, as stated
above (Q[11], A[2]). Much more, therefore, is it possible for them to use.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But
irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance, their
feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for
irrational animals to use.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a rational
animal can make use of a thing."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, as stated above (A[1]), to use is to apply an active
principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive movement
to the desire of something, as stated above (Q[15], AA[1],2,3). Now he
alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to something else;
and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to something
else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none but a rational
animal consents and uses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to
the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite to
something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and
enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use;
because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is
appetible only as directed to something else. But if we compare them in
respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excellence
is required on the part of use: because to direct one thing to another is
an act of reason; whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the
competency even of sense.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Animals by means of their members do something from natural
instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members to these
operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their members
to action, nor do they use them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether use regards also the last end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys, uses." But man enjoys
the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "to use is to apply something to the purpose of the
will" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything else, is the
object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object of use.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "Eternity is in the
Father, Likeness in the Image," i.e. in the Son, "Use in the Gift," i.e.
in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the last end.
Therefore the last end can be the object of use.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses
God, but one enjoys Him." But God alone is the last end. Therefore we
cannot use the last end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Use, as stated above (A[1]), implies the application of
one thing to another. Now that which is applied to another is regarded in
the light of means to an end; and consequently use always regards the
means. For this reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said
to be "useful"; in fact their very usefulness is sometimes called use.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two
ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual. For since the
end, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[2], A[7]), signifies sometimes the
thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing
(thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of it); it is
evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself; for the
possession of money is good only inasmuch as there is some good in money.
But in regard to the individual, the obtaining of money is the last end;
for the miser would not seek for money, save that he might have it.
Therefore, simply and properly speaking, a man enjoys money, because he
places his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he
is said to use it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so far as it
implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks in that
end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the
will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, which is the
enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the means
are applied to the will's purpose, not only in being used as means, but
as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to rest in
the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be said to
use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that "this love, delight, felicity, or
happiness, is called use by him."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether use precedes choice?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing follows after
choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to the will, precedes
execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the less
relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two relations:
one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other, of the thing
chosen, in respect of that to which it is preferred; whereas use implies
relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it removes
them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above (Q[9], A[3]).
Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act. But it does this
when it consents. Therefore there is use in consent. But consent precedes
choice as stated above (Q[15], A[3], ad 3). Therefore use does also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "the will
after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses
(the powers)." Therefore use follows choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed. One,
according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing subject, by a
kind of proportion or order to the thing willed. Wherefore those things
that are naturally proportionate to a certain end, are said to desire
that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is to have it imperfectly.
Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection. And therefore both the
natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have the end in reality; and
this is to have it perfectly. This is the second relation of the will to
the thing willed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the
last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means, is
choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing the
means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second relation of
the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing
willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; provided that by
use we mean the will's use of the executive power in moving it. But since
the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we may take the
use of the means, as consisting in the consideration of the reason,
whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The motion of the will to the execution of the work,
precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use belongs to that
very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: What is essentially relative is after the absolute; but the
thing to which relation is referred need not come after. Indeed, the more
a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has relation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the same
object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the choice of
another. And since the acts of the will react on one another, in each act
of the will we can find both consent and choice and use; so that we may
say that the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses
itself in consenting and choosing. And such acts as are ordained to that
which precedes, precede also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head
there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
(3) Of the order between command and use
(4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?
(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?
(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
(9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the
will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna says that there
are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, and
by counselling." But it belongs to the will to move all the other powers
of the soul, as stated above (Q[9], A[1]). Therefore command is an act of
the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is
subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most free.
But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command
belongs to the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of the
reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a thing
should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act
of the reason, but of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] and the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appetite obeys reason."
Therefore command is an act of the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however, an
act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since the acts
of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one another, in
so far as the reason reasons about willing, and the will wills to reason,
the result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will,
and conversely. And since the power of the preceding act continues in the
act that follows, it happens sometimes that there is an act of the will
in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as
we have stated in reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there
is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of an
act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the
commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of intimation
or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of
the reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare something in two ways.
First, absolutely: and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the
indicative mood, as when one person says to another: "This is what you
should do." Sometimes, however, the reason intimates something to a man
by moving him thereto; and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the
imperative mood; as when it is said to someone: "Do this." Now the first
mover, among the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will,
as stated above (Q[9], A[1]). Since therefore the second mover does not
move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact
that the reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will.
Consequently it follows that command is an act of the reason,
presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its
command, moves (the power) to the execution of the act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating and
declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but
it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards
various objects, precisely because the reason can have various
perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will as being "a
free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason is the root of
liberty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument proves that command is an act of reason not
absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals.
Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement is the
appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles and
nerves." But both powers are in irrational animals. Therefore command is
to be found in irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives
commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to his master,
as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is commanded by
the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are composed of soul and
body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action.
But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found in
irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Command is an act of reason, as stated above (A[1]).
But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore, is
there command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do
something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the proper
act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational animals should
command in any way, since they are devoid of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The appetitive power is said to command movement, in so far
as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In irrational
animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a commanding
faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey; but
its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent to
direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and commanded;
but only of mover and moved.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise than
in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the directing
reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other hand, the
impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural instinct; because as
soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appetite is
moved naturally to pursue or to avoid. Wherefore they are directed by
another to act; and they themselves do not direct themselves to act.
Consequently in them is impulse but not command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether use precedes command?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an act of
the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above (A[1]). But,
as we have already shown (Q[16], A[1]), use is an act of the will.
Therefore use precedes command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to the
end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end. Therefore
it seems that use precedes command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called use;
because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q[16], A[1]).
But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as stated above
(A[1]). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the common precedes the
proper. Therefore use precedes command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to
action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.
Therefore command precedes use.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it
is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as stated
above (Q[16], A[4]). Wherefore still more does it precede command. On the
other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is
subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user
is united to the act of the thing used; for one does not use a stick
before doing something with the stick. But command is not simultaneous
with the act of the thing to which the command is given: for it naturally
precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time.
Consequently it is evident that command precedes use.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every act of the will precedes this act of the reason
which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. choice; and an
act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after counsel's decision,
which is reason's judgment, the will chooses; and after choice, the
reason commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then,
last of all, someone's will begins to use, by executing the command of
reason; sometimes it is another's will, when one commands another;
sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to
do something.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank
before the act. Now the object of use is that which is directed to the
end. Consequently, from the fact that command precedes, rather than that
it follows use.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as the act of the will in using the reason for the
purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say that this
act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a command of reason;
since the acts of these powers react on one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command
itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves distinct. But the
commanded act belongs to one power, and the command to another; since one
is the power that commands, and the other is the power that receives the
command. Therefore the commanded act is not one with the command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever things can be separate from one another, are
distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes the commanded
act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command is given, and
the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a distinct act from
the act commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever things are related to one another as precedent
and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes the
commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where one
thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But there is no
commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one
respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one in
some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is to
be observed in this, that some are simply many, and one in a particular
aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now "one" is predicated in
the same way as "being." And substance is being simply, whereas accident
or being "of reason" is a being only in a certain respect. Wherefore
those things that are one in substance are one simply, though many in a
certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance, the whole composed of its
integral or essential parts, is one simply: because the whole is being
and substance simply, and the parts are being and substances in the
whole. But those things which are distinct in substance, and one
according to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain
respect: thus many men are one people, and many stones are one heap;
which is unity of composition or order. In like manner also many
individuals that are one in genus or species are many simply, and one in
a certain respect: since to be one in genus or species is to be one
according to the consideration of the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of
matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though he has many
parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a
lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher
power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power
moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as the form in
regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident that command and
the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is one, yet in its
parts, many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another,
their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the
other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the mover
and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The fact that command and the commanded act can be
separated from one another shows that they are different parts. Because
the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet they form
one whole.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In those things that are many in parts, but one as a whole,
nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the soul, in a way,
precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of the will is commanded?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded. For
Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind to will,
and yet it does not." But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the
act of the will is not commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can understand
the command. But the will cannot understand the command; for the will
differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore
the act of the will is not commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same reason
all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are commanded, we must
needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes the act
of reason commanding, as stated above (A[1]); for if that act of the will
be also commanded, this command will be precedes by another act of the
reason, and so on to infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not
possible. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command.
But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our
acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary.
Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), command is nothing else than the
act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to act. Now
it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as
it can judge it to be good to will something, so it can direct by
commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an act of the will
can be commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands
itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that sometimes it
commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly.
Now imperfect command arises from the fact that the reason is moved by
opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates
between the two, and fails to command perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as each of the members of the body works not for
itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body that
the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect
understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will
wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, in
so far as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act of the
will for himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded
which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is not due to
the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a
higher cause, as stated above (Q[9], A[4]). Therefore there is no need
to proceed to infinity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded. For
it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But it is the reason
that commands, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore the act of the reason is
not commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that which is
by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by reason, is
rational by participation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the act
of that power, which is essentially rational, is not commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to
know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always in
our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our
command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the
free-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his
free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves." Therefore the acts
of the reason can be commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs the
acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. Consequently its act
can be commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in
two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, the
act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to be
attentive, and to use one's reason. Secondly, as to the object; in
respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the
act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in
our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural
light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in our
power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of the reason is that
whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the
reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g. the
first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the
like: assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is
not subject to our command. But some things which are apprehended do not
convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to
assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on account
of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our
power, and is subject to our command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as
stated above (Q[9], A[3]), that is to say, in so far as each power
reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: On account of the diversity of objects subject to the act
of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating in itself:
thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the knowledge of the
conclusions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not
commanded. For the Apostle says (Rm. 7:15): "For I do not that good which
I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although he
wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite.
Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of
formal transmutation, as was shown in the FP, Q[65], A[4]; FP, Q[91],
A[2]; FP, Q[110], A[2]. But the act of the sensitive appetite is
accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or
cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man's
command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive appetite is
something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is not always in
our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the
act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] says:
"That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the
irascible," which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of
the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in
our power, as stated above (A[5]). Consequently in order to understand in
what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command
of reason, we must consider in what manner it is in our power. Now it
must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from the
intellective appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that the
sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas the will is
not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not
only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that
corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight,
and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a hindrance
to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive appetite depends not
only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows
apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular
apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is
universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal
active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive
appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other hand,
condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of
reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive
appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive
appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the
imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command
of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen.
Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the
irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is that
of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal supremacy,"
whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a
disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from
perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the Apostle adds
(Rm. 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of
my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement of
concupiscence, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to
the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus a man may
be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or
that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man becomes heated
through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the
command of reason: since it is due either to nature, or to some previous
movement, which cannot cease at once. But the condition that is
consequent, follows the command of reason: since it results from the
local movement of the heart, which has various movements according to the
various acts of the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since the external sensible is necessary for the
apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend anything
by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence of the
sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man can use his
senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on the part of
the organ. On the other hand, the apprehension of the imagination is
subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the strength or
weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable to imagine the
things that reason considers, is either because they cannot be imagined,
such as incorporeal things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative
power, due to some organic indisposition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to
the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of higher rank than
the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to
the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are the powers of the
vegetal soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man is called a "little world" [*Aristotle, Phys. viii.
2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world. But God is
in the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys His
command. Therefore all that is in man, even the powers of the vegetal
soul, obey the command of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as are
subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive and
generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: as
in the case of gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues. Therefore
the acts of these powers are subject to the command of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] sats
that "the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason has
no control."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from
the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires an
end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some
apprehension, as to the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the
reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that
proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded by
reason: but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite. And
such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa
(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says "that generation and nutrition belong
to what are called natural powers." Consequently the acts of the vegetal
soul are not subject to the command of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and
the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very fact that
the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank
lowest.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The comparison holds in a certain respect: because, to wit,
as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But it does not hold
in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as
God created the world; for which reason the world is wholly subject to
His command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect the acts
themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i.e. digestion, and
formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of the sensitive
part, that are ordained to the acts of generation and nutrition; for
example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the act
of generation, and the right or wrong use thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as
to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the body are more
distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the
powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above (A[8]).
Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But the
movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason: for
Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that "the pulse is
not controlled by reason." Therefore the movement of the bodily members
is not subject to the command of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that "the movement
of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired;
sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with
desire, the body remains cold." Therefore the movements of the members
are not obedient to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands a
movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can
one discern obedience from command."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers.
Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of
obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect
thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of
reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of
members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the
command of reason; whereas those movements of members, that arise from
the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The members do not move themselves, but are moved through
the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact with
the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is
according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived:
thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is
derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end
naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily
movements the principle is according to nature. Now the principle of
bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. Consequently the
movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the
will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, which follows
from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light
things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are
said to be moved by their generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys.
viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is called "vital." For which reason
Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says that, just as the
movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither
does the pulse which is a vital movement. By the pulse he means the
movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in
punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey
reason: in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion
against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is
transmitted to posterity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[17] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our
first parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the
withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we
must consider the natural cause of this particular member's insubmission
to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says
that "the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are
involuntary," and that the reason of this is as follows. These members
are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the
intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of
the soul, of which passions these movements are a consequence. But they
are not moved at the command of the reason or intellect, because these
movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold,
which change is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case
with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were a
separate animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the
principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the
senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue,
which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have their proper
movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated
above (Reply OBJ 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] Out. Para. 1/3
OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (ELEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a human
act is good or evil; secondly, what results from the good or evil of a
human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] Out. Para. 2/3
Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first
will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general; the second, of
the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good and evil of
external acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] Out. Para. 3/3
Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?
(2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its
object?
(3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?
(4) Whether it is derived from the end?
(5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?
(6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?
(7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the
species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
(8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
(9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent?
(10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good
or evil?
(11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse,
places the moral action in the species of good or evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every human action is good, and that none is
evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not, save in
virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the good. Therefore
no action is evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a
thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its
potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is
perfected by act, it is good, as stated in Metaph. ix, 9. Therefore
nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is good.
Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as Dionysius
declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect which is proper
to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 3:20): "Every one that doth evil,
hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and
evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it
produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being: since
good and being are convertible, as was stated in the FP, Q[5], AA[1],3.
But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a certain unity:
whereas every other thing has its proper fulness of being in a certain
multiplicity. Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have being
in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to
them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and
body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement:
wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in
something due to the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has of
being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in
goodness, and is said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of
goodness inasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight.
That, however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said
to be either evil or good. But since this same fulness of being is of the
very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of being,
it is not said to be good simply, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as
it is a being; although it can be called a being simply, and a non-being
in a certain respect, as was stated in the FP, Q[5], A[1], ad 1. We must
therefore say that every action has goodness, in so far as it has being;
whereas it is lacking in goodness, in so far as it is lacking in
something that is due to its fulness of being; and thus it is said to be
evil: for instance if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its
due place, or something of the kind.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there
were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility
of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be
no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good, which is good
in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain
respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in act,
so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of
walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of
sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the
goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human
generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not
inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not derived
from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But "evil is
not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human action is
not derived from their object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object is compared to the action as its matter. But
the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather from the form,
which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from
their object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the object of an active power is compared to the action
as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not depend on its
effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is
not derived from their object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 9:10): "They became abominable as
those things which they loved." Now man becomes abominable to God on
account of the malice of his action. Therefore the malice of his action
is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies to
the goodness of his action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, as stated above (A[1]) the good or evil of an action, as
of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack of that
fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness of being seems
to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing
has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its
object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as the primary
goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its
species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its
suitable object: hence some call such an action "good in its genus"; for
instance, "to make use of what is one's own." And just as, in natural
things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does not realize its
specific form (for instance, if instead of a man, something else be
generated); so the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from
the object, for instance, "to take what belongs to another." And this
action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus here standing for
species, just as we apply the term "mankind" to the whole human species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although external things are good in themselves,
nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that
action. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such
actions, they have not the quality of goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The object is not the matter "of which" (a thing is made),
but the matter "about which" (something is done); and stands in relation
to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The object of the human action is not always the object of
an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way, passive; in so
far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle of
human actions. Nor again have the objects of the active powers always the
nature of an effect, but only when they are already transformed: thus
food when transformed is the effect of the nutritive power; whereas food
before being transformed stands in relation to the nutritive power as the
matter about which it exercises its operation. Now since the object is in
some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term
of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species,
since movement derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the
goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an
action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good
effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is
the measure of its goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a
circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action, as
being outside it, as stated above (Q[7], A[1]). But "good and evil are in
things themselves," as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4. Therefore an action
does not derive goodness or malice from a circumstance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered
principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are
accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art:
because "no art takes notice of what is accidental" (Metaph. vi, 2).
Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a
circumstance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its
substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But good and
evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an action
can be good or evil in its genus as stated above (A[2]). Therefore an
action is not good or bad from a circumstance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous man
acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the other
circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in the
matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or where he should not, and
so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions are good or
evil according to circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole
fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial
form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from
supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and
if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the
result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does not
consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which accrue
to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances.
Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance
the action will be evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are
not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents thereof.
Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some
are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And thus it is
that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of
morals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since good and being are convertible; according as being
is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good predicated of a
thing both in respect of its essential being, and in respect of its
accidental being; and this, both in natural things and in moral actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are not
from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing acts with a
view to evil." If therefore an action were good or evil from its end, no
action would be evil. Which is clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the goodness of an action is something in the action.
But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not said to be
good or bad according to its end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end,
as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an evil
action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in
order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action is not good or
evil from its end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that "if the end
is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is
evil."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as
their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does not
depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being
absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on something
else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its
relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being of a
thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness of a thing
depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not
depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from the end.
Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on
something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on which they
depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.
First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as
much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as stated
above (A[1]). Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which
is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness from its
circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it has
goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its
goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The good in view of which one acts is not always a true
good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in
the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless due
proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to the
action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way
mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may
happen that an action which is good in its species or in its
circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an
action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since
"evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause,"
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not make a
difference of species. For the existence of good and evil in actions is
in conformity with their existence in things, as stated above (A[1]). But
good and evil do not make a specific difference in things; for a good man
is specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore neither do they make a
specific difference in actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But
non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the species, it seems
that an action is not constituted in a species through being evil.
Consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, acts that differ in species produce different effects.
But the same specific effect results from a good and from an evil action:
thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and
evil actions do not differ in species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a
circumstance, as stated above (A[3]). But since a circumstance is an
accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human actions
do not differ in species on account of their goodness or malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) "like habits
produce like actions." But a good and a bad habit differ in species, as
liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad actions differ in
species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Every action derives its species from its object, as
stated above (A[2]). Hence it follows that a difference of object causes
a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed that a
difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions,
according as the latter are referred to one active principle, which does
not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred to
another active principle. Because nothing accidental constitutes a
species, but only that which is essential; and a difference of object may
be essential in reference to one active principle, and accidental in
reference to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ
essentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to the
reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "the good of man is to
be in accordance with reason," and evil is "to be against reason." For
that is good for a thing which suits it in regard to its form; and evil,
that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore evident that
the difference of good and evil considered in reference to the object is
an essential difference in relation to reason; that is to say, according
as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions
are called human or moral, inasmuch as they proceed from the reason.
Consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the species in
human actions; since essential differences cause a difference of species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as
something is according to nature, and something against nature, diversify
the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are not of the
same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in accord with
reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral
species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting some
potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its species, not
because it has no object at all; but because it has an object in
disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's property.
Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it can
constitute the species of an evil act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason,
differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because the
other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as
compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species; and thus
they have one specific effect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential
difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify
a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms
an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would not make an action
evil, except through being repugnant to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do
not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their species
from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the object.
Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the
species of an action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the
species, as stated above (A[5]). But it is accidental to an action to be
ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from
vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to species, according
to the good and evil which are from the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the same
end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues and vices
can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken from the
end, do not diversify the species of action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It has been shown above (Q[1], A[3]) that human actions
derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in respect of
the end diversify the species of actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are
voluntary, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]). Now, in a voluntary action,
there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the will, and the
external action: and each of these actions has its object. The end is
properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object of
the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear.
Therefore just as the external action takes its species from the object
on which it bears; so the interior act of the will takes its species from
the end, as from its own proper object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that
which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses the
limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of
morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the species
of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but
materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may commit
adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The end also has the character of an object, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although it is accidental to the external action to be
ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior act
of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form to matter.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to
the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the
external actions; but unity of species on the part of the internal action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species
derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the species of goodness derived from the end
is contained under the species of goodness derived from the object, as a
species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits a
theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its species from its
object, as stated above (AA[2],6). But it is impossible for a thing to be
contained under another species, if this species be not contained under
the proper species of that thing; because the same thing cannot be
contained in different species that are not subordinate to one another.
Therefore the species which is taken from the end, is contained under the
species which is taken from the object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the last difference always constitutes the most specific
species. But the difference derived from the end seems to come after the
difference derived from the object: because the end is something last.
Therefore the species derived from the end, is contained under the
species derived from the object, as its most specific species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more formal a difference is compared to genus, as
form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more formal than
that which is derived from the object, as stated above (A[6]). Therefore
the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived
from the object, as the most specific species is contained under the
subaltern genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an
action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained to
an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an
infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived from
the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as
under its genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold
relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained
thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly,
as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take what belongs to
another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the
differences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of that
genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that genus
essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is
incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided into rational and
irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals
without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless" are not essential
determinations of the irrational being. But the following division would
be correct: "Some animals have feet, some have no feet: and of those that
have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many": because the latter
division is an essential determination of the former. Accordingly when
the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the specific difference
derived from the object is not an essential determination of the species
derived from the end, nor is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these
species is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained
under two species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say
that he that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a
twofold malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of
itself ordained to the end, one of these differences is an essential
determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be
contained under the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the
other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that the
more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the more
specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an agent
is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the more
remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it corresponds;
thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end intended by
the commander in chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment
is the end intended by one of the lower officers. From all this it
follows that the specific difference derived from the end, is more
general; and that the difference derived from an object which of itself
is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in relation to the
former. For the will, the proper object of which is the end, is the
universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper
objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: One and the same thing, considered in its substance, cannot
be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the other. But in
respect of those things which are superadded to the substance, one thing
can be contained under different species. Thus one and the same fruit, as
to its color, is contained under one species, i.e. a white thing: and, as
to its perfume, under the species of sweet-smelling things. In like
manner an action which, as to its substance, is in one natural species,
considered in respect to the moral conditions that are added to it, can
belong to two species, as stated above (Q[1], A[3], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The end is last in execution; but first in the intention of
the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Difference is compared to genus as form to matter, inasmuch
as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered as
more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something more absolute
and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of a definition are reduced
to the genus of formal cause, as is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this
sense the genus is the formal cause of the species; and so much the more
formal, as it is more universal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no action is indifferent in its species. For
evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xi).
But privation and habit are immediate contraries, according to the
Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not such thing as an
action that is indifferent in its species, as though it were between good
and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, human actions derive their species from their end or
object, as stated above (A[6]; Q[1], A[3]). But every end and every
object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is good or
evil according to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its
species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (A[1]), an action is said to be good,
when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when it lacks that
complement. But every action must needs either have the entire plenitude
of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore every action must
needs be either good or bad in its species, and none is indifferent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that
"there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a good
or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment." Therefore some
actions are indifferent according to their species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],5), every action takes its species
from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its
species from the object, in relation to the principle of human actions,
which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes
something in accord with the order of reason, it will be a good action
according to its species; for instance, to give alms to a person in want.
On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order of
reason, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to
steal, which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But it may happen
that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the
order of reason; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to
walk in the fields, and the like: and such actions are indifferent
according to their species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a result"
[privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: thus
blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life.
Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no medium in
respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in process"
[privari]: thus sickness is privation of health; not that it takes health
away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of
health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of privation leaves
something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the opposite habit.
In this way evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his
commentary on the Categories: because it does not take away all good, but
leaves some. Consequently there can be something between good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least
natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or malice, which is
considered in relation to the reason, as stated above. And it is of this
that we are here treating.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to its
species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may not contain
all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it is not
therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specifically good. Thus a
man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an individual action can be indifferent?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that an individual action can be indifferent. For
there is no species that does not, cannot, contain an individual. But an
action can be indifferent in its species, as stated above (A[8]).
Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in
Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal
disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good,
since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect
of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil belongs
to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a
specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore
an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle word
is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of
just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an evil, because
"men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of judgment" (Mt.
12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious
utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good or bad. For the
same reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no
individual action is indifferent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its
species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And the
reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (A[3]), derives
its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but
also from the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just as
something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which
does not belong to him by reason of his species. And every individual
action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at
least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the
reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be
not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to
reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due
end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good.
Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end.
Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if
it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some
act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his
hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human;
since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as
standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: For an action to be indifferent in its species can be
understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species demands
that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along this line.
But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since no object of
human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or evil, either
through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly, specific
indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far as its
species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it can be
made good or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his species is
concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a condition of his
species that he should not be black or white; but blackness or whiteness
is superadded to man by other principles than those of his species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly
speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because he hurts
none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are not hurtful
to other men. But we say here that evil, in general, is all that is
repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual action is
either good or bad, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it
belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice.
Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of his body,
it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct his body
itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to other actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or
evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral action in
the species of good or evil. For the species of an action is taken from
its object. But circumstances differ from the object. Therefore
circumstances do not give an action its species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the moral
action, as stated above (Q[7], A[1]). But an accident does not constitute
the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute a species of
good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action has
several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not place a moral
action in a species of good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action
to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy
place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be
specifically good or bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are constituted by
their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by
forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above
(A[5]). But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process
of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate form,
giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference
is possible. Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental
to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species. But
the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any
point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one
action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the
action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as the principal
condition of the object that determines the action's species. Thus to
appropriate another's property is specified by reason of the property
being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of
theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or
time, then this will be an additional circumstance. But since the reason
can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the
condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being
in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done
to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an
additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which was
first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the
principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And
in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason,
either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether
good or bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is
considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as being,
as it were, a specific difference thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does
not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when it
becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the
action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is not every circumstance that places the moral action
in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance implies
accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one action may
have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in many species.
Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several,
even disparate, moral species, as said above (A[7], ad 1; Q[1], A[3], ad
3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a
moral action in a species of good or evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every circumstance relating to good or evil,
specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences of moral
actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the goodness or
malice of a moral action, causes a specific difference, which is the same
as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes an action better or
worse, makes it differ in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to
differ in species. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action
better or worse, constitutes a species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the
character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot make
the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make a
greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil. But if it
has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason it has
a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every circumstance that
makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new species of good or
evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is caused
by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increases malice, has
a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a new species of
sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that increases goodness,
seems to add a new species of goodness: just as every unity added to a
number makes a new species of number; since the good consists in "number,
weight, and measure" (FP, Q[5], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, More and less do not change a species. But more and
less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not
every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it
in a species of good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[11] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[10]), a circumstance gives the species
of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a special
order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not
regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on
the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral
action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take something in a
large or small quantity, does not regard the order of reason in respect
of good or evil, except a certain other condition be presupposed, from
which the action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what is
taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant with
reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small
quantity, does not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can
aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good
actions. Consequently not every circumstance that makes a moral action
better or worse, changes its species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In things which can be more or less intense, the difference
of more or less does not change the species: thus by differing in
whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in
regard to its species of color. In like manner that which makes an action
to be more or less good or evil, does not make the action differ in
species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the
goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself, but
in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above.
Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness or
malice derived from this other condition of the action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[18] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of
its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something else. In
like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except
in reference to something else. And, for as much as it does, although it
may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species
of good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under
which head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject?
(2) Whether it depends on the object alone?
(3) Whether it depends on reason?
(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?
(5) Whether erring reason binds?
(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the
law of God?
(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on
the intention of the end?
(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the
degree of good or evil in the intention?
(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the
Divine Will?
(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to
be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on
the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than to what is
good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will depended on the
object, it would follow that every act of the will is good, and none bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the goodness
of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the end, but goodness
of making is never the end": because the latter is always ordained to the
thing made, as to its end. Therefore the goodness of the act of the will
does not depend on any object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be. But
the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of nature.
Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore the moral
goodness of the will does not depend on the object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is that
habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly, virtue is a
habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will is one which
is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of the will is from
the fact that a man wills that which is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences of the act of the
will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just as truth
and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided essentially by
the difference of truth and falsehood, for as much as an opinion is said
to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will are acts differing
in species. Now the specific difference in acts is according to objects,
as stated above (Q[18], A[5]). Therefore good and evil in the acts of the
will is derived properly from the objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but
sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure of good,
but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that
the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although an action can, in a certain way, be man's last
end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated above
(Q[1], A[1], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Good is presented to the will as its object by the reason:
and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the moral order,
and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because the reason is
the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above (Q[18], A[5]).
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on
the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to the will than
to any other power. But the acts of the other powers derive goodness not
only from the object but also from the end, as we have shown above (Q[18]
, A[4]). Therefore the act also of the will derives goodness not only
from the object but also from the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only from the
object but also from the circumstances, as stated above (Q[18], A[3]).
But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of
goodness and malice in the act of the will: for instance, if a man will,
when he ought, where he ought, as much as he ought, and how he ought, or
if he will as he ought not. Therefore the goodness of the will depends
not only on the object, but also on the circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will,
as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). But it would not be so, unless the goodness
or malice of the will depended on the circumstances. Therefore the
goodness and malice of the will depend on the circumstances, and not only
on the object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, An action does not take its species from the
circumstances as such, as stated above (Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good and
evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated above
(A[1]). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend, not on the
circumstances, but on the object alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more
simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first
things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one
principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions
is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness and malice
of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the goodness and
malice of other acts may depend on several things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not
something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto:
because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to
its principle. Therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on that
one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and that one
thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are accidents, as
it were, of the act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The end is the object of the will, but not of the other
powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived
from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end,
as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps
accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of the
will on another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no
circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said that a
man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, this can be
understood in two ways. First, so that this circumstance is referred to
the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed on something
good: since to will to do something when it ought not to be done, is not
to will something good. Secondly, so that the circumstance is referred to
the act of willing. And thus, it is impossible to will something good
when one ought not to, because one ought always to will what is good:
except, perhaps, accidentally, in so far as a man by willing some
particular good, is prevented from willing at the same time another good
which he ought to will at that time. And then evil results, not from his
willing that particular good, but from his not willing the other. The
same applies to the other circumstances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, in
so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to say, in
so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on
reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows. But the
good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from
what has been said above (Q[9], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the will
does not depend on reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the goodness of
the practical intellect is "a truth that is in conformity with right
desire." But right desire is a good will. Therefore the goodness of the
practical reason depends on the goodness of the will, rather than
conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved, but
vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers, as stated
above (Q[9], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will that
persists in its desires in opposition to reason." But the goodness of the
will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the goodness of the will
depends on its being subject to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2), the goodness of the will
depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed to it
by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object of the
will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will
but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to the universal
good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive appetite tends only
to the particular good, apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the
goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends on
the object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible, pertains to
the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered as true it
pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of goodness, pertaining
to the will: because the will cannot desire a good that is not previously
apprehended by reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect, in
so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this respect it
is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of
the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end:
nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of
reason a right apprehension of the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves the
will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above (Q[9],
A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend
on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule and one
measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends,
is right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on
the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured"
(Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the human
will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the
goodness of the human will depends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal law is
unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which the goodness
of our will depends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is a
deed, word or desire against the eternal law." But malice of the will is
the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to goodness, the
goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one
another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause:
since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now it is from
the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that human reason is the
rule of the human will, from which the human derives its goodness. Hence
it is written (Ps. 4:6,7): "Many say: Who showeth us good things? The
light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": as though to say:
"The light of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide our
will, in so far as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance."
It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends on
the eternal law much more than on human reason: and when human reason
fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To one thing there are not several proximate measures; but
there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing measured;
a remote measure is not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it
is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us somewhat,
either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image;
or by some sort of additional revelation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at variance
with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the human will, in
so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated above (A[4]). But
erring reason is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore erring
reason is not the rule of the human will. Therefore the will is not evil,
if it be at variance with erring reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower authority
does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority: for
instance, if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by
the emperor. But erring reason sometimes proposes what is against the
command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore
the decision of an erring reason does not bind. Consequently the will is
not evil if it be at variance with erring reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of malice.
But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not reducible to
some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason err in telling
him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to do so, cannot be
reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will is not evil when it
is at variance with erring reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, As stated in the FP, Q[79], A[13], conscience is
nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now
knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at variance with
erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil; for
it is written (Rm. 14:23): "All that is not of faith"---i.e. all that is
against conscience---"is sin." Therefore the will is evil when it is at
variance with erring reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for
it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the FP,
Q[19], A[13]), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance
with erring reason, is the same as to inquire "whether an erring
conscience binds." On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of
actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent; some are
evil generically. And they say that if reason or conscience tell us to do
something which is good generically, there is no error: and in like
manner if it tell us not to do something which is evil generically; since
it is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is
evil. On the other hand if a man's reason or conscience tells him that he
is bound by precept to do what is evil in itself; or that what is good in
itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like manner
if a man's reason or conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in
itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or
commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say, therefore, that
reason or conscience when erring in matters of indifference, either by
commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so that the will which is at
variance with that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say that
when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or
in forbidding what is good in itself and necessary for salvation, it does
not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with
erring reason or conscience is not evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that
is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on
account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will
depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its
own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as
something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will is
that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (A[3]), from the
very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will
by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not only in
indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in
themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received the character
of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can
receive the character of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the
character of goodness, on account of the reason apprehending it as such.
For instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not
tend to this good except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If,
therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to it
as to something evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills
evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil
accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like
manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for
salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is
proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as
something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it
were evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the
apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9)
that "properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow
right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not follow false
reason." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will
at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the judgment of an erring reason is not derived
from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as being true,
and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known that
the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command of
the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the command of the
proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning the command of
the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor. In like manner
if a man were to know that human reason was dictating something contrary
to God's commandment, he would not be bound to abide by reason: but then
reason would not be entirely erroneous. But when erring reason proposes
something as being commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason
is to scorn the commandment of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it apprehends
it under some species of evil; for instance, as being something contrary
to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for some such like reason.
And then that evil is reduced to that species of malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is good when it abides by erring
reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason, tends to
that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with reason, it
tends to what reason judges to be good. But the will is evil when it is
at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even when it abides
by erring reason, the will is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the
commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's
commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even
when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by erring
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring
reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring
reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with
erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma, and,
of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. Therefore the will is
good when it abides by erring reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The will of those who slew the apostles was evil. And
yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to Jn. 16:2: "The
hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a
service to God." Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by erring
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring
"whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is the same as
inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses." Now this question
depends on what has been said above about ignorance. For it was said
(Q[6], A[8]) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary,
and sometimes not. And since moral good and evil consist in action in so
far as it is voluntary, as was stated above (A[2]); it is evident that
when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the
character of moral good and evil; but not, when it does not cause the act
to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Q[6], A[8]) that when
ignorance is in any way willed, either directly or indirectly, it does
not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call that ignorance "directly"
voluntary, to which the act of the will tends: and that, "indirectly"
voluntary, which is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to
know what he ought to know, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
If then reason or conscience err with an error that is involuntary,
either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one
ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse
the will, that abides by that erring reason or conscience, from being
evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and
without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then
that error of reason or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that
erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man
that he should go to another man's wife, the will that abides by that
erring reason is evil; since this error arises from ignorance of the
Divine Law, which he is bound to know. But if a man's reason, errs in
mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right when
she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error
arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and
causes the act to be involuntary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from the
entire cause, evil from each particular defect." Consequently in order
that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices,
either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But
in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can.
Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always right,
nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity,
others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one absurdity,
others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he will
sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether he omit to do it.
Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: because he can put aside his
evil intention. In like manner, suppose a man's reason or conscience to
err through inexcusable ignorance, then evil must needs result in the
will. Nor is this man in a dilemma: because he can lay aside his error,
since his ignorance is vincible and voluntary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the
intention of the end?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on
the intention of the end. For it has been stated above (A[2]) that the
goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as regards the
means, the object of the will is one thing, and the end intended is
another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not
depend on the intention of the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a good
will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to vainglory
or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of temporal gain.
Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of
the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they
diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on the malice
of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to give
alms, has an evil will, although he intends a good end. Therefore neither
does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end intended.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards the
intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the
goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act
of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine
edn.: 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of the will
causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And
then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of
the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God's sake;
because the act of fasting is specifically good from the very fact that
it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of the will
depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated above (AA[1],2),
it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is
added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to do
something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness of
the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent intention,
except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent intention.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of willing, the
order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the
object, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an evil
intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give an alms
for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a
species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is evil. Wherefore
his will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the act of
the will, then the latter may be good: and the intention does not spoil
that act of the will which preceded, but that which is repeated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As we have already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil results from
each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause." Hence,
whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species
of good; or to the good under the species of evil, it will be evil in
either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the
good under the species of good; in other words, it must will the good for
the sake of the good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the
degree of good or evil in the intention?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on
the degree of good in the intention. Because on Mt. 12:35, "A good man
out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good,"
a gloss says: "A man does as much good as he intends." But the intention
gives goodness not only to the external action, but also to the act of
the will, as stated above (A[7]). Therefore the goodness of a man's will
is according to the goodness of his intention.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But the
goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will. Therefore a
man's will is good, according as his intention is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his
intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous intention,
he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same reason, in good
actions, the will is good in proportion to the good intended.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the will is evil.
Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the will
less good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end,
we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object, by
reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken
from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts
intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] Body Para. 2/4
If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view
of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does not depend
on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external act this
may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is ordained to the
intended end not being proportionate to that end; for instance, if a man
were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his intention, if he
intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds. Secondly, on account of
the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which
obstacles we are unable to remove: for instance, a man intends to go to
Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the
other hand, with regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in
only one way: because the interior acts of the will are in our power,
whereas the external actions are not. But the will can will an object
that is not proportionate to the intended end: and thus the will that
tends to that object considered absolutely, is not so good as the
intention. Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act
of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to
pass that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act
of the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great good
for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is
not proportionate to that good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] Body Para. 3/4
But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act,
according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the
intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the
will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form,
as is clear from what has been said above (Q[12], A[4]; Q[18], A[6]). And
yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior
or exterior act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance,
when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he
wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health
intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition of
medicine.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] Body Para. 4/4
We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or exterior
act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when a man
intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it does
not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the quantity of
goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quantity
of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it is that a man does
not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the quantity of merit
is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (Q[20]
, A[4]; Q[114], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of God, Who
considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore another gloss
says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart is the
intention, according to which God judges our works." For the goodness of
the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the goodness
of the will, which makes even the external act to be meritorious in God's
sight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of a
good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the will
evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention is evil.
But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine
will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend
on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible for man's
will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the word of
Isaias 55:9: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are My ways
exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts." If
therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the Divine
will, it would follow that it is impossible for man's will to be good.
Which is inadmissible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so does
our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge does not
require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows many things
that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will to be conformed
to the Divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action cannot
be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be conformed to His.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou
wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright and to
tend to God," as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr. in Ps.
32, serm. i.]. But the rectitude of the will is its goodness. Therefore
the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[7]), the goodness of the will depends
on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will is the
Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[3], A[1]).
Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to
the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will,
as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus is the
measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover, everything
attains to rectitude and goodness, in so far as it is in accord with its
proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be good it needs to
be conformed to the Divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as
to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human knowledge
is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth: and
human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is becoming to
the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third
Objections.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be conformed to
the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot will what we
know not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But in
many things we know not what God wills. Therefore the human will cannot
be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing willed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about to die
in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will to the
Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man
is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial piety.
But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes be contrary
to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death of a father: if
his son were to will it also, it would be against filial piety. Therefore
man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing
willed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, (1) On Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," a gloss
says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills." But
everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound
to will what God wills.
(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every
act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will, it
follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different
things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has an
evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine
will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above (AA[3],5),
the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the reason.
Now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason, so as to
appear good from one point of view, and not good from another point of
view. And therefore if a man's will wills a thing to be, according as it
appears to be good, his will is good: and the will of another man, who
wills that thing not to be, according as it appears evil, is also good.
Thus a judge has a good will, in willing a thief to be put to death,
because this is just: while the will of another---e.g. the thief's wife
or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch as killing is a
natural evil, is also good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] Body Para. 2/5
Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect;
the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more universal
the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the example given
above: because the judge has care of the common good, which is justice,
and therefore he wishes the thief's death, which has the aspect of good
in relation to the common estate; whereas the thief's wife has to
consider the private, the good of the family, and from this point of view
she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be put to death. Now the good
of the whole universe is that which is apprehended by God, Who is the
Maker and Governor of all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it
under the aspect of the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is
the good of the whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension of a
creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good,
proportionate to that nature. Now a thing may happen to be good under a
particular aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice
versa, as stated above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certain
will is good from willing something considered under a particular aspect,
which thing God wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa. And
hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in respect
of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a
particular thing to be or not to be.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] Body Para. 3/5
But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he
refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite of
each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end
that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is
directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some
particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good
materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally. Therefore the
human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which
is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and universal
good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason given
above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] Body Para. 4/5
At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to
the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is conformed to
the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed
thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it is not
conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it is
conformed to that will considered as efficient cause; since the proper
inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular apprehension of
some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its efficient cause.
Hence it is customary to say that a man's will, in this respect, is
conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what God wishes him to
will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] Body Para. 5/5
There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause,
consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God wills it. And
this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is in
respect of the last end, which is the proper object of charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For we know
that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.
Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will
conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But
we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are not
bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he
wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular
matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not
only formally, but also materially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/5
Reply OBJ 2: God does not will the damnation of a man, considered
precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as death,
because, "He wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4); but He wills such
things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to such things it
suffices for man to will the upholding of God's justice and of the
natural order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 2/5
Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 3/5
To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said
that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of the
thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms his
will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed; because the will
tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 4/5
To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act
are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the
object considered materially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[19] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 5/5
To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when
several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect:
but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect, one
man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is no question of
this here.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] Out. Para. 1/1
OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under
which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in
the external action?
(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends
on the goodness of the will?
(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as
those of the external action?
(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of
the interior act?
(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness
or malice?
(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the
external action?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior
to being in the act of the will. For the will derives goodness from its
object, as stated above (Q[19], AA[1],2). But the external action is the
object of the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to
commit a theft, or to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil are
in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since what
is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its relation to
the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated
above (Q[1], A[1], ad 2), the act of another power can be an end.
Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the
act of the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the
external action, as stated above (Q[18], A[6]). But that which is formal
is subsequent; since form is something added to matter. Therefore good
and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the
will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will
that we sin, and that we behave aright." Therefore moral good and evil
are first in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, External actions may be said to be good or bad in two
ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected
with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be
observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or
evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for vainglory
is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will's proper object, it is
evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the external action
derives from its relation to the end, is to be found first of all in the
act of the will, whence it passes to the external action. On the other
hand, the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, on
account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due
circumstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from the reason.
Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, in so
far as it comes from reason's ordination and apprehension, it is prior to
the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as
it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the
goodness of the will, which is its principle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as
it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and
ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of
the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, it
is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows in
the order of execution.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter in
the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of nature:
but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now
the will is compared to the exterior action, as its efficient cause.
Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active
cause, is the form of the exterior action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on
the goodness of the will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external
action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written (Mt. 7:18):
"A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree
bring forth good fruit." But, according to the gloss, the tree signifies
the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is impossible for the
interior act of the will to be good, and the external action evil, or
vice versa.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin
without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there will be
none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or malice of the
external action depends on the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are
differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential division
in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12). Since
therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that goodness
and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are
some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), we may consider a twofold
goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter
and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And that
which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the
will: while that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances,
depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the
will, in so far as the will tends towards it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now it must be observed, as was noted above (Q[19], A[6], ad 1), that
for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it to be
good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point only, it
must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good, both from
its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action
is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this is
not enough to make the external action good: and if the will be evil
either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act
willed, it follows that the external action is evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it must
be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed and from
the end intended.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end;
but also when he wills an evil act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the
will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from the
will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and evil is
applicable to both the interior and external act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as
those of the interior act?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior act of
the will are not the same as those of the external action. For the
principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or appetitive
power of the soul; whereas the principle of the external action is the
power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the principles of action
are different, the actions themselves are different. Moreover, it is the
action which is the subject of goodness or malice: and the same accident
cannot be in different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior
act cannot be the same as that of the external action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and renders
its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective virtue in the
commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the power
commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the goodness of the
interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct from the
goodness of the external action, which belongs to the power commanded.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since nothing
is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act is the cause of
the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as stated above
(AA[1],2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It was shown above (Q[18], A[6]) that the act of the
will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that which
results from the material and formal element is one thing. Therefore
there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[4]), the interior act of the
will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. Now it
happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several
aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it has but one. Hence
we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act is
the same as that of the external action, and sometimes not. For as we
have already said (AA[1],2), these two goodnesses or malices, of the
internal and external acts, are ordained to one another. Now it may
happen, in things that are subordinate to something else, that a thing is
good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good merely
because it procures health. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one
the goodness of health, and the other the goodness of the draught; but
one and the same. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which
is subordinate to something else, has some aspect of goodness in itself,
besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a
palatable medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good,
besides being conducive to health.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or
malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one and the
same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end, and
of the external action, which regards the end through the medium of the
act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or malice of
itself, i.e. in regard to its matter and circumstances, then the goodness
of the external action is distinct from the goodness of the will in
regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes into the
external action, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances passes
into the act of the will, as stated above (AA[1],2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument proves that the internal and external actions
are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are in that
respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order, as stated
above (Q[17], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is ordained to
the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were, of that virtue;
whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained to things directed
to the end. For this reason various virtues are necessary. But right
reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness than
the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the goodness of the reason is
participated in each virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as from
a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both: thus when a
hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the
thing heated, although it be the same specifically. But when a thing is
derived from one thing from another, according to analogy or proportion,
then it is one and the same in both: thus the healthiness which is in
medicine or urine is derived from the healthiness of the animal's body;
nor is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from health as
applied to the body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause,
and urine the sign. It is in this way that the goodness of the external
action is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz.
according to the order of one to the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the
interior act?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the external action does not add any goodness
or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xix
in Mt.): "It is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or punished for
doing evil." Now works are the witnesses of the will. Therefore God seeks
for works not on His own account, in order to know how to judge; but for
the sake of others, that all may understand how just He is. But good or
evil is to be estimated according to God's judgment rather than according
to the judgment of man. Therefore the external action adds no goodness or
malice to that of the interior act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and external
acts are one and the same, as stated above (A[3]). But increase is the
addition of one thing to another. Therefore the external action does not
add to the goodness or malice of the interior act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the entire goodness of created things does not add to
the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom. But
sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived from the
goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as stated above
(AA[1],2). Therefore neither of them adds to the goodness or malice of
the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. If
therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be added,
it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does a good
deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the external action
derives from the will tending to the end, then the external action adds
nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will in itself is
made better in good things, or worse in evil things. This, seemingly, may
happen in three ways. First in point of number; if, for instance, a man
wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in view, and does not
do it then, but afterwards wills and does it, the act of his will is
doubled and a double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly, in
point of extension: when, for instance, a man wishes to do something for
a good or an evil end, and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas another
man perseveres in the movement of the will until he accomplish it in
deed; it is evident that the will of the latter is more lasting in good
or evil, and in this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in point of
intensity: for these are certain external actions, which, in so far as
they are pleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to make the will
more intense or more remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely
the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external action
derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands in relation
to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds to the goodness
or malice of the will; because every inclination or movement is perfected
by attaining its end or reaching its term. Wherefore the will is not
perfect, unless it be such that, given the opportunity, it realizes the
operation. But if this prove impossible, as long as the will is perfect,
so as to realize the operation if it could; the lack of perfection
derived from the external action, is simply involuntary. Now just as the
involuntary deserves neither punishment nor reward in the accomplishment
of good or evil deeds, so neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if
a man through simple involuntariness fail to do good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's will is
complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the
impossibility of achievement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: This argument applies to that goodness which the external
action derives from the will as tending to the end. But the goodness
which the external action takes from its matter and circumstances, is
distinct from that which it derives from the end; but it is not distinct
from that which it has from the very act willed, to which it stands in
the relation of measure and cause, as stated above (AA[1],2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or
malice?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the consequences of the external action
increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually in
its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect from
its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a thing is
judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a virtue "makes
that which has it to be good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore the consequences
increase the goodness or malice of an action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences
resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these redound
to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1: "My dearly
beloved brethren, my joy and my crown." Therefore the consequences of an
action increase its goodness or malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault increases:
wherefore it is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure of the sin
shall the measure also of the stripes be." But the punishment is
increased on account of the consequences; for it is written (Ex. 21:29):
"But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day
before, and they warned his master, and he did not shut him up, and he
shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner
also shall be put to death." But he would not have been put to death, if
the ox, although he had not been shut up, had not killed a man. Therefore
the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by
striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does not
contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore the
consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The consequences do not make an action that was evil,
to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man
give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a
sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in like manner,
if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is not thereby
excused. Therefore the consequences of an action doe not increase its
goodness or malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not.
If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness or
malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his
action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this shows his will
to be all the more inordinate.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction.
Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the majority
of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or
malice of that action: for it is evident that an action is specifically
better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if
it is of a nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the
consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do not increase the
goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing
according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to
that which belongs to it of itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows
from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The good actions done by the hearers, result from the
preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature. Hence
they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such is his
intention.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The consequences for which that man is ordered to be
punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed to
be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This argument would prove if irregularity were the result
of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of the fact, and
of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one and the same external action can be both
good and evil. For "movement, if continuous, is one and the same" (Phys.
v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and bad: for
instance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at first
vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and the same
action can be both good and bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3), action and
passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as Christ's was; and
the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one and the same act can
be both good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of his
master, the servant's action is his master's, just as the action of a
tool is the workman's action. But it may happen that the servant's action
result from his master's good will, and is therefore good: and from the
evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore the same
action can be both good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But
good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be both
good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But
good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be both
good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as it
is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to another
genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the genus of
quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to the genus of color, if
it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing hinders an
action from being one, considered in the natural order; whereas it is not
one, considered in the moral order; and vice versa, as we have stated
above (A[3], ad 1; Q[18], A[7], ad 1). For continuous walking is one
action, considered in the natural order: but it may resolve itself into
many actions, considered in the moral order, if a change take place in
the walker's will, for the will is the principle of moral actions. If
therefore we consider one action in the moral order, it is impossible for
it to be morally both good and evil. Whereas if it be one as to natural
and not moral unity, it can be both good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This continual movement which proceeds from various
intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one in the
point of moral unity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Action and passion belong to the moral order, in so far as
they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as they are voluntary in
respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can
be in one of them while evil is in the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[20] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The action of the servant, in so far as it proceeds from
the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but only in so far
as it proceeds from the master's command. Wherefore the evil will of the
servant does not make the action evil in this respect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND
MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of
their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being
good or evil?
(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?
(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?
(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or
evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so far as
it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature" (Phys. ii, 8).
But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the order of
nature. Now things that are produced according to art and reason imitate
those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an
action is not sinful by reason of its being inordinate and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature and art,
when the end intended by nature or art is not attained. But the goodness
or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the intention of the
end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems that the malice of an
action does not make it sinful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it follows
that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false: since
punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an action is
not sinful by reason of its being evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, As shown above (Q[19], A[4]), the goodness of a human
action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently its
malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But this
is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27)
that "sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal Law."
Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good than
right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an evil:
whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain end, and
lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end is measured by
some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is the
natural force that inclines them to that end. When therefore an action
proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the natural inclination to
an end, then the action is said to be right: since the mean does not
exceed its limits, viz. the action does not swerve from the order of its
active principle to the end. But when an action strays from this
rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is the
human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When, therefore,
a human action tends to the end, according to the order of reason and of
the Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when it turns aside from
that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is evident from what
has been said (Q[19], AA[3],4) that every voluntary action that turns
aside from the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that
every good action is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it
follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being
good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result from a
sin in nature's action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the proximate end. In
the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in respect of the last
end, which is the perfection of the thing generated; but it does not fail
in respect of any proximate end whatever; since when nature works it
forms something. In like manner, the sin of the will always fails as
regards the last end intended, because no voluntary evil action can be
ordained to happiness, which is the last end: and yet it does not fail in
respect of some proximate end: intended and achieved by the will.
Wherefore also, since the very intention of this end is ordained to the
last end, this same intention may be right or sinful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its action: and
therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end,
consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment regards the
person of the sinner, as was stated in the FP, Q[48], A[5], ad 4; A[6],
ad 3.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being
good or evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise or
blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens even in
things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not
deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action
does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and,
consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it happen
in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii, 8 "it is a sin
in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the wrong
medicine." But the artist is not blamed for making something bad: because
the artist's work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad thing,
just as he lists. Therefore it seems that neither is there any reason for
blaming a moral action, in the fact that it is evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak and
incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or diminishes
guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that
"virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue
deserve censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; because
"virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good" (Ethic.
ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore a human
action deserves praise or blame, through being good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin
more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise or
blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame
means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of
his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his
power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through his will
that man has dominion over his actions, as was made clear above (Q[1],
AA[1],2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions
alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in such like actions,
evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent:
since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore, although there
be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Reason stands in different relations to the productions of
art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed to a
particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in moral
matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life. Now a
particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since therefore sin is
a departure from the order to the end, as stated above (A[1]), sin may
occur in two ways, in a production of art. First, by a departure from the
particular end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper to the
art; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while intending to
produce something good; or produce something good, while intending to
produce something bad. Secondly, by a departure from the general end of
human life: and then he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a
bad work, and does so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But
this sin is not proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently
for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the
latter he is blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where
we take into consideration the order of reason to the general end of
human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of
reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such
a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but
in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he is the
reverse."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to
man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is
good or evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or
demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of merit
or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in matters
relating to another person. But good or evil actions are not all related
to another person, for some are related to the person of the agent.
Therefore not every good or evil human action is meritorious or
demeritorious.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he
chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys what
belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs
to another. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a man does
not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or
evil purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not on
that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and the same applies
to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the
agent: while an inordinate action is his evil. Therefore a man does not
merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a good or an evil deed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): "Say to the just man that
it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked
unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to
retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according to
justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to
another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that every
individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the
whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member of a
society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the hand, hurts
the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual,
there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in his action: first, in
respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has
done good or harm; secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by
the whole of society. Now when a man ordains his action directly for the
good or evil of the whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and
above all, by the whole society; secondarily, by all the parts of
society. Whereas when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit
or disadvantage, then again is retribution owed to him, in so far as this
too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a part of society: although
retribution is not due to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or
harm of an individual, who is identical with the agent: unless,
perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so
far as man is said to be just to himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or
blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is right or
sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit or
demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards
another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not ordained to the
good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless ordained to the good
or evil of another, i.e. the community.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far as he
belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms part, he merits
or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill: just as if
he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his, in respect of
which he is bound to serve the community.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his
action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God,
according as it is good or evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not
meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated
above (A[3]), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or
harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does no good or
harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6,7): "If thou sin, what shalt
thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him?"
Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or
demeritorious in the sight of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the sight
of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument belongs
to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power
which is the principal cause of his action; hence it is written (Is.
10:15): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it? Or
shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn?" where man
while acting is evidently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits
or demerits nothing in God's sight, by good or evil deeds.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through being
ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained to God.
Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in
God's sight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 12:14): "All things that are
done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or evil." Now
judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit and
demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires merit
or demerit in God's sight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A human action, as stated above (A[3]), acquires merit or
demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by reason of
himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way, our actions,
good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God. On the part
of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end; and it is our duty to
refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above (Q[19], A[10]).
Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable to God, does not
give God the honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole
community of the universe, because in every community, he who governs the
community, cares, first of all, for the common good; wherefore it is his
business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in
the community. Now God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe,
as stated in the FP, Q[103], A[5]: and especially of rational creatures.
Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in
reference to Him: else it would follow that human actions are no business
of God's.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God in Himself neither gains nor losses anything by the
action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God, or offers
something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order
instituted by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that, at the
same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above
(Q[9], A[6], ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or
demerit in God's sight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all
that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action of his
acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that
man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: and therefore every
action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the
sight of God, as far as the action itself is concerned.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] Out. Para. 1/2
TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)
OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general;
secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things to
be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3)
Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?
(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive
part?
(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any passion is in the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because
passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of matter and
form, as stated in the FP, Q[75], A[5]. Therefore there is no passion in
the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But
the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore passion
is not in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every passion,
when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in Topic. vi, 6. But
the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:5): "When we were in the flesh,
the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members."
Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions also,
which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a
general way, according as whatever receives something is passive,
although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is
passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to be
passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper sense,
when something is received, while something else is taken away: and this
happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is unsuitable to
the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and loses sickness. At
other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be passive; because
the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in
its most proper acceptation. For a thing is said to be passive from its
being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable
to it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else.
Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a more excellent
thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and
corruption in a particular respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when
from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these
three ways it happens that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of
mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind of
passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of
something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore
passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in
so far, to wit, as the "composite" is passive. But here again we find a
difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more
of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow
is more properly a passion than joy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose
something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those things
that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying mere
reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in
potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form,
yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it is competent
to receive or to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a
kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be
passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in De
Anima i, 3.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by
transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not
found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is
corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the
soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first in any
genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and
to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is found to
be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the
appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous passion in the
apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in the apprehensive part more
than in the appetitive.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is
contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the
apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the
apprehensive part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a
corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But passion
in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily
transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive appetitive
than in the sensitive apprehensive part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement
of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of our
writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer
to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)] for instance,
disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the
Greek more accurately, call them passions." From this it is evident that
the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections
manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part.
Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather than in the
apprehensive part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As we have already stated (A[1]) the word "passion"
implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now
the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the
apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power,
an order to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says
(Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of the appetitive
power, "are in things themselves." On the other hand the apprehensive
power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason
of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or
receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that
"the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things,
but in the mind." Consequently it is evident that the nature of passion
is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive
part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite,
in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things
relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one
first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, the more intense
it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its
approach to something endowed with light in a supreme degree, to which
the nearer a thing approaches the more light it possesses. But in things
that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something
supreme, but in receding from that which is perfect; because therein
consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a
thing recedes from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and
the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which
afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect,
because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality.
Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e.
to God, there is but little potentiality and passion: while in other
things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the
apprehensive, power of the soul, passion is found less than in the other
powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active, because it
is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior
action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its
being related to things as existing in themselves: since it is through
the external action that we come into contact with things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in the FP, Q[78], A[3] the organs of the soul can
be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which
the organ receives an "intention" of the object. And this is essential to
the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the
object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of
color. But the organs are receptive of another and natural change, which
affects their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or
cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind of change is
accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the
eye be wearied through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the
intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of
the sensitive appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions
of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the
organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about
the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more
consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the
sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal organ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in
the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii)
Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not
only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens] them."
But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since its
object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in the intellectual
appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the
passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which is the
universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the
sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore passion is more
consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are to
be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive appetite: else
they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels.
Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than in the
intellectual appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing
the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite
when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of
the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]) passion is properly to be found
where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is
found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as
in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no need for
corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because
this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ. It is
therefore evident that passion is more properly in the act of the
sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this
is again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well affected
towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place without
any alteration in the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the
agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things that
are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore
although the object of the intellectual appetite has greater activity
than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is
more passive.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[22] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the
angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they signify
simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels feel no anger while
they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the
unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascribe to them also
these passions by name, because, although they have none of our weakness,
their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] Out. Para. 1/1
HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from
those of the irascible part?
(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based
on the contrariety of good and evil?
(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?
(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in
species, but not contrary to one another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those
of the irascible part?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and
concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that the
passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy or
sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore all
the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the
irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, on the words of Mt. 13:33, "The kingdom of heaven is
like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in
the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in
the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as
also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7.
Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and irascible
faculties.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to
their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible
passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions
are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species; for
instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible
are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in
the FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the
sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the
irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the
concupiscible part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species from
those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers have
different objects, as stated in the FP, Q[77], A[3], the passions of
different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much
more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties differ in
species; since a greater difference in the object is required to
diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species of
passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of
genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while
diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so
in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ
not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions regarding
different specific objects, included under the one common object of a
single power, differ as the species of that genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and
which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these
powers. For we have stated in the FP, Q[81], A[2], that the object of the
concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such,
which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity,
experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good,
or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more
than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very
good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the
object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good
or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy,
sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard
good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid,
belong to the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated in the FP, Q[81], A[2], the irascible faculty is
bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the
concupiscible power from tending towards its object, either by making
some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The
result is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible
passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are in the
irascible faculty are followed by joy and sadness which are in the
concupiscible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty,
not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; but
on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible
power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact it has a
certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of
another power tending to that good. The same applies to evil. And this
power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions
are specifically different from the irascible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the
contrariety of good and evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is
based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. For the
irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated
above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible passions is
no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred,
joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the irascible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as
movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other
contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in
Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save
that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil.
Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions
other than that of good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach and
withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now
approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the
apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" (Ethic. i,
1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul,
there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated
in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good
and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every
contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3.
Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements or
changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as
stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and withdrawal in
respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to
changes, i.e. to generation, which is a change "to being," and to
corruption, which is a change "from being." The other contrariety is
according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements:
thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is contrary to
blackening, which is movement from white to black.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul:
one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the
other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term.
In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be
found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible
passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that
the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (A[1]), is
sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot
be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing shuns good as
such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing
desires evil, as such; but all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have
the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly
every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love,
desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil,
tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in
the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good
or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty or
arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as
good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which
tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as
arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the
passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an
evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the
passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to it, as
attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil;
and this tendency is called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible
passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope
and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in
respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For
every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the
concupiscible faculty, as stated above (A[1]). But both kinds of passion
have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of
the soul has its contrary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for
its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive part. But
a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having
evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a contrary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or
withdrawal, as stated above (A[2]). But every approach has a
corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every
passion of the soul has a contrary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set
down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore
not every passion has a contrary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot
have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or
according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a
difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the
appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the
limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a
movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of
"anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is
supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary to
anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and
evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be
no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once
good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the
appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy,
which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of
anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary
thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary
to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically
different, but not contrary to one another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,
specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. For
the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the
objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this distinction
is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the
same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But
every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as stated in
Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary
to one another, do not differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or
withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every difference in
the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and
evil; or from the difference of approach and withdrawal; or from degrees
in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause
contrariety in the passions of the soul, as stated above (A[2]): whereas
the third difference does not diversify the species; else the species of
the soul's passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not possible for
passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary
to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there
are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes,
which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now,
the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first,
from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from
water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active
power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference of their
active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as if they were
natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient
to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does
three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the
patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light
body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it
has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated
body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement towards
that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its
proper place: since to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and
the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Body Para. 2/6
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a
force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first
place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain
inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this
belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is
"hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed,
it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good
beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence":
and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or
"dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to
rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion
of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is
"sorrow" or "sadness."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Body Para. 3/6
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or
inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from
the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in
respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair." In
respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring." But in
respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is no
longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above
(A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Body Para. 4/6
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are
three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy
and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible
faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has not
contrary passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Body Para. 5/6
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing
specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[23] A[4] Body Para. 6/6
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] Out. Para. 1/1
OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice
of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or
evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are
properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in accord, or
in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now the
passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive
appetite, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they have no
connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised and blamed for
moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of
the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if our
love is good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:
first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the
reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to
wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good
or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (Q[18]
, A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the
reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the
sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and
will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are
morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more,
therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called
morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from
being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man
and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are proper to
man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so
far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed
for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude their
becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to
reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is angry, is not
praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e.
according to, or against reason."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil.
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call the soul's
passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those things which the
Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases
(Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally
evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement in
accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature is
passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful
and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "the
devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is
against nature." Therefore these passions are morally evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these
passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of sins"
(Rm. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these
emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they
fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice
in good works."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from
that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are evil,
while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This
difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in
reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either
school. For the Stoics did not discern between sense and intellect; and
consequently neither between the intellectual and sensitive appetite.
Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the
movements of the will, in so far as the passions of the soul are in the
sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the
intellectual appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part
they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds the
limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc.
Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of the soul": whence he
argues that "those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are
unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we speak of those who are wanting in
sense of being "unsound."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all
the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them good,
when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled
by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De
Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the
passions, when he says that "every evil, though moderate, should be
shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing, is not
sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not
sound." For passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of the
soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the
natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more or
less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the
character of passion. But there is no need for passion to deviate always
from the order of natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to
the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they are
controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a
moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on which
depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness
of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of reason: for
Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of
doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and pity." Therefore
passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better it
is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of God, as most
dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger when they
punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the
unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better
to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so
also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion: for he sins
less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he
does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he who does with
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion of
pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating
right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven." But
nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a
passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is
evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the
goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good
altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by
passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive
appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name
of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it
belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by
reason. For since man's good is founded on reason as its root, that good
will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things
pertaining to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to
the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward members be
controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can
obey reason, as stated above (Q[17], A[7]), it belongs to the perfection
of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be
controlled by reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do
it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of moral
good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his
will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to Ps.
83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God": where by
"heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by "flesh"
the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to
the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure
the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends,
they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do
a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion
of pity. In the second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First,
by way of redundance: because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul
is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that
movement: and thus the passion that results in consequence, in the
sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so
indicates greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to
wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a
passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the
sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness
of an action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor
again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the right
ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of
reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the ways
mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a
sign of its being more grievous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally
according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on reason.
But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with
reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing accidental
belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or evil
according to its species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their object.
If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its species,
it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are
specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that those passions,
the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and
sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil
according to its species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found
in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no passion of
the soul is good or evil according to its species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind
of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty
is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil
according to their species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been
said in regard to acts (Q[18], AA[5],6; Q[20], A[1])---viz. that the
species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from
two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral
good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion.
Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and
controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the
species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends,
is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the
case of "shame" which is base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for
another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the
external act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the passions in their natural
species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself. But
in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason
are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but
essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if
they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if they turn
away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions
which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to evil, are
themselves evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[24] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey
reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative
power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a
certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions;
(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;
(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;
(4) The four principal passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or
vice versa?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their
objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good,
which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions seem
to precede the concupiscible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the
irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that
which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; FP, Q[81], A[2]
). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii,
4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and
sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it
produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore the
concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good,
while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult,
good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good,
it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity
than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we find
something relating to movement---e.g. desire; and something belonging to
repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible passions there is
nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement.
The reason of this is that when we find rest in a thing, we no longer
look upon it as something difficult or arduous; whereas such is the
object of the irascible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of
intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we compare
the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions
that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of execution,
the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the
concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it,
according to the Apostle (Rm. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope." But the
concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes
between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we become
sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes
the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that
results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked
upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man
has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of
the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting
rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions
that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take precedence:
because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of
the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds the
aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible
faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising
of the spirits to the realization of the arduous good. In like manner
fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on
account of difficulty in shunning the evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those
concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and
those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is
therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and
terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object of the
concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as the
formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But
because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it
naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes
the proper.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an
accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly
related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the
obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.
Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those
concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads to the
same conclusion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible
passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence,
which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their
chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence
of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and
binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or
desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired.
Therefore desire precedes love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes
the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii,
3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the
first of the concupiscible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the
passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object,
is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the
first of the concupiscible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible
faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of
good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are
naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is to say,
each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the
reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the
order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the
order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order
of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the
first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that
tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has,
in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing
tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end;
thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very
aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is
complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or
concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this
order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the
order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended
causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which
enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated
above (Q[11], A[3], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs
of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most
cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the
beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is
desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are
more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of
all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this
reason the power is named after it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real
union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union
belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an
affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as
one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an
inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union.
This union precedes the movement of desire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the
order of intention.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible
passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. Since,
therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic" (cf. A[2],
OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something
arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary evil
that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil
actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to
obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a
present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to be a stronger
passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And consequently it seems
that hope does not precede them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of
withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and despair imply
withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards
something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it
precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the
passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible
faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]) all irascible passions imply
movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty
towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or
proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose
object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter
of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as
stated above (Q[23], AA[3],4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the
passion of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude
to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all
the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And
among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement
arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good,
viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil,
viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a
movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that
hope tends to good directly; whereas despair is a movement away from
good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in
respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is
accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement
from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede
fear and daring is evident from this---that as the desire of good is the
reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and
daring: because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises
from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no
one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself,
as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it
is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of
generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; hope
and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and
last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as stated in
Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion;
hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as
may be gathered from what has been stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect
from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest
than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason
for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more
directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger
regards something more arduous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly
towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from evil
results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in
proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature,
which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which
removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and
fear?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four
principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] sqq.) omits
hope and puts desire in its place.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul:
the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. The
principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of
intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions, will
be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation,
and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy and sadness,
hope and fear should in no way be called the four principal passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by
despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned as
principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from
being akin to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four
principal passions, says:
� "Banish joys: banish fears:
Away with hope: away with tears."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions.
Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in
them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they
arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and
hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply,
but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite
towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes
forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins
in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary
to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the
future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something
present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present
evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future,
they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that
these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions;
and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the
appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in
so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: These are called principal passions, in the order of
intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last
passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend
towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any further
except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a
principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be a
principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply OBJ 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[25] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it
were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and this too
is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because
that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither
can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] Out. Para. 1/3
OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the
passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the irascible
faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] Out. Para. 2/3
The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall
consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and
sadness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] Out. Para. 3/3
Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2)
The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
(2) Whether love is a passion?
(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?
(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love
of concupiscence?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it
is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have
sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part
of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not
apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible
power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the object
beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is
contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness."
But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which
is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power. Therefore we
must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love." But
natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which belong
to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible
power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in
the concupiscible power."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good
is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference
of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension
existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other: and this
is called the "natural appetite." Because natural things seek what is
suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an apprehension
which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature, as stated in the
FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2; FP, Q[103], A[1], ad 1,3. And there is another
appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but
from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals,
the "sensitive appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share of
liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite
following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite.
And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the
"will."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the
principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the
principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness
with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love": thus
the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its
weight and may be called "natural love." In like manner the aptitude of
the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its
very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or
"rational love." So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite,
just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs
to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not
under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible
faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness,
not essentially but causally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul,
but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and
universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
"Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; since each single thing
has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love is a passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a
passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore love is not a passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De
Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but rather a
relation. Therefore love is not a passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a
movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; for this
is desire, of which movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not
a passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a
passion."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a
natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the first
place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that
results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body both
weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being
the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural to that body
by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called "natural love." In the
same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain
adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and
from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the
appetitive movement is circular," as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because
the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were,
into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of
the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began.
Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible
object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that
object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same
object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is
"joy." Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the
appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion:
properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a
wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or action,
Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement
in the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the
complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which
he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear
that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result
of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div.
Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work
of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite
in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement
whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have
complacency therein.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love is the same as dilection?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is to twice two,
and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines." But
these have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection denote the same
thing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their
objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. Therefore
these are the same.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is
chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love to evil
things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either
good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do not differ: thus
indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "it is not one thing
to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have
held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing:
viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, however, in
this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5),
"is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" are expressed by way of
act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either way.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider
signification than the others, since every dilection or charity is love,
but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a
choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes: and
therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the
will, and only in the rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to
love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that which is loved is
held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to the
Latin "carus" (dear)].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as
they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same as
dilection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The object of love is more general than the object of
dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil,
but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same as
dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the
passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that "a right will is
well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love." However, the
fact that love, which is concupiscible passion, inclines many to evil, is
the reason why some assigned the difference spoken of.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The reason why some held that, even when applied to the
will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than
"dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as
it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the
judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love,
being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be
drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature of dilection,
as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of
concupiscence?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of
friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, while
friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5).
But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions. Therefore love
is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same
division; for man is not a member of the same division as "animal." But
concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a passion
distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a division of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) friendship
is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that which is
founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on "goodness." But
useful and pleasant friendship are not without concupiscence. Therefore
concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because we desire
them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness which
he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for
wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. Therefore love of
concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to
wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency:
towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another)
and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, man has love
of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of
friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary:
since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and
for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence,
is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as
that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in
another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being,
the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is
another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a
thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the
love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is
relative love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but
into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is,
properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire,
what we wish for ourselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man
does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character
of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his
own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or
pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses
the character to true friendship.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?
(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?
(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether good is the only cause of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For good
does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens that evil
also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: "He that loveth iniquity, hateth
his own soul": else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the
only cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those
who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil is the cause
of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" only
but also "the beautiful is beloved by all."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good
alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[26], A[1]), Love belongs to the
appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands
in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the
cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love
is the good; because, as stated above (Q[26], AA[1],2), love implies a
certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved,
and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate
to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that
is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered as
being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends
to that which is not simply a true good. It is in this way that man
"loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained;
pleasure, for instance, or money, or such like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for
their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good thing to
acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or
hypocrisy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in
aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that
which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which
calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently those senses
chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight
and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights
and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other
senses, we do not use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of
beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty
adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good"
means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is
something pleasant to apprehend.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is
due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought without
being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the
same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 35), if we knew
them we should have them, and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge
is not the cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something
more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they are known:
thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in
Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no
love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is love, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all
things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love
what he does not know."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), good is the cause of love, as
being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as
apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension of the good
that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says
that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner
the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of
spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same
reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge
thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either in
a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it
commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But to have it is not to
know it thus, but to know it perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that
is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs to the
reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are
united, and to unite together, after a fashion, things that are distinct,
by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge
requires that man should know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as
its parts, powers, and properties. On the other hand, love is in the
appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it
suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as
it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more
than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being
perfectly known. This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which
some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for
instance, they know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to
persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies
to the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a
kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, but
in Him Who created their nature, as stated above (Q[26], A[1]; cf. FP,
Q[6], A[1], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether likeness is a cause of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same
thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the cause of
hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that "among the proud there are
always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that
"potters quarrel with one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of
love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves in
another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an actor, but
would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness were
the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another,
that which he possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore
likeness is not a cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it
not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches. But in so
far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not
only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those
who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain their
friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not
a cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its
like."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it
must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind of
likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for
example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be
alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially
and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has actually: thus
we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper place is like
another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according
as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since act is contained,
in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or
well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it were,
one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men
are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men are one thing
in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one
with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of
likeness causes love of concupiscence, or friendship founded on
usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has
the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if it
be a sentient and cognitive being.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Now it has been stated above (Q[26], A[4]), that in the love of
concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing
the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than another:
because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is
one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's
likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him
from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for
being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is
why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one another's
gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they
hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in
himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the latter
is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves
in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good writer, we can see
a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming
to him in respect of his art.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he
loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act,
the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he expects
from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is
constant in his friendship as compared to one who is inconstant. For in
either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say
that although not all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet
they have them according to certain seminal principles in the reason, in
force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous
man, as being in conformity with his own natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love.
For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved for the
sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore
another passion is a cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire
to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship based on
usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no hope of
getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at all, even if we
see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that does not
presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion of
the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something.
Now every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from
some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist.
Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be
universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other
passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the
cause of another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his
love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in
its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that
which is loved in some way.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing.
But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's being loved;
thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he
receives it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[27] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of pleasure,
because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because hope
strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we
have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is
loved.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether union is an effect of love?
(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?
(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?
(6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether union is an effect of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is
incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for the
Apostle says (Gal. 4:18): "Be zealous for that which is good in a good
thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), "and not only
when I am present with you." Therefore union is not an effect of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is
united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the whole, or to
another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in
genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause union of essence;
else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other
hand, love does not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it,
as stated above (Q[27], A[3]). Therefore union is not an effect of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the
intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in act
is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge
rather than of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a
"unitive love."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is
real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The
second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in
relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite
follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence
and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension
of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a
thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In
like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he
wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he
apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to
him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic.
ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his
friend: Thou half of my soul."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love
moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something
suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by
love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine
says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or
seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For
in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection,
without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite,"
he refers to real union.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to
pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of the
beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union
which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love
with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one
loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (Q[27],
A[3]). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union
is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union,
inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if
it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be
love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of
love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his
love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as
the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers
would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in
either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming
union---to live together, speak together, and be united together in other
like things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united,
through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that the
thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated
above. Consequently the union caused by love is closer than that which
is caused by knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that
the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which is in another
is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents.
Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in
the beloved and vice versa.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of
a division of the whole. But it is the function of the reason, not of the
appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united.
Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice
versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in the same
way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love,
as stated above (A[1]). Therefore it follows that the lover is always
loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore
mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:16): "He that abideth in charity
abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of God.
Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be in the
lover, and vice versa.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as
referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because,
as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover,
inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover,
according to Phil. 1:7, "For that I have you in my heart": while the
lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch
as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the
beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything
pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it
is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He
"searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God" (1 Cor. 2:10).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover,
inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing
him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in
the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with
the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the
beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause
(as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to
another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the
beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love
as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand,
the lover is in the beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love
of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence is
not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of
the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating
into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover
is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his
friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that
it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of
his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the same things, and
to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3
and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his
friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as
though he were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand,
he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on
his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be
understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return love
for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed
on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On the
other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover
penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing hinders a thing
from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus
is contained in its species, and vice versa.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of
love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement of
love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument is true of the third kind of mutual
indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy
seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result in loss of
reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love
does not cause ecstasy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him.
Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes himself
into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above
(A[1]). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to
betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always loves
the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore
ecstasy is not an effect of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love
produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through love."
Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love
is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that every love
causes ecstasy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself.
This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive power.
As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself,
when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. This may be due to
his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer
ecstasy, inasmuch as he is placed outside the connatural apprehension of
his sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to comprehend things
that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down
into a state of debasement; thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy,
when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive
power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards
something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far,
namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above
(A[2]), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other
things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of
friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a
restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is carried
out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being
satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something
outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for
himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement
remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship,
a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes and does
good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as
stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills
the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will the good of
his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he
loves another more than himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether zeal is an effect of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a
beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 3:3): "Whereas
there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But
contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect of
love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates
itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it seems an
effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with
another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of [zelare] their wives,
because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an
effect of love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there
without love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): "I had a zeal on occasion of
the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any
more than of hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a
zealot, on account of his great love for all things."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity
of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to
anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance.
Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object loved," as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove
everything that opposes it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence,
and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires
something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or
quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are
said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a
hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those who
seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though these
were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of
which it is written (Ps. 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy
[zelaveris] them that work iniquity."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good:
wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against
everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said
to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling
whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too,
a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the
best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of
God; according to 3 Kgs. 19:14: "With zeal I have been zealous for the
Lord of hosts." Again on the words of Jn. 2:17: "The zeal of Thy house
hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal,
who strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears
with it and laments it."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of
envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object of
love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the
lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this
communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But
through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot,
in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the
love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise,
properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their entirety,
can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of
truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps one may envy
another his superiority in the knowledge of it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the
object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down as an
effect of love rather than of hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor denotes a
hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: for it is
written (Cant 2:5): "Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with
apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is a wounding
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts that in
which it is: for it is written (Cant 5:6): "My soul melted when my
beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a
corruptive and a wounding passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which excess
has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius (Coel.
Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the Seraphim's love,
includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent." Moreover it is said of
love (Cant 8:6) that "its lamps are fire and flames." Therefore love is a
wounding and corruptive passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything loves
itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves it.
Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves
and perfects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[26], AA[1],2; Q[27], A[1]), love
denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now
nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it; rather,
if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to
that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby.
Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but
love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him.
Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by the love of God: but
is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to Osee 9:10: "They
became abominable, as those things which they loved."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal
element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the material
element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens
that love is hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as
it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is
exercised through the change of some bodily organ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate
effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, languor, and
fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing.
For things that are frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be hard
to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive
the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as
stated above (A[2]). Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart
is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a
softening of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for
the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present and
possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent,
two passions arise; viz. sadness at its absence, which is denoted by
"languor" (hence Cicero in De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term
"ailment" chiefly to sadness); and an intense desire to possess the
beloved, which is signified by "fervor." And these are the effects of
love considered formally, according to the relation of the appetitive
power to its object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue,
proportionate to the above, in respect of a change in the organ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love.
For love is a passion, as stated above (Q[26], A[2]). But man does not do
everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some
things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything
that a man does, is done from love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in
all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, whatever a man
does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are
superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary
causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all things are
not done from love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things,
whatever they do, they do for the love of good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated above (Q[1], A[2]
). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is
evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of
some kind.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection takes love as a passion existing in the
sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general sense,
inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love:
for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter iv of De
Divinis Nominibus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (A[5]; Q[27], A[4]) desire, sadness and
pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result
from love. Wherefore every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also
from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are
proximate causes, are not superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[28] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further
on (Q[29], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] Out. Para. 1/1
OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?
(2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?
(3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?
(4) Whether a man can hate himself?
(5) Whether a man can hate the truth?
(6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred.
For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore evil be the
object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can
be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence (2 Macc 3:1) some
are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of the
godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls [Douay:
'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object
of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable: and this is
clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and
evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different subjects.
Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love
is good, as stated above (Q[26], A[1]; Q[27], A[1]). Therefore the object
of hatred is evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension
(though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural
appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural
appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which does result from an
apprehension in the same subject, as stated above (Q[26], A[1]). Now,
with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each
thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it,
wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that
which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore,
in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a
certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as
suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is
apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable,
as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such,
bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of
love, so evil is the object of hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only
of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being,
inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to
some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another,
and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not
truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not
truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor
love of good is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable or
hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same
thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to
another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water: and in
respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being
apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love is a cause of hatred?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the
opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" (Praedic. x).
But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are
contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous.
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other.
But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the cause of
hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which
precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a
turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good.
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions
are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion of the
soul, is caused by love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), love consists in a certain
agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a
certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing,
what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees
with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it.
Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and nothing is hated, save
through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it
is that every hatred is caused by love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally
simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, or
two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while,
in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g. the species of
numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous
either really or logically; e.g. substance and accident; for substance is
in reality the cause of accident; and being is predicated of substance
before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it
is not predicated of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in
substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but
not really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of
the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are not
themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the
same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus
love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from one term
precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the case in
the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for
turning away from the other. Now the appetitive movement belongs rather
to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love
precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hatred is stronger than love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine
says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee from pain, more
than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while
desire for pleasure belongs to love. Therefore hatred is stronger than
love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is
overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into hatred.
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. But
man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on seeking what is
pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of
the whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore hatred is
stronger than love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing
except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred
and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore
love is stronger than hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its
cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above
stated (A[2]). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than
love absolutely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than
hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the
means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining
of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's movement in respect
of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two
reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For, since
the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when
once the impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as in the
moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater,
is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because
the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a second nature. For
this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved;
thus Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when
we lack what we love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of
that which is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that
which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a hatred and
a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to
different degrees of good there are different degrees of love to which
correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that
corresponds to a greater love, moves us more than a lesser love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of
pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which corresponds
flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man can hate himself?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written (Ps.
10:6): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul." But many love
iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But
sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who kills
himself. Therefore some men hate themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a man
hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But some
men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that "no man ever hated
his own flesh."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate
himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire
anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is outside
the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now to love a
man is to will good to him, as stated above (Q[26], A[4]). Consequently,
a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to
hate himself, properly speaking.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two
ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself. For it
happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular
respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil
to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to
whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it;
wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were
the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man.
And it happens that some men account themselves as being principally that
which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they
love themselves according to what they take themselves to be, while they
hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason.
And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his
own soul," but also himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend
it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, apprehend
death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness
or pain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not
for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his sickness
for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice
makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is caused by
inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for
himself more than he should.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man can hate the truth?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true,
and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither,
therefore, can he hate the truth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as stated
in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge is only of truth.
Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a
thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man can hate the truth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those
who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive for this save
truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate
it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): "Am I become your enemy
because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably
from memory, as though it were an assertion: "I am become," etc.]
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ
as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of something
desirable, while being and true are not so considered: because good is
"what all things seek." Wherefore good, as such, cannot be the object of
hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being and truth in general
cannot be the object of hatred: because disagreement is the cause of
hatred, and agreement is the cause of love; while being and truth are
common to all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or some
particular truth being an object of hatred, in so far as it is considered
as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not
incompatible with the notion of being and truth, as they are with the
notion of good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant
or hurtful to the good we love. First, according as truth is in things as
in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth,
when he wishes that what is true were not true. Secondly, according as
truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from gaining the object
loved: such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith,
that they may sin freely; in whose person it is said (Job 21:14): "We
desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." Thirdly, a particular truth is
hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is in the intellect of another
man: as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he
hates that anyone should know the truth about his sin. In this respect,
Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men "love truth when it enlightens,
they hate it when it reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First
Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence
Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, the
knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from
accomplishing one's desire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reason why we love those who are straightforward is
that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth,
considered in itself, is a desirable thing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal
hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite, which is
moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend
the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is
disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of universality
implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of
universal hatred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things,
and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the universal is in
the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it
would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a
thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first,
as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered
in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider
the universal man, and another to consider a man as man. If, therefore,
we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of
apprehension or of appetite, can attain the universal: because the
universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, on which
every sensitive power is based.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite,
can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight
is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of
universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizant by the
sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but
simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty
can regard something universally: because this thing, by reason of its
common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the
animal---for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates
the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by
something in particular: because it is caused by some action of the one
that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to
something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in general."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises
from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the
universal in both ways.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but
they apprehend something to which the character of universality is given
by abstraction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred.
But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance
with others, so as to be hateful to them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect of
universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension
or appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] Out. Para. 1/1
OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?
(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?
(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive
appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according to Wis. 6:21:
"The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the
everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have no tendency to
wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the
sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says (Rm. 7:18): "There dwelleth
not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." But desire
for God's commandments is an act of concupiscence, according to Ps.
118:20: "My soul hath coveted [concupivit] to long for thy
justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive
appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, and
not only in the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into
the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational part of
the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore concupiscence is in the
sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is
a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, as we
shall state later on (Q[31], AA[3],4): one is in the intelligible good,
which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the
senses. The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the
latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated
in a bodily organ: wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole
composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter
pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by
the Latin word "concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking,
concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible
faculty, which takes its name from it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is
sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness;
or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so
vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that the latter
also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of
the higher appetite, the result being that the body itself renders its
service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my
flesh have rejoiced in the living God."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, but
also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship in craving,
as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper
good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension. But
the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from
apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And to crave a thing
under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein
concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the
concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by their objects. But
the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the
senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence, as the Philosopher
declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion
of the concupiscible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness is
the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct from love. But
all specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore
concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there is a
specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above (Q[23], A[4]).
But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to
concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "good when
desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, it gives joy: in like
manner, the evil we apprehend makes us fear, the evil that is present
makes us sad": from which we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy,
so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the
concupiscible, but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is not
a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to pleasure,
both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty. Hence it is
distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a specific
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]; Q[23], A[1]), the good which gives
pleasure to the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty.
Hence the various concupiscible passions are distinguished according to
the differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object can arise
from the very nature of the object, or from a diversity in its active
power. The diversity, derived from the nature of the active object,
causes a material difference of passions: while the difference in regard
to its active power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect of
which the passions differ specifically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs
according as it is really present, or absent: because, according as it is
present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as
it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards it. Wherefore the
object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as, so to speak, it
attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes concupiscence,
inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to itself; and it causes
pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it makes the faculty to find rest in
itself. Accordingly, concupiscence is a passion differing "in species"
from both love and pleasure. But concupiscences of this or that
pleasurable object differ "in number."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not
absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, considered as
past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify
the species of passions, and even of the powers of the sensitive part,
which regards particular things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the passage quoted we have causal, not essential
predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect of
love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness in a wide
sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect of good to come: so
that it includes both love and hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has
no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in regard to
good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes
by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes called covetousness. For a
small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing: and
consequently every movement of the appetite in future good or evil is
called hope or fear, which regard good and evil as arduous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into those
which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence belongs to
the animal appetite, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the natural
appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. Therefore no
concupiscence is natural.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, material differences makes no difference of species, but
only numerical difference; a difference which is outside the purview of
science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they
differ only in respect of their objects; which amounts to a material
difference, which is one of number only. Therefore concupiscences should
not be divided into those that are natural and those that are not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in Phys. ii,
5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is not natural, it
must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because, since
concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sensitive appetite, and not
to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no
concupiscences which are not natural.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11)
distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), concupiscence is the craving for
pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because
it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and
the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be
natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as
suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends something as good and
suitable, and consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of
such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont to be
called "cupidity."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural
concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both is
there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in
these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) calls
them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second kind are
proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and
suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the
latter, "rational." And because different men reason differently,
therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and
acquired," i.e. in addition to those that are natural.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The same thing that is the object of the natural appetite,
may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is apprehended. And in
this way there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and the
like, which are objects of the natural appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The difference between those concupiscences that are
natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; it
is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in
the active object. Now the object of the appetite is the apprehended
good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of
apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended as suitable, either by
absolute apprehension, whence arise natural concupiscences, which the
Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension together
with deliberation, whence arise those concupiscences that are not
natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls "rational"
(Rhet. i, 11).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the
intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the
sensitive faculty, as stated in the FP, Q[78], A[4]; FP, Q[81], A[3]: so
that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite.
Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the universal reason
also, through the medium of the particular imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether concupiscence is infinite?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object
of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. But where there
is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence
cannot be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds
from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and therefore
unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and thus
there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject of
concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term.
Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever ensue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since
concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), concupiscence is twofold; one is
natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot be
actually infinite: because it is of that which nature requires; and
nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires
infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is
potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be
infinite successively; so that, for instance, after getting food, a man
may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires:
because these bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but
fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (Jn. 4:13): "Whosever
drinketh of this water, shall thirst again."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as stated
above (A[3]), it follows from the reason, and it belongs to the reason to
proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire to be rich,
not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i,
3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another infinite. Because
concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for
its own sake, e.g. health: and thus greater health is more desired, and
so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight,
that which is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand,
concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the concupiscence of
the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who
place their end in riches have an infinite concupiscence of riches;
whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life,
desire a finite measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of
life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the
concupiscence of any other things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite:
either because it is finite in reality, as being once actually desired;
or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as
infinite, since the infinite is that "from which, however much we may
take, there always remains something to be taken" (Phys. iii, 6).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain
sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears in the
addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a
certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact the universal which the
reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains
potentially an infinite number of singulars.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[30] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him
to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the realization of
each object of his concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] Out. Para. 1/2
OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things
must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of delight; (3)
Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is a passion?
(2) Whether delight is subject to time?
(3) Whether it differs from joy?
(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?
(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of
the lower;
(6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;
(7) Whether any delight is non-natural?
(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether delight is a passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De
Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and says that
"operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a
movement contrary to nature." But delight is an operation, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in Phys. iii,
3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having been moved;
for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is
delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic. x, 4,5. But
to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as
stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons
delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly
called passions, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]). Now every emotion arising
from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite:
and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the
Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and
a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature
of the thing."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural
things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this
happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur
all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at
once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural
things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming
their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this
perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive
appetite; which movement is called delight. Accordingly by saying that
delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus. By saying
that it is "an establishing in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e.
with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz.
the presence of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is "all
at once," we mean that this establishing is to be understood not as in
the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete
establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is
not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete
fact," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this
establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible
things wherein there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since
delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension
of sense, it is a passion of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second
perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is
established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight
follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed above.
Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not
its essence, but its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one,
according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite;
the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external
operation. And so, although in him who has already gained the good in
which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends
to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease,
since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards
does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a
certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the
pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains
the impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which
delight is a kind of movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those
passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily
ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a
tendency to something good, as stated above (Q[23], AA[1],4): and in this
sense delight is called a passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether delight is in time?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of
movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in
time. Therefore delight is in time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect
of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore pleasure is in
time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some
passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes
pleasure according to time."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself;
secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For
since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of
themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something
pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech
and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by
reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is
not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the
fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is
not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being
begotten: yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in
this respect, to be a man is in time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time:
for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the
movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight
therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether
unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason
of itself or accidentally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is
"the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in
potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time.
Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something
existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like,
also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is it of
itself in time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as
it is accidentally in time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Other passions have not for their object a good obtained,
as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect
in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not
to be in time.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether delight differs from joy?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because
the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But delight
and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is
altogether the same as delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the
same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore delight
and joy are altogether the same.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is
equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness
from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But
this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ from delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas
we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of
delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are
natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above
(Q[30], A[3]), so also some delights are natural, and some are not
natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory
of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of
the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the same. For we take
delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them,
and in those things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not
speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do not ascribe
joy to irrational animals, but only delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned
desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be the
object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And
yet everything is not always the object of joy; since sometimes one feels
a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to
reason. And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an
apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to
diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also
called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called
otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to
concupiscences (Q[30], A[3], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also:
so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds to
desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence
there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of
movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: These other names pertaining to delight are derived from
the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from the
"dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is
derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which appear outwardly
in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and
"cheerfulness" is so called from certain special signs and effects of
gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ
them save in speaking of rational beings.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite.
Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is a sensible
movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power.
Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the
sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals.
Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have in common
with irrational animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." But
the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual
appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), a certain delight arises from the
apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not
only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some
particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the
will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that
delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that
delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily
transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing
but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the
things we wish."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word
"sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For he
says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is
also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." Or we may say
that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking,
when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the
intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus it is
also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14)
that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of
De Coel. Hier., that "the angels are not susceptible to our passible
delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of incorruption."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb
animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De
Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights."
Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite, which we
have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite,
which we have in common with the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and
intellectual pleasures?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than
spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek some pleasure,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible
pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily
pleasures are greater.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But
bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state of the
body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily
pleasures are greater.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by
reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check spiritual
pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:103): "How sweet are Thy words
to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation
of wisdom."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), pleasure arises from union with a
suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul,
especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that,
since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections
of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because
actions which pass into outward matter, are actions and perfections
rather of the matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by
the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid
actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain
good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from
them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures,
according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive
and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are
much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight in
knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by
perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more
perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects on
its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more
beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight
rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived
thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible
bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking, spiritual
pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the
three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into
conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself.
For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a
sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures,
rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise
the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the
sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect
and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward
accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence;
for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect,
because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement,
which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived
all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other part
is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures
of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are
without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once.
More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and
soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more
vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more
known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible
pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are
accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur
in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the
superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are
sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs
arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs
of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than
spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state
farther on (Q[35], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because
sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because
men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and
since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to
the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures,
inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty
which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and
checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is
itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by
the other senses?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than
the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest pleasure
seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the
pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tobias 5:12:
"What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the
light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded by the sight is the
greatest of sensible pleasures.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is loved
most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be
afforded by sight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the
pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such
friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the
greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[25], A[2], ad 1; Q[27], A[4], ad 1),
everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as stated in
Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for the purpose of
knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses
afford pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper to man to
apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former
pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are
proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved for their
usefulness, are common to all animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of
knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than
any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure
which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure is afforded
by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their
relation to the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible
objects of touch bear the closest relation to this usefulness: for the
touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal,
namely, of things hot and cold and the like. Wherefore in this respect,
the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the
end. For this reason, too, other animals which do not experience sensible
pleasure save by reason of usefulness, derive no pleasure from the other
senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for
dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . .
nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring
it" (Ethic. iii, 10).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of
usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in respect of
knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the
pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the pleasure of
sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible
pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that which is natural
is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the touch that the
natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union, and the
like, are ordained. If, however, we consider the pleasures of sight,
inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of sight
are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are greater than
sensible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Joy, as stated above (A[3]), denotes pleasure of the soul;
and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure belongs
principally to the touch.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge, because
it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the same passage
(Metaph. i, 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in
another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, is
the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant:
whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a movement has its
beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives
an impression of its image, which entices him to love it and to seek its
delight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any pleasure is not natural?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to
the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But the appetite of a
natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither,
therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, which is pleasure, be
elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is
non-natural.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is
violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which is
unnatural can give pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature, if
perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the Philosopher's
definition quoted above (A[1]). But it is natural to every thing to be
established in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural
end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things
are pleasant "not from nature but from disease."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord
with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken
in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal
part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific
nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to man,
which are derived from things pertaining to man in respect of his reason:
for instance, it is natural to man to take pleasure in contemplating the
truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken
as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that which is common to man
and other animals, especially that part of man which does not obey
reason. And in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the
body, either as regards the individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the
like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to
afford man natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, we find some
that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some
respect. For it happens in an individual that some one of the natural
principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is
contrary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this
individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat.
Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man,
either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preservation of the body,
becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of there being some
corruption of nature in him. And this corruption may be either on the
part of the body---from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever,
sweet things seem bitter, and vice versa---or from an evil temperament;
thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on the
part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or
in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, or other such things,
which are not in accord with human nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the answers to the objections.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another.
Because the passions of the soul derive their species and contrariety
from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since
therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to evil,
and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one pleasure
is not contrary to another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in
Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is
not contrary to pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only on
account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. But this
difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as
stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety between one
pleasure and another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one another are
contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures
impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures
are contrary to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
repose in natural bodies, as stated above (Q[23], A[4]). Now one repose
is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini;
thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place"
(Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one
pleasure is contrary to another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of good
and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may be
contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another
virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one good from being contrary
to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation
to fire, the latter, in relation to water. And in this way one pleasure
can be contrary to another. That this is impossible with regard to the
good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on
fittingness in relation to some one thing---i.e. the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and
connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; because
its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the place of
violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural
repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body, and to the
natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore pleasure is
contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the
objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal
difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because
difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in acts and
passions, as stated above (Q[23], AA[1],4; Q[30], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?
(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?
(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of
pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "pleasure consists
in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is requisite for
pleasure, as stated above (Q[31], A[1]). But the objects of operations
are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore operation is not
the proper cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since it
is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an operation,
but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore operation is not
the proper and direct cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and
they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is not
the proper cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that
"pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[31], A[1]), two things are requisite
for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good, and knowledge
of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a kind of operation:
because actual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the
suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover, the proper operation
itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every pleasure must needs be the
result of some operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable save inasmuch
as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when we take
pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some other
way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes pleasure in knowing
that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like; which would not
be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as possessed. For as the
Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take great pleasure in looking
upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for
ourselves." Now to have such like things is nothing else but to use them
or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation. Wherefore
it is evident that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its
cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an
operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as
possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are
proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is
finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain
measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. And
in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to repose,
are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results from labor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure. Because,
as stated above (Q[31], A[1]), the good which is obtained and is actually
possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with generation, but with
the operation of a thing already in existence. Now that which is being
moved towards something has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being
generated in its regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united
to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement is not
a cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our
works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are not
pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the
opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are
pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is
not a cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O
Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some things
around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion
of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and reconciled?" From
these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind
of alterations: and therefore movement seems to cause pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the
one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a
third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these
three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14 and
Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change
is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: for which reason that
which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at another; thus to
warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer.
Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is united to us, change is
pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect:
thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and
dried. Now the natural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and
therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the
measure of one's natural mode of being, the removal of that object
becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes
pleasant), because man desires to know something whole and perfect: when
therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change in
such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and another succeed,
and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11):
"Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may
come, and thou hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up
of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please
collectively more than they do severally, if all could be perceived
collectively."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the
natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of any
pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its delight at
once---to such a one change will afford no delight. And the more any
pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being continual.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly that
to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have something
thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure.
But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; because the more
perfect pleasures regard things that are unchangeable. Moreover movement
becomes the cause of pleasure, in so far as thereby something which
previously was unsuitable, becomes suitable or ceases to be, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our
natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by removing
the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes
natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the movement which
gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather that
which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of being, that might
result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of
connaturalness, both custom and movement become pleasant.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure. Because
pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of the
past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory and hope do not cause
pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But hope
causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is deferred
afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good, so
also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned as a cause
of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope"; and
(Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in
so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present to
us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i.e. according as the thing known
is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality---i.e. according
as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either
actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is greater than
conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of knowledge; and
again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the
greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation which requires the
presence of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the pleasure
of hope, wherein there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of
apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining
the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of
memory, which has only the conjunction of apprehension.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely
speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion, present, i.e.
either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and
possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being
the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a present
appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch as it
implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For everything
that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind of
union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object
of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since desire is chiefly a
craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a certainty of the real
presence of the pleasing good, that is not implied either by love or by
concupiscence, is reckoned in preference to them as causing pleasure; and
also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed
away.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sadness causes pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For nothing
causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore
it does not cause it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures, when
called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when remembered,
cause sorrow and not pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But
hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as stated
above (Q[29], A[2]). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my bread
day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure.
Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing
actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can
cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure,
inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence of which
causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The
recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on account of the
deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as
something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been
delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason has
he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31 [*Gregory,
Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad things . . . and
in the season of health we recall past pains without feeling pain . . .
and in proportion are the more filled with joy and gladness": and again
(Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril there was in the battle,
so much the more joy will there be in the triumph."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its
contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as stated in
Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of
pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of something
pleasant.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so far
as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far as man is
delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of pleasant things,
by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e. so
far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one and
the same thing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause of
pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when
conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us.
Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If, therefore, the
actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the same reason all
goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which is evidently
untrue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate
habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon the
pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit
existing in us." But the actions of others do not proceed from habits
existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents.
Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the agents
themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written in the second canonical epistle of John
(verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking in
truth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]; Q[31], A[1]), two things are
requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper good, and
the knowledge of having obtained it. Wherefore the action of another may
cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain
some good through the action of another. And in this way, the actions of
those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us: since it is pleasant to
be benefited by another. Secondly, from the fact that another's action
makes us to know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men take
pleasure in being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they
thus become aware of some good existing in themselves. And since this
appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise
men, hence men take greater pleasure in being praised and honored by
them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is
pleasing to some. And as love is for something good, while admiration is
for something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others,
inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness,
through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the fact that
another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by
reason of the power of love, which makes a man to regard his friend as
one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon
another's good as being in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an
enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is written (1 Cor. 13:6)
that charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its
effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way; or by
affection, as in the third way.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not for the
first two.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the actions of another do not proceed from habits
that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that gives
pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they
proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of
pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's proper
good, as stated above (AA[1],5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good pertains not
to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good. Therefore it
seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "illiberality
is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is a mark of
prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of illiberality to
desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone takes pleasure in a
connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x, 4, it seems that
doing good to others is not a cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But man
takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such as
overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in
punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore doing
good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most
pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways.
First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred on
another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by
love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take pleasure in the
good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good.
Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when a man, from doing good to
another, hopes to get some good for himself, either from God or from man:
for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the
principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure in respect
of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and in this
regard, doing good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses
in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is
able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their
children, and in their own works, as being things on which they bestow a
share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual inclination
to do good, by reason of which doing good becomes connatural to him: for
which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to others. The
third principle is the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one
whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for a
friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good. But in
so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of sadness; for
instance when it is excessive.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is unnatural:
wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give pleasure,
not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's own good,
which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is naturally
pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to appreciate his own
superiority. Wherefore all those games in which there is a striving for
the mastery, and a possibility of winning it, afford the greatest
pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, in so far as they admit
hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two
ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be wise and excellent;
since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove and to scold.
Secondly, in so far as by scolding and reproving, one does good to
another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It is pleasant to
an angry man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself to be removing an
apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous hurt: for when a man
is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he
wishes to be quit of this slight by paying back the hurt. And thus it is
clear that doing good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing
evil to another is not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect
one's own good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure. Because
ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. But "it is
natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in Rhetor.
i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But those
who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather than
likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive not
pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated with food.
Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated (Q[27],
A[3]): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore likeness is a cause
of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like us,
as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love, as stated
above (Q[27], A[3]). And if that which is like us does not hurt our own
good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man in
respect of another, one youth in relation to another. But if it be
hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes disgust or sadness,
not as being like and one with us, but as hurtful to that which is yet
more one with us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own
good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, by a kind of
excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned
by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous good or any bodily pleasure,
causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's own good:
thus a potter dislikes other potters, not because they are potters, but
because they deprive him of his own excellence or profits, which he seeks
as his own good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since ruler and subject are in communion with one another,
there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is
conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding pertain
to the excellence of a man's own good: because they belong to men who are
wise and better than others; the result being that they give man an idea
of his own excellence. Another reason is that by ruling and presiding, a
man does good to others, which is pleasant.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man, though it
be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is sorrowful:
because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man
seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so far as it is a remedy
for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures, which are contrary to
certain sorrows, are more sought than intellectual pleasures, which have
no contrary sorrow, as we shall state later on (Q[35], A[5]). And this
explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever
work through sense and movement. For this reason also young people are
most inclined to seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which
they are subject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic
has a strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: because
his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure:
wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and
consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to
the proper good of man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure. Because
wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of something, as
Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of
pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were, the
road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaph. i, 2.
But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than to seek what we
know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7): since in the latter
case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the former not; while
pleasure arises from an operation which is unhindered, as stated in
Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to:
wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. But "we
wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.).
Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the
cause of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above
(Q[23], A[4]): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing loved,
the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very increase of
desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise
to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it was stated above
(A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now
wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man
when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or
surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder
is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it includes a hope of getting the
knowledge which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is
wonderful is pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also,
representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant in
themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one
thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the
proper and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet.
iv). This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered from great
danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies ignorance,
but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and in so
far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other
than he had thought it to be. [*According to another reading:---that he
is other than he thought himself to be.]
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and
perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more
perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, the
contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing than the
research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second, it
happens that research is sometimes more pleasing accidentally, in so far
as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater desire is awakened when
we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man takes the greatest
pleasure in finding or learning things for the first time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch as
this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of rare
occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from the fact
that we desire to know something about them, in so far as they are
wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind is more
inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are new," as stated in
Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation causes more perfect pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure. For
expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the Apostle (2 Cor.
6:11): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:96)
concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is exceeding broad."
But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore expansion is not
an effect of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more. But
receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet possessed.
Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But contraction
seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that which we wish to
grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that
which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain to pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written (Is. 60:5):
"Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged."
Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" as being derived
from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above (Q[31], A[3], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude:
hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically.
Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs
to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite for pleasure. One of
these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the
conjunction with some suitable good. As a result of this apprehension,
man perceives that he has attained a certain perfection, which is a
magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said
to be magnified or expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure
is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the
pleasurable object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it
within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as
though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its
pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the
same thing from being attributed to different things according to
different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by
reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the
lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own
interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand expansion
pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample in itself
so as to become more capacious.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the
imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the
presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders itself
more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it, than when
it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end of desire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by
clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that he
may enjoy it perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for itself.
Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But pleasure is, as
it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as stated above
(Q[23], A[4]; Q[25], A[2]). Therefore the movement of desire ceases when
pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure is,
in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since desire
regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the
good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire for
itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure often
causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this
water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in
Joan.), water denotes pleasures of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as
existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst,
or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a
craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding
distaste.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause
thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take
thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed:
because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something
actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is not
perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of the thing possessed,
or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing possessed, this
happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole;
wherefore one obtains possession of it successively, and while taking
pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess the remainder: thus if a
man is pleased with the first part of a verse, he desires to hear the
second part, as Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all
bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully
realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some movement: as is
evident in pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this
happens when a man possesses a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does
not possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little.
Thus in this life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us
delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; in
which sense we may understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that
drink me shall yet thirst."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere
intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all
others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because
bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing an excess
in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they
are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table. This
is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in bodily
pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another kind.
Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural mode of
being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is
reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except, perchance,
accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is accompanied by
some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from protracted activity.
And in this sense also we may understand those words of Ecclus. 24:29:
"They that drink me shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know
God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written (1 Pt. 1:12) that they
"desire to look at Him."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as
existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to cause
thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that
disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is
past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that
pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the
memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete rest;
and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed, ceases.
But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not
possessed, does not cease altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in one
respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it may be
the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and rest, the soul is
inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is written (Wis. 8:16): "When
I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her," i.e. wisdom. But
pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it helps rather than hinders the
use of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though they be
contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the appetitive
faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore
pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be moved, as
it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power moves pleasure
rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure.
Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure
destroys the estimate of prudence."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures
increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources are
impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is
taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in
contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act
of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in doing that
which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three
ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just
observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the attention
is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in respect of other
things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the bodily
pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by
concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else it hinders it
considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason. Because some
pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary to the order
of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that "bodily pleasures
destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the speculative estimate," to
which they are not opposed, "for instance that the three angles of a
triangle are together equal to two right angles." In the first sense,
however, they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in
so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the
body, greater even than in the other passions, in proportion as the
appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an
absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as
may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is
fettered or hindered.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in
the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to reason; but
on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of
both points, it hinders the use of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed
distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently when the soul
is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending
to a contrary act of the other part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination
and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through a bodily
organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason,
because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the other sensitive
powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pleasure perfects operation?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation. For every
human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure hinders the
use of reason, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore pleasure does not
perfect, but weakens human operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But pleasure is an
operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its essence or in its
cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either as
end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation is not
sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above
(Q[4], A[2]): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that
causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation, as a habit does."
Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure
perfects operation."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an
end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a thing
is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes
it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic.
x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it":
that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there is
added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the repose of the
appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed
directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects
operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does":
but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure
in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with
greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures
increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that are not
appropriate."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason,
but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of reason,
but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified
by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises from the act of
reason, strengthens the use of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes of one
another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And in this
way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure
perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[33] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every pleasure is evil?
(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?
(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral
good and evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every pleasure is evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which
destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil in
itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use
of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore
"in sexual pleasures," which are the greatest of all, "it is impossible
to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome
says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the
time of conjugal intercourse, the presence of the Holy Ghost is not
vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty."
Therefore pleasure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is
evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man lacking
in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be avoided;
because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind of measure
and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The
spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and dumb animals, in whom
there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the man who is master of
himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil in themselves and should
be avoided.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and
the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure. Therefore
pleasure is not something good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." Since,
therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every
pleasure is evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that
all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took
account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest;
since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did not
discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between
intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all bodily
pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone to
immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from
pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. Because, since
none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who
teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of taking
pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example
of their works instead of listening to the doctrine of their words:
since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of great
weight, example moves more than words.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are
evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved
good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold
reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in which a
man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on
agreement or disagreement with reason, as stated above (Q[18], A[5]):
just as in the order of nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it
agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as
in the natural order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing
rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance, when a heavy
body rests down below; and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing
rests in that which disagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body rests
up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the
higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason;
and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is
discordant from reason and the law of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which
are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to actions are
more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of
time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and of evil
actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and
those of evil actions evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the pleasures
which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy
prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body.
These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above (Q[33], A[3]),
either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant
to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or by fettering the
reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord
with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the
accompanying bodily change. But in this case the pleasure is not morally
evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil,
if it be taken according to reason: for reason itself demands that the
use of reason be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that
although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal
intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither a mortal nor a
venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the
sin of our first parent; because, as stated in the FP, Q[98], A[2] the
case was different in the state of innocence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those
that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that children and
dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil:
because they have from God their natural appetite, which is moved to
that which is naturally suitable to them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the
making of external things, as we shall state further on (Q[57], A[3]).
But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the concern of
prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there is an art of making
pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art of making arguments,"
as stated in Ethic. vii, 12.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every pleasure is good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in
the FP, Q[5], A[6] there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the
useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is good; and in like
manner everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else,
is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But pleasure is not sought
for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he
seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in itself. Now that which
is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof
universally. Therefore every pleasure is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of
itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic. i, 1.
But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals.
Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently all pleasure is
good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 2:14): "Who are glad when they
have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures
are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and that
consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred through
not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that which is
good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good simply, is
good in itself. Now that which is not good in itself, may be good in
respect of some individual in two ways. In one way, because it is
suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which
disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes good for a
leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to
the human temperament. In another way, through something unsuitable being
esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in
some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the
pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a man's
appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that
particular man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a
pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain
respect, or an apparent good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with
reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being
good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which
tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Consequently not
every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the
order of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of
something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be
either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far as
it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with regard to
pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good:
since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just as it
happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily
good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good. Because
nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot be the
last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that
a thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its own nature,
as stated above (Q[31], A[1]). Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by
addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since pleasure
together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore
pleasure is not the greatest good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as
being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is prior to and
greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not
universally good, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore pleasure is not the
greatest good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of
man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written (Ps.
15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right
hand are delights even to the end."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all
pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that all
pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet,
so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. But, judging from
his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from observing
that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in a certain movement and
"becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating and the like; he
concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and movement: and
from this, since "becoming" and movement are the acts of something
imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate
perfection. But this is seen to be evidently false as regards
intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in the
"becoming" of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as
stated above (Q[32], A[8], ad 2); but also in the act of contemplation,
by making use of knowledge already acquired.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the
supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, and
unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good;
whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the
greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above
(Q[1], A[8]; Q[2], A[7]) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the
use of that thing; thus the miser's end is either money or the possession
of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to be either God Who is
the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain
pleasure in the last end. And in this sense a certain pleasure of man may
be said to be the greatest among human goods.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for some
pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above. Accordingly
nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every
pleasure is not such.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by
participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can
make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true
that any good becomes better by the addition of another good. Moreover it
might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation
of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere
fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose in
the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is
supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science is supremely
good, but not every science is.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good
or evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral
good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is the measure of
all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the
moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire. Therefore it is not
the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that
movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all
movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since
some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not the
measure and rule of morals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain
than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of operation
is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures
are good which result from good operations, and those are evil which
arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore
pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of
hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the
pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal,
"end [*St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is the
genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political
philosopher), "is the architect of the end."], in regard to which, we say
absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as
stated above (Q[20], A[1]); and it is chiefly from the end that we
discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that
in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every
appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be
good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since
that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue;
and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule
of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to
the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the
good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which the
will of the evil man gives no heed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of
generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which
serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the
rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the
repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure
can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in
the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[34] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated
above (Q[33], A[4]); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there
be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on its
end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of
goodness in the operation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] Out. Para. 1/2
OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must
consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects;
(4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. Because no
passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the body, since
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a sudden
corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by making evil
use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain is not a passion
of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive
faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather to the
apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that "bodily pain
is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful body." Therefore pain is
not a passion of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal
appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather to
the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "Had
not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in being
punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion of the
soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the
passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild
desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears."
[Translation: Conington.]
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely,
conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two
things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which
is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and perception of
this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect
of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot
cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that something under the
aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good
and evil, as such, are objects of the appetite. Consequently it is clear
that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension,
belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since the inclination
of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the
subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension of another, as stated
in the FP, Q[103], AA[1],3. Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some
sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like
pleasure, is in the intellective or sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as
stated above (Q[22], AA[1],3): and especially those which tend to some
defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite,
is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments
are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of
ailment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the
body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the movement
of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless
the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an
act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required for
bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature,
not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because nature
desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there
results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering." But
sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not
pain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can
refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow for the
past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different
from pain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch.
But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is not pain,
and extends to more objects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 9:2): "I have great sorrow
[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart,"
thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension,
namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the interior
apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior
apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior apprehension:
because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under
the interior, but not conversely. Consequently that pleasure alone which
is caused by an interior apprehension is called joy, as stated above
(Q[31], A[3]): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an
interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure which
is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so
too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain
indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is
a species of pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because
"pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which are
better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: External sense perceives only what is present; but the
interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future.
Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily
pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can only regard
something present.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as
they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in so far
as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses
can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are
not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of
touch. Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes
pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas
other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles
of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the
objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is
contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to
joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is its more
usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the
distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although, on the part
of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if
pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For one of
two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow can be the cause
of pleasure; for it is written (Mt. 5:5): "Blessed are they that mourn,
for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are not contrary to one
another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some,
pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 2) that
in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that
"weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases us." Therefore
pain is not contrary to pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because
contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the matter of
pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent should ever
sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The Philosopher too says (Ethic. ix,
4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain at having been
pleased." Therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the
volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the
volition of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent and
dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to one
another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a
difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion or
movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the
objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good and present
evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are
contrary to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other
accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way,
in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence
of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something pleasant: thus
a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for
the pain he suffers. In another way, in so far as, from a strong desire
for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink from undergoing pain, so as
to obtain that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the
present life lead us to the comfort of the future life. Because by the
mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory, he
merits the consolation of eternity. In like manner a man merits it when
he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it
is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as it recalls a
beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the
thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since love is pleasant,
both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind
us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this reason, we derive pleasure
even from pains depicted on the stage: in so far as, in witnessing them,
we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there
represented.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch
as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered under the
aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure,
or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: that is, in so far as
either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure.
Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color,
so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But
whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another.
Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). But
every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every
sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every
sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. x, 5.
Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy
for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same
habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that
rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (Rm. 12:15). Therefore not every
sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in
respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently
things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and
vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms,
e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in
relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which
derive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those
things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species
contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their specific
nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or
fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in
the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another
in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or
fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those things that are
specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species
belonging to contrary genera, are not only not contrary to one another,
but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The
reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two
contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white thing, and
to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary relations
to contrary things, implies a certain likeness, e.g. to recede from
something white, and to approach to something black. This is most evident
in the case of contradiction, which is the principle of opposition:
because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g.
"white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness and likeness in the
affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the other, as, if I were to
say "black" and "not white."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects.
According to their respective genera, they are contrary to one another:
since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which
"are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial are to the intellect"
(Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same
object, are specifically contrary to one another: whereas sorrow and
pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary but disparate, are
not specifically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for
instance, sorrow at the death of a friend, and pleasure in contemplation.
If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then
pleasure and sorrow are not only specifically contrary, but they also
have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice
in good and to sorrow for evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from
their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow do:
wherefore the comparison does not hold.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii,
2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now it has
been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one
another. Consequently in every sorrow the subject has a disposition
contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every
pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in
every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore on the part of the subject
every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a
hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed
to sorrow specifically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say
that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every
pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their
effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature,
while the other results in a kind of discomfort.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10): "The
sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto
salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act is
to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii,
3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore the
contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other contrary will
give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of
sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the Philosopher
says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of certain things."
Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of
pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the work of
contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it
altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation there
can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, as it
is written (Eccles. 12:12) "much study is an affliction of the flesh."
Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's,
"conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy
and gladness." Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found in
contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two
ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the object
of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the
thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something harmful
and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and pleasant.
Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation be taken in this way,
nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that
contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in the
very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow is contrary to that pleasure
which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the same (Topic.
i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be understood as being the case
properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of itself contrary to
pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to
sorrow caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the object of
contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are not
contrary, but one is the means of knowing the other. Wherefore, properly
speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures
have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus a man
takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when
the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases also.
Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit
of an annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in
itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as
stated above (Q[31], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of
contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,
secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of an
organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as regards
the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a bodily organ;
either from the sensible object disagreeing with the normal condition of
the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and the smell of something
foul; or from the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continuous
in its action on the sense, that it exceeds the normal condition of the
organ, as stated above (Q[33], A[2]), the result being that an
apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two
things cannot occur directly in the contemplation of the mind; because
the mind has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority
quoted above that intellectual contemplation has neither "bitterness,"
nor "tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation,
makes use of the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts
weariness is incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly
mingled with contemplation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally
mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because
pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony with
it, as is evident from what has been said above (A[4]): while pain or
sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the same genus,
wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is evident that no
sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation;
nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused by
the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which the
mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary to
the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not
contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are
contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed
rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and
the same science considers contraries.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is
nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the
intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the
contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more
noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the
appetite is inordinately attached.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally
and indirectly, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is
to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There is nobody that
does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now that which all
agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is natural and right
for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and
intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as the
Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to
the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for pleasure
does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of
the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more eagerly than
pleasure is sought.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according
to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more virtuous: since
"virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But
the brave man who resists the movement of shunning sorrow, is more
virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for
pleasure: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and
the just are chiefly praised." Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow
is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div.
Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which is its
object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore
the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the
shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is a
suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil.
Now it happens that a certain good is suitable without any repugnance at
all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be
suitable in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect:
whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore desire for pleasure is
naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is because
the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought for its own sake:
whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned as
being a privation of good: and that which is by reason of itself is
stronger than that which is by reason of something else. Moreover we find
a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every natural movement
is more intense in the end, when a thing approaches the term that is
suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it leaves the term
that is unsuitable to its nature: as though nature were more eager in
tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable.
Therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more
eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he
seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of the
apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is felt
more keenly, when we lack that which we love." Now from the lack of what
we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of some loved
good, or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no
lack of the good loved, for it rests in possession of it. Since then love
is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the shunned,
according as love is the more keenly felt on account of that which is
contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain,
which cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in
which we take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being of the body
more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the
pleasure of eating and the like, from fear of the pain occasioned by
blows or other such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the
body. Thirdly, on the part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow
hinders not only one pleasure, but all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more than
pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And this is
clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most savage animals
are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain," which pain is
contrary to life which is loved above all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not the same with movement from within and movement
from without. For movement from within tends to what is suitable more
than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked above in
regard to natural movement. But movement from without is intensified by
the very opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to resist
anything contrary to it, as aiming at its own preservation. Hence
violent movement is intense at first, and slackens towards the end. Now
the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within: since it tends
from the soul to the object. Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to
be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive
faculty is from without, as it were from the object of the soul.
Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And then
too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and
pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with
reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, but
because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of
death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than pleasures of the
table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which latter pleasures are the
object of temperance: thus life is loved more than food and sexual
pleasure. But the temperate man is praised for refraining from pleasures
of touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to
them, as is stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow
of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant to the
well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is
caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is loved
more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has been
said above (A[6]), outward pain is greater than interior sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But
outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary; whereas
inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary.
Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has
more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than of
interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more
than interior sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the
heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman is
all evil." Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all
other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses
every outward wound.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ
in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive
power, as stated above (A[1]). But they differ in respect of those two
things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of
the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the
apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil
repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil
repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an
apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an
interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward
pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both these
pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly. Because
inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite itself,
while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite,
through being repugnant to the body. Now, that which is of itself is
always prior to that which is by reason of another. Wherefore, from this
point of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on
the part of apprehension: because the apprehension of reason and
imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of
touch. Consequently inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than
outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward pain
in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not
repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in a manner pleasant and
agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is
accompanied by inward pain, and then the pain is increased. Because
inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more
universal: since whatever is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to
the interior appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be
apprehended by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the
passage quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the heart is
every wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in
the interior sorrows of the heart.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive
of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must not be
taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to
the various ways in which this cause of pain is compared to the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a
thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness
itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is
all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this
likeness is more immaterial and abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of
itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is
better known by an inward apprehension.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward
pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive
conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of
touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than the
inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the
intellective. For this reason, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]; Q[31], A[5]
), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the
sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than from inward
pain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are only four species of sorrow?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of
sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, distress,"
which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls
"anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But
there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to
assign different species of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are
"indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9,11).
But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division
is insufficient.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that are
opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one another.
For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] "torpor is sorrow
depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down; envy is
sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another's wrongs." But it
is possible for one to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for another's
good, and at the same time to be weighed down inwardly, and outwardly to
be speechless. Therefore this division is correct.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius] and of Damascene.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that it is
something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two
ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually
contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal." Such an addition
makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12;
viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a genus, that is, as
it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that genus: thus "white" or
something of the kind may be added to "animal." Such an addition does not
make true species of the genus, according to the usual sense in which we
speak of genera and species. But sometimes a thing is said to be a
species of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that
genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: thus a
live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of
them the nature of fire is applied to a foreign matter. In like manner we
speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics,
inasmuch as the principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are
reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign
to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the
object, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is "one's own
evil." Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either
through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we
have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, considered, however, as
one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is neither
evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as one's own
evil: and thus we have "envy." The proper effect of sorrow consists in a
certain "flight of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the
effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by
excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so
as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also called "perplexity."
If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become
motionless, which belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element
affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in the
appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of
speech is because of all the external movements the voice is the best
expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in
other animals, as is stated in Polit. i, 1.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and
so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; for the
latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper
object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species. Jealousy
and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later (SS,
Q[36], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[35] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This division is not according to opposite species; but
according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion of
sorrow is applied, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the
presence of an evil?
(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather
than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ. Dulcit.
qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in
like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it was said above (Q[35], A[4]) that the sorrow which
is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that pleasure. But the
object of pleasure is good, as stated above (Q[23], A[4]; Q[31], A[1];
Q[35], A[3]). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is
the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But the object
of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good
rather than for an evil that is present.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the dreaded
evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they
are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. For, as
stated in the FP, Q[14], A[10] and FP, Q[48], A[3], evil is the privation
of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the
contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for the loss of good,
would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil. But sorrow is a
movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a
privation, as apprehended, has the aspect of a being, wherefore it is
called "a being of reason." And in this way evil, being a privation, is
regarded as a "contrary." Accordingly, so far as the movement of the
appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards
chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in
the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things; the truth
of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements. For if, in
natural movements, we observe those of approach and withdrawal, approach
is of itself directed to something suitable to nature; while withdrawal
is of itself directed to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body,
of itself, withdraws from a higher place, and approaches naturally to a
lower place. But if we consider the cause of both these movements, viz.
gravity, then gravity itself inclines towards the lower place more than
it withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is
the reason for its downward tendency.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind
of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or approach;
just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper object,
so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the other hand love, which
is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and
therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present
evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or pain, than the good which is
lost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just as
the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine
says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, but
under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular thin be
the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is the object of
sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation of the other, as stated
in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is,
in a way, directed to the same thing under a contrary aspect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does not
follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly,
but only the first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that
which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.
Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above (A[1]): whereas
desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards
one contrary is not a cause of movement towards the other contrary.
Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is
caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is something
future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain.
But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11).
Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of
things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their
way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But ignorance
is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as
stated above (A[1]), the appetitive movement is likened to the natural
appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on
the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement.
Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's downward
movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a
natural inclination resulting from gravity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the
object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above (A[1]) that the
cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause,
by way or principle, of that movement, is the inward inclination of the
appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in
consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle
of this appetitive movement is love, which is the first inclination of
the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle
is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the
avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire is the first effect
of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above
(Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine often speaks of desire or
concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad
2): and in this sense he says that desire is the universal cause of
sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the
cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its
end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the
movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire
becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a
desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal
cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in
which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future
good which we desire to have.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession of good
causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as stated above.
And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good, are
reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that regard evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which is desired, though really future, is,
nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may
say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is
reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of
obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the
presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of
sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion," which
held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division [*Aristotle
wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin version, read
'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow,
"seems to have originated in pains and pleasures connected with food."
But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the craving
for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains
to unity, and division is the cause of multitude.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore
sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would be
pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of
whatever is superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good
and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since it is a
kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving
for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving for separation,
as causing sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the
pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire
unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a
feeling of impatience of division or corruption?"
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned
as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted
as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in a certain
unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements of
which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that "one"
is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything naturally desires
unity, just as it desires goodness: and therefore, just as love or desire
for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but only
that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither does
the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have
maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from the fact
that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man has eaten
to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating; because repletion
or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect
being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of
unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes
something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some union
connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired,
in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the desire
for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the
craving for unity is.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause
of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent is not present but
future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not
a cause of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can be
inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power should not be
reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of
the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something external.
Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul
is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the body
is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), a present evil, is cause of
sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause of
the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now
it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to
be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing's
inclination does not happen to it save by the action of something
stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater power as being the cause
of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to
transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will be
no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its action
on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, its consequent
upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from
the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain
or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the
contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says
(De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a stronger
power": for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result
would be not sorrow but pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially
but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from
being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to inflict some
harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore
it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[36] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements,
in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it is thus that a
greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other
passions of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power to
learn. For it is written (Is. 26:9): "When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on
the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice": and further
on (verse 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruction was with
them." But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow in men's
hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the
power of learning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Is. 28:9): "Whom shall He teach
knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that
are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts," i.e.
from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure;
since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and
(Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one
forget great delights." Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases
the faculty of learning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated above
(Q[35], A[7]). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore,
can he learn while in bodily pain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those
days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to turn
over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to
learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required
undivided attention."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one
essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the soul
is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn
from the action of another power: because the soul, being one, can only
have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the
entire intention of the soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else
requiring considerable attention is incompatible therewith.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's
attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing to tend wholly
to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in natural
things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn anything new, we
require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in
Prov. 2:4,5: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for her
as for a treasure, then shalt thou understand learning" [Vulg: 'the fear
of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the
time from learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as
it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that which he
knew already. However a difference is to be observed according to the
difference of love that a man has for learning or for considering:
because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of
his mind so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander,
can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard to those
things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, "in the
tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt to be taught by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon
themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of
consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the
moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything."
Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does:
thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural body is
more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot water is more
accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If
therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the
facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure.
But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it
altogether.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it
involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: and yet the
latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs
to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater hindrance to
contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward sorrow is.
Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts the intention,
so that man is unable to learn anything for the first time: wherefore on
account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom.
xxii in Ezechiel).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the
soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11): "Behold this self-same thing,
that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it
worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation," etc. Now carefulness and
indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to being
depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of
pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression but
contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of
sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, as
may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7): "Lest perhaps
such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." But that which is
depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by something heavy,
whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer. Therefore
depression should not be reckoned an effect of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named
metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason that
the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the
natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed to love, expansion
to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be depressed,
through being hindered in his own movement by some weight. Now it is
evident from what has been said above (Q[23], A[4]; Q[25], A[4]; Q[36],
A[1]) that sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the
very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, depresses the
soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to
enjoy. And if the evil which is the cause of sorrow be not so strong as
to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed
in so far as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves
for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the
other hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of
evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is
absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or
that. Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so
that a man becomes completely stupefied.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is
according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness
of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned,
contraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul, through
being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things,
withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the
afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus also
it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain things,
taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken literally, appear to
exclude one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity. Because
carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage of the
Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to good
work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to
present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed."
Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one to work well.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in Ethic.
vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore sorrow does too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are others
proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing is improved
by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not
hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure
perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it" (Ethic.
x, 5).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), sorrow at times does not depress
or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal or
external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself.
Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as
being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: for we
never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that which we do with
pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is that the will is the
cause of human actions: and consequently when we do something that gives
pain, the action must of necessity be weakened in consequence. Secondly,
action stands in relation to sorrow, as to its principle and cause: and
such action must needs be improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows
on account of a certain thing, the more one strives to shake off sorrow,
provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or
action would result from that sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the
soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For
sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things which have
only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as
is evident with regard to the images of colors, which images are in the
air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to
the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its
having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily
transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated
above (Q[22], AA[1],3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body
than the other passions of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and
desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm, since
reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be
more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow
is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age
flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Prov. 25:20):
"As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a
man consumeth the heart": and (Ecclus. 38:19): "Of sadness cometh death."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the
body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's life in
respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its
measure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul.
For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart
to the other parts of the body: and this movement is befitting to human
nature according to a certain fixed measure. Consequently if this
movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's
life in respect of the measure of quantity; but not in respect of its
specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress,
it will be repugnant to life in respect of its species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily
transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with and
in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element:
just as in everything matter is proportionate to form. Consequently those
passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something,
are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they
may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy,
desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being
of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On
the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of
flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as
regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are
simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which
depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger
impression than future evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual
movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. Nor
is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not
naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally moved
by the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is
specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow
implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[37] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than
to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one of the
use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger
cause very great harm to the body, by reason of the sorrow which they
imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover
sorrow too sometimes deprives man of the use of reason: as may be seen in
those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head
there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?
(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
(4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?
(5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain or
sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far as it is
contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3). But not
every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above (Q[35], A[4]
). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But some
pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, "the wicked man
feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every pleasure assuages
sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from his
country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, now dead:
"for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to
see him." Hence we may gather that those things which united us to our
dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their death
or absence. But nothing united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in
common. Therefore these very pleasures become burdensome to us when we
mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is
driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other,
provided it be intense."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above (Q[23], A[4]
), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable good; while
sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite. Consequently in
movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bodies, repose
is to weariness, which is due to a non-natural transmutation; for sorrow
itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty.
Therefore just as all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of
weariness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings
relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to
every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above (Q[35], A[4]). And
consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow
can be assuaged by any pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow while
they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as wicked men
repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is healed
by contrary pleasures.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary movements,
each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and more
persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by
those things in which he took pleasure in common with a deceased or
absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For the
thought of the friend's death or absence, inclines him to sorrow: whereas
the present good inclines him to pleasure. Consequently each is modified
by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present moves more
strongly than the memory of the past, and since love of self is more
persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end, the
pleasure drives out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on (Confess.
iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former pleasures."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no effect
diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect of sorrow.
Therefore they do not diminish sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so
laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy. Therefore
tears do not lessen sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to the
imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases sorrow,
just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems
that tears do not assuage sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned
the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some
little refreshment."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for
two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it
shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed
to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on outward
things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men, burdened
with sorrow, make outward show of their sorrow, by tears or groans or
even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, because an action,
that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant
to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow
or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as
stated above (A[1]), every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it
follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the
relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man. For
every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it;
but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that sorrows. Hence the
effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as
the cause of sorrow is. For this reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect,
on account of the aforesaid contrariety.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the
object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because in each case
the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing increases its like.
Therefore joy is increased by laughter and the other effects of joy:
except they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The image of that which saddens us, considered in itself,
has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very fact that a
man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his
actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure. For the same reason
if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought
to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done something unbecoming to him,
as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 27).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not
assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. Now as
Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each one
has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed one by the
other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that
their sorrow is greater.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine declares
(Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the sorrow of
his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a
sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause of
sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as
though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other self" (Ethic.
ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing
friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he sympathizes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are
in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a
friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates a
twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a
depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden
ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it
seems as though others were bearing the burden with him, striving, as it
were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter
for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens.
The second and better reason is because when a man's friends condole with
him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as
stated above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages
sorrow, as stated above (A[1]), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a
sympathizing friend.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz. when a
man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the sorrowful.
Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: but
consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not assuage
sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. 1:18): "He that addeth knowledge
addeth also sorrow" [Vulg.: 'labor']. But knowledge pertains to the
contemplation of truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth does not
assuage sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative
intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a principle of
movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow
are movements of the soul, it seems that the contemplation of truth does
not help to assuage sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part
which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect. Therefore it
does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that
if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should not
feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all
pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure
assuages pain as stated above (A[1]): hence the contemplation of truth
assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a
lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice
in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness, according
to James 1:2: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into
divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily
tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking
barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I walk on roses, in the
name of Jesus Christ." [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th,
commemoration of St. Tiburtius.]
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either on
account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth; or
because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary
to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known, knowledge
causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes
pleasure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the
part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation itself,
which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the
higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of
contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate
even that pain which is in the senses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow. For
sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body. Therefore
they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary
causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with the
contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as
stated above (A[4]). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body,
denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies as these
seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the
interior disposition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that the
bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from the
fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And further on, he says: "I
slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not a little assuaged": and
quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First
Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers], in
which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired limbs to labor, refreshes
the weary mind, and banishes sorrow."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[37], A[4]), sorrow, by reason of its
specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; and
consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state of
vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such
remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal
state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure
consists, as stated above (Q[31], A[1]). Therefore, since every pleasure
assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt,
is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[31], A[8]), one pleasure hinders
another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is not
unreasonable that sorrow should be assuaged by causes which hinder one
another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[38] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the
heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as stated in
De Causa Mot. Animal. xi.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under
which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sorrow is evil?
(2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
(3) Whether it can be a useful good?
(4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all sorrow is evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from its very
nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere.
Therefore, all sorrow is evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil. But
all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in Ethic. vii, 11,
"though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding
sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily
pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow in the soul.
But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow
is an evil of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. But
pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men, it is
written (Prov. 2:14), that "they were glad when they had done evil."
Therefore sorrow for evil is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered
simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the mere
fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an
evil, because it hinders the response of the appetite in good. Secondly,
a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else:
thus shame is said to be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed
done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Accordingly, supposing the presence of
something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in
sorrow or pain on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be
in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or
because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are
manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that,
supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he
sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his
nature, he could not be punished by the loss of good." Because, however,
in the science of Morals, we consider things individually---for actions
are concerned about individuals---that which is good on some supposition,
should be considered as good: just as that which is voluntary on some
supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and
likewise above (Q[6], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on the
part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the subject that
feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, all shun sorrow,
inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not shun the perception and
rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because the
perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of the goodness of
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which
leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled
overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering into the rest of the
blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." Therefore sorrow is not a
virtuous good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. But
sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7):
"Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of
necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is
concerned about those things which happen against our will." But not to
will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will
opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is done is
subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a
condition of the rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[19], A[9]), it
seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that
consequently it is not virtuous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous.
But such is sorrow; as is evident from Mt. 5:5: "Blessed are they that
mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good.
For it has been said above (A[1]) that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it
denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards
bodily pain, are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due
that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing that
causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the evil is
sometimes due to a right judgment of reason; while the rejection of the
evil is the act of the will, well disposed and detesting that evil. Now
every virtuous good results from these two things, the rectitude of the
reason and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a
virtuous good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All the passions of the soul should be regulated according
to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good; but
excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule,
and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and
reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse
reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an
obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; for instance, when
a man gives an alms sorrowfully.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but
because He permits them to happen---such as sins. Consequently a will
that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not
discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen actually, even by
God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that
man should will them in themselves: but only that he should not revolt
against the order of Divine justice, as stated above (Q[19], A[10]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sorrow can be a useful good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is
written (Ecclus. 30:25): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no
profit in it."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow
is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow is to be
chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore
sorrow is not a useful good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," as
stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," as stated in
Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But
according to Eccles. 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is
mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore sorrow
is useful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present
evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present evil;
and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present,
cannot be not present. The other movement arises in the appetite to the
effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect,
sorrow is of use, if it be for something which ought to be avoided.
Because there are two reasons for which it may be right to avoid a thing.
First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being
contrary to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful
as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9): "I
am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made
sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as
though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil;
either through one's being attached to it, and loving it too much, or
through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident
in the case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal
goods may be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: "It is better to go to the
house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put
in mind of the end of all."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful,
since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil is in
itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own
sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good.
Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more
earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive
sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, and
hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (Q[37], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by
reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to be
shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow
for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst
is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain pleasure is the
greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is
the greatest evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last
end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever he will, and in
willing naught amiss," as stated above (Q[3], A[4], OBJ[5]; Q[5], A[8],
OBJ[3]). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his
will. Now pain consists in something happening contrary to the will, as
Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain is man's
greatest evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are composed
of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body is the
inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part:
while the supreme evil is the greatest evil of the inferior part. But
wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in the
body is pain. Therefore man's greatest good is to be wise: while his
greatest evil is to suffer pain."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated
in the FP, Q[48], A[6]. But sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of
sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain of the soul, except
for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont to enjoy, or had
hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the
punishment of sin." Therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's
greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is
truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in
reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be the
greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon
as evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or
pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really good, cannot be the
greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that
which is truly good. Hence it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be
man's greatest evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely,
a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order of the will
in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or
sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which they become worse: and
yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the
pleasure is better. Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good,
in the way above stated (Q[34], A[3]): whereas sorrow cannot be man's
greatest evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good.
And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; because
it has an admixture of good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[39] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That which harms the better thing is worse than that which
harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," as
Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the
soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body. Therefore
this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but
as taken from another [*Cornelius Celsus].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2)
Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?
(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?
(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?
(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?
(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?
(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
(7) Concerning the order of hope to love;
(8) Whether love conduces to action?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity.
Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions. But
Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in
the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore hope is the same as
cupidity or desire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the
object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz. the
future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the
possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever is
accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion.
But possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future good, which is
the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not
differ specifically from desire or cupidity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, To different powers belong different species of
passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity
is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire
or cupidity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now,
in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it is
something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in
this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil. Secondly, that
it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already
possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy which regards a present
good. Thirdly, that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain,
for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's
power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or
cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs
to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty.
Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for
one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this
respect, hope differs from despair. It is therefore evident that hope
differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the
concupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just
as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible
faculty, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each
regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is
reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to
the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The object of hope is the future good considered, not
absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object
of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to another
power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated
in the FP, Q[81], A[2]. Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not
altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power: because the
appetite is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything
except under the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that
which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from
despair according to the difference of possible and impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because
hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says (Rm. 8:25):
"If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience." But
awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, which we exercise by
"looking out." Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a
man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope and to be
confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to
belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But
certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive
power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above (A[1]). Now good, as
such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appetitive power.
Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the
appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power;
since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas
the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement of
the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are
in the knower. But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by
presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite various
movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the
apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appetite,
while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner
various movements arise from the apprehension of something present and of
something future; of something considered absolutely, and of something
considered as arduous; of something possible, and of something
impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive power
ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to
obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a
twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in two ways,
viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man hopes to
obtain something by his own power, he is not said to wait for it, but
simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that
which he hopes to get by another's help as though to await [exspectare]
implied keeping one's eyes on another [ex alio spectare], in so far as
the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the
good which man intends to get, but also on the thing by whose power he
hopes to get it; according to Ecclus. 51:10, "I looked for the succor of
men." Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on
account of the preceding inspection of the cognitive power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it,
he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from
this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement
in the appetite is called confidence. Because the movement of the
appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect
from a cause which is better known; for the apprehensive power knows its
own act better than that of the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the
sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone is
certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the
movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from the
certainty of the knowledge that precedes it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is in dumb animals?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. Because hope
is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But
knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose
knowledge is confined to the senses and does not extend to the future.
Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of
attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the true and
the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph.
vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals, since they have no
mind.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are
moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things unseen: "for
what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" (Rm. 8:24). Therefore there is
no hope in dumb animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty
is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The internal passions of animals can be gathered from
their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb
animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it
makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it: whereas, if
it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching
it. Because as stated above (Q[1], A[2]; Q[26], A[1]; Q[35], A[1]), the
sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of
insensible things, result from the apprehension of an intellect, just as
the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will. But
there is a difference, in that the will is moved by an apprehension of
the intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural
appetite results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is
the Author of nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb
animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in the
actions of irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a
procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions of
art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an animal
is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as though it
foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in them by the
Divine Intellect that foresees the future.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The object of hope is not the possible as differentiating
the true, for thus the possible ensues from the relation of a predicate
to a subject. The object of hope is the possible as compared to a power.
For such is the division of the possible given in Metaph. v, 12, i.e.
into the two kinds we have just mentioned.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the thing which is future does not come under the
object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present, an
animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether despair is contrary to hope?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope. Because "to
one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear is contrary to
hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope and
despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards the good,
whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining
good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in
opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair seems to
imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to
hope, which implies movement of stretching out towards the hoped-for good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it
is contrary to hope [spes].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[2]), there is a twofold
contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary
terms: and this contrariety alone is to be found in the concupiscible
passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is according to
approach and withdrawal with regard to the same term; and is to be found
in the irascible passions, as stated above (Q[23], A[2]). Now the object
of hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of a principle of
attraction, if it be considered in the light of something attainable; and
thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. But in so far
as it is considered as unobtainable, it has the character of a principle
of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an
impossibility they disperse." And this is how despair stands in regard to
this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: and
consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e. good
and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the irascible
passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible.
But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety of approach and
withdrawal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however it
regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible to
obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a
recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed impossible
to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we neither
hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire to have. For this
reason, too, each of them regards the good, which is the object of desire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether experience is a cause of hope?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope. Because
experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs experience and time." But
hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the appetite, as stated above
(A[2]). Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old are
slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems to follow
that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive
of opposites. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that "to have
something to say about everything, without leaving anything out, is
sometimes a proof of folly." But to attempt everything seems to point to
great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. Therefore
inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful,
through having been victorious often and over many opponents": which
seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the object of hope is a future
good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a
cause of hope, either because it makes something possible to a man: or
because it makes him think something possible. In the first way hope is
caused by everything that increases a man's power; e.g. riches, strength,
and, among others, experience: since by experience man acquires the
faculty of doing something easily, and the result of this is hope.
Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do that which
he is sure of having learned well."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think
that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching and persuasion may
be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so
far as it makes him reckon something possible, which before his
experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, experience
can cause a lack of hope: because just as it makes a man think possible
what he had previously thought impossible; so, conversely, experience
makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought
possible. Accordingly experience causes hope in two ways, despair in one
way: and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not only
produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom,
which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself
adds to the power of acting with ease: because it shows something to be
possible; and thus is a cause of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in
so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence he adds
(Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen them."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally
as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to judge truly
a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for
the same reason as experience causes lack of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.
Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so that it is
compared to an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards are
wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore
youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (A[5]), the cause of hope is chiefly
whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness are united to
weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above (A[5]).
But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men
are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the
Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be
gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of
hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated above
(A[1]). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the
past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future,
it has little to remember and lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on
account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their
heart expands: and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends
to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful.
Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of
obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible to them.
Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own
shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and consequently are of good
hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink---viz. heat
and high spirits, on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and
shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons
attempt everything and are full of hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in
reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think that
they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that
young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in
their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their
shortcomings.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in
some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is a cause of love?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because,
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the
soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love
precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as
stated above (Q[25], A[2]). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and
consequently is not its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[3]). But
pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mt. 1:2, "Abraham begot Isaac,
and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets
charity." But charity is love. Therefore love is caused by hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object,
the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is something
difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that
what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through ourselves but
through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which
something becomes possible to us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused
by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love. But
in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to
us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because by the very fact
that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved
towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas
from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, except
accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love.
Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in him; but
our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action.
Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence which
hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above (Q[37], A[3]).
But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written (Prov. 13:12): "Hope
that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope hinders action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above (A[4]). But
despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is
written (2 Kgs. 2:26), that "it is dangerous to drive people to despair."
Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that "he that plougheth
should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to
all other actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it
more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object,
which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being
difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible is
no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is
intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. Because hope,
as stated above (Q[32], A[3]), causes pleasure; which is a help to
action, as stated above (Q[33], A[4]). Therefore hope is conducive to
action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an
evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear
rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence,
save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: whereby it also
lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no
hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it
causes sorrow, as stated above (Q[32], A[3], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[40] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain
hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive less to
fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they
fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous to the foe.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] Out. Para. 1/1
OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring.
With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in itself;
(2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether fear is a special passion?
(3) Whether there is a natural fear?
(4) Of the species of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by way of
{systole}"---i.e. of contraction---"desirous of vindicating nature." But
no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 5. Therefore fear is
not a passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an
agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something future, as
Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive
appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses. But sense
apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of
future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear
among the other passions of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear
chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above (Q[22]
), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive
power---i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its active
principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both "to
feel" and "to understand" are passions. Secondly, more properly speaking,
passion is a movement of the appetitive power; and more properly still,
it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such
movement being accompanied by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most
properly those movements are called passions, which imply some
deterioration. Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil,
belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil.
Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by
a certain transmutation---i.e. contraction---as Damascene says (Cf. OBJ
1). Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some
particular good. Wherefore it has most properly the character of passion;
less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear
regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far
as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles of
external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that
passion is a virtue by way of habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the bodily
presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the agent
being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really
present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really future, is
present in the apprehension of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from
apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope
for a future good, or to fear a future evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear is a special passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For Augustine
says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught by fear, is
neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"---i.e. sorrow---"nor
tossed about in transports of empty joys." Wherefore it seems that, if
fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed. Therefore fear is
not a special but a general passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit and
avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in the
intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is
affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore neither is avoidance
anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but a kind of
avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in
the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: since the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; and
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is "a power of desire":
and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated
above (Q[23], A[4]). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it
belongs to different powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Fear is condivided with the other passions of the soul,
as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their species from their
objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object. Now
fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is
a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so the object of fear is
a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a special
passion of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz.
love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of this
connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are
dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but avoidance
of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be something
common, yet fear is a special passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil,
not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost
unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of
the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (Q[25],
A[1]); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to
fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object of fear causes
sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is either
corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to
fear, because just as hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises
from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of
good, as is evident from what has been said above (Q[25], A[2]; Q[29],
A[2]; Q[36], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is a natural fear?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through the soul
refusing to be severed from the body."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). But
there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore
there is also a natural fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above (Q[40], A[4],
ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from Rm. 4:18, where
it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he believed in
hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, That which is natural is common to things animate and
inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is no
natural fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines
thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely
accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive
faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, and to grow
is the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a movement is
said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto, though it be accomplished
by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated above (Q[10], A[1]),
the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to
nature as to their first principle. In this way, even the acts of the
apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as
well as the movements of the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be
natural.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is
distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its
object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of
"corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from on account of its natural
desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a
fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not to nature, but to the
desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we
have stated above (Q[26], A[1]; Q[30], A[3]; Q[31], A[7]) that love,
desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that
certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as love,
desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The reason
of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply a certain
inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which
inclination is to be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently
there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire and hope as
being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the
other passions of the soul denote certain movements, whereto the natural
inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that
perception or knowledge is essential to these passions (thus we have
said, Q[31], AA[1],3; Q[35], A[1], that apprehension is a necessary
condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge
cannot be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because
such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural
inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some
difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of
which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like
passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness,
shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil." Therefore the species of
fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four
species of sorrow, as stated above (Q[35], A[8]). Therefore there should
only be four species of fear corresponding to them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our
power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as stated above
(A[2]). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our
own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (AA[1], 2). But
"shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame is not a species of
fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard
great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and
stupor are not species of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the
truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads to
flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of
fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), fear regards a future evil which
surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now
man's evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in
external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First,
there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises "laziness,"
as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil. Secondly,
there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And
thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is
"shamefacedness"; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is
"shame."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass
man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of its
magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the
outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is "amazement."
Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted
evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation:
and then there is "stupor," which is caused by the representation of
something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus
future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called "anxiety."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from
the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and for
certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species
of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are derived
from the proper division of the object of fear itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power
of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something
connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for
which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense that laziness,
shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future
reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but
that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which
arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness
shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement and stupor shrink
from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether
good or evil: so that amazement and stupor stand in relation to the act
of the intellect, as laziness does to external work.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[41] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment
of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, but
inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to
judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore amazement is a
beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance
thereto.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?
(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?
(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
(4) Whether fear itself can be feared?
(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?
(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no
remedy?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the object of fear is good or evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says
(QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what we love and
possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." But that which we love
is good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to be
above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good thing.
Therefore good is the object of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to
fear God, according to Ps. 33:10: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints."
Therefore even the good is an object of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of
future evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it
belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in
Ethic. vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil.
Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit,
has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance,
has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies an avoidance,
in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper
object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This
can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of
good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of
some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it
follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one
pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there
is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as
some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so, just
as hope, as stated above (Q[40], A[7]), regards two things, namely, the
good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of
obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two things, namely,
the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can
inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can
inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the
power of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust,
because then it is more likely to do us a harm.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another,
so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears another, who
knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take counsel." But
we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not an object of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always
threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object of fear, man
would needs be always in fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature
is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such like evils
through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural
fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems that it should be.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most
terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by
the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful."
Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a
corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil
of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a
natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from
being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of
nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But sometimes evil
of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death
inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a
certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises "from
the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5),
whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also.
Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be.
First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance,
such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either
do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all
know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not."
Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on
account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already
present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are
already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the
very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a
man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as
future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as near
at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as
stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although it may
be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it.
And with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not
always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always
feared.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the
common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them as far
as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature
arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear when
threatening in the future.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For
Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix), that "by
chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs
us from God; according to Is. 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided
between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of
fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear when
they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they are
present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account
of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be
the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4): and the
Apostle says (Gal. 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you
will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q[41], A[4]).
But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore
fear does so likewise.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils
are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[40], A[1]; Q[41], A[2]), as the object
of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object
of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily avoided. From this
we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is
not an object of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is
due to an external cause. Now human will is the proper cause of the evil
of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object
of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause;
if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that respect a man
may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic
cause: as when he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he be
led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears
the being led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature,
i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this light it is not an object
of fear to him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: and
every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards
evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is about
present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow,
being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely; wherefore it
can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the
irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a certain arduousness
or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far as a thing is subject to
the will. Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are
present, make us fear when they are yet to come, but only some things,
namely, those that are difficult.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain a
good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be of an act
of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear is of
an evil that does not lie in our own power: and consequently the evil
which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is
hoped for may be both from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As stated above (Q[41], A[4], ad 2,3), shame is not fear of
the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises
therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear itself can be feared?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is feared,
is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a man who fears
to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a
man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by being afraid:
which seems absurd.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from itself.
Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him
that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own
sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), nothing can be an object of fear,
save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from
our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is
partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far as
it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In
this sense it is possible for fear to be the object of fear, i.e. a man
may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing,
through being assailed by some great evil. It is subject to the will, in
so far as the lower appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive
fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine
says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments,
in order to prove that fear cannot be at all be the object of fear, we
must add a solution to the same.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are various
fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then, prevents a
man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so
that the fear which he has preserves him from the fear which he has not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the
fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a thing flies
from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to
(ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sudden things are especially feared?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially
feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is about evil
things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things.
Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are
feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and cunning."
Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to
sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be feared.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the
more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous through
ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is different from
what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden things are feared
less.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at
things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes
forethought for their safety."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated about (A[3]; Q[41], A[2]), the object of fear
is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this
is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the
weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to
both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater.
Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider
them, the smaller they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present
evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc.
iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about
it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the
weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies
with which he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming
evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain.
Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to
increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is
about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, therefore,
experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it increases
hope, so does it diminish fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger;
wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be
foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their
anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be
foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says
that such men are feared more than others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at
first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when seen in
juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly
from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his wealth on account of his
previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly
becomes poor, finds poverty all the more disagreeable. For this reason
sudden evil is feared more, because it seems more to be evil. However, it
may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is
hidden; for instance if the foe hides himself in ambush: and then it is
true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that those things are not more to be feared, for
which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of fear, that there
be some hope of safety, as stated above (A[2]). But an evil that cannot
be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not
feared at all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the
natural course of things, there is no return from death to life. And yet
death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things are not feared most, for which
there is no remedy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing which
lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: nor is that
which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting": and
the same applies to evil. But things that cannot be remedied seem to
differ from other things, merely in the point of their lasting long or
for ever. Consequently they are not therefore any worse or more to be
feared.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things
are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . . or
for which there is no help, or which are not easy."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends
to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased
not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as
stated above (Q[18], A[3]). And of all the circumstances,
longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest
bearing on the increase of evil. Because things that exist in time are
measured, in a way, according to the duration of time: wherefore if it be
an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should
reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time.
And accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length of time,
i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase. Now those
evils which, after they have come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least
not easily, are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for
which reason they inspire the greatest fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future evil
is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there is an end
to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of
remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one by which an already
present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it
threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above (A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[42] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are good
in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like good is no better
for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love is the cause of fear?
(2) Whether defect is the cause of fear?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether love is the cause of fear?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For that which
leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear leads to the love of charity" as
Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore
fear is the cause of love, and not conversely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are
feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But the dread of
evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love him.
Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than by love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it has been stated above (Q[42], A[3]) that those
things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do
from love, is done from our inmost heart. Therefore fear is not caused by
love.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt
that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when we
possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for." Therefore all
fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently love is the
cause of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation
thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the
passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the
aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a
cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so
whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of
the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way of
efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of
pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient
cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or
goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by way of
material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of
which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is
something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to
avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient
cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While
that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him,
is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition. And
thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his loving a
certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to
him, and that consequently he fears it as an evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (Q[42], A[1]), fear, of itself and in the
first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to
some loved good: and thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the
second place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so that
sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for
instance, through fear of God's punishments, man keeps His commandments,
and thus begins to hope, while hope leads to love, as stated above (Q[40]
, A[7]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at first;
but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, we begin to
love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved
from the beginning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument is true of that which is the efficient cause
of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of material
disposition, as stated above.
�Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether defect is the cause of fear?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. Because those
who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary to power.
Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is
extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in Rhet. ii, 5. Therefore
defect is not a cause of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But "those
who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore
defect is not a cause of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth,
strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (Rhet. ii,
5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), fear may be set down to a twofold
cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of him that
fears; the other is by way of efficient cause, on the part of the person
feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause of
fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to
repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order to cause fear, this defect
must be according to a measure. For the defect which causes fear of a
future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present, which is the
object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if perception of
the evil, or love of the good whose contrary is feared, were entirely
absent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause
of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the cause apprehended as
harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen,
however, in this respect, that some defect causes fear accidentally, in
so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for
instance, by reason of injustice, either because that other has already
done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of
the efficient cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who are already being executed, are actually
suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the measure
of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[43] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on
account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account of the
lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory.
